COGNITIVE REVOLUTION, VIRTUALITY AND GOOD LIFE
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic
School of Innovation, Design and Engineering
Mälardalen University, Västerås, Sweden
[email protected]
http://www.idt.mdh.se/~gdc
Abstract
We are living in an era in which the focus is shifting from performing and physical to controlling and
cognitive/informational. This emerging increasingly informational world is our new ecology, an infosphere
that presents the grounds for a cognitive revolution based on interactions in networks of biological and
artificial intelligent agents. After industrial revolution which extended human body with the mechanical
machinery, cognitive revolution extends human mind with the information processing machinery. Those
novel circumstances come with new qualities and preferences which demand new conceptualizations. We
have a work ahead on establishing value systems and practices extended from the real to the virtual or infocomputational.
This paper first presents current view of the virtual versus the real and then offers an interpretation framework
based on info-computational understanding of cognition in which the agency implies computational
processing of informational structures of the world as an infosphere. The notion of good life is discussed in
the light of different ideals of well-being in the infosphere, connecting virtuality as a space of potential and
alternative worlds for an agent for whom the reality is a space of actual experiences. The conclusion is that by
building around an elaborate info-computational infrastructure as a cocoon may isolate us from the reality of
immediate experiences of the world. The biggest challenges of cognitive revolution might not be
technological, but ethical, they are about the nature of being human and its values.
Introduction
It is a common place that ICT is revolutionarily changing our lives on a global scale and in number of
dimensions. As (Floridi, 2007) rightly proclaims:
“... in information societies, the threshold between online and offline will soon disappear, and that once there
is no difference, we shall become not cyborgs but rather inforgs, that is, connected informational organisms.”
This revolution is at least as radical as the industrial revolution, and its far-reaching consequences we can still
only speculate about. The basic reason is the “phase transition” from slow and predominantly local contacts
and information processing to practically instantaneous communication on the global scale, supported by
unprecedented capacities of massive information processing – computation and storage. Single human’s
cognitive capacities are extended by large networks of humans and machines. Those networks include among
others research (CERN was the birth-place of the World Wide Web), education, commerce, business,
government (e-government, still local), and virtual (often global) teams in business, communications and
entertainment (an industry of worldwide proportions engaging vast resources). Present-day networks of users
and computing machinery both in social networking services (Facebook, Twitter, Google+), virtual worlds
(Second Life, World of Warcraft, virtual education environments, e-commerce, medical) are obviously just a
beginning in the development of computational networks and environments supporting globally extended
cognition. The next step is an envisaged internet of things connecting virtual and real objects, which will be
an epoch-making change in human relationships with the world, both in terms of extended cognition and
enhanced decision-making and impact capabilities. Up to now we have witnessed only the very beginning of
cognitive revolution.
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In this context understanding of cognition is central as very much of information-processing technology
provides inputs to human cognition, and old understanding of human as a dual system consisting of physical
body and a non-physical mind does not suffice. The dichotomy between body and mind is echoed in the
dichotomy between nature and culture which according to (Latour, 1993) is a fundamental maxim of
modernity which he rightly questions in his actor theory. Latour describes the endlessly ongoing concurrent
process of shaping and being shaped between nature and humans (culture, technology) in complex interacting
networks, where each element is an actor.
This paper presents a contemporary view of virtual worlds and offers an interpretation framework based on
info-computational understanding of cognition in which the world, real as well as virtual is a source of
information for an agent. Agency implies information processing. Through interactions – both with the
environment (including other agents) and by interactive information processing within agents cognitive
apparatus, information is structured, and the relationships between different informational structures
established.
The info-computational approach goes a step further from Latour’s hybridization. Not only nature and culture
shape each other, producing hybrids, but there are concurrent ongoing “virtual” processes on many levels of
organization of the reality which interact with physical processes and which shape each other in feedback
loops going from space-time-matter-energy to elementary particles up. Thus unlike Laturian hybrid is not a
top-down view of the world – it is bottom-up.
It starts from the elementary observations of the world as a complex multi-layered network of physical
phenomena constituting more and more complex phenomena – from elementary constituents of space-timematter-energy to elementary particles, atoms, molecules, liquids, crystals, compounds, colloids, which in
organic matter build cells, tissues, organs, organisms, eco-systems and in case of social animals even social
systems. On the level of artifacts, there are also complex structures, and cultures are such complex artifactual
structures. Everything in this construction is informational structure, from the primary information or protoinformation which is the world in itself and a source of information for agents, and then secondary
information which is the information about primary (proto-)information and tertiary information which is the
information about secondary information and so on. The culture is the result of information communication
and processing in multiple layers of physical reality and it necessarily interact with nature through complex
structures informational structures shaped by computational processes. Computation in this sense is in general
information processing, symbolic, as well as sub-symbolic.
This interactivist, autopoe tic (Maturana, Varela), constructivist understanding of cognition has consequences
for our view of socio-technical systems, including computer aided cognition and virtual reality. Infocomputational framework is used to elucidate mechanisms of information processing in the virtual and their
consequences for the real, as a basis for understanding values of the virtual as related to the real. The idea of
good life is discussed in the light of different dimensions of well-being – economy of fun (Castronova, 2007)
and sensemaking (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005).
What is a Virtual World? The Nature of Virtuality
The term ‘virtuality’ is used by (Introna, 2008) to refer to “the mediation of interaction through an electronic
medium between humans as well as between humans and machines.” The taxonomy of virtuality suggested by
(Søraker, 2010) identifies the following types (p. 56): virtual reality “a three-dimensional interactive
computer generated environment that incorporates a first-person perspective” (Brey, 1999); multi-access
virtual reality; virtual worlds; virtual environments; virtual communities and virtual institutions (banks,
libraries, universities, museums, galleries, experiments, enterprises, businesses). Yet another way to delineate
virtuality is through the Journal of Virtual Worlds Research, which features such phenomena as cultures of
virtual worlds, pedagogy, education and innovation in virtual worlds, virtual worlds for health and healthcare,
technology, economy and standards in virtual worlds, virtual economies, virtual goods and service delivery in
virtual worlds, and consumer behaviour in virtual worlds - among others. The list shows that the popular idea
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of virtual worlds as “the pearly gates of cyberspace” and the return to medieval, spiritual concerns, proposed
by (Wertheim, 1999) is representative of only a fraction of virtual worlds today. Equally partial is the view of
the virtual as a global shopping mall (Dibbell, 1998).
Heim (Heim, 1993) identifies seven divergent topics dominating virtual reality: simulation, interaction,
artificiality, networked communication, telepresence and immersion. Simulation and generative modelling has
become a major research field with wide range of applications - from sciences to movie industry.
An interesting process of integration of the virtual and the real is going on, both literally in the form of
ubiquitous computing and hybrid spaces (Aliaga, 1997), as well as conceptually. The idea of hybrid space is
that the virtual objects are created that interact with the real objects with equally realistic feel. Holographic
3D environments are an example of this physical hybridization between the real and the virtual. The nature of
virtuality as an increasingly pervasive phenomenon, is addressed in (Poulymenakou et al., 2007) and (Tsekeris,
2008). For (de Souza e Silva, 2004) the idea of cyberspace actualizes the question to what degree the mental
image corresponds to the real world. Importantly, de Souza e Silva argues that the concept of the virtual
changes, since “it can no longer be considered independently from physical space; rather, it belongs to it.”
In his Difference and Repetition, Deleuze offers the following essential distinction:
“The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real in so far as it is virtual. Exactly what
Proust said of states of resonance must be said of the virtual: 'Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract';
and symbolic without being fictional.” (Deleuze, 1994)
For Deleuze, the reality of the virtual is its structure. The structure (a pattern) as essential for understanding
the virtual is also supported by (Petry, 2010) who points to the Wittgenstein’s claim from Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus that patterns are minimal elements of a cognitive structure that enable understanding.
Cognitively, the difference between real and virtual is not as sharp as one might believe. Minsky, in Societies
of Mind, proposes a mechanism that helps us understand the relationship between the real and the virtual.
Understanding human mind as a complex system of dynamical processes composed of many interacting
mindless agents whose interactions constitute a “society of mind”, Minsky explains:
„But then, what makes some recollections seem so real? The secret is that real-time experience is just as
indirect! The closest we can come to apprehending the world, in any case, is through descriptions which our
agents make. In fact, if we inquire, instead, about why real things seem so real, we'll see that it depends, as
well, on memories of things we've known before!“ (Minsky, 1988) p.155
Memories as well as anticipations and fantasies, along with perception constitute the basis of both the real and
the virtual experience.
Info-computational Framework for understanding Virtuality and Reality
In order to analyze the functioning of virtual worlds as systems made to provide for a user an experience of
being present in the virtual, the info-computationalism offers a suitable framework. On the basic level, within
this approach, information is the stuff of the universe (structures) while computation is its dynamics
(processes). The universe is a network of computing processes and its phenomena are fundamentally infocomputational: continuous as well as discrete, analogue as well as digital. The absolute distinction between
physical and mental is dissolved as both the real world as the virtual ones present different types of
relationships between info-computational agents on different levels of organization. (Dodig Crnkovic and
Müller, 2009)
Info-computationalism (Dodig Crnkovic, 2006 and 2009) is a synthesis of two existing cosmologies, of the
informational and the computational universe. It unifies Informationalism (Informational Structural Realism)
of Floridi (2008); Informational Realism of Sayre (1976) and (Ladyman et al., 2007) - with the Naturalist
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Computationalism/ Pancomputationalism of among others Zuse, Fredkin, Wolfram, Chaitin, and Lloyd. Infocomputationalist naturalism interprets the dynamics of informational structures as computation. (Dodig
Crnkovic, 2011a)
Info-computationalist understanding of cognition provides a framework for unification of knowledge from
computing, neuroscience, cognitive science, biology, artificial intelligence, philosophy and number of other
research fields. (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2009 and 2010) It is a way of naturalizing epistemology by connecting two
previously incompatible views: a symbolic, explicit and static notion of representation (mind as a mirror of
the world) and implicit and dynamic (interactive) one. Within info-computational framework, classical
symbolic and connectionist (sub-symbolic) views are reconciled and used to describe different aspects of
cognition. Naturalizing of epistemology is possible by defining cognition as information processing based on
the development of multilevel dynamical computational models and simulations of intelligent systems. This
approach has consequences for among others conceptual analysis of artificial intelligence and artificial life.
(Dodig Crnkovic and Müller, 2009)
Starting from the assumption that cognition by nature is an info-computational phenomenon makes it easier to
understand and analyze the situation where human cognition is aided by computing machinery. It should be
emphasized that in info-computationalism, both information and computation are given broader meaning than
in conventional computationalism. This approach answers Weizenbaum’s criticism:
“Still, the extreme or hardcore wing of the artificial intelligentsia will insist that the whole man, to again use
Simon’s expression, is after all an information processor, and that an information –processing theory of man
must therefore be adequate to account for his behaviour in its entirety. We may agree with the major premise
without necessarily drawing the indicated conclusion. We have already observed that a portion of the
information that human “processes” is kinesthetic, that it is “stored” in his muscles and joints. It is simply
not clear that such information, and the processing associated with it, can be represented in the form of
computer programs and data structures at all.
It may, of course, be argued that it is in principle possible for a computer to simulate the entire network of
cells that constitutes the human body. But that would introduce a theory of information processing entirely
different from any which has so far been advanced.” (Weizenbaum, 1976) p. 213
That is exactly this entirely different theory of information (from sub-symbolic to symbolic) and entirely
different understanding of computation (natural computation going on in both brain and muscles, on different
levels of complexity) that are fundamental for info-computationalism. Yes, humans (and other living
organisms) are information processing systems! They exist through information for each other, and the world
as a totality exists through information exchanged by computational processes.
Within info-computationalism, all characteristics of the cognitive revolution according to (Pinker, 2003) are
accounted for: 1. the mental world is grounded in the physical world by the concepts of information and
computation, with feedback as a (self-reflective) computational process; 2. an unlimited repertoire of
behaviours are generated by finite informational structures of the embodied (and embedded) brain in the
interaction with the environment; 3. universal info-computational mechanisms underlie variation across
cultures; 4. the mind is a complex system of dynamical processes composed of many interacting mindless
agents in a sense of Minsky, with interactions constituting a “society of mind”.
At this stage of the development we are still capable of making clear distinctions between the perceptions
coming from the real and those from the virtual. However, our memories, thoughts and feelings about the real
and virtual may be much closer in flavour and sometimes even indistinguishable. With the development of the
virtual towards with increasing realism, technology might enable so realistic perceptions that it will be more
and more difficult to make the distinction even on the basic level of experience. That is one of the reasons
why it is so important to understand the role of virtual worlds and their impact on the development of society
as they are gradually becoming indistinguishable and “hybridized”.
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Computer Aided Cognition, Distributed Cognition and Beyond
Hutchins made in the mid 1980s an important contribution to cognitive science by developing the framework,
(not a method!) of distributed cognition, which involves interplay between (groups of) agents and the
environment. It presupposes embodiment of information in representations of interactions, coordination
among (embodied) agents and a cognitive ecosystem.
” The nearly perfect mirror symmetry of the titles of Vygotsky’s (Mind in Society) and Minsky’s (Society of
Mind) books suggests that something special might be happening in systems of distributed processing,
whether the processors are neurons, connectionist nodes, areas of a brain, whole persons, groups of persons,
or groups of groups of persons.” Hutchins, http://files.meetup.com/410989/DistributedCognition.pdf
Cognition in the society is distributed through the process of information exchange (communication). ICT
enables dramatic increase in communications globally. Computational artifacts have always extended human
cognition, but the importance of that extension grows dramatically with ubiquitous computing and the
development of social computing and virtual organizations connected in global networks. In the area of
computer aided cognition, computer scientists typically are focusing on the computing technologies, while
other researchers (cognitive scientists, sociologists, human-machine experts etc) are studying the impact of
the computational technology such as computational artefacts designed to enhance human perception,
reasoning capacity, learning and performance.
Entertainment is one of the most important fields of global communication, and an example of distributed
cognition. One may wonder (Castronova, 2007) about the effects of the fact that millions of people are daily
spending hours in virtual spaces and fantasy worlds that provide amusement and excitement. Castronova talks
about the Exodus to the Virtual World. People spend their spare time playing games or in social networking
(on a global level) that in previous decades was spent watching TV (typically on a national level), while
historically entertainment was on a village or town-level of social organization. Not only that the size of the
social group have increased together with the distance between the participants but also a level of virtuality.
When talking about exodus, it may be understood as an escape into the virtual world of fun:
”We are witnessing the birth of a new science, the practical science of giving people the sensation of fun
through the design of social institutions. This new science will play an ever more significant role in public
affairs during the course of twenty-first century. As the exodus to the virtual world proceeds, more and more
people will come to view the tenets of this new science as practical rules for running the real world. Those
tenets have already been developed, and at the moment, they are all rules of some game.” p. 111
This leads to the question about the possibility of bit by bit creating a society in which the primary goal of
government is to assure that people have fun. The first question would be if it is possible, and the next one is
if it is desirable. Shall we strive towards the global society of fun, where deep and profound insight attained
through difficulties and efforts of confrontation with real physical world and real humans would be less
valued than an easy obtained fun with virtual worlds and creatures? Related is a more general question of the
relationship between a human and an artifact. Coeckelbergh (2009) offers a different perspective on the idea
of a politics of artifacts, discussing a radical redefining of the social.
Ethics of The Virtual
Communication in the virtual opens a variety of new possibilities that can be understood by ethical analysis.
Ethics as moral philosophy addresses questions such as good and evil, right and wrong and virtue and vice.
As those issues in virtual worlds are not trivially recognized as special cases of traditional ethical issues, they
require appropriate ethical assessment. (Moor, 1985) Unlike physical territories, virtual worlds present not
only new environments but also new kinds of relationships between agents. The question is how to establish
suitable value systems and practices in the virtual.
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In considering the ethics of the virtual, we must take into account several previously discussed meanings of
the term virtual world. Our basic ideas about what is important, valuable, what matters, what is right or good
in virtual worlds are dependent on the understanding of how they relate to the real world. If we conceive of
information as being at the heart of our conceptualization of the reality, and even forming the fabric of reality
(info-computationalism), then our ethical analysis will need to take into account both the ontological
(existence) and epistemological (knowledge) aspects of the virtual. The epistemological significance of the
virtual can be studied through the interactive learning process. Simulation, emulation, visualisation and
similar forms of virtual universes are new environments that are changing our understanding of reality and the
character of our agency in it.
Number of authors have already analyzed ethical consequences of the virtual, arguing for a spectrum of
views, ranging from the claim that virtual constitutes essentially nothing new and that old ethical theories
apply (Johnson, 1997); to the diametrically opposite view that our ability of acting in reality gets significantly
modified by experiences made in virtual worlds. Floridi (2007) suggests that the virtual world of computerbased interactive environments presents our new habitat, which more and more defines our lives, the
relationships with other people and our daily activities. Floridi developed Information ethics as a means to
cope with this changed human condition:
“According to an information ethics perspective, the world of data, information, knowledge and
communication, made possible by ICTs, is best approached ecologically, as a new environment, the
infosphere. The infosphere is not a geographical, political, social, or linguistic space. It is the semantic space
of education, sciences, cultures, and communication, a global environment that is essentially intangible and
immaterial but not, for this reason, any less real or important.”
Floridi thus formulates Information ethics as the new environmental ethics for the knowledge society and the
most general approach for analysis of our lives in the infosphere. (Floridi and Savulescu, 2006) question the
ways “the changing nature of new artefacts is affecting our moral values, their adaptation to new realities,
their daily implementation, their transmission through an increasingly synthetic world, and their protection”
Those are indeed the central issues to be addressed.
Many of present-day ethical concerns of virtual worlds are related to lack of trust caused by anonymity and
disembodiment. (Johnson, 1997), (Huff, Johnson & Miller, 2003), (De Laat, 2005). The virtual lacks welldefined elements which are in real world essential for the establishment and maintenance of trust (Pettit,
1995, 2004). This view is supported by (Nissenbaum, 2001) who finds that basic elements obstructing trust in
virtual worlds are ambiguous identities and fluid social settings with unclear roles. The difference between a
movie or a drama and a MMO (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Play) is significant in this respect: you
know who the real actor in real life is, and you know for sure she is not the role she plays. Identity
constructions are much freer in games and their relationships with real people are blurred. Here a
psychological and sociological analysis of the phenomenon of trust and identity (personal and social) can
provide valuable support to ethical argument.
The problem of trust in virtual worlds often seems overwhelming. However, examples of e-commerce and ebanking show that there are domains in which trust is taken very seriously and problems have been solved.
Indeed, one may ponder over the fact that economic relationships are seemingly the only ones that our
civilization finds important enough to handle with due respect.
Closely related to the problem of trust is privacy which often is breached in computer-mediated
communications (Dodig-Crnkovic, 2006a), (Dodig-Crnkovic and Horniak, 2005; 2006). Contrary to the belief
that our behaviour in the virtual does not affect our real life, Brey provides several interesting examples of
ethical problems in virtual worlds and their relevance for the real life:
„VR applications may be developed that allow and graphically depict almost any conceivable immoral act
including murder, mutilation, torture, rape, robbery, and grand theft. Also possible in VR are role-playing
and the acting out of extended scenarios, such as terrorist missions and the preparation and execution of
serial killings.“ (Brey, 1999)
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Moreover, as (Introna, 2008) notices, the virtualization of human interactions opens a host of new
possibilities: virtual organizations, virtual government, virtual communities, virtual education, virtual
friendships, and so on which change existing social relationships as well.
“(M)ost of our current thinking about ethics implies a certain sense of community based on reciprocal moral
obligations that are largely secured through situated, embodied practices and institutions that are often
overlapping and mutually inclusive. If these practices and institutions become virtualized then it would seem
that we need to reconsider some of our most fundamental human categories.”
In the Uniqueness Debate about the status of Computer Ethics Johnson claimed that whatever artificial agents
do on the screen is already predefined by people, and so there is nothing unique about the virtual world ethics
that would be essentially different from the ethics of the theatre. Both are just ethics of humans who create
those artificial spaces, characters and the rules of the game. However, there is a neglected substantial property
of virtual worlds which makes them unique: computational virtual worlds have potential for distinctly new
situations. Intelligent adaptive learning artificial agents will not be under complete control of the designer of
the virtual world, and they may be considered as autonomous actors capable of being good or evil on their
own, which will be indisputably a new kind of good (evil) - artificial good (evil) (Floridi and Sanders, 2001).
A judgment of the moral significance of the behavior in virtual worlds obviously depends on the character of
the virtual world and its relationship with the real life. In the case of games and fantasy worlds, the act of
playing is a process of making choices in a specific context: a process of playful creation, ‘ludic phronesis’
(Dodig Crnkovic and Larsson, 2005). Even in such a highly idealized and metaphoric environment it is
argued that reinforcement learning and power of habit contribute to forming of a player’s character. For
example empathetic ability is claimed to diminish by habitual playing of violent computer games. (Dodig
Crnkovic and Larsson, 2005) Strain discusses three central issues of ethics in the virtual: protection of
sensitive data, the human character of virtual environments and the necessity to teach ethics to students of
computing. (Strain, 2007) The same appeal for introducing ethics into computing curricula is found in (Dodig
Crnkovic, 2006) who argues that besides research in ethics of the virtual, education is essential means of
filling what Moor calls “policy vacuums”. (Moor, 1985) (Bynum, 2010)
Conclusions: The Evolving Idea of Good Life. The Question of Meaning and Making Sense
Virtual worlds are becoming integral part of our everyday lives. How can virtual worlds be developed in order
to contribute to well being of humanity? (Søraker, 2010) discusses the ideals of the good, theories of value
and well-being to finally focus the analysis on subjective well-being, emphasizing the importance of
normative evaluations of technology. Those are undoubtedly central questions especially when addressing
virtual worlds used in social networking and games.
There are also increasingly important virtual worlds used not for entertainment, pleasure, fantasy or chat but
in professional context of science, government, health care and alike. When thinking about such applications,
the first association is not providing pleasure (for an individual) but making sense (both individually and as a
social group). Some may object that even making sense provides pleasure if only on a higher cognitive level,
but there is an obvious difference between the pleasure of having fun and the pleasure of sensemaking. The
idea of sensemaking is that:
“reality is an ongoing accomplishment that emerges from efforts to create order and make retrospective
sense of what occurs (…) In sensemaking, actors creatively arrange and reassemble cues that they get from
the “real” world, providing structure and guidance in an ongoing process of reality enactment (Neuman
1990; Weick 1995). ” (Fiss and Hirsch, 2005)
For contemporary societies this opens an important discussion about good life vs. meaningful life. What sort
of civilization do we like to develop? The techno-cognitive revolution has ethical consequences, with concept
of well being shifting from industrial era’s focus on pleasure of material welfare (that which industrial era
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produced) towards emphasis on meaningful existence, broadening horizons and making sense (that is what we
may hope for from cognitive revolution). Given satisfactory material conditions, new expectations for
meaningful life arise – material wealth becoming human right, meaningful life is something to strive for,
engage in and develop.
In the emerging New Renaissance of information era (Dodig Crnkovic, 2003), thanks to the progress of
technology, numerous new possibilities will appear for meaningful life. It is necessary to think through and
foresee the outcomes of possible scenarios of the development. In this process, virtual worlds as anticipative
tools of augmented cognition are of great value. Progress of human civilization, including science, art,
literature, technology, politics, organization of labour and culture of everyday living, is based on imaginative
activities. The ability to present different possibilities (alternative worlds) and enable our interaction with
them and through them is the most distinctive characteristics of virtual worlds.
After industrial revolution which essentially extended human body with the mechanical machinery, the
beginning cognitive revolution extends human minds with the computing (information processing)
technology. Information constitutes our new ecology, an “infosphere”, in which ubiquitous computing
facilities are changing our interactions with the world and the character of our relationships with other people.
It is a fundamental change in our understanding of the mind and its relationship with the world, extended
through interactions with other intelligent systems – biological as well as artificial.
At the same time as cognitive revolution brings big promises for increase of wellbeing of humanity, there is
an inherent risk involved in our producing more and more of our own environment, the risk of loosing contact
with the natural world, as expressed in the following passage by Kass in (Melzer et al., 1993) p. 11:
"In the famous allegory of the cave in Plato's Republic, Socrates implies that it is the Prometean gift of fire
and the enchantment of the arts that hold men unwittingly enchanted, warm and comfortable yet blind to the
world beyond the city. Mistaking their crafted world for the whole, men live ignorant of their true standing in
the world and their absolute dependence on powers not of their own making and beyond their control. (…)
The coming of new modern technological project added a new wrinkle to that dispute. What if technology,
founded upon the new science, could address not only the stingy nature without but also unruly nature
within? What if a science-based technology could be brought to bear on the human psyche (and the human
society) by means of a perfected psycho-physics (and scientific political science)? Might one then secure
human happiness by purely rational and technological means?"
However, above understanding identifies technology with rationalism which in case of information
technology is far from self evident. On the contrary, contemporary virtual worlds frequently represent for a
user a return to the mythopoethic thinking, fantasy and freedom from real-world limitations. Here of course
the distinction should be made between the production of technology and its use. On the other hand, the issue
of superhuman intelligence obtained by cognitive enhancements still resonates with the above thinking.
Nevertheless: is technology really even developed based on rational grounds? It can hardly be the case – the
history of technological inventions is strongly related with chance discoveries, personal economical and other
interests of the proponents of technology. Today situation is slightly changed as high technologies are
typically developed by groups of specialists, but it does not guarantee rationality of new technology either.
Who will address the prospect of humanity closing into self-made virtual cocoon? Philosophers? Cognitive
scientists? Ethicists? Engineers? Users? All of us as globally distributed intelligence?
Let me finish recalling words of Weizenbaum, who criticizes identifying rationality with logicity:
“There have been many debates on “Computers and Mind.” What I conclude here is that the relevant issues
are neither technological nor even mathematical; they are ethical.” (Weizenbaum, 1976) p. 227
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