Cognitive Development 24 (2009) 125–132
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Cognitive Development
Preschoolers use speakers’ preferences to learn words
Megan M. Saylor a,∗, Mark A. Sabbagh b, Alexandra Fortuna a,
Georgene Troseth a
a
b
Vanderbilt University, United States
Queen’s University, Canada
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Keywords:
Word learning
Language development
Theory of mind
Preschoolers
a b s t r a c t
In two studies, we investigated preschoolers’ ability to use others’
preferences to learn names for things. Two studies demonstrated
that preschool children make smart use of others’ preferences. In
the first study, preschool children only used information about others’ preferences when they were clearly linked to referential intentions. The second study established that children only used others’
preferences to learn words when the preference and intention information came from the same person. Both studies reveal impressive
use of mental state information for word learning purposes.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
A large body of research has established that social information is important for word learning
(Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2005). For example, seminal research by Baldwin and colleagues demonstrated
that toddlers use information about others’ focus of attention to disambiguate speakers’ intentions
(Baldwin, 1993). In addition, research by Akhtar and colleagues has shown that toddlers use a variety
of cues to make accurate judgments about those referential intentions, including discourse novelty
and emotional expressions (Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996; Akhtar & Tomasello, 1996). There is
increasing evidence that children’s understanding of most mental states emerges early in the second
year of life (Behne, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2005; Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008; Onishi
& Baillargeon, 2005; Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997). However, less is known about how this understanding
might be elaborated during the preschool years. One skill that preschoolers may master is the ability to
use one mental state to make inferences about another. We explore this possibility by asking whether
preschoolers can use information about preferences to disambiguate referential intentions.
We focus our investigation on preferences for several reasons. First, preferences are complex. Second, understanding of some aspects of preferences emerges early, making it likely that preschoolers
∗ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology and Human Development, GPC 512, Vanderbilt University, Nashville,
TN 37203-5701, United States.
E-mail address: [email protected] (M.M. Saylor).
0885-2014/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2008.12.003
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M.M. Saylor et al. / Cognitive Development 24 (2009) 125–132
have a stable enough understanding of this mental state to use it productively to inform inferences
about referential intentions. Third, there is some ambiguity in the existing literature concerning the
way that children use preferences to interpret other mental states. We review the relevant literature
below.
Preferences are complex for three reasons. For one, preferences (likes) are only probabilistically
associated with desires (wants). Although it may generally be safe to assume that people will want the
things they like, this does not always hold. For example, one may prefer chocolate ice cream but on
occasion choose to eat strawberry ice cream (perhaps because of a desire for something different). Second, preferences are subjective; an object may be liked or disliked by different people. This holds even
for people who are similar to one another, such as best friends. Third, preferences are not necessarily
stable, they often change over time.
Research suggests that 3-year-olds understand the link between preferences and desires. For example, Cassidy et al. (2005) demonstrated that 3-year-olds inferred that if someone liked a type of activity
(e.g., playing outside) they would want to engage in an activity that was consistent with their preference (e.g., going on a picnic). Similarly, Saylor and Troseth (2006) showed that preschoolers use
speakers’ preferences to infer desires in a word learning task. In their study, 3-year-olds were introduced to pairs of novel toys. One researcher asked children about their own preference regarding the
two objects and indicated which toy she liked by looking at it and telling them about her preference.
After the objects were removed from view, the researcher expressed her desire to play with her preferred toy, which she referred to with a novel label (e.g., “I really want to play with the dax! But we put
the dax away!”). She then asked children to select the dax from an array of two objects. Children had
to remember which object the researcher had preferred to interpret her desire and, importantly, the
intended referent of the novel word. Even when their preferences conflicted with those of the other
person, 3-year-olds were able to do so.
Both of these studies suggest that children may be able to use preferences to make inferences about
other mental states as early as age 3. However, both studies fall short of demonstrating that preschoolers recognize that likes are not perfectly predictive of other mental states. We focus on preschoolers’
understanding of the link between preferences and intentions in the present investigation because
the cost of incorrectly assuming a link between preferences and intentions is high—it could lead to
incorrect word-referent mappings. In particular, because the researcher in the Saylor and Troseth
(2006) study always named what she preferred, preschoolers may have succeeded at learning words
by making the (incorrect) assumption that people name what they like.
This account seems plausible for two reasons. First, young children sometimes have difficulty telling
the difference between desires and intentions (Astington & Gopnik, 1991; Baird & Astington, 2005). For
example, Feinfield, Lee, Flavell, Green, and Flavell (1999) demonstrated that when 3-year-olds were
told a story about a character who preferred to go to the mountains but whose mother told him to go
to the football field (which he disliked), they confused the character’s intention (to go to the disliked
location) and desire (to go to the preferred location) (Schult, 2002). Second, research on children’s
word learning demonstrates that preschoolers have other, similar assumptions about regularities of
others’ labeling behavior. In particular, they learn words on the basis of assumptions that people tend
to name objects that they are familiar with (Birch & Bloom, 2002) and that people tend to label objects
that are new in a particular context (Akhtar et al., 1996). It therefore seemed possible that 3-year-olds
might assume that people name what they like.
We constructed a situation in which a speaker’s preference was either relevant or irrelevant to their
referential intention. Unlike the Saylor and Troseth (2006) study, there was no conflict between the
child’s and the researcher’s preferences. As in their study, an adult first indicated which of two objects
she liked and then asked children to identify her preferred object. In one condition, when the toys were
out of sight, the adult re-expressed her preference for the novel object while labeling it with a novel
word (e.g., “I like the blik.”). By restating her preference and using a definite article, the adult promotes
the inference that her preferences are relevant to identifying the referent of the novel word she offers.
This condition is the most similar to that used in the Saylor and Troseth study. A second condition
was the same except that the novel word was used without the adult restating her preference (e.g., by
saying, “I have a blik.”). In this case, there was no indication that the preferred object was the one being
labeled (the adult did not use the word “like” and she used an indefinite article). Although children
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were familiar with the adult’s preferences, those preferences were not helpful in disambiguating the
referent of the novel word.
If children have a simple assumption that people label things they like, they should learn equally
well in both conditions. In contrast, if children appreciate that contextual factors allow preferences to
disambiguate referential intentions, they should learn only in the condition in which the preference
is restated.
1. Study 1
1.1. Method
1.1.1. Participants
The 48 children (27 females) in the final sample ranged in age from 3–5 to 4–11 years (M = 4–2). They
were typically developing, monolingual, English speaking children from a predominately middle-class
Caucasian community in the southern USA. Children were recruited from a database of families interested in research participation drawn from state birth records. Two additional children participated,
but their data were not included because of experimenter error.
1.1.2. Materials and equipment
Each child saw two pairs of familiar objects (a car with a boat and a fish with a turtle) and two
pairs of novel objects (Fig. 1). The novel objects were grouped so that both items of a pair would be
equally interesting. All paired objects were of a different color (red versus blue, pink versus green),
making them easily distinguishable. A second set of novel objects, identical to the first set in every
aspect except for color, was used during comprehension trials to assess children’s generalization of
novel labels. Each of two novel labels (blik and fep) was consistently assigned to one pair of objects.
Objects were taken out of multi-colored boxes. The experimental sessions were videotaped.
1.1.3. Design
Equal numbers of children were assigned to either a relevant condition, in which the adult reexpressed her preference for an object when offering a novel label, or an irrelevant condition, in which
the adult did not re-express her preference during labeling. Assignment to condition was random with
the constraint that we attempted to equate groups for sex and age. The order of presentation of the
two sets of novel objects was counterbalanced across participants.
1.1.4. Procedure
After becoming acquainted with the two experimenters (E1 and E2), the child was seated at a small
table across from E1, who asked if he/she liked to play with toys. With E2 still in the room, E1 explained
that “sometimes [E2] asks for things,” and that when this occurred, the child should only give her what
she asked for. E2’s role was to add to the pragmatic feasibility of the scenario. The session was divided
into four phases: warm-up, object introduction, labeling, and comprehension test.
Fig. 1. The novel toys used in Studies 1 and 2.
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The warm-up phase helped children become familiar with the comprehension procedure. E2 began
by asking for a familiar item (e.g., a car) by name. E1 presented children with a box containing a pair
of familiar objects (e.g., a boat and a car) and said, “I have a car right in this box! Can you give E2 the
car?” After children selected an object, the sequence was then repeated for a second set of familiar
objects. All children performed correctly in this phase.
At the beginning of the object introduction phase, E2 told children that she had to make a phone
call and exited the room. E1 said that she had more fun toys to play with, offered a box with two toys,
and let children play with both for at least 20 s. E1 then asked the child to place the toys in her hands.
With the two toys in separate hands, and without naming either toy, E1 expressed her preference for
one of them (saying “This is the toy that I like to play with” while she looked at it) and told the child
that she did not like to play with the other (saying “This is the toy that I don’t like to play with,” while
she looked at it). To be sure that the child understood E1’s preference, E1 asked the child to show her
the toy that she liked to play with and the toy that she did not like to play with. All children performed
correctly in this phase.
At the start of the labeling phase, E2 re-entered the room and requested a novel object by name
(“I really need a blik.”). E1 then brought out a box. While the toys were in the box and not visible to
children, in the relevant condition, E1 provided a label while expressing her preference for one of the
toys (“I like the blik. I like playing with the blik. I have a blik right in this box.”). In the relevant condition,
information about E1’s preference served to specify her intended referent. In the irrelevant condition,
E1 did not mention her preference while offering the novel label (“I have a blik. I can show you the blik.
I have a blik right in this box.”). Although in the irrelevant condition, E1’s preferences were not helpful
in disambiguating the referent of the novel word, E1 offered her utterances with equal enthusiasm,
rate, and pitch in the two experimental conditions.
Next the comprehension phase occurred. E1 opened the box containing the novel objects and said,
“Give E2 the blik.” After the children had chosen an object from inside of the box and presented an
object to E2, to assess children’s generalization of novel labels, a set of novel objects (identical to the
first set except for color) was shown. Again, children were asked to “Give E2 the blik.”
The object introduction, labeling, and comprehension/generalization tests were then repeated for
the second pair of novel objects.
1.1.5. Coding
Children received one point each time they chose the adult’s preferred object and a zero otherwise. Preliminary analyses revealed no differences in children’s selection of the target object for test
and generalization items (paired-samples t(47) = .33, p = .74), by age (3-year-olds versus 4-year-olds,
independent-samples t(46) = .80, p = .43), or by object pair (paired-samples t(47) = 1.16, p = .26). Data
were therefore collapsed across age, test question, and item. Children could therefore score between
0 and 4 points on comprehension questions. Children’s responses were largely unambiguous (they
pointed to or picked up one toy).
1.2. Results
The main question was whether children were more likely to learn words when a speaker’s preferences were clearly tied to her referential intentions. Children selected the preferred referent in the
relevant condition (M = 3.21 of 4, SD = 1.32) more frequently than in the irrelevant condition (M = 1.67
of 4, SD = 1.55), independent-samples t(46) = 3.71, p = .001, d = 1.07. Tests against chance determined
whether children reliably learned the novel word. One-sample t-tests revealed above chance responding only for children in the relevant condition, t(23) = 4.49, p < .001. Children showed chance responding
in the irrelevant condition, t(23) = 1.05, p = .30.
2. Study 2
The findings from Study 1 demonstrated that preschool children reliably used preferences to learn
words only in the presence of a clear connection between a speaker’s preferences and her referential
intentions. One alternative explanation for these findings is that hearing the reminder of the preference
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in the relevant condition activates a representation of a previously preferred object. Then, when labeling
information is offered, children may link the label with their active mental representation of the object,
instead of using the preference information to make inferences about the speaker’s intended referent.
In the irrelevant condition, no preference information is offered during labeling, so no reminder is provided. If a reminder of the speaker’s preference activated children’s mental representation of the target
object in the Study 1 relevant condition, they might continue to make such word–object associations
even when preference information and intention information come from two different people. On this
account, a verbal reminder of someone’s preference may activate a child’s mental representation of
the object even if the preference is not tied to the particular speaker who provides an object’s name.
In Study 2, we adapted the relevant condition from Study 1 to investigate this possibility. The object
introduction phase (in which E1 states her preference for one novel object over the other) was not
changed. The wording of the labeling phase did not change, but the person who offered the words
did. Instead of E1 labeling the novel object she preferred, E2 expressed her preference for one of the
objects in the box with a novel label (e.g., E2: “I like the blik. I like playing with the blik. I have a
blik right in this box.”). However, because the objects were out of sight during this phase, the object to
which E2 was referring was unclear. If hearing E2’s preference activates children’s representation of the
object E1 desired, they should associate that object with the novel word and should continue to learn
words in this condition. However, if children understand that preferences are only relevant to naming if
preference and labeling information come from the same person, they should not use E1’s preference to
interpret E2’s request and therefore they have no basis on which to select a referent for the novel word.
One way that preschoolers might come to this correct conclusion is by recognizing that preferences
are not shared between speakers. Several studies suggest that toddlers treat preferences as specific
to individuals (Graham, Stock, & Henderson, 2006; Henderson & Graham, 2005). However, because
preschoolers may be able to infer potential similarities (like shared preferences) between people who
know each other well (as E1 and E2 seemed to), it was not clear that they would act on this assumption.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Twenty-four children (10 female) participated, ranging in age from 3–2 to 4–9 years (M = 4–1).
Children were recruited as in Study 1.
2.1.2. Materials and equipment
The materials and equipment were the same as in Study 1.
2.1.3. Design
As in Study 1, the boat and car were shown first during the warm-up and the order in which the
two different sets of novel objects were shown was counterbalanced.
2.1.4. Procedure
The procedure in Study 2 was identical to that in the Study 1 relevant condition, except E2 (instead
of E1) expressed her preference for a toy in the labeling phase to see if children used E1’s previously
stated preference to respond to E2’s request. As in Study 1, E2 left the room to make a phone call. E1
told the child that she liked one toy more than the other. Upon E2’s return, E2 requested the object as
in Study 1 (“Do you have a blik?”) and then offered preference and name information together exactly
as E1 did in the Study 1 relevant condition (“I like the blik. I like playing with the blik. I have a blik right
in that box. Can you give me the blik?”). Children were then given the box so that they could choose a
toy.
2.1.5. Coding
Coding was identical to that used in Study 1. As in Study 1 there were no differences in children’s
selection of the target object for test and generalization items (paired-samples t(23) = .30, p = .77), by
age (independent-samples t(22) = .29, p = .77), or by object pair (paired-samples t(23) = .35, p = .73).
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2.2. Results
To investigate whether children learned words by linking two different speakers’ preferences, we
compared responses to comprehension questions in Study 2 and the Study 1 relevant condition. The
analysis revealed higher rates of word learning in the Study 1 relevant condition (M = 3.21 of 4, SD = 1.32)
than in Study 2 (M = 2.25, SD = 1.36), independent-samples t(46) = 2.48, p = .02, d = .72. Consistent with
this result, tests against chance revealed that children’s responding did not reliably differ from chance
in Study 2, one-sample t(23) = .90, p = .38.
2.3. Discussion
In Study 2, children failed to learn words when preference and name information came from two
different speakers. This result supports our conclusion that children’s tendency to link preference
and intention information in Study 1 was guided by something more than a reactivation of a mental
representation of the preferred object. When E2, rather than E1, said exactly the same words as in the
relevant condition of Study 1, children failed to select the target object. This result suggests that the
presence of preference information alone was not enough to trigger a representation of a previously
preferred object, to which children attached a novel label.
However, one could argue that the association between the person and the particular words spoken
is highly specific. In particular, the representation of the preferred object may have been re-activated
only when E1 (but not E2), said, “I like playing with the blik,” during the test phase. This account
seems unlikely when viewed in light of the relevant condition in Study 1. In particular, such a specific
association would have required E1 to use exactly the same words during the object introduction and
test phase to activate a representation of the preferred object. However, she said different things during
object introduction (“This is the toy that I like to play with.”) and test (“I like the blik. I like playing with
the blik. I have a blik right in that box.”). This means that children had to go beyond surface properties of
the utterances (the exact words used) to sort out how the information being offered in the two phases
of the relevant condition were related. It thus seems likely that children recognized that E1’s intent in
the relevant condition was the same in the two sets of utterances (to direct children’s attention to her
preferred toy), and that E2’s intent was not relevant to E1’s preference in Study 2. The results of the
two studies may therefore be consistent with a growing body of evidence suggesting that children use
knowledge of others’ intentions – instead of simple perceptual/linguistic associations – to guide their
inferences about word meaning (Booth & Waxman, 2008; Keil, 2008; but see Colunga & Smith, 2008).
3. General discussion
This research demonstrates that preschoolers make smart use of preferences during word learning.
The first study resolves a previous ambiguity in the literature about the nature of children’s understanding of the relation between preferences and referential intentions (Saylor & Troseth, 2006). In particular,
preschoolers recognize that preferences are not always relevant to naming. They only learned words
when given clear evidence of a link between preferences and referential intentions. The results of the
second study ruled out the possibility that word learning was the result of a reminder of a preference
activating a representation of a preferred object. In addition, because the verbal information offered in
Study 2 was identical to that used in the Study 1 relevant condition, the findings from Study 2 suggest
that children’s success in the Study 1 relevant condition was not the result of their use of the offered
the linguistic frame alone.
Our finding that preschoolers use preferences to disambiguate referential intentions echoes previous findings suggesting that children of this age use knowledge states for a similar purpose (Birch &
Bloom, 2002; Sabbagh & Baldwin, 2001; Saylor & Carroll, 2008). Sabbagh and Baldwin (2001) found
that 3-year-olds tended not to learn words in the absence of a clear link between knowledge states and
intention. Saylor and Carroll (2008) demonstrated that 3-year-olds only learned a label from a speaker
following direct, physical evidence that the speaker knew about the topic under consideration.
Together with the present results, these studies indicate that preschoolers may require direct evidence that mental states are related before they will use one mental state to interpret the other. Young
M.M. Saylor et al. / Cognitive Development 24 (2009) 125–132
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children’s reliance on direct information may indicate less flexible use of mental state information
than is found in adults. Adults, and possibly older children, most likely use desires, preferences, and
knowledge states to make inferences about referential intentions even if the relation between mental
states is implicit. For example, after a husband tells his wife that he saw a particular movie, she might
assume that he would be able to name a novel device featured in the film; she would not necessarily
have to see him watching the movie to make this inference.
Previous research supports the possibility of developmental differences in children’s ability to use
information about mental states offered in less direct ways is supported. For example, in a study using
facial/emotional expressions of desire (e.g., an expression of disgust on seeing an object), children as
young as 18 months appear to understand that people can have different desires (Repacholi & Gopnik,
1997). In contrast, when given a verbal cue to a desire not until age 4 or 5 do children understand
that people can have different desires (Moore, Jarrold, Russell, & Lumb, 1995; Reiffe, Terwogt, Koops,
Stegge, & Oomen, 2001). The emotional expression may offer a more direct route to a person’s desire
than verbal information because using the verbal information may require a more elaborated set of
inferences. Children thus display an earlier appreciation of knowledge state cues that do not involve
inference (e.g., seeing another view an object versus being given a clue; Gopnik & Graf, 1988; O’Neill &
Gopnik, 1991). A question for future research is whether and when preschool children will use more
indirect evidence of preferences to guide inferences about speakers’ intended referents.
Previous research suggested that 3-year-olds have some difficulty recognizing that people do not
always intend what they desire or prefer (Feinfield et al., 1999; Schult, 2002). A tendency to conflate
fulfilled desires and intentions might have led children in our study to be confused about the relation
between naming and preferring: that people name what they like. However, we found no evidence of
such confusion. Our findings do not contradict studies suggesting that children merge fulfilled desires
and intentions. In those studies, preschoolers conflated a desire to change something in the world
with the intention to do the same. This confusion is detected when children fail to recognize that
desired and intended outcomes might conflict. In the present case, the preference for an object and
the intention to name an object may be sufficiently dissimilar to be kept distinct.
The present study highlights preschool children’s skillful use of speakers’ preferences to interpret
referential intentions. When preferences were clearly linked to a speaker’s intention to name a novel
object, preschool children learned the meaning of a new word. In the absence of such a link, children
did not learn words. The study thus suggests a route by which preschoolers succeed at word learning:
They appropriately employ a robust set of social-cognitive skills that includes using one mental state
to interpret other mental states.
Acknowledgements
Portions of these data come from Alexandra Fortuna’s honors thesis at Vanderbilt University. The
findings were presented at the Cognitive Development Society meeting in 2005. We offer our special
thanks to the parents and children who participated.
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