2.4: Game Theoretic approach to energy efficiency

Socially-aware Management of
New Overlay Application Traffic combined with
Energy Efficiency in the Internet
European Seventh Framework STREP FP7-2012-ICT-317846
http://www.smartenit.eu
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2.4: Game Theoretic approach to Horst-RB
Mateusz Wielgosz, AGH
? ?, ? ?, 2014
© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium
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Players – End user and Provider
 Provider is interested in reduction of his inter-domain
traffic. He must weigh cost/benefit (C, B) of the
mechanism.
 End user benefits from higher QoS (Q), but may suffer
from delay (due to searching for local/prefetched content)
and may need encouraging to participate in WiFi sharing
mechanism (privacy issues?) (D, S).
User \ Provider
Using HORST
Not using HORST
© 2013 The SmartenIT Consortium
Provider supports HORST
HORST not supported
[Q – (D+S) , B – C]
[0 , 0]
[0 , B-C]
[0 , 0]
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Chain migration
 More users participate home router sharing, more
likely each user is to benefit from improved QoS.
 Assuming gaussian distribution of users, cumulative
benefit function therefore is expected to reflect
cumulative distribution of normal distribution.
1.2
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To be adressed
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 Simulation analysis
 Delay aspect of HORST search for local content.
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Thank you !
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Questions?
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