New Players, New Rules:
Galileo and EU-China Relations
Tom Kane
Xiudian Dai
US Hegemony
• There were two main operating technologies
in GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) in
the 1990s
– GPS from the USA
– GLONASS from Russia
• GPS being a de facto global standard
• Free access to GPS signals but only in part
• USA could ‘switch off’ any country
New Players
• The EU decided to build its own GNSS Galileo
in 1998
• The EU entered partnerships with nonEuropean countries, principally China, to
jointly develop Galileo
• China pledged €200 million
• Meanwhile, China wanted to build its own
Beidou2/Compass system
A New World Order of GNSS?
• The EU was unhappy about totally relying upon
GPS
• Galileo was declared a ‘civilian’ system, but
would technologically underpin the EU’s CFSP
• The PRC do not have access to the ‘M-code’ of
GPS, hence an independent space programme
is a strategic necessity
• EU-China cooperation: strategically sensitive
American Response
• Initially: no need for an alternative system
• Then: Galileo should be compatible and
interoperable with GPS
• Meanwhile: EU-China cooperation would pose
threat to US security
• US reminded the EU of the arms embargo
• Influenced by US, NATO never expressed
support to Galileo
Implications of USA Position
• The USA did not wish to see the emergence of
a challenger on the other side of the Atlantic;
• the status quo of the existing GNSS world
order should not be changed
• Strategically sensitive technologies should not
be shared with the Chinese
EU Position on China (1)
• EU initially rejected American concerns by
insisting on the civilian nature of Galileo
• But when interviewed, EC official in Brussels
did not deny the possibility that Galileo
technologies could serve military purposes
• The importance of China to Galileo is now
much reduced in terms of contribution and
ownership
EU Position on China (2)
• In Nov 2007, the governance structure of
Galileo was changed from a PPP model to
direct government ownership and
management
• The European Commission centred
governance structure and EU funding make it
very difficult for China to participate
• The EU is now concerned with competition of
the Chinese Compass
Navigating for Power (1)
• The USA wanted to keep the PRC in the
satellite navigation slow lane
• The EU disappointed the PRC by not offering
access to its Public Regulated Service
• Galileo became increasingly more tilted
towards accommodating US demands
• The PRC’s €200 shopping list was not
honoured by the Europeans…
Navigating for Power (2)
• The truth is:
• Compass has more satellites in space than Galileo
• Compass uses frequencies that overlap with
those to be used by Galileo
• Compass will likely be ahead of Galileo in
broadcasting signals
• By international law, the EU might have to get
PRC’s permission for using the same frequencies
and the latter can say ‘no’.
Navigating for Power (3)
• During a recent interview, a European
Commission official expressed a high degree of
frustration over the difficult process of
negotiating with the Chinese
• Technically speaking, Compass could significantly
cripple Galileo through frequency overlay
• EC Delegation to Beijing: China should be treated
by the EU as an equal partner rather than a
developing country in science and technology
(Interview)
Concluding Remarks
• The case of Galileo tells us:
– The EU and the PRC have a shared strategic vision:
US hegemony should and can be challenged
– The EU and the PRC recognise the importance of
partnership but any partnership can be sabotaged
by self-interest
– The US plays a significant role in EU-China
relations
– China, in this case, appeared to be a more serious
challenger than the EU to US hegemony