Ridgeview Publishing Company
A Puzzle About the Rational Authority of Morality
Author(s): David O. Brink
Source: Philosophical Perspectives, Vol. 6, Ethics (1992), pp. 1-26
Published by: Ridgeview Publishing Company
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6, Ethics,1992
Philosophical
Perspectives,
A PUZZLE ABOUT THE
RATIONALAUTHORITY OF MORALITY
David 0. Brink
MassachusettsInstituteof Technology
variousother-regarding
dutiesto help,
Commonsense
morality
recognizes
or forbear
fromharming,
others.Mostofus also regardmoralobligations
thatgiveagentsreasonsforaction.But
considerations
as important
practical
ofhisowninterest
theagent'spursuit
mayconstrain
heeding
theseobligations
withtheagent'sownpointofview,we
or aims.Ifwe associaterationality
maywonderwhethermoralconductand concernare alwaysrationally
inordinary
aboutmorality
reveala tension
thinking
Thesethoughts
justifiable.
as
betweenlivingrightand livingwell.Thattensionmightbe represented
a puzzleabouttherationalauthority
ofmorality
thatconsistsofa quartet
inconsistent.
ofclaimsthatcanseemindividually
plausiblebutare mutually
I Moralrequirements-including
obligations-apply
other-regarding
to agentsindependently
oftheiraimsor interests.
II. Moralrequirements
necessarily
provideagentswithreasonsfor
action.
III. Reasonsforactionare dependent
on theaimsor interests
ofthe
agentwho has them
betweenother-regarding
IV. Thereis no necessaryconnection
oftheagent.
actionand anyaim or interest
a familiar
andinitially
plausibleidea.
Eachelementofthepuzzlearticulates
familiar
from
oftheobjectivity
ofethics,
Kant,according
(I)is a statement
are categorical
to whichmoralrequirements
norms,theyapplyto us inTheagent'sowninterests
ofourantecedent
desiresandinterests.
dependently
ofappliare not,intherelevant
andinclinations
way,amongtheconditions
Thisis clearestinthecase ofother-regarding
cationformoralrequirements.
ofobligation
tometo help
I do notdefeatan ascription
moralrequirements.
thatI have
outthatdoingso willservenogoalorpurpose
another
bypointing
ofmorality
and moraldeliberation.
(II) capturesthepracticalcharacter
inordertodecidewhattodo;
engageinmoraldeliberation
Agentstypically
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2 / David 0. Brink
others'conduct;andmost
peoplegivemoraladvicewiththeaimofguiding
oftheseattitudes
Oneexplanation
tomoralcriticism.
ofus arequitesensitive
give
agentsreasons
requirements
moral
is thatwe think
and expectations
about
as
truths
defended
conceptual
are
sometimes
claims
foraction.Such
do
something
to
obligation
moral
under
a
to
be
say
that
Internalists
morality.
justare
justis to havea reasonto do it;theyassumethatnormsofmorality
normsofrationality.1
theagent
thata factmustaffect
thecommonassumption
(III)articulates
about
assumption
Call
this
to
her.
significance
rational
be
of
insomewayto
in
case
just
is
agent-neutral
rationality
contrast,
By
agent-relative.2
rationality
independently
directly,
for
action
an
reasons
agent
interests
give
another's
assumpAgent-relative
ordesires.3
withherowninterests
ofanyconnection
individual
of
discussions
and
informal
formal
tionsseemto underliemany
an agent-relative
Moreover,
andpolitics.
economics,
inphilosophy,
rationality
for
action
and motivation,
reasons
theoryprovidesa reliablelinkbetween
to acton
motivated
to
be
action
reasonsfor
we expectone whorecognizes
his
about
facts
by
them,and an agentseemsmorelikelyto be motivated
others.
of
interest
or
desires
owninterest
or desiresthanbyfactsaboutthe
certain
to satisfy
Also,whenwe explainan agent'sbehavioras an attempt
This
her
behavior.4
we
are
to
"rationalize"
said
desires,givenherbeliefs,
the
promote
which
would
behavior
is
that
rational
thatgenuinely
suggests
certain
if
she
met
have
would
she
desires
that
agent'sdesiresorat leastthose
conditions.
epistemic
ofdifferent
abouttheindependence
a commonassumption
(IV)reflects
assumption.
thatI willcalltheindependence
andattitudes
people'sinterests
Ofcourse,agentsoftendo care aboutthewelfareofothersand desireto
between
and therewilloftenbe connections
correctthing,
do themorally
holds
connection
and thoseofothers.Butneither
an agent'sowninterests
and
be
self-confined,
ornecessarily.
Myaimscould largely
eitheruniversally
to
reference
no
intermsthatmake essential
myowngoodcan be specified
of
thegoodofothers,say,in termsofmyownpleasureor thesatisfaction
mydesires.
appeal,notall fourclaimscan be true;we must
Despitetheirindividual
rejectat leastone elementofthepuzzleifwe are to avoidinconsistency.
atthefoundations
offamiliar
positions
Indeed,we canmakesenseofa number
ofthepuzzle
tothispuzzlethatrejectoneelement
ofethicsas tacitresponses
in orderto preserveothers.
suchas ethicalegoism,
moraltheories,
and minimalist
Moralrelativism
in(I);theyclaimthat
moralnormsasserted
ofcategorical
rejecttheexistence
ordesiresinsomeway.
theagent'sinterests
mustfurther
moralrequirements
ofmorality
abouttherationality
assumption
Externalists
rejecttheinternalist
andnormsofmorality
betweennormsofrationality
in(II).Theydistinguish
suchthatfailureto act on themis not
and recognizemoralrequirements
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/ 3
ofMorality
A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority
assumpnecessarilyirrational.Kantiansand othersrejectthe agent-relative
tionsabout reasons foraction in (III); theyclaim thatthe interestsof other
people can directlyand necessarilyprovidean agentwithreason foraction.
Finally,metaphysicalegoistsrejecttheindependenceassumptionin (IV) and
resolve the puzzle by arguingthat,properlyunderstood,people's interests
moral
are interdependentin ways such that acting on other-regarding
requirementspromotesthe agent's own interests.
and
I'll sketchsome of these solutionsand theirresources,limitations,
puzzle,
to
the
solution
goal is notdefenda particular
interrelations.
Myprimary
frameworkwithinwhichto address
but to show thatit providesa fruitful
some foundationalissues about ethics.
1. Relativistand MinimalistSolutions
Some writersbegin withassumptions(II)-(IV)in place and conclude that
requirements.5
we mustrejectthe existenceof categorical,other-regarding
For example,in his article"MoralRelativismDefended"GilbertHarman
natureof rationality
relieson Humean assumptionsabout the instrumental
assumptionsabout the connectionbetweenmoralobligation
and internalist
and reasonsforactionin orderto defenda viewthathe callsmoralrelativism,
accordingto whichan agent'smoralobligationsmustbe relativizedto her
pro-attitudes.
thisas a logicalthesis,I wantto treatthemoral"ought"as a
Formulating
"Ought(A,D, C, M),"whichrelatesan
predicate(or "operator"),
four-place
attitudes
M
C, and motivating
agentA, a typeofact D, considerations
[1975 10]
Harmanclaims,forinstance,thatHitleris someone to whom obligationsof
fairness,decency,or respectforhumanlifecould not have appliedbecause
he (Hitler)lackedtherelevantattitudesnecessaryforhimto have had reasons
to be fair,to be decent,or to respecthumanlife(1975: 7-11).
Harman'sargumenthas the followingform
1. Moral requirementsgeneratereasons foraction.
2. Reasons foraction are desire-dependent.
3. Hence moral requirementsare desire-dependent.
This is a versionof relativism,because it relativizesmoral obligationsto
because it holds the
people's variable aims. It is a versionof minimalism,
contentofone's obligationshostageto one's interestsand aimsand so seems
dutiesthatcommonunlikelyto recognizethenormalrangeofother-regarding
sense moralitydoes.
ethicaltheory
Moreover,thisview can be representedas an agent-relative
as well
ifitclaimsthatpromotingan agent'sinterestsor desiresis a sufficient
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4 / David 0. Brink
as a necessaryconditionformoralobligation(1975: 11). An agent-relative
ethicaltheoryclaimsthatan agentis obligatedto do somethingjustinsofar
as it would promotehis own interestsor desires.
ethical
Anotherview thatcan be representedeitheras an agent-relative
theoryor as a skepticalview is Callicles'positionin Plato'sGorgias.Callicles
betweenthedemandsofjusticeand theagent's
resolvestheapparentconflict
own interestby arguingthat"real" or naturaljusticedoes not requirethe
agentto helpothersor forbearfromharmingthem,as conventionalmorality
supposes (482de, 483ab, 488b-490a).The naturallyjustpersonsatisfiesher
own unrestraineddesires (488b). And, preciselybecause the revisionin
ordinarymoral views that he makes is so drastic-his account of virtueis
is usuallythoughtofas a moralskeptic,even though
so minimalist-Callicles
he accepts the rationalauthorityof real virtue.
Libertarianviews mightbe motivatedin a similarway. They recognize
obligationsto forbearfromharmingothersand
negative other-regarding
withtheirlibertybutno positiveobligationsofmutualaid. Robert
interfering
libertariansideNozick,forexample,defendsa moraltheoryincorporating
by appeal to the separatenessofpersons.
constraintsagainstutilitarianism
He writes
chooseto undergosomepainor sacrifice
we each sometimes
Individually,
hold
or to avoida greaterharm. Whynot,similarly,
fora greaterbenefit
otherpersonsmore?
thatsomepersonshaveto bearsomecoststhatbenefit
for
somesacrifice
Butthereis no socialentitywitha goodthatundergoes
respect
itsowngood To use a personin thiswaydoes notsufficiently
and takeaccountofthefactthathe is a separateperson,thathisis theonly
and
goodfromhissacrifice,
lifehe has He does notgetsomeoverbalancing
to forcethisuponhim. [1974 32-3]
no one is entitled
Nozickconcludesthattheseparatenessofpersonsgroundslibertarianrights
thatdemand
moralrequirements
fromother-regarding
thatprotectindividuals
uncompensatedsacrifices.His argumentseems to have the followingform.
1. It is unreasonableto demand uncompensatedsacrifices.
2. Moral requirementsmustbe reasonable.
3. There is no interpersonalcompensation;benefitsto anotherdo not
compensateme formy losses.
duties.
4. Hence moral requirementscan includeno other-regarding
supHowever,we mightnotice thatlibertarianminimalismis imperfectly
For,whileshe recognizesno positivedutiesofmutual
portedbythisargument.
aid that apply independentlyof the agent's own desires and choices, the
libertariandoes recognize negativedutiesto refrainfromforceand fraud
that apply independentlyof the agent's own aims or interests.Even the
libertarianthinksthat negative duties of forbearanceare other-regarding
categoricalnorms.
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A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority
ofMorality
/ 5
Anyagent-relative
ethicaltheory
thatholdsan agent'sobligations
hostage
tothepromotion
ofherimmediate
orunreflective
interests
ordesiresseems
committed
toa highly
revisionary
form
ofminimalism.
Someagentsareconcernedaboutothers.Butsuchother-regarding
attitudes
are notuniversal.
Moreover,
benefiting
othersconsumestimeand resources
thatmighthave
beenspentinmoreself-confined
ways.As longas peoplearepsychologically
malleable,
we mayaskwhythosewhodo nothaveother-regarding
attitudes
shouldcultivate
themandthosewhohappento havethemshouldmaintain
them.Unlessthereare answersto thesequestionsagent-relative
ethical
theorieswillbe quiteminimal.
A sophisticated
agent-relative
ethicaltheory
might
trytoavoidminimalism
thatitis inthelong-term
interest
ofagentstodevelop,maintain,
byarguing
and act on other-regarding
attitudes.
Sucha theorywouldbe a versionof
ethicalegoism;it wouldclaimthatan agentis morallyobligatedto do
as thatcourseofactionwouldpromote
hisowninterest
something
justinsofar
The ethicalegoist'sexplanation
ofother-regarding
moralrequireoverall.6
isconcerned
mentswouldexploittheideathatmorality
withtheappropriate
andsocialinteraction
andcooperation
andrequires
terms
forpersonal
people
theirpursuit
oftheirownaimsand interests
and accepta fair
to restrain
inthefruits
division
ofgoodsandresources.
Eachindividual
hasan interest
andcooperation.
from
a selfofsuchinteraction
it
be
desirable
Though might
interested
pointof view to reap the benefits
of others'forbearances
and
the
burdens
of
one's
the
without
cooperation
incurring
own, opportunities
todo thisareinfrequent.
is generally
andothers
Noncompliance
detectable,
won'tbe forbearing
and cooperative
towardsagentswhoare knownto be
thatcompliance
So noncompliance
securesshort-term
benefits
noncompliant.
benefitsthannondoes not,but compliancesecuresgreaterlong-term
compliance.
andrestrained
Becauseofthegenerally
character
ofcooperative
beneficial
ofactingfrom
withthecognitive
andaffective
behavior,
together
advantages
fairly
coarse-grained
dispositions,
peoplewillhavereasontodevelopandact
willalso
Theseattitudes
on socialsentiments
andother-regarding
attitudes.
inothers'cooperation
receiveexternal
Becauseeachhasan interest
support.
willtendto reinforce
behaviorand
and restraint,
communities
compliant
willalso
behavior.
discourage
noncompliant
Community
pressure,
therefore,
It's
offairly
fosterthedevelopment
coarse-grained
compliant
dispositions.
and otherno accident,therefore,
thatpeoplewillhave socialsentiments
reasonto actin
andthesewillgivethemagent-relative
regarding
attitudes,
other-regarding
ways.Andwheretheydon'tyethavetheseattitudes,
they
reasonstoactinother-regarding
willnonetheless
haveagent-relative
typically
suchattitudes.
ways(ifonly)as partofa processofdeveloping
The strategic
egoistreasonsas follows.
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6 / David0. Brink
1. It is in theagent'sinterest
to receivethebenefits
ofsystems
of
cooperation
and restraint.
and restraint
are available
2. The benefits
ofsystems
ofcooperation
and
onlyto thosewho maintain
theappearanceofcooperation
restraint
towardsstrategic
partners.
3. The leastcostlymeansofmaintaining
theappearanceof
and restraint
and restrained.
cooperation
is by beingcooperative
to be cooperative
and restrained
4. Henceit is in theagent'sinterest
. towardsstrategic
partners.
dutiesthathave agent-relative
5. Hencethereare other-regarding
foundations.
Inthisway,thestrategic
ethicalegoisttriesto explainwhyone shouldboth
byappealtoone'slong-term
cultivate
andmaintain
other-regarding
attitudes
to justify
other-regarding
interests.
Thisformof ethicalegoismattempts
conclusions
whiledenying
(I)'s
morality
andavoidunacceptably
minimalist
oftheir
claimthatthesemoralrequirements
applyto agentsindependently
interests
and desires.7
theindependence
assumption,
Butas longas ethicalegoismrecognizes
inwhichan agentwouldbenefit
itmustremainrevisionary.
Incircumstances
theethicalegoistcannot
from
actingonselectively
noncompliant
dispositions,
First,
(2) is notalwaystrue.Inthe
ascribeother-regarding
moralobligations.
theappearanceofcompliance
case ofpublicgoodsthatare nonexcludable,
compliance,
though
fairness
isnotnecessary
toreceivethebenefits
ofothers'
ifthestakesaresufficiently
Moreover,
typically
seemstorequirecompliance.
partners
havealreadycomplied,
highina particular
case,andone'sstrategic
eventheappearanceofcompliance.
one mayhaveno reasonto maintain
insucha case can outweigh
thecostsof
Forthebenefits
ofnoncompliance
Second,(3) is sometimesfalse.
beingexcludedfromfutureinteraction.
whereitis difficult
to monitor
Selectivenoncompliance
maygo undetected
Butsurelythemoralobligation
tocomply
anddetectdeception.
compliance
ispossible.
doesnotceasejustbecausesuccessful
deception
Third,
(4)doesn't
of(5).Noncompliance
towards
thosewith
a sufficiently
version
support
strong
in
will
be
interest.
So ifthe
not
interact
one's
whomone does
strategically
to stand
so
as
and
talented
have
strength
and
resources
wealthy
sufficient
in
and
a
the
weak
togainbyparticipating
with
handicapped system
nothing
andforbearance,
thenthestrategic
ofmutual
egoistcanrecognize
cooperation
even
former
towards
the
latter.
nodutiesofmutualaidthatthe
have
Finally,
were
ifthestrategic
conduct
of
extensionally
justificationother-regarding
ensuresthattherearepossiblecases
adequate,theindependence
assumption
ifonly
forcompliant
inwhichan agenthasnostrategic
behavior,
justification
are
so
finebecausethestakesare so high,herdiscriminatory
capacities
our
While other-regarding
deceiver.
obligagrained,
orsheissucha successful
ofotherthestrategic
tionsarepresumably
stable,
justification
counterfactually
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ofMorality
/ 7
A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority
ethicalegoismare
regarding
conductis not.8Theselimitations
in strategic
in
all limitations
in thescope ofmorality
itself,
and notsimplylimitations
therationality
ofother-regarding
conductand concern.9
tacit,solutions
Oneaspectofviewing
minimalist
moraltheories
as,perhaps
to thispuzzleabouttherationalauthority
ofmorality
is thatitestablishes
the
a linkbetweenmetaethical
and normative
issuesand so undermines
commonclaimthatmetaethics
and normative
ethicsare completely
independentofeach other.The linkis simplythatifone acceptscertainmetaassumptions
aboutreasonsfor
ethicalclaims-viz.internalism,
agent-relative
is
one committed
to a
action,and the independence
assumption-then
kindofmoraltheory,
viz.some
particular,
indeed,extremely
controversial
ifone is to avoidthesenormative
formofminimalism.
views,
Conversely,
claims.
one mustrejectat leastone ofthreemetaethical
2. ExternalistSolutions
Some acceptthe existenceof categoricalmoralnorms,agent-relative
andso reject
aboutrationality,
andtheindependence
assumption
assumptions
in (II). This
of morality
the internalist
assumption
aboutthe rationality
oftheapplication
deniesthatitis a condition
ofa moral
externalist
solution
thatitprovidetheagentto whomitapplieswitha reasonfor
requirement
action.Whilemoralrequirements
ofourantecedent
applytousindependently
on their
desiresand interests,
theygiveus reasonsforactionconditional
promoting
ourinterests
or desires.
an ambiguity
within
We might
motivate
thisexternalist
position
bynoting
betweenhypothetical
Kantianrationalism.10
Kant,ofcourse,distinguishes
arecondiandcategorical
imperatives
imperatives
(1785:414).Hypothetical
tionalon whethertheconductenjoinedpromotestheagent'santecedent
are not.Kantclaimsthat
interests
or desires,whilecategorical
imperatives
thanhypothetical,
rather
moralrequirements
imperatives
expresscategorical,
twodistinguishable
claimsherecorrespond(1785:416).Butwe might
identify
In one
can be categorical.
ingto twodistinct
sensesinwhichan imperative
are categorical
sense,imperatives
justin case theyapplyto peopleindeinthissense
oftheiraimsorinterests.
arecategorical
pendently
Imperatives
norms.(I) assertsthatmoralrequireinsofaras theygeneratecategorical
norms.
moralrequirements-are
categorical
ments-including
other-regarding
inanothersensejustincase theyprovidethose
are categorical
Imperatives
oftheirdesires,
to whomtheyapplywithreasonsforactionindependently
inthissensejustincase they
are categorical
aims,or interests.
Imperatives
reasonsareagent-neutral
reasons.Categorical
reasons,
generate
categorical
reasons
and other-regarding
moralrequirements
couldprovidecategorical
reasonsforaction.
onlyifthereare agent-neutral
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8 / David0. Brink
themequally
thesetwoKantian
theseswe maynotfind
Oncewe distinguish
arecategorical
inthefirst
plausible.
Wemight
agreethatmoralrequirements
inthe
norms-but
denythattheyarecategorical
sense-theyarecategorical
reasons.
secondsense-theydo notgeneratecategorical
might
arguethatwe cannotseparatecategorical
However,
theinternalist
reasons.
normsand categorical
(i.e.
applyto peoplecategorically
1. Moralrequirements
oftheircontingent
desiresand interests).
independently
(categorically)
tellsme to do x, thenI
2. Ifa moralrequirement
moralreasonto do x.
have a (categorical)
moralreasonto do x, thenI have a
3. IfI have a (categorical)
reasonto do x.
(categorical)
reasonsfor
4. Hencemoralrequirements
generate(categorical)
action.
ofme to failto act on
5. Henceit wouldbe protantoirrational
ofmyinterests
or desires).
moralrequirements
(regardless
tradeson an equivocation
Buttheexternalist
can replythattheargument
betweendifferent
sensesof'reason'.Inonesense(a) fortheretobe a reason
is simplyforthereto existthe relevantsortof
forme to do something
behavioral
standard
ornorm.Inthissense,thereareas manykindsofreasons
ofnorms;therearemoralreasons,reasonsofetiquette,
as therearesystems
moralnorms
reasonsofstate,etc.Inthissense,theexistenceofcategorical
does implytheexistenceofmoralreasonsand,hence,reasons.
obviously
we arejustgiving
another
reasons,
Butwhenwe callthesereasonscategorical
norms.The othersense
calledcategorical
nameto whatwe hadpreviously
ofa certain
sortofbehavioral
of'reason'(b)signifies
morethantheexistence
thatthereis a reasonto behaveinaccordancewithsuch
norm;itindicates
a normsuchthatfailure
tobehaveinthatwayis ceterisparibusorprotanto
irrational.
Ifthereis reason,in thissense,to act on a norm,thenpractical
that
reasonendorsesthisnorm.Anditis thissenseofreasonandrationality
ofmorality
andthedebateaboutwhether
authority
is atstakeintherational
the
all reasonsare agent-relative.
Reasons,inthissense,do notfollowfrom
seemsto
mereexistenceofcertainsortsofnorms,as thecase ofetiquette
ofmy
demonstrate.
Normsofetiquette
applytomybehaviorindependently
or attitudes,
butfailureto observethemdoes notseemirrational
interests
oraims.So theexternalist
unlessthisinsomewayundermines
myinterests
between
tradesonan equivocation
inconcluding
thattheargument
isjustified
for(4) is soundjustin case it is
thesetwosensesofreason:theargument
as (4a),while(5) followsfrom(4) onlyif(4) is readas (4b).
understood
Ina similar
mayappealtothesetwosensesof'reason'
way,theexternalist
of'reason',theexternalist
to dissolvethepuzzle.On a univocal(b)-reading
from(I) and is not
of(II),(II) followstrivially
denies(II).On an (a)-reading
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/ 9
ofMorality
A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority
won'tdeny(Ila). But(III)clearly
premise.The externalist
an independent
of'reason'.But,ofcourse,thefourclaimsdo notform
the(b)reading
requires
a genuineparadoxifwe read (II) as (Ila) and (III)as (IlIb).
by considering
We can bettersee thischallengeto Kantianrationalism
(Foot1972).
and
etiquette
morality
between
analogy
PhilippaFoot'suseful
and rules
etiquette
rules
of
distinguish
to
be
difficult
Atsomepointsitmay
consideration
sort
of
enjoinsthesame
often
etiquette
ofmorality;
forinstance,
does. Becausewe wantto examine
and respectforothersthatmorality
thefocus
unimportant,
agreedto be fairly
to something
relation
morality's
moral
with
overlap
thatdo not
onetiquette
mustbe onthoserulesofetiquette
in
the
addressed
invitations
that
requiring
rules
forinstance,
requirements,
morality
thirdpersonbe answeredinthethirdperson.So we mustcompare
thatare notalso moralrules).
(thoserulesofetiquette
and mereetiquette
norms.
arecategorical
requirements,
moral
like
Rulesof(mere)etiquette,
cost
at
little
do
so
whenyoucan
The moraldutyto helpothersindistress,
ourascription
doesnotfailtoapplytoyou-we do notwithdraw
toyourself,
to yourneighbor's
to you-justbecauseyou are indifferent
of obligation
to readyourmail,as wouldbe thecase ifitwas
and in a hurry
suffering
toa third-person
norm.Inthesameway,rulesagainstreplying
a hypothetical
inthefirst
persondon'tfailto applyto you-we don'ttakeback
invitation
toyou-justbecauseyouthink
etiquette
ofdutiesofetiquette
ourascriptions
is sillyoryouhavea desiretoannoyyourhost,as wouldbe thecase ifrules
norms.
statedhypothetical
ofetiquette
theygenerate
But rulesof etiquetteseem to lack rationalauthority;
maystatecategorical
reasons.Rulesofetiquette
notcategorical
hypothetical,
unless
norms,butfailureto observethesenormsdoes notseemirrational
or aims.Heretoo moral
theagent'sinterests
thisinsomewayundermines
of etiquette.If the
mayseem on a par withrequirements
requirements
mutualaid,
offorbearance,
obligations
is correct,
assumption
independence
oftheagent.Though
no aimsorinterests
further
andjusticewillsometimes
insuchcases,perhapswe
ofobligation
theascription
we neednotwithdraw
We can
conductin sucha case is notirrational.
shouldallowthatimmoral
reproachsucha personforimmoralbehavior,butnotforirrationality.
Buttheanalogybetweenmoralsand mannersprovidesno explanation
Nowtheexternalist
hasa specialauthority.
belief
thatmorality
ofthecommon
is justan illusion-an
ofmorality
mightconcludethatthespecialauthority
ofmoralnorms(as Foot
ofmoraleducationand theinternalization
artifact
areimperfectly
andetiquette
claimthatmorality
mayseemto).Buthemight
is
normswhoserationality
categorical
analogous.Whilealikeingenerating
systems
notcategorical,
theyneednotbe equallyauthoritative
hypothetical,
ofthetwotypesofnorms.Different
ofnorms.Thisis becauseofthecontent
and havedifferent
sortsofrequirements
ofnormsmakedifferent
systems
The externalist
mightclaimthatthemoral
principles.
pointsor organizing
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10 / David0. Brink
to people's
pointof view has a moreintimateand regularrelationship
does.
and aimsthanthepointofviewofetiquette
interests
important
claimsaboutwhatthemoralpointofview
Thebasicidearestsonfamiliar
is).Oneversionappealsto claims
is (andwhatthepointofviewofetiquette
equality,and imconcernswithfairness,
other-regarding
aboutmorality's
thatwe saw an ethicalegoist
reasoning
and thesortofstrategic
partiality
herewithin
figures
reasoning
mightinvoke.However,thissortofstrategic
moral
ofother-regarding
to defendtherationality
a rationalegoistattempt
ofmorality.
an ethicalegoistaccountofthecontent
notwithin
considerations,
as itwould
Rationalegoismis theviewthatan actionisrationaljustinsofar
whereasethicalegoismis theviewthat
theagent'sowninterests,
promote
as itwouldpromotetheagent's
justinsofar
obligatory
an actionis morally
The rationalegoist,whois notan ethicalegoist,allowsthat
owninterests.
of the
independently
the contentof moralrequirements
we can identify
canbe shown
thatmoralrequirements
andthenthinks
agent'sowninterest
theagent'sowninterest.
to be rational
justto theextentthattheypromote
ofconducthostageto theagent's
The rationalegoistholdstherationality
and desires;but,unliketheethicalegoist,he does nothold
owninterests
thesamesortof
ofconducthostagein thisway.Nonetheless,
themorality
ethicalegoistemployscan be
reasoningthatthe sophisticated
strategic
toexplainwhyagents
purports
egoist.Thatreasoning
invoked
bytherational
and act on fairly
coarsereasonto develop,maintain,
have agent-relative
The rationalegoistcan
and attitudes.
dispositions
grainedother-regarding
reliablecontingent
justification
employtheseclaimsto providea generally
We sawthatthereare
orother-regarding
morality.
oftherational
authority
ofotherlimitations
tothestrategic
justification
actualoratleastcounterfactual
egoistneednot
conduct.
But,unliketheethicalegoist,therational
regarding
itselfThey
in thescope of morality
as limitations
view theselimitations
ofmorality.
thelimitsoftherationalauthority
represent
I assume,the pointof view of mereetiquette-whatever
By contrast,
to people's
exactlyit is-has no such intimateand regularrelationship
is notonly
ofetiquette
interests
andaims.Therationalauthority
important
butweak and unreliable.
contingent
inhumaninterests
implicated
Ifso,themoralpointofviewismorecentrally
claims
Theseconstructive
anddesiresthanis thepointofviewofetiquette.
has a special
can tryto show thatmorality
suggesthow an externalist
toagent-relative
herself
whilerestricting
notenjoyedbyetiquette,
authority,
reasons.
Solutions
3. Agent-Neutral
assumptions
tothepuzzleistogiveuptheagent-relative
solution
Another
ofcourse,
claims.Thetrick,
in(III)infavorofagent-neutral
aboutrationality
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 11
We
aboutreasonsforactionplausible.
assumptions
is tomakeagent-neutral
simplybecauseit
haveto explainhowI can havereasonto do something
or desireofmine.
no interest
someoneeven ifit wouldfurther
benefits
Whereas
mysterious.
primafacie
assumptions
We mayfindagent-neutral
for
and
his
reasons
desires
and
thelinkbetweentheagent'sowninterests
reasons
and
his
of
others
theinterests
thelinkbetween
actionseemsintuitive,
Moreover,agent-relative
foractionmay seem less clear or compelling.
of reasonsforactionshould
explainbetterwhyrecognition
assumptions
byagent-neutral
tobe unmoved
theagent,whereasitseemspossible
motivate
seem
aboutrationality
assumptions
agent-relative
Further,
considerations.
behavior,
of
explaining
mode
ofthe"rationalizing"
extension
tobe a natural
sensesof'reasonfor
and explanatory
and thisallowsus to linknormative
forthewelfare
desires
ifan agenthasnotalreadyformed
action'.Bycontrast,
ofotherpeople,it'shardto see howthewelfareofotherscouldexplainhis
aboutrationality
assumptions
behaviorinanyway Butthenagent-neutral
reasonsforaction.
andexplanatory
anylinkbetweennormative
willnotforge
aboutanother's
believesthatfacts
ofagent-neutrality
thefriend
Presumably,
thatand
whentheagentunderstands
welfarecan and willbe motivational
maintain
can
whysuchfactsprovidereasonsforaction.Ifso,agent-neutrality
reasonsforaction.Explanatory
and normative
a linkbetweenexplanatory
Normative
givenheractualbeliefs.
oftheagent'spro-attitudes,
reasonsconsist
rational
Genuinely
reasons.
ofexplanatory
an idealization
reasonsrepresent
theaimstheagentwouldhave in
behavioris behaviorthatwouldsatisfy
statein whichhervariousbeliefsand desireswere
an idealizedepistemic
(cf.Brink1989:63-6).Ifthereare convincing
equilibrium
inwidereflective
theagent'saims
reasons,thenthiswillaffect
foragent-neutral
arguments
fromthe
Ifso, therecan be no a prioriargument
in reflective
equilibrium.
and
orbetweenexplanatory
andmotivation
betweenrationality
connection
must
We
reasons.11
ofagent-neutral
reasonsagainstthepossibility
normative
on a case by case basis.
foragent-neutrality
arguments
considerparticular
andtheoretical.
intuitive
toconsider:
Therearetwomainkindsofargument
ofrationality
theories
Agent-relative
argument.
first
an intuitive
Consider
heraims.But
theagentor further
assumethatrationalactionmustbenefit
or
we have goodreasonto helpothersin distress
surely,we mightthink,
evenifhelping
costtoourselves,
harmtothemifwe cando so atlittle
prevent
ouraims.Supposethatwitha littleeffort
us or further
themwon'tbenefit
is jammedor that
I couldwarnyou,beforeourjump,thatyourparachute
I couldeasilysteparoundyourgoutytoes.Surely,I have reasonto warn
me or further
my
youand avoidyourtoesevenifdoingso doesn'tbenefit
aims.12
13Buttheexternalist
whoacceptsagentforce.
Thisclaimhasconsiderable
can acceptiton onereading.Shecan
aboutrationality
relativeassumptions
agreethatthereis a moralreasonforme to warnyouaboutyourjammed
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12 / David 0. Brink
parachute
andwalkaroundyourgoutytoes,evenifdoingso doesnotbenefit
ifI failtodo so. So sheagrees
meorfurther
myaims,andthatI amimmoral
inthesensethatthereis a categorical
thatI havea reasontodo thesethings
normthatenjoinssuchconduct.She deniesonlythatthereis a categorical
Assuming
thatI wouldreceiveno benefit
reasonforme to do thesethings.
would
not
be
irrational
ofme to failto warnyouor
fromtheseactions,it
clearis thatitwouldbe (grossly)
avoidyourgoutytoes.Whatis intuitively
immoralof me to let you jumpor to treadon yourgoutytoes;it is not
irrational.
clearthatthiswouldalso be necessarily
comparably
forrecognizing
arguments
Kantand neo-Kantians
also offer
theoretical
can be foundin ThomasNagel'sThe
agent-neutral
reasons.One argument
and
of Altruism.
Nagelsees a parallelbetweenintertemporal
Possibility
ofbenefits
andharms.
He arguesforagent-neutrality
interpersonal
distribution
ofan agent's
future
oraltruism
Just
as theinterests
byanalogywithprudence.
selfprovidehimwithreasonsforactionnow,so too,Nagelargues,others'
prudence
interests
providehimwithreasonsforactionFailuretorecognize
dissociation-failure
to see thepresentas justone time
involvestemporal
involvespersonaldissociatorecognizealtruism
amongothers-andfailure
torecognize
oneself
as justonepersonamongothersBothkinds
tion-failure
ofdissociation
aremistakes.
Theparity
oftimeandpersonwithin
rationality,
therefore,
requiresacceptingagent-neutrality.
by thisanalogywith
Buttherationalegoistwillnotbe veryimpressed
compensation,
that
requires
prudence.
Rational
egoismassumesthatsacrifice
if
say to benefit
another,
is,thatan agenthas reasonto makea sacrifice,
inreturn.
andonlyiftheagentreceivessomesufficient
benefit
Nagelhimself
strictpositionthattherecan be no interpersonal
acceptsthe "extremely
forsacrifice"
requires
compensation,
(1970:142).Butifsacrifice
compensation
andaltruism
mustbe importantly
disanalogous.
For,intheprudenprudence
in favor
fora sacrifice
ofmypresentinterests
tialcase,I am compensated
are mine.Because
of my greaterfutureinterests;
thesefutureinterests
andbeneficiary
arethesame,diachronic,
intrapersonal
compensabenefactor
isnotautomatic;
benefactor
tionisautomatic.
Butinterpersonal
compensation
the
andbeneficiary
are distinct.
Iftheindependence
is correct,
assumption
ofmine.
interests
ofotherselves,howevergreat,are notipsofactointerests
and thoseofothers
betweenmyinterests
Unlessthereis someconnection
whenI sacrifice
therewillinfactoften
be),I amnotcompensated
(as,ofcourse,
concern
forthoseofothers.Butthenjustified
orfuture)
myinterests
(present
does notitselfestablish
concernforothers.
formyownfuture
justified
A morepromising
is to developthe Kantianattemptto link
strategy
thatmoralrequirenormsand categorical
reasons.Kantthinks
categorical
mentsare categorical
norms,becausetheyapplyto us insofaras we are
andinclinations
ofourcontingent
interests
rational
beingsandindependently
applyto us in
(1785:408,411,425-7,432,442).Ifso, moralrequirements
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 13
and theseare essentialto ourbeingagents
virtueofourrationalfeatures,
who deliberateand possessreasonsforaction.If so, suchrequirements
of their
arguablyprovideagentswithreasonsforactionindependently
way
to
us
in
this
that
apply
Any
norms
inclinations.
interests
and
contingent
action.
for
reasons
agent-neutral
categorical,
generate
would
and
thereareanysuchmoralrequirements
tobe seenwhether
Itremains
so.
He
Kant
thinks
duties.
other-regarding
whethertheyincludefamiliar
require
that
to
Imperative
oftheCategorical
thefirst
formulation
understands
one act on maximsthata rationalbeingas suchcouldwillto be universal
thattheone thingthatan agentwouldchoose
(1785:421,425-7).He thinks
ofhercontingent
as sheisrational,
andindependently
foritsownsakeinsofar
agency.IfI
rational
of
wouldbe therealization
and interests,
inclinations
a
thenI will
being,
chooserationalagencysolelyinsofaras I am rational
as
and
not
the
rational
agencyof
chooseto developrationalagency such,
If
agency. so,thenreason
notjustmyrational
thisorthatbeing,inparticular,
aboutotherrationalagents,as rationalagents,
directsme to be concerned
as we are rationalbeings
fortheirownsakes.Kantconcludesthatinsofar
and
we wouldwillthatall rationalagentsbe treatedas endsin themselves
of
main
formulation
nevermerelyas means(1785:429);thisis hissecond
theCategorical
Imperative.
treating
duties.Itprohibits
imposesother-regarding
The secondformula
no
one
be
treated
that
as a means.Thenegative
requirement
anyonemerely
and
this
carries
as a meremeansrequiresthateach be treatedas an end,
as
ends
requires
certainpositiveduties.Forto treatotherrationalagents
and agencyis valuable.This
themas agentswhosedeliberation
treating
fromdoingthingsthat
ceterisparibus,notsimplythatwe refrain
requires,
and agencyofothersbutalso thatwe do things
wouldharmtheinterests
agency.Andthiswillinvolvea concerntopromote
topromote
theirrational
andagency,
fordeliberation
or assist,wherepossible,others'opportunities
and theexecutionoftheirchoices
theeffectiveness
oftheirdeliberations,
and commitments
(cf.1785:430).
a wayofunderstanding
suggests
ThisbriefsketchoftheKantianstrategy
moralnormssuchthatthese
ofother-regarding
thecategorical
application
reasonsforaction.
agent-neutral
normsgeneratecategorical,
as theyare rational
applyto peopleinsofar
1. Moralrequirements
agents.
2. Hencemoralrequirements
supplyagentswithreasonsforaction.
she willbe concernedwithrational
3. Insofar
as an agentis rational,
agency.
4. Insofaras an agentis concernedwithrationalagency,she will
treatrationalagentsas end in themselves.
dutiesto treat
includeother-regarding
5. Hencemoralrequirements
othersas ends.
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14 / David0. Brink
6. Henceagentshave reasonto act on other-regarding
duties.
Thisis nottheplacetodefendthedetailsofthisstrategy,
butitis a solution
to thepuzzleworthexploring
further.14
4. MetaphysicalEgoist Solutions
An agent-neutral
solutionwouldbe unnecessary
if the independence
werefalse.Butthatassumption
assumption
looksveryplausibleas applied
totheconnection
betweenother-regarding
actionandtheagent'sdesiresor
pro-attitudes.
We'vealreadynotedthatother-regarding
attitudes
seemneither
universal
nornecessary.
Butthereis a moreabstract
argument
fordenying
thatthereisa necessary
connection
betweenanyother-regarding
actionand
oftheagentthatappealstothesystematic
anypro-attitude
ofproplasticity
attitudes.
Thereare variousconnections
betweenfactsand people'sproattitudes.
Givensomeofmypro-attitudes,
certainfactsor theirrecognition
maycommitme to otherpro-attitudes.
IfI wantto hirea suitableperson
fortheposition,
andyouaretheonlysuitable
personavailable,
then,ifI realize
this,I willwantto hireyouforthepositionButthissortofconnection
is
nota necessary
connection
betweena factor beliefand a pro-attitude.
For
inresponse
tothefactorbelief,
itisalwayspossibletochangethepro-attitude
thathadpreviously
madethefactor beliefrelevant,
ratherthanadoptthe
newdesirethatthefactorbeliefrecommends.
So ina context
inwhichsome
background
are heldfixedthereare necessaryconnections
pro-attitudes
betweenfactsor beliefsand otherpro-attitudes.
Buttheseconnections
are
not necessarysimpliciter,
because systematic
of one's promodification
attitudes
inlightofthefactsorone'sbeliefs
Ifso,thisaspect
isalwayspossible.
oftheindependence
is secure.
assumption
Butthisdoesnotruleoutthepossibility
ofnecessary
connections
between
actionsandtheagent'sinterests,
other-regarding
becausewe can construct
non-conative
of people'sinterests.
If people'sinterests
conceptions
were
in certainways,thiswouldundermine
interdependent
the independence
We mightcall sucha viewmetaphysical
assumption.
egoism The metaphysicalegoistclaimsthatwhentheagent'sown happinessor interest
is
understood
we willsee thatthegoodofothersis,intheappropriate
correctly
way,partoftheagent'sowngoodso thatactingon other-regarding
moral
isa wayofpromoting
requirements
hisowninterests.
Ifso,therational
egoist
will be able to explainthe rationalauthority
of other-regarding
moral
on agent-relative
requirements
assumptions.
Metaphysical
egoismis sometimes
defended
as partofabsoluteidealism,
whichclaimsthateverything
thatthereis existsas partofa singlecosmic
or divineconsciousness.
Forthenwhatwe thinkofas distinct
lives(distinct
streams
ofconsciousness)
as we
wouldstandtocosmicordivineintelligence
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/ 15
ofMorality
A PuzzleAbouttheRationalAuthority
now believe thatthe stages of a single lifestand to the person whose life
it is. There would be a super-personalentitythat is both benefactorand
beneficiaryin the interpersonalcase in much the same way thatwe take
in diachronic,intrapersonal
thepersonto be bothbenefactorand beneficiary
sacrifice(contraryto Nozick'sclaim,quoted above). Whilethiswould make
compensationautomatic,it would not yet establishinterpersonal
intradeity
compensation,because theperson who is benefactoris notalso beneficiary.
compensation,rationalegoismwillnotrecognize
And withoutinterpersonal
demands.Ifabsoluteidealismis to
the rationalauthorityof other-regarding
establishinterpersonalcompensation,it musthold not only thatthereis a
entitybutalso thatpersonsare essentiallypartsofthissupersuper-personal
personal entitysuch thattheirwelfareis to be understoodin termsof its.
This, I gather,is roughlythe view of idealistssuch as Hegel, Green,and
Bradley.15
But, stated baldly,these metaphysicalassumptionsare likelyto seem
implausible.The general strategy,however, is also familiarfromGreek
to showthatjusticeis intheagent's
philosophy.In theRepublicPlatoattempts
own interest,properlyunderstood,because justiceis partof havinga wellorderedsoul. InNicomacheanEthicsix 4-12Aristotlearguesthatfriendship,
whichis the virtueappropriateto communitiesand includesthe perfection
ofjustice(1 155a22-8,1159b25-1160a8),is a virtuethatpromotesthe agent's
own happiness,because the virtuousfriendis "another-self"(1168b2-6,
benefits
herpresumably
thenbenefiting
1170b6-9).Ifthefriendis another-self,
thenperhaps
are associationsoffriendship,
me. And ifpoliticalcommunities
I can take thisattitudetowardsothersas well. Ifso, perhaps I can expect
reasonto comply
compensationand so willhave agent-relative
interpersonal
moral requirements.
withother-regarding
One attemptto unpack these claims relies on familiar,though not
metaphysicalclaims.Indeed,I thinkthatthebasic strategy
uncontroversial,
Aristotleclaimsthatwe can justifyconcernforone's (best
is Aristotelian.16
or complete)friendsand familymembers(e.g. childrenand siblings)as cases
of, or on the model of,self-love(1161b15-1162a5,1166alO).
in thesamewayas he is related
The excellentpersonis relatedto hisfriend
is anotherself,and therefore,
to himself,
sincea friend
justas hisownbeing
forhimin the
is choiceworthy
beingis choiceworthy
forhim,thefriend's
sameor a similarway [1170b6-9]
One way to understand
theseclaimsis as a proposalto modeltherelationship
betweena selfand
on therelationship
between"other-selves"
(e.g. intimates)
its temporalparts. I have reason to regard my intimatesas other-selves,
to me as future
stages
thesame relationship
because theybear approximately
bearto me,and thisfactprovidesme withreasonto care aboutthem.
ofmyself
Accordingto rationalegoism, concern for my own futureis rational;
concernformy own futureis concernforme, and I am compensatedfor
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16 / David0. Brink
ofmypresentselfon behalfofmyfuture
self,becausemyfuture
sacrifices
self
selfbe relatedto mypresent
selfis a partofme.Buthowmusta future
inorderforbothtobe partsofme?A commonandplausibleanswer(which
On thisview,
continuity.17
I shallemploybutnotdefend)is psychological
continuous
of
psychologically
person
consists
of
a
series
a particular
person
justin case
continuous
stages.A seriesofpersonstagesis psychologically
inthisseriesare psychologically
wellconnected.
And
members
contiguous
connectedjustin case theyare
a pairofpersonstagesis psychologically
desires,andintenas beliefs,
similar
(intermsofsuchthings
psychologically
ofthelaterstagearecausallydependent
features
tions)andthepsychological
wouldseemto implythatI
upontheearlierstage.On thisview,self-love
continuous
with
aboutselvesthatare psychologically
shouldbe concerned
mypresentself.
withotherselveswithwhomI
continuous
ButI can be psychologically
as wellas intrapersharea mentallifeand interact
causally.Interpersonal,
is possible.There will be psychological
continuity
sonal, psychological
values,and goalsas the
betweenanypeoplewhosharebeliefs,
continuity
extentin
Thiswillbe trueto a significant
resultoftheircausalinteraction.
Itwillalso be trueto an
thecase ofintimates,
suchas spousesand friends.
ofthesamecommunity,
thoughlesser,extentamongmembers
interesting,
becausetheyhavecommongoalsandaimsandbecausethesesharedgoals
and interaction.
havebeen producedat leastin partby mutualdiscussion
becauseit can
continuity
can also be indirect,
Interpersonal
psychological
butwhoare each
connected
holdbetweenpeoplewhoare notthemselves
whenitis mediated
connected
to othersincommon.Itcan also be indirect
andpractices
institu(e.g.mediaandlegalandpolitical
bysocialinstitutions
in. In theseways,
tions)thatotherwiseisolatedpeople bothparticipate
evenifthe
can extendquitebroadly,
continuity
interpersonal
psychological
oftenweakensas it extendsfurther.
degreeofcontinuity
arepsychologically
each
individuals
continuous,
To theextentthatdistinct
whoextendsherowninterests
canandshouldviewtheotheras another-self
Ifso,
selfextendsherinterests.
inmuchthesamewaythatherownfuture
therecanbe automatic
amongother-selves
just
compensation
interpersonal
Onewillhave
as thereis automatic
intrapersonal
compensation.
diachronic,
tothe
ofanother
thewelfare
reasonstopromote
proportional
agent-relative
one bearsto her.
continuity
degreeofpsychological
willpresumably
theamountofother-regarding
affect
Degreeofcontinuity
I have
in thisway.Presumably,
conductand concernthatcan be justified
thanmyintimates,
lessagent-relative
reasontobenefit
comparative
strangers
withme
are less psychologically
continuous
precisely
becausetheformer
to a disthanthelatter.In thisway,metaphysical
egoismseemscommitted
to thedegreeofpsychological
countrateofrationalconcernproportional
tomorality,
Butthisneednotbe a threat
theagentbearstoothers.
continuity
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 17
tobe
thought
toothersis commonly
becausetheextentofone'sobligations
thatone can conferbutalso
a function
notsimplyoftheamountofbenefit
beneficiaries.
inwhichonestandstopotential
ofthenatureoftherelationship
obligations
towards
those
more
stringent
Commonsense
morality
recognizes
and
family
and
friends
in
relationships
(e.g.
to
stands
special
to whomone
moral
in
Even
impartial
than
towards
others.
topartners cooperative
schemes)
typically
tryto justify
or consequentialism,
theories,
suchas utilitarianism
of
differential
concern
and
the
legitimacy
recognition
ofspecialobligations
The
forthoseto whomtheagentstandsin specialrelationships.18 scale of
to thoseto whomwe standin difamongourmoralobligations
stringency
a moraldiscount
tobe seenwhether
rate.Itremains
ferent
relationships
forms
discount
rateofrational
egoist's
rateandthemetaphysical
themoraldiscount
butitisnota defect
ofotherperse ofitsjustification
concern
areisomorphic,
becausethere
rateofconcern,
regarding
concernthatitembodiesa discount
is a moraldiscountrate.
conthedegreeofpsychological
one'spowertoaffect
Becauseitiswithin
thereisa question
whether
oneshouldcultivate
oneshareswithothers,
tinuity
or maintainother-selves.
The metaphysical
egoistcan claimthathaving
inimportant
extendsmyinterests
ways.A plausibleconception
another-self
to exercisethose
ofwelfarecan reasonably
claimthatit is in myinterest
capacitiesthatarecentraltothesortofbeingI am andthatthesecapacities
deliberative
capacities(cf.ENi 7). Havinganother-self
include,importantly,
capacities.
Myothertoexercise
mydeliberative
provides
uniqueopportunities
I canlearnandbenefit
theexperiences
from
selfbrings
menewinformation.
deliberation
has by addingthemto myown.Moreover,
thatmyother-self
is exercisedin the
Practicaldeliberation
includespracticaldeliberation.
andplans.Bydrawing
andpursuit
ofprojects
reflective
formation,
assessment,
I improve
herindiscussion,
ofmyother-self
andengaging
ontheexperience
informed
decisions
notjustbyreaching
better
deliberations,
myownpractical
manner.I can also exercise
mydecisionsina reflective
butalsobyforming
inmorecomplexprojects
newdeliberative
requiring
capacities
byengaging
expandmydeliberative
mutualcooperation.
Intheseways,myother-selves
and control.
powers,activities,
extendsone's interests
Theseaspectsoftheway in whichanother-self
one has reasonto seek in
constrain
similarity
thedegreeofpsychological
willbe morediverseand morecomplex
sucha relationship.
Myactivities
I willdiversify
ifmyother-self
myexperiis no merecloneofme.19Clearly,
interests
different
withsomeonewhohassomewhat
encemorebyinteracting
from
willbe aidedbyinputandcriticism
andexperiences.
Mydeliberations
willoften
be enhanced
incomplex
newperspectives.
Andcooperation
projects
andtalents.
Theseconsiderations
strengths
whenparticipants
havedifferent
in larger,morediversegroupsas wellsmall
providereasonto participate
andmyownpractical
willbe enlarged
intimate
associations.
Myexperiences
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18 / David0. Brink
deliberations
willbe enhancedby the inputfrompeople withdifferent
andlargergroupswithmorediverse
experiences,
values,andperspectives,
make possiblemorecomplexformsof social
membership
will typically
capacities.
cooperation
and,hence,theexerciseofnewkindsofdeliberative
showthatbeneficial
forcultivating
another-self
Indeed,thearguments
one'sinterests.
Ifso, one
interaction
withothersisitselfa wayofextending
reasonto benefit
others,as a way ofestablishing
willhave agent-relative
eventowardsthosewithwhomone is notalreadycontinuous.
another-self,
reasonstocultivate
thatthereareagent-relative
Thesearereasonstothink
for
compensation
andmaintain
other-selves,
andbecausethereisautomatic
sacrifice
thereis reasonto thinkthatother-regarding
amongother-selves,
actioncan be a necessarypartofan agent'sgood.
thefullrangeofmoral
theegoistcanjustify
Butwe maywonderwhether
theactions
formorality
seemstorequirenotjustthatwe perform
demands,
itsdemandsfromtherightsortof
it demandsofus butalso thatwe fulfill
motives.Evenifegoismcan justify
themoraldemandthatI benefit
others,
others
itmayseemthatitcannotaccountforthemoraldemandthatI benefit
fortheirownsakes.Becausethemetaphysical
egoistjustifies
outofa concern
theother'sgoodas partofthe
sacrifice
onbehalfofanother
byrepresenting
actionnot
agent'sowngood,thisseemsto base theagent'sother-regarding
on concernfortheother'sownsake,butinsteadon self-love.
to defendother-regarding
Whilethestrategic
egoistmayfinditdifficult
is
at
the
concernthat not, bottom,
egoistcan do
instrumental, metaphysical
for
cultivating
other-selves
appeals
egoist's
argument
better.
Themetaphysical
of
and
that
the
to a deliberative
welfare claims
right
conception individual
extendmy interests
sortof other-regarding
by givingme
relationships
toexercisemorediverseandcomplexdeliberative
capacities.
opportunities
onone's
other-selves
Thisargument
acquiring
byappealtoitseffects
justifies
other
one's
but
in
things,
capacities, thecapacities questioninvolve,among
if
I'm
andbeneficial
ways.So
justified
relation
tootherpeopleincooperative
inentering
becausetheyexercisethesesortsofcapacities,
suchrelationships
attitude
does not obviouslyreflecta purelyinstrumental
myjustification
towardsthosewithwhomI'm entering
suchrelationships.
withothersis underway,psychological
oncemyrelationship
Moreover,
and I can beginto see theirwelfareas
continuity
beginsto getestablished,
partofmyown.Butifthisis true,thenmyconcernforthemwillnotbe
Recallthe intrapersonal
parallel.WhenI undergoa
purelyinstrumental.
ofmyfuture
I do so becausetheinterests
sacrifice
fora future
benefit
present
out of a
selfare interests
of mine;in thisway,I makepresentsacrifices
self.Ofcourse,theon-balance
concernforthesakeofmyfuture
rationality
ofthesacrifice
myoverallgood.But,because
dependsuponitspromoting
thegoodofmyfuture
selfispartofthisoverallgood,concernformyoverall
self.
as a constituent
part,a concernforthegoodofmyfuture
goodrequires,
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 19
selfforitsownsake seemscompatible
In thisway,concernformyfuture
withand,indeed,essentialto self-love.
and
continuity
egoistwantstomodelinterpersonal
Nowthemetaphysical
future
as
the
agent's
Just
and concern.
continuity
concernon intrapersonal
arepartofherinterests.
ofother-selves
selfisa partofher,so tootheinterests
be concernedabout
should
agent
the
why
Andso justas egoismexplains
withherpresent
continuous
it
is
as
selfforitsownsake,insofar
herfuture
aboutherother-selves
self,so tooitexplainswhysheshouldbe concerned
withher.
as theyare continuous
fortheirownsakes,insofar
egoismhas appealedto bothdeliberative
Myaccountof metaphysical
accountsofpersonal
continuity
ofwelfareand psychological
conceptions
One could
of
argument.
lines
Thesemayseemto be independent
identity.
relationships
other-regarding
andmaintaining
cultivating
justify
apparently
theidea
invoking
ofwelfarewithout
conceptions
byappealto deliberative
psychological
appealtointerpersonal
andonecouldapparently
ofanother-self,
evenifonewere,say,
conduct
ofother-regarding
as a justification
continuity
are somewhatindependent,
Whilethesetwolinesofargument
a hedonist.
egoism.The
metaphysical
andtogether
strengthen
theyarecomplementary
why
in
role
explaining
ofwelfare
playsa distinctive
conception
deliberative
between
parallel
while
the
I shouldcultivateand maintainother-selves,
providesa noncontinuity
psychological
and intrapersonal
interpersonal
to whom
people
about
accountofwhyI shouldbe concerned
instrumental
the
other.
supports
arguably
eachlineofargument
Moreover,
I amso related.
conceptions
betweendeliberative
Weshouldexpecttofindinterdependence
of welfare,deliberativeconceptionsof personhood,and psychological
in termsofreasonedcontroland
accountsofpersonalidentity
continuity
continuity,
(psychological
of beliefs,desires,and intentions
modification
and
category
a normative
isitself
Becausepersonhood
interpreted).
properly
in
matters
what
personal
is an accountof
continuity
becausepsychological
ourviewsaboutwelfare
oughttoaffect
ourviewsaboutthesematters
identity,
or happiness.Ifwhatit is to be a personis to have certaindeliberative
forthere
andwhatitistobe thesamepersonovertimeis,roughly,
capacities
states,thenwe shouldexpectone's
ofintentional
tobe reasonedcontinuity
of one's
ingredient
capacitiesto be an important
exerciseof deliberative
Andtotheextentthat
inpartbecauseitwillextendone'sinterests.
welfare,
we should
ina goodlife,
ingredients
seemtobe principal
deliberative
activities
ingredient
statesto be a principal
ofintentional
expectreasonedcontinuity
tobe principal
capacities
anddeliberative
inpersonal
identity
inwhatmatters
egoist'sdualappeal
Inthisway,themetaphysical
inpersonhood.
ingredients
psychological
conceptionsof welfareand interpersonal
to deliberative
promisesto be a virtue.
continuity
ofotherjustification
egoistcan provideagent-relative
The metaphysical
howanother's
goodcanbe partoftheagent's
demands
byshowing
regarding
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20 / David0. Brink
reasontofulfill
an agentwillalwayshavean overriding
owngood.Whether
further
moralrequirement
isanother
matter,
requiring
everyother-regarding
ofboththenatureofmorality's
other-regarding
demandsand
articulation
egoism.
versionofmetaphysical
thisneo-Aristotelian
5. Solutions
of
viewsaboutthefoundations
I havetriedto showhowsomefamiliar
be seenas, perhapstacit,solutions
to thepuzzle.This
ethicscan profitably
perspective
mayhelpus betterassesstheseviews.
and minimalist
For instance,whenwe view certainkindsof relativist
andlocate
tothepuzzle,we canbothsee theirrationale
theories
as solutions
topreserve
byan attempt
theirimplausibility.
Thesetheories
aremotivated
the
the otherintuitively
plausibleelementsof the puzzle.But rejecting
whilemaintaining
duties(norms),
other-regarding
existenceofcategorical
tothepuzzle.
seemstheleastplausible
theindependence
response
assumption
was to insistthatmoral
Itwouldbe reasonableonlyifthesole alternative
ofmere
thanrequirements
requirements
have no morerationalauthority
Butthisis notso.
etiquette.
Supposewe acceptnotonly(I)butalso(III)'sclaimthatallreasonsforaction
areagent-relative
and(IV)'sindependence
assumption;
thiswouldrequireus
and reject(II). But thiswould not show thatmoral
to be externalists
For
ofetiquette.
thantherequirements
requirements
hadno moreauthority
a rational
ofstrategic
reasoning
toshowhow
forms
egoistcanemploycertain
otherreasonsto fulfill
agentshave generallyreliable,albeitcontingent,
Andin
offorbearance,
andmutual-aid.
cooperation,
regarding
requirements
in whichactingon otherthoseactualor merelypossiblecircumstances
theinterests
oraimsofthe
wouldnotfurther
regarding
moralrequirements
offailure
toactonthoserequirements
theimmorality
agent,we canmaintain
itsirrationality.
evenifwe cannotmaintain
So,evenifwe hadtoaccept(III)
and (IV),itwouldstillbe morereasonableto reject(II) than(I).
isthecombination
ofan agent-relative
ethicaltheory
What'sobjectionable
Anagent-relative
moraltheory
thatdenied
andtheindependence
assumption.
minimalist.
Metatheindependence
assumption
neednotbe unacceptably
understood,
correctly
thatpeople'sinterests,
physical
egoismtriestoestablish
conductand
are interdependent
in waysthatensurethatother-regarding
I presented
metaconcernnecessarily
promotetheagent'sown interests.
ratherthanethical,egoism-that
physicalegoismas a versionofrational,
ofother-regarding
andtherationalauthority
is,as an accountofrationality
moralrequirements,
ratherthanas an accountofthecontentofmorality.
Buttheresources
ofmetaphysical
egoismare availabletotheethicalegoist
Insofar
be agent-relative.
whoinsists
thatmoralrequirements
mustthemselves
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 21
other-regarding
so as to justify
egoismcan be articulated
as metaphysical
metamoral
theoryincorporating
conductand concern,an agent-relative
minimalist
clearly
unacceptable
while
avoiding
egoismcandeny(I)
physical
ofcategorical
Indeed,we mightconcludethattherejection
commitments.
relativist
is
neither
if
it
is
in
only
asserted
(I),
plausible
norms,
other-regarding
if
it
incorporates
and
minimalism
only
relativism
will
avoid
it
minimalist;
nor
egoism.
metaphysical
Of course,ifwe take (I) to be reasonablyfixed,our viewsaboutthe
withour
ofanyotherelementofthepuzzlewillvaryinversely
plausibility
if
we
for
accept
other
two.
instance,
of
the
So,
the
viewsabout plausibility
there
are
requirements
the
that
other-regarding
fixed
claim
orholdreasonably
denial
thenwe cansee thattheexternalist
assumption,
andtheindependence
under
will
be
If,
plausible.
denial
of
inversely
(III)
the
of(II)and agent-neutral
are
agent-relative,
that
all
reasons
for
action
we
also
think
theseassumptions,
we mustconcludethatit is at leastpossibleforthereto be circumstances
foran agentto failto fulfill
butnotirrational
inwhichitwouldbe immoral
think
(II)isfalse
Wewill,therefore,
moralrequirements.
herother-regarding
that
moral
we
also
assume
if,undertheseassumptions,
And,similarly,
all
that
not
think
should
we
mustsupplyreasonsforaction,
requirements
If
we
(III).
will
to
reject
lead
us
This
reasonsforactioncanbe agent-relative.
we acceptagent-relative
then,whether
assumption,
reject(IV)'sindependence
we
should
accept(II)'sclaim
aboutrationality,
assumptions
oragent-neutral
for
do supplyreasons action(thoughwe needn't
thatmoralrequirements
aboutmorality).
truth
does,thatthisis a conceptual
as theinternalist
think,
can
Moreover,we maypool resources.The friendof agent-relativity
egoiststoprovide
ofbothstrategic
andmetaphysical
combinetheresources
ofother-regarding
a strongrationalegoistdefenseoftherationalauthority
maywishto enlistthe
ofagent-neutrality
moraldemands.Eventhefriend
and metaphysical
egoists.Forevenifwe reject(III)'sclaim
aid ofstrategic
ofagentandaccepttheexistence
thatallreasonsforactionareagent-relative
tothink
thatallreasonsforactionareagentwe areunlikely
neutral
reasons,
reasonsforaction.Butthisraises
neutral.Therewillstillbe agent-relative
otherreasonsthatsupport
betweenagent-neutral
thepossibility
ofconflict
reasonsthatmaynot.Ifwe
andagent-relative
moralrequirements
regarding
reasons
ofmoralrequirements,
agent-neutral
theimportance
aretovindicate
agent-relative
overridden
by countervailing
mustnot be systematically
reasons
theses
andweakerrationalist
theneedtodistinguish
stronger
Thissuggests
reason
to
fulfill
thesisclaimsthatthereis alwayssome
A weak rationalist
The
todo so istothatextentirrational.
suchthatfailure
moralrequirements
thesiswouldclaimthatforeveryagentthereis always
rationalist
strongest
to do so is
suchthatfailure
moralrequirements
reasonto fulfill
overriding
theses.
rationalist
irrational.
on-balance
And,ofcourse,thereareintermediate
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22 / David0. Brink
ofthe
thesiswillaffect
ourformulation
Infact,thestrength
oftherationalist
a
ofthepuzzleso that(II)reflects
puzzle.We mightreviseourformulation
strongrationalist
thesis
to
other-regarding
obligations-apply
I. Moralrequirements-including
oftheiraimsor interests.
agentsindependently
or
provideagentswithcompelling
II. Moralrequirements
necessarily
overriding
reasonsforaction.
III. Reasonsforactionaredependent
ontheaimsorinterests
oftheagent
who has them.
IV Thereis no necessaryconnection
betweenother-regarding
action
oftheagent.
and anyaim or interest
A solution
theexistence
ofagent-neutral
totheinitial
puzzlethatestablishes
reasonstobe moralmaynotsolvetherevisedpuzzle.Thedefenseofagentabout
reasonsandtherejection
ofpurelyagent-relative
assumptions
neutral
to vindicate
therarationality,
thoughsignificant
claims,are notsufficient
reasonsare
tionalist
elementof the revisedpuzzle.Unlessagent-neutral
wouldbe toarguethatagentnecessarily
superior
reasons,thebestsolution
moralrequireunderstood,
support
other-regarding
relative
reasons,
properly
the
mentsas well.So friends
ofagent-neutrality
woulddo wellto cultivate
egoists,
eveniftheyrejecttherational
resources
ofstrategic
andmetaphysical
thatall reasonsforactionare agent-relative.
egoistassumption
ofthepuzzlewouldrequiremorecomprehensive
Further
investigation
foragentof(III) and (IV).Are therecompelling
arguments
investigations
foragent-neutrality
be articulated
CanKantian
plausibly?
relativity?
arguments
as theneo-Aristotelian
viewclaims?If
Arepeople'sinterests
independent,
moralrequirements
and other-regarding
aspectsof
so, do other-regarding
istheauthority
ofmoral
Howstrong
an agent'swelfare
dovetail
appropriately?
forjustifying
conduct
demandswhenthevariousresources
other-regarding
we willhavethe
are countedtogether?
Whenwe answerthesequestions,
solution
to thepuzzleabouttherational
authority
resources
fora satisfying
ofmorality.20
Notes
it
assumes the normsof moralityare normsof rationality,
1. Because internalism
that(II) is an a prioriconstrainton moraltheoryand is not up
implies,in effect,
forgrabs So understood,internalismis a groundforasserting(II) Internalism
is sometimesunderstoodas a claim about moralmotivation,whereas the kind
or morality
thatsupports(II) is a claimabouttherationalauthority
ofinternalism
see Brink1989 ch 3 Internalism
For a discussionofvariousformsofinternalism,
about moral motivationis relevantto a puzzle about moral motivation
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A Puzzle About the RationalAuthontyof Morality/ 23
I
II
III
IV
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
MoralJudgments
express beliefs
Moraljudgmentsimplymotivation
Motivationinvolvespro-attitudes
Thereis no necessaryconnectionbetweenany beliefand anypro-attitude
Noncognitivists
(e g Stevensonand Hare) reject(I), externalists(e g Foot and
I) deny(II),and new-wavetheoriesofmotivation(e g Nageland McDowell)deny
either(III) or (IV) ThoughI do notagree withtheirsolutions,thissecond puzzle
is usefullydiscussedby McNaughton1988 and Smith1989
theegoistclaimthatI have reason
In some contextsit is important
to distinguish
to do somethinginsofaras it wouldpromotemyinterestsor advance myoverall
claim thatI have reason to do somethinginsofar
good and the instrumentalist
as it would satisfymy presentdesires Amongotherdifferences,
the latterhas
an important
thatthe formerdoes not But bothare agenttemporalrestriction
relativeviews,and mypresentpurposesdo not in generalrequirethattheybe
only where it seems relevant
sharplydistinguishedI will markthe distinction
to my argument
As I am understanding
it,agent-neutrality
says onlythatotherpeople's interests
ofanyconnection
can directlyprovideme withreasonsforaction,independently
withmy interestsor aims,it says nothingabout the scope or weightof various
reasons So agent-neutral
theoriescan be quite varied
directlyother-regarding
benevolence
and Broad'sself-referential
altruism
For instance,Sidgwick'srational
are both agent-neutral
(cf Broad 1953 279-280)
Cf Davidson 1963, 1974
Cf Hume 1739 III i 1, Mackie 1977 ch 1, Harman 1975, 1984
betweenact egoismandmotive
Myaccountofstrategic
egoismdoes notdistinguish
egoism That's a topic foranotheroccasion
Cf EpicurusKuriaiDoxa 31-38,Taylor 1987,Axelrod 1984,Gauthier1986,and
such
Frank 1988 Thougheach accepts a formof rationalegoismincorporating
strategicreasoning,Epicurusand Gauthierare clearestabout employingsuch
reasoningas partofethicalegoismand itsattemptto derivethecontentofmorality
fromagent-relative
rationalchoice
constraintson the models of social interaction
There are various significant
in whichcooperationand restraint
are strategically
rational.The modelmustbe
too much,the environment
dynamic,actorsmustnot discountfuturepay-offs
mustincludea sufficiently
largenumberofconditionalcompliers,and conditional
compliersmustbe able to monitorreliablythe complianceand noncompliance
of others(thislast conditiontendsto be more easily satisfiedin small groups)
The RingofGygesexposes thecounterfactual
ofstrategicegoism,this
instability
is whyPlato insiststhatjusticebe shownto be valuable foritsintrinsic,
and not
simplyextrinsic,consequences(Rep 359b-361d) However,Repubhci-uiappears
ofjustice,
to be concernedwitha rationalegoistchallengeto therationalauthority
notwithethicalegoism Ifso, it differs
fromtheGorgias,inwhichCalliclespresents
an ethicalegoist challengeto conventionaljustice
Indeed, Gauthieris quite candid about these limitationsin his argument His
situations
ofother-regarding
conductamongactorsinstrategic
depends
justification
on theassumption
thatsuchactorsare "psychologically
translucent"
(1986 173-4),
and he acknowledgesthathe cannotexplaindutiesto thosewithwhomone has
no strategicinteraction(1986 16, 17)
My discussionhere owes much to Foot 1972
Anyview,such as this,thattreatsrationalactionas actionthatwouldsatisfythe
aims the agent would have in an idealized epistemicstate in whichher beliefs
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24 / David 0 Brink
anddesiresareinreflective
equilibrium
might
seemtobe an agent-relative
view
Ifso,itmayseemthatnoarguments
aboutrationality
foragent-neutrality
within
reflective
equilibrium
couldunseatagent-relative
assumptions
aboutrationality,
therationality
ofother-regarding
conductwouldstilldependon factsaboutthe
agent'saimsor desires(cf Williams1980) Butthisa prioridefenseofagentisnota constituent
relativity
hastwoproblemsFirst,
thiskindofagent-relativity
elementofthepuzzle Ifreflective
equilibrium
might
be suchthataimsthatare
inreflective
equilibrium
mustincludedirectconcernforothers,
thenthereis no
problemabouttherationalauthority
ofmorality
on thekindofagent-relative
ofthisreflective
assumptions
characteristic
equilibrium
accountofrationality
Ifwe understand
theagent-relativity
of(III)inthisway,thereis or needbe no
in(I-(IV)To putitanother
inconsistency
way,thekindofagent-neutrality
sufficient
toresolvethepuzzleisnotinconsistent
withagent-relativity
inthissenseSecond,
whether
thereflective
isagent-relative
equilibrium
accountofrationality
depends
thearguments
ifgood,are goodarguments
foragent-neutrality,
uponwhether
becausethey'rein reflective
equilibrium
or whether
they'repartofreflective
Iftheformer,
therationality
equilibrium
becausethey're
goodarguments
ofotherifthelatter,
regarding
conductis agent-relative,
itis agent-neutral
The friend
ofagent-neutrality
advancesarguments
themerits
presumably
foragent-neutrality
inreflective
ofwhichareintended
toexplainwhyagent-neutrality
shouldfigure
equilibriumAs such, these arguments,if successful,would vindicate
agent-neutrality
12 Theexampleinvolving
gouty
toesisHume's(1751ch V,pt ii),though
hisconcern
is withegoisttheoriesofmotivation,
notrationality
13 Itwillhaveevenlessforceagainstagent-relative
aboutrationality
assumptions
ifwe rejecttheindependence
assumption
(cf ?4 below)
14 I explorethisstrategy
morefullyin Brink1991
15 Cf Hegel1821 ?268, 1840 ch 3, Green1883 ??180-91,199-203,
232-9,286,
and Bradley1927 69-81,163,166-92,203-6,219-25
16 Whatfollowsis a condensedversionofclaimsthatI defendat greaterlength
in Brink1990,cf Irwin1988 ch 18
is also PlatonicPlatoclaimsthat(1) thevirtuous
Thisargument
personwill
haveloveforothers(Rep402d-403c,
concernfor
412d),and(2)love(a) involves
thebeloved'sownsake,and(b)is,forthelover,thenextbestthing
toimmortality
(Symp206e-212candPhdrs243c-257b)(Cf Irwin1977 241-3) Plato'sgrounds
foraccepting
toAristotle's
reasonsforregarding
one'sfriend
(b)seemverysimilar
as "another-self"
(see below)(1)-(2)allowPlatoto arguethatthevirtuous
agent
willbe concernedabout othersfortheirown sakes and willnecessarilybenefit
frombenefiting
them
Also,thereis a readingof thisproject,whichI won'tpursue,thatbears
to theidealiststrategy
mentioned
above
resemblance
17 Cf Parfit
1984 partIII,Shoemaker1984 Forsomeevidencethatsucha view
see Irwin1988 241-255,284-6,345,376-8
appealsto Aristotle,
18 Cf Sidgwick1907 432-9,Railton1984,and Brink1986
iscompatible
the
19 Psychological
withpsychological
diversity
continuity
provided
diversityis the resultof interactionin which the participantsexchanged and
resultfroma process
discussedbeliefs,
goals,and values Forthendifferences
inwhichtherewerecommonintentional
statesproduced
bycausalinteraction
at theCenterforAdvanced
20 Workon thispaperwas doneduringa fellowship
Sciencesthatwasfunded
StudyintheBehavioral
byan OldDominion
Fellowship
andbygrants
from
theNational
from
theMassachusetts
Institute
ofTechnology
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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
A Puzzle About the RationalAuthorityof Morality/ 25
and the AndrewW Mellon
(#RA-20037-88)
forthe Humanities
Endowment
fortheirsupportI wouldalso
I wouldliketothanktheseinstitutions
Foundation
like to thankRandyCalvert,StephenDarwall,ThomasHurka,and David
ofsomeoftheseissues
forhelpful
discussion
McNaughton
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