Birth control and women's
empowerment
Pierre Andre Chiappori
Sonia Oreffice
Conference: The economics of the family
London, September 2006
Introduction: Abortion and
‘Female Empowerment’
General view:
abortion as ‘empowering’ women
•
Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures
•
However, not obvious: clearly some women are made
better off, but should we expect all women to benefit
from the reform?
•
In particular:
–
–
–
What about women who want children / exclude abortion?
What impact on the ‘market for marriage’?
What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?
Introduction: Abortion and
‘Female Empowerment’
General view:
abortion as ‘empowering’ women
•
Common claim in feminist and sociological literatures
•
However, not obvious: clearly some women are made
better off, but should we expect all women to benefit
from the reform?
•
In particular:
–
–
–
What about women who want children?
What impact on the ‘market for marriage’?
What consequences on intrahousehold allocations?
This paper
•
•
•
Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)
Identical men; women differ in their preferences for
children
Abortion as exogenous change in birth control
technology
This paper
•
•
•
Marriage as matching (as opposed to bargaining)
Identical men; women differ in their preferences for
children
Abortion as exogenous change in birth control
technology
Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•
Two cases (which side in excess supply?), various regimes
Women in excess supply: all women benefit in general
Crucial conditions: technology available to single as well
Plus: comparative statics
Difference with bargaining: the commitment issue
Related work
•
Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock
child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun
marriages’)
–
–
Related issues, different approach
Major differences:
•
•
‘Change in social norms’
Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas
endogeneity crucial here
Related work
•
Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) on out-of-wedlock
child bearing in the United States (‘shotgun
marriages’)
–
–
Related issues, different approach
Major differences:
•
•
•
Neal (2004): matching model
–
•
‘Change in social norms’
Intrahousehold allocation as exogenous in AYK, whereas
endogeneity crucial here
Similar approach; different emphasis
‘Collective’ models of household behavior
–
–
–
Same family
Idea: endogeneize the sharing rule
Examples: Chiappori-Iyigun-Weiss
The model
•
Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →
intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children
•
Men all identical; quasi linear utility U H 
a H , ka H u H . k
if married; zero utility of children if single.
•
Women: quasi linear utility U
a, ka uk where u
distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.
•
•
Unwanted pregnancies, probability p
Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children
The model
•
Continuum of men and women; one private commodity →
intrahousehold allocation of consumption an issue; children
•
Men all identical; quasi linear utility U H 
a H , ka H u H . k
if married; zero utility of children if single.
•
Women: quasi linear utility U
a, ka uk where u
distributed of [0,U], density f; note that utility is transferable.
•
•
Unwanted pregnancies, probability p
Income: men Y, women y without children, z < y with children
•
Frictionless marriage market (matching model); surplus
generated by children
→ equilibria as stable matches
•
Mass 1 of women, M of men
→ excess supply of women if M < 1
Fertility decisions
•
Single women
–
If u < y – z = ū : no children
–
Otherwise: children
Fertility decisions
•
Single women
–
If u < y – z = ū : no children
–
•
Otherwise: children
Couples
–
Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
–
Hence: children if u >
y z u H  u;
Fertility decisions
•
Single women
–
If u < y – z = ū : no children
–
•
•
Otherwise: children
Couples
–
Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
–
Hence: children if u >
y z u H  u;
Hence three types of women (depending on preferences):
–
‘low’:
u<u
–
‘intermediate’:
u<u<ū
–
‘high’:
u>ū
Fertility decisions
•
Single women
–
If u < y – z = ū : no children
–
•
•
Otherwise: children
Couples
–
Efficiency: children if maximizes total surplus
–
Hence: children if u >
y z u H  u;
Hence three types of women (depending on preferences):
–
‘low’:
u < u never want a child
–
‘intermediate’:
u < u < ū want a child only when married
–
‘high’:
u > ū always want a child
Stable match:
excess supply of women
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Y + uH
H
Y + p.uH
I
L
u
u
u
Stable match:
excess supply of women
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Married
Singles
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u(M)
u
u
Number of males
Stable match:
excess supply of women
Basic graph: husband’s maximal utility (as a function of u)
Married
Singles
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u(M)
u
u
Number of males
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u
Small excess supply of women (SESW)
u
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u
Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)
u
Hence: three cases
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u
Large excess supply of women (LESW)
u
Hence three regimes
‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.
1.
–
–
Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births
No surplus
Hence three regimes
‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.
1.
–
–
Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births
No surplus
‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type
2.
U
uMft dt M
–
Marginal woman: u(M) with
–
No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have
children
Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type
–
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u(M)
u
Intermediate excess supply of women (IESW)
u
Hence three regimes
‘Large’ ESW → marginal woman high type.
1.
–
–
Some H women not matched → out-of-wedlock births
No surplus
‘Intermediate’ ESW → marginal woman intermediate type
2.
U
uMft dt M
–
Marginal woman: u(M) with
–
No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; all married couples have
children
Surplus for all married women, increases with M, max for high type
–
‘Small’ ESW → marginal woman low type
3.
–
–
No out-of-wedlock birth unless unwanted; some married couples
don’t have children
Surplus for all married women, independent of M, max for high.
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u(M)
u
u
Small excess supply of women (IESW)
u
Excess Supply of Men
At any stable equilibrium:
• All women married, receive all the
surplus
• ‘High’ and ‘intermediate’ types have
children
• ‘Low’ type don’t.
Comparative statics: income
•
•
Women’s welfare non decreasing in y and z.
Assume, for instance, a proportional increase
in y and z. Then:
– Less H, more L → fertility decreases
– The equilibrium may switch (from LESW to IESW
to SESW) → larger rents for women, smaller for
men
→ In a sense, income growth alleviates ESW
u
u(M)
u
u
u
u(M)
u
u
Comparative statics:
cutting male supply
•
Within each regime:
– No impact if LESW or SESW
– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus
Married
Singles
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u(M)
Married
Singles
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u(M)
Comparative statics:
cutting male supply
•
Within each regime:
– No impact if LESW or SESW
– IESW: higher u(M) reduces female surplus
•
Change of regime:
– All women lose
– From IESW to LESW: reduces total fertility,
increases out-of-wedlock fertility.
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u
u
From IESW to LESW
u
Single parent benefits
•
•
•
More high type women → fertility increases
May change regime to LESW → out-ofwedlock fertility increases
Welfare: within a constant regime
– All women gain
– Married women (who do not receive the benefit)
may gain more (per capita) than most singles.
– Men lose the same amount.
•
If regime changes: more complex
Application: the US over three
decades
Major trends:
Application: the US over three
decades
Major trends:
1. Per capita benefits increase
then decrease
Benefits
Source: Moffit JEL 1992
Application: the US over three
decades
Major trends:
1. Per capita benefits increase
then decrease
2. Drop in the ‘supply’ of black,
HS drop-out males
Source: U.S. Department of Justice
Source: U.S. Department of Justice
Source: Western-Pettit, ILRR 2000
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Hence:
•
Benefits:
– Inverted U-shape
– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race
•
Supply of male:
– Strong reduction of male supply…
– … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts
Hence:
•
Benefits:
– Inverted U-shape
– Note that the impact is not differentiated by race
•
Supply of male:
– Strong reduction of male supply…
– … concentrated on young, black, HS dropouts
Impact on marriage and fertility?
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Source: Neal JHR 2004
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
Y
u
u(M)
u
u
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
– If LESW: no impact on married women
•
Men’s welfare: cannot increase
– If LESW: no difference
u
u
u
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
– If LESW: no impact on married women
– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want children
Intuition: single are better off, and indifference
•
Men’s welfare: cannot increase
– If LESW: no difference
– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share
increased
u
u
u
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
– If LESW: no impact on married women
– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want children
Intuition: single are better off, and indifference
•
Men’s welfare: cannot increase
– If LESW: no difference
– If IESW: total surplus unchanged, wife’s share
increased
– If SESW: LT lose unwanted births; for all others,
wife’s share increased
u
u
u
Legalizing abortion
•
•
ESM: straightforward
ESW: more interesting
– Women not wanting kids gain
– If LESW: no impact on married women
– If S- or I-ESW: all married women gain, including
those who want children
Intuition: single are better off, and indifference
•
Men’s welfare: cannot increase
– If LESW: no difference
– If SESW or IESW:
net transfer to the wife!
‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u1
u
u2
‘The Pill’
What if technology reserved to married women?
Married
Singles
Married
Y + uH
Y + p.uH
u1
u
u2
Hence:
•
•
•
•
Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose
Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of
married), lose
Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no
change
Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single),
gain
Conclusion: most married women lose
Hence:
•
•
•
•
Women with u ≥ u2(M): married, children, lose
Women with u (M) ≤ u < u2(M): single (instead of
married), lose
Women with u 1(M) ≤ u < u(M): single anyway, no
change
Women with u < u1(M): married (instead of single),
gain
Conclusion: most married women lose
The new technology helps married women (who
do not use it), but only insofar as it is
available to singles
Extension 1: costly access
Idea: fixed cost c for all
Y + uH
Y-(1-p)c+uH
Y + p.uH
Y+pc
Y
u-c
u
Extension 1: costly access
•
•
•
•
New technology favors all women in general,
including those who do not want to use it
(idea: one marginal woman at least uses it)
However, restrictions to access harm all
women in general, including those who do
not want to use it and those who can afford it.
Example: Hyde Amendment (1976)!
Problem: definition of a ‘market’!
Extension 2:
heterogeneous costs
•
•
Idea; ‘psychological’ costs differ
Extreme case: zero for some, large for others
Extension 2:
heterogeneous costs
Y + uH
Y-(1-p)c+uH
Y + p.uH
Y+pc
Y
Extension 2: shotgun
marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance
of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
Extension 3: shotgun
marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance
of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
Empirical problems (Neal 2004):
• Why only for poor and minorities?
• Adoptions did not increase.
Extension 3: shotgun
marriages
Claim (AYK 96): abortion lead to disappearance
of shotgun marriages, which harmed women.
Empirical problems (Neal 2004):
• Why only for poor and minorities?
• Adoptions did not increase.
Theoretical problem:
Intrahousehold allocation is not exogenous!
→ ‘female pauperization’ a complex issue…
Extension 3: shotgun
marriages (cont.)
In our model:
• Suppressing shotgun marriage does not
harm women…
• … unless it cuts the supply of men.
Empirically: unclear
Fraction of single men among all employed men (PSID)
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Fraction of single men among all employed men (PSID)
0.12
0.1
0.08
0.06
0.04
0.02
0
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
Year
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
Deviation from the average annual change in the fraction of single
men (PSID)
0.008
0.006
0.004
0.002
0
-0.002
-0.004
-0.006
-0.008
-0.01
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
‘Female empowerment’:
empirical test 1 (Oreffice 2004)
Basic idea: labor supply (CFL 1998)
– ‘empowerment’: she receives a larger share
of household resources
– If leisure normal:
•
•
she should work less
he should work more
– Need to control for wages, education,…
– Findings: Prediction confirmed!
Source: Oreffice 2004
Source: Oreffice 2004
‘Female empowerment’: empirical
test 2 (Mazzocco, Chiappori 2004)
Divorce in Ireland
Stylized facts:
•
•
legalization of divorce, but actual number very small
Strong labor demand, increase in participation
Theory:
•
•
•
•
Labor demand → potential empowerment of women
Divorce law as triggering renegotiations
Working women: same effect as before
Non working women: need to ‘build up a threat point’
→ increased participation
Tests: confirm the predictions
Discussion
Heterogeneous males
•
•
by income: same
by preferences: supermodular; more complex, similar
predictions
Commitment versus bargaining
•
•
•
•
Basic insight: ‘market’ conditions matter
One interpretation: commitment (‘prenuptial agreement’)
Alternative polar case: ‘pure’ bargaining.
Differences:
–
–
–
the existence of an ‘abortion threat’ matters only if credible
therefore: no impact on women unwilling to use abortion.
exclusive availability to married women does not matter
Conclusions
Very simple model …
•
•
•
Multiple dimensions (income,…)
Frictions
Dynamics (age of marriage; divorce;…)
… but some robust conclusions:
•
•
•
Intrahousehold allocation crucial; equilibrium
Various ‘submarkets’ (empirical translation?)
General insight: an innovation (technology, but also
policy,…) can have a major impact on people not directly
affected
→ Cost-benefit analysis!