TEACHING NOTE
"WIN AS MUCH AS YOU CAN"
This is a four-party, scoreable game that encourages participants involved in a
negotiation to build trust, exchange information, and work together cooperatively. Your
role is to introduce players to the game, to help them play, and to lead a "debrief" of the
results. The debrief should show the advantages and disadvantages of various
cooperative and competitive strategies.
SCENARIO: The game has l0 rounds. Each participant must play an "X" card or a "Y"
card each round. Players either win or lose points after each round, depending on their
choice of a card to play as well as on the choices of the other three players in their group.
The "X" strategy offers a high individual payoff, as long as at least one of the other
players plays a "Y" (See payoff chart below). A "Y" strategy loses if at least one other
person plays an "X", but everyone can consistently gain if all players agree to play "Y's".
Since the gains of cooperation (by all choosing "Y") are relatively modest, many players
are tempted to play "X", thereby maximizing their individual gain on a single round at the
expense of the others. However, the more the players succumb to this urge, the worse off
the group becomes. Eventually, with your help, the players can learn that cooperation
may lead to smaller payoffs in the short term, but it is the strategy most likely to produce
the highest benefits for each individual over the longer term.
Following is the pay-off schedule for "Win As Much As You Can."
Group Choices
Individual Payoffs
4 X's
Each Player Loses 1 point
3 X's, 1 Y
Each X Player Wins 1 point, the Y Player Loses 3 points
2 X's, 2 Y's
Each X Player Wins 2 points, Each Y Player Loses 2 points
1 X, 3 Y's
Each X Player Wins 3 points, Each Y Player Loses 1 point
4 Y's
Each Y Player Wins 1 point
Choosing X versus Y
Risk vs. Return Analysis
X
Lowest Risk: 1 loss option = -1 point
Highest Payoffs: 3 win options = 1, 2, 3 points
Y
Highest Risk: 3 loss options = -1, -2, -3 points
Opportunity for Consistent Gains = 1 point
LOGISTICS:
The game and debriefing should take approximately 1 hour and 30 minutes (please see
the attached “Annotated Game Schedule for Trainers”). It should be played in groups of
four. You should have paper, magic marker, instructions and a score card for each
participant. In addition, you will need an overhead projector, transparencies, and a felttip marker for yourself.
Hand out the Schedule, Instructions, and Score Sheet (make copies from Appendix A-Participant Materials), and two index cards and a marker to each player. Ask each player
to write an X on one of the index cards, and a Y on the other.
INTRODUCING THE GAME:
Review the Instructions for Players with the players. Be careful about the way you
describe the goal of the game; you should encourage players to strive for the highest
score they can get as individuals--within the rules of the game.
Each player must play either their "X" or their "Y" index card in each round, at the same
time as the other players play their index cards. All the players must play all of the
rounds. Players may not talk to each other at any time during the game, with three
exceptions. Just before playing rounds 5, 8, and 10, the players may confer with one
another for two to three minutes before making their decisions.
It is important to explain the scoring system carefully. The maximum individual score
obtainable at the end of the game is 75, but negative scores are also common. After each
round, players must record both their personal choice (an X or a Y) as well as the group
choices (total X's and Y's). Each player's personal score is determined by their individual
choice within the context of the group’s choices. Players may not trade points. You
should display the overheads showing the payoff schedule and the participant score card
as you explain how the scoring works (Appendix B--Overheads.)
It is possible that even after a careful explanation, the players will still make mistakes in
their scoring; if they do, much of the teaching value of the game is wasted. To prevent
mistakes, it is a good idea to have the players practice scoring before you start. Ask
players in each group to count off from 1 to 4. Ask all player #1s to imagine they played
an X. Ask players #2s and #3s to imagine they played Ys, and ask player #4s to imagine
they played an X. Then ask them to calculate and write their own individual score for
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that round. Players #1 and #4 should have written down 2 points. Players # 2 and 3
should have written down (-2) points.
Rounds 5, 8 and 10 are bonus rounds. Payoffs (and losses) increase as follows:
•
•
•
Round 5:
Round 8:
Round 10:
Multiply your individual score times 3
Multiply your individual score times 5
Multiply your individual score times 10
The players may not talk except immediately before these three rounds.
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PLAYING THE GAME:
After you have introduced the game and answered questions, you should ask the players
to stop talking and prepare to play the first round. Tell the players to put their X or Y
card on the table when you call “play.” Each non-speaking round should take 2 minutes
to play and score.
Before round 5, give the players 2-3 minutes to talk, then ask them to stop talking and
call “play.” There should be no talking from the end of Round 5 until the end of Round
7. Allow players to talk briefly again (2-3 minutes) before Round 8, and again before
Round 10. Each of these three speaking rounds should take 5 minutes to play and score.
After playing 10 rounds (roughly 30 minutes), collect the score cards and write the
cumulative score for each player, along with total scores for each group, on the overhead
with the “Who Won What” table provided in Appendix B. You should display this
overhead during the debriefing, and use it to review the results of the game.
DEBRIEFING THE GAME:
The Debriefing Pyramid: In debriefing Win As Much as You Can (or any other
negotiation game), you should think of the debriefing process as a pyramid:
INSIGHTS FROM THEORY
CROSS-GROUP COMPARISON
GROUP PROCESS AND OUTCOME
INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND ASSESSMENT
The first level of debriefing begins at the base of the pyramid, with individual strategy
and self-assessment. You should begin by asking individuals to talk about the strategy
they began with, how well that strategy worked, and what they might do differently if
they had the opportunity to play again.
The second level of debriefing explores the way individuals interacted within each
negotiating group. After talking with individuals in each group about their own
experience, you should ask them to reflect on how their individual decisions--and those
of other players--affected the negotiation process and the group’s outcomes. At this level
of the debriefing, you are also exploring how players communicated with each other both
verbally and nonverbally, whether and how they made decisions jointly (e.g. did they
agree to cooperate? did they decide to communicate their commitment to cooperate in
some way?) and the effect of those decisions on individual and group scores.
The third level is cross-group comparison. After you have explored the experiences of
each negotiating group, you should help the participants to draw general lessons about the
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way differences in individual strategies and group processes affect both individual and
group outcomes. At this level of the debriefing, you should invite the group to look again
at the differences in group scores. Were there commonalties in the group process among
the high scoring groups? Among the low scoring groups? What lessons can be drawn
from a cross-group comparison about the best way to "win as much as you can"?
The final level is the use of negotiation theory to highlight and summarize key issues and
lessons from the game. Win As Much as You Can is a four-player version of the
Prisoners’ Dilemma, one of the most studied games in negotiation theory. Theorists have
developed and tested a large number of strategies for multiple-round games of Prisoners’
Dilemma, and some clear prescriptive lessons have emerged. These lessons are relevant
not only to the game, but to many real-life negotiating situations. By reviewing these
theoretical issues and lessons, you can create a bridge to the presentation of the Mutual
Gains Approach.
The pyramid is useful for understanding the general flow of a debriefing. It is important
to note that any debriefing process is likely to move back and forth between these
different levels. For example, when you begin asking participants in one group about
their individual strategies, the discussion will naturally segue into a discussion of group
process, and then may move back again to a discussion of individual strategy. You may
also make a conscious decision to jump a level. For example, you may want to make a
cross-group comparison before you have finished the group-by-group debriefing, because
you know that a particular incident from another group's negotiations will help to
highlight a lesson you are drawing out. The pyramid is most helpful for understanding
the direction you want to be moving on overall: beginning with a focus on individual
experiences, and ending up with a broader focus on what the game as a whole suggests
about successful negotiations.
SUGGESTIONS FOR LEADING A DEBRIEFING
The main purpose of the debriefing is to show that in this game, a cooperative strategy
provides the best chance of maximizing individual scores in the long run. The discussion
should focus on how players can build cooperation even when they can’t communicate
directly. It should also highlight the challenge of re-establishing cooperation when it has
broken down.
You should try as much as possible to lead a discussion rather than lecturing to the
participants about the lessons of the game. Through a process of comparing scores,
discussing the strategies and actions of individual players, asking how others in a group
responded to a player’s actions, and how the players’ interaction affected both individual
and group outcomes, you should be able to draw out the participants' observations about
the value of cooperation.
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Getting the Discussion Started
The results listed on the overhead tell you individual players' results and group results.
What they don't tell you is the strategies that individuals used (i.e. playing X or Y to start,
changing from X to Y or vice versa in response to other players' actions and statements),
or how group members reacted to each others' strategies. Begin the debriefing by talking
about players individual strategies and decisions.
First comment on the variations in the scores. Note that there were some groups where
no one did very well, others where some did well but others did not, and some where
everyone did fairly well. Then select the lowest scoring group, and ask the participant
with the highest score some of the following questions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
What was your strategy?
Did you change it during the game? Why?
How did others in the group respond to your actions?
What was the result, for you and for the group?
Are you satisfied with the way things worked out for you? For the group?
Would you want to play this game with your group again?
Now ask some of the participants with lower scores to describe their strategies, and
how and why they changed their strategies during the game. Ask them if they think there
is anything they could have done differently to achieve a higher score.
It is important to keep in mind that those who got a particularly low score may be
embarrassed by the results. Therefore, if you point out a particularly low score and ask
the person involved to comment, be sure to point out that your intent is to help the group
learn. To avoid "spotlighting" anyone, ask the group, and not just the individual to talk.
You can also tell a brief story about your own past mistakes to engage participants in
speaking openly about theirs.
As players comment on their strategies, their actions, their reactions, and the impact on
their own scores and their group’s score, begin to highlight key teaching points about
group process and outcome. For instance, if it becomes clear that the group attempted
to make or actually made a commitment to cooperate, ask players how this happened? If
the group did not engender any commitments to cooperate, ask group members what
affect this had on the outcome. Explore the obstacles they encountered, and ask them to
consider whether and how the group process might have been different. As the
discussion moves from individual strategy to group process, you should be able to cover
some of the following learning points:
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•
recognizing the tension between what’s good for you and what’s good for
others; realizing that everyone faces the same tension
•
deciding your strategy (X or Y) and changing it in light of experience
•
communicating intentions and making commitments in the talking rounds
•
building, maintaining, losing and regaining trust (did you do what you said you
were going to do? if you didn’t, how did others react?)
After you have debriefed a low scoring group, move to a group that had a better group
score, but a big internal split between high scoring and some low scoring players.
Ask a high-scoring player in this group to talk about his/her strategy, etc., as you did with
the first group. Then move to lower-scoring players in the same group.
Finally, move to a group that had a high total score, and where no player scored
dramatically higher than others. Repeat the same process of questioning about
individual actions and reactions and group outcomes.
Outcomes You Might See
In this game, strategy gets developed at two levels. First, individuals may adopt their own
strategies (and they may alter these during the course of play.) Second, the groups may
develop joint strategies before or during the three rounds when they are allowed to
communicate. Most groups begin with some cooperators (playing Y) and some noncooperators (playing X). For the first four rounds, they see-saw: some who started
playing X switch to Y, and vice versa. When they have the opportunity to talk before the
5th round, one or more players may try to get others to commit to a cooperative group
strategy.
Individual players might decide to follow one (or more) of these strategies:
•
Maximizing Gain through Deception: going for the highest possible maximum
score by attempting to maximize your own X's and other's Y's, perhaps through
"baiting" or deception.
•
Assessing Risk and Return Round by Round: choosing X or Y before each
round on the basis of a judgment about risk and return;
•
Assessing Risk and Return over Many Rounds: planning a longer term
strategy that involves thinking several rounds ahead.
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•
Tit for Tat: Beginning "cooperatively" with Y's in the first few rounds, but
retaliating with X's if the other players do not cooperate in turn.
During the talking rounds, groups might agree on one of the following strategies:
•
Cooperation without Commitment: the entire group decides to play “Y,” so
that players all gain equally, but everyone keeps holding their X cards. In the
8th and/or 10th round, one or more players may decide to break the agreement
to get bonus points;
•
Cooperation with Commitment: The group decides to put their X's aside (or
tear up their Xs) and play with Y's only.
• Unbalanced Commitment: One or two players commit to play only Y, but
others do not. The player who committed to play Y may go back to playing X
after losing points with a Y strategy.
• Demand for Compensation: One player who played Y’s unilaterally in the first
four rounds may demand the opportunity to play X in a bonus round while
others play Y. Others may or may not agree.
A major lesson of this game is that if all of the members of a group opt for a cooperative
strategy, everyone in the group will gain consistently over time, thereby producing
moderate individual scores and a high group score. Of course, these gains will not be
realized if one or several players are unwilling to choose a cooperative strategy, or if they
choose one and then defect in a later round.
A HYPOTHETICAL DEBRIEFING OF THREE GROUPS:
Here is an example of a score sheet you might see when you run Win as Much as You
Can with a group of twelve (three groups of four):
Player 1
Group 1
-31
Group 2
35
Group 3
0
Player 2
-11
-9
16
Player 3
9
-9
32
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Player 4
-27
35
16
TOTAL
-60
52
64
By looking at these scores, you can begin to see that Group 1 must have a story to tell
about failure to achieve cooperation. Group 2 looks like it had two cooperators and two
non-cooperators. Group 3 appears to have evolved cooperative strategies (probably after
some confusion in early rounds).
After putting up the overhead with these scores on it, you should begin by asking Player
3 in Group 1 (the highest scoring player in the lowest scoring group) to talk about his/her
strategy, actions and reactions, and then ask others in the same group to comment on their
own strategies and on the group process.
When you do, you might hear a story like this:
• Player 1, then Player 4 played Y in the early rounds, hoping others would
follow, but Players 2 and 3 kept playing X.
• By round 4 Players 1 and 4 gave up, and all played X in round 4.
• When they were allowed to talk before round 5, Player 4 said "we're all losing,
so let's play Y," but Players 2 and 3 said “That's not the objective of the game.
The objective is ‘win as much as you can.’" Player 1 pointed out that if all play
X, all lose, but they didn't have time to finish the discussion before they had to
play round 5. Players 1 and 4 played Y, but Players 2 and 3 played X.
• In rounds 6 and 7 all four players played X.
• Before round 8, Players 1 and 4 tried again for an agreement to cooperate, but
Player 2 was skeptical that others would actually play Y, and Player 3 was noncommittal. In fact, all except Player 3 played Y in round 8, but after seeing that
Player 3 wasn’t going to cooperate, all played X in 9 and 10. Now frustration
reigns, and all are unsatisfied. None would care to play with the others again.
In talking with Players 2 and 3, it should become clear that they 1) interpreted the goal of
the game in a way that limited their ability to see that they could in fact do better for
themselves by cooperating with others; and 2) they either could not or were not willing to
consider ways to bind themselves and others to a cooperative strategy.
In talking with Players 1 and 4, it should become clear that they were initially wedded to
a Y strategy. They tried to organize cooperation, and when others did not pick up on
their cues, they continued to play Y. After a few rounds, they learned the hard way that a
Y strategy is a losing strategy when others are playing Xs, so they switched to a tit for tat
approach. In each talking round, they tried each time to engender a commitment from
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others to play Ys, and each time they were unsuccessful in binding the group to a
cooperative approach
If they had it to do over again, players 2 and 3 might have thought harder about whether
it was in their interest to continue playing X after others wised up to their noncooperative strategies. Players 1 and 4 might have tried to find a better way to commit
themselves and the other two players to a cooperative strategy, rather than making their
case, hoping for the best, and then reacting to non-cooperation by others. For example,
they might have proposed a way for group members to express their commitment to
cooperate (e.g. setting their Xs aside) so that each player would be more willing to
accept the risk involved in throwing Ys.
Turning to Group 2 (some high scores and some low scores), the story turns out to be a
bit different than what you might have expected:
• Player 2 took the lead in trying to promote cooperation. Before round 1, Player
2 smiled and nodded at the other players, then played Y. Everyone but Player 4
also played Y.
• After round 1, Player 2 actually tore up his/her X card and put the shreds in the
middle of the table.
• In round 2, all played Y except Player 1, who explained that s/he wasn’t sure
Player 4 could be trusted (since Player 4 had played X in the first round).
Starting in round 3, all played Y in every round--until the last. (Player 4
decided to trust Player 1, and vice versa).
• They all had positive point scores after round 9 (15 points each for Players 2
and 3, 11 points each for Players 1 and 4). When they talked, they agreed to
play Y in round 10, but despite this agreement, Players 1 and 4 decided to play
X, gaining 20 points each, while Players 2 and 3 lost 20 points each.
Now Players 2 and 3 are bitter about the result, and would not want to play with Players 1
or 4 again. Players 1 and 4 insist “it was only a game” and “the idea was to win as much
as you can,” but agree that they would not want to play with Players 2 or 3 again.
In talking with Players 1 and 4, you might ask whether “the game is ever really over,” in
situations where you expect to have ongoing relationships with your negotiating partners.
You might also ask Players 2 and 3 whether they would, if they were playing the game
again, ask Players 1 and 4 to tear up their X cards in the early rounds. You could also ask
Player 2 whether it makes sense to tear up your X card if others aren’t prepared to do the
same.
The underlying point is that negotiators should be trustworthy, not necessarily trusting.
Giving up the option to play X is like signing a blank check. Unless you are absolutely
sure of cooperation from your negotiating partners, it’s a very risky thing to do. You
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might ask the players what they could have done to commit themselves without tearing
up their X cards. (If they don’t have an answer, you might ask players from other groups
for their suggestions--for example, putting their X cards down, face up, but reserving the
option to pick them up again.)
Turning to Group 3 (highest group score, relatively equal individual scores), you might
hear this story:
• Player 1 began by playing Y, and continued playing Y for the next three rounds
“to send a message” but in each of the first four rounds, at least one player
played X.
• In round 5, Players 1, 2 and 4 thought all four players had agreed to play Y, but
Player 3 claims s/he never committed to play Y. In fact, Player 3 played X in
round 5.
• In rounds 6 and 7, only Player 1 continued playing Y; all the others played X.
• Before round 8, Player 1 proposed that all put down their Xs, and all play Ys
through round 10. The others--including Player 3--agreed.
• In round 10, Player 1 asked to play X while others played Y, since s/he had the
lowest score and had been playing Y every round, but others refused. Player 1
is left feeling wronged. Player 3 is satisfied--s/he got a high score and “played
by the rules.”
In talking with Player 3, you might ask whether s/he would have agreed to put down
his/her X card in Round 5 if someone else had proposed this idea. Also, even if Player 3
did not “really” commit to play Y in Round 5, s/he risked losing the trust of others by
leaving his/her intentions unclear. Would Player 3 use the same strategy of “letting
others think what they want” again? What would have been the effect on individual and
group scores if Player 5 had joined with the others in a clear expression of commitment to
play Ys?
You might ask Players 2 and 4 why they decided to play X’s in rounds 6 and 7. In
talking with Player 1, you might ask whether s/he would play Y on every round if s/he
had to play the game again, or would s/he do something different (e.g. to establish the
commitment of others to play Y, or to respond to their playing Xs). It should become
clear that it only makes sense to cooperate if you have some reasonable assurance that
others will do the same.
Cross-group Comparisons: After debriefing each of the groups, you could compare the
different approaches the three groups used to try to get everyone to play Y. In Group 1,
no one could figure out a way to get commitments, and the group as a whole did not do
very well. In Group 2, Player 2 chose to show a commitment to playing Y by tearing up
the X card, even though others didn’t. Nevertheless, the force of Player 2’s commitment
was strong enough to get others to play Y--until the last round. In Group 3, the group
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took a long time to find a way to commit everyone, but when they did, by deciding to lay
down their X cards in Round 8, they ensured high points for each player for the last three
rounds.
You might also ask whether the strategy of unilateral commitment (Player 2 in Group 2,
and Player 1 in Group 3) was helpful to the players who chose it, or whether they ended
up sacrificing their own interests for the sake of the group. At the other end of the
spectrum, you might ask whether those who were least interested in cooperating actually
served their own interests. In Group 2, Players 1 and 4 did benefit by playing their X
cards in the last round, but neither seems to think that this would be a good idea in real
life. In Group 3, Player 3 also scored high, but may have made it more difficult for other
players to trust him/her in the future. These questions will help you transition to a more
general discussion about the lessons this game teaches regarding cooperation and
competition.
LESSONS FROM PRACTICE AND THEORY:
After you have debriefed each of the three groups, you should review the score sheet
again and tell the players the range of possible scores in Win as Much as You Can:
• highest possible individual score: if a player plays X every round while all
others play Y, X player gets 75; group score is zero
• lowest possible individual score: if a player plays Y every round while all
others play X, Y player gets minus 75; group score is zero
• lowest possible group score: if all play X every round, group score is minus
100; each individual gets minus 25
• highest possible group score: if all play Y every round, group score is 100;
each individual gets 25
Two key strategic lessons should emerge from the experience of the players and from
reviewing these scoring possibilities. First, although one person can score high by
playing X if all others play Y, it’s not likely that all others will, and eventually, everyone
will end up playing X. When everyone plays X, all get low scores. Though it seems
counter-intuitive to some people, the best chance for an individual to get a high score is
to get everyone at the table to play Y.
This first lesson holds as long as players think that there will be more rounds to play. If
you are confident that you'll only be playing one round of Win as Much as You Can--and
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you'll never be playing again--you should play X. In real life, most negotiations of real
importance involve ongoing relationships. Even if we will not deal directly with a person
again, we need to consider whether that person will tell others about our behavior. A
reputation for trustworthiness and cooperative behavior is a valuable asset in negotiation,
and not one we should risk without very good reason.
Another important lesson is not to commit to play Y unless others do too. Even if
everyone recognizes that all are likely to be better off if all play Y, individuals still
benefit even more by playing X when others play Y. Therefore, it is important not to
commit yourself to a cooperative strategy unless others have made a commitment you
can trust. If you make a unilateral commitment, you are signaling to others that they can
take advantage of you, and they may take you up on your offer. Instead, try to find ways
to commit both yourself and others, or at least to demonstrate trustworthiness by doing
what you said you were going to do. The greater the possible gains from cooperation,
and the greater the temptation to “defect,” the harder you should search for ways to
cement cooperation and make defection difficult.
Here are four broader negotiation lessons from Win as Much as You Can that are
presented on the debriefing overhead. You might want to explain to the participants that
these lessons echo Robert Axelrod's conclusions from Chapter 5 of The Evolution of
Cooperation. Axelrod developed these lessons after extensive research on the Prisoner's
Dilemma (as noted earlier, Win as Much as You Can is based on one version of this
dilemma.) After testing literally thousands of potential player strategies with computer
programs, Axelrod found that the following four principles constitute the most successful
strategy one can adopt:
•
Be nice: seek cooperation
If you start by playing X, it’s hard to get others to play Y. If you start by
playing Y, you demonstrate trustworthiness and lay the foundation for
cooperation.
In real-life negotiations, it's best to start out with an open mind and a
willingness to explore possibilities for mutual gain. If you have a difficult
history and little trust in your negotiating partner, you can acknowledge it.
But if there is some reason to believe that cooperation may be in your
interest, you should be willing to discuss options and find ways to commit
both yourself and your negotiating partner(s) to live up to any agreement
you reach. It is important to do this early in a negotiation, because once
you have used a competitive strategy aimed at securing benefits for
yourself at the expense of others, it can be difficult to cultivate trust later on
when you decide that a cooperative strategy may be best in the long run.
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•
Be provokable: only cooperate as long as others do.
If others are playing X, you shouldn't keep playing Y.
We often do things that are good for others (family, friends, co-workers,
neighbors, etc.) without expecting anything concrete in return.
But sometimes we find ourselves in situations where that there's been too
much give and take: we've been doing the giving, and others have been
doing the taking. In these situations, others have no incentive to cooperate
with us as long as we continue to give. If we really do feel that we're being
taken advantage of, we need to make it clear that others will have to
reciprocate in a way that meets our interests before we do anything else to
help them.
•
Be forgiving: if others commit to cooperate, you should too
Even if others have been playing X, you should be willing start playing Y
again if they can convince you that they are also committed to playing Y.
The key to rebuilding trust after an incident or period of non-cooperation is
to find ways for us and our negotiating partners to commit ourselves to a
cooperative course of action. In many of our interpersonal negotiations, we
are willing to accept other people's word as the first step toward rebuilding
cooperation. In other negotiations, we need to wait until we see others'
behave in a cooperative way (judging by deeds, not words) before we
change our own behavior. In many organizational and business dealings,
we require some written document that commits all parties to a course of
action, and we may also allow an outside authority to enforce commitments
once we've made them (e.g. the courts for contracts). Negotiating partners
need to demonstrate their commitment to cooperate with both words and
deeds.
•
Be clear: don't risk your trustworthiness
One of the most valuable assets you have in any negotiation is your
reputation for saying what you mean and meaning what you say. We are
often tempted to say things in a way that leaves us "wiggle room," and there
are some situations in which "constructive ambiguity" may be appropriate.
Nevertheless, in negotiations where there is not a strong foundation of
mutual trust, it is unwise to say something that you know can easily be
misunderstood by your negotiating partner, act in a way that you know they
will not appreciate, and then claim that what you did was in perfect accord
with what you said. By the same token, it is important to seek clarity from
Win as Much as You Can Teaching Note
Copyright © 1998 Consensus Building Institute
Page 14
your negotiating partners about what they mean. If the words of your
negotiating partner seem ambiguous and difficult to interpret, you should
ask for further explanation, and perhaps a more concrete expression of any
commitments that are being offered.
If you need to keep your options open, it's usually better to explain that you
cannot commit than to resort to vague language. And if you are thinking
about getting the other side to commit while keeping your options open,
think how you felt when you thought you had an agreement to play Y and
they played X.
Win as Much as You Can Teaching Note
Copyright © 1998 Consensus Building Institute
Page 15