RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
TD ESALE price maintenance raises not only economic problems but also
legal ones. Indeed, much of the material on the subject is legal in
origin. These legal aspects are, of course, important in showing the nature
of the arguments—economic and other—involved, but their importance is
mainly with respect to the technique of maintaining the system. For the
immediate purpose one can assume that the economic aspects of resale price
maintenance are the same, irrespective of the actual technique of enforcement and therefore the legal aspects, as such, can be ignored here.
It may be pointed out, however, that the methods used to enforce compliance with the system are various. In Great Britain, for example, the
trade association with contracts for its members and dealers is common.
These may be enforced by legal action or economic action such as refusal
to sell. In other cases it may be handled by contracts between the manufacturer and the jobber and then jobber and dealer. The actual technique
used is usually dependent upon what the law permits; accordingly it varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Of course, the effectiveness of the scheme
depends upon enforcement. Paradoxically enough, the better the system
is maintained, the greater are the gains to any one dealer in evading it.
Thus success tempts the very forces which if not checked will break it.
It may be well to define the term resale price maintenance as it is used
here. In general, a thorough-going system of resale price maintenance
exists when a manufacturer sets his price to the jobbing or wholesale trade
and fixes the mark-up which this trade must use. This means an established price to the retail trade which in turn must sell to the consumer at
an established price, thus allowing a given margin or mark-up to the retail
dealer. When other channels of distribution are involved the arrangements vary accordingly, as in the case of manufacturer's sales direct to the
retailer. Discounts for cash, etc., are fixed, and rebating through premiums,
gifts, deals, etc., is prohibited.1 It will be noted that the system does not
need collusion or co-operation among the manufacturers; each manufacturer
can set whatever prices he wishes. But whatever price is set must then
be maintained. Now, of course, the detail will vary from trade to trade and
the degree to which the system exists in practice will also vary. Sometimes
one finds only partial systems but the above gives the main outlines of a
fairly complete system of resale price maintenance.
It may be added that it is a technique of selling which applies mainly
in those commodities and lines sold to ultimate consumers; it is of less
*E. T. Grether, Resale Price Maintenance in Great Britain (Berkeley, 1935),
gives an outline of the situation in many industries in Great Britain.
350
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Resale Price Maintenance
351
significance in producers' goods and supplies. Also, in general, it is found
more commonly in differentiated products—that is, those distinguished by
trade-marks, patents, etc.
Assuming that a system of resale price maintenance can be enforced in
any given commodity or trade, what are the economic implications and
results? As a complete answer, if such is possible, would go far beyond
the space allowed, I can deal with only a few of the important aspects in
outline.
It seems to me that the ultimate test of the practice must be its longrun effects upon the distribution of economic resources and thus its effects
upon the national income. This is, of course, subject to all the problems
and difficulties involved in this concept and its measurement. There is,
also, the transfer or exploitative aspect of resale price maintenance, but
this is of less importance here. In other words, it seems to me that the only
possible criterion is of the character developed by Pigou ;2 and this may be
subject to difficulty. More narrowly one must analyse the effects of such
a system upon the distribution of resources in the different divisions of the
trade—roughly the manufacturer, jobber, and retailer—distinguishing carefully between the immediate and long-run results.
As it is clear by now that a system of resale price maintenance involves
in the main a fairly fixed retail price for differentiated products, the
economics of the situation are not to be found in the economic theory based
on simple competition but, rather, in the theory of imperfect or monopolistic
competition and, in particular, in the contributions of the last decade. This
field is developing and its present conclusions may be tentative but, even
so, it represents a great advance. One feels in reading the earlier literature
on the subject, that the contributors were greatly handicapped and seemed
to be fumbling because of the absence of adequate tools. Although one
might draw on various sources I shall refer mainly to Chamberlin3 which
is sufficiently representative for my immediate purpose.
It is Chamberlin's broad conclusion that where price competition fails
to operate, the volume of production is smaller, and prices are inevitably
higher than when simple competition exists. Also, profits may be normal,
less or more than normal, when price competition is absent; under such
conditions there is also a tendency for excess capacity to exist.4 It seems
to be the conclusion, then, that resale price maintenance being specifically
directed at eliminating price competition, must lead to the above results
2
A. C. Pigou, Economics of Welfare (London, 1932).
E. H. Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Cambridge, Mass.,
1935).
*Ibid., ch. v and conclusion.
3
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The Canadian Journal oj Economics and Political Science
and, accordingly, it is a practice which does not maximize the volume of
production and thus the national income. All this, of course, applies
immediately only to the producers or manufacturers.
Now it may be suggested that it is not quite correct to say that resale
price maintenance eliminates all price competition because manufacturers are free to vary their prices and thus to compete among themselves. To the extent that manufacturers do compete in price the point
is technically correct but there are two reasons why, in general, it is not
an important qualification of the above conclusion. In the first place, a
system 'of resale price maintenance does not lend itself to rapid price
changes; in fact one of the arguments frequently advanced is that it avoids
price changes which "disturb" consumers. So, while price changes may
be made, frequent changes are clearly against the spirit of the practice. In
the second place, observation shows that maintained prices are more stable
than non-maintained ones5 and that there is a tendency for maintained
prices in any line of commodities to reach a common level.
It is abundantly clear that the absence of price competition does not
eliminate rivalry among producers. But by removing it from the price
field it is simply canalized into non-price channels. And so there will be
increasing expenditures on advertising, services, etc.—all cost-increasing
items.
There is no reason to assume that the volume of unit sales will be
increased by resale price maintenance per se. However, assuming that
unit prices are higher, there may be a larger volume of dollar sales, depending on the elasticity of demand. It is probable that the volume of dollar
sales will be increased, as the whole implication of differentiation is less
elasticity.
Turning how to the distributive trades a somewhat similar analysis
niay be recorded briefly. Retailing may be discussed first. As practically
every commodity which the consumer uses is distributed through retailers,
and as very few retailers are in fact confined to price-maintained products
alone, the problem becomes more complicated through the sharing of
common overhead costs. For the sake of simplicity I shall assume that the
retailer deals solely in one price-maintained product, and then modifications
of this assumption may be introduced as needed.
With a fixed resale price the individual retailer's margin on each unit
is fixed. But the really important thing from his point of view is his total
net income which is a function of the margin per unit times the number of
units sold—-less costs. Thus turnover and costs are as important as the
margin or mark-up although one rarely sees them mentioned in trade dis5
E. T. Grether, Resale Price Maintenance, pp. 317-8.
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Resale Price Maintenance
353
cussions of resale price maintenance. Now if a margin is allowed to retailers
which, with the appropriate turnover, will give attractive incomes to
retailers, there will be a tendency for others to enter the field. And the
result will be that more outlets will be established and will do roughly the
same volume of business—possibly more—with a consequent reduction in
the total volume per actual outlet. Thus the retailer's income will come
back to normal or even less than normal and to the point where no attraction exists to enter the trade. So the effects of a fixed margin will have to
be found in the numbers in the occupation. If there is easy access to the
field, the apparent short-run gains to the retail trade will tend to be used
in supporting more outlets. If access is difficult, the excess gains may be
protected for longer periods.
Now it is common knowledge that retailing is generally one of the
easiest trades to enter. 6 People seem to be attracted instinctively to the
field—possibly a survival of adolescent ambitions. But in any case the
result is that the easy access to the field simply means more outlets, the
returns are "normal", the high cost dealers cannot make a living and more
pressure is exerted usually to raise margins. And no matter how high the
margin is there will be differential returns and the marginal concern will
always be next to difficulty.
The above analysis has been over-simplified and may now be modified.
In the first place most retailers are not confined to price maintained goods
alone. Consequently, the extent to which price maintenance has the above
results depends on the importance of these lines in the total turnover.
Frequently the price maintained lines are fast movers and are substantial
contributors to the total income; in other cases they are unimportant. But
to the extent that they are important, the results are as indicated above.
In the second place, the canalizing of rivalry into advertising, services,
etc., adds to the costs of doing business and may favour the retailers who
are most apt in this type of activity. Thus while the results for the trade
at large are as already indicated, individual members of the trade may
gain from a system of resale price maintenance. This is accentuated by
location as the better situated stores will probably get more business
because their location cannot be compensated for, or offset by, price reductions on the part of the more poorly situated retailers.
In the third place there is the possibility that when price and non-price
maintained lines are carried by one dealer the returns on the former will
be used to subsidize the latter. It is impossible to say how important this
is but one must mention the possibility. If the grocery retailer has to
maintain the price on product A, he may put product B in at a lower price.
"E. D. McGarry, Mortality in Retail Trade (Buffalo, 1930), ch. vii.
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The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
Thus a system of resale price maintenance may intensify price cutting on
other non-maintained lines and is really subsidizing them. To a considerable extent this includes problems of overhead costs whose allocation is
always a cause for argument.
It may be concluded, then, that in general, resale price maintenance
will in the retail field tend (1) to make higher unit prices, (2) to increase
the number of outlets and reduce the volume of turnover, (3) to increase
costs per outlet and to make a smaller income per dealer, and (4) in addition it tends to favour certain types of retailers not necessarily the most
efficient under price competition.
The wholesale or jobbing trade can be dealt with briefly along the
same lines. Again it is largely a matter of the number in the field. And
the results will be similar to those in the retail analysis, depending on the
facts in the case. It is more difficult generally to enter the wholesale business and consequently it may be that there is greater possibility of this
trade gaining from the practice. This is a question of fact and differs
from line to line. Also, the manufacturers may have some say in the
selection of jobbers, thus giving another tendency towards greater control
of access. It may be concluded, then, that the results of a system of resale
price maintenance are not so clear in the wholesale trade and that the basic
facts are more variable.
From this brief recital it appears evident that resale price maintenance
is not an economic practice which in general maximizes the volume of
production or which tends to distribute our economic resources in the best
manner. There is another aspect which may be mentioned. In the last
few years we have become very conscious of the existence of rigid and
flexible prices and of their importance in business cycle analysis. Generally
speaking, rigid prices are not regarded as having a desirable influence on
the business cycle adjustments, and it is quite clear that resale price
maintenance tends to make the price structure more rigid.
Possibly now a few of the general aspects of the problem may be surveyed quickly. First, a common question is, what effect does resale price
maintenance have on retail prices? The general answer is, I think, and it
has been my assumption, that it tends to raise retail prices. This will be
denied by many traders but the main studies made on the subject, particularly in the state of California,7 and by the National Recovery Administration,8 lead to this conclusion. It is, of course, subject to some
7
E. T. Grether, "Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation"
(California Law Review, vol. XXIV, no. 4, Sept., 1936, pp. 640-700).
8
Work Materials No. 57, Special Study Section, Division of Review, National
Recovery Administration, M. Merrell, E. T. Grether, and S. S. Kittelle, Restriction
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Resale Price Maintenance
355
modification in that the California study showed that some price reductions
occurred in the rural and small communities in which more than the established price had been charged previously. But as Grether puts it, "Resale
price fixing inevitably involves some increase of the level of prices of the
commodities protected; else the system would not be worth fighting for".9
Secondly, what effect does it have on margins? Here the answer must
be ambiguous as it depends on the circumstances. When the distributors
are powerful the general tendency is to increase margins. Indeed, this has
become so obvious in the United States that recently some uneasiness has
been discernible among the manufacturing groups. 10 On the other hand,
where the manufacturers dominate the system the margins may not show
any increase. Thus it becomes a matter of the relative strength of the two
groups, but the balance is probably towards higher margins because this
is one of the best ways—even for strong manufacturing groups—to keep
the goodwill of their dealers.
Thirdly, what is the consumer's narrow interest in the matter? It
seems to me that the position of the consumer—if there is such an interest
any more—is generally worsened by a system of resale price maintenance
because it must by and large raise the prices of the protected articles. In
addition it increases the other and various non-price forms of selling pressure—a further worry in these days. It forces all users to take more
service and not less price; this conclusion may be satisfactory to those
income groups among consumers which are more interested in service than
in price. But it is not satisfactory to the most of the consumers who must
always consider the price angle; these people are deprived of the choice
which should be theirs of deciding whether they will take less price or more
service. And it also deprives the efficient retailer of the opportunity to
pass on to the consuming public the results of his efficiency. This is another
aspect of some importance. Without resale price maintenance there is
always some pressure, through the price cutting of some dealers and the
consequent reduction in their margins, on the manufacturers for price
reductions. This pressure may at times force the manufacturer to pass
on some gains from technological and other advances. And at all times
it is acting as a force towards greater manufacturing efficiency. When
of Retail Price Cutting with Emphasis on the Drug Industry (Washington, 1936),
p. 440.
9
E. T. Grether, "Resale Price Maintenance and the Consumer" (American
Marketing Journal, July, 1935, p. 146).
10
Resale Price Fixing Under the Fair Trade Laws: Special Report by Business
Week, August 28, 1937 (New York, 1937) ; see also Trade Regulation Review,
no. 3, March, 1937.
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The Canadian Journal oj Economics and Political Science
resale price maintenance exists, this pressure must be greatly reduced.
Possibly now, with the practice generally questioned here, it is worth
considering the causes and reasons why it persists. For many years resale
price maintenance has been regarded as the hope of the small independent
retailers against the chain and department stores. As these latter stores
made their initial appeal mainly on a price basis, with consequent pressure
on the independent unit, it was believed that resale price maintenance
meant protection for the latter. And it is true that in practically all the
public hearings held by Congressional Committees in the United States
generally the chain and department stores have opposed resale price maintenance and the independents have favoured it. At the same time, there
is the occasional chain store which having become established is quite willing
to forsake the price appeal methods by which it grew, and thus to turn
respectable and maintain prices.
Because of this general feeling on the part of the independent retailer
that a system of protected margins should be adopted, the greatest pressure
for the practice has come from distributors' associations. Although the
main drive may come from the independent retailer, the wholesalers have
concurred readily because they, too, have been threatened by chain activity.
And the manufacturers have frequently followed, less out of conviction,,
than of expediency in refusing to alienate the distributors of their products.
The general growth of a feeling among business men that price competition
is something low, unethical, and undesirable has increased the appeal of
price maintenance. Like the individual, no dealer can believe that his own
extinction can be a good thing for society because it is not pleasant for him.
And to a great extent the attitude of the dealer is a reaction against a
competitive system which may in the interests of society eliminate him.
Resale price maintenance seems to be a protection against this evil.
Many arguments have been developed to show the manufacturer's
interest in price maintenance, but it seems to me that most of them are
irrelevant. One that is most frequently brought out is that if a branded
good is not protected it may be cut by the cut-rate stores that independents
lose interest in it and the manufacturer's property right in the brand has
thus been wantonly destroyed. This argument raises two points. In the
first place it raises the question of property rights in trade-marks. I
presume that the current position would be that such rights are a part of
a system of private property and should be protected. But it seems to
me that we must inquire further into the social usefulness of this particular
form of property right. And, even if one regards trade-marks as generally
desirable, I doubt if an unlimited property right is necessary. However,
I can do no more than mention the point. I do not raise the point of
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Resale Price Maintenance
357
quality for it seems to me that branding is concerned with vendibility,
of which quality is only one factor—often not the most important.11 The
second point is that the type of price cutting assumed in this argument
seems to be of the "loss leader", or "sporadic" type. Now if this is
correct, then it appears to me that the corrective is the stopping of this
abuse—if it is one—and not a general system of resale price maintenance.
It may be mentioned in passing that there are mathematical demonstrations
that loss leaders may at times be economically desirable.12
The economic problems involved in resale price maintenance have been
of interest for many years although interest has waxed and waned with
varying circumstances and conditions. The last few years have seen an
increasing interest in the subject in the United States and to some extent
in Great Britain. The traditional attitude of the United States has been
relatively hostile to the practice; that of Great Britain has been relatively
favourable. Recent years have seen some weakening—possibly more
apparent than real—in the attitude of the United States. But, curiously
enough, while the practice has appeared to be gaining some favour there,
it is possible, I think, to detect a little more questioning of it in Great
Britain.
Great Britain has for years permitted resale price maintenance to an
extent probably unequalled in any other English-speaking country. The
practice has been subject to two governmental inquiries, one in 192013 and
again in 1931." The last one gave a sort of Scottish verdict of "not
proven" but it is not a very satisfying report. There seems to be a growing
interest in the practice, which apparently has been taken for granted, and
this may lead to a more questioning attitude. On the other hand, the
growing tendency towards cartels and trusts, to some extent encouraged
by the tariff changes, may simply overwhelm any growing opposition to
resale price maintenance.
Since 1908 or so, the attitude of the United States has been fairly stiff
in opposition to resale price maintenance. The Federal Trade Commission
has been a stern opponent to the system and its frequent studies and
reports have given little encouragement to it. As a general result of this,
"See Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition, appendix E, for some
arguments on the infringements of trade-marks.
12
C. F. Roos, Dynamic Economics: Theoretical and Statistical Studies of Production and Prices (London, 1935).
^Findings and Decisions of a Committee Appointed to Inquire into the Principle
of Fixed Retail Prices (Cmd. 662, London, 1920).
"Board of Trade, Restraint of Trade: Report of a Committee Appointed by the
Lord Chancellor and President of the Board of Trade to Consider Certain Trade
Practices (London, 1931).
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The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
and of court interpretations of the anti-trust and ancillary laws, the degree
of resale price maintenance possible to the American manufacturer has
been really very slight. However, in practically every year since 1920
some bill has been introduced into Congress legalizing resale price maintenance in some degree. The last of these bills, the Capper-Kelly Bill,
gained a great deal of publicity and was the occasion for numerous public
hearings when all sides were heard. This bill was finally rejected in 1932.
Most of the drive for these bills came from distributors' associations among
which the one representing the Proprietary Articles—the drug trade—•
was particularly active. The main opposition came from chain and departmental stores plus farm and consumers' organizations.
Apparently concluding that further frontal attacks on the federal Congress were likely to be useless, interested groups turned their activities to
the state Legislatures. These were found much easier to convince on the
subject. The general line of approach was to have passed Fair Trading
Acts and Unfair Practices Acts; the former dealt with resale price
maintenance frequently extending the scope of the contracts to third
parties, the latter with various forms of price discriminations. The California Fair Trade Law, passed first in 1931 and subsequently amended,
has served as a model for many other states. After the courts had upheld
the Acts the movement grew, and by the end of 1937 at least thirty states
had some sort of law, although not all permitted price fixing.
As the state Acts could cover only intra-state commerce the active
interests again turned their attention to Congress. Having out-flanked
Congress through the state Legislatures they no longer asked for out-andout legalizing of resale price maintenance but only that it should be legalized
in inter-state commerce for those states which had legalized it in intrastate commerce. The Tydings-Miller Bill which gave the desired power
was, after a considerable struggle, passed in 1937 but was vetoed by the
President. It was then tacked to a District of Columbia appropriation bill
and although subject to protest by the President, went through in this
form. Thus after many years' struggle the traditional attitude of the
United States seems reversed. It may be suggested that the experience
with the N.R.A. and its codes paved the way for an astute and forceful
lobby. It remains to be seen if the transition is as substantial as appears
and if it is a permanent change.
The Canadian position, as I understand it, is not as clear as that in
Great Britain and the United States. We have never had a case on the
practice per se; the main case, that of the Proprietary Articles Trade
Association, hinged on the technique of enforcing the system. It is
interesting, too, that since this case in 1926 the subject has been little
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Resale Price Maintenance
359
talked of in Canada. But in 1936 the province of Alberta passed a trading
Act which showed some of the American trend. Not much attention was
paid to this because other Alberta Acts attracted greater attention. In
December, 1937, the province of British Columbia passed a Food Products
Minimum Loss Act, which covers loss leaders, etc., and a Commodities
Retail Sales Act which permitted price fixing. Thus the matter stands
but it will be interesting to see what the courts do and how far the movement goes.
The question may be asked, why have these countries with similar
economic systems based on laissez-faire come to such different conclusions
on this matter of public policy? I do not know the complete answer, but
I would suggest that Great Britain has regarded interference with the
right of contract as a greater breach of laissez-faire than combination,
while the United States has held to the contrary view. The difference
in attitudes may be further dependent upon the absence or presence of
protective tariffs. The implicit and even explicit insistence in Great
Britain was that the absence of a protective tariff gave protection to the
public even when a lawful combination threatened it. The change in Great
Britain's position on tariffs may be coincident with a greater questioning
of the practice. In addition, the great British co-operative societies have
offered a protection against price exploitation not in existence on this
continent. These, I think, are factors contributing to the answer.
In conclusion, I come back, as the lawyers say in their description of
real property, "to the point of beginning". I trust that I have raised plenty
of points for discussion and I know that I have settled very few. I think
that the practice of resale price maintenance must be discussed as a case
of monopolistic competition and can be understood only as an aspect of
the general problem of monopoly and its control.
C. A. CURTIS
Queen's University.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY ON RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
BOOKS ,
GRETHER, E. T. Resale Price Maintenance in Great Britain. Berkeley: University
of California Publications in Economics, vol. II, no. 3. 1935. Pp. 75.
HARING, A. Retail Price Cutting and its Control by Manufacturers. New York:
Ronald Press. 1935. Pp. 247.
MURCHISON, C. T. Resale Price Maintenance. New York: Columbia University,
Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol. LXXXII, no. 2, Whole
Number 192. 1918. Pp. 202.
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The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science
PERSONS, W. M. Consequences of Price Fixing in Competitive Industries. New
York: W. M. Persons. 1933. Pp. 73.
SELIGMAN, E. R. A. and LOVE, ROBERT A. Price Cutting and Price Maintenance: A
Study in Economics. New York and London: Harper and Brothers. 1932.
Pp. 539.
ARTICLES, ETC.
COPELAND, M. T. "Some Business and Legal Aspects of Resale Price Maintenance"
(Harvard Business Review, vol. VI, no. 1, Oct., 1927, pp. 114-20).
"Standardized Retail Prices" (Harvard Business Review, vol. IV,
no. 4, July, 1926, pp. 393-406).
GRETHER, E. T. "Experience in California with Fair Trade Legislation" (California
Law Review, vol. XXIV, no. 4, Sept., 1936, pp. 640-700).
"Fair Trade Legislation Restricting Price Cutting" (Journal of
Marketing, vol. I, no. 4, April, 1937, pp. 344-59).
:
:
——
"Marshall's Role in Price Maintenance in Great Britain'1 (Note)
(Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. XLVIII, no. 2, pp. 348-52).
"Resale Price Maintenance and the Consumer" (American Marketing Journal, vol.-1, no. 4, April, 1937, pp. 344-59).
"Solidarity in the Distributive Trades in Relation to the Control
of Price Competition" (Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. IV, no. 3, June,
1937, pp. 375-92).
TAUSSIG, F. W. "Price Maintenance" (American Economic Review, Supplement,
vol. VI, no. 1, March, 1916, pp. 170-84; discussion, pp. 185-209).
:
"Price Maintenance" (American Economic Review, vol. VIII, no.
1, March, 1918, pp. 28-47; no. 2, June, 1918, pp. 283-305).
DOCUMENTS
Canada
Department of Labour. Report of the Commissioner on the Investigation into the
Proprietary Articles Trade Association. Ottawa: King's Printer. 1927.
Great Britain
Board of Trade. Restraint of Trade: Report of a Committee Appointed by the Lord
Chancellor and President of the Board of Trade to Consider Certain Trade
Practices. London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1931.
Findings and Decisions of a Committee Appointed to Inquire, into the Principle of
Fixed Retail Prices. (Cmd. 662.) London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1920.
New Zealand
The Proprietary Articles Trade Association: Report of the Committee of Inquiry
together with Minutes of Proceedings of Evidence. Wellington: Government
Printer. 1927. Pp. 164.
United States
Federal Trade Commission. Report on Resale Price Maintenance. Part I. General
Economic and Legal Aspects. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1929.
Also printed as House of Representatives Document 546, 70th Congress, 2nd
Session.
Report on Resale Price Maintenance. Part II. Commercial Aspects and Tendencies. Washington: Government Printing Office.
1931.
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Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary, United States
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Monopolies", Approved July 2, 1890, March 4, 1937. Washington: Government
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Hearing before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States
Senate, 74th Congress, 2nd Session on S. 3822 (Tydings-Miller Bill), A Bill to
Amend the Act Entitled "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against
Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies", Approved July 2, 1890, March 13, 1936.
Washington: Government Printing Office. 1936.
Hearing before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of
Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st Session on R. R. 1611 (Tydings-Miller Bill)
To Amend the Act Entitled "An Act to Protect Trade and Commerce Against
Unlawful Restraints and Monopolies", Approved July 2, 1890, January 27,
29, 1937. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1937.
Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Commerce, United States Senate on
S". 97 (Capper-Kelly Fair-Trade Bill). Parts I and II. Washington: Government Printing Office. 1932.
Work Materials No. 16, Special Study Section, Division of Review, National
Recovery Administration, H. S. KANTOR. Resale Price Maintenance Legislation
in the United States. Washington: N. R. A., 1935. Pp. 116.
Work Materials No. 57, Special Study Section, Division of Review, National
Recovery Administration, M. MERRELL, E. T. GRETHER, and S. S. KITTELLE.
Restriction of Retail Price Cutting with Emphasis on the Drug Industry. Washington: N. R. A., 1936. Pp. 430.
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