Abuse of Monopoly Power
(or Dominant Position)
Douglas H. Ginsburg
Moscow, July 9, 2010
1
Abuse of Market Dominant Position:
Common Types of Conduct
• Monopolization
• Attempted monopolization
• Exclusionary practices
2
The Rule of Reason
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
•
Operator of primary grain market instituted rule
prohibiting members of the market from buying and
selling grain after market hours.
•
United States sued, alleging antitrust violation.
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The Rule of Reason
Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918)
•
The true test of legality is whether the restraint
imposed [by the биржа] is such as merely regulates
and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history
of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
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Applying the Rule of Reason
•
Is the economic effect of the practice pro- or
anti-competitive?
–
The competitive effect of a business practice may
be ambiguous.
–
Under the rule of reason, relevant facts are any
facts that tend to establish whether a restraint
•
increases or decreases output or
•
increases or decreases prices.
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Applying the Rule of Reason
•
Economic analysis guides the inquiry into the likely
effect of a challenged practice. Example: Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877 (2007) on Resale Price Maintenance:
•
“The overall balance between benefits and costs ... is
probably close. ... Minimum resale price maintenance
can stimulate interbrand competition -- the competition
among manufacturers selling different brands of the
same type of product-by reducing intrabrand
competition-the competition among retailers selling the
same brand.”
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Predatory Pricing
U.S. v. AMR Corp. (American Airlines), 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001)
•
Claim: American Airlines reallocated planes
from more-profitable routes to less-profitable
routes and lowered prices on the less
profitable routes in order to drive out smaller,
lower-cost carriers.
•
Claim: After driving out competitors American
reduced the number of flights on these routes
and raised prices.
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Predatory Pricing
U.S. v. AMR Corp. (American Airlines), 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001)
•
Unlawful if
– Prices were below cost and
– American likely could recoup its losses from
below-cost pricing after driving out its competitors
•
Central economic issues:
– What is the appropriate measure of “cost”?
– What is the probability of American Airlines
recovering its costs, considering the potential for
new entry or reentry of competitors?
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Predatory Pricing
U.S. v. AMR Corp. (American Airlines), 140 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Kan. 2001)
•
Result: American wins on summary judgment.
“The government’s claims in the present case
fail because
1.
American did not price below an appropriate measure of cost
2.
At most American matched the prices of its competitors, and
3.
Even if American did price below cost, there is no dangerous
probability of American recovering its losses and then earning
profits by raising prices above the competitive level.
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Tying
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
•
Facts: Trident had market power in patented device to
print on cardboard. It licensed patent to
manufacturers that agreed to use only Trident’s ink.
•
Claim: An independent seller of ink sued, claiming
Trident was extending its power in the market for
printers into the market for inks.
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Tying
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
•
Court: Plaintiff must show that defendant actually has
market power. Patent alone does not necessarily
justify a finding of market power
•
Economic issues
–
Definition of product: car + radio? Computer operating system
+ internet browser?
–
Fixed proportions: left shoe + right shoe: consumer values
total bundle, not separate parts
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Tying
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006)
•
Some firms tie two products in order to discriminate in price by
“metering.” For example, a seller of equipment may require the
purchaser to use the seller’s maintenance services (Kodak) or
buy supplies from the seller (in this case, ink) rather than allowing
the purchaser to use the services and supplies sold by
independent firms. These practices alone do not create antitrust
liability but the practices may give rise to liability if the
requirements are also deemed an anticompetitive tying of one
product to another.
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Refusals to Deal
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
•
Ski Co. owned three ski mountains in Aspen, Colorado;
Highlands owned one ski mountain. Both companies had sold
“All Aspen” tickets giving skiers access to all four mountains and
divided the revenue from these tickets.
•
Ski Co. then refused to continue the All Aspen ticket and instead
sold a pass that gave access to only its own three mountains.
Ski Co. refused to let Highlands sell tickets to Ski Co.’s
mountains even at the full retail price.
•
Highlands claimed Ski Co. unlawfully refused to deal with it.
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Refusals to Deal
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
•
General rule: “In the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly,” a private
businessman may freely “exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will
deal.” U.S. v. Colgate & Co (1919).
•
Court: Aspen is liable in damages. “The high value
that we have placed on the right to refuse to deal with
other firms does not mean that the right is
unqualified.”
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Refusals to Deal
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)
•
Requirements for unlawful refusal to deal
under Aspen
–
A prior course of dealing.
–
Evidence that the refusal to continue dealing harms
not just the plaintiff, but also consumers.
Defendant failed to show a legitimate business
justification for refusing to deal
–
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Exclusive Dealing
Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC (7th Cir. 2000)
•
Claim: Toy store with dominant position in
marketplace persuaded toy manufacturers not
to sell the same toys to discount stores.
•
Court: “Exclusive dealing is an unreasonable
restraint on trade only when a significant
fraction of buyers or sellers are frozen out of a
market by the exclusive deal.”
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Exclusive Dealing
Menasha Corp. v. News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc., (7th Cir. 2004).
•
•
Facts: Menasha signed contracts with supermarkets
to be the exclusive supplier of in-store promotional
coupons; the exclusive contract was held not
anticompetitive and was therefore lawful.
Court: Competition for exclusive contracts is “a vital
form of rivalry . . . which the antitrust laws encourage
rather than suppress.”
Supermarket 2
Supermarket 1
Promo Co. 1
Promo Co. 2
Promo Co. 3
Promo Co. 1
Promo Co. 2
Promo Co. 3
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Other Types of Violations
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
•
Unique practices may also be anticompetitive.
•
The case against Microsoft involved several
technology-specific claims of anticompetitive
conduct, such as:
–
Restricting ability of computer manufacturers to
install competing web browsers
–
Designing software (Microsoft’s Java) to be
incompatible with other similar software (Java)
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