_________________________
STAIT Learning Review
Preparedness for Response
in Nepal
Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT)
January 2016
i
Contents
List of Abbreviations ......................................................................................................................................... i
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................................ iii
Background ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
Purpose and Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology ................................................................................................................................................... 2
Nepal Preparedness Learning – Findings and Proposed Learning Actions ..................................................... 3
A.
Leadership, Governance and Coordination ......................................................................................... 3
B.
Strengthening the Humanitarian-Development Nexus ....................................................................... 8
C.
Localising Preparedness .................................................................................................................... 11
D.
Strategic Investment in Preparedness Capacity ................................................................................ 14
E.
Effective use of surge ........................................................................................................................ 20
Annex 1 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium ................................................................................................... 21
Annex 2 Team Bios, STAIT Learning Review Team Preparedness for Response in Nepal ............................. 22
Annex 3 Documents Consulted ..................................................................................................................... 24
Annex 4 Chronology of Preparedness Actions and Events ............................................................................ 30
Annex 5 Overview of Nepal Preparedness Learning Actions ........................................................................ 31
ii
___________________________________________
List of Abbreviations
Advanced Preparedness Actions (APAs)
Assessment Capacity Project (ACAPS)
Accountability to Affected People (AAP)
Association of International NGOs (AIN)
After Action Review (AAR)
Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)
Cash Transfer Programming (CTP)
Cluster Lead Agency (CLA)
Community Service Organisation (CSO)
Communicating with Communities (CwC)
Common Feedback Project (CFP)
Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO)
Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)
District Lead Support Agency (DLSA)
District Preparedness and Response Plan (DPRP)
Emergency Directors Group (EDG)
Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP)
Humanitarian Coordinator (HC)
Humanitarian Country Team (HCT)
Humanitarian Programme Cycle (HPC)
Humanitarian Staging Area (HSA)
IASC Task Team for Preparedness and Resilience (TTPR)
Index for Risk Management (INFORM)
Information Management (IM)
Inter- Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
Inter-Agency Rapid Response Mechanism (IARRM)
Inter-Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG)
International Development Partners Group (IDPG)
International NGOs (INGO)
International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)
Key Performance Indicators (KPI)
Minimum Preparedness Actions (MPAs)
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD)
Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA)
National Disaster Response Committee (NDRC)
i
National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC)
National NGO (NNGO)
Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)
Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)
OCHA Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP)
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
Operational Peer Review (OPR)
Resident Coordinator (RC)
Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO)
Return on Investment (ROI)
Senior Transformative Agenda Implementation Team (STAIT)
Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)
The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)
Transformative Agenda (TA)
Trekking Agencies Association of Nepal (TAAN)
UK Department of International Development (DFID)
United Nations (UN)
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF)
United Nations Country Team (UNCT)
United Nations Development Group (UNDG)
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR)
Urban Search and Rescue (USAR)
World Humanitarian Summit (WHS)
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___________________________________________________________
Executive Summary
Background
Nepal faces a variety of life-threatening hazards. With its diverse landscape ranging from the
Himalayas to the lowlands of the Terai plains, it is a global ‘hotspot’ for natural disasters including
earthquakes, floods, landslides, windstorms, hailstorms, fire, glacial lake outburst floods and
avalanches. As a result, the country has been the focus of many preparedness activities for many
years. Past and current political complexities have also brought an additional dimension to risk
reduction, preparedness and disaster response.
The IASC TA includes two main protocols on preparedness: 1. The ERP Approach primarily focusing
on the preparedness of IASC actors and 2. The IASC/UNDG/UNISDR Common Framework for
Preparedness, primarily developed for humanitarian action, to build national and local
preparedness capacity. With this in mind, the STAIT was keen to gather learning from a review of
preparedness for response measures and how they contributed to the 2015 earthquake response.
Collective preparedness of the international (IASC) community is coordinated through the HCT+,
other national preparedness, supported in part by the international community, is coordinated
through Flagship 2 of the NRRC (see Annex 1).
Purpose and Objectives
The overall purpose of the review was to gather lessons in relation to preparedness for response
that could be shared in order to (i) inform decision-making on future response preparedness
actions in Nepal; (ii) inform RCs/HCs/HCTs and other collective bodies at country and regional
levels in their preparedness work; and (iii) provide feedback on global response preparedness
guidance and policies, particularly the ERP approach.
The learning review is not an evaluation and whilst the earthquake response has been used to
inform learning, the role of the review is not to make specific comment on the response itself, but
to identify learning and provide proposed Learning Actions for a more effective future response.
Methodology
The method and itinerary were developed in close collaboration with the RCO, OCHA and Save
the Children, for which the team is very grateful. The review team was made up of senior
colleagues from both NGO (3) and UN (3) organisations (Annex 2).
Methodology included: a consultation of literature (Annex 3); a chronology of preparedness
related actions (Annex 4); several remote interviews; a field mission to Nepal between 30
November and 8 December 2015 and subsequent analysis. In-country information collection
included a series of facilitated and bilateral meetings with key stakeholders – UN, Red Cross
Movement, INGOs, NNGOs, HCT, ICCG and key national government ministries.
The mission started on 30 November and concluded with debriefs of findings to the RC/HC and
the HCT on 8 December, as well as to the Regional IASC Preparedness Group in Bangkok on 9
December.
The report on the Learning Review has been split into three distinct products, each informed by
the Nepal Preparedness Learning Review:
1. Nepal Preparedness Learning – with learning and learning actions specifically for Nepal.
2. Global Preparedness Learning – directed at other RCs, HCs, HCTs, other leadership teams and
global preparedness support.
3. Leadership Preparedness Checklist – a two-page checklist of tips and learning around
preparedness for response.
iii
The following table outlines the key transformational learning from the Nepal Preparedness
Review and informs the Global Learning and Leadership Checklist, noting in which sections further
details can be found. The learning is informed by good practice as well as identified gaps where
preparedness may have supported a more effective response. A summary of learning actions to
support future preparedness actions in Nepal can be found in Annex 5. Indication is given if
actions are substantial (S), light (L) or quick wins (Q) and if urgent (bold/italic.
Key Transformational Learning for Preparedness for Response
1. Collective Action
– Working Better
Together
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
2. Mainstreaming a
risk management
approach
Strengthening
Humanitarian Development Nexus
3. Investment in
Dedicated
Coordinating
Capacity
Learning from Nepal around preparedness strongly supports one of the key
messages of the TA – that there is high potential for increased efficiency and
effectiveness from working better collectively. The NRRC provides us with an
example of collective action – a multi-stakeholder mechanism for planning and
prioritising together. Whilst preparedness and capacity building under Flagship 2
has worked on core priorities, and addressed some potential duplication, there
is a sense that greater efficiencies and effectiveness can be gained from a
more collective, collaborative approach. This requires (going beyond the HCT)
agreeing priorities and ensuring these are implemented and monitored within
the framework of the collective plan, recognizing that specific investments in
preparedness will largely be carried out by individual organisations. Information
sharing and ‘communication’ are essential to move towards ‘alignment and
collaboration’.
In a high disaster risk environment such as Nepal, it is imperative that emergency
preparedness for response is integrated into the normal life cycle of all
development programming, contributing to resilience by reducing exposure
and vulnerability. It is essential to avoid disassociating the timelines of
‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’ where such terminology is not helpful in a
holistic approach to sustainable development; they need to be seen as a
continuum and Nepal has the opportunity to lead in good practice.
Preparedness requires dedicated investment and coordinating capacity. There
is no shortage of calls for investment in preparedness, most recently in the
Report of the High Level Panel on Humanitarian Financing, and many confirm
that preparedness is an investment that results in a return1. In a resourceconstrained environment, investment is unlikely to take place without funding to
preparedness action as a distinct project.
Core to this investment is human resource capacity; sufficient to coordinate
collective planning and action, to protect preparedness investments; to
maintain preparedness gains, and ensure review and continuous development
of preparedness, commensurate with the level of risk and baseline
preparedness.
Experience shows that after a disaster, significant opportunities exist to increase
resources and scale-up preparedness for response action. However, in order to
capitalise on this, having enough human and financial resources is critical.
The HCT AAR cited many effective preparedness investments – rapid activation
of clusters, individual agency contingency plans, coordination architecture,
donor engagement before and during response, etc that appear to have been
technically low-cost investments, however they require time and staff, both of
which are often hard to justify in fundraising.
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
It is important to note the difficulty RCOs have in ensuring sufficient resources to
support the collective – there is a real challenge to meet the needs that a
collective preparedness plan requires. Ensuring appropriate resources across
RCOs in high risk environments requires a global review of need and capacity.
1
UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency Preparedness Study, 2015 report training sessions yield by far the highest financial ROIs (1.318.7) and countries with higher coping capacities have higher ROIs for human capital (e.g. training and organizational capacity)
iv
4. Increased Use of
Evidence Base –
Demonstrate
Value to Increase
Investment
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
5. Preparing for
Recovery Recovery is the
Overarching
Challenge of
Responding to
Earthquakes, and
not Disaster Relief
Strengthening
Humanitarian Development Nexus
6. Timely
Investment in
Transformational
Response
Mechanisms –
Cash, Private
Sector and AAP
Although Nepal and many parts of Asia fare better for preparedness than other
developing regions, risk reduction and preparedness remain undervalued and
underinvested in. Mechanisms such as ROI2 need to be more effectively used to
provide evidence and increase investment in preparedness. Other indicators of
effectiveness, including ‘shelf life’ and ‘return period’ as elements of
sustainability, must also be integrated into the assessment of the added value of
investment into a preparedness activity. Capacity building, long seen as a ‘freefor-all’ approach, must be brought under the same rigour of assessment and
streamlining as other preparedness investments.
A key lesson from previous earthquakes and other natural disasters 3 is that there
is no gap between relief and recovery. Government recovery structures take
time to set up so agencies need to focus on recovery right from the start of the
operation (ideally carrying out recovery preparedness planning, including
testing through recovery simulations). All involved need to recognize that
recovery from a large disaster takes up to five years. This will facilitate setting
realistic time frames, setting indicators for transition from response to recovery
coordination (a challenge in Nepal), and effective management of
communication to affected populations and media. It is critical to accelerate
strategies and activities in support of Preparedness for Recovery in order to
make this a more robust and effective process for Nepal. Whilst the benefits of
earlier recovery preparedness efforts have not been so evident (perhaps due to
the shelf life of activities), regular reviews throughout the earthquake recovery
period can inform future preparedness and recovery work.
Increasing importance is being placed on a number of key mechanisms and
modalities that support a more effective disaster response. These mechanisms
can take a lot of time to set up if advanced levels of preparedness haven’t
already taken place, with the result that the impact of the interventions will be
significantly reduced. Greater investment is urgently needed to ensure benefits
in future responses, capitalising on current gains, motivation and opportunities
after the earthquake response.
Cash – CTP significantly increased in Nepal during the earthquake relief and
recovery efforts and is only going to increase in its importance in future disaster
responses. To be more ‘cash ready’, significant work is needed in the
preparedness phase to: (i) increase government and responder buy-in and
agreements of its application, particularly multipurpose cash in a sector-based
humanitarian system (ii) understand the feasibility of cash programming and (iii)
markets in and around Nepal (iv) ensure pre-agreements with financial service
providers (some already done). Issues of inclusion, targeting and linkages to the
existing government safety net programme need to be more comprehensively
addressed. Given some of the challenges of larger distribution programmes,
reflection should be made regarding other recent approaches to CTP, which
were often made up of many much smaller distributions and agreed at the
district level.
Private sector partnership and coordination – considerable opportunities exist to
collaborate more effectively and take initial work through to conclusion. Both
the private sector and national diaspora associations provide opportunities, not
only for increasing the size and effectiveness of response, but also by tapping
into their networks to advocate for changes in disaster risk management at both
national and district level. It is critical that this work is done in a coordinated way
to ensure that the international community is perceived as coherent by the
business community.
Accountability,
community
engagement
feedback
mechanisms
–
pre-agreements are needed with key national and international partners to
enable rapid set-up of AAP mechanisms (such as the Inter-agency Common
Feedback Project) to support the responding community in taking, giving and
2
UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency Preparedness Study, 2015 report savings of up to double the amount invested and more
than a week in time saved.
3
Responding to earthquakes: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operation, ALNAP/Provention 2008.
v
being held to account, ensuring greater clarity of how this feeds into strategic
and operational decision-making in the response. Opportunities exist to
increase awareness and understanding of AAP within potentially influential
national organisations at national and district level, as well as more broadly
among DDRC members through extending CFP activities into the reconstruction
and recovery phase and into other (non-earthquake) high-risk DDRCs.
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
7. Sustaining Gains
in National Risk
Management
Requires
Long-Term
Commitment and
Planning Horizons
Cash, along with increasing partnerships with the Private Sector and Diaspora,
has the potential to transform preparedness, including in pre-positioning of
stocks. Cash, Private Sector and AAP mechanisms all made gains in the
earthquake response which need to be maintained and built upon.
There have been, and continue to be, positive developments from long-term
engagement with government – comprehensive DRR and disaster response
structures are being developed and capacity is being built – while the political
environment presents considerable challenges for rapid and sustained
outcomes. Efforts need to be maintained and seen as part of a long termstrategy, perhaps 10–20 years.
Leadership, Governance,
Coordination
8. Leadership
accountability for
preparedness,
not only for
response
Leadership, Governance,
Coordination
9. Investing in
strategic
engagement with
national and
local authorities
and national
NGOs
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
10.Strengthening
Linkages
Between
Emergency
4
Part of increasing the value of preparedness comes from how performance is
evaluated. Strong accountability mechanisms need to be developed in the
same way that response has specific accountability systems, particularly for
leadership. It is essential to value and measure leadership and effectiveness of
the international community on the basis of what has been done to reduce risk,
including capacity-building of national actors/government and emergency
management structures and how well they are prepared to respond to Level 1-3
emergencies. There are opportunities for Nepal to lead the way in developing its
own accountability mechanism and KPIs.
Accountability also includes ensuring that leadership positions (RC as well as
across key organisations, cluster coordinators) in high risk environments like
Nepal have emergency response experience. The future RC should also have
an understanding of regional and global emergency response tools.
Capacity-building efforts of key national actors can support a more effective
disaster response and potentially offer some of the best returns on investment
(ROI)4. Whilst there are over 40,000 registered NGOs/CSOs in Nepal, a collective
strategic approach to engagement with national NGOs involved in disaster
response seems somewhat limited and ad hoc, although there are notable
exceptions such as the Nepal Red Cross and NSET. More effective coordination
of the response of national NGOs requires a solid understanding of their
networks and demand come from within. Several opportunities exist for AIN to
play a bigger role in facilitating the development of national NGO coordination
mechanisms; AIN also played an additional support role in getting new INGOs
operational faster, and potentially play a further catalytic role in bringing a
broader base of INGOs to the table in preparedness and broader risk
management approaches in longer-term work.
Opportunities to increase awareness of humanitarian principles, vulnerability
and accountability through members of DDRCs have also been highlighted. This
offers greater openings for increasing national advocates within different fora to
challenge issue around protection, gender equality and social inclusion,
application of vulnerability criteria (versus often nationally supported blanket
approaches) as well as integrating AAP mechanisms more locally.
Coordination architecture for emergencies exists and provides linkages
between government and the international community, functioning to a
greater or lesser degree. However, the coordination between disaster response
and development would benefit from clearer and stronger linkages, and
UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency Preparedness Study, 2015.
vi
Response and
Development
Actors and
Coordination
Mechanisms
provides an opportunity to bring the life cycle of disaster response into
development processes. The ERP planning processes and activities provide
opportunities to reflect and improve on this by bringing in a broader base of
organisations at national and district levels.
Strengthening
Humanitarian Development Nexus
11.Effective Data
Preparedness
Can Reduce
Needs
Assessment Data
Collection and
Support Faster
Appropriate
Responses
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
12.Simulations Work
Strategic Investment in
Capacity Building
13.Effective Use of
Surge Capacity
Having the right data and information ahead of any disaster enables a much
clearer understanding of how communities and infrastructure will be affected
and can therefore support a more rapid initial response and reduce data
collection needs. A comprehensive approach to the District Profiles
(incorporating vulnerability, protection, inclusion and SADD), provide exactly this
opportunity.
Information management gains need to be continually maintained and
oversight provided by senior management. Consistent deployment of IM
capacity across clusters does not automatically translate into meeting IM
expectations of decision-makers and therefore agreement on what questions
need to be answered by data collection needs to be made clearer ahead of a
disaster, not a problem unique to Nepal.
Assessment analysis provided through local social media provides opportunities
for the future. However, effective needs assessment continues to present a
challenge in Nepal (as other countries). An analysis of recent performance is
needed – after much investment offering few results.
Simulations for first responders clearly contribute to a more effective response.
Despite attempts, multi-stakeholder simulations have proved allusive. Whilst work
to integrate all actors together in simulations continues, it is essential to offer
lighter table-top simulations annually at the very least (based on assessment of
turnover), to ensure the international community has clarity of roles and
responsibilities and an understanding of latest response guidance and support,
ready to support a nationally led response. The great challenges of recovery
should be simulated as well as first response.
IASC surge capacity risk eroding the goodwill of national governments as well as
other key actors due to lack of understanding of existing systems, cultures and
context. Existing pre-disaster government-international community coordination
mechanisms risk withdrawal of government involvement and potentially access
to affected populations in the response.
The political dynamics in Nepal mean that there are frequent changes in key
government roles which reset many relationships and progress in DRM. Frequent
staff changes in the international community also represent challenges for
national partners.
Effective Use of Surge
14.Working More
Locally Can
Reduce the
Political
Complexities of
Engaging at
Central Level
Some existing good practices need to be recognized and replicated and
stronger strategies to address the challenges of surge, experience, contract
duration, briefing and standard contact would benefit future responses.
Whilst the complexities of interacting with national-level government bodies can
often slow progress, opportunities do exist to engage more directly with local
authorities, NGOs and the private sector through the DDRCs at an operational
level. DLSAs provide an excellent opening to support capacity building for
response and recovery but also in preparedness for new disasters.
Leadership, Governance,
Coordination
vii
_______________________________________________________________________________
Background
Nepal, with its diverse landscape ranging from the Himalayas to the lowlands of the Terai plains,
faces a variety of life-threatening hazards. Classified by the World Bank as a global ‘hotspot’ for
natural disasters, a report from the Government of Nepal cites an average of 900 natural disasters
each year resulting in lost lives and damaged livelihoods5. These disasters include earthquakes,
floods, landslides, windstorms, hailstorms, fire, glacial lake outburst floods and avalanches. The
internationally used INFORM rates Nepal as ‘high risk’. As a result, the country has been the focus
of many preparedness activities for many years. These have included initiatives undertaken by
national and international actors. Past and current political complexities have also brought an
additional dimension to risk reduction, preparedness and disaster response.
The IASC TA includes two main protocols on preparedness:
(i)
(ii)
The ERP Approach, as part of the protocol on the HPC, primarily focuses on the preparedness
of IASC actors. Important to note is that the ERP (Phase 1) plan for Nepal, as part of a
prelaunch roll-out and focusing on flooding, had just been undertaken prior to the
earthquakes of 25 April and 12 May, 2015, with partial implementation.
The IASC/UNDG/UNISDR Common Framework for Preparedness was primarily developed for
humanitarian action, to build national and local preparedness capacity. A key theme in the
consultations of the WHS and a priority of the IASC for 2016-17 is localising response and the
Humanitarian-Development Nexus. The work of the NRRC (Annex 1) illustrates an example of
the application of the common framework and the strengthening HumanitarianDevelopment Nexus in action.
With this context in mind, the STAIT6 was interested to gather learning from a review of
preparedness for response measures and how they contributed to the 2015 earthquake response.
Preparedness for response is coordinated through two main structures:
1. Flagship 2 – Emergency Preparedness and Response; one of the five Flagships of the NRRC
which brings the Government, development and humanitarian partners together with donors
and international financial institutions around DRR planning and action.
2. ‘HCT+’ – an extended Humanitarian Country Team bringing together key UN, NGOs, Red
Cross Movement, donors, co-lead Cluster and Working Group coordinators.
A third mechanism, the International Development Partnership Group (IDPG), brings together the
UN, donors and international financial institutions around development initiatives.
____________________________________________________
Purpose and Objectives
The overall purpose of the review was to gather lessons in relation to preparedness for response
that could be shared in order to (i) inform decision-making on future response preparedness
actions in Nepal; (ii) inform RCs/HCs and HCTs and other collective bodies at country and
regional levels in their preparedness work; and (iii) provide feedback on global response
preparedness guidance and policies, particularly the ERP approach.
The learning review is not an evaluation, and while the earthquake response has been used to
inform learning, the role of the review is not to make specific comment on the response itself, but
5
Ministry of Home Affairs, Nepal Disaster Report 2009.
6
The IASC EDG established the STAIT, an inter-agency team (NGOs/UN), to support understanding of Transformative Agenda. It seeks to improve
understanding, learning and knowledge around increasing the effectiveness and accountability of humanitarian response.
1
to provide proposed Learning Actions to improve on preparedness for a more effective future
response.
The specific objectives of the learning review were to:
1. Review collective preparedness for response measures implemented and gather feedback
on their relative usefulness in supporting a more effective response to the earthquakes.
2. Consider gaps in collective preparedness for potential future action.
3. Review collective preparedness measures, with respect to their perceived ‘shelf life’ and
sustainability.
4. Review prior contingency planning assumptions and the impact these had on the
effectiveness of response.
5. Review the roles of different actors at different stages of the earthquake response and
whether their relative importance is reflected in their involvement within collective7
preparedness planning.
6. Identify potential opportunities and constraints in advancing preparedness action in Nepal.
___________________________________________________________
Methodology
The method and itinerary were developed in close collaboration with the RCO, OCHA and Save
the Children, for which the team is very grateful. The review team was made up of senior
colleagues from both NGO (3) and UN (3) organisations with a mix of experience in preparedness,
humanitarian response and development programming (Annex 2).
Methodology included: a consultation of formal and grey literature (Annex 3); several remote
interviews with key informants outside of Nepal; a field mission to Nepal between 30 November
and 8 December 2015; and subsequent analysis. A chronology of preparedness-related actions,
including those undertaken and/or directed by the Government of Nepal, was also collated to
understand the sequence of events (Annex 4).
In-country information collection included a series of facilitated meetings with key stakeholders –
RCs, HCs, HCTs, ICCGs, INGOs, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The
STAIT Nepal Preparedness Review Team also supported the HCT AAR which has also fed into the
review’s findings. Bilateral meetings were held with representatives of UN agencies, international
and national NGOs, donors, regional institutions, key national government ministries (Home Affairs,
Federal and Local Development), as well as military representation. Additional meetings with
private sector representatives were included towards the end of the review when this was
identified as a specific gap in the response. Field visits to government offices, operational
agencies and communities in the districts of Sindhupalchowk (earthquake affected) and
Nepalgunj (flood affected) were also included. The mission started on 30 November and
concluded with debriefs of findings to the RC/HC and the HCT on 8 December, as well as to the
Regional IASC Preparedness Group in Bangkok on 9 December.
The report on the Learning Review has been split into three distinct products: 1. Nepal
Preparedness Learning 2. Global Preparedness Learning and 3. a Leadership Preparedness
Checklist – the global learning and leadership checklist being informed from the learning review
in Nepal.
7
‘Collective’ in this instance refers to actions which form part of a joint approach to preparedness for response. This would include any actions
which make part of a common plan for the response. This may include actions of one organisation that supports or enables others to respond
more effectively/efficiently. These are likely to include, as a minimum, IASC organisations (including observers/standing invitees) and where
possible, Government and key regional actors such as militaries.
2
_______________________________________________________________________________
Nepal Preparedness Learning – Findings and
Proposed Learning Actions
The following section provides both statements of learning and proposed Learning Actions
informed by the review. There are five sections to the findings:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
Leadership, Governance and Coordination
Strengthening the Humanitarian-Development Nexus
Localising Preparedness
Strategic Investment in Preparedness
Effective Use of Surge
Those responsible for Learning Actions have also been indicated in Annex 5. Responsibility refers to
those who would ensure that the action is implemented, but not necessarily responsible for
implementation. Top priorities are indicated for each of the five sections. There are instances of
learning actions being somewhat repeated e.g. the need for dedicated and sustained capacity
to coordinate and support preparedness; these have been left inside the summary, as they are
important for different outcomes and highlight the depth of impact of not addressing the action.
Annex 5 provides a summary of all learning actions, indicating if actions are substantial (S), light (L)
or quick wins (Q). Urgent actions are also indicated through bold/italic.
A. Leadership, Governance and Coordination
Top Three Priorities
1. Collective and systematic approach to preparedness. A collective and systematic approach
to preparedness in high-risk contexts is critical and requires dedicated convening and
facilitation capacity. A common plan that engages IASC membership and international
development actors is essential, as is avoiding multiple individual plans, gaps and duplication.
Individual agency plans will always exist, however, it is important for all to understand how
their own individual plans are connected to an overall common plan. This is particularly critical
for NGOs, to see how they can add value by being part of an overall plan without
compromising their independence
Learning Action – The RCO ensures sufficient support to facilitate the development of an
overarching collective preparedness plan with the IASC and other international actors, and
continued support for decentralised DPRPs, ensuring clarity of how different levels of plans fit
together.
Learning Action – RC/HC ensure dedicated capacity within the RCO, with OCHA-type
humanitarian experience and capability including awareness of regional and global response
and support mechanisms.
2. Developing explicit strategies to implement preparedness and response activities within a
politically complex environment is crucial. It is important to acknowledge ambiguity when
operating in Nepal and to always have several plans in place. Various modalities for linking
with the government should be kept in mind in order to meet humanitarian imperatives.
Working with the government at different levels (national, district etc.) includes varying levels
of complexity and opportunities to support preparedness for response activities continue to
exist.
3
Rapid changes in government representation present challenges for progressing and ownership in
DRR and preparedness measures on a national basis – there is recognition that international
agencies face similar challenges with continuity, handover and knowledge management.
Learning Action – HCT to work on different strategies of engagement with government bodies for
preparedness and response – linking longer-term engagement with the need to meet
humanitarian imperatives.
3. Importance of NGO Coordination Forum in preparedness and response. AIN members worked
together on specific disaster management preparedness activities after reflection of the
effectiveness of the 2014 flood response, some of which were able to bear fruit in the initial
response. AIN has also played an important role in supporting incoming INGOs during the
response allowing them to become operational more quickly.
Learning Action – AIN, HCT consider how AIN can go beyond working with its membership in
facilitating a stronger collective (INGO, NNGO, Red Cross, UN) preparedness approach, which
has great potential to go beyond information sharing and alignment to become a strong
advocating force for greater collaboration in preparedness.
Learning Action – AIN, HCT consider how AIN can play a facilitating role in promoting the
integration of preparedness and response beyond the dual-mandated international NGOs into
the life cycle of programmes of normally single mandated development actors.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT, AIN consider how AIN can go further in its support of the
development of national NGO networks for disaster response and how this can also be replicated
at district level.
4. Leadership accountability for preparedness, not only for response. Part of increasing the value
of preparedness comes from how performance is monitored and evaluated. There are
opportunities for Nepal to lead the way in developing its own accountability mechanism and
indicators to measure more precisely the readiness of the collective international community
in responding to disasters.
Learning Action – RC/HC champion and pilot KPIs and greater accountability mechanisms for
preparedness in Nepal, supported by the Regional Directors group and the IASC TTPR. In the same
way that emergency response effectiveness is given priority and has strong accountability
mechanisms in place (particularly for leadership), KPIs for response preparedness need to be
developed8, and be part of a greater accountability to encourage high performance of these
preparedness indicators, and institutionalized.
5. Emergency response experience in leadership critical in high-risk environments. In a high
disaster risk environment such as Nepal, it is essential that the RC has significant humanitarian
leadership experience. This equally stands for Country Directors of other key organisations.
Learning Action – the HCT and UNCT organisations advocate through their global representation
in the IASC (EDG), that the next RC for Nepal has a significant humanitarian leadership profile;
STAIT to advocate through its linkages with the EDG. Advance consideration should be made by
the RC/HC and HCT if a Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator may be required for future L2 or L3
emergencies.
6. HCT+ structure useful for broader response coordination. The HCT+ structure, originally set up
for previous responses and preparedness work, was also used for the earthquake response.
Participation included cluster coordinators9, working group coordinators, other organisation
representatives as well as donors, and was considered a useful inter-agency and donor
8
Ensuring KPIs incorporate appropriate gender, inclusion, vulnerability and protection components
9
An inter-cluster coordination group also existed for cluster-specific issues.
4
coordination mechanism as well as a coherent way to identify challenges and finding
solutions. National NGOs also joined the ‘+’ structure after the earthquake. Additional donor
briefings meant that donors were aware of priorities, which facilitated support to agreed
priority areas. Later in the response the HCT+ often functioned as a meeting for informationsharing and issue-raising for the broader humanitarian community and were largely attended
by emergency operations staff rather than heads of agencies, reflecting also its preearthquake composition. Cluster coordinators in the review were positive about the HCT+
mechanism and it is likely it was the first inter-cluster coordination consultation in a STAIT review
where the linkages between the HCT and the ICC were not raised as an issue. When having a
two-tier HCT system, it is important to be clear who participates in which structure, and the role
of each to ensure effective strategic decision-making and discussions.
Learning Action – HCT, with the HCT+ to review participation and agree complementary ToRs for
the HCT and HCT+ structures.
7. RC/HC understanding of regional and global response tools and support is critical. ERP
activities and communication by regional preparedness organisations and OCHA ROAP
meant that the RC was familiar with international coordination tools and was able to accept
and support their deployment and effectiveness in-country, i.e. UNDAC, although the RC’s
OCHA background will have almost certainly had an influence. Previous relationship and
communications efforts prior to the earthquake, including a tailored approach to support,
were critical in the effective deployment of such support tools, although gaps (role, who
coordinates what, handover procedures), were identified between first responders (UNDAC
and USAR), Emergency (Foreign) Medical Teams, military and the IASC Humanitarian System
(HCT/Clusters)
Learning Action – RCO, OCHA ROAP, to prioritise continued building of relationships between RC
and regional and global support mechanisms, particularly during the interim as this is likely to
cover flood season preparedness. Ensure an accelerated process of briefing and relationship with
the newly appointed RC, including briefing in OCHA New York, Geneva and Regional Office in
Bangkok.
Learning Action – RC/HC,RCO, OCHA ROAP to concentrate on bridging the gap of understanding
and clarity of roles at the onset of a disaster between first responders and the in-country IASC
Humanitarian System.
Learning Action – RCO, NRRC Flagship 210 Coordinator to work with OCHA, ROAP and globally with
the INSARAG Secretariat in OCHA Geneva to more effectively request appropriately classified
USAR teams and stand down their arrival in Nepal after an international request is withdrawn11.
8. OCHA support in preparedness and response coordination is critical. OCHA plays a key role in
supporting important components of emergency response preparedness. In this instance,
OCHA’s investment translated into a rapid deployment in support of the RC’s earthquake
response. Given OCHA’s previous prolonged withdrawal from Nepal, an exit strategy was
quickly put in place to manage expectations. As part of the exit strategy, immediate lessons
were captured as part of the ERP process (including from this report), to inform better
preparedness in 2016. The high level of support in preparedness and response from OCHA’s
regional team will, however, be difficult to maintain over time and requires integration of
additional capacity into the RCO.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT to set specific indicators which consider handover periods and
opportunities to further response preparedness post-disaster and as part of an OCHA exit strategy.
10
See Annex 1 for further details
11
A global learning action is also noted in the Global Learning Report
5
Learning Action – RC/HC – ensure RCO capacity for coordination of response and preparedness,
similar to OCHA coordination and preparedness profiles.
9. Early corrective action of response operations and strategies. When carried out as a
collective, several lessons from the 2014 Floods AAR were implemented in response to the
2015 earthquake. The effectiveness of implementation is potentially related to a review of
these lessons just ahead of the earthquake (whilst planning for flood responses), as well as the
same RC (and HCT Leadership Team) being in place during the previous response and at
implementation of learning during the earthquake.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – consider a light facilitated ‘course-correcting’ review (1.5 hour
sessions – a sort of OPR ‘light’) after the first month of the next disaster response whilst still in the
operational phase, as a means to increase AAP, as well as an AAR towards the end of response.
10. Opportunities exist to increase preparedness and risk reduction post-disaster, but to maximise
these, full human resource capacity is needed. Experience shows significant opportunities exist
with partners and donors after a disaster to increase resources to intensify and scale-up
preparedness for response action within the international community, government (e.g. MoE,
MoH, DDRCs), civil society, military actors, financial service providers and the private sector.
However, dedicated human as well as financial resources are needed to capitalise on these
opportunities.
NRCS/IFRC plays a crucial coordination and leadership role in the Flagships for Preparedness
for Response and Community Based Disaster Risk Management. Their experience and pivotal
relationship with the government makes the coordination role they share with the RCO
(sharing capacities for the common good) not only unique but absolutely critical.
Learning Action – RC/HC, UNCT, HCT, IFRC to work with donor and IASC partners to support an
intensification of preparedness activities of national and international actors, advocating for
sufficient staffing capacity within the RCO and Flagships to progress common preparedness
response actions throughout 2016.
11. Importance of protection in natural disasters. The recent Nepal earthquake is an important
reminder of how crucial protection is during natural disasters, which often present challenges
due to forced or voluntary relocation and exacerbation of pre-existing inequalities, and
therefore acute risks to vulnerable groups. Background challenges around social inclusion and
gender equality in Nepal are well understood by the development community. In the longterm these issues are best tackled by the development of appropriate disaster management
legislation. In the meantime, the international humanitarian community needs to ensure that
protection, social inclusion and gender equality remains a priority (as importantly identified in
the ERP Phase I for floods prior to the earthquake), and is considered across all emergency
preparedness activities, and that information about gender equality, social inclusion and
equity is part of baselines used to plan any response. Protection, gender equality, social
inclusion and challenges in Nepal were largely long-standing protection and human rights
concerns, exacerbated further by the earthquake. An understanding of these issues needs to
be fully integrated into district profiles and made part of a standard briefing pack. The 2014
flood response also provided several examples of concern – in this case, that protection was
more absent from the longer-term response.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – ensure pre-agreed leadership roles for protection, gender
equality and social inclusion in disaster response are in place as well as clear responsibilities and
expectations to support preparedness activities.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – ensure the Protection cluster and Inter-Cluster Gender Working
Group are embedded within the humanitarian cluster coordination system with support to
6
addressing protection, social vulnerabilities and gender equality issues related to disaster
preparedness.
Learning Action – Protection cluster, Inter-Cluster Gender Working Group to work with RCO/IM to
agree gender, social and vulnerability data and mapping that can be incorporated into district
profiles, ensuring sex, age and disability disaggregated data throughout.
12. Maintenance of Clusters outside of emergency response. Clusters are a permanent presence
in Nepal and this makes sense in a high-risk environment. Nepal has applied the flexibility
promoted by the TA in adapting preparedness and response structures in a way which is most
effective for the context, rather than being formulaic. Clusters, led by the government and
co-led by the international community, work on preparedness activities throughout the year,
although effectiveness varies greatly between clusters (potentially relating to the quality of
leadership handover and the consistency of support). Agreed response planning – type and
numbers according to specific risk events – is critical in determining information preparedness
needs.
Learning Action – RC/HC reiteration of preparedness responsibilities and expectations in levels of
preparedness of Cluster Co-Lead Agencies is needed from the RC/HC and HCT; responsibilities
commensurate with the high risk-disaster environment, recognizing the often fluid political
dynamics and their impact on government leadership roles. Expectations should be measurable
and monitored on a regular basis.
Learning Action – RC/HC consider drawing upon Global Inter-Cluster and Cluster support
mechanisms to support Cluster Lead Agencies develop work plans.
Learning Action – Nepal presents Global Inter-Cluster Coordination with a learning opportunity for
handover and transition of cluster leadership from international organisations to government, to
both support the development of more detailed guidance for transition in other contexts and
through case studies. Propose an example set of key indicators to be met in the transition process.
7
B. Strengthening the Humanitarian-Development Nexus
Top Three Priorities
1. Mainstreaming the risk management approach across all programming. In a high disaster risk
environment such as Nepal, it is imperative that emergency preparedness for response be
integrated into the normal life cycle of all development programming. All should be done to
avoid disassociating the timelines of ‘humanitarian’ and ‘development’. Risk management
has to be considered as part of any humanitarian or development process or programme,
with some actors who are more highly specialised in relief, and others who need to better
integrate this and increase response preparedness to support a better response. DRR, again
often prioritised and implemented by largely dual-mandated organisations, should be integral
to all development processes, contributing to resilience by reducing exposure and
vulnerability.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT, UNCT, IDPG to work with Government to institute a risk
management approach to all programming, with all partners.
2. Preparedness for recovery is critical; recovery is the overarching challenge of responding to
earthquakes, and not disaster relief. Whilst the focus of the learning review is on ‘Preparedness
for Response’, one of the key lessons from previous earthquakes and other natural disasters is
that providing effective support to recovery is the overarching challenge of responding to
earthquakes, and not disaster relief12. There is no gap between relief and recovery in natural
disasters, where households begin their recovery efforts immediately after an earthquake.
With government recovery structures taking time for set up and for recovery plans to be
agreed, agencies need to focus on recovery right from the start of the operation, having
already carried out recovery preparedness planning, including testing through simulations, to
accelerate these steps. Work also needs to be undertaken in advance with government and
donors to recognize that recovery from a large disaster will take up to 5 years. This will facilitate
setting realistic time frames for the recovery phase, setting indicators for transition from
response to recovery coordination and effective management of communication of this to
affected populations and media. It is critical to accelerate strategies and activities in support
of Preparedness for Recovery in order to make this a more robust and effective process for
Nepal. Whilst efforts have been made in earlier years (2011-13), the benefits have not been
evident, perhaps due to the shelf life of activities and turnover.
Learning Action – RCO, HCT, IDPG – previous work should be reviewed to identify what is useful for
leading recovery in the current and next disaster and to determine why certain preparedness
work has not been sustained.
12
Responding to earthquakes: Learning from earthquake relief and recovery operation, ALNAP/Provention 2008.
8
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – institute regular real-time reviews over the next three years of the
recovery programme to document recovery and turn learning into real-time action; work with the
broader response and recovery communities to inform and mainstream future preparedness for
recovery and recovery implementation in Nepal.
3. Significant value from multi-stakeholder initiatives in increasing prominence of integrated risk
management approaches, particularly in dual-mandated organisations. The NRRC, led by the
government and supported by the international community (developed in 2009 and formally
launched in 2011), DIPECHO programmes (since 2001) and other similar initiatives, have
increased awareness of DRR and resilience among disaster response and some development
actors in Nepal and improved coordination of efforts, perhaps particularly among dualmandated actors. The NRRC has played a crucial convening role (recognized also by
MoHA/MoFALD) between government and actors in preparedness and risk reduction
including different components of government, national and international communities,
including donors. NRRC’s mandate has been extended to 2020 13 and the end of 2015 was to
see an important review of priorities given to Sendai, COP21 and the SDGs. However, given
the earthquakes, the response and recovery focus, as well as the current political events and
complexities, it is understandable that this has not been possible. Of critical importance to any
decision on NRRC’s future is the centrality of the continued support for a risk management
and preparedness approach including (i) continued high-level advocacy on DRR integration
and (ii) centralising, encouraging and monitoring collaborative multi-stakeholder partnerships
to further risk reduction and resilience.
Learning Action – NRRC Steering Committee to ensure that a reconsideration of priorities is
conducted in 2016 and that preparedness for response, which has made good progress,
continues to be a focus area under leadership.
Learning Action – NRRC with IASC TTPR. The impact of multi-sector partnerships such as the NRRC
as risk reduction interventions should be shared with other high-risk countries.
4. Strengthening linkages between emergency response and development actors and
coordination mechanisms. Coordination architecture for emergencies and ‘mega’
emergencies exists and functions at government level and provides the linkages to the
international community, and functions to a greater or lesser degree. However, the
coordination between disaster response and development would benefit from clearer and
stronger linkages, ensuring that parallel structures are not created and provide an opportunity
to bring the life cycle of disaster response into development processes. The ERP planning
processes and activities provide opportunities to reflect and improve on this by bringing in a
broader base of organisations at national and district levels, so that humanitarian and
development divisions are not reinforced, and ERP processes act as bridges between different
actors.
Learning Action – RC/HC, RCO clarify and strengthen linkages and coordination between
disaster response and longer-term programming; Develop in advance of a response, explicit
mechanisms for coordination and collaboration with development structures and actors;
ensure key development actors are integrated into clusters, particularly at the beginning to
ensure broader sector knowledge is shared.
5. Sustained gains in risk management and preparedness are possible, but require long-term
commitment. There have been, and continue to be, positive developments from long-term
engagement with the government. Comprehensive DRR and disaster response structures
13
NRRC Steering Committee Minutes 2014.
9
have been developed over time and capacity is being built, although continues to be ‘workin-progress’ on several levels. Whilst the political environment presents considerable
challenges for rapid, effective and sustained outcomes, causing frustration and challenges for
programme and budget frameworks which do not have the same timeline, efforts need to be
maintained and seen as part of a long-term strategy of engagement (some suggest a 10-20year planning horizon). Efforts to further develop the national framework for preparedness and
response should be maintained.
Sustained gains also require recognition of the shelf-life of activities and that there is a returnperiod in which the activity needs to be refreshed or updated. Consistent coordination
support, such as that potentially provided by NRRC, is important in providing a consistent
comprehensive framework to monitor and maintain results.
Learning Action – UNCT, IDPG, NGOs – policy and structural development programmes for the
international community (as part of engagement with government and national actors) need to
be set within a long-term framework of engagement.
10
C. Localising Preparedness
Top Three Priorities
1. Working more locally can reduce the political complexities of engaging at central level. Whilst
the complexities of interacting with national-level government bodies can often slow progress,
opportunities do exist to engage with government at an operational level. There are examples
of highly effective districts maintaining strong and positive engagement. There is however the
challenge of potential changes with the first district elections in 18 years planned for 2016. It
may be important in the short term to identify mechanisms, people and positions which are
likely to remain in place, including the non-government members of the DDRC.
Learning Action – RCO – build on existing good practices to strengthen capacity of DDRCs by
increasing preparedness to coordinate fast and effective response (use experience-sharing
across districts).
2. Capacity building of national actors requires a more collective and professional approach,
integrating concepts and indicators of effectiveness and efficiency. Capacity-building efforts
of key national actors can support a more effective disaster response and potentially offers
some of the best returns on investment (ROI)14. However, opportunities exist to challenge the
often ‘free-for-all’ approach to capacity for national actors, building through a more
coordinated collective and strategic approach to professionalise, prioritise and streamline
capacity-building efforts. This would incorporate quality control through standards,
benchmarks, and, in some instances, certification, as well as a recognition of the concepts of
shelf life and sustainability and a measurement of value for money.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT, IDPG, Flagship 2, AIN – through a more comprehensive
understanding of capacity-building efforts of the international community (including
development banks) and the involvement of key donors, develop a collective and strategic
approach to capacity building of specific key national actors in preparedness for response
(potentially beyond flagship areas), identifying who will take the convening and coordinating
role.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT, IDPG, Flagship 2, AIN review, as standard, each capacity
development effort through the lens of: (i) a measurement of value for money, likely ROI for
improved disaster preparedness and response; (ii) the effective ‘shelf life’ of interventions and
therefore the length of the necessary repeat cycle for the activity; (iii) standards and benchmarks
for capacity building (including in relation to gender equality, social inclusion and protection).
3. Strategic engagement with NNGOs responding in emergencies. Despite upwards of 40,000
registered civil society organisations and the modus operandi in Nepal indicating INGOs must
work though national NGOs, it proved difficult to organise a meeting with National NGOs
implementing relief operations (which may, of course, be more of a reflection of the
understanding of the international community of how NNGOs coordinate). Whilst there is an
obligation by government to use national NGOs for response activities, a collective approach
to supporting the direct localisation of assistance, as demanded by the World Humanitarian
Summit, seems, on the surface, somewhat limited and ad hoc, although there are notable
exceptions such as the Nepal Red Cross and NSET. Further attempts at supporting national
NGOs to take up a coordinating role may need to be based on a more solid understanding of
NNGO networks and emanate from within their own community.
Learning Action – RC/HC, RCO, HCT, Clusters consider the need for a more conscious, strategic
and partnership approach to engagement with those national NGOs working in emergency
response, on a collective and collaborative basis. A prerequisite to this is ensuring that the
14
UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency Preparedness Study, 2015.
11
international community give appropriate space and support (and probably relinquish some
power), to allow NNGOs to set their own benchmarks and mapping of capacity assessment to
deliver in line with humanitarian principles and international standards. Ensure within any
conscious capacity-building plan to go beyond technical development and include
organisational development e.g. financial, leadership, coordination, planning, as well as
humanitarian standards and principles (including in relation to gender equality, social inclusion
and protection), identifying opportunities for national NGOs to be agents for increasing
accountability within DRM.
Learning Action – RC/HC, RCO, DLSAs build on existing good practice to develop long-term
collective strategies for district level partnerships and capacity development as well as continue
progress with district risk management plans, utilising the DLSA mechanism to coordinate efforts.
4. Strong potential in the DLSA mechanism to improve capacity and coordination at district level.
The DLSA is seen as a mechanism with strong potential to promote effective coordination
between international actors and district authorities and build capacity. With roles becoming
clearer and the mechanism becoming more widespread in its roll-out, the initial benefits can
now be seen. Although in the longer term this would be seen more as a national responsibility,
the DLSA mechanism can offer a great deal in coming years, both within ongoing response
and recovery but also in preparedness for new disasters. The model could look at transitioning
to capacitated national actors, involving them as partner DLSA agencies as early in the
process as possible.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT to ensure clarity and continuity of support to the DLSA structure
(potentially from UNDP) to maximise its effectiveness. Ensure DLSA good practice is shared
between agencies – particularly flood-affected areas where the DLSA structure is already being
implemented. Ensure regular performance monitoring of delivery against the agreed ToR by DLSA
agencies, and replacement where benchmarks are not met.
5. Subject capacity building to the same demands for collective approaches, effectiveness and
efficiency measurement as other preparedness investments. Capacity-building efforts can
support a more effective disaster response. Significant opportunities exist to follow on from
efforts of Flagship 5 in mapping the impact of capacity building, to challenge the often ‘freefor-all’ approach through a more collective and strategic approach to professionalise,
prioritise and streamline capacity-building efforts, incorporating quality control through
standards, benchmarks, as well as a recognition of the concepts of shelf life and sustainability
and a measurement of value for money.
Learning Action – HCT, UNCT, IDPG gain commitments from international actors to follow on from
mapping and assessment of impact of capacity-building efforts to professionalise, prioritise and
streamline capacity-building efforts.
Learning Action – HCT, UNCT, IDPG to impose the same rigour of assessment of effectiveness and
efficiency and value for money as recommend for other capacity-building initiatives.
6. Opportunities to increase awareness of humanitarian principles, vulnerability and
accountability at national and district level. Opportunities exist to work with national actors
represented at district level to act as advocates within national and district level coordination
bodies within response and preparedness e.g. local government, NNGOs and private sector
representation groups. In particular this is can be made possible through the DDRCs, raising
awareness of humanitarian principles and standards, protection, gender equality and social
inclusion, application of vulnerability criteria (versus often nationally supported blanket
approaches) and AAP.
Learning Action – RCO, Clusters and HCT strengthen support nationally and DLSAs (as per their
revised ToRs) to identify and further explore potential change agents at national and district level
for inclusion, protection and targeting in capacity building and engagement on promoting a
more effective and accountable response. It will be important to agree and coordinate
approaches before implementation and include the Women and Child Office (WCO) and key
12
CSOs working on protection, gender equality and social inclusion issues at the district level for
these awareness efforts.
7. Importance of getting sub-national coordination in line with operational realities. Coordination
hubs set up at regional level were limited in their ability to bring a regional coherence to the
response as the operational level for government is more based on districts and geography. In
a strong government coordination environment, ensuring sub-national coordination that
reflects the operational realities of government is critical.
Learning Action – RC/HC, RCO, HCT, Clusters review sub-national coordination mechanisms for the
earthquake response (three hubs) and use the findings to guide future strategies. This will
strengthen sub-national coordination among international actors and national and local
authorities in the event of new emergencies.
8. Critical importance of private sector and the diaspora to support response, but also as
potential advocates and change agents for humanitarian principles. The earthquake response
illustrated the increasing importance of private (national) individuals, the diaspora and the
private sector in delivering relief assistance. Considerable opportunities exist to collaborate
more effectively. Both the private sector and national diaspora associations provide
opportunities, not only for increasing the size and effectiveness of response (including stocking
appropriate quality of materials), but also tapping into their networks, internally and externally,
to advocate for changes in disaster risk management. For example, through different
chambers of commerce, the private sector is represented at district level and participates in
DDRCs, but is also represented at the highest levels nationally in disaster response committees
and therefore represents a potential route of important advocacy messages to government.
The Federation of Nepal Chamber of Commerce and Industries indicated a desire to work
with the international community to support the setting-up an internal emergency cell to
coordinate private sector responses from both preparedness and response perspectives. A
study by the National Business Initiative and Kathmandu University indicated the need for an
Emergency Coordination Unit within the private sector, serving as an entry point for private
sector engagement. Other more informal networks of private donors exist, which would
require a very light approach to coordination. It is critical that this work is done in a
coordinated way to ensure that the international community is perceived as coherent by the
business community. Whilst OCHA ROAP resources can be punctually made available to
support ongoing engagement and relationship building over time, oversight and senior
national staff inputs are needed to realistically make more substantive progress .
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT to identify potential routes for advocacy with development of
relationships with the private sector and diaspora, critically displaying a coherent level of
engagement of the international community.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT ensure dedicated human resources to finalise the in-depth
assessment and plan of action for engagement with the private sector and the diaspora building
on work done prior to the earthquake and additional learning from their involvement throughout
all phases of response and recovery and ongoing work of the Shelter Cluster. Plan for future
limited involvement of OCHA’s regional office.
13
D. Strategic Investment in Preparedness Capacity
Top 5 Priorities
1. Increasing effectiveness and efficiency from a more collaborative approach. Investments in
preparedness need to be prioritised and based on a conscious, transparent review of
evidence of likely effectiveness and sustainability of interventions, as part of a collective
approach to preparedness planning and implementation. Whilst core preparedness and
capacity building under Flagship 2 has worked on core priorities, and addressed some
potential duplication, there is a sense that greater efficiencies and effectiveness can be
gained from a more collective, collaborative approach to preparedness across the
international community. This requires (going beyond the HCT); agreeing priorities and
ensuring these are implemented within the framework of the collective plan, whilst
recognizing that specific investments in preparedness will largely be carried out by individual
organisations is essential. There is a critical need for a shift from relative ‘autonomy’ in
preparedness to an increase in information sharing and ‘communication’, moving towards
‘alignment and collaboration’ (see below). This process is more challenging when resources
are more plentiful, giving less incentive for greater levels of coordination. This therefore
requires commitment at the highest levels within the international community, with the overall
process supported by donors.
Spectrum of Coordination – Exploring Coordination of Humanitarian Clusters, ALNAP, 2015
Learning Action – NRCC - In reviewing the Flagship 2 priorities and work plan (as part of the overall
NRRC review), assess the potential usefulness of including the coordination of broader
preparedness for response activities across international and national actors, into Flagship 2, or
reaffirming and resourcing the RCO’s role, strengthening linkages between the two.
2. Increased use of evidence base for preparedness to demonstrate value and increase
investment. Whilst Nepal and parts of Asia fare better for preparedness than other developing
regions, risk reduction and preparedness remains undervalued and underinvested in, is not
mainstreamed through all programming and comes with limited accountability. Mechanisms
need to be found to more effectively use evidence e.g. ROI15 to value preparedness to
increase investment in action that does not necessarily have an immediate return. Other
indicators of effectiveness and sustainability must also be integrated into the assessment of
the added value of investment in a preparedness activity
Learning Action – RC/HC,HCT, UNCT, IDPG utilise existing ROI evidence more broadly and develop
Nepal context-specific data to use as the evidence base to support increased investment and
prioritisation of preparedness.
15
UNICEF/WFP Return on Investment for Emergency Preparedness Study, 2015 report savings of up to double the amount invested and more
than a week in time saved.
14
3. Effective data preparedness can reduce needs assessment data collection. Information
management gains need to be continually maintained and oversight provided by senior
management to ensure data preparedness and that critically agreed information needs are
readily available and adapted to responder needs. The collection, reporting and use of sex,
age, disability and ethnicity disaggregated data needs to be supported and emphasised as
mandatory at all stages in order to strengthen effective support for vulnerable groups.
Consistent deployment of IM capacity across clusters does not automatically translate into
meeting IM expectations of decision-makers; those accountable need to indicate how well
the response is meeting needs (not a problem unique to Nepal).
Despite dedicated Cluster IM capacity at country level, the system is not set up to consistently
respond with evidence to key questions such as: (i) is aid reaching the most affected locations
and populations; (ii) is aid reaching the most hard-to-reach locations and most vulnerable
people; (iii) if the donors had to put their money in one place, in one sector, where should it be?
The most commonly used IM tools are not set up in a way to easily report such data. It is important
data and IM are improved as part of preparedness, as it is incredibly difficult to develop this
effectively in an emergency response.
Learning Action – RCO, HCT and Clusters, carry out a light review of IM performance. Consult on
expectations of senior managers and decision-makers and IM products needed. Develop revised
data needs and IM products overviews and integrate into preparedness planning.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT, IMU, IMWG develop (and implement where there are gaps), data
and IM benchmarks that need to be consistently maintained for preparedness purposes and
ensure adequate capacity is available (potentially across organisations and coordinated by the
RCO), to ensure support for data preparedness actions, recognizing the need for appropriate
strategies and timelines to effectively engage within government.
Learning Action – RCO/IMU, IMWG – a mechanism needs to be identified by which all disaster and
response-related data from all parties is available from one location and effectively
communicated, recognizing that external surge capacity by default turns to HDX 16.
Learning Action – RCO/IMU, IMWG ensure re-disaster District Profiles effectively integrate other key
vulnerability, protection, age and gender disaggregated data; this critical preparedness and
response data must not be developed separately.
4. Imperative to invest in preparedness in time-sensitive response mechanisms and modalities –
cash, AAP and private sector collaboration. Increasing importance is being placed on a
number of key mechanisms and modalities that support a more effective disaster response.
These mechanisms can take a lot of time to set up if advanced levels of preparedness
haven’t already taken place, with the result that the impact of the interventions will be
significantly reduced. Greater investment is urgently needed to ensure benefits in future
responses, capitalising on current gains, motivation and opportunities after the earthquake
response.

Cash – greater strategic and technical awareness of its use is essential among government,
response actors and clusters; in-country agreements are needed on how to apply and
coordinate multipurpose cash in a sector-based humanitarian response system; preagreements must be developed with financial service providers; preparedness work in
analysing market systems in and around Nepal needs to take place. Whilst there have been
attempts to link cash distributions with the national safety net programme (already linked to
by individual agency programmes, such as Unicef), issues of inclusion and targeting need to
be more comprehensively addressed.
16
HDX –Humanitarian Data Exchange is an open platform for sharing data. The goal of HDX is to make humanitarian data easy to find and use for
analysis; it has been accessed by users in over 200 countries and territories.
15
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Accountability, community engagement feedback mechanisms – pre-agreements are
needed with key national and international partners to enable rapid set-up of mechanisms
(such as the Inter-agency Common Feedback Project) to support taking, giving and being
held to account, ensuring clarity of how this feeds into strategic and operational decisionmaking.
Private sector partnership and coordination – including stocking and donating the right goods
to humanitarian standards and specifications; opportunities for the private sector to support
more broadly humanitarian response and also to increase involvement in emergency
preparedness and DRR; more effectively sharing information and coordination on needs
assessment and capacity to respond; reviewing advocacy potential of private
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT - greater investment is urgently needed to ensure sustained gains in
cash, AAP/CwC and working with the private sector, capitalising on recent learning, motivation
and opportunities after the earthquake response to support ongoing response, recovery and to
build solid systems for future response.
5. ERP works. There are strong signs that the initial ERP roll-out supported the earthquake
response. Although being rolled-out as a trial prior to the earthquake, the tailored selection of
multi-hazard MPAs identified for roll-out as part of flood response preparedness assisted the
initial response to the earthquake by having the essential foundations in place, e.g. SOPs for
the first hours of the response, an overview of coordination structures, key contact details,
district profiles, communication and reporting templates and the CERF pro forma submission.
The flexibility and tailoring to country context undertaken by the HCT and OCHA ROAP during
ERP phase 1, has been an important factor in success; it is important to see ERP preparedness
activities as live, flexible and promoting involvement and familiarity. The ERP can be seen as
the building blocks of the planning process rather than a heavy document needs to be
considered when moving forward. Significant parts of the ERP require the Co-Cluster Lead
Agencies to take responsibility to ensure preparedness tasks are completed and are ongoing;
this also requires effective inter-cluster coordination. The high level of input in the ERP process
by OCHA ROAP is not sustainable and the RC/HC, HCT and donor partners need to find a way
to sustain preparedness coordination capacity and efforts.
Learning Action – RC/HC, RCO, HCT,AIN – If the ERP approach is to be owned more broadly within
the international community and used as an opportunity to bring in more development actors, its
‘packaging’ needs to be reconsidered so that it is seen as an inclusive process. NGOs need to see
their added value and substantive role more clearly, not focusing solely on the UN and the HCT.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT to agree how to sustain and ensure consistency of capacity to
support the implementation of the ERP when OCHA ROAP’s involvement becomes more limited.
6. Implement APAs in high-risk environments and maintain preparedness readiness. Where there
is a specific identifiable hazard, the ERP calls for APAs to be implemented. Nepal is quoted as
one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world; preparedness therefore has to be on an
ongoing and continuous basis with all response partners. Whilst OCHA ROAP is, and continues
to be, a crucial catalyst on these issues, providing leadership and technical support to the
country team where necessary, they lack the continuous presence and follow-up that is
needed. Some gains made during OCHA’s more significant presence have been lost, one
example being in IM – the data readiness matrix is no longer maintained, no one-stop access
to Nepal’s rich data sources and administrative boundaries are not clear due to recent
changes.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT to ensure continual support to the development of preparedness
and response. Given the high risk and permanent level of response needed, capacity is needed
to: protect resource-intensive investments; maintain preparedness gains; and ensure review and
16
continuous development in preparedness. It must also be agreed where capacity will rest, for
example, in the RCO or NRRC, or indeed, both.
7. Monitoring risks. Investment in preparedness is optimised if sufficient warning is provided. This
requires effective risk monitoring, something explicitly recognized in the ERP approach.
Learning Action – NRRC/HCT/UNCT - a common platform is needed to monitor key risks and
provide early warning signals; who would provide this platform is not clear. Whilst this may sit in the
NEOC with the central NDRC, it is perhaps more realistically that it becomes a function within
Flagship 2 of the NRRC.
8. Effective preparedness measures in the earthquake response. Based on the HCT AAR, many of
the cited effective preparedness investments, e.g. rapid activation of clusters, individual
agency contingency plans, coordination architecture, donor engagement before and during
response and open spaces (where located in the earthquake area), appear to have been
technically low-cost investments, but require time and staff inputs which are often some of the
most difficult to justify in fundraising. Other preparedness interventions seen as effective are
related to first responders in the initial response rather than the longer relief phase, where
significant investments had been made (USAR and military simulations, foreign medical teams,
prepositioning – although not enough – and the Humanitarian Staging Area). Whilst not all of
these are within Nepal’s control, there is a need for a greater evidence base of impact versus
cost of some of these interventions. It was also noted that high-level global support missions,
can be helpful although need to be focused on solving specific problems in country.
ERP preparedness actions and relationships built with OCHA’s regional support also facilitated
a sitrep within hours of the earthquake, a CERF application within days, and a focus on key
immediate needs – important documents in accessing funds for response and
communicating with the humanitarian and donor communities.
Learning Action – RCO ensure annual refreshers with the HCT and Clusters to support a rapid
turnaround of critical response documents – e.g. Situation Analysis, CERF application, Flash
Appeals, Humanitarian Response Plans.
9. Simulations work. Investments in simulations have been an effective mechanism to test
response readiness in civil-military and military-military coordination in Nepal, although used
only to test the initial response phase (as is appropriate for military support interventions) and
rarely used to test how humanitarian response transitions to recovery. The simulations have
been annual events which is likely to be a contributing factor to effectiveness of first
responders.
Recovery from a major disaster is never simple, quick or clear – roles of key actors into
recovery are rarely well-defined and often dependent on the level of funding; this can be
said for both international actors and government and simulation could support a better
understanding of these roles. Simulations for humanitarian disaster response with government
have been postponed for a variety of reasons over several years with the latest having been
prepared for May 2015.
Learning Action – RCO/NRRC – carry out regular, light tabletop simulations for international disaster
response actors in Nepal on an annual basis and ahead of monsoons to ensure internal readiness.
This will support national response and ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities while identifying
gaps to be worked on (some of this is being planned). Continue to advocate for more integrated
exercises (although not at the cost of lighter regular simulations), bringing all key national and
international actors together, recognizing that such simulations are more challenging to organise,
will be resource intensive and will only be implemented on a multi-year basis (beyond the ‘returnperiod’ needed to compensate for staff turnover).
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Learning Action – RCO/NRRC - ensure simulations are used to test the transition from relief to
recovery phases as part of broader preparedness for recovery work.
Learning Action – RCO/NRRC - consider supporting tabletop simulation exercises for key
government officials to test their own internal readiness in a more controlled environment and
ahead of potential simulations with international actors.
10. Pre-positioning of stocks support an initial rapid response, although it was considered that
there were not enough stocks. Some work in pre-agreeing specifications for some materials
brought benefits in the response (e.g. Shelter cluster work in ERP Phase 1 and implementing
learning from the 2014 flood response), whilst stocks mentioned in some contingency plans
existed only on paper.
Learning Action – RCO/NRRC - pre-positioning materials, quality specifications, stock levels and
location of supplies (taking into account related logistic requirements),need to be agreed on a
collective basis across the international (and where possible national) community to ensure
sufficient quantity and quality of material in the right place, presenting a more coherent
approach to donors.
11. Humanitarian Staging Area at the airport was seen to bring benefits to rapid movement of
relief goods. Finished a short time ahead of the earthquake, the project had taken several
years of negotiations to secure and subsequent HSAs are planned.
Learning Action – RCO/HCT/NRRC, WFP - as part of a review of all preparedness actions in terms of
effectiveness and efficiency, HCT to review cost-effectiveness evidence of the HSA before
agreeing to move forward in support of further staging areas or review alternative approaches,
providing a stronger case to donors. Investments here, as with any other, also need to be
sustained and it must be determined what their assured ‘shelf life’ will be, particularly where asset
ownership will be transferred.
Learning Action – HCT, Log Cluster – ensure rapid decision-making procedures and criteria are in
place for use of alternative airports and transport of relief goods in support of future disaster
responses, including regional agreements with both civil and military actors. Continue work
towards availability of alternate national airports for receipt of international goods. As several new
international airports are planned, disaster preparedness planning should be included at the
earliest possible stage.
12. Predictability in assessments. Critical decisions regarding assessments were made ahead of
the earthquake, which influenced the response approach to assessments more at the onset
of the earthquake. Given the rich data available in Nepal, there was an immediate decision
not to carry out a MIRA although this likely had an impact on how later assessments were also
coordinated and questioned previous work on the government endorsed needs assessment
process and format.
Whilst newer areas are gaining greater prominence, key support components of effective
response such as effective needs assessment and information management, continue to
elude Nepal’s disaster response (as it does in many responses).
The rapid deployment of ACAPS supporting the delivery of needs analysis on a daily basis, was
seen as extremely positive. Their approach in gathering data through formal and informal
sources, tapping into local social media, was valued by clusters and should set the trend in
mining data from social media in Nepal in future emergencies.
Learning Action – RCO, Clusters – given a change in previously agreed approaches to
assessments, it is important to carry out a light review on the impact of assessment approaches in
the earthquake response (including gender responsiveness of assessment formats) as part of the
next phase of the ERP. It is essential to have clarity regarding how to move forward with
assessments in future disaster responses.
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Learning Action – RCO/IMU, IMWG – review how assessment data from hard-to-reach areas can
be collected more consistently and comprehensively, considering alternative mechanisms
outside of usual data collection mechanisms (e.g. more predictable use – agreements and
training – of TAAN and similar entities).
Learning Action – RCO/IMU, IMWG institute systems to ensure ongoing monitoring of formal and
informal data sources e.g. Nepalese social media. Consider taking further a more formal
approach to pre-agreements with local groups, e.g. Kathmandu Living Labs, as well as
international groups such as ACAPS, MapAction, including to support preparedness activities.
Learning Action – RCO (or other assigned body responsible for assessment) review how
assessment is planned and implemented in countries that have had successes such as
Bangladesh and Indonesia. In these countries, INGOs have developed joint rapid needs
assessment methodologies which can be launched quickly and information shared quickly with
government and other actors.
13. Increased use of cash to assist affected people. Cash as a preferred mechanism of
assistance. CTP significantly increased in Nepal during the earthquake relief and recovery
efforts and is only going to increase in its importance in future disaster responses. To be more
‘cash ready’, significant work is needed in the preparedness phase to increase government
and responder understanding of cash programming and markets and systems need to be
agreed ahead of any response. Issues of inclusion and targeting and potential linkages to the
existing safety net programme need to be more comprehensively addressed. Given some of
the challenges of larger distribution programmes, reflection should be made regarding other
recent approaches to CTP which were often made up of many much smaller distributions and
agreed at the district level.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT carry out a light review of CTP in Nepal to date, including the
earthquake response, to confirm specific areas for strengthening. Agree the mechanism to
develop and coordinate CTP for future preparedness and response and give a consistency to
coordination. Consider if Flagship 2 would be an appropriate body to do this.
Learning Action – RCO – cash programming awareness for key interlocutors (e.g. CaLP training) is
critical to be able to advance work with government on CTP. Inclusion and targeting should be a
key part of this.
Learning Action – RCO, HCT in coordination with existing relevant market and private sector
bodies, carry out preparatory market systems analysis to better understand their ability to respond
to disruptions by disasters.
Learning Action – RCO – under the coordination mechanism agreed for future CTP work, review
with relevant bodies (including UNCDF) options and develop pre-agreements with financial
service providers (FSPs) to accelerate the response time for CTP.
14. Increasing AAP awareness and application. AAP mechanisms take time to set up and
therefore, to be effective early in the response, more advanced preparedness measures
should be included as MPAs, particularly where there are recurrent disasters. Opportunities
exist to increase awareness and understanding of AAP within potentially influential national
organisations at national and district level, as well as more broadly among DDRC members
through extending CFP activities into the reconstruction and recovery phase as well as into
other (non-earthquake) high-risk DDRCs. This would also increase the potential for
institutionalisation of accountability mechanisms, building on gains made in the response
phase of the CFP.
Learning Action – RCO, HCT carry out a light review of: the impact of AAP activities on improving
response strategies and activities; the RC/HC and HCT’s role, and the most effective mechanisms
in ensuring appropriate action takes place; focal points for AAP to carry forward agreed activities.
Learning Action – RCO, HCT – extend CFP activities into reconstruction and recovery phase,
review potential additional national partners to support accountability in recovery and other highrisk districts.
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E. Effective use of surge
Top Priorities
1. Better management of surge to protect government-international community relationships.
Unless involved in in-country preparedness or well briefed, IASC surge resources risk eroding
the goodwill of national governments as well as other key actors, due to lack of
understanding of, or reference to, local culture and context. Existing pre-disaster governmentinternational community coordination mechanisms risk withdrawal of government
involvement and potentially access to affected populations in the response, but also present
a high risk of adversely affecting cooperation in post-disaster recovery as well as longer-term
development coordination.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT whilst recognizing the value of rapid and experienced surge
deployment, it is important to find ways to integrate surge in a more nuanced way, particularly
where there is (ongoing) critical interaction with government and other national bodies.
Learning Action – RC/HC, NRRC Work with government to consider developing a national rapid
response team to support affected districts in subsequent emergencies
2. Turnover and churn – government and international community. The political dynamics in
Nepal mean that there are frequent changes in key government roles which reset many
relationships. Frequent changes in staff during the response and, in particular, changes and
displacement of national cluster coordinators by international surge have meant a
disengagement of government in some instances. There is recognition that international
humanitarian agencies continue to face challenges with continuity, handover and
knowledge management as well as critical briefing of all staff on context and culture. In
recognition of this, the RCO instituted open daily briefings for incoming staff, made mandatory
for UN staff by the RC; donors and partners participated too.
Learning Action – HCT/Cluster Co-Lead Agencies – agree and replicate the good practice of
some clusters and organisations of ‘pairing’ of experienced surge staff with existing national
coordinators, ensuring continuity of relations with government counterparts, institutional memory,
and maximising capacity-building opportunities.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – agree in advance that response organisations should reduce very
short-term (1-2 week) deployments where possible to first responders, eliminate these when it
comes to coordination functions; 1-2 months into the response, enforce minimum 3-month
deployments if possible.
Learning Action – RC/HC, HCT – agree in preparedness to make a call at the beginning of an
emergency requiring agencies to send staff who have recent experience in Nepal – ideally
regional advisers who are already involved in preparedness for response activities enabling
accelerated effectiveness.
Learning Action – RCO – document and replicate good practice of open daily briefings for
incoming staff and share with OCHA regionally and globally for onward sharing.
Learning Action – RCO – create a generic briefing pack which can be translated, made available
online and circulated to all current and new staff in event of an international response, to support
knowledge management challenges; for example, government structure, operational modalities
and culture, key planning documents – crisis through to recovery. This could also include key
components of District Profile mapping of vulnerabilities, age, gender and protection issues.
Learning Action – RCO/Cluster – generate generic email addresses ahead of any emergency for
coordination functions; install knowledge management systems and discipline around filing and
handovers, ensuring response and contingency planning decisions are documented and are part
of key briefing documents for new and incoming surge developed as part of preparedness.
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Annex 1 Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium
Flagship 2 – Emergency Preparedness and Response Outcomes
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Annex 2 Team Bios, STAIT Learning Review
Team Preparedness for Response in Nepal
Team Leader
Mr Anthony Craig, Co-Chair IASC Task Team on Preparedness and Resilience, Snr Emergency
Preparedness and Response Adviser
Anthony (Tony) Craig is currently the Senior Emergency Preparedness and Response Adviser of the
UN WFP. His primary function is interagency engagement on preparedness and wider DRR,
including leadership of the humanitarian Inter-Agency Standing Committee’s (IASC) Task TTPR,
developing international humanitarian norms related to preparedness and resilience, including
the new ERP Approach Guidance.
Prior to this, Tony was Chief of WFP’s Emergency Preparedness and Response Branch at its HQ,
responsible for support to WFP’s global emergency preparedness and response coordination.
Tony was also responsible for emergency preparedness and response for the programme’s AsiaPacific. During this period he established a dedicated emergency management simulation
capability within WFP. Tony has also served as the Senior Policy Adviser (Peace Operations) within
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and within the UN’s Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Tony started his carrier in the Australian Army.
Mr Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui, Deputy Country Director (Egypt), Plan International
Mudasser Hussain Siddiqui has over ten years of experience in the humanitarian sector, mainly in
Asia and Africa. Currently, he is working as Deputy Country Director for Plan in Egypt where he is
involved in implementing a response to the Syrian refugee crisis. Prior to this, Mudasser was
working as the regional humanitarian specialist for Plan International’s Risk Reduction and
Humanitarian Relief work in Asia. He was closely involved with many countries, including Nepal, to
improve their preparedness for disasters and emergencies. In 2013, he led a simulation to prepare
Nepal for a Level 3 earthquake emergency.
Mudasser has also been engaged with the humanitarian reform process and led a consortium of
NGOs in Zimbabwe to improve their participation in the reform process. Lastly, Mudasser served as
Plan's representative on the HAP board and is the founding board member of the CHS alliance.
Ms Maguette Ndiaye, Preparedness and Resilience Partnership Specialist, Unicef
Maguette Ndiaye joined Unicef in August 2014 as the Preparedness and Resilience Partnership
Specialist in the Inter-Agency Humanitarian partnerships section. Maguette brings more than 20
years of experience in nutrition, public health and emergency issues throughout Africa, Asia and
the Americas, with experience working with WFP, WHO, Helen Keller International (HKI), MSF,
MOST/USAID and UNICEF. For the past five past years she has been coordinating the FAO
emergency unit in Bangui (CAR) and Bamako (Mali).
Mr Nick Finney, Regional Operations Director (Asia), Save the Children
Nick Finney is Operations Director for Asia with Save the Children, currently based in their regional
office in Singapore. His role is focused on leading the Asia operations team (covering logistics,
project management and humanitarian support to country offices around Asia), along with direct
management of some of Save the Children’s country operations in the region.
Nick has spent most of the last ten years working on humanitarian preparedness, response and risk
reduction with Save the Children, mostly in the Asia region. He deploys as a response team leader
when necessary. His work on preparedness has included organising simulations, conducting
lessons learned processes following responses and leadership development/training. He was also
responsible for working with UNICEF to set up a preparedness package for the education cluster in
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Asia and the Pacific. Prior to his work in humanitarian response, Nick worked in education and
training, both in NGOs and higher education.
Mr Alexandre Latour, Global Emergency Preparedness Adviser, Christian Aid
Alex Latour has 13 years of experience in the humanitarian aid and international development
sector. He has been working at community, field office and head office levels as project
manager, programme coordinator, programme adviser, surge support, researcher and
consultant. He has conducted approximately 30 field assignments across the world, including
Nepal, mainly with national and international NGOs as well as the Red Cross movement. His main
areas of expertise are community-based DRR, disaster resilience, organisational preparedness and
humanitarian response.
Ms Jean McCluskey, Field Support, IASC/STAIT
Jean McCluskey has worked in the humanitarian sector for nearly 20 years. Her current role is to
support the understanding, implementation and learning around the IASC’s reform – the
Transformative Agenda, which looks to increase the effectiveness and accountability of
humanitarian response. She has worked in several coordination roles including Global Inter-Cluster
Coordination within OCHA, Global and Country level WASH Cluster Coordination with Unicef and
Sphere Project Manager. Jean has worked for several NGOs including Oxfam and MSF, as well as
independently in assessment, monitoring, evaluation and training. Jean first came to Nepal in
2008 to support the national WASH Cluster preparedness through implementing an earthquake
simulation.
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Annex 3 Documents Consulted
1. General Preparedness
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2015/11 – Nepal Emergency Response Preparedness ERP Package
2015/10/29 – Policy and event timeline
2015/08/31 – DFID preparedness project phase 2
2015/07 – IASC – Emergency Response Preparedness Transformative Agenda Protocol
2015/06 – Emergency Response Preparedness Package Nepal
2015/03 – OCHA – list of the key partners and focal persons of the core cluster/sectors
2015/03 – OCHA ROAP – Strategy Document, Regional Emergency Response Preparedness
2015/02 – Draft menu of OCHA’s support for preparedness activities in
2015/01/07 – Nepal National progress report on the implementation of the Hyogo Framework
for Action (2013–2015)
2013/10 – IASC – Common Framework for Preparedness Transformative Agenda Protocol
2012/03/26 – IASC Contingency Planning
2011/05/04 – Ram Sharan Sedhai – The sociology of disaster
2011 – Government of Nepal, Disaster Management Section – Guidance Note, Disaster
Preparedness and Response Planning, conceptual framework for Disaster Preparedness
Planning
IASC – Preparedness in the IASC Transformative Agenda PowerPoint
Leadership and Preparedness Governance PowerPoint
2. Preparedness for floods
June 2015
 2015/06/11 – OCHA ROAP – Monsoon Preparedness Meeting – Emergency Response
Preparedness (ERP), Kathmandu, Nepal
 2015/06 – OCHA ROAP – Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP) Package Nepal, flood risk
and earthquake
 2015/06 – OCHA Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) Nepal – Contingency Plan Nepal: Floods
 2015/05/26 – Nepal Earthquake Assessment Unit – Pre-Monsoon Overview Nepal Earthquake
April 2015
 2015/04/10 – Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP) workshop – Tentative Agenda for Joint
Meeting at National Level, Kathmandu
 2015/04/01 – Resident Coordinator (RC) letter – International Community Preparedness for
forthcoming Monsoon Season
 2015/04 – OCHA – District Familiarization Workshops, Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP)
Package in Nepal (take the ERP meeting to a district level)
 2015/03/26 – OCHA ROAP – Emergency Response Preparedness (ERP) Meeting report,
monsoon season flood risks, 24-26 March 2015, Kathmandu
Others
 2015 – OCHA – Nepal Floods Contingency Plan 2015, minimum level of multi-hazard
preparedness
 2013/07/22 – DPNet Nepal – Report on current Floods and Landslides: Lessons Learned and
ways forward, Kathmandu
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 2013/07 – United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Office – Field bulletin Humanitarian
governance in Nepal : Lessons learned and challenges from the response to the natural
disasters (floods) in Dang and Kaski during 2012
 2009/04/23 – Koshi Flood Emergency Response, Lessons Learnt Workshop, Inaruwa, Sunsari
 Summary of risks during floods, Terai region
3. Nepal Earthquake Response 2015 General
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2015/12/01 – Earthquake Response HCT After Action Review Powerpoint
2015/11/22 – FTS – Flash Appeal: Nepal Earthquake Flash Appeal 2015
2015/11/22 – FTS – Nepal Earthquake Total funding per donor
2015/11/20 – HCT – Nepal situation update
2015/11/20 – Nepal Earthquake Response, Preparedness Humanitarian Response and
Recovery
2015/10/29 – OXFAM – Rebuilding a more resilient Nepal, key recommendations for
reconstruction and recovery
2015/10/25 – PLAN International – Nepal Earthquake Response Six Month Review
2015/10 – Logistics cluster – Nepal Earthquake Response 2015 Lessons Learned exercise
2015/09/30 – OCHA – After Action Review Nepal Earthquake
2015/09/30 – OCHA – Nepal Earthquake Humanitarian Response April to September
2015/09/30 – Nepal Real Time Review – executive summary
2015/09/18 – Nepal Earthquake Operational Presence map
2015/09/17 – Transition of the clusters
2015/09/06 – Shelter Cluster Nepal – Winterisation Priorities
2015/09/02 – USAID Map Humanitarian Assistance for the Nepal Earthquake
2015/09 – Nepal Earthquake 2015 revised flash appeal April to September 2015
2015/09 – Inter Agency Common Feedback Report Nepal
2015/08 – UNFPA – Nepal 100 days into the humanitarian response
2015/08 – DEC Humanitarian Coalition – Nepal earthquake appeal response review
2015/08 – Red Cross – EPS ramp Survey
2015/07/31 – Joint UNWomen and UNOCHA letter about partnership on gender equality and
inter-cluster performance
2015/07/08 – RC/HC letter on evacuation from high-risk landslide areas
2015/07/07 – Nepal Earthquake Humanitarian Snapshot
2015/07 – Nepal Earthquake cluster brief: Health
2015/07 – Nepal Earthquake cluster brief: Logistics
2015/07 – WVI – Nepal’s Emergency Response Real-time evaluation
2015/06/25 – USAID Fact sheet “US announces $130 million contribution to Nepal to “Build Back
Better”
2015/05/17 – OCHA–UNDAC – Mission report on Nepal Earthquake, 25 April to 17 May
2015/04/27 – ACAPS – Lessons learned for Nepal Earthquake response
2015/03 – Red Cross – Ramp Survey questionnaire
2015 – ALNAP – Nepal Earthquake Response: Lessons for operational agencies
2015 – Government of Nepal – Nepal Earthquake 2015: Post-disaster Needs Assessment
2015 – AIN – NGO National 2015 Earthquake Response Coordination Proposal
2014 – Groupe URD/Nepal Red Cross/British Red Cross – Urban preparedness, Lessons from the
Kathmandu valley
ERP Framework Overview
ERP Framework – Components for Team Allocation
Nepal Humanitarian Coordination Structure
Nepal Earthquake: HCT After Action Review Workshop Summary Report
CASH
 2015/10/20 – Cash coordination Group Information Sheet
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 CCG post-distribution monitoring of cash transfers to meet humanitarian needs, review of PDM
data
 2015/10/16 – Multi-purpose grants household reached
 2014/11 – Understanding the demand for financial services in Nepal
4. Others Lessons Learned
 2015 – AIN Task Group on Disaster Management – Lesson Learned Workshop to mark six months
of Gorkha Nepal Earthquake Response
 2010/10/01 – UNICEF Nepal WASH – Study on seismic vulnerability of drinking water supply
system in Kathmandu Valley
 2010/06 – NSET – Concept paper for implementing earthquake vulnerability reduction program
in schools in Kathmandu Valley
 2008 – ALNAP – Responding to earthquakes, learning from earthquake relief and recovery
operations
 2006 – Review of IFRC Societies recovery operations, summary report
 AIN – Nepal’s emergency preparedness and response system, Good practices, lessons learnt
and gaps
5. Coordination Mechanisms in Emergencies
 2015/05/06 – The Himalayan Times – TIA makes mockery of disaster response plan in time of
earthquake
 2014/09/02 – Ministry of Home Affairs – Policy and institutional response for disaster
management in Nepal
 2014/07/25 – 10NCEE – Development of Response Plan of airport for mega earthquakes in
Nepal
 2013/07 – Government of Nepal – National Disaster Response Framework
 2013/03 – Government of Nepal – National Disaster Response Framework
 2011/07/06 – Humanitarian Reform – International Coordination Mechanisms during Mega
Disasters
 1996/04 – Agreement between UN and Nepal on relief in the event of emergencies
 International Disaster Response Law (IDRL) in Nepal, a study on strengthening legal
preparedness for international disaster response
 ALNAP – 2 pager explaining coordination mechanisms
 Tax exemptions decisions on the import of relief material
6. Search and Rescue INSARAG
 2015/09/05 – Causes of Deaths and Injuries Earthquake 2015
 2015/09/01 – Save the Children – Epidemiological study of the causes of deaths and injuries in
the 25 april 2015
 2015/05/07 – Nepal Earthquake : Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) Team Snapshot
 2015/03/31 – Technical advisor search and rescue – summary report
 2015 – INSARAG Asia-Pacific Regional Exercise in Mongolia 2015
 2013/08 – Government of Nepal, Ministry of Home Affairs – National Strategic Action Plan on
Search and Rescue 2013
 2011/05 – INSARAG – Emergency Response Capacity Scoping Mission Report, Kathmandu
 USAR Nepal Earthquake Response – Technical Evaluation INSARAG mini-survey
7. Information Management
 2015/10/16 – OCHA Nepal – Information Management Products inventory
 2015/05/13 – OCHA – Mission Report : Information Management support to the initial response
to the Nepal Earthquake, Kathmandu, Nepal, 26 April to 13 May 2015
 2015/03/13 – OCHA – Mission report, Information Management Consultations to prepare for the
Humanitarian Workshop, Kathmandu, 11-13 March
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

2014/02 – Guidance for OCHA Information Management in Sudden Onset Emergencies
Nepal Earthquake Response 2015
2015/09/30 – Humanitarian Bulletin Nepal Earthquake, issue 04, 1 to 30 September 2015
2015/08/31 – Information management key messages and Q&A about Nepal earthquake
2015/08/10 – UNHAS press release “Emergency helicopter service in Nepal may stop due to
lack of funds”
2015/08 – Sectoral Key Messages for the Nepal Earthquake
2015/06/03 – Nepal Earthquake Situation Report No.20
2015/05/12 – OCHA Flash Update Earthquake
2015/04/27 – Situation Analysis 48H Nepal Earthquake
District profiles
 2013/05 – Disaster Preparedness and Response (DPR) district plans update status
 Banke district profile
 Bardiya district profile
 Kanchapur district profile
 Kanchanpur district profile Snapshot
 Nawalparasi district profile
 Rautahat district profile
 Saptari district profile
 Sarlahi district profile
Maps
 2015/09/18 – OCHA – Nepal Earthquake: Operational Presence Map
 2015/02/09 – USAID – USG humanitarian assistance for the Nepal Earthquake
 1993 – Liquefaction Hazard Map of Kathmandu Valley Floor Area
 Nepal Political Map
 Nepal Political Map
 Nepal Districts Map
 Physical Map and Regions Nepal
8. Civil/Military
 2015/10/23 – interview of James Brown
 2015/04/29 – article about US militaries participating in Search and Rescue in Nepal
 2014/10/06 – after-action report, Nepal Tribhuvan International Airport Disaster Response Plan
Exercise, 15-18 September
 2014 US Pacific Endeavor
9. Needs Assessment
 2015/08/24 – Assessment Unit Report Registry
 2014/09/09 – ACAPS & START Network – Nepal floods 2014, Lessons learned
 2014/06 – Government of Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs – Guideline for common assessment
tools
 2009/09 – IASC/GoN Multi cluster Initial Rapid Assessment Draft Guidance Note
 2009/08/05 – Multi-Cluster Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) Roster Training, Follow up and action
points, 8-9 July, Kathmandu, Nepal
10.
Disaster Risk Reduction
 2015/08 – Safer schools, resilient communities – A comparative assessment of school safety
after the 2015 Nepal Earthquakes – Risk RED
 2014 – Marla Petal – Critical Reflections on Disaster Prevention Education
 2014 – Marla Petal – Urban Risk Reduction Mitigation Framework
27
 2012 – UnHabitat & UNISDR – Tools for the assessment of school and hospital safety for multihazards in South Asia, Toolkit book 1: New design
 2012 – UnHabitat & UNISDR – Tools for the assessment of school and hospital safety for multihazards in South Asia, Toolkit book 2: Retro Maintenance
 2011/05/31 – DPNet Nepal – Report of a monthly dialogue for DRR policy and practices on
climate change and DRR aspects in Nepal
 2011-02 - Gov Nepal/USA/UN - High-level symposium on DRR “Be aware, be prepared:
implementing lessons learned from other earthquakes” Key messages
 2010/10/25 – Mercy Corps – Cost-benefit analysis for community-based DRR in Kailali, Nepal
 2010/10/19 – NSET – Briefing and interaction meeting on Nepal disaster risk reduction flagship
programs
 2010/06/02 – ActionAid – A report on launching of DRR Toolkit for constituent assembly
members of Nepal
 2010/04/20 – CARE Nepal – Role of women in community-based disaster risk
 Household questionnaire
11.















Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium and Flagships
2013/08/22 – Review of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety, Component A:School Safety
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 1: School and Hospital Safety, Component B: Hospital Safety
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 2: Emergency Preparedness and Response
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 3: Flood Risk Management in the Kosi River Basin
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 4: Integrated Community-Based Disaster Risk Reduction
2012 – NRRC – Flagship 5: Policy/institutional Support for DRM
2011/09/14 – NRRC – Progress update
2011/04/19 – NRRC – Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal, Flagship Programmes
2011/04/19 – NRRC – Progress update
NRRC – 9 minimum characteristics of a resilient community, Flagship 4
NRRC Flagships summary
Updated summary of flagships
NRRC – Urban Disaster Risk Reduction in Nepal, 8 questions for Janakee Shrestha, OXFAM
Bernd Schnell, Flagship 2 coordinator, Nepal IFRC
12.
Press articles about preparedness and lessons learned
 2015/09/04 – Oxfam GB Policy and Practice – How disaster preparedness helped save lives in
Nepal
 2015/05/18 – BMJ – Nepal earthquake exposes significant gaps in disaster preparedness
 2015/05/13 – WHO – Emergency preparedness pays off as Kathmandu hospitals respond to
earthquakes
 2015/05/13 – UN health agency – Nepal’s emergency preparedness saved lives in earthquake
aftermath
 2015/05/09 – The Lancet – Nepal earthquake exposes gaps in disaster preparedness
 2015/05/05 – Eos – What can we learn about disaster preparedness from Nepal’s quake? [
 2015/04/29 – K@W – Lessons on disaster preparedness from the Nepal Earthquake
 2015/04/27 – IRIN – Why wasn’t quake-prone Nepal better prepared?
 2015/04/27 – DW – How political instability affected Nepal’s disaster preparedness
 2015/01/09 – Shreya Thapa – Straws of steel : Earthquake proof houses
 2014/10/17 – IRIN – Nepal disaster preparedness needs to go local
 2011/04/08 – IRIN – Health sector focus for earthquake preparedness
 2011/02/25 – IRIN – Political impasse stalls disaster preparedness bill
13.
OCHA Handover Notes
 2015/06 – OCHA/HAT Nepal Handover Document
28
 2014/07 – Mahendra Raj Adhikari, Humanitarian Coordination Analyst, UNRCO, Field
Coordination Office – Handover Note
 2014/06 – UN Resident Coordinator Office FWR Dadeldhura – Humanitarian activities Phase-out
Report
 2014/05 – Bitu Babu Shreevastav, UN RCO / Field Coordination Office, Biratnagar – Handover
Note
 2012/02 – OCHA Nepal – HSU Handover Document
14.
Regional Actors
China
 2015/10/23 – OCHA ROAP – Mission Report, China
 OCHA Nepal – Input for a briefing note to ASG, China’s contributions to Nepal following the
2015 Earthquakes and Fuel Crisis
India
 2015/07/13 – OCHA ROAP – Talking points for Director’s visit to New Delhi
 2015/08/14 – OCHA – Meeting between Ministry of Home Affairs, Gol and OCHA, New Delhi
 2015/08/17 – OCHA – Note to USG Mission to India
29
___________________________________________________________
Annex 4 Chronology of Preparedness
Actions and Events
30
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Annex 5 Overview of Nepal Preparedness Learning Actions
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
Ensure sufficient support to facilitate the development of an overarching
collective preparedness plan with the IASC and other international actors, and
continued support for decentralised DPRPs, ensuring clarity of how different levels
of plans fit together.
Ensure dedicated capacity within the RCO, with OCHA-type humanitarian
experience and capability including awareness of regional and global response
and support mechanisms.
RCO
S
3.
Work on different strategies of engagement with government bodies for
preparedness and response – linking longer-term engagement with the need to
meet humanitarian imperatives.
HCT
S
4.
Consider how AIN can go beyond working with its membership in facilitating a
stronger collective (INGO, NNGO, Red Cross, UN) preparedness approach, which
has great potential to go beyond information sharing and alignment to become
a strong advocating force for greater collaboration in preparedness.
Consider how AIN can play a facilitating role in promoting the integration of
preparedness and response beyond the dual-mandated international NGOs into
the life cycle of programmes of normally single mandated development actors.
Consider how AIN can go further in its support of the development of national
NGO networks for disaster response and how this can also be replicated at
district level.
AIN, HCT
S
AIN, HCT
S
RC/HC, HCT, AIN
S
Advocate through global representation in the IASC (EDG) that the next RC for
Nepal has a significant humanitarian leadership profile; STAIT to advocate
through its linkages with the EDG.
HCT, UNCT, STAIT
Q
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
A. Leadership,
Governance
and
Coordination
Collective and systematic
approach to preparedness
1.
2.
Developing explicit
strategies to implement
preparedness and response
activities within a politically
complex environment is
critical
Importance of NGO
Coordination Forum in
preparedness and response
5.
6.
Emergency response
experience in leadership
critical in high-risk
7.
17
S
RCO
Level of action refers to how substantial the action requires – this can be in terms of time of investment, or resources needed. S=substantial L=Light Q=Quick (relatively easy and quick to implement), with urgent actions
highlighted in bold and italics
31
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
environments
8.
Advance consideration should be made by the RC/HC and HCT if a Deputy
Humanitarian Coordinator may be required for future L2 or L3 emergencies.
RC/HC HCT
Q
HCT+ structure useful for
broader response
coordination
RC/HC understanding of
regional and global
response tools and support
is critical
9.
Review participation and agree complementary ToRs for the HCT and HCT+
structures.
HCT, with HCT+
S
10. Prioritise continued building of relationships between RC and regional and global
support mechanisms, particularly during the interim as this is likely to cover flood
season preparedness. Ensure an accelerated process of briefing and relationship
with the newly appointed RC, including briefing in OCHA New York, Geneva and
regional office in Bangkok.
11. Concentrate on bridging the gap of understanding and clarity of roles at the
onset of a disaster between first responders and the in-country IASC humanitarian
system.
12. Work with OCHA, ROAP and globally with the INSARAG Secretariat in OCHA
Geneva to more effectively request appropriately classified USAR teams and
stand down their arrival in Nepal after an international request is withdrawn.
RCO, OCHAROAP
Q
RCO, Flagship 2
Coordinator
L
OCHA support in
preparedness, response
and transition to recovery
coordination is critical
13. Set specific indicators which consider handover periods and opportunities to
further response preparedness post-disaster and as part of an OCHA exit strategy.
14. Ensure RCO capacity for coordination of response and preparedness, similar to
OCHA coordination and preparedness profiles.
RC/HC, HCT
L
RC/HC
S
Early corrective action of
response operations and
strategies
15. Consider a light facilitated ‘course-correcting’ review (1.5 hr sessions – a sort of
OPR ‘light’) after the first month of the next disaster response whilst still in the
operational phase.
RC/HC, HCT
Q
Opportunities exist to
increase preparedness and
risk reduction post-disaster,
but to maximise these, full
human resource capacity is
needed
Importance of protection in
natural disasters
16. Work with donor and IASC partners to support an intensification of preparedness
activities of national and international actors, advocating for sufficient staffing
capacity within the RCO and Flagships to progress common preparedness
response actions throughout 2016.
RC/HC, UNCT,
HCT, IFRC
S
17. Ensure pre-agreed leadership roles for protection, gender equality and social
inclusion in disaster response are in place as well as clear responsibilities and
expectations to support preparedness activities.
18. Ensure the Protection cluster and Inter-Cluster Gender Working Group are
embedded within the humanitarian cluster coordination system with support to
addressing protection, social vulnerabilities and gender equality issues related to
RC/HC, HCT
L
RC/HC, HCT
L
32
RCO, OCHAROAP
L
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
disaster preparedness.
19. Work with RCO/IM to agree gender, social and vulnerability data and mapping
that can be incorporated into district profiles, ensuring sex, age and disability
disaggregated data throughout.
Maintenance and role of
Clusters outside of
emergency response
B. Strengthening
Humanitarian
Development
Nexus
Mainstreaming the risk
management approach
across all programming
Preparedness for recovery is
critical; recovery is the
overarching challenge of
responding to earthquakes
Significant value from multistakeholder initiatives in
increasing prominence of
integrated risk
management approaches,
particularly in dualmandated organisations
Strengthening linkages
between emergency
response and development
actors and coordination
mechanisms
20. Reiteration of preparedness responsibilities and expectations in levels of
preparedness of Cluster Co-Lead Agencies is needed from the RC/HC and HCT;
responsibilities commensurate with the high-risk disaster environment, recognizing
the often fluid political dynamics and their impact on government leadership
roles. Expectations should be measurable and monitored on a regular basis.
21. Consider drawing upon Global Inter-Cluster and Cluster support mechanisms to
support Cluster Lead Agencies to develop work plans.
Protection
cluster, InterCluster Gender
Working Group
RC/HC
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
L
L
RC/HC, HCT
L
1.
Work with Government to institute (with all partners) a risk management
approach to all programming.
RC/HC, HCT,
UNCT, IDPG
S
2.
Previous work should be reviewed to identify what is useful for leading recovery in
the current and next disaster, and to determine why certain preparedness work
has not been sustained.
Institute regular real-time reviews over the next three years of the recovery
programme to document recovery and turn learning into real-time action; work
with the broader response and recovery communities to inform and mainstream
future preparedness for recovery and recovery implementation in Nepal.
RCO, HCT, UNDP,
IDPG
L
RC/HC, HCT
S
Ensure that a reconsideration of priorities is conducted in 2016 and that
preparedness for response, which has made good progress, continues to be a
focus area under leadership.
The impact of multi-sector partnerships such as the NRRC as risk reduction
interventions should be shared with other high-risk countries.
NRRC Steering
Committee
L
IASC TTPR with
NRRC
L
Clarify and strengthen linkages and coordination between disaster response and
longer-term programming; develop, in advance of a response, explicit
mechanisms for coordination and collaboration with development structures and
actors; ensure key development actors are integrated into clusters, particularly at
the beginning to ensure broader sector knowledge is shared.
RC/HC, RCO
L
3.
4.
5.
6.
33
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
Sustained gains in risk
management and
preparedness are
possible, but require longterm commitment
C. Localising
Preparedness
7.
Policy and structural development programmes for the international community
(as part of engagement with government and national actors) need to be set
within a long-term framework of engagement.
UNCT, IDPG,
NGOs
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
L
Working more locally can
reduce the political
complexities of engaging
at central level.
Capacity building of
national actors requires a
more collective and
professional approach,
integrating concepts and
indicators of effectiveness
and efficiency
1.
Building on existing good practice, coordinate the strengthening of DLSAs to
strengthen capacity of DDRCs to be able to coordinate a rapid and effective
response (using experience-sharing across districts).
RCO
S
2.
Through a more comprehensive understanding of capacity-building efforts of the
international community (including development banks) and the involvement of
key donors, develop a collective and strategic approach to capacity building of
specific key national actors in preparedness for response (potentially beyond
flagship areas), identifying who will take the convening and coordinating role.
Review, as standard, each capacity development effort through the lens of: (i) a
measurement of value for money, likely ROI for improved disaster preparedness
and response; (ii) the effective ‘shelf life’ of interventions and therefore the length
of the necessary repeat cycle for the activity; (iii) standards and benchmarks for
capacity building (including in relation to gender equality, social inclusion and
protection).
RC/HC, HCT,
IDPG, Flagship 2
S
RC/HC, HCT,
IDPG, Flagship 2
S
Strategic engagement with
NNGOs responding in
emergencies
4.
Consider the need for a more conscious, strategic and partnership approach to
engagement with those national NGOs working in emergency response, on a
collective and collaborative basis. A prerequisite to this is ensuring that the
international community give appropriate space and support (and probably
relinquish some power) to allow NNGOs to set their own benchmarks and
mapping of capacity assessment to deliver in line with humanitarian principles
and international standards. Ensure any conscious capacity-building plan goes
beyond technical development and includes organisational development e.g.
financial, leadership, coordination, planning – as well as humanitarian standards
and principles (including in relation to gender equality, social inclusion and
protection), identifying opportunities for national NGOs to be agents for
increasing accountability within DRM.
Build on existing good practice to develop longer-term collective strategies for
district level partnerships and capacity development as well as continued
progress with district risk management plans, utilising the DLSA mechanism to
RC/HC, RCO,
HCT, Clusters
S
3.
5.
34
RC/HC, RCO,
HCT, Clusters
RC/HC, RCO,
DLSAs
S
S
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
coordinate efforts.
Strong potential in the DLSA
mechanism to improve
capacity and coordination
at district level
6.
Ensure clarity and continuity of support to the DLSA structure (potentially from
UNDP) to maximise its effectiveness. Ensure DLSA good practice is shared
between agencies – particularly flood-affected areas where the DLSA structure is
already being implemented. Ensure regular performance monitoring of delivery
against the agreed ToRs by DLSA agencies, and replacement where benchmarks
are not met.
RC/HC, HCT
S
Subject capacity building
to the same demands for
collective approaches,
effectiveness and
efficiency measurement as
other preparedness
investments
Opportunities to increase
awareness of humanitarian
principles, vulnerability and
accountability at national
and district level
7.
Gain commitments from international actors to follow on from mapping and
assessment of impact of capacity-building efforts to professionalise, prioritise and
streamline capacity-building efforts.
Impose the same rigour of assessment of effectiveness and efficiency and value
for money as recommended for other capacity-building initiatives.
HCT, UNCT, IDPG
L
Strengthen support nationally and DLSAs (as per their revised ToRs) to identify and
further explore potential change agents at national and district level for inclusion,
protection and targeting in capacity building and engagement to promote a
more effective and accountable response. It will be important to agree and
coordinate approaches before implementation and include the Women and
Child Office (WCO) and key CSOs working on protection, gender equality and
social inclusion issues at the district level for these awareness efforts.
RCO, Clusters
and HCT
S
Importance of getting subnational coordination in line
with operational realities
10. Review sub-national coordination mechanisms for the earthquake response
(three hubs) and use the findings to guide future strategies. This will strengthen
sub-national coordination among international actors and national and local
authorities in the event of new emergencies.
RC/HC, RCO,
HCT, Clusters
L
Critical importance of
private sector and the
diaspora to support
response – potential
advocates and change
agents for humanitarian
principles
11. Identify potential routes for advocacy with development of relationships with the
private sector and diaspora, critically displaying a coherent level of engagement
of the international community.
12. Ensure human resources to finalise the detailed assessment and plan of action for
engagement with the Private Sector and the Diaspora. This will build on work
done prior to the earthquake and additional learning from the involvement of the
Private Sector throughout all phases of response and recovery and ongoing work
of the Shelter Cluster.
RC/HC, HCT
S
8.
9.
35
HCT, UNCT, IDPG
RC/HC, HCT
S
L
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
D. Strategic
Investment in
Preparedness
Capacity
Increasing effectiveness
and efficiency from a more
collaborative approach
1.
In reviewing the Flagship 2 priorities and work plan (as part of the overall NRRC
review), assess the potential usefulness of including the coordination of broader
preparedness activities of international and national actors into Flagship 2’s area
of responsibility; or if not, potentially reaffirming and resourcing the RCO’s role,
strengthening linkages between the two.
NRCC
L
Increased use of evidence
base for preparedness to
demonstrate value and
increase investment
Effective data
preparedness can reduce
needs assessment data
collection
2.
Utilise existing ROI evidence more broadly and develop Nepal context-specific
data to use as the evidence base to support increased investment and
prioritisation of preparedness.
RC/HC,HCT,
UNCT, IDPG
S
3.
Carry out a light review of IM performance. Consult on expectations of senior
managers and decision-makers and IM products needed. Develop revised data
needs and IM product overviews and integrate into preparedness planning.
Develop (and implement where there are gaps), data and IM benchmarks that
need to be consistently maintained for preparedness purposes and ensure
adequate capacity is available (potentially across organisations and
coordinated by the RCO), to ensure support for data preparedness actions,
recognizing the need for appropriate strategies and timelines to effectively
engage within government.
A mechanism needs to be identified by which all disaster and response-related
data from all parties is available from one location and effectively
communicated, recognizing that external surge capacity by default turns to HDX.
Ensure pre-disaster District Profiles effectively integrate other key vulnerability,
protection, age and gender disaggregated data; this critical preparedness and
response data must not be developed separately.
RCO, HCT and
Clusters
L
4.
5.
6.
Imperative to invest in
preparedness in timesensitive response
mechanisms and modalities
– cash, AAP and private
sector collaboration
7.
Geater investment is urgently needed to ensure sustained gains in:
(i)
Cash
(ii)
AAP/CwC
(iii)
Working with the private sector, capitalising on recent learning,
motivation and opportunities after the earthquake response to support
ongoing response, recovery and to build solid systems for future response
ERP works
8.
If the ERP approach is to be owned more broadly within the international
community and used as an opportunity to bring in more development actors, its
‘packaging’ needs to be reconsidered so that it is seen as an inclusive process.
NGOs need to see their added value and substantive roles more clearly, not
36
S
RC/HC, HCT,
RCO/IMU, IMWG
L
RCO/IMU, IMWG
L
RC/HC, HCT
S
RC/HC, RCO,
HCT, AIN
L
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
focusing solely on the UN and the HCT.
Agree how to sustain and ensure consistency of capacity to support the
implementation of the ERP when OCHA ROAP’s involvement becomes
more limited.
RC/HC, HCT
L
Implement APAs in high-risk
environments and maintain
preparedness readiness
10. Ensure continual support to the development of preparedness and response.
Given the high risk and permanent level of response needed, capacity is needed
to: protect resource-intensive investments; maintain preparedness gains; and
ensure review and continuous development in preparedness. It must also be
agreed where capacity will rest, for example, in the RCO or NRRC, or indeed,
both.
RC/HC, HCT,
NRRC
S
Leadership accountability
for preparedness, not only
for response
11. Supported by the Regional Directors Group and the IASC TTPR, champion and
pilot KPIs and greater accountability mechanisms for preparedness in Nepal. In
the same way that emergency response performance is prioritised and has
strong accountability mechanisms in place (particularly for leadership), KPIs for
response preparedness need to be developed18 and be integrated into
accountability systems to encourage high performance of these preparedness
indicators.
RC/HC, HCT,
Regional
Directors Group
L
Monitoring risks
12. A common platform is needed to monitor key risks and provide early warning
signals; who would provide this platform is not clear. Whilst this may sit in the
NEOC with the central NDRC, it is perhaps more realistic that it becomes a
function within Flagship 2 of the NRRC.
NRRC/HCT/UNCT
S
Effective preparedness
measures in the earthquake
response
13. Ensure annual refreshers with the HCT and Clusters to ensure a rapid turnaround of
critical response documents – Situation Analysis, CERF application, Flash Appeals,
Humanitarian Response Plans.
RCO
L
Simulations work
14.
RCO/NRRC
L
9.
18
Ensuring KPIs incorporate appropriate gender, inclusion, vulnerability and protection components
37
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
RCO/NRRC
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
L
RCO/NRRC
RCO, NRCC
L
L
Pre-positioning of stocks
support an initial rapid
response
15. Pre-positioning materials, quality specifications, stock levels and location of
supplies (taking into account related logistic requirements), need to be agreed
on a collective basis across the international (and where possible, national)
community to ensure sufficient quantity and quality of material in the right place,
presenting a more coherent approach to donors.
Humanitarian Staging Area
at the airport was seen to
bring benefits to rapid
movement of relief goods
16. As part of a review of all preparedness actions in terms of effectiveness and
efficiency, HCT to review cost-effectiveness evidence of the HSA before agreeing
to move forward in support of further staging areas, or review alternative
approaches, providing a stronger case to donors. Investments here, as with any
other, also need to be sustained and it must be determined what their assured
‘shelf life’ will be, particularly where asset ownership will be transferred.
17. Ensure rapid decision-making procedures and criteria are in place for use of
alternative airports and transport of relief goods in support of future disaster
responses, including regional agreements with both civil and military actors.
Continue work towards availability of alternate national airports for receipt of
international goods. As several new international airports are planned, disaster
preparedness planning should be included at the earliest possible stage.
RCO, HCT,
NRRC, WFP
L
HCT, Log Cluster
L
18. Given a change in previously agreed approaches to assessments, it is important
to carry out a light review on the impact of assessment approaches in the
earthquake response (including gender responsiveness of assessment formats) as
part of the next phase of the ERP. It is essential to have clarity regarding how to
move forward with assessments in future disaster responses.
19. Review how assessment data from hard-to-reach areas can be collected more
consistently and comprehensively, considering alternative mechanisms outside of
usual data collection mechanisms (e.g. more predictable use – agreements and
training – of TAAN and similar entities).
20. Institute systems to ensure ongoing monitoring of formal and informal data
RCO, Clusters
S
RCO/IMU, IMWG
L
Predictability in assessments
38
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
sources e.g. Nepalese social media. Consider taking further, more formal, preagreements with local groups e.g. Kathmandu Living Labs as well as international
groups such as ACAPS and MapAction, including to support preparedness
activities.
21. Review how assessment is planned and implemented in countries that have had
successes such as Bangladesh and Indonesia. In these countries, INGOs have
developed joint rapid needs assessment methodologies which can be launched
quickly with information being shared quickly with government and other actors.
Increased use of cash to
assist affected people;
cash as a preferred
mechanism of assistance
Increasing AAP awareness
and application
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
RCO/IMU, IMWG
L
RCO
L
22. Carry out a light review of CTP in Nepal to date, including the earthquake
response, to confirm specific areas for strengthening. Agree the mechanism to
develop and coordinate CTP for future preparedness and response and give a
consistency to coordination. Consider if Flagship 2 would be an appropriate body
to do this.
23. Cash programming awareness for key interlocutors (e.g. CaLP training) is critical
to be able to advance work with government on CTP. Inclusion and targeting
should be a key part of this.
24. In coordination with existing relevant market and private sector bodies, carry out
preparatory market systems analysis to better understand their ability to respond
to disruptions by disasters.
25. Under the coordination mechanism agreed for future CTP work, review options
with relevant bodies (including UNCDF) and develop pre-agreements with
financial service providers (FSPs) to accelerate the response time for CTP.
RC/HC, HCT
L
RCO
L
RCO, HCT
L
26. Carry out a light review of: the impact of AAP activities on improving response
strategies and activities; the RC/HC and HCT’s role, and the most effective
mechanisms in ensuring appropriate action takes place; focal points for AAP to
carry forward agreed activities.
RCO, HCT
39
RCO
L
L
Category
Proposed Action
Preparedness Issue
Who
(bold and italic actions identified as urgent)
E. Effective use of
surge
Better management of
surge to protect
government-international
community relationships
1.
2.
Turnover and churn –
government and
international community
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Whilst recognizing the value of rapid and experienced surge deployment, it is
important to find ways to integrate surge in a more nuanced way, particularly
where there is (ongoing) critical interaction with government and other national
bodies.
Work with government to consider developing a national rapid response team to
support affected districts in subsequent emergencies.
RC/HC, HCT
Agree to replicate the good practice of some clusters and organisations of
‘pairing’ of experienced surge staff with existing national coordinators, ensuring
continuity of relations with government counterparts, institutional memory, and
maximising capacity-building opportunities.
Agree in advance that response organisations should reduce very short-term (1-2
week) deployments where possible to first responders, eliminate these when it
comes to coordination functions; 1-2 months into the response, enforce minimum
3-month deployments if possible.
Agree in preparedness planning to make a call at the beginning of an
emergency, requiring agencies to send staff members who have recent
experience in Nepal – ideally regional advisers who are already involved in
preparedness for response activities, enabling accelerated effectiveness.
Document and replicate good practice of open daily briefings for incoming staff
and share with OCHA regionally and globally for onward sharing.
Create a generic briefing pack, made available online and circulated to all
current and new staff in the event of an international response. Contents may
include: culture and context, government structure, operational modalities, key
planning documents etc. – from crisis through to recovery. This could also include
key components of District Profile mapping of vulnerabilities, age, gender and
protection issues.
Generate generic email addresses ahead of any emergency for coordination
functions; install knowledge management systems and discipline around filing
and handovers, ensuring response and contingency planning decisions are
documented and are part of key briefing documents for new and incoming
surge developed as part of preparedness.
HCT/Cluster CoLead Agencies
40
RC/HC, NRRC
RC/HC, HCT
Level of
Action17
(S, L, Q)
L
S
L
L
RC/HC, HCT
Q
RCO
Q
RCO
Q
RCO, Clusters
Q