Foreign Policy
at BROOKINGS
MISSILE
DEFENSE IN
EUROPE:
Cooperation or
Contention?
Steven Pifer
Arms Control Series
Paper 8 • May 2012
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my deep gratitude to John Beyrle, Linton
Brooks, Michael Elleman, Michael O’Hanlon and Greg Thielmann, as well
as to officials in the U.S. government, for taking the time to review a draft
of this paper and for their very useful reactions and comments. Of course,
the contents, conclusions and recommendations are my own.
I appreciate Gail Chalef ’s assistance in the paper’s editing and production.
Finally, I am very grateful to the Ploughshares Fund for its generous support for this paper and for other activities of the Brookings Arms Control
Initiative.
Brookings recognizes that the value it provides to any supporter is in its
absolute commitment to quality, independence and impact. Activities
supported by its donors reflect this commitment, and the analysis and
recommendations of the Institution’s scholars are not determined by
any donation.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
1. Introduction and Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. A Brief History of Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
3. The European Phased Adaptive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4. The Russian View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5. Models of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Transparency and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
7. Pursuing Cooperation over Contention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
About the Brookings Arms Control Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
About the Author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30
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1. I ntroduction and Executive
Summary
Missile defense has been an issue on the agenda
Initially, the Russians seemed to see the EPAA as less
of a threat than the Bush administration plan that
it replaced. The Russians agreed at the end of 2010
to explore a cooperative missile defense arrangement
with NATO. In 2011, however, Russian officials attached priority to securing from Washington a “legal
guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be
directed against Russian strategic ballistic missiles,
accompanied by a series of constraints.
between Washington and Moscow since the 1960s.
Although the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
appeared to resolve the question, it kept coming
back—in the form of U.S. suspicions about the
large, phased array Soviet radar at Krasnoyarsk, Soviet concern about the Strategic Defense Initiative,
National Missile Defense programs, U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and plans
for deploying missile defenses in Europe.
The Obama administration has offered a political assurance on this but could not agree to a legal guarantee. Republican support for missile defense and opposition to any treaty limits on it would mean that a
treaty could not obtain the two-thirds majority necessary for Senate ratification. Moscow nevertheless
has held to its insistence. The mix of motives that
underlies the Russian approach to missile defense
and possible cooperation with NATO is not entirely
clear but likely includes: concern that later phases of
the EPAA or subsequent developments will threaten
Russian strategic ballistic missiles; Ministry of Defense reluctance in principle to engage in a cooperative effort; opposition to U.S. military infrastructure
on the territory of countries that joined NATO in
or after 1999; and a desire to drive wedges within
NATO. Finally, Moscow may be in a holding pattern on missile defense, as it is on nuclear arms control issues, until it sees who wins the November U.S.
presidential election.
In 2012, the missile defense issue ranks high on the
U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas. Policymakers in Washington, Moscow and NATO capitals face
a challenge: can they manage the question in a cooperative manner, perhaps by developing a NATORussia missile defense of Europe, or will this be a
contentious issue that undermines arms control and
broader relations?
After a review of the history of missile defense, this
paper describes the Obama administration’s “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA) to missile
defense in Europe. The EPAA is based on the Aegis
SPY-1 radar and Standard SM-3 missile interceptor,
which is to be upgraded over the next decade to defend NATO Europe, and later to augment defense of
the U.S. homeland, against prospective longer-range
ballistic missiles from Iran (though NATO as a matter of policy does not publicly cite Iran). NATO has
endorsed this approach, and the first phase began
in 2011, with deployment of U.S. Navy warships
armed with SM-3 interceptors in the Mediterranean
and a supporting radar in Turkey. Later phases envisage SM-3 interceptors plus SPY-1 radars deployed
on land in Romania and Poland.
Should the sides find a way around the legal guarantee obstacle, there appears to be a rich menu of
ideas as to how a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement might be structured. In
2011, U.S. and Russian officials reportedly found
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convergence on ideas such as transparency; joint
NATO-Russian missile defense exercises; a jointlymanned “data fusion center” that would share early
warning data and develop a “common operational
picture;” and a “planning and operations center”
that would, among other things, implement transparency measures, exchange updated threat assessments, and discuss possible attack scenarios. Several
U.S.-Russia Track II dialogues over the past two
years have developed complementary ideas for NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation.
For the time being, missile defense falls into the
category of difficult issues in U.S.-Russia relations.
Achieving a NATO-Russia agreement on missile
defense cooperation appears all but impossible in
2012. The U.S. and NATO objective should be to
keep the door open for a NATO-Russia agreement
in 2013. Then, the United States and NATO could
offer a package to encourage Russia to join in a cooperative missile defense. Such a package could include some or all of the following measures:
• A U.S. and NATO political commitment
not to direct their missile defenses against
Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
The Russian proposal for a legal guarantee is accompanied by a proposal for “objective criteria,” which
translates to limits on numbers, velocities and locations of missile defense interceptors—a treaty covering missile defense. Short of a treaty, however, there
are ways to reassure Moscow about the capabilities
of U.S. missile defenses and the inherent limits on
those capabilities. For example, as the head of the
U.S. Missile Defense Agency has suggested, the Russians could observe SM-3 interceptor tests to confirm that the velocity and range of the missile would
not allow it to engage Russian strategic missiles. The
U.S. government might also offer an annual declaration regarding the current and planned numbers of
key elements of the U.S. missile defense system—interceptor missiles, silos and land-based launchers, associated radars and missile-defense capable ships—
and commit to provide advance notice of changes in
the planned numbers. This would allow Moscow to
gauge whether the sum of U.S. capabilities seriously
challenged its strategic deterrent.
• Maximum transparency regarding planned
U.S. missile defenses. This should include
an offer of an annual notification laying
out the numbers of key missile defense elements currently deployed and planned for
deployment each year over the next decade.
This should be accompanied by a commitment to provide the Russians notice in advance should there be any changes in those
planned deployment numbers. Ideally, this
would apply on a reciprocal basis.
• Technical briefings as to why the Defense
Department concludes that U.S. missile
defenses will not threaten Russian strategic
ballistic missiles.
• Reiteration of the offer to allow Russian
experts, using their own sensors, to observe
SM-3 interceptor tests.
In different political circumstances, given current
U.S. plans, it would appear that a ten-year agreement limiting each side to no more than 100-125
interceptors capable of engaging strategic ballistic
missiles would (1) assure Moscow that its strategic
ballistic missile force was not threatened, and (2) permit the United States to do everything that it wants
to do over the next decade to defend against the
Iranian and North Korean ballistic missile threats.
The administration, however, is not exploring such
a treaty, as it understands that any such agreement
would have no prospect of Senate ratification.
• Indicating that a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement could be
of a provisional, time-limited nature, with
NATO acknowledging at the outset that
(1) Moscow has strong concerns regarding U.S./NATO missile defense capabilities and (2) Russia’s decision to agree to a
provisional cooperative arrangement does
not preclude that Moscow may decide not
to make the arrangement permanent if it
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believes that U.S./NATO missile defense
capabilities will threaten its strategic forces.
The United States and NATO should seek, without
degrading their ability to defend against limited ballistic missile attack, to make it as easy as possible
for Moscow to agree to a cooperative missile defense
arrangement. Ultimately, the Russians will have to
decide how to respond. A Russian readiness to accept a political commitment that U.S. missile defenses were not directed against their strategic ballistic missiles rather than a legal guarantee would open
dramatic potential for cooperation. The reported
convergence in the sides’ thinking could presage a
relatively rapid realization of a practical cooperative
arrangement. That would be in the U.S. interest,
making missile defense an asset rather than a liability
on the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas, providing for a stronger missile defense of Europe, and
perhaps proving a game-changer in broader NATO
and Russian attitudes toward each other.
• Indicating that, as long as the ability of
NATO’s missile defense to protect all Alliance members is not degraded, NATO is
prepared to listen to and accommodate reasonable Russian suggestions for a cooperative arrangement.
• Indicating that the “adaptive” part of the
EPAA includes a possibility that the United
States might slow development of and/or
in consultation with NATO choose not to
deploy the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor if it
were clear that Iran were not making significant progress toward achieving a longerrange missile capability.
•
Establishing regular U.S.-Russia (or NATORussia) ballistic missile threat assessment
conferences, focusing on North Korea and
Iran, to close the gap in the sides’ estimates.
A note on scope: This paper focuses on Europe, currently the geographic center of the discussion on
missile defense. While not addressed here, missile
defense is also an issue in the Middle East and in
Asia, as demonstrated by the deployment of landand sea-based missile defense assets in anticipation
of the April 13, 2012 North Korean rocket launch.
China also figures in the broader discussion. Having
a smaller strategic missile force than Russia, Beijing
will closely follow U.S. efforts to defend America
against ballistic missile attack. And one reason why
the U.S. Navy is interested in the Standard SM-3
interceptor is that it could enhance the Navy’s ability to defend aircraft carriers against Chinese ballistic missile attacks designed to deny access to certain
ocean areas.
In 2013, if Moscow is prepared to move forward,
these recommendations would provide a basis for
engaging the Russians and for moving to agree on
and implement ideas for a cooperative missile defense arrangement for Europe. Some of these recommendations would prove controversial in Washington. But they would not undermine current U.S.
plans for missile defense to protect Europe and the
U.S. homeland. They would only cause a change in
those plans if it became clear that some threats, such
as an Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile, were
not emerging.
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2. A Brief History of Missile Defense
nuclear warhead, provided a second echelon of defense and was designed to engage incoming warheads once they had reentered the atmosphere.
Galosh, Spartan and Sprint
Missile defense is by no means a new issue. Almost
as soon as the United States and Soviet Union began
developing and deploying intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) in the late 1950s and early 1960s,
they began work on systems to defend against those
missiles. The Soviets by the mid-1960s had begun
developing an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system
to defend Moscow, based on the Galosh interceptor
missile. The Galosh was intended to engage and destroy an incoming ballistic missile warhead outside
of the atmosphere, using a nuclear warhead. The
Moscow ABM system became operational in 1971.
The early ABM systems on both sides had to be
guided by ground-based radars. The challenges of
tracking and intercepting relatively small warheads
traveling at high velocities—ICBM warheads travel at about seven kilometers per second (well over
15,000 miles per hour)—are formidable. Neither
side had a reliable technical capability to hit an incoming warhead directly or even get close enough
to destroy it with a conventional warhead. ABM interceptors thus were armed with nuclear warheads.
By the mid-1960s, both the United States and the
Soviet Union had deployed sufficient strategic offensive nuclear forces—ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclearcapable heavy bombers—so that a situation of mutual assured destruction (MAD) prevailed. If either
side considered striking first, it would have to calculate that it would still suffer huge damage as a result
of the other’s retaliatory strike. U.S. officials began
to consider the offense-defense relationship, specifically, the consequences of widespread anti-ballistic
missile defenses for strategic stability. Strategic stability was generally seen to have two components:
arms race stability and crisis stability.
Suspicions about Soviet ABM intentions played a
significant role in the U.S. calculation of its strategic
offensive needs in the 1960s. The United States in
parallel pursued its own ABM efforts. The Johnson
administration proposed the Sentinel program to
deploy nuclear-armed ABM interceptor missiles at
locations around the United States to defend cities
against a deliberate Chinese attack or unauthorized
Soviet launch. The Nixon administration replaced
that plan with the Safeguard system to protect Minuteman ICBM silos against possible attack in order to preserve a robust retaliatory capability. The
Safeguard system utilized two types of interceptor
missiles. The Spartan was designed to carry a large
nuclear warhead—at five megatons, it was bigger
than most warheads in the U.S. strategic offensive
stockpile—and intercept incoming reentry vehicles
(warheads) outside of the atmosphere. The Sprint,
a very high velocity missile with a much smaller
First, U.S. officials worried that ABM systems could
undermine arms race stability, which envisaged a
situation in which neither side had incentives to expand its nuclear forces. If the Soviet Union began
deploying a widespread ABM system, the United
States might need to increase its ICBMs and SLBMs
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in order to be confident that it could overwhelm the
Soviet defenses. The action-reaction phenomenon
thus could result in ever expanding strategic forces
on both sides. This would have made a strategic arms
limitation arrangement, which Washington had just
begun to think about, difficult if not impossible to
achieve.
radars capable of tracking ICBM and SLBM warheads be located on the country’s periphery and oriented outwards. So located, the radars could provide
early warning of missile attack but could not direct
ABM interceptors against incoming warheads. The
treaty also prohibited developing, testing or deploying ABM systems that were “sea-based, air-based,
space-based or mobile land-based.”1
Second, and more importantly, U.S. officials worried about the impact of ABM systems on crisis stability. If both the United States and Soviet Union
had ABM systems in addition to large strategic
offensive forces, would one side in a severe crisis
be more tempted to launch a first strike? The side
might calculate that, if it struck first and destroyed a
substantial portion of the other’s strategic offensive
forces, its ABM systems could cope with the weakened retaliatory strike—or at least leave it in a substantially better position than if it instead absorbed
a first strike.
A key reason—above and beyond strategic stability
arguments—that motivated the sides to conclude
the ABM Treaty was cost. At the time, building
additional strategic offensive systems appeared to
be as cheap as or cheaper than building ABM interceptors. This was particularly true as the sides
developed ICBMs and SLBMs capable of carrying
multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles
(MIRVs); some missiles ultimately were deployed
with as many as 10-14 warheads. It was apparent to
officials in both Washington and Moscow that, with
the technology of the time, offense would “win” the
race with defense.
These kinds of stability considerations led U.S. officials to favor limiting ABM systems as well as limiting strategic offensive forces by agreement. In 1969,
U.S. and Soviet negotiators began the Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) negotiations, which
addressed both.
Both sides ratified the ABM Treaty in summer 1972,
the U.S. Senate by a vote of 88-2, and the treaty
entered into force that October. In 1974, President
Gerald Ford and Brezhnev signed a protocol to the
ABM Treaty that restricted each side to 100 ABM
interceptor launchers at only one site. The Soviets
chose to maintain their site around Moscow, but
Congress in 1975 voted to end funding for the U.S.
site at Grand Forks ICBM base in North Dakota,
shutting it down just months after it had become
operational.
The ABM Treaty
Following seven negotiating rounds, President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
in June 1972 signed the Interim Offensive Arms
Agreement and the ABM Treaty. The Interim Offensive Arms Agreement capped the numbers of U.S.
and Soviet ICBM and SLBM launchers at the levels
then existing or under construction.
Many analysts agreed with the two governments that
the ABM Treaty shaped the offense-defense relationship in a way that enhanced strategic stability. The
low number of interceptors permitted by the treaty
provided little additional incentive for the sides to increase their ICBM and SLBM forces (although those
forces did increase for other reasons, primarily due to
the ease of adding MIRVs on missiles). Moreover, the
tight treaty limits on ABM systems gave each side assurance that it would be able to retaliate against and
inflict heavy damage on the other, which reduced incentives to consider a first strike in a crisis.
The ABM Treaty prohibited the United States and
Soviet Union from deploying a nationwide defense
against strategic ballistic missiles and limited each
side to two deployment sites, one near the national
capital and one at an ICBM field. No more than 100
ABM interceptor launchers could be located at each
site. The treaty restricted radars, permitting a limited
number of battle management radars at each ABM
deployment site but otherwise requiring that large
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systems based on “other physical principles,” such
as lasers, were subject to discussion under terms of
the treaty.
The Strategic Defense Initiative
Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 believing that
the Soviet Union had gained crucial advantages in
the overall strategic nuclear balance. While taking
steps to augment U.S. strategic offensive forces, he
was distressed to learn that, in the event of a Soviet
attack, he could order a retaliatory strike but had
no ability to defend the United States against Soviet
ballistic missiles. The Reagan administration also
worried that the Soviets might be laying the basis
for a prohibited territorial defense. The concern focused on construction of a large phased array radar
at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia; in contrast to the
requirements of the ABM Treaty, the radar was not
located on the periphery of the Soviet Union and
oriented outwards.
SDI devoted particular attention to exploring technologies that could destroy ICBMs and SLBMs during the boost phase, when the missiles’ engines were
still burning and before the warheads could separate.
If they could successfully destroy missiles, U.S. defenses would not have to cope with the smaller and
more numerous reentry vehicles (warheads) that
would be dispersed by the missiles or differentiate between warheads and decoys. Moreover, while
missile engines were still burning, they provided a
bright and very visible target, far easier to see and
track than a warhead.
Soviet military planners initially went into a near
panic over SDI, fearing that a crash U.S. program
might negate Moscow’s huge investment in ICBMs
and SLBMs. Even if SDI did not provide a complete
shield, it might prove capable of defeating most of
the warheads that the Soviets could launch in a retaliatory strike. The Soviets began investigating countermeasures and launched a major public campaign
to undermine support for SDI in the West. By 1986
and early 1987, however, Soviet scientists had concluded that the U.S. program faced large technological challenges and would not pose a serious threat
to their strategic missile force for many years or decades. This helped enable General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev to consider significant reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces.
In March 1983, Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), posing the question:
“What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat
of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack,
that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or
that of our allies?”2 Reagan sought to replace nuclear
deterrence and MAD with the ability to defend the
United States against a large-scale Soviet ballistic
missile attack. Dubbed “Star Wars” by pundits, SDI
explored a variety of defense possibilities.
The technologies included ground-based interceptor
missiles with “hit-to-kill” capabilities, that is, they
would destroy an incoming ballistic missile warhead by directly colliding with it, “hitting a bullet
with a bullet.” “Smart Rocks,” which later evolved
into “Brilliant Pebbles,” envisaged a constellation of
satellites, each carrying dozens of small powered interceptors that could be fired against Soviet missiles
in their boost phase. Other technologies included
directed-energy weapons, such as an X-ray laser
in space that used a nuclear explosion to generate
a pulse of X-rays, which could be directed against
multiple warheads or against ballistic missiles in
their boost phase. Many of these technologies—
space-based systems, for example—appeared to be
potential violations of the ABM Treaty. Moreover,
When Reagan met Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986, the two came close to agreeing on a
plan to eliminate all of their nuclear weapons. But
Gorbachev insisted that the sides agree to limit SDI
research, development and testing to the laboratory for a period of ten years, and Reagan would
not agree. Reykjavik nevertheless laid the foundations for the 1987 treaty banning U.S. and Soviet
intermediate-range missiles and the 1991 Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START I).
By the end of the 1980s, the United States was finding that defensive technologies were far more difficult
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to develop than anticipated, and the costs went well
beyond what had been hoped. Offense still appeared
to be readily capable of winning the race with defense.
engaging faster targets, including ICBM and SLBM
warheads. U.S.-Russian discussions ensued in the
Standing Consultative Commission, a body established by the ABM Treaty to consider issues related
to the treaty’s operation. Those discussions in September 1997 produced several agreed statements
that collectively became known as the ABM demarcation agreement.
The George H. W. Bush administration scaled back
plans for missile defense, embracing a more limited
system called GPALS (Global Protection against
Limited Strikes). That envisaged a combination of
ground- and space-based interceptors that would
provide protection against a limited number of offensive ballistic missiles. (Protection of the United
States against a limited ballistic missile attack remains U.S. policy to the present.) While not nearly
as ambitious as SDI, GPALS still would have violated the limits of the ABM Treaty, both in the number of interceptors and the fact that up to hundreds
of them would have been space-based. The Clinton
administration decided to shelve the plan after it assumed office.
The statements provided that tactical missile defense interceptors would not be considered ABM
systems—and thus would not be subject to the constraints of the ABM Treaty—provided that their velocity did not exceed three kilometers per second,
that the velocity of the target missile against which
the interceptors were tested did not exceed five kilometers per second, and that the range of the target
missile did not exceed 3,500 kilometers. The logic of
the demarcation agreement was that any missile interceptor with a velocity of less than three kilometers
per second and tested against a target with a velocity
of less than five kilometers per second—for example,
the THAAD interceptor—would lack the capability
to engage ICBM or SLBM warheads, which travel
at velocities well above five kilometers per second.
A second factor affecting the Bush administration’s
approach was the problem that Iraqi Scud missiles
had posed for U.S. and coalition forces and for Israel during the 1991 Gulf War. U.S. missile defense
efforts shifted toward deployable theater missile defense systems capable of dealing with shorter-range
missiles that could threaten U.S. forces on the battlefield. By the end of the 1990s, the Pentagon was
preparing to deploy the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system, with capabilities against tactical ballistic missiles; had begun testing the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system,
with capabilities against theater ballistic missiles;
and was developing the Standard SM-2 interceptor for U.S. Navy ships to provide terminal defense
against shorter-range missiles. These missiles offered
some prospect of intercepting shorter-range ballistic
missiles, which travel at considerably slower velocities than ICBMs and SLBMs and thus are easier to
engage.
In the meantime, Congress adopted the National
Missile Defense Act of 1999, which declared: “It
is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon
as is technologically possible an effective National
Missile Defense system capable of defending against
limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental,
unauthorized or deliberate).”3 The legislation was
motivated in part by the 1998 report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States, led by Donald Rumsfeld. The report
challenged the intelligence community for underestimating the growing ballistic missile threat and asserted that Iran and North Korea could develop an
ICBM capable of striking the United States within
five years of a decision to do so.
National Missile Defense
The Clinton administration began looking at possible national missile defense (NMD) architectures,
including configurations involving 100-250 groundbased interceptors—not enough to stop a major
Russian missile strike. The plan envisaged deploying
As the capabilities of defenses to deal with ballistic
missiles increased in the 1990s, the Russians expressed concern that they might become capable of
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interceptors in Alaska and possibly in North Dakota. The Alaska site would have been inconsistent
with the terms of the ABM Treaty, as would have
been the number of interceptors if they exceeded
100, so the administration decided to consult with
Moscow on possible changes to the agreement. U.S.
officials explored with the Russians the possibility of
amending the treaty in late 1999 and the first half of
2000, but the Russians showed no interest, in part
because of the looming U.S. presidential election.4
In the end, the Clinton administration deferred on
the issue rather than choosing to deploy an NMD
system that would have contravened the ABM Treaty. That decision was made easier by the failure of
a key missile defense test in summer 2000, which
raised questions about whether the system was ready
for deployment.
missiles, the Bush administration pushed the Pentagon to accelerate deployment of some missile defense
capability to protect the United States. In 2004, the
Pentagon began deploying the ground-based interceptor (GBI), a three-stage missile designed to
intercept warheads outside the atmosphere during
the mid-course phase of their flight. Deployed before the testing program had been completed, the
GBIs are attributed with some capability to engage
and intercept rudimentary ICBM warheads. They
employ a hit-to-kill technology: the interceptor’s kinetic kill vehicle is given initial guidance toward the
incoming warhead’s path and, as it closes, opens its
infrared seeker. The seeker “sees” the warhead, which
will appear hot against the coldness of space, and
guides the kill vehicle to collide with the warhead.
(One critique of the GBI’s seeker—and of the seeker
on the Standard SM-3 interceptor discussed in the
next section—is that it cannot discriminate between
a warhead and a decoy such as a balloon, which
would, in the vacuum of space, travel at the same
velocity as a warhead and appear hot to the seeker.)
ABM Treaty Withdrawal and
Ground-based Interceptors
The George W. Bush administration came to office
intent on advancing missile defense. In December
2001, following pro forma consultations with the
Russian government, the administration gave the
treaty-required six months notice of its intent to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s calm reaction likely defused what
might otherwise have been a controversial issue with
some in Congress and certain NATO allies.
By November 2005, nine GBIs had been deployed
at Ft Greeley, Alaska and at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California. The United States presently deploys 26 GBIs at Ft Greely and four at Vandenberg,
and intends to complete construction of 14 additional silos to house GBIs at Ft Greely.
The Alaska and California sites were well positioned
to defend against first-generation ICBMs from
North Korea and offered a capability to defend most
of the United States against ICBMs from Iran. The
Bush administration sought a third site for GBIs
in Europe that would provide additional capability
against an Iranian ICBM. In early 2007, U.S. officials began negotiating with Warsaw on the deployment in Poland of ten two-stage variants of the GBIs
based in Alaska and California. U.S. officials also negotiated with Prague on positioning an associated
X-band tracking and discrimination radar in the
Czech Republic. The following year, U.S. officials
succeeded in gaining a measure of NATO endorsement at the April 2008 summit. The NATO leaders’ communiqué read: “We therefore recognize the
substantial contribution to the protection of Allies
With conclusion in May 2002 of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, which limited each side
to 1,700-2,200 operationally deployed strategic
warheads, Bush administration officials believed
that they had severed the offense-defense link established by the SALT I agreements in 1972. Missile
defenses were no longer constrained by treaty once
the United States formally withdrew from the ABM
Treaty in June 2002, while U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces were treaty-limited (though
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty was a thin
piece of work, lacking definitions, counting rules or
verification measures).
Citing concerns about the potential of rogue states
such as North Korea and Iran to develop long-range
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from long-range ballistic missiles to be provided by
the planned deployment of European-based United
States missile defense assets. We are exploring ways
to link this capability with current NATO missile
defense efforts…”5
of these radars’ field-of-view looked south, providing coverage of Iran. U.S. officials welcomed the offer, which Bush and Putin discussed at a July 2007
meeting in Kennebunkport. Although U.S. and
Russian officials continued to discuss the issue for
the following year, they failed to find agreement.
Washington wanted to add the Russian radars to the
U.S. plan. The Russians, on the other hand, wanted
their offer to substitute for elements of the proposed
U.S. missile defense system and suggested that U.S.
interceptors be deployed on ships in the Mediterranean or in Turkey or Iraq instead of in Poland. By
the end of the Bush administration’s second term,
Moscow continued to object vociferously to the
third site plan, and missile defense had become one
of the most contentious issues on a troubled bilateral
agenda.6
The Russian government almost immediately expressed concern about the planned location of the
GBIs and radar. Russian officials asserted that the
GBIs posed a potential threat to their ICBM force.
Moscow argued that Iran was many years away from
building an ICBM that could reach the United
States and that therefore the GBIs in Poland could
only be intended against Russia. Although the Bush
administration noted that it planned just ten GBIs in
Poland, Russian officials contended that that number could increase. The radar planned for the Czech
Republic, moreover, had a 360 degree field-of-view
and, as Pentagon officials later acknowledged, could
track targets in space over Russian territory to the
Ural Mountains.
Not to be lost in the discussion of missile defense is
the fact that Russia continues to maintain an ABM
system around Moscow, referred to as the A-135.
The system originally included the Gorgon and Gazelle ABM interceptor missiles armed with nuclear
warheads. Gorgon missiles may have been removed
from their silos, leaving 68 deployed Gazelle interceptors, which are now believed to be armed with
conventional high explosive warheads.
In spring 2007, Putin proposed a cooperative U.S.Russian missile defense system and offered to make
available data from a Russian early warning radar at
Armavir in southern Russia and a second radar operated by the Russians in Gabala, Azerbaijan. Both
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3. T
he European Phased Adaptive
Approach
The Iranians have a large number of short-range
ballistic missiles, including Scuds. Their Shabab-3
medium-range missile has an estimated range of
1,000-1,600 kilometers, and the Sejjil-2, which is
under development, has a projected range of 2,200
kilometers. The Shabab-3 gives Iran a capability to
target Israel and Turkey, while the Sejjil-2 could
reach targets in southeastern Europe.
The U.S. Plan
Barack Obama took office in January 2009. One of
his key foreign policy goals was to “reset” U.S.-Russia relations, which in the aftermath of the August
2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia had fallen
to their lowest point since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. President Obama met with Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev in April 2009. Among
other things, the joint statements coming from that
meeting acknowledged the offense-defense relationship and announced early negotiations for a new
strategic arms reduction treaty to replace START I,
which was due to expire in December 2009.
Given this reassessment of the Iranian threat, the
administration stated that it intended to replace the
Bush administration’s third site plan with the “European Phased Adaptive Approach” (EPAA). The
EPAA would provide earlier capabilities to protect
Europe against Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and could adapt to deal with longerrange Iranian missiles as the Iranians developed
them.8 (It also no doubt occurred to administration
officials that the new plan would appear less threatening to Russia than the previous GBI plan.)
In September 2009, the Obama administration announced a significant reconfiguration of U.S. missile
defense plans for Europe. The White House attributed the change in large part to a revised assessment
of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities:
The EPAA is based on the solid-fueled Standard
SM-3 interceptor missile currently deployed on
board U.S. Navy Aegis-class cruisers and destroyers.
(The Aegis system refers to an advanced SPY-1 radar
and its associated computer hardware and software,
capable of tracking a large number of ballistic missile
targets simultaneously, as well as the SM-3 interceptor.) Like the GBI, the SM-3 employs a kinetic kill
vehicle guided by an infrared seeker into an incoming reentry vehicle (warhead) during its mid-course
phase, though the range of the SM-3 is significantly
shorter than that of the GBI (while ranges remain
classified, the SM-3’s current range is believed to be
well below 1,000 kilometers, while the GBI’s range
“The intelligence community now assesses
that the threat from Iran’s short- and medium-range ballistic missiles is developing
more rapidly than previously projected,
while the threat of potential Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities has been slower to develop than
previously estimated. In the near-term, the
greatest threats from Iran will be to U.S. Allies and partners, as well as to U.S. deployed
personnel—military and civilian—and
their accompanying families in the Middle
East and in Europe.”7
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is believed to more than several thousand kilometers).9 The SM-3 interceptor is guided by tracking
information from the SPY-1 radar to a point in
space, where it opens its infrared seeker.
designed to fit into U.S. Navy vertical box launchers, which have a diameter of 21 inches. The initial
booster rocket for the SM-3 Block IA and Block
IBs has a diameter of 21 inches, but the rest of the
missile has a diameter of only 13.5 inches. With the
Block IIA, the entire SM-3 missile body will have a
diameter of 21 inches, allowing greater volume for
fuel. That will mean that the SM-3 Block IIA will
have a longer range and a higher velocity, estimated
at about 4.5 kilometers per second, giving it a capability to engage intermediate-range ballistic missile
warheads. Phase 3 envisages the deployment of 24
SM-3 Block IIA interceptors and an SPY-1 radar at
a second ground site at Slupsk-Redzikowo, near the
Baltic coast in northern Poland, which will extend
NATO’s missile defense coverage to northern Europe.
As outlined by the administration, the EPAA comprises four phases.10 Phase 1, beginning in 2011, is
based on the deployment of U.S. Navy Aegis warships equipped with the SPY-1 radar and armed
with SM-3 Block IA interceptor missiles in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, from where they can provide
defense for Turkey and southeastern Europe. The
U.S.S. Monterrey conducted the first such patrol in
spring 2011. To provide early warning and tracking
information, a U.S. AN/TPY-2 X-band radar that
can view Iran was deployed to Turkey in late 2011.
The SM-3 Block IA interceptors are believed to have
a velocity of around three kilometers per second and
provide a capability to intercept existing Iranian
short- and medium-range ballistic missile warheads.
Phase 4 is scheduled to begin in 2020. It will entail deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB, which is
planned to have an improved kill vehicle and a high
performance upper stage. Its velocity reportedly will
be 5-5.5 kilometers per second. The SM-3 Block IIB
will have an enhanced capability against mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads,
plus some capability against ICBM warheads and
for “early intercept,” which could allow the possibility of multiple shots at a warhead. The SM-3 Block
IIB would likely be deployed in Poland. Still in the
design stage and several years from being tested, the
SM-3 Block IIB will, in contrast to earlier SM-3
blocks, carry some liquid fuel. That could be an
issue for its deployment on board warships, as the
U.S. Navy prefers solid-fueled missiles for fire safety
reasons.
In October 2011, NATO, the United States and
Spain announced that, beginning in 2014, the U.S.
Navy would homeport four Aegis-class warships in
Rota, Spain. This will allow the Navy to have the
same forward-deployed capability with fewer ships
than would be the case were they operating out of
U.S. ports, requiring lengthy transits across the Atlantic.
Phase 2 is planned for 2015. At that point, the U.S.
Navy will be deploying the SM-3 Block IB interceptor missile. The missile, with the same velocity and
range as the SM-3 Block IA, will have an improved
seeker on its kinetic kill vehicle. At-sea deployments
will be augmented by “Aegis Ashore,” which will entail the deployment of 24 SM-3 missile interceptors
and an SPY-1 radar in Romania. In May 2011, the
United States and Romania agreed that the interceptors and radar would be located at Daveselu Air Base
in southern Romania.
According to the Department of Defense FY 2012
budget submission, the U.S. Navy plans to increase
the number of warships capable of deploying SM-3
interceptors from 23 in 2011 to 43 in FY 2020. The
total planned buy of SM-3 interceptors in Blocks
IA, IB and IIA out to 2020 is 515 missiles, of which
only 29 will be Block IIA. The number of Block IIB
interceptors by 2020 has not yet been determined
but likely will be a relatively small portion of the
total SM-3 program (some suggest less than 50).
Phase 3 is scheduled to begin in 2018. This phase
will entail the deployment on land and at sea of
SM-3 Block IIA interceptor missiles, which will be
larger than their predecessors. SM-3 interceptors are
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statement when signing the START I Treaty in 1991
but continued to abide by that agreement, even after
the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.
Missile Defense and New START
U.S.-Russian negotiations on the New START treaty began in April 2009. Russian negotiators raised
the issue of missile defense in those talks. Their U.S.
counterparts turned the issue aside, noting that they
were prepared to acknowledge the offense-defense
interrelationship in the preamble of a new treaty but
that missile defense should be discussed in a separate
channel. U.S. negotiators did accept a provision in
the treaty prohibiting deployment of missile defense
interceptors in converted ICBM silos or converted
SLBM submarine launch tubes, something the U.S.
military said it would not do in any case.
During the New START ratification debate, some
Senators expressed concern that the preambular language recognizing the offense-defense relationship
and the Russian unilateral statement might somehow restrict U.S. missile defense, if only by creating a situation in which Moscow might attempt to
blackmail Washington with a threat to withdraw
from New START. Senate Republicans have strongly supported missile defense and have made clear
that they would oppose any restrictions on it; with
some Republicans, support for missile defense appears to have become an article of faith on par with
opposing tax increases.
As the sides came to closure on final issues in early
2010, the Russians tried to insert language in New
START’s withdrawal clause to the effect that, were
one side’s missile defenses to develop quantitatively
or qualitatively, that might be grounds for the other
side to invoke its right to withdraw from the treaty.
U.S. negotiators refused to accept that proposal, and
Obama reportedly told Medvedev that, if the Russians insisted on this point, there would be no treaty.
In the end, the Russians relented but, on signature
of New START in April 2010, issued a unilateral
statement, which said that the treaty:
On December 18, 2010, Obama sent the Senate
Republican leader a letter, in which he stated: “The
New START Treaty places no limitations on the
development or deployment of our missile defense
programs” and that “my Administration plans to deploy all four phases of the [European] PAA.” The
Senate’s resolution of ratification nevertheless called
on the president to certify that he would go forward
with all four phases and stated that it was the understanding of the United States that “the New START
Treaty does not impose any limitations on the deployment of missile defenses other than the requirements of paragraph 3 of Article V” [the provision
that prohibits putting missile interceptors into converted ICBM or SLBM launchers].
“may be effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative or
quantitative build-up in the missile defense
system capabilities of the United States of
America. Consequently, the extraordinary
events referred to in Article XIV of the
Treaty [the article containing language on
withdrawal] also include a build-up in the
missile defense capabilities of the United
States of America such that it would give
rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear potential of the Russian Federation.”11
NATO Endorsement and NATORussia Discussions
At their Lisbon summit in November 2010, NATO
leaders embraced the goal of defending NATO Europe against ballistic missile attack. They stated: “the
Alliance will develop a missile defense capability to
pursue its core task of collective defense. The aim
of a NATO missile defense capability is to provide
full coverage and protection for all NATO European
populations, territory and forces against the increasing threats posed by the proliferation of ballistic
missiles.”12
The U.S. side issued its own unilateral statement on
missile defense, which said that U.S. missile defenses
“are not intended to affect the strategic balance with
Russia” and would be used to defend against “limited missile launches” and “regional threats.” U.S.
officials pointed out that Moscow issued a similar
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While the United States will provide the bulk of the
missile defense capability, NATO will collectively
fund the command, control and communication
system at an estimated cost of $200 million. Other
NATO members with missile defense assets may
also participate. Germany and the Netherlands operate the Patriot PAC-3 system, and the Spanish and
Dutch navies have or are procuring Aegis-class warships compatible with the SM-3 interceptor.
The Russians say that their S-400 missile, now being deployed, has capabilities to intercept short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles. Russia is also developing the S-500, which is to have greater capabilities
for missile defense, including against intermediaterange ballistic missiles. The potential contribution of
the S-400 and S-500 to a cooperative missile defense
is less clear, and U.S. officials for now appear more
interested in Russian radar data.
NATO leaders also met with Medvedev in Lisbon.
They agreed to pursue the possibility of missile defense cooperation, noting in their joint statement:
“we agreed to discuss pursuing missile defense cooperation. We agreed on a joint ballistic missile threat
assessment and to continue dialogue in this area.
The NRC [NATO-Russia Council] will also resume
Theater Missile Defense Cooperation. We have
tasked the NRC to develop a comprehensive joint
analysis of the future framework for missile defense
cooperation.”13
In 2011, discussions on missile defense cooperation
proceeded in two channels: NATO-Russia and U.S.Russia. Moscow seemed to attach greater priority to
the latter, and U.S. and Russian officials engaged in
both State Department-Foreign Ministry and Defense Department-Ministry of Defense discussions
with the idea that, if U.S. and Russian officials could
agree on the principles and framework for missile
defense cooperation, the dialogue could then be
shifted to the NATO-Russia channel.14
The discussions between the Defense Department
and Ministry of Defense reportedly found considerable convergence on what a cooperative missile
defense might look like: transparency regarding missile defense systems; a joint analysis of the impact
of missile defense on the U.S. and Russian strategic
deterrents; joint missile defense exercises; a jointlymanned “data fusion center,” where the sides would
share early warning data, and a jointly-manned “planning and operations center,” where the sides might,
among other things, discuss how to coordinate rules
of engagement if their missile defense systems provided overlapping coverage. U.S. and Russian officials notionally agreed that the sensors—including
radars and satellite-based sensors—would remain
under national control, and each side would retain
control over any decision to launch its interceptor
missiles. U.S. and Russian officials also discussed a
defense technology cooperation agreement, which
would have to be in place as an umbrella agreement
in order to share classified or sensitive information,
including early warning data.
The Russians suggested a sectoral approach to missile defense cooperation, in which NATO and Russia would divide Europe into two sectors, with each
responsible for defending one. This plan was unacceptable to NATO and U.S. officials, because it
would have placed some NATO allies in the Russian
sector. NATO intended that its missile defense system would provide coverage for all NATO countries.
At present, the primary Russian contribution to a cooperative missile defense system with NATO would
be early warning and tracking data from the Russian
radar at Armavir and the Russian-operated radar at
Gabala. These radars, which view Iran, would likely
be able to provide earlier warning and tracking data
than the U.S. AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey, though
they could not provide a fire control solution (the
AN/TPY-2 is more discriminating and can help “cue”
SM-3 interceptors to the point where they could
open their infrared seeker to locate and intercept the
target warhead). Still, the data would be valuable to
the United States and NATO, and General Patrick
O’Reilly, head of the Missile Defense Agency, told a
Congressional hearing in April that the United States
could benefit from access to this data.
In spring 2011, Russian officials began to call, both
privately and publicly, for a “legal guarantee” that
U.S. missile defenses in Europe would not be directed
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against Russian strategic missiles. They added that
such a guarantee should be accompanied by “objective criteria” regarding the numbers, velocity and location of missile defense interceptors in the EPAA
system. As explained by a group of Russian analysts,
Moscow’s position would mean “non-deployment
of tracking and interception instruments in certain
areas, restrictions on the speed and effective range of
interceptors, and limitation of the number of interceptors in defined areas. These guarantees should be
featured in an international treaty.”15
presidential statement, but both sides had to stretch
their instructions to reach the agreement. Neither
Washington nor Moscow was fully comfortable with
the resulting draft statement, and the presidents did
not issue a statement on missile defense following
their meeting. (Russian officials later contended that
they had secured presidential-level approval of the
draft statement and asserted that the U.S. side deserved blame for failing to do the same.)
U.S. officials continued to hold out hope in fall
2011 that the Russians might back off of their demand for a legal guarantee and accept a political
assurance in some form. That would open the possibility for a NATO-Russia summit in May 2012 in
Chicago that could move forward on missile defense
cooperation. The Russians, however, did not budge.
Consultations between U.S. and Russian officials
continued into 2012 on missile defense and strategic stability issues, but they appear to have made no
progress in resolving differences over Russia’s call for
a legal guarantee.
The Obama administration regarded a legal guarantee
on missile defense as a non-starter. It would have to
be recorded in a treaty, requiring Senate ratification.
As had been made clear during the 2010 ratification debate over New START, anything that looked
even remotely like limits on missile defense had zero
chance of gaining Senate ratification. U.S. officials
told their Russian counterparts that the United States
was prepared to offer a political assurance that U.S.
missile defenses were not directed against Russia and
to put it in writing, signed at the highest level. They
made clear that they could not conclude a legallybinding agreement to limit missile defense.
In March 2012, the Russian government advised
that Putin, who would be sworn in as president on
May 7, would not travel to Chicago. When Obama
and Medvedev met in Seoul on March 26, they
agreed that the sides continued to differ over missile
defense but that they would continue to seek a solution. In April, following a NATO-Russia ministerial
meeting, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reaffirmed Moscow’s requirement for a guarantee and
objective criteria.
U.S. officials hoped that the late May 2011 meeting
between Obama and Medvedev on the margins of
the G-8 summit in France might offer an opportunity for the leaders to announce an agreement on
principles of missile defense cooperation. U.S. and
Russian officials met in Moscow a few days before
the summit and reached ad ref agreement on a joint
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4. The Russian View
radar in Kaliningrad; strengthening Russia’s aerospace defense, including by deployment of S-400
and S-500 interceptors; equipping Russian ICBMs
and SLBMs with more advanced penetration aids;
developing the capability to attack NATO control
systems for missile defense; and deploying modern
weapons in locations where they could “take out any
part of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe.
One step in this process will be to deploy Iskander
missiles in Kaliningrad.” Medvedev left the door
open for further discussions with the United States
and NATO and noted that U.S. plans would not
threaten Russian strategic forces for six-eight years.17
What’s Behind the Russian Position
The Russian government originally appeared to welcome the EPAA as a substitute for the Bush administration plan to deploy two-stage GBIs in Poland,
in part because the SM-3 interceptor—less than a
tenth the weight of a GBI—has a significantly lower
velocity and shorter intercept range. Over the past
year, however, the Russians have taken a harder line
and insisted on a legal guarantee that U.S./NATO
missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic missiles. That has proven a roadblock
to a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement.
As analysts pointed out, the Russian military was already pursuing most of these steps. For example, the
radar in Kaliningrad had been under construction
for years. With the exception of the threat to deploy
Iskander missiles to Kaliningrad—which touched a
nerve with nearby NATO allies—the measures generated little apparent concern in Washington.
Russian officials have also linked missile defense to
other issues, suggesting that Russia was unready to
proceed with further nuclear arms reductions beyond the New START Treaty until Washington
addressed Russian concerns on missile defense and
other questions. In March 2011, Lavrov told the
UN Conference on Disarmament: “We insist that
there is a clear need to take into account the factors
that negatively affect strategic stability, such as plans
to place weapons in outer space, to develop nonnuclear armed strategic offensive weapons, as well
as unilateral deployment of a global BMD [ballistic
missile defense] system.”16
The mix of motives that underlies Russian concern
about the EPAA is not entirely clear. Russian officials have always had a healthy respect for U.S. technological prowess, and some in Moscow may genuinely fear that planned U.S. missile defenses will be
able to challenge Russian strategic missiles. Others
may not be concerned by the current plans, but
many wonder what will come after the EPAA, given
continuing U.S. interest in missile defense. Dmitry
Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister—and former Russian ambassador to NATO, where he was
closely involved in missile defense discussions—recently said: “There are no guarantees that after the
In a November 23, 2011 statement, Medvedev reiterated Russian concerns over missile defense, noted
that Russia sought a guarantee set “out on paper in
the form of clear legal obligations,” and listed a range
of measures that Moscow would take in response.
These included commissioning a new early warning
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first, second, and third phases are completed, there
will be no fourth, fifth and sixth. Do you really
think they will halt all their technologies after 2020?
That’s nonsense! They will go ahead with developing
and boosting the technical parameters of their interceptor missiles and performance capabilities of their
warning systems.”18
direction, not toward Poland. So the SM-3, once
launched, would have to chase the ICBM. But the
SM-3 would not have the velocity to catch up. The
Russians say that they have not been persuaded by
these presentations and express concern about potential deployment schemes such as SM-3 Block II
interceptors on board U.S. warships stationed in the
Baltic, Barents and Norwegian Seas.
U.S. policy for 20 years—going back to the George
H. W. Bush administration and as reflected in the
National Missile Defense Act of 1999—is to defend
the United States against a limited ballistic missile attack. Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stated that
the system is not directed against Russian strategic
ballistic missiles or, for that matter, the considerably
smaller force of Chinese ICBMs. Some Russians
may, however, pay more attention to minority voices
in Congress, such as that of Senator Jim DeMint,
who in 2010 offered an amendment to the defense
authorization bill to deploy as fast as technically possible a missile defense system capable of defending
America and U.S. allies against “all” ballistic missile
attacks. Rogozin complained in summer 2011 that
several Senators he met with had openly said that
missile defense was aimed at weakening the Russian
deterrent. Russian officials have repeatedly stated
that a legally-binding guarantee offers the only assurance that will “carry over” and be binding on a
future U.S. administration that they fear might regard Russia with greater hostility than the Obama
administration.
More broadly, the Russian Ministry of Defense may
be opposed in principle to cooperation. Following the May 2002 Bush-Putin summit in Moscow,
when the leaders agreed to pursue missile defense
cooperation, the Ministry of Defense showed little
interest in follow-up. (To be fair, the Pentagon also
showed little desire to engage.) The Russian military
may calculate that a dispute over missile defense is
more likely to enhance the resources it receives for
force modernization, including of its air defense and
missile defense capabilities.
Another motivation behind the Russian position
is undoubtedly long-standing opposition to the
deployment of U.S. military infrastructure on the
territory of countries that joined NATO in and after 1999. Moscow remains profoundly unhappy
about the Alliance’s enlargement. Although the infrastructure and number of U.S. military personnel
to support the SM-3 interceptors in Romania and
Poland will be relatively small, the Russians plainly
do not like it. (Russian attention over the past year
has focused almost solely on the SM-3, particularly
the later, more capable Block IIA and Block IIB
variants. The Russians have said little about the 30
GBIs in Alaska and California, which have the velocity and range to engage ICBMs, even if the GBIs’
ability to deal with the countermeasures on Russian
missiles is dubious.)
The Russians seem more concerned about the
planned SM-3 deployment in Poland than that in
Romania. This could be because the Polish site is
closer to potential tracks of ICBMs from silos in
Russia to the United States. U.S. officials say they
have provided Russian Ministry of Defense officials
with technical briefings showing why the SM-3 deployed in Poland, even SM-3 Block IIB, could not
threaten Russian ICBMs. U.S. officials argue that,
before launching an SM-3 from Poland against a
Russian ICBM, U.S. or NATO commanders would
have to wait until the ICBM had completed its boost
phase in order to calculate its track for an intercept
solution. Russian ICBMs heading for the United
States would fly in a roughly northwestern-northern
Yet another reason relates to NATO. The Russians
may be calculating—or hoping—that a failure to
find a formula for NATO-Russia cooperation on
missile defense would undercut support within the
Alliance for missile defense in general. Thus far,
however, NATO allies appear firmly behind the
EPAA, even if few worry about an Iranian missile
attack. Romania and Poland—who will host SM-3
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interceptors and associated SPY-1 radars—welcome
the prospective deployment as an added security
guarantee. Other allies hope that missile defense will
assume some of the Alliance’s overall deterrence and
defense burden previously borne by non-strategic
nuclear weapons and thereby help make it possible
for NATO to reduce or eliminate those weapons.
Still other allies recognize that the EPAA matters to
Washington and are inclined to be supportive. It is
highly unlikely that missile defense will provoke the
kind of tensions within NATO that the prospective deployment of nuclear-armed Pershing II and
ground-launched cruise missiles did in the early
1980s. Any Russian hope of using this issue as a
wedge-driver may be misplaced.
Do the Russians Have Reason for
Concern?
U.S. officials repeatedly state that the EPAA, even
Phase 4, will pose no threat to Russia. Following
Medvedev’s November 23, 2011 statement, White
House, State Department and Defense Department
spokesmen reiterated that the missile defense system
was directed against Iran, not Russia, and would
not threaten Russia’s strategic missile force. Dean
Wilkening, a physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, recently examined Russian concerns. He concluded:
“It appears, then, that BMD [ballistic missile defense] interceptors with speeds below approximately 5.0 kilometers/second
launched from sites in or around Europe
cannot intercept Russian ICBMs or SLBMs
without violating the laws of physics. In
those cases where some missile trajectories
might be intercepted, cross-targeting of
ICBMs [aiming ICBMs in western Russia
at targets in the western United States so
that their trajectory would fly further away
from Poland] or lofting ICBM or SLBM
trajectories [flying the ICBMs and SLBMs
to higher apogees, taking them out of range
of the SM-3] readily negates this capability.
Moscow’s concern with phases III and IV
of the European Phased Adaptive Approach
BMD architecture, therefore, lacks technical merit, unless the SM-3 Block IIB interceptor has a maximum speed greater than
approximately 5.0 kilometers/second.”19
Finally, the continued Russian insistence on a legal
guarantee suggests that Moscow has decided to go
into a holding pattern on the missile defense issue, as the Russians wait to see who wins the U.S.
presidential election in November. As early as mid2011, Russian diplomats privately indicated that
Moscow would not undertake new nuclear arms
reduction negotiations until 2013, when they knew
who would be in the White House for the next four
years. The Russian reasoning was that a Republican
president might bring a different approach to arms
control than would Obama, if reelected. The same
appears to hold true for missile defense.
There is a precedent for this. In 2000, then-President
Putin decided not to pursue discussions with the
United States on whether and how the ABM Treaty
might be modified to accommodate the Clinton administration’s NMD plans but instead opted to wait
and deal with the new U.S. president in 2001. If
Moscow wants again to put things on hold, insisting on a legal guarantee—when the Russian government well understands that the Obama administration cannot agree to that—is a convenient way to do
so. Obama’s “off mic” comment to Medvedev at the
conclusion of their March 26 meeting in Seoul—
“After my election, I have more flexibility”—likely
will reinforce the Russian tendency to wait. (That
said, Moscow should be realistic. Even if reelected,
Obama would not be able to get a missile defense
treaty ratified by the Senate as currently constituted.)
At least one knowledgeable Russian seems to agree
with Wilkening. Yuriy Solomonov, chief designer
responsible for the newest strategic ballistic missiles
in the Russian inventory, took part in a late February
2012 meeting with Putin devoted to national security and defense questions. Solomonov recalled how
the initial panicky Soviet reaction to the Strategic
Defense Initiative had proven baseless and stated:
“My point is that we’ve been hearing a lot of similar
talk about the missile defense system in Europe. In
most cases, and I’m saying this absolutely officially
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and competently, this is an absolutely far-fetched
threat to our strategic potential.”20
The short answer to the question is that no one
knows with certainty. The SM-3 Block IIB is still
being designed, so its ultimate capabilities are at
this point unknown. If the interceptor performs as
advertised, it would have some capability to engage
and destroy ICBM warheads. But the SM-3 Block
IIB is projected to be a relatively small portion of
the 500-550 SM-3 missiles to be procured over the
coming decade. The SM-3 Block IIBs would have
a very difficult time coping with a large number of
ICBMs and SLBMs—as of March 2012, the Russians had some 420 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs
with about 1,425 warheads—particularly if the missiles deployed decoys, chaff and other countermeasures. As the Department of Defense acknowledges,
discriminating a real warhead from balloons or other
decoys poses one of the most daunting technological
challenges for an effective missile defense system.
Yousaf Butt, a consultant to the Federation of American Scientists, and Theodore Postol, a physicist at
MIT, came to a different conclusion. They argue
that SM-3 Block II interceptors with velocities of
4.5-5.0 kilometers per second could have some capability to engage Russian ICBMs if deployed on
ships operating off the U.S. coasts (as opposed to the
site in Poland). Such deployments would eliminate
the problem of having to chase Russian ICBMs and
could negate the cross-targeting tactic. Somewhat
paradoxically, however, Butt and Postol also argue
that, due to the inability of the infrared seeker to
discriminate between a warhead and decoy or other
countermeasures, “SM-3s will never be able to reliably function in real combat conditions,” and “the
planned [European] PAA midcourse defense system
cannot devalue the nuclear deterrent forces of any
nation.”21
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5. Models of Cooperation
regarding missile defense; when signing the act, the
president issued a signing statement noting that the
administration would interpret the act “in a manner
that does not interfere with the president’s constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs.”)
Converging U.S. and Russian Ideas
Considerable thought over the past two years has
gone into what a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement might look like in practical
terms. There appears to be significant convergence
in thinking, both in official U.S.-Russia channels
and in U.S.-Russia Track II dialogues.
A second element for a cooperative arrangement
would be joint missile defense exercises. The United
States, NATO and Russia already have experience
in this regard: Russia between 1996 and 2008 conducted a variety of computerized and command
post exercises, both bilaterally with the United States
and with NATO. (A NATO-Russia theater missile
defense command post exercise was planned for fall
2008 but fell victim to the downturn in NATORussia relations following the Russia-Georgia conflict.) NATO and Russia conducted a computerassisted missile defense exercise in late March 2012.
Continuing such exercises would allow the militaries
to gain familiarity with the equipment, doctrine and
tactics of the other side. This experience could prove
useful in developing a cooperative missile defense
system.
As noted, Defense Department and Ministry of Defense officials have reportedly found considerable
convergence on what missile defense cooperation
would entail. One element would be transparency
regarding missile defense systems and capabilities.
Defense Department officials have indicated that,
in a cooperative arrangement, they would be prepared to share some sensitive information with the
Russians (hence the need for a defense technical cooperation agreement). They have not specified what
that information would be.
Missile Defense Agency head O’Reilly said in fall
2011 that he would be prepared to organize visits by
Russian experts, with their own sensor equipment,
to observe SM-3 tests. Assuming that this would
also apply to tests of the SM-3 Block IIA and Block
IIB interceptors, which will not take place for several
years, the offer could allow the Russians to observe
the interceptors about which they express the greatest concern in order to assure themselves that those
missiles lack the capabilities to engage Russian strategic missiles. Moscow has not yet taken up this offer. (The 2012 National Defense Authorization Act
requires 60 days notice to Congress before sharing
with the Russian government classified information
A third element would be jointly-manned NATORussia centers, an idea put forward by the Russians
in late 2010. One would be a data fusion center,
modeled on the Joint Data Exchange Center originally agreed in 1998 between Washington and Moscow as a bilateral mechanism to share early warning
data on ballistic missile launches around the world.
(For a variety of reasons, with blame falling on both
sides, that agreement was never implemented.) Each
side would provide the data fusion center data from
its radars and satellites, which would remain under
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national control. At the jointly-manned center, the
data would be combined to provide a “common operational picture” displaying possible missile launches from the Middle East, and the enhanced product
would then be sent back to the sides’ missile defense
command centers. Such a data fusion process would
allow, for example, NATO access to data from the
radars at Armavir and Gabala to confirm data provided by the AN/TPY-2 radar in Turkey and other
U.S. sensors. That could prove useful in the event
of an Iranian ballistic missile test or actual launch
against NATO and provide earlier data than the
AN/TPY-2. (Note that the data shared under this
plan would focus on Europe and launches from the
Middle East, while the Joint Data Exchange Center
envisaged sharing of data on worldwide launches.)
memorandum for senior U.S. and Russian officials
which, among other things, offered a set of principles to guide NATO-Russia or U.S.-Russia missile defense cooperation. They included: a focus on
“detecting and defending against intermediate- and
shorter-range ballistic missiles” (to avoid the question of cooperation that might undermine a side’s
strategic deterrent); transparency on missile defense
systems, including the U.S. SM-3, Patriot PAC-3
and THAAD, and the Russian S-300, S-400 and
S-500 plus associated radars and sensors; transparency on possible missile defense deployment options;
“a focus on regional threats to Europe, including
European Russia,” which might minimize Chinese
concerns; a “complementary rather than ‘joint’ defense,” in which each side would retain control over a
decision to launch its interceptors; and a division of
responsibilities so that “the United States would have
responsibility for intercepting ballistic missiles aimed
at NATO members; Russia would have responsibility
for intercepting missiles aimed at Russia,” with the
proviso that either side might in advance authorize
the other to engage a missile aimed at it.22
The sides have also discussed a joint planning and
operations center. This could provide a venue for
implementing agreed transparency measures, exchanging updated threat assessments, and discussing
possible attack scenarios. NATO and Russian officials have each stated that they would retain control
over a decision to launch their own interceptors—
given the short flight times of ballistic missiles, there
would be no time to coordinate a launch decision
even if the sides were inclined to consult. The planning and operations center could address issues such
as coordinating rules of engagement if NATO and
Russian missile defense systems were to provide
overlapping coverage and could develop preplanned
responses. It is possible that some NATO members
in Central/Eastern Europe and some parts of western Russia might fall under the coverage of both
NATO and Russian interceptors.
The Sustainable Partnership with Russia (SuPR)
Track II dialogue, organized by the PIR Center (Russian Center for Policy Studies) and the Ploughshares
Fund, held a detailed discussion on missile defense
at a February 2011 meeting. In a subsequent memorandum that was submitted to the U.S. and Russian
governments, the participants proposed transparency regarding missile defense systems, “integration of
warning and assessment data from U.S. and Russian
radars and other sensors in a single, jointly-manned
NATO-Russia center,” and “integration of the decision to launch an interceptor missile by agreeing
in advance on a set of NATO-Russia protocols that
would determine whether NATO and/or Russian
interceptors would engage a particular ballistic missile.” The protocols would be worked out in advance
by NATO and Russian military experts and would
be provided to NATO and Russian officers controlling the launch of NATO and Russian missile interceptors. The protocols would serve the purpose
of coordinating separate NATO and Russian launch
decisions without need for a single NATO or Russian commander.23
Track II Dialogues
Over the past two years, several U.S.-Russia Track
II dialogues have addressed principles or models for
missile defense cooperation, developing ideas consistent with those discussed in official channels in 2011.
A June 2010 Track II discussion led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and supported by
the Brookings Institution and Institute for World
Economy and International Relations, produced a
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The most detailed Track II discussion of NATORussia missile defense cooperation took place in
the context of the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative
(EASI), led by Ivanov, former German State Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger and former Senator Sam
Nunn and organized by the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. The EASI working group
on missile defense—co-chaired by former National
Security Advisor Stephen Hadley, former Russian
Deputy Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov and
former German Defense Minister Volker Ruehe—
produced in 2011 a notional architecture that was
briefed to U.S., NATO and Russian officials and
subsequently released publicly in February 2012.
The EASI proposal laid out a cooperative missile defense system that would be designed to deal with
ballistic missiles with ranges up to 4,500 kilometers
(avoiding the issue of strategic missiles).
radars at Armavir and Gabala, while Russia would
gain access to information from U.S. Defense Support Program satellites and the AN/TPY-2 radar in
Turkey. The EASI working group outlined three
phases for implementing its plan.
Most suggestions for missile defense cooperation focus on how existing and planned U.S./NATO and
Russian defense capabilities might be operated in a
complementary or integrated manner to defend Europe, including European Russia. An intriguing proposal by Wilkening suggests that NATO and Russia
together build an early warning radar, with a 360 degree field of view, in central Russia. The radar would
provide data directly to Russian and NATO dataprocessing centers. The radar would plug an existing gap in Russia’s early warning coverage. It would
also provide the United States tracking information
on a future Iranian ICBM launched at the western
United States after it left the field of view of the AN/
TPY-2 radar in Turkey and before it entered the field
of view of U.S. radars in Alaska and Greenland.25
Under the EASI plan, data and other information
from NATO and Russian radars and early warning
satellites would be provided in real time to two cooperation centers, one located in Warsaw and the
second located in Moscow. NATO and Russian military officers would jointly man the two centers. The
centers would combine incoming data and other
information, with the enhanced product then sent
back to NATO and Russian command and control
centers, which would separately retain the authority
to launch their interceptor missiles. While the plan
would leave each side the responsibility to protect its
own territory, the sides might develop protocols for
intercepting a ballistic missile warhead crossing one
side’s territory but aimed at a target on the territory
of the other side.24
What emerges from this discussion is that there is a
rich menu of ideas in both governmental and nongovernmental channels as to how a cooperative NATO-Russia missile defense system might be structured and how it might work. Many of the plans
share common elements: transparency regarding
missile defense programs; joint exercises; operating
radars, other sensors and interceptors under separate
NATO and Russian control; and the concept of centers jointly manned by NATO and Russian military
officers. Such ideas have been discussed in the Department of Defense-Ministry of Defense channel.
If a way can be found around the legal guarantee
obstacle, the sides might find that it would not be
difficult to work out the specifics of a practical cooperative arrangement.
The fusing of the data would mean that the United
States and NATO would gain access to information
from Russian early warning satellites and from the
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6. Transparency and Arms Control
SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3 Block IIB),
GBI silos, SM-3 land-based launchers, associated radars and Aegis-capable ships in
the U.S. inventory as of the date of the
declaration. This would give the Russians a
detailed picture of current U.S. missile defense capabilities.
Not Limits, But Transparency?
The Russian proposal for a legal guarantee that the
U.S./NATO EPAA will not be directed against Russian strategic missiles accompanied by objective
criteria—which translate into limits on numbers,
velocities and locations of missile defense interceptors—would amount to a new treaty limiting missile
defense. For the foreseeable future, however, there is
no chance that the U.S. Senate would ratify such a
treaty, and the Obama administration has shown no
interest in pursuing one.
• Numbers of interceptors (again broken
down by type), GBI silos, SM-3 land-based
launchers, associated radars and Aegis-capable ships planned to be in the U.S. inventory each year for the next ten years. This
would give the Russians a detailed picture
of planned future U.S. missile defense capabilities.
If the U.S. administration is either disinclined or
unable to negotiate a treaty, there are ways short of a
treaty to reassure the Russians about the capabilities
of U.S. missile defenses and the inherent limits on
those capabilities. For example, transparency measures—such as the test observations offered by the
Missile Defense Agency director—could allow the
Russians to observe the velocity and range of SM-3
interceptors. That would better inform their calculations as to whether or not such interceptors could
engage Russian strategic missiles.
Along with the declaration, Washington could commit to provide the Russians advance notice of any
changes in the planned numbers. The advance notice would derive from the fact that it takes time to
contract, build and deliver new weapons systems,
especially sophisticated systems. The Pentagon
could calculate for each declared element of the U.S.
missile system—interceptor, silo, launcher, radar or
ship—the time from a decision to procure to actual
delivery, and the U.S. government could inform the
Russian government that it would have at least that
much notice of a change in planned numbers. The
advance notice time would vary with the element of
the missile defense system; it presumably would be
shorter for an increase in the number of SM-3 interceptor missiles than it would be for the construction
of a new Aegis-capable warship, with the advance
notice of a change in the number of ships measurable in years.
The U.S. government might also offer to make an
annual declaration to the Russian government regarding U.S. missile defense systems. For key missile
defense elements—including GBI and SM-3 interceptors, GBI silos, SM-3 land-based launchers, SPY1 and AN/TPY-2 radars, and Aegis missile defensecapable warships—the declaration would comprise
the following:
• Numbers of interceptors (broken down
by GBI, SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IB,
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This kind of declaration would give the Russian
government a regularly updated, rather complete
picture of existing and planned U.S. missile defense
capabilities over the next ten years, as well as an assurance of advance notice of changes. It would not
constitute a limit; indeed, much of the information
could probably be found by a diligent search of Defense Department appropriation bills. In contrast, if
a transparency regime were reciprocal—with Russia
providing corresponding information on its missile
defense systems, such as the S-400 and S-500 interceptors—the United States would gain information
not otherwise available. (Such an exchange of information might have to be non-public, given the traditional Russian antipathy to sharing their defense
plans.)
An agreement of ten years’ duration that limited
each side to no more than 100-125 deployed interceptors with a velocity of five kilometers per second
or greater could assure Russia that its strategic ballistic missile force would remain capable of inflicting
enormous damage on the United States (and vice
versa). At the same time, such a constraint would
allow the United States a significant capability to defend against rogue state ICBM warheads. Neither
Iran nor North Korea today has an ICBM, and it is
unclear how quickly either could deploy one. The
development and testing of an ICBM would be visible to U.S. sensors, and it would take several years
from the first test to achieve an initial operational
capability. So, by 2020 or 2022, one could expect
that rogue states would have, at most, a handful of
ICBMs.
An Arms Control Limit?
Verification measures could be worked out to allow
the sides to monitor such a limit on interceptors. It
might be possible to work out a limit on radars in
order to keep a side from putting in place the radar
infrastructure that could facilitate a breakout from
the agreement by rapidly increasing the number of
interceptors.
Were political circumstances in the United States to
change, and if the Russians did not seek to constrain
missile defenses too tightly, it might be possible to
design a limited-duration arms control agreement in
a way that would (1) reassure Russia that there is no
threat to its strategic ballistic missile force and (2)
allow the United States and NATO to do everything
that they would want to do to defend themselves
against limited ballistic missile attack from rogue
states such as Iran and North Korea.
The Russians would seek limits on locations of interceptors. This could pose a harder question, as Moscow undoubtedly would press to bar deployment of
U.S. interceptors in Poland and possibly Romania.
The U.S. government likely feels that it has to go
forward with deployments in both European countries. That is a result of the difficult political blowback from NATO allies in Central and East Europe
that followed the badly handled September 2009
announcement of the reconfiguration of U.S. missile defense plans for Europe, as well as the overall
need to assure those allies of the U.S. commitment
to their security. The Russians might also seek “keepout” zones for U.S. Navy warships equipped with
SM-3 interceptors in areas such as the Arctic Ocean
or Barents Sea. However, if the United States agreed
to restrict its total number of missile interceptors capable of engaging ICBM warheads to 100-125, the
Russian ICBM and SLBM force could readily overwhelm the interceptors, and there would be no need
for limits on location.
The Russians appear to accept that SM-3 Block IA
and Block IB interceptors are too slow to engage
their strategic missiles; Russian analysts seem divided over whether the SM-3 Block IIA would pose
a threat. Moscow’s primary concern focuses on the
SM-3 Block IIB. Based on current U.S. plans, the
number of SM-3 Block IIB interceptors plus GBIs
in eight-ten years is likely to number, at most, 100125 missiles. This would include the deployment of
14 GBIs in the additional interceptor silos under
construction at Ft Greely—for a total of 44 GBIs
in Alaska and California. This also assumes that the
SM-3 Block IIB program proceeds on schedule,
which may be optimistic given that this interceptor
is still being designed and faces significant technical
challenges.
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Of course, such a treaty would not apply only to
U.S. missile defenses. It would also apply to the
Moscow ABM system and, depending on their capabilities, other Russian missile interceptors.
Development by either side of such a system would
reawaken concerns about strategic stability, including both arms race and crisis stability.
Arguably, such an agreement, limited to ten years’
duration, would not prevent the United States from
doing anything that it plans to do over the next decade in the field of missile defense. Yet it still would
offer Russia a significant degree of assurance that
missile defense would not undermine its strategic
deterrent.
Given the current state of the technology and the
imposing costs of missile defense, neither the United
States nor Russia has a prospect in the next ten years
of defending itself against anything other than a limited ballistic missile attack. But as technologies mature and possible new technologies emerge, it may
become possible to do more in the missile defense
area.
The problem with this or any missile defense agreement, however, is that, under current circumstances
on the American side, no treaty on missile defense—
not even one that would only prevent the United
States from doing things that it does not intend to
do—would have any chance of ratification in the
U.S. Senate. U.S. government officials indicated privately in 2011 that, given the degree of hostility in
Congress to any hints on limits on missile defense,
they had not considered what an arms control approach might look like and saw no point in doing so.
The issue will become more relevant if the United
States and Russia proceed, as the Obama administration desires, to negotiate further reductions in
their strategic offensive forces below the limits in
New START. As the numbers of strategic ballistic
missiles and warheads in the U.S. and Russian arsenals are reduced, the more manageable the task for
missile defense will become. Concern may grow on
one side or both about the ability of missile defenses
to cope successfully with strategic offensive forces
and thus undermine deterrence.
Eventually, a Choice to Be Made
If Obama or a successor president wishes to continue the process of nuclear reductions, he (or she)
might at some moment reach the point where the
Russians decline to reduce strategic arms without a
treaty limiting missile defense, particularly the number of interceptor missiles, or some other kind of
agreement that constrains defenses (some have suggested a treaty might limit strategic warheads and
missile defense interceptors under a single cap, with
each interceptor counting as some fraction—say,
one-half or one-fifth—of a warhead). At that point,
the U.S. president could face a difficult choice between further nuclear reductions and freedom to
pursue missile defense. But that potential dilemma
is for the future.
Even were transparency ideas as described above to
help move Russia off its current demand for a legal
guarantee and open a path for practical NATO-Russia
missile defense cooperation, the issue of treaty limits
on missile defense may well return in the future. Missile defense technologies will probably improve. The
Russians have a legitimate concern that a large, effective American missile defense system may at some
point be capable of seriously degrading the Russian
strategic deterrent, just as the United States would
be understandably concerned—as Washington has
been in the past—about the prospect of Russia successfully deploying a nationwide missile defense that
could seriously degrade the U.S. strategic deterrent.
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7. P ursuing Cooperation over
Contention
Given the current state of technology, while
cuts—and European support continues, there is every reason to believe that the EPAA will go forward.
The U.S. and NATO objective should be to keep the
door open for NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation in 2013. Then, the United States and NATO
could offer a package to encourage Russia to join in
a cooperative missile defense. Such a package could
include some or all of the following measures:
it is in the U.S. interest to pursue missile defense
against limited ballistic missile attack, such as might
be mounted by a rogue state, it is not now in the
U.S. interest to attempt to defend the U.S. homeland against a large-scale Russian missile attack. The
technology does not exist, the costs would be too
high, and trying would almost certainly provoke a
Russian missile build-up, resulting in an increase in
the number of nuclear weapons capable of striking
the United States. Between major powers and in the
realm of strategic arms, offense can still win the race
with defense.
• A U.S. and NATO political commitment
not to direct their missile defenses against
Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
• Maximum transparency regarding planned
U.S. missile defenses. This should include
an offer of an annual notification laying
out the numbers of key missile defense elements—interceptors (broken down by
GBI, SM-3 Block IA, SM-3 Block IB,
SM-3 Block IIA and SM-3 Block IIB),
GBI silos, SM-3 land-based launchers, associated radars and Aegis-capable ships
carrying SM-3 interceptors—currently deployed and planned for deployment each
year over the next decade. This should be
accompanied by a commitment to provide
the Russians notice in advance should there
be changes in any of those planned deployment numbers. Ideally, this would be on a
reciprocal basis.
For the time being, missile defense falls into the category of difficult issues in U.S.-Russia and NATORussia relations. Achieving a NATO-Russia cooperation agreement appears all but impossible in 2012.
The Russians seem to have decided to sit tight, waiting to see whether Obama will win reelection in
November or whether they will be dealing with a
Republican president. As Medvedev acknowledged
in November 2011, the problem does not become
acute for Moscow for six-eight years. In an intensely
political period in the run-up to the U.S. election,
the Obama administration likely feels constrained
on what it can pursue. The reaction to the open
mic incident in Seoul suggests that even transparency measures might be seized upon by opponents
to charge that the president is on a slippery slope or
not fully committed to missile defense.
•
Assuming that declining U.S. defense resources do
not force a rethink of missile defense—which may
well be one of the programs insulated from significant
Technical briefings as to why the Defense
Department concludes that U.S. missile defenses will not threaten Russian strategic ballistic missiles (as have been done in the past).
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• Reiteration of the offer to allow Russian
experts, using their own sensors, to observe
SM-3 interceptor tests, with sufficient advance notification so that the Russians can
properly prepare to observe the tests.
•
•
• Indicating that the “adaptive” part of the
EPAA includes a possibility that the United
States might slow development of and/or
in consultation with NATO might choose
to delay deployment of the SM-3 Block
IIB if it were clear that Iran was not making significant progress toward achieving
an ICBM. If/once it become clear that Iran
would not have an ICBM in 2020, the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB in Europe
by that date would not be necessary. (Since
the SM-3 Block IIB is also intended to
enhance capabilities against intermediaterange ballistic missiles, Iranian progress
toward achieving an intermediate-range
ballistic missile might alternatively be made
the litmus test.)
Indicating that a cooperative NATO-Russia
missile defense arrangement could be of a
provisional, time-limited nature. It could be
limited to four years, with NATO acknowledging at the outset that (1) Moscow has
strong concerns regarding U.S./NATO missile defense capabilities and (2) Russia’s decision to agree to a provisional cooperative arrangement does not preclude that Moscow
may decide not to make the arrangement
permanent if it believes that U.S./NATO
missile defense capabilities will threaten its
strategic forces. The point of a provisional
agreement would be to allow NATO-Russia
engagement, which U.S. and NATO officials argue will result in a better Russian
understanding that their missile defense capabilities pose no threat to Russia. If they
are right, Moscow has the option to make
the arrangement permanent. If not, the Russians can walk away, and NATO will have
acknowledged that at the outset.
•
Establishing regular U.S.-Russia (or NATORussia) ballistic missile threat assessment
conferences, focusing on North Korea and
Iran, to close the gap in the sides’ estimates
of those countries’ missile capabilities.
The United States should also continue to work with
Russia to negotiate a defense technical cooperation
agreement, which, among other things, would provide an umbrella for the exchange of sensitive information, such as early warning and tracking data.
Indicating that, as long as the ability of
NATO’s missile defense to protect all Alliance members is not degraded, NATO
is prepared to listen to and accommodate
reasonable Russian suggestions for a cooperative arrangement. This would replace the
current U.S./NATO stance, which is that
cooperation with Russia would in no way
affect NATO’s missile defense plans. That
only feeds a view in Moscow that a NATORussia arrangement would not truly be cooperative or allow Russia a serious voice.
The Alliance should pursue cooperation in a
manner that does not degrade the ability of
NATO’s planned missile defenses to defend
all members of the Alliance; if that goal can
be protected, NATO should show flexibility
to consider accommodating Russian ideas.
These ideas constitute a package that could provide
Russia substantial and ongoing transparency regarding U.S. missile defense plans. In 2013, if Moscow
is prepared to move beyond its current holding pattern, these ideas would provide a basis for engaging
the Russians and for moving to design the practical
elements of a cooperative missile defense arrangement between NATO and Russia, drawing on the
ideas already developed in official and Track II channels. (Presidential leadership would be needed on
both sides to ensure that the militaries and defense
bureaucracies make cooperation a priority and not
drag their feet.)
After November 2012, the Russians will know who
they will be dealing with in the White House for the
next four years. While they may not like the U.S./
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NATO missile defense project, they may see value
in cooperating rather than sitting on the sidelines
and appearing impotent to affect NATO’s plans. If,
however, the Russian were to choose not to engage,
the United States and NATO could proceed, having
made more than a good faith effort to address and
mitigate the basis for Russian concerns.
an ICBM (or is slow to develop an intermediaterange ballistic missile), what would be the point of
deploying the SM-3 Block IIB in Poland? There is
a political argument for deploying the SM-3 Block
IIA there (for assurance purposes), but the rationale
for deploying an interceptor for which there is no
Iranian missile to defend against is not clear. These
are issues on which a greater degree of U.S./NATO
flexibility than has been articulated might increase
the prospects for agreement with Russia without
compromising the system’s ability to defend NATO
Europe and the United States against limited ballistic missile attack.
Some of these ideas would prove controversial in
Washington. Some in Congress will fear that transparency measures might morph into undeclared limits. Even in the absence of such measures, however,
the Russians likely could learn details of U.S. missile
defense plans by closely following the Congressional
budgeting process and Pentagon multi-year plans.
Some will be concerned that Russian observation
of SM-3 tests will reveal too much information,
such as the missile’s maximum velocity at burn-out.
But SM-3 interceptors are not intended to be used
against Russian missiles, and the Russians may be
able to observe tests anyway, as they generally take
place in/over international waters. For the most
part, these measures would provide the Russians information that they could, at some cost, acquire on
their own.
The United States and NATO should seek to make
it as easy as possible for Moscow to agree to a cooperative missile defense arrangement. Ultimately,
the Russians will have to decide how to respond. If
they hold to their demand for a legal guarantee—
which Putin himself did not seek when suggesting
missile defense cooperation in 2007—there will be
no cooperative agreement. The sides will then have
to look at ways to manage this problem and avoid
missile defense differences infecting broader areas of
their relations.
Still others will be concerned by a readiness to adjust NATO plans to accommodate Russian wishes.
However, as long as the Alliance’s ability to extend
missile defense protection over all allies is not compromised, why would there be a problem? And some
will object that offering to slow development and/
or deployment in Europe of the SM-3 Block IIB
“changes” U.S. plans and would be inconsistent
with Obama’s pledge to go forward with all four
phases of the EPAA. (U.S. officials in the past have
said that “adaptive” refers to changes in the numbers of different types of SM-3 interceptors but that
the U.S. government would pursue all four phases.)
If, however, as 2020 approaches, Iran does not have
A Russian readiness to accept a political commitment
that U.S. missile defenses were not directed against
their strategic ballistic missiles in lieu of a legal guarantee, on the other hand, would open dramatic potential for cooperation. The reported convergence in
the sides’ thinking could presage a relatively rapid realization of a NATO-Russia missile defense arrangement. That would be in the U.S. interest, making
missile defense a cooperative asset rather than a liability on the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas,
providing for a stronger missile defense of Europe,
and perhaps proving a game-changer in broader
NATO and Russian attitudes toward each other.
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Endnotes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
or a history of the negotiation of the ABM Treaty, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT, Holt, Rinehart and
F
Watson, New York, 1973.
Reagan Presidential Library, “Address to the Nation on Defense and National Security,” March 23, 1983, http://www.reagan.
utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1983/32383d.htm.
U.S. Congress, “National Missile Defense Act of 1999.”
See Strobe Talbott, The Russia Hand, Random House, New York, 2002, pp. 377-397.
NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
See Steven A. Hildreth and Carl Elk, “Long-Range Ballistic Missile Defense in Europe,” Congressional Research Service,
December 8, 2008, pp. 15-17.
The White House, “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A ‘Phased Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe,”
September 17, 2009.
Short-range ballistic missiles are missiles with ranges up to 1,000 kilometers. Medium-range ballistic missiles have ranges of
1,000-3,000 kilometers. Intermediate-range ballistic missiles have ranges of 3,000-5.500 kilometers. ICBMs have ranges of 5,500
kilometers or greater. Note that the 1987 treaty banning U.S. and Soviet ground-based intermediate-range ballistic and cruise
missiles uses a different definition, categorizing missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers as intermediate-range.
Some U.S. Navy ships also carry the Standard SM-2 missile, a terminal defense interceptor designed to engage ballistic missiles in
the atmosphere employing a blast-fragmentation warhead. The Navy’s inventory numbers less than 100 SM-2 interceptor missiles.
The following information draws on “Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, February 2010,” U.S. Department of Defense;
Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional
Research Service, December 22, 2011; and Arms Control Association, “The Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” http://www.
armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach.
“Statement of the Russian Federation Concerning Missile Defense,” April 7, 2010.
NATO, “Lisbon Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North
Atlantic Council in Lisbon,” November 20, 2010.
NATO-Russia Council Joint Statement, November 20, 2010.
The following discussion is based in part on conversations with American and Russian officials, 2011-2012.
V. I. Trubnikov, Ye. P. Buzhinsky, V. Z. Dvorkin, V. I. Yesin, V. V. Korbelnikov and F. G. Voitolovsky, “Problems and Prospects of
Russia’s Cooperation with U.S./NATO in the Field of Missile Defense,” Institute of World Economy and International Relations,
2011.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Information and Press Department, “Statement by H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 1
March 2011,” http://www.ln.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/2de66a92e764dbb8c3257846004
dfd44!OpenDocument.
President of Russia website, “Statement in Connection with the Situation Concerning the NATO Countries’ Missile Defense
System in Europe,” November 23, 2011, http://eng.news.kremlin.ru/news/3115.
RIA Novosti, “U.S., NATO Have Some 1,000 Interceptors—Rogozin,” January 20, 2012, http://en.rian.ru/
world/20120120/170856516.html.
Dean Wilkening, “Does Missile Defence in Europe Threaten Russia?” Survival, vol. 54, no. 1, February-March 2012, pp. 31-52.
Prime Minister of Russia website, “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin Meets with Experts in Sarov to Discuss Global Threats to
National Security, Strengthening Russia’s Defenses and Enhancing the Combat Readiness of its Armed Forces,” February 24, 2012,
transcript as reported on Johnson’s Russia List, February 29, 2012.
Yousaf Butt and Theodore Postol, “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defense,”
Federation of American Scientists, FAS Special Report No. 1, September 2011.
The Brookings Institution and Institute for World Economy and International Relations, “Next Steps on U.S.-Russian Nuclear
Negotiations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Recommendations from the June 23 Meeting of Madeleine Albright, Strobe Talbott,
Igor Ivanov and Aleksander Dynkin,” October 2010, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/10_nonproliferation_albright_
talbott.aspx.
PIR Center, “Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia (SuPR) Group,” March 2011.
See Euro-Atlantis Security Initiative, Working Group on Missile Defense, “Missile Defense: Toward a New Paradigm,” February
2012 for a fuller discussion.
Dean Wilkening, “Cooperating with Russia on Missile Defense: A New Proposal,” Arms Control Today, vol. 42, no. 2, March
2012, pp. 8-13.
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About the Brookings Arms Control Initiative
The Brookings Arms Control Initiative
table Series and public events aimed at discussing
the key arms control and non-proliferation challenges of the day. The initiative produces research and
policy recommendations on these issues, including
the Brookings Arms Control Series papers. This is
the eighth paper in that series. Previous papers are
listed below; all may be downloaded at http://www.
brookings.edu/projects/arms-control/Arms-Control-Series.aspx.
brings the institution’s multidisciplinary strengths
to bear on the critical challenges of arms control
and non-proliferation. Housed in the Center on the
United States and Europe in the Brookings Foreign
Policy Studies program, the initiative addresses global arms control and proliferation challenges as well
as the central negotiations between the United States
and Russia. Research by Brookings scholars in the
Arms Control Initiative focuses on several clusters:
#1 R
esetting U.S.-Russian Leadership on Nuclear
Arms Reductions and Non-Proliferation, by
Steven Pifer, Joseph Cirincione and Clifford
Gaddy, January 2010
• nuclear arms reductions, including U.S.Russian nuclear arms reductions; reductions of third-country nuclear forces; and
the challenges of moving to a non-nuclear
world;
#2 S alvaging the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty Regime: Options for Washington, by Anne Witkowsky, Sherman Garnett and
Jeff McCausland, March 2010
• U.S. nuclear deterrence policy in the 21st
century;
#3 U
.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges, by Steven Pifer,
Richard C. Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin
S. Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth M.
Pollack, May 2010
• nuclear non-proliferation challenges, including Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ratification and entry into force; a fissile
materials cut-off treaty; the April 2010
nuclear security summit; and strengthening
the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime; and
#4 Th
e Next Round: The United States and Nuclear Arms Reductions after New START, by
Steven Pifer, November 2010
• nuclear outliers (India, Israel and Pakistan)
and rogue states (North Korea and Iran).
#5 Th
e U.S. Policy of Extended Deterrence in East
Asia: History, Current Views and Implications,
by Richard C. Bush, February 2011
The initiative supports a dialogue led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Brookings President Strobe Talbott, former Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Institute of World Economy and
International Relations (IMEMO) Director Alexander Dynkin on U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear
arms reductions and non-proliferation, which has
produced joint recommendations that are shared
with senior U.S. and Russian officials. The initiative
also sponsors the Brookings Arms Control Round-
#6 Th
e Trilateral Process: The United States, Ukraine,
Russia and Nuclear Weapons, by Steven Pifer,
May 2011
#7 N
ATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control,
by Steven Pifer, July 2011
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About the Author
Steven Pifer is a senior fellow in the Center on the United States
and Europe and director of the Arms Control Initiative at the Brookings Institution. A retired Foreign Service officer, he served more than
25 years with the Department of State, including as deputy assistant
secretary of state with responsibility for Russia and Ukraine, ambassador to Ukraine, and special assistant to the president and National
Security Council senior director for Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia. He
also served at the U.S. embassies in London, Moscow and Warsaw, in
addition to assignments in Washington and in Geneva with the U.S.
delegation to the negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces.
Pifer has authored numerous policy reports, academic articles and
opinion pieces on arms control, Ukraine and Russia. He frequently
comments on these issues in the media.
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