“Identifying social norms using
coordination games: why does
dictator game sharing vary?”
Krupka, E. L. & Weber, R. A. (2013)
Experiment – primary data
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
identifying social norms
prediction and data analysis
u(𝑎𝑘 ) = V(π(𝑎𝑘 )) + γ N(𝑎𝑘 )
u(𝑎𝑘 ) = βπ(𝑎𝑘 ) + γ N(𝑎𝑘 )
2 variants of dictator game
standard: ($10;$0) ; only option “give”
bully:
($5 ; $5) ; options “give” and “take”
socially appropriateness of all possible outcomes of
one game
playing one game
N(𝑎𝑘 )
β and γ by conditional logit
prediction 1: in the bully game more agents will select ($5;$5)
“[…]behavior changes significantly across two payoff-equivalent choice environments, in a manner
prediction 2: when not taking ($5;$5) more agents of the bully game will chose ($10;$5)
consistent wit the a-priori predictions […] ”
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Pauline Grambow
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Experiment – secondary data
Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012)
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Experiment – secondary data
List (2007)
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Conclusion and Criticism
• elicitation method with simple utility framework, “[…] accurately
predicts behavioral changes across several variants of the dictator
game […]“
• “[…] relatively stable degree of concern for money and for social
appropriateness.”
• incentivized model in a more complex environment?
• different weights needed for different stakes?
• other motives than social norm?
• different appropriate ratings for different regions, generations …?
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Thank you for your attention.
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