Definitional Arguments & objections
(defining God in a certain way guarantees
that he exists)
Conceptual Arguments &
objections
(necessary existence is part of
right concept of God)
Existence not a predicate
objections – then OA fails, as it
is based on idea that if a maximal
being has existence, it is greater.
M is an existent F
Hence M exists.
I conceive of an existent God.
Hence God exists.
Anselm 1: God is TTWNGCBC. A maximal
being that exists in reality is greater than
one that exists only in mind. Reductio. So
God must exist both in mind and in
reality. Fool does not recognise that
conceiving it must mean it exists. By
definition.
Anselm 2: TTWNGCBC cannot
be conceived of as not existing.
Therefore MUST exist. (Anselm 1
assumes he proved such a being
exists, Anselm’s 2nd discovers
necessary existence must be one
of his attributes)
Descartes:
Existence is a perfection. God
is a supremely perfect being
lacks no perfection. So God
exists.
- Why is existence a great making property
-why does it only apply in case of maximal
beings (Gaunilo & islands)?
- What does it mean to “exist in the
understanding”: logical possibility cf
Plantinga??
- Only true “according to” this definition.
Eg “there are real dragons” is only true
within the story world. Anselm is making a
claim about the outside world, when his
argument only relates to within the context
of his own definition.
- Is it possible to coherently
conceive of a being TTWNGCBC?
- Even if coherent as a concept, no
reason to think that anything falls
under the concept. No ‘a priori’
reasons to conclude existence of
any nonmental entity.
- invalid argument: from “I
conceive of X” to “X exists” is an
invalid move.(Aquinas, Hume)
Aquinas: the human mind cannot have a
correct understanding of God, so we
cannot conclude anything about God from
our definitions of Him.
Hume: “God exists” is not analytic,
because claims about what exists are
synthetic. “God does not exist” is not a
contradiction
Descartes: (reply to Hume, supporting
Anselm) “God exists” is analytic –God
defined as supreme perfect being cannot
fail to exist. Or it could be synthetic a
priori. Analytically known in the mind in a
way that reflects reality – like the
absolutes of morality.
Kant: repeats Hume’s point. “God exists”
can be denied without contradiction (it
would, if analytic). Like rejecting a
triangle and its 3 sides together. Since it
can be contradicted, it cannot be analytic.
Plantinga: modal interpretation of the
definition. If there is a maximal being in
possible world W and if maximally great,
then there can be none greater in any
other world, (x in w > y in w) so must
exist in actual world.
1. It is possible that a maximally great
Descartes: I have the clear and
distinct idea of God which
includes his necessary existence
as one of his divine attributes.
(mountains/ valleys; triangles/ 3
sides) So He must exist
(intuitionism)
- atheist would agree that such a
definition implies his existence.
But would reject that there is
any such being.
- Hume/ Kant: can reject both –
any existent thing can be denied
without contradiction.
Malcolm: on modal
understanding, a possible
maximal being exists necessarily.
If it is possible that there is a
maximal being, then as maximal,
nothing can make him come into
existence or cease to exist, if he
exists.
So if he exists, his existence is
necessary.
If he possibly doesn’t exist,
nothing can make him exist (or
he wouldn’t be maximal being).
So his coming into existence is
impossible.
God’s existence is either
necessary, or impossible. But
- Descartes’ idea of “perfect”
brings in notions of existing – a
claim about existence, that other
descriptions of God do not make
eg God is omnipotent (no
suggestion of therefore existing)
Invalid, as any entity should only
be described using characterizing
predicates.
Kant: To say “God exists” adds
no new predicate to the concept
God. Simply positing the object
with all its predicates. Thalers –
no difference between 100
possible and 100 actual. Paradox
if you say something “lacks
existence”. Existence is a
relational property between the
object as related to my concept
of it – not a feature of the object
itself
- is this correct? Don’t we want to
say about things in the world that
there existence is an independent
matter?
Russell: theory of descriptions.
Names stand for descriptions.
Logically analyzing “God exists”
in Russell’s way shows that there
is actually no entity that is the
subject of the predicate “exists” rather there are only properties
are simply instantiated/ find
extension in the actual world. So
“God exists” in OA incorrectly
assumes a subject “God” .
Analysing this into “There is
such an x such that…” shows that
it can be T or F but only
synthetically – a matter of fact if
these properties are or are not
instantiated.
- Other benefits of Russell’s
analysis is that it shows that
“God exists” is not meaningless,
as God is not an empty term,
nor by saying “God does not
exist” (a negative existential)
are we paradoxically implying
being exists
2. If it is possible that a maximally great
being exists, it exists in some possible
worlds
3. If a maximally great being exists in
some possible worlds, it exists in all
possible worlds (since it is maximally
great, it is greater to be so in all of them,
in the same maximal way)
4. If it exists in all possible worlds, it
exists in the actual world (which is one of
the possible worlds)
5. Hence a maximally great being exists.
Steps 2-5 are relatively uncontroversial.
- no agnostic/ atheist would accept
premise of the possibility of a maximal
being, so OA fails
- but is it incoherent to suppose that a
maximally great being is possible? Like
married batchelors ?
- the real problem lies in comparing God’s
greatness in a world where he does exist vs.
a world where he doesn’t (to then conclude
that maximal greatness must entail
existence)– but this is incorrect: something
that does not exist, does not have any
greatness at all, to compare with.
- If this objections is correct, redefine the
argument as “God is the maximal being in
every possible world in which he exists” so there is a possible world where he does
not exist. .
- Hume/ Davies: it does not follow from the
definition that such a being exists analytic/ synthetic distinction).
The argument defines God as a maximal
being that must exist in all possible
worlds, and therefore exists in the actual
world. Having so defined him, it is no
surprise to conclude he exists!
Hartshorne: existence alone might not
be a real predicate, but existing
necessarily certainly is. (like Inwagen
vs.Kant).
- To say that something exists without the
possibility of not existing is to say
something unique about the being in
question
- if it did exist contingently rather than
necessarily, it would not be maximal.
- God's existence is either impossible or
possible, and, if possible, then necessary
(theism). He is assuming here that there
are three alternatives for us to consider:
(1) God is impossible; (2) God is possible,
but may or may not exist; (3) God exists
necessarily. The ontological argument
shows that the second alternative makes
no sense (source: Stanford Encyclopedia)
God’s existence is not impossible
– the concept is not selfcontradictory - So God must
necessarily exist.
- an agnostic will not accept that
it is possible for a maximal being
to exist.
- is this concept of a maximal and
necessary being coherent?
Malcolm can reply that it is not
incoherent either.
- if God doesn’t, in fact, exist, then
to say his existence is necessary is
false (reject triangle and its 3
sides). It is only possible to derive
the weaker claim “if God exists,
God exists necessarily”
Hick- Malcolm confuses 2
claims:
1. that necessary existence is
something God has (as a
property - a form of existence,
by which God doesn’t depend
on anything else) [G-p]
2. that it is necessarily true
that God exists E![G]
This does not follow. God as
characterized (with necessary
existence) ≠ existence
characterizing God.
Hick/ Davies: definition - of
how God can be characerised (1)
- does not lead to claim of
existence (2) since definitions
are not claims about existence
(analytic/ synthetic distinction)
2. Talking about God as
characterized in this way, is an
empty term that paradoxically
implies existence suggesting
there is something we are
talking about.
both his existence & nonexistence.
- Kripke: famously showed that
names do not always stand for
descriptions, or they may not
always pick out any objects
correctly
Frege: existence is a 2nd order
predicate. Number applies to
concepts. “The Kaiser’s carriage
is drawn by 4 horses” – 4 is a
feature of the concept. 0 is also a
feature of a concept - God exists
is just to say that the concept is
instantiated – or that there is
nothing under this concept. It is
not to make a claim about actual
objects. (“There is Julius Caesar”
is meaningless - existence is a
property of concepts.)
So OA fails, as OA treats
existence incorrectly as a 1st
order predicate attaching to
objects.
- but Frege does allow that “Julius
Caesar exists” is meaningful. And
OA may see God as a particular
individual, rather than a concept.
- supporters of OA may deny that
“horses exist” says nothing about
horses as objects.
Overall, very difficult to prove
that existence is not a predicate.
But OA fails without worrying
about this – agnostics can reject
premises that a maximal being is
conceivable or is possible, or is
the case in the actual world,
outside of the context of the
definition.