Transparency International UK`s Defence and Security Programme

Defence Corruption Risk Index
of governments A new metric
Lunchtime talk, World Bank, March 5th, 2013
Mark Pyman, Director
Defence and Security Programme
1
THE TI DEFENCE & SECURITY PROGRAMME
1 ADVOCACY and ENGAGEMENT
Impacting international & national policy
Government Defence Anti-Corruption Index
NATO AU WB UN AU ECOWAS OSCE UNDPKO IAPKTC
Media Academies NGOs Development agencies
3 RESPONSIBLE
ARMS TRANSFERS
2 TOOLS, TRAINING
RESEARCH
4 RESPONSIBLE
DEFENCE
Implementing
strong controls
Introducing new
approaches
Engaging on
practical reforms
Arms Trade Treaty
Companies A-C Index
Encouraging IFBEC
Defence company
engagement
Offsets integrity
Research
Comparative
analyses
Doctrine
Police reform
Org’n reform
PK tools
Training
Training
development
Leader days
Workshops
War-games
Bulgaria
Chile
Kenya
Kuwait
Malaysia
Poland
Saudi Arabia
Taiwan
Turkey
Ukraine
Afghanistan
Balkans
Burundi
Colombia
Guatemala
Honduras
Sierra Leone
South Sudan
Somalia
Uganda
DEFENCE CORRUPTION - THE PROBLEM
DANGEROUS It undermines military effectiveness
Poor equipment risks the lives of troops
DIVISIVE
WASTEFUL
dollars
It destroys citizens’ trust in the armed forces
Factional control risks; Regional arms race risks
The defence sector is worth $1.7 trillion p.a.
The waste from corruption is in billions of
3
INDEX METHODOLOGY
•77 questions, scored on a 5-point scale. ‘Model answers’ guide
assessor’s responses
•Questionnaire filled out by an independent assessor, reviewed by two
independent peer reviewers; TI National Chapter review, TI-DSP review
•Government involvement requested, comments on drafts requested
•Objective answers where possible; reasoned assumptions acceptable
where information is lacking.
•Structured according to the TI-DSP typology of corruption risks.
•All info publicly available: One page summary, 30-50 pp country detail
THE GLOBAL RESULTS
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GLOBAL FINDINGS
•
•
•
•
70% of countries have poor or non-existent
controls
50% do not publish their defence budget in
any detail
85% have minimal legislative scrutiny of
defence policy
90% have no real system for whistleblowing
7
COUNTRY RESULTS
AFGHANISTAN - BAND E
POLITICAL
FINANCIAL
PERSONNEL
39%
22%
34%
+
+
+
+
+
+
OPERATIONS
35%
PROCUREMENT
17%
Inspector General system of control in operation
A Military Anti-Corruption unit inside the MOD is in operation
No indication of corruption concerning military-owned businesses
No indications of corruption concerning natural resource links.
Personnel and soldier pay rates are published
Ghost soldiers controlled
WEAK AREAS
POLITICAL
39%
FINANCE
22%
PERSONNEL
34%
OPERATIONS
35%
PROCUREMENT
17%
- Unclear responsibility for approving security policy
- Indications of criminal penetration into the military
- No scrutiny of secret spending.
- No information on off-budget spending
- Non-objective recruitment and promotions
- Private Military Contractors need better controls
- Procurement processes are weak
COMPARISON WITH POST-CONFLICT NATIONS
ANALYSIS
REGIONAL RESULTS | MENA
ANALYSIS – NORTH AFRICA
35
30
REGIONAL
RESULTS | NORTH AFRICA
25
Political
Finance
Personnel
Operations
Procurement
20
15
10
5
0
Morocco (E) Tunisia (E) Algeria (F)
Egypt (F)
Libya (F)
70
ANALYSIS
– LEVANT
60
50
REGIONAL
RESULTS | LEVANT +
Political
Finance
Personnel
Operations
Procurement
40
30
20
10
(F
)
Sy
ria
)
Ira
q
(E
)
(E
n
Ira
)
st
in
e
(D
-
(D
-)
Pa
le
an
rd
ae
l
I sr
Jo
Le
ba
no
n
(D
(D
+)
+)
0
GI vs CPI 2012 Scores - MENA
60
Over-perform relative to
the CPI
50
Israel
Kuwait
Lebanon
United Arab Emirates
40
GI % Score
Jordan
30
Oman Bahrain
Iran
Tunisia
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
20
Qatar
Morocco
Algeria
Egypt
10
Yemen
Under-perform relative to
the CPI
Libya
Syria
0
10
20
30
40
50
2012 CPI % Score
60
70
80
90
ANALYSIS
80%
70%
60%
50%
Political
Financial
40%
Personnel
Operations
30%
Procurement
20%
10%
0%
Angola
Eritrea
DRC
Cote Zimbabwe
d'Ivoire
Nigeria
Ethiopia
Uganda
Rwanda
Kenya
Ghana
Tanzania
South
Africa
RECOMMENDATIONS
Legislators: Open defence budget; Scrutiny of policy
Civil Society: Open the dialogue with MOD, Armed Forces
President and Cabinet Insist that the military and Ministry
of Defence be leaders in anti-corruption measures
Defence leaders Build a common understanding of defence
corruption. Analyse the corruption risks in your defence context.
Develop and implement a plan. Work with civil society.
17
PRACTICAL REFORMS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Analyse and understand the risks
Use good diagnostic tools
Use surveys and metrics
Develop a counter-corruption plan
Engage the leadership, build confidence
Serious training on counter-corruption
Clear conduct standards for officials, officers
Procurement reforms; use of monitors
Engage media, civil society
Work with the defence and security contractors
Establish a counter-corruption Director and unit
BUILD LEADERSHIP UNDERSTANDING
TI suggested approach
• Workshop with MOD and military leadership
• Review corruption risks
• Outline counter-corruption plan
TRAINING
• 5 day counter-corruption course
•OF5 level officers, MOD officials
•Focus on personal integrity and on
corruption prevention
•Given 15-20 times to date
•Nations develop own version
•Very well received
THE WEBSITE: WWW.DEFENCEINDEX.ORG
www.ti-defence.org
www.defenceindex.org
21
Additional detailed slides
22
Nations can make progress in controlling corruption post conflict
70
60
50
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Central African Republic
40
Colombia
Georgia
30
Liberia
Mozambique
Serbia
20
10
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
World Bank control of corruption indicators, www.govindicators.org
2009
2010
2011
Arresting Corruption
in the Police
the global experience
of police corruption
reform efforts
A new report from TI-UK’s
defence and security
programme
Main findings
1. Citizens rate police corruption as the top concern in
dozens of countries.
2. Reform efforts are often limited and incomplete,
especially if undertaken without strong, independent
external monitoring.
3. Urgent need for civil society to find more effective
ways of contributing to, stimulating and monitoring
police anti- corruption efforts.
25
Police corruption: a global issue
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