RELIGIOUS CONFLICT AND REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM
FRENCH LAICITE
• 2004 – All visible signs of religion barred from schools.
• 2007 – No-one making a delivery to a public service
may wear a visible sign of religion.
• 2012 – Schools encouraged to ‘uphold the neutrality of
public service’ and ban any parent wearing a visible
sign of their religion from chaperoning a field trip.
FRENCH LAICITE
• 1958 – ‘France shall be an indivisible, secular,
democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the
equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction
of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It
shall be organised on a decentralised basis’ (article 1 of
the French constitution).
• Since that time, gov’t employees – civil servants, mail
carriers, etc. – have been prohibited from wearing
visible symbols of their religion.
FRENCH LAICITE
• Justification
• Religion is a private matter.
• It is fair to treat all religious positions equally.
• Objection: The law is not really fair.
• 2011 – The niqab is banned from all public places
• 2015 – Nicholas Sarkozy calls for a ban of the hijab
at university.
FRENCH LAICITE
• Justification
• Religion is a private matter.
• It is fair to treat all religious positions equally.
• Objection: The law is not really fair.
• The law is not treating people equally.
• Religion is not really private.
• It is failing to ‘respect all beliefs’ (Article 1).
RAWLS’S POLITICAL LIBERALISM
A political conception of justice is broadly liberal in
character:
1. ‘It specifies certain basic rights, liberties, and
opportunities.’
2. ‘It assigns a special priority to these rights, liberties,
and opportunities, especially with respect to claims of
the general good and of perfectionist values.’
3. ‘It affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate allpurpose means to make effective use of their basic
liberties and opportunities’ (1996, 223).
RAWLS ON PUBLIC REASONS
‘Public reason … is public in three ways’:
1. ‘As the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of
the public’
2. ‘Its subject is the good of the public and matters of
fundamental justice’
3. ‘Its nature and content is public, being given by the
ideals and principles expressed by society’s
conception of political justice, and conducted open to
view on that basis’ (1996, 213).
RAWLS ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC DEBATE
The exclusive view
• ‘Reasons given explicitly in terms of comprehensive
doctrines are never to be introduced into public reason’
(1996, 247).
The inclusive view
• Citizens may, in certain situations, ‘present what they
regard as the basis of political values rooted in their
comprehensive doctrine’ provided doing so ‘best
encourages citizens to honor the ideal of public reason
and secures its social conditions in the longer run in a
well-ordered society’ (1996, 247-8).
RAWLS ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC DEBATE
A. Religious reasons may only be introduced if there are
not public reasons that will do as effective a job.
B. The proviso: comprehensive doctrines ‘may be
introduced in public reason … provided that in due
course public reasons, given by a reasonable political
conception, are presented sufficient to support
whatever the comprehensive doctrines are introduced
to support’ (1999, li-lii).
RAWLS ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC DEBATE
Objections
1. The ideal of public reason presupposes pluralism
about value.
2. Even on the inclusive view, religious reasons are
subordinate to public reasons.
3. This view demeans the religious adherent, failing to
respect her in her particularity and in her difference.
RAWLS ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC DEBATE
Objections
1. The ideal of public reason presupposes pluralism
about what people believe about value.
2. The ideal of public reason presupposes that
reasonable people desire for its own sake a social
world in which they, as free and equal, can cooperate
with others on terms all can accept’ (1996, 50).
THE NATURE OF PUBLIC REASONS
• A necessary condition for success in giving a reason:
The recipient must see it as a reason.
IPHIGENIA AT AULIS
1. It will be for the
greater good.
2. The gods have
commanded it.
3. She has been created
for this moment.
a. It is her purpose in
life.
THE NATURE OF PUBLIC REASONS
• The birds’ flight pattern is a sign that we must Y.
• Artemis commands Y.
• ‘Do Y’ is a divine command.
• We were created to Y (it is our purpose).
• Our tradition (or sacred text) requires us to Y when we
see the birds behaving like that.
• Because I am an X and Y is central to the identity of
Xs.
THE NATURE OF PUBLIC REASONS
• A necessary condition for success in giving a reason:
The recipient must see it as a reason.
• This will only screen out reasons that conflict with
liberal commitments.
• The more diverse the range of comprehensive
doctrines affirmed within a polity, the more secular will
be the public reasons.
NARROW REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
A. Considered moral judgments (of competent
judges)
1. These are intuitive – as opposed to being
‘determined by a conscious application of
principles’ (Rawls 1999, 6).
2. ‘A considered judgment does not provide any
reasons for the decision. It simply states the felt
preference in view of the facts of the case and
the interests competing therein’ (Rawls 1999, 9).
NARROW REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
B. Moral principles
1. These are an explication of the considered
moral judgments.
2. Any competent person who applied these
principles would arrive at the same judgments
as those made by the group of competent
judges (Rawls 1999, 7).
NARROW REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
1. One establishes coherence between A and B.
2. Sometimes this involves modifying our moral
principles in order to better reflect our considered
moral judgments.
3. Sometimes it involves modifying a judgment, in
order to bring it in line with a principle in which we
have more confidence than we do in the particular
judgment (Rawls 1999, 11).
WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
C. Relevant background theories
1. A theory of the person
2. A theory of procedural justice
3. A theory of a well-ordered society
4. A general social theory
5. …
WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
A. Considered moral judgments
B. Moral Principles
C. Relevant background theories
D. Other background beliefs, assumptions, values, etc.
•
The undifferentiated Lifeworld
WIDE REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (1951)
A. Considered moral judgments
B. Moral Principles
C. Relevant background theories
D. Other background beliefs, assumptions, values, etc.
•
WRE establishes coherence between A, B, C, and D.
•
This may involve modifying features of A, B, C, or D.
FULL REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM (2001, 31)
• Wide
• General
‘the same conception is affirmed in everyone’s
considered judgments’
• Mutually recognized
FULL REFLECTIVE
EQUILIBRIUM