The Appearance of Reality
Presentation for Boston Philosophy of Mind
2/27/10, Boston, MA
Thomas W. Clark
Center for Naturalism
Naturalism.Org
Overview
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Preliminaries: the hard problem and naturalism
Epistemic perspectivalism and a conclusion about mental
causation.
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Options for explaining consciousness.
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Motivating representationalism.
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The mental-physical distinction as a representational
phenomenon.
How representationalism might help solve the hard
problem.
What epistemic perspectivalism might explain.
Generating the hard problem
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Mental realism: reality of qualitative, private subjective states,
billions of them, that aren’t publicly observable. Implausible
alternative: eliminativism.
Physical realism: reality of public, self-existent objective world that
we access via consciousness, which contains billions of loci of
subjectivity. Implausible alternatives: idealism, solipsism.
Explanatory gap: seeming incommensurability of the mental and
physical in current philo-scientific theory, the collaboration of
philosophy and science. In explaining consciousness we’re engaging
in the collective, intersubjective philo-scientific enterprise that more
or less assumes the existence of physical, self-existent, mindindependent objects. Hence the bias toward physicalist reduction.
Target properties of consciousness: the appearance of a unified
phenomenal world composed of elementary qualia – pain, red, etc.
– with the subject at its center; essentially private, qualitative,
ineffable, unified, and intentional - carrying information.
Naturalism
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Rational epistemic commitment to intersubjective empiricism,
exemplified by science, when modeling reality.
The argument from objectivity: in seeking objectivity, must
minimize subjective bias, hence must use intersubjective
evidence available in principle to all observers.
Non-dualism: scientific empiricism tends to unify our
understanding of reality.
No intersubjective evidence for soul, supernatural, or
paranormal.
Naturalism nothing new: precursors, long history.
Explanatory success of science adds plausibility to naturalism.
1a. Epistemic perspectivalism
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Epistemic perspectivalism – a representational thesis. Reality is
only known under a description, as modeled by a representational
system (RS) with a limited perspective; reality is never grasped
directly. Reality appears for a system (hence the title of this
presentation) by virtue of the system’s representational,
knowledge-gathering (epistemic) capacities.
Mental-physical distinction (MPD) is a function of representation.
For a knowledge-seeking representational system, the mental is
what the system categorizes as its own internal representational
operations, plus the self which produces or possesses them. The
physical is what’s categorized as external reality, both directly
presented and as represented by internal operations. Note that
the system isn’t specified as mental or physical! (see part 4)
Epistemic perspectivalism, cont.
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Epistemic categorization becomes ontological dualism. Folk
metaphysics takes a naively realist view of the MPD - we’ve
divided reality into two substances. We are mental and physical
realists (see start of presentation). Philoscience inherits this
dualism, then wants to overcome it.
The hard problem is how to put reality back together. We’re
stuck inside our categories with the Memphis blues again. Watch
out for epistemic and explanatory loops! Is there a way out?
Maybe the concept of representation – prior to the MPD – is the
key. But in conceiving representation we can’t help but assume
the MPD. Can you see the way out? Help wanted!
Meanwhile…
Epistemic perspectivalism, cont.
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Two epistemic perspectives (EPs). Organismic perspective, results
in 1st person qualitative subjective consciousness, vs. the 3rd
person intersubjective perspective, results in quantitative and
conceptual scientific theory. Each has its own basic representational
vocabulary, one qualitative, the other quantitative/conceptual.
1st person subjective epistemic perspective. The organism/system
(e.g., human) has complex representational capacities, in our case
acquired via evolution, which somehow entail phenomenal,
qualitative consciousness – a subjective mental reality.
Consciousness is categorically private: experiences are always
someone’s, tied to particular representational systems (RSs);
3rd person intersubjective epistemic perspective. Public, objective,
scientific models of reality abstract away from qualitative subjective
experience in forming conceptual and quantitative descriptions of
the world. Qualia necessarily drop out when forming concepts and
constructing quantitative and causal models in the collective
epistemic perspective we call science. (Ray Tallis quote in notes).
Epistemic perspectivalism, cont.
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David Gamez on the two perspectives as non-interacting:
“The approach to consciousness in this thesis is based around the
identification of correlations between the phenomenal and physical
worlds … which may eventually lead to a causal theory of
consciousness. However, until this point is reached it is
inappropriate to use phrases like ‘The consciousness of X is caused
by brain state Y’ or ‘The brain state Y gives rise to the
consciousness of X.’” (from Gamez’ thesis on consciousness)
Human beings occupy both epistemic perspectives. We experience
the world, and we conceptualize the world. We feel and we do
science. This is why we can talk about (conceptualize)
consciousness, not because consciousness causally influences our
neurons – more on this later.
1b. The problem of mental causation
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The problem: How do private conscious mental states cause
physical, intersubjectively observable behavior? Answers:
Physicalism: conscious states just are what the brain does, so no
problem. But this violates the privacy constraint on consciousness:
we observe brain states, but not experience.
Eliminativism: no mental states, so no problem of mental causation.
But it’s tough to give up on mental realism.
Dualist interactionism: problematic since no mechanism specified,
conservation of energy violated. Further, EP says qualia in a
different explanatory space than the brain.
Epiphenomenalism: mental states exist alongside physical states but
are not causally effective. But can I really believe pain plays no
causal role in my behavior?
So what’s the solution??
The problem of mental causation, cont.
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Epistemic perspectivalism (EP) says: it’s a mistake to suppose we
can combine the 1st person subjective, qualitative perspective and
the 3rd person intersubjective conceptual-quantitative perspective
when explaining behavior. Predictably, we will want to combine
them since we occupy both perspectives, and philoscience wants to
since it seeks a unified account of reality. But remember:
Experience doesn’t exist from an intersubjective perspective. No
one has ever seen or observed an experience. I don’t observe your
experience, nor you mine. We only observe the physical correlates
of experience; that’s all that’s available to science in its explanations
since subjective qualities drop out in concepts and quantities.
So therefore…
The problem of mental causation, cont.
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Consciousness isn’t even epiphenomenal from the 3rd person EP.
Consciousness doesn’t appear intersubjectively, only subjectively. It
doesn’t occupy the same explanatory space as brains, neurons and
other publicly available phenomena, so it can’t be epiphenomenal.
Each epistemic perspective has its own explanatory space, one
qualitative, one conceptual-quantitative. Explanatory spaces can’t
causally interact since they are epistemic phenomena. But…
Conscious states are essentially causal from the 1st person EP. We
non-inferentially experience pain as the cause of wincing, limping, of
learning to avoid painful stimuli.
Since we occupy both EPs, we naturally try to combine them in our
explanations of behavior, but fail. We are subjectively certain that
pain is causally effective, but can’t conceive of how it affects neurons
in 3rd person explanations. Recommendation: stop trying!
2. Options for explaining consciousness
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What we’re shooting for. We want a satisfying explanation, one
that demonstrates a transparent, intuitive, necessary entailment
from 3rd person reality to 1st person reality, closing the
explanatory gap, or if that’s not forthcoming, explain what the
relation, if any, is.
Standard types of explanatory relations. 3rd person philoscientific explanations of phenomena usually involve causal,
combinatorial or emergentist entailments from less complex to
more complex phenomena, but:
Consciousness is essentially private and subjective. Phenomenal
states constituting consciousness exist only for a representational
system; no conscious states have ever been intersubjectively
observed, therefore:
Explanatory options, cont.
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Not a causal relation: mental/subjective not causally produced or
generated by physical/objective since that would make it public; causal
mechanisms are non-starters, e.g., no “2nd transduction” into
objective mental stuff (Dennett).
Not a combinatorial relation: no locatable elementary “quanta” or
“units” of the phenomenal that get combined into personal
consciousness; panpsychism a non-starter. No observational evidence
for panpsychism as yet.
Not emergence: emergentist explanations involve part/whole relations,
but the parts and wholes are of the same (public) kind, and underlying
mechanisms and relations are in principle discoverable/observable; but
consciousness not public, no obvious public object relations out of
which something categorically private could arise as an emergent
phenomenon.
Explanatory options, cont.
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Not identity: identity claims between private qualitative experience
and public, non-qualitative states of affairs are very difficult to
sustain, so physicalism, reductive or non-reductive, is a tough sell,
e.g., Jaegwon Kim explores the limits of physicalism here.
Not interactionist dualism: substance dualism supposes
consciousness is objective, on the same playing field as physical
objects, but this seems wrong according to epistemic
perspectivalism (see part 1 above). Interactionism violates causal
closure, plus there’s no evidence for the causal contribution of
qualia in 3rd person explanations, e.g. no evidence for violations of
energy conservation, for instance as hypothesized by Eliztur.
So, what’s left in the way of an explanatory option?
Explanatory options, cont.
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Conclusion re explaining consciousness. 3rd person theory
needs, ideally, some sort of non-causal, non-combinatorial, nonemergentist entailment to understand how qualitative
consciousness comes to exist only for a system that’s part of the
natural, physical world.
Possible representational explanation coming from EP: qualia,
the basic qualitative elements of conscious mental reality, are
non-causally entailed by being a sufficiently recursive and
ramified representational system (RS). Phenomenal reality
necessarily appears for the RS as a function of what’s involved in
adaptive representation (a tentative hypothesis – see section 5
forthcoming).
3. Motivating representationalism
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Prima facie plausibility of representationalism. Given robust evidence
of correlation with neurally instantiated higher-level representational
functions, consciousness is likely an entailment of being a complex
representational system (RS), see here for evidence and citations. But
the exact nature of that entailment is difficult to specify - the hard
problem.
Neural activity sufficient for consciousness. Dreams, especially lucid
dreams, are good evidence that brain processes are sufficient for
consciousness. No need for online sensory or behavioral interaction
with the world for full-blown conscious and self-conscious states to
exist (contra Noe in Out of Our Heads).
General claim about self-regulation and self-representation. Having an
internal representational self-model is necessary for self-regulation,
according to Metzinger, citing Conant and Ashby, 1970, “Every good
regulator of a system must be a model of that system.” International
Journal of Systems Science 2: 89-97. Reprinted in G. J. Klir, ed., (1991),
Facets of System Science. New York: Plenum Press.
Motivating representationalism, cont.
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Representation as anticipation in service to behavior control. The
brain evolved representational capacities in response to behavior
control exigencies. Internal states that track the environment are
necessary for flexible behavior that responds to environment under
time pressure. Brain is a predictor of events (Jeff Hawkins: On
Intelligence), hence needs internal model that anticipates the world,
otherwise response time too slow, action too late. Brain looks to
confirm/disconfirm currently active model using sensory input.
Metzinger: “dreaming vigorously at the world.”
Co-variation of intentional brain states and conscious states. Particular
neural sub-systems at various levels, e.g., the visual cortical areas,
support particular feature recognition, e.g., colors, edges, movement,
faces, objects, binding, highest level gestalts (workspace) – all these are
intentional, information-carrying, hence representational systems. We
observe close co-variation between certain classes of physically
instantiated intentional states and reported phenomenal states, e.g.,
color, taste, smell, proprioception, plus bound unified gestalts (objects,
self, world).
Motivating representationalism, cont.
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Qualia as 1st person representational content. Subjective
phenomenal states (basic elements are qualia) are plausibly
construed as representational, informational, intentional content
about the organism and world, content which is normally
associated with high level behavior (Tye: Ten Problems of
Consciousness, Dretske: Naturalizing the Mind, Lycan: Consciousness,
Metzinger Being No One, The Ego Tunnel, Tononi articles, and other
representationalist philosophers).
Conclusion re representationalism. Representationalism a plausible,
evidence-based hypothesis that connects brain functions and
phenomenology. They co-vary closely and both carry intentional,
representational content about the world and thus are central to
explaining flexible behavior, from both the 3rd and 1st person
epistemic perspectives, respectively. But what is the connection,
the entailment from 3rd EP to 1st EP, precisely? That’s the hard
problem, see part 5.
4. Mental-physical distinction as a
representational phenomenon
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Consciousness as essentially qualitative. Qualitative states, ordinarily
bound into integrated objects, scenes and events with the phenomenal
self at the center, are all there is to consciousness. There is no nonqualitative contrast set for qualia within experience. If you subtract all
qualitative experience, would there still be something it is like to think,
believe, or be the subject of other non-sensory, non-perceptual
states? Arguably not. We never transcend our qualitative states.
The mental-physical distinction is generated within consciousness.
Although qualitative experience is all we have as conscious subjects,
we pre-theoretically, folk-metaphysically divide the world given to us
in experience between what’s mental (my private thoughts, emotions,
and sensations that no one else has access to) and what’s physical (my
body and brain, other people, external objects, all of which are
possible objects of observation by others).
Mental-physical distinction, cont.
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“Stuck inside of Mobile…”. As conscious subjects we rarely step outside
the MPD categorization of our represented reality: the external world as we
represent it usually seems directly given to us as a physical, systemindependent reality, and our internal states as we represent them are
directly given to us as a mental, system-dependent reality. Moreover, as
conscious beings we never step outside our phenomenal, “system-real”
worlds – the private representational reality of qualitative experience –
within which this categorization is generated. As Metzinger puts it, we're
stuck inside our ego tunnels. We never transcend consciousness.
The mental-physical distinction as representational. The mental-physical
distinction (MPD) is a represented distinction that gets it content from
more basic representational achievements of behaviorally complex
representational systems (RSs) such as ourselves. The RS discriminates
(represents the difference) between 1) self and world, 2) between what’s
inside and outside the system, and 3) between represented states and
what’s represented (a representationally recursive achievement). These
discriminations have their neural correlates (with which evolution did its
work), but are also phenomenally real for us, hence part of commonsense
folk metaphysics.
Mental-physical distinction, cont.
Elements of the Represented Mental-Physical Distinction
Mental
Physical
Self (soul, mental agent)
Not-self
Internal
External
Private
Public
Non-spatial, non-extended
Spatial, extended
System dependent
System independent
Representation
What’s represented
Mental-physical distinction, cont.
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Naïve realism re the MPD. Folk dualism supposes that we have direct
contact with the external, physical world (including the body) in that
some experience is naively classified as being physical: we are thus
naïve realists about the external world (Metzinger). We also
experience being in direct contact with the mental realm, e.g., our
thoughts and emotions, so we are also mental realists, and perhaps
naïve in this as well.
The discovery of the hard problem. Philosophy (and then with science,
hence “philo-science”) inherits folk dualism, but goes further:
according to a widely held theory (as opposed to pre-theoretical
commonsense) conscious experience is entirely mental. The theory says
that in experience we don’t have direct contact with the physical
external world as the naïve realism of folk metaphysics would have it.
Instead, consciousness mediates that contact. But where does
consciousness itself come from? This is the hard problem.
5. The hard problem: explanatory
possibilities of representationalism
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From a representational categorization to a metaphysical divide.
Philoscience is trying to conceptually unify, by means of a theory, a
pretheoretical represented categorization of reality divided into the mental
and physical (the mental-physical distinction, MPD). This representational
categorization gets construed by folk naïve realism, and then by much
traditional philosophy, as a metaphysical claim: that there exist in reality two
categorically different sorts of things or substances, mental vs. physical.
What connects these two seemingly disparate realms?
Epistemic perspectivalism, round 2: being a representational system as
possibly entailing consciousness. The story I favor is representational.
Following others who explore representational accounts of consciousness,
I suggest that the appearance of a private phenomenal reality for the
system – conscious experience – might be entailed by certain of the
system’s representational characteristics and capacities. Where I part ways
with most others is in denying the causal contribution of consciousness in
3rd person accounts of behavior, as argued in part 1b above.
The hard problem, cont.
Some explanatory target properties of consciousness
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Qualia: The basic elements of consciousness are irreducibly
qualitative (e.g., pain, red), in that they possess an essential
character (the redness of red, the painfulness of pain) that itself
can’t be further qualified or broken down. This makes such
qualities (qualia) ineffable: not amenable to further description.
Unified gestalts: But qualia never appear alone in consciousness
(Metzinger), but are grouped into objects, scenes, events, and a
coherent experiential gestalt of self-in-the-world.
Phenomenal self: At the center of our phenomenal reality (most
of the time) is the phenomenal self, the hard to pin down but
very “system real,” qualitative sense of being an experiencer to
whom experience is presented.
The hard problem, cont.
Two sorts of considerations about representation, logical and
adaptive (mostly from Metzinger):
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Logical: what’s possibly entailed by being a representational
system independent of adaptive considerations – no selection
pressure.
Adaptive: what further characteristics selection pressure
might have given a representational system (RS) that might
explain consciousness – the existence of phenomenal reality
for the RS.
To be continued…
See www.naturalism.org/appearance.htm parts 5
and 6 for the rest.
Thanks!