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ACPO
Guidance
2015
Guidance for the
Management of
Extremist
Speakers
NECTU
West Yorkshire Police
12/03/2015
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Contents
1. Front cover
2. Contents
3. 1.0. - Introduction
1.1. Terrorism
1.2. Extremism and Prevent
1.3. Human Rights considerations
1.4. The Approach
1.5. Communications strategy
7. 2.0 - The Extremist Speaker risk assessment process
8. 2.1
2.2
2.3
Assessing the credibility and community impact of the intelligence
Community Impact
National Decision making model and Code of Ethics
9. 3.0 – Operating Model and Behavioural indicators
9. 4.0 - Information Sharing, security and confidentiality
10. 5.0 - Implementation and review
10. 6.0 - Intelligence handling process
6.1
Initial assessment
6.2
Intelligence handling process
13. 7.0 - Prevent tool kit
7.1
Decision making and recording of decisions
7.2
Necessity
7.3
Proportionality
7.4
Collateral intrusion
15.
19.
21.
22.
24.
25.
26.
28.
29.
30.
35.
41.
Annex A - Extremist speaker assessment
Assessment matrix
Grading assessment
Decision making rationale supporting notes
Annex B - National decision making model
The decision making
National decision making model guidance
Annex C - European convention on human rights
Annex D - Tactical options
Tactical options additional information
Annex E - Extremist speaker – policing Communications toolkit
Annex F - Extremist speaker profile
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Extremist Speaker Guidance
1.0
Introduction
This guidance has been difficult to create owing to the uncomfortable position of the
police having to design an operational process that directs policing resources at
members of the public who are exercising their right of freedom of expression,
which is seen as a corner stone of human dignity within our democracy. The
necessity for this guidance has been brought about by the increased risk to public
safety by a small minority of people who exploit the liberal freedoms enjoyed within
the UK to intimidate, elicit fear and motivate others to follow a pathway that could
lead to harm to themselves and others. It is not the role of the police to seek to
interfere with the rights and freedoms of people unless there is clear justification
and necessity to do so. The police are representative of the communities they serve
and are acutely sensitive of the uncomfortable position in which they have been
placed in creating guidance that will limit the rights of a minority of people to
express their views. The police do not seek to limit democracy or control political or
public debate. Indeed the contrary is the case, as the police service strives to
support democratic freedoms, the rights of minorities and the safeguarding of
vulnerable people through upholding privileges enshrined in UK law.
This guidance has been prepared to assist police to identify and manage threat,
harm and risk to public safety within the context of terrorist related extremism and
radicalisation expressed by individuals in the pre-criminal space. The guidance
directly supports the UK CONTEST Counter Terrorism Strategy. It is intended to
support objective decision making and guide leadership in managing individuals who
express terrorist related extremist views and who seek to influence others in a way
that could undermine national security and the rule of law, in a criminal way. The
guidance has been designed in partnership with colleagues from the CTU network,
the police, OSCT, health, education, probation, communities, prisons, Charity
Commission, the National Challenge Panel and with independent legal advice.
The Extremist Speaker guidance is deliberately robust in terms of the steps
practitioners should take in reaching and recording their decisions. This reflects the
caution the police place on taking action against members of the public in the precriminal space.
Accountability and decision making for the management of Extremist Speakers lies
with local police forces supported by their CTU/CTIU. The management and
oversight of this national guidance sits with NCTPHQ.
Ethical, impartial and transparent decision making is essential in maintaining public
support for policing activities. It can be expected that there will be media and public
interested in the use of this guidance and its assessment tool.
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1.1 Terrorism
The UK Terrorism Act includes the description of terrorism as “the use or threat of
action … where the use or threat is designed to influence the government, or an
international government organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the
public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political,
religious, racial or ideological cause.” The study of terrorism as a subject is vast,
complicated and is beyond the scope of this guidance. However it is useful to state
that terrorism covers the breadth of international, national and regional politics.
1.2 Extremism and Prevent
Violent and non-violent extremism in the context of terrorism is of great concern
within our liberal democracy where freedom of speech is quite rightly considered a
fundamental right. The UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
guarantees the right to freedom of expression and freedom of opinion. The same
convention also requires the prohibition of “any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”.
There are clearly tensions here and policing professionals must demonstrate their
careful considerations as to how they are reconciled. The public are entitled to make
arguments for or against political acts in the UK and other countries and the police
will uphold their right to protest, but not to intimidate others or to elicit fear.
However, the responsibility for tackling such challenges does not lay wholly with the
police. The Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the Prevent Duty and the
anticipated Extremism Strategy, each describe that responsibility for preventing
extremism and radicalisation is a shared duty of specified bodies that include Local
Authorities, health, education, Prisons, Probation and the Police.
The Prevent Strategy (2011) describes extremism as: “vocal or active opposition to
fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty
and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Also included in the
Government’s definition of extremism are calls for the death of members of our
armed forces, whether in this country or overseas”. In the absence of a UK legal
definition of extremism, the Extremism Speaker Guidance uses this Prevent
definition as a starting point to identify and mitigate risk to the public.
Being a core pillar of CONTEST, The Prevent Strategy (2011) has three key
objectives that the Extremist Speaker Guidance directly supports:

Responding to the ideological challenge of terrorism;

Preventing individuals from being drawn into terrorism;

Working with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.
The guidance seeks to focus on individuals who come within the interest of counter
terrorism professionals through Prevent Case Management. It is not intend to be
used as a tool for general policing purposes.
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1.3 Human Rights Considerations
The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of
its actions and the willingness of the public to voluntarily observe the law.
Fundamental to this is the police securing and maintaining the respect and
confidence of communities by consistently demonstrating integrity and impartiality
when taking action in keeping communities safe. The Extremist Speaker Guidance
directly supports those functions.
Assuring public safety requires that the police engage with communities and
partners to understand their views and to ensure that freedom of expression is
facilitated and that crime and disorder is prevented. In safeguarding these principles
the police should ensure that the right of the public to express their views is not
interfered with unless there is a clear and justified case that public safety is at risk.
Such justification would not include an intellectual argument for a more democratic
system where freedom of speech is responsibly exercised within the protections of
the law, which includes:

The Equalities Act 2010;

The Human Rights Act 1998;

The European Convention on Human Rights 1953.
These safeguards provide protection for minority and vulnerable groups, together
with supporting freedom of expression, association and rights to a private and family
life. Where such justification to interfere with the right of expression exists, the
police and partners should take reasonable and proportionate steps to moderate,
mitigate or prevent harm to public safety. In reaching decisions in respect of this,
the police should demonstrate their considerations with regards to equality,
diversity, human rights and fairness. Where such risks do not exist, the police should
not interfere with these fundamental rights. Indeed their duties include facilitation of
such peaceful public activity, even if the views expressed by some may seem
abhorrent or unpalatable.
1.4 The approach
In determining if an individual poses a risk to public safety, the police will consider
how the conduct of the individual engages with the definition of extremism as
described in The Prevent Strategy (2011). Using the National Decision Making Model,
relevant information and intelligence for the previous two years is assessed for
credibility and compared against a series of behaviour indicators for community
impact. An aggregated score of these provides an overall assessment of risk, which
in turn signposts police and partners to prevent tactics that seek to deny, disrupt or
deter the individual in their ability to express their damaging views. These tactics are
offered as guidance for activity that may be undertaken, and are not designed to be
prescriptive. If a tactic or approach different to that suggested is decided upon then
the decision maker is at liberty to utilise that, but a record of their reasoning must
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be made. A record of decision making for the overall process and selection of tactics
is made that is to include necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion
considerations. The assessment has supervisory oversight to assure quality and
decision making standards.
The use of this guidance will be exposed to the members of the public constituting
The National Challenge Panel, under the leadership of the Chief Constable ACPO
Prevent Lead.
1.5 Communications Strategy
The communications strategy for Extremist Speakers can be found at Annex E. It
includes advice on core narratives, media messaging, Proscribed and Non Proscribed
Groups and responding to media enquiries.
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2.0 The Extremist Speaker Risk Assessment Process
This assessment should only be considered if there is an Intelligence Case to
suggest that an individual causes a CT / DE concern, based on their individual
behavioural indicators. If an individual’s conduct includes any criminal activity, this
would take primacy and may negate any assessment by this process. Any individual
who is the subject of security service or police operation should not be assessed
through this process without the agreement of the SIO or security service.
Stage 1:- Complete nominal details
Stage 2:- Complete the Assessment Matrix, assessing intelligence against the
indicators.
Stage 3:- Score the assessment to identify the grading of RISK, thus enabling
the decision on level of tactical option to allocate.
Stage 4:- Identify & record tactical option chosen.
Stage 5:- Complete decision making rationale.
The following diagram outlines the process:
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Decision
making Impact of Intelligence
2.1 Assessing the Credibility and
Community
Credibility is an assessment of the overall intelligence against behavioural indicators:




Very Low is selected when there is no credible intelligence to provide any
credibility towards the behavioural indicator.
Low is selected when there is only single strand or limited intelligence in
existence. Additionally the intelligence lacks any context and/or corroboration
towards the behavioural indicator.
Medium is selected when there are numerous reports of intelligence,
however they lack supporting context and corroboration.
High is selected when there are numerous reports and supporting context
and / or corroboration is in existence.
2.2 Community Impact
Community Impact is the consideration of the speaker’s attendance at a location
that may cause adverse impact on community cohesion or polarise tensions. This
scoring identifies if the speakers attendance, assessed by their behavioural indicator,
will meet any of the below risks.




Negligible impact is when the speakers attendance at a location will have
very low impact on community cohesion or tensions, and unlikely to be
noticed or recorded.
Minor impact will have a slightly higher impact than negligible, and may
cause minor disruption to community life and tensions. This may cause some
recording of the speaker’s attendance, with limited engagement required.
Moderate impact may require a higher degree of intervention and planning
to evade any undue influence on the communities. This may cause disruption
to everyday life of the community, and increase tension concerning local
issues.
Substantial impact will require immediate tactical options to ensure the
speaker’s attendance does not polarise tensions or cause the instigation of
criminal or violent actions by any part of the community or society.
2.3 National Decision making Model and Code of Ethics
The National Decision Making (NDM) model will be used to assist decision making.
It can be applied to spontaneous incidents or planned operations, by an individual or
teams of people, and to both operational and non-operational situations. Decision
makers can use it to structure a rationale of what they did during an incident and
why. Managers and others can use NDM to review decisions and actions taken. The
inherent flexibility of the NDM means that it can easily be expanded for specialist
areas of policing. In every case, the model stays the same, but users decide for
themselves what questions and considerations they apply at each stage.
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In a fast-moving incident, the Police Service recognises that it may not always be
possible to segregate thinking or response according to each phase of the model. In
such cases, the main priority of decision makers is to keep in mind their overarching
mission. The work of the police is crucial to maintaining a just and fair society. It
also requires the public’s cooperation to succeed. The public expect the police to
safeguard the rule of law, act fairly and impartially and provide a professional and
selfless service. The National Intelligence Model and the Police Code of Ethics drives
decision making and ensures a management record is kept of the rationale of those
decision. Thus ensuring that any conduct by or on behalf of the police is justified,
lawful and maintains the standards expected of the police service by society.
3.0 Operating Model and Behavioural Indicators
The guidance adopts for its starting point the definition of extremism described in
the Prevent Strategy (2011). Using the national decision model, the available
intelligence and information of a person considered to be a potential extremist
speaker is assessed for credibility and community impact and compared against a
series of behaviour indicators. The resulting aggregated risk score (low, medium,
high) directs practitioners to a choice of Prevent tactical options clustered under
either “disrupt, deter or deny”. The proposed course of action by the police is
recorded to show necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion considerations.
Indicators graded as a low risk may require minimal intervention, and consideration
may be given for intelligence gathering opportunities or no further action.
Prevent Officers lead on implementing the chosen tactics, which could include
working with partners. On completion of the event at which the speaker was
intending to speak, the tactics that were used and their effectiveness are recoded
and stored on intelligence systems. These notes comprise an Extremist Speaker
Profile (ESP) that can be shared nationally if the person wishes to speak elsewhere.
Accountability and decision making for the management of Extremist Speakers lies
with local police forces supported by their CTU/CTIU. The management and
oversight of the national guidance will sit with NCTPHQ.
Locations and venues are not graded on this matrix, though consideration for a
community impact assessment may be given. This may provide additional support
for tactical options and disruption. Though some venues may be suspected of
promoting extremism, it is the speaker’s attendance that is the principal concern for
this guidance.
4.0 Information Sharing, Security and Confidentiality
To enable a thorough examination of the threat and risk of an Extremist Speaker, all
overt avenues of gathering information and intelligence should be utilised. This
includes searching social media and open source within the internet. Intelligence
obtained from partners should be managed appropriately to the GPMS grading of
that intelligence. No sharing of intelligence can be divulged without the prior
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authority of the intelligence owner. Only once permission is granted intelligence can
be shared, and submitted to the agreed readership.
Briefing to other agencies, partners and the wider police community can be provided
by agreed ‘forms of words’ (FOW), which will provide sufficient information to
conduct an assessment. Any FOW should be agreed by all parties whom have any
interest in the source of the intelligence to be used.
The police service is obliged to share and provide information to other agencies to
safeguard society.
5.0 Implementation and Review
Regions should maintain records where assessments have taken place.
This Guidance for the Management of Extremist Speakers is offered for adoption
nationally by the Thematic Prevent Board. It is recommended that it be piloted for
six months to allow a post implementation review. It is further recommended that
partners within health, education and local authorities produce their own guidance
regarding these matters. A lead agency for policing to be responsible for the
intelligence support functions under pinning the guidance needs to be agreed.
Scrutiny arrangements through the National Challenge Panel should be developed to
provide independent oversight of the management of extremist speakers. On
successful operational implementation of the Extremist Speaker Guidance, the
development of APP through the College of Policing should be considered.
6.0 Intelligence Handling Process
The lead policing agency to manage the intelligence functions in support of this
guidance has yet to be agreed. For the purposes of the guidance such an agency
will be referred to as the Lead Agency (LA).
On receipt of intelligence which suggests an individual is an extremist speaker due to
attend an event, an extremist speaker assessment must be conducted.
It is suggested that all regional CTU and CTIU’s manage an extremist speaker profile
(ESP). This profile will include a full intelligence record of the individual, associates,
addresses, vehicles etc. The ESP will also record all events and locations visited by
the Extremist Speaker. At the rear of the profile a record will record any tactical
options utilised and the effectiveness.
A copy of the draft Extremist speaker (ES) profile is attached at annex F
Each region will continue to manage the individuals whom reside in their area,
through local Prevent Case Management processes. Any individual whom is not a UK
resident will have an ESP administered by the LA. A non UK extremist speaker,
whom visits the UK for the first time, will have their assessment prepared and profile
collated by the region where the event first takes place. Continued maintenance will
then be administered through the LA.
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An Extremist Speaker assessment should be conducted by prevent staff, or any
other staff member if suitable skilled. Prevent tactical options should be authorised
by an officer of at least Inspector level. The authorising officer’s rationale of
necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion should be documented on the
matrix.
The LA will administer the storage of all the ESP’s, and ensure that they can offer a
24/7 facility to provide regions with access to the these. It is suggested that a
spreadsheet is available on TACIT to enable a quick check of whether an ESP exists
at the LA. A Cluster message than can be sent to the LA to obtain a copy of the
ESP, or phone call if urgent. The LA will provide a quarterly review and update of all
ESP’s which appear on the TACIT spreadsheet. Once NCIA is nationally implemented
the ESP can be managed on a national view facility
On the identification of an event with the attendance of an ES, the LA will Cluster
the ESP to the region whom will then conduct an ES assessment through the
attached matrix. Once the grading of risk is identified and tactical options chosen, a
record of this will be attached the ESP. On return of the ESP to the LA, this ESP will
be copied back to the regional CTU or CTIU whom manages the ES to update their
records. This will enable regions in the future to conduct an ES assessment and
identify suitable tactical options.
6.1 Initial assessment
An individual will be considered suitable for assessment under the Extremist Speaker
Guidance if:






Intelligence in the last two years supports the behaviour under assessment.
An assessment of the individual has taken place, through the Extremist
Speaker matrix.
Risk is identified as being either Medium or High.
Persons serving a custodial sentence will be not considered as an Extremist
Speakers, and will be managed by HMPS.
Individuals under MAPPA, Part 4 or Licence Conditions should be managed in
consultation with their offender manager.
No individual whom is currently part of an operation or investigation (Crime or
CT/DE) should be considered without prior approval of the CTSIO and deconfliction with relevant partners.
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6.2 Intelligence Handling Process
Event
Check TACIT for
Extremist Speaker
Profile
CLUSTER LA for ESP
ESP managed
through by
CTU/CTIU
URGENT - Phone
LA CLUSTER ESP to
CTU / CTIU
CTU/CTIU Conduct
ES risk assessment
Tactical Options
chosen / NDM and
Justification
recorded
ESP updated with
event and results.
Returned to LA
Notes
ESP – Extremist Speaker Profile
CTU/ CTIU region
where ES resides,
updated with
intelligence.
LA - Lead Agency
ES – Extremist Speaker
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7.0 Prevent Tool Kit
CTU/CTIU manage
ES through Prevent
Case Management
The Extremist Speaker assessment matrix signposts the authorising officer to tactical
options of “deny, disrupt and deter”. These allow the creation of a working strategy
to manage the risk posed by the speaker. Such a strategy may be as flexible and
creative as necessary and appropriate.
A list of Prevent tactical options and relevant supporting legislation is attached at
annex D.
7.1 Decision Making and Recording of Decisions
It is vital that decision making in respect of the use of the Extremist Speaker
Assessment Tool is made with due regard to the principles of the National Decision
Making Model and the Police Code of Ethics. To assure public confidence in ethical,
impartial and transparent decision making by police and partners, it is absolutely
essential that such decisions are recorded to demonstrate necessity, proportionality
and collateral intrusion considerations. Described below are considerations that
decision makers should take cognisance of:
7.2 Necessity
The decision maker must suspect that the likely conduct of the person/group
concerned would be contrary to HM Government’s definition of extremism, as
described in the Prevent Strategy (2011) and adopted within the Prime Ministers
Extremism Task Force 2013:
“Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and
beliefs. Also included in the Government’s definition of extremism are calls for the
death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas.”
7.3 Proportionality
The decision maker should demonstrate how they reached the decision they have
and should include an explanation of the reasons why the proposed decision, tactics
or process is not disproportionate. It should include an explanation as to why the
decision maker feels that the proposed course of action, on balance would be the
most effective and least intrusive towards the person concerned, while reducing the
risk posed and safeguarding the safety of the public.
A model answer may contain comments regarding:

Balancing the extent of the perceived mischief against the size and scope of
the measures put in place to counter the risk posed.
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
Explaining how the proposed activity to be undertaken by an agency or
department would cause the least disruption in the circumstances to the
person/group.

The proposed decision, tactics or process to be undertaken are the only
reasonable way, having considered all others, of obtaining the necessary
result.

What other actions, decision or activities were considered and why they were
discounted.
7.4 Collateral Intrusion
In reaching a decision to use the proposed decision, tactics or process, the decision
maker should take into account the likely risk of obtaining personal information
about the person(s) who are subjects of the decision making process. This should
also be considered for people who do not fall within this process but whose details
may be gathered as a result of this decision making process. The decision maker
should consider the likelihood of this risk and comment on the measures taken to
limit this.
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Annex A:
Extremist Speaker
Assessment
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The Prevent Strategy 2011, defines extremism as:
‘Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of
law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs.
Also included in the Government’s definition of extremism are calls for the death of
members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’.
Assessment Process
This assessment should only be considered if there is an Intelligence Case to suggest that an
individual causes a concern, based on the below behavioural indicators, leading to the consideration
of Tactical Options. No assessment should take place if the intelligence suggests criminal acts /
conduct has taken place instead, a separate assessment should be instigated for an investigation to
be implemented.
Stage 1:- Complete nominal details
Stage 2:- Complete the Assessment Matrix, assessing intelligence against the indicators.
Stage 3:- Score the assessment to identify the grading of RISK, thus enabling the decision on level
of tactical option to allocate.
Stage 4:- Identify & record tactical option chosen.
Stage 5:- Complete decision making rationale.
Decision making
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Nominal Details
Name
DOB
Address
Telephone
Police Force
An assessment is required against each strand of behaviour to identify the overall risk of each high,
medium and low behavioural indicator. A speakers risk will correspond to various tactical options.
1. Ensure intelligence is available to make an assessment against the Behavioural
Indicator – identify if any intelligence ‘Fully meets’ or ‘Partially meets’ the indicator
(Tick the appropriate box). If no intelligence supports the behavioural indicator
please disregard that indicator and move onto the next one.
2. Score the Credibility of the intelligence associated with this Behavioural Indicator
(Indicate – VL/L/M/H using the guidance).
3. Identify any Community Impact, which may cause concern at the location to be
frequented or where the event is to be held, against each known behaviour on the
matrix. (Indicate – VL/L/M/H using the above guidance).
4. Score – ‘Scoring of Indicator’ should be transposed over each line of behavioural
indicator, and score at the end of each line accordingly with VL/L/M/H.
5. Complete ‘Highest Grading of Risk’ box. Place the highest scored risk from the H/M/L
assessments into the results box, and identify the overall highest achieved Score.
6. Tactical Option –Choose the option of Deny / Disrupt / Deter against the scored risk.
7. Review the tactical options list and choose an appropriate tactic.
8. Decision making rationale completed to ensure all considerations have been
considered against the tactics to be used.
Guide to Completing the Extremist Speaker Assessment
Credibility
Community Impact
An assessment of the overall
Consideration of the speaker’s attendance at a location
intelligence against the behavioural
may cause adverse impact on community cohesion or
indicator. Measuring the intelligence
polarise tension. This scoring identifies if the speakers
against the indicator.
attendance assessed by their behavioural indicator will
meet any of the below risks.
Very
Low
Low
Medium
High
Where there is no credible
intelligence
Single strand / limited intelligence
exists and lacks context and/or
corroboration
Numerous reports however they lack
supporting context and corroboration
Numerous reports and supporting
context and/or corroboration exist
Negligible impact
Minor Impact
Moderate Impact
Substantial Impact
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Example of completing assessment grading
Behavioural
Indicators(HIGH)
Campaigns through
leafleting / Social Media
etc. to support their
extremist purposes
Arranges/organises/attends
aid convoys / conflict
zones
Engagement with Public
bodies – limited or candid
Scoring of Indicator
Assessment High
Assessment Medium
Assessment Medium
Assessment Low
Assessment Low
Assessment Low
Behavioural
Indicators(HIGH)
Behaviour
Fully Met
Behaviour
Partially
Met
X
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Behaviour
Fully Met
Campaigns through
leafleting / Social Media
etc. to support their
extremist purposes
Arranges/organises/attends
aid convoys / conflict zones
Credibility
VL/L/M/H
H
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Behaviour
Partially
Met
Community
Impact
VL/L/M/H
H
H
H
H
M
H
H
M
VL/L
M/H
M/H
VL/L
VL/L
VL/L
Credibility
VL/L/M/H
Community
Impact
VL/L/M/H
X
Score
VL/L/M/H
L
L
Score
VL/L/M/H
L
Engagement with Public
bodies – limited or candid
Scoring of Indicator
Assessment High
Assessment Medium
Assessment Medium
Assessment Low
Assessment Low
Assessment Low
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
Either
Selected
H
H
M
H
H
M
VL/L
M/H
M/H
VL/L
VL/L
VL/L
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Assessment Matrix
Each behavioural indicator carries its own risk, as these characteristics identify the known conduct
and attitudes identified from individuals whom have an extremist or radical mind-set.
Only chose behavioural indicators where the intelligence exists to support that assessment, and grade
accordingly.
High Potential Behavioural Indicators
Behavioural
Indicators(HIGH)
Attending or instigating
meetings / marches/
demos to promote
extremism
Attempts to oppose,
influence or intimidate
people including protests
and complaints for
extremist purposes
Supremacist language,
targeting or attempting to
groom new vulnerable
persons to indoctrinate or
radicalise for extremist
purposes
Intelligence indicates their
support and approval for
terrorist activities
Displayed
contempt/intolerance
towards others who do not
share their extreme
ideology – e.g. Hatred to
unbelievers / polarise
tensions / community
disharmony / encourages
division
Defends or promotes
violent actions in support
of ideology
Persuades or arranges for
others to travel for
extremist purposes
Intelligence suggests a
hierarchy and influence
over other known
extremists
Threatening or using
violence towards others for
extremist purposes
Scoring of Indicator
Assessment High
Assessment Medium
Assessment Medium
Assessment Medium
Behaviour
Fully Met
Behaviour
Partially
Met
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Credibility
VL/L/M/H
Community
Impact
VL/L/M/H
M/H
VL/L
M/H
VL/L
M/H
M/H
VL/L
VL/L
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Medium Potential Behavioural Indicators
Behavioural
Indicators
(MEDIUM )
Contravenes Equality Act –
Discriminates against
people or groups/
faiths/beliefs/gender
Shown support for
conspiracy theories or
radical or violent causes
and/or leaders that are
linked to extremist views
/ideology
Conducts talks / speeches
to limited audiences
(behind closed doors)
Opposes British Values and
denounces democracy –
anti western sentiment
Use of extremist language
or emblems e.g. Flags /
stickers / banners
Contact with other known
extremists e.g. social
media /phone / email /
meetings etc.
Travel patterns to meet/
associate / participate in
regions of extremist
concern
Supports collecting or
attempts to collect funds
for extremist purposes
Campaigns through
leafleting / Social Media
etc. to support their
extremist purposes
Arranges/organises/attend
aid convoys /conflict zones
Engagement with public
bodies – limited or candid
Scoring of Indicator
Assessment High
Behaviour
Fully Met
Behaviour
Partially
Met
Credibility
VL/L/M/H
Community
Impact
VL/L/M/H
Assessment Low
Assessment Low
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
Either Selected
H
M
H
VL/L
M/H
H
H
M
M/H
VL/L
Assessment Low
Either Selected
Either Selected
VL/L
VL/L
Assessment Medium
Assessment Medium
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Highest Grading of Risk associated with Behavioural Indicators
Identiify the highest grading of risk achieved from the intelligence once it has been passed through
the assessment matrix. This risk will then identify the type of activity to take place – Deny, Disrupt or
Deter.
Assessing Officer
(Sergeant or above)
Date
Assessment From behavioural
indicators
Score
High / Medium / Low /
Very Low
Behaviour Indicators High
Behaviour Indicators Medium
Behaviour Indicators Low
Highest Grading achieved
At the conclusion of the assessment if no behavourial indicator is identified, consideration for
intelligence gathering pre event should be considered and other options under DETER - Negligible
Tactical Option/s
From the attached list of Tactical options, select the most appropriate option or options.
Deny – is the highest level of Prevent activity and will seek to stop premises being used by persons
or groups of concern. It may take away the opportunity for extremists to operate. Enforcement of
non – TACT legislation includes to deny access, remove unsuitable people from positions of influence,
and remove web content. Remove access to travel document. Use of bail or licence conditions.
Disrupt – is a prevent intervention which seeks to frustrate the use of premises by persons of
concern, or frustrate the travel or opportunities for extremists to operate. It is also to dissuade others
from involvement, this may include overt policing action, partnership action or use of a counter
narrative.
Deter - is the lowest level of prevent intervention and may include awareness raising, advice,
leafleting, visible police or other authority presence.
Risk
Method
High
Deny
Medium
Disrupt
Low
Deter
Negligible
Engagement
Date
Tactical Options
Legislation
Intelligence gathering
Authorising Officer
(Inspector or one rank above assessing officer)
Force / Organisation
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Decision making Rationale Supporting Notes
Appendix A identifies various options to Disrupt, Deter and Deny tactics to manage and deal with any
threat and risk an individual may pose to damage community cohesion / harmony. The below
guidance provides the authorising officer to ensure that any tactics have considered ECHR and other
risks associated with the tactic or tactics chosen.
Date
Name
DOB
Address
Authorising
officer
Tactic/s
Chosen
Guidance
NECESSITY
The decision maker must suspect that the likely conduct of the person/group
concerned would be contrary to HMG definition of extremism, as defined in the
Prevent Strategy and adopted within the PM ETF 2013:
‘Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and
beliefs. Also included in the Government’s definition of extremism are calls for the
death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas’.
Record
Decisions
NECESSITY
Guidance
PROPORTIONALITY
The decision maker should demonstrate how they reached the decision they have and
should include an explanation of the reasons why the proposed decision, tactics or
process is not disproportionate (the preverbal sledge hammer to crack a nut). It
should include an explanation as to why the decision maker feels that the proposed
course of action, on balance would be the most effective and least intrusive to the
person concerned while reducing the risk posed and safeguarding the safety of the
public.
A model answer may contain comments regarding:
 Balancing the extent of the perceived mischief against the size and scope of
the measures put in place to counter the risk posed.
 Explaining how the proposed activity to be undertaken by an agency or
department would cause the least disruption in the circumstances to the
person/group.
 The proposed decision, tactics or process to be undertaken are the only
reasonable way, having considered all others, of obtaining the necessary
result.
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
What other actions, decision or activities were considered and why they were
discounted.
Record
Decisions
PROPORTIONALITY
Guidance
COLLATERAL INTRUSION
In reaching a decision to use the proposed decision, tactics or process, the decision
maker should take into account the likely risk of obtaining personal information about
the person(s) who are subjects of the decision making process. This should also be
considered for people who do not fall within this process but whose details may be
gathered as a result of this decision making process. The decision maker should
consider the likelihood of this risk and comment on the measures taken to limit this.
Record
Decisions
COLLATERAL INTRUSION
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Annex B:
National Decision Making Model
Application
The NDM is suitable for all decisions. It can be applied to spontaneous incidents or planned
operations, by an individual or teams of people, and to both operational and non-operational
situations. Decision makers can use it to structure a rationale of what they did during an incident and
why. Managers and others can use it to review decisions and actions taken. The inherent flexibility of
the NDM means that it can easily be expanded for specialist areas of policing. In every case, the
model stays the same, but users decide for themselves what questions and considerations they apply
at each stage.
In a fast-moving incident, the Police Service recognises that it may not always be possible to
segregate thinking or response according to each phase of the model. In such cases, the main
priority of decision makers is to keep in mind their overarching mission.
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The Decision Making
Necessity
The decision maker must suspect that the likely conduct of the person/group concerned would be
contrary to HMG definition of extremism, as defined in the Prevent Strategy and adopted within the
PM ETF 2013:
“Vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, rule of law, individual
liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. Includes calls for the death of
Armed Forces at home and abroad.
Proportionality
The decision maker should demonstrate how they reached the decision they have and should include
an explanation of the reasons why the proposed decision, tactics or process is not disproportionate
(the preverbal sledge hammer to crack a nut). It should include an explanation as to why the decision
maker feels that the proposed course of action, on balance would be the most effective and least
intrusive to the person concerned while reducing the risk posed and safeguarding the safety of the
public.
A model answer may contact comments regarding:
Balancing the extent of the perceived mischief against the size and scope of the measures put in
place to counter the risk posed.
Explaining how the proposed activity to be undertaken by an agency or department would cause the
least disruption in the circumstances to the person/group
The proposed decision, tactics or process to be undertaken are the only reasonable way, having
considered all other, of obtaining the necessary result
What other actions, decisions or activities were considered and why they were discounted
Collateral Intrusion
In reaching a decision to use the proposed decision, tactics or process, the decision maker should
take into account the likely risk of obtaining personal information about the person who are subjects
of the decision making process. This should also be considered for people who are not being
considered under this process but whose details may be gathered as a result of the decision making
process. The decision maker should consider the likelihood of this risk and comment on the measures
taken to limit this.
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The National Decision Model
Stage 1: INFORMATION Gather Information and Intelligence
During this stage the decision maker defines the situation (i.e., defines what is happening or has
happened) and clarifies matters relating to any initial information and intelligence.
• What is happening?
• What do I know so far?
• What further information (or intelligence) do I want/need?
Stage 2: ASSESSMENT Assess Threat and Risk and Develop a Working Strategy
This stage involves assessing the situation, including any specific threat, the risk of harm and the
potential for benefits.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Do I need to take action immediately?
Do I need to seek more information?
What could go wrong? (and what could go well?)
How probable is the risk of harm?
How serious would it be?
Is that level of risk acceptable?
Is this a situation for the police alone to deal with?
Am I the appropriate person to deal with this?
Develop a working strategy to guide subsequent stages by asking yourself:
• What am I trying to achieve?
(Amongst other things consider discrimination, good relations and equal opportunities.)
Stage 3: POWERS AND POLICY Consider Policy and Powers
This stage involves considering what powers, policies and legislation might be applicable in this
particular situation.
• What police powers might be required?
• Is there any national guidance covering this type of situation?
• Do any local organisational policies or guidelines apply?
• What legislation might apply?
As long as there is a good rationale for doing so, it may be reasonable to act outside
policy.
Stage 4: OPTIONS Identify Options and Contingencies
This stage involves considering the different ways to make a particular decision (or resolve a
situation) with the least risk of harm.
Options
• What options are open to me? Consider the immediacy of any threat; the limits of information to
hand; the amount of time available; available resources and support; your own knowledge,
experience and skills; the impact of potential actions on the situation and the public.
If you have to account for your decision, will you be able to say it was:
• Proportionate, legitimate, necessary and ethical?
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• Reasonable in the circumstances facing you at the time?
Contingencies
• What will I do if things do not happen as I anticipate?
Stage 5: ACTION and REVIEW Take Action and Review What Happened.
This stage requires decision makers to make and implement appropriate decisions. It also requires
decision makers, once an incident is over, to review what happened.
Action
Respond
 Implement the option you have selected;
 Does anyone else need to know what you have decided?
Record:
 If you think it appropriate, record what you did and why.
Monitor:
 What happened as a result of your decision?
 Was it what you wanted or expected to happen?
If the incident is continuing, go through the NDM again as necessary
Review
If the incident is over, review your decisions, using the NDM.
• What lessons can you take from how things turned out?
• What might you do differently next time?
REVIEWS/DEBRIEFS
The NDM is ideal for examining decisions made and action(s) taken, whether by a supervisor, an
informal investigation or a formal inquiry. Examples of questions and considerations are:
Values
• How were the police mission and values, risk, and the protection of human rights kept in mind
during the situation?
Information.
• What information/intelligence was available?
Assessment.
• What factors (potential benefits and harms) were assessed?
• What threat assessment methods were used (if any)?
• Was a working strategy implemented? Was it appropriate?
Powers and policy.
• Were there any powers, policies and legislation that should have been considered?
• If policy was not followed, was this reasonable in the circumstances?
Options.
• How were feasible options identified and assessed?
Action and Review.
• Were decisions proportionate, legitimate, necessary and ethical?
• Were decisions reasonable in the circumstances facing the decision maker?
• Were decisions communicated effectively?
• Were decisions and the rationale for them recorded as appropriate?
• Were decisions monitored and reassessed where necessary?
• What lessons can be taken from the outcomes and how the decisions were made?
For Supervisors.
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• Did you recognise and acknowledge instances of initiative or good decisions (where they passed to
managers where appropriate)?
• Did you recognise and challenge instances of poor decisions?
Even where the outcome was not what was hoped for, if the decision taken by your staff was
reasonable given the circumstances, they deserve your support and that of the organisation.
Annex C
European Convention on Human Rights
Article 2 – The right to life.
Protects the individual against death inflicted arbitrarily by the State but it does not exclude the death
penalty if carried out in accordance with the law. Protocol No. 6 abolishing the death penalty in time
of peace, was adopted in 1985. A new protocol abolishing death penalty is being prepared.
Article 5 – The right to liberty and security of person
That everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. Liberty and security of the person are
taken as a "compound" concept - security of the person has not been subject to separate
interpretation by the Court
Article 6 – The right to a fair trial in civil and criminal matters
Right to a fair trial, including the right to a public hearing before an independent and impartial
tribunal within reasonable time, the presumption of innocence, and other minimum rights for those
charged with a criminal offence (adequate time and facilities to prepare their defence, access to legal
representation, right to examine witnesses against them or have them examined, right to the free
assistance of an interpreter).
Article 8 – Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others..
Article 10 – The right to freedom of expressions (including freedom of the press)
The right to freedom of expression, subject to certain restrictions that are "in accordance with law"
and "necessary in a democratic society". This right includes the freedom to hold opinions, and to
receive and impart information and ideas
Article 11 – Freedom of peaceful assembly and association
Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. No restrictions
shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on
the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of
the State.
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Extremist Speaker Assessment - Tactical Options
Annex D
Deny – Consider Disrupt and Deter / Disrupt – Consider Deter / Deter – Consider this category
TYPE
Deny
Disrupt
Individual
Public Order Act
Wilfully obstruction of the
highway
 Depositing anything whatsoever
on the highway
 Section 50 of the Police Reform
Act
 Section 5 of the Police (Misc.)
Factories Act 1916
 Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972
 Section 60 – Prevent disorder
 Breach of the Peace
 Breaching Bail / ASBO
 Home Office New Powers:1. Civil Orders to Disrupt Extremist
Individuals
2. Banning order for Extremist
groups
 Liaise with key individuals
 RTA Legislation –
Insurance/Tax/MOT
 Briefing to Policing Teams
 Pre-emptive disruptive
interviews
 Deploy active engagement/
deploy traffic units
 Declare public meeting –
conditions of conduct
 Set up ANPR operation to stop
or deal with any vehicle used by
the group
 CCTV
 Evidence Gathering Team


TYPE

Deter



Individual
Safeguarding visits to persons
whom are vulnerable
Channel to support those whom
are vulnerable
Use of MAESM with NOMS for
any prison releases
No further action as insufficient
information to assess


















Institution
Consider local authority
options if a centre is used.
Planning regulations
Licensing conditions for use
– Permit etc.
Fire Service regulations
Police closure orders
Charities commission –
seizure of assets/Freeze
assets/ remove trustees
and take over Control of
Charity
Liaise with Property owner
to cancel an event
Use of enforcement
agencies to undertake visits
and disrupt activity e.g.
Environmental Health,
HMRC, OFSTEAD
Civil Order/injunctions
Uniform presence within
vicinity of event with active
engagement
Body Cams if appropriate.
Institution
Media messaging/ liaison
with media
Responsible booking policy
Fusion Cell
Intelligence gathering
Suggest employment of
private security staff
DPA 1998 share
information with institutions
Local Policing team – Overt
Policing & consider









Ideology
See options for
individuals
Media Messaging
Pre-event
contract to cover
the Equality Act
Briefing Senior
Leadership Team
Community
counter
messaging having
local Imams or
faith venues set
up a legitimate
Dawah
stall/leafleting
Empower local
community to
counter ideologies
Alternative
activities for
expected
audience/commu
nity
Ideology
Leaflet drop,
targeted leaflet
campaign can be
used to respond
to a narrative.
Press article – a
public Prevent
related article.
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appropriate leaflets to the
public
Tactical Options – Additional Information
Tactic
Option
Legislation - statute
Description
Wilfully Obstructing the
Highway – Section 137
of the Highways Act
1980
Lead
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Depositing anything
whatsoever on a
highway – Contrary to
Section 158 © of the
Highways Act 1980
Police/LA
DENY
Legislation - statute
Section 50 of the Police
Reform Act 2002
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Section 5 of the Police
(Miscellaneous)
Factories Act 1916
Police
DENY
Comments
If a person without
lawful authority or
excuse, in any way
wilfully obstructs the
free passage along a
highway.
If a person without
lawful authority or
excuse, deposits
anything on a
highway, to the
interruption of a user
of the highway.
The legislation
empowers an
accredited person
(constable or PCSO) to
request the name and
address of a person
acting in an anti-social
manner. Where that
person fails to, he
commits an offence.
This allows regulations
to be made with
regard to persons
collecting donations or
selling articles for
charity in a street or
public house.
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Tactic
DENY
Option
Legislation - statute
Description
Section 222 of the Local
Government Act 1972
Lead
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Section 60 to be
implemented to prevent
a disorder situation
Public Order Act
Offences
DENY
Legislation - statute
Breaching Bail/ASBO’s
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Police
DENY
Legislation - statute
Section 4 of the Public
Order Act
Section 5 of the Public
Order Act
DENY
Legislation - statute
Breach of the Peace
Police
Police
Police
Comments
Longer term initiatives
may be useful if other
legislation such as
obstruction is not
applicable. It relies
upon evidence
showing the activity
(stall) is causing
nuisance.
Authorisation from
Senior Officer required.
For example – Section
4A – intentional
harassment, alarm or
distress
Section 14 – Senior
officer present can
impose conditions on
public assemblies
Section 29b – stir up
religious hatred
Section 2 1936 POA
Prohibit wearing
Quasi-military uniform.
Police division to adopt
positive arrest policy
and where relevant,
gather intelligence.
Harassment, alarm or
distress.
Words or behaviour
within the hearing of a
person likely to be
caused harassment,
alarm or distress.
Words or behaviour
likely to cause a
breach of the peace.
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DENY
Tasking other
resources
Government
Proposals
Media messaging
Police
Consistent press lines.
Home Office New
Powers Civil Orders &
Banning Orders
Police
Proposed new Powers
by Government.
Tactic
DENY
Option
Police
Description
Uniform presence within
vicinity of stalls, active
engagement
Lead
Police
DENY
Local Authority
Consideration of local
authority options if a
centre is being used
LA
DENY
Local Authority
Licensing conditions for
use
LA
DENY
Local Authority
Local authority planning
regulations
LA
DENY
Fire Service
Establish if any Fire
Service regulations have
been breached
Fire Service
Comments
Check ID, identify
individuals, and set
ground rules. Examine
literature being
distributed. If prior
knowledge of event,
consider setting up
mobile police station to
deny space to
extremists.
Robust management
to ensure compliance
with local authority
values.
Consider licensing
conditions if
appropriate.
Consider breaches of
planning regulations
and take appropriate
action.
Take appropriate
action. Visits prior to
or at the time of the
meeting to comply
with legislation.
DENY
Legislation - statute
Police Closure Order
Police
DENY
Police
Pre-event contract
LA/Police
DENY
Legislation – statute
Charities Commission
powers
Charities
Commission
DENY
Consideration of any
closure orders if
appropriate i.e. crack
house closures etc.
Contract to ensure the
compliance of the
Equality Act 2010.
Use powers to
intervene with seizure
or freezing of
assets/remove trustees
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and take over control
of the Charity.
Tactic
DISRUPT
Option
Tasking other
resources
Description
Road Traffic Vehicle
deployment
Lead
Police
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Briefing general to
Senior Leadership Team
Police
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Briefing specific to
appropriate ward/teams
Police
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Pre-emptive disruptive
interviews
Police
DISRUPT
Legislation – statute
Police
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Set up potential ANPR
operation to stop or deal
with any vehicle used by
the group. RTA
legislation
Community counter
messaging - Community
messaging via local
policing team, PEO and
faith officers creating
resilience to extremist
narrative
CCTV
Comments
Deploy staff to
locations known to be
used by extremist
groups to ensure
complying with the
road Traffic Act.
Manage reputational
risk if situations not
dealt with robustly.
Raise awareness to
policing colleagues,
Street wardens and
parking enforcement
etc.
When events are
known, contact
participants prior to
activity taking place.
Management to tackle
attendance of
individuals to an event.
Police
Support local Imams
or faith venues to set a
legitimate Dawah
stall/leafleting.
Police
Utilise local authority,
CCTV resources to
help identify nominal,
offences and
intelligence gathering
to assess risk.
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DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Liaise with key
individuals
Police
When events known,
contact KINS prior to
activity taking place.
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Briefing /Engagement
Local Police Team
Police
Ensure local officers
are in vicinity of event
and engaging with
community.
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Uniform presence within
vicinity of event
Police
Ensure local police
team are aware of
forthcoming event.
Tactic
DISRUPT
Option
LA
Description
Declare public meeting
Lead
LA
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Liaise with property
owner to cancel event
Police
DISRUPT
Tasking other
resources
Alternative activities
Police
DISRUPT
Legislation – statute
Civil Order or injunctions
DISRUPT
Local Authority protocols
DISRUPT
Local Authority protocols
DETER
Legislation – statute
Liaison with other
enforcement agencies
e.g. environment health
Encourage LA to
instigate procedures for
persons having to obtain
permit to set up
tables/stalls
Charities Commission
powers
Police / Civil
Court
LA
Comments
Legislation to allow the
general public to
attend.
Early contact with
owner prior to any
meetings.
Alternative activities
for expected
audience/community
e.g. football matches
other activities.
Court order to restrict
their attendance
Consider noise
nuisance in public
areas.
Utilise local procedures
to identify organisers
to enable thorough
assessment.
DETER
Legislation – statute
Use of MAESM with
NOMS for any prison
releases
Police
DETER
Tasking other
resources
Tasking other
resources
Liaison with Media
Police
Responsible booking
policy
LA/Business
Owner
Police
Tasking other
resources
Legislation
Fusion Cell
LA/Business owner
Police
LA/Owner of
premises
Police/Partners
DETER
DETER
DETER
DETER
Data Protection Act
LA
Charities
Commission
Consideration of
seizure or freezing of
assets/remove trustees
and take over Control
of Charity.
Partner Agencies to
manage and supervise
individuals.
Ensure media are
aware of event.
Ensure policy in place
for bookings to assess
speakers/organisers
Intelligence gathering.
Employ private
security staff.
Share information.
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DETER
Tasking other
resources
Press article
Police
Press article – related
to Prevent.
DETER
Tasking other
resources
Tasking other
resources
Leafleting
Police
No further action i.e.
insufficient information
to assess
Police
Targeted leaflet
campaign.
Gather intelligence.
DETER
Police
Safeguarding
Police
DETER
Police
Channel
Police
DETER
Ensure safety of those
involved are
considered.
To support vulnerable
individuals.
Annex E
Extremist Speakers - Policing
Communications Toolkit
1. Communications Toolkit: Introduction
Welcome to the Extremist Speakers Communications Toolkit.
This communications guidance has been developed by the National Counter Terrorism Policing
Headquarters to support national, regional and local engagement and communications activity by the
police service focused around extremist speakers.
Background/Communications Environment
The terrorist threat to the UK is the focus of intense national, international and local media coverage
at this time. With the current conflicts in Syria, Iraq as well as other areas of the world, there is an
overriding need to challenge home grown extremist speakers who are creating a permissive
environment where religious justification for taking part in conflict abroad and potentially returning to
the UK to commit terrorist acts is encouraged and/or justified.
This is set within the wider context of both the findings from the Prime Minister’s Extremism
Taskforce (ETF) November 2013, which concluded that it is too easy for extremist preachers and
groups to spread extremist views which can lead individuals into terrorism, and also the Government’s
new counter extremism strategy. This strategy, to be published in Spring 2015, will aim to move
beyond the hard end of the extremism spectrum, countering extremism in all of its forms: not just
Islamist extremism but the extreme right wing and other forms of extremism too. The strategy will
build society’s ability to identify extremism, confront it, challenge it and defeat it.
Whilst overseen by the Home Office, the implementation of the strategy will be the responsibility of
the whole of Government, the rest of the public sector, and wider civil society.
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The new Counter-Terrorism and Security Act will also place a statutory duty on named organisations such as schools, colleges, universities, the police, prisons, probation service and local government - to
help prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. For example, universities will have to put
policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus and prisons will have to
show they are dealing with extremist prisoners in an appropriate way.
In light of this, the clear challenge for the police service, working with its partners and all
communities, is to ensure a consistent communications and engagement approach to tackling those
who spread extremist views at national, regional and local level. This applies equally to
communicating about groups that are currently banned in the UK and those who, whilst they have
not been proscribed, are considered to be extreme in their views.
There is also a broader need to empower communities by providing them with the support,
information and advice they require to confront and exclude extremist speakers who attempt to
operate in their area and undermine local community relations.
This communications guidance for the police service seeks to support this work , providing useful
communication ‘tools’ that can be drawn upon to support the wide range of engagement activity that
is already underway across the country.
Who should use the Extremist Speakers Communications Toolkit?
The toolkit is designed to support national, regional and local police stakeholder engagement activity
around extremist speakers. It is intended for use by:
Police forces
Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs),
Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs)
The Metropolitan Police Service Counter Terrorist Command (CTC)
Police Force and CT(I)U Communication Managers
Police Prevent Regional Co-ordinators.
The tools within the guidance are intended to be used as templates for communications activity. The
materials can be adapted as appropriate for use with both internal and external audiences and via
bespoke communication channels.
What does the Extremist Speakers Toolkit contain?
The toolkit consists of a range of material which is not protectively marked.
This includes:




National Extremist Speakers Core Narratives (Government and Police Messaging Guidance for
Police Service
Media Messaging Guidance (Proscribed and Non Proscribed Groups)
Responding to Media Questions about Extremist Speakers
Further Information.
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2. National Extremist Speakers Core Narrative
The messaging below outlines current overarching Government messaging and also provides bespoke
messaging guidance for the police service to support engagement and communication activity in
respect of Extremist Speakers.
(A.) Overarching Government messaging

The Government’s Prevent strategy aims to stop people becoming terrorists or extremists, or
supporting terrorism or extremism.

A key focus of activity by Prevent partners is challenging extremist ideas (and non violent
ideas) promoted by extremist speakers, which are used to justify terrorism by terrorist
groups.

Extremist speakers undermine the notion that a diverse community can thrive by living and
working together - by promoting ideas of separateness and lack of respect for others.

Government continues to be concerned about some groups and individuals who are not
currently banned in the UK, but still cause societal harm, for example, by promoting ideas
that encourage separation and are contrary to shared values such as democracy, the rule of
law and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs . Such groups can encourage individuals to
become further drawn to the ideologies of those groups that are already banned in the UK,
such as al-Muhajiroun and Muslims Against Crusades.

The Home Secretary announced last September a new strategy to counter extremism in all of
its forms: not just Islamist extremism but the extreme right wing and other forms of
extremism too. The strategy will build society’s ability to identify extremism, confront it,
challenge it and defeat it. It will support those who champion British values like tolerance,
democracy and the rule of law.

Whilst overseen by the Home Office, the implementation of the strategy will be the
responsibility of the whole of government, the rest of the public sector, and wider civil
society.
Overarching Government messaging - Proscribed Organisations

Under the Terrorism Act 2000 the Home Secretary has powers to proscribe any organisation
believed to be concerned in terrorism. Proscription makes it a criminal offence for someone
to belong to, or invite support for an organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange or
address a meeting in support of a proscribed organisation or wear clothing or carry articles in
public which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a
proscribed organisation.
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
Proscription can also support other disruptive activity, including the seizure of assets, use of
immigration powers such as exclusion, prosecution for other offences, messaging and EU
asset freezes.
(B.) Police messaging

Whilst there is a need for a careful balance in protecting freedom of speech, promoting
terrorism is unlawful and the police service, working with its partners and local communities,
is committed to ensuring that individuals or groups that glorify terrorism, or engage in
extremism that promotes terrorist ideologies have no voice in the UK.

The police service also has a clear role to play in ensuring that the public is protected from
any individual or organisation that seeks to exploit communities for extremist purposes and
create distrust and division.

Through a coordinated policing approach and proactive local engagement activity we aim to
effectively support communities and organisations, increase their awareness of local issues
and any group or individual, proscribed or otherwise, who may target them and use their
community spaces for propaganda activities.
3. Media Messaging Guidance
The messaging below is intended to provide suggested content for news releases and/ or media
statements issued by the police service.
It includes guidance for a policing led communications response around proscribed groups and also
recommendations for a partnership response, supported by police, around non proscribed extremist
speakers.
A joint communications approach is advocated whenever appropriate and feasible , to be adopted
between the police and local authority/other relevant partner agency (and/or relevant venue owner)
with early engagement activity. This will maximise the effectiveness of any communications response.
This will reinforce the message that statutory partners are working together to protect communities
from extremist speakers.
Messaging should also highlight any support shown by local community leaders/representatives , with
involvement and consultation taking place at the earliest possible opportunity. This will help to ensure
a negative impact on community relations.
It is recognised, however, that the approach taken will vary from area to area according to local need
and feasibility.
4. Proscribed Groups - Policing Communications Response
The messaging below is intended to provide the police service with suggested content for news
releases/media statements linked to operational activity focused on extremist speakers related to
proscribed organisations.
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Please note that any press statements should be developed in close collaboration with the relevant
investigation team.
Wherever an extremist speaker appears to be linked to or is speaking in support of a proscribed
organisation advice is sought from your relevant CT(I)U in respect of relevant and appropriate
legislative processes (see list of proscribed organisations in the Further Information section).
Example Media Release/Statement for Police
Disruption Activity With Arrests - Proscribed Organisation
All arrests should be proactively offered out. Press lines should not however identify those arrested in
line with the Association of Chief Police Officers’ media policy.
FOR OFFER: Officers from the xxx have arrested xx men and xx women this morning, xx/xx/xx, on
suspicion of being a member of a proscribed organisation, supporting a proscribed organisation
contrary to Section 11 and 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 and encouraging terrorism contrary to
Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
The men [A - XXyrs], [B - XX years], [C - XX years] , [D - XX years] and woman [E - XX years] were
arrested in (insert area). They have all been taken to a police station/police stations in (insert area)
and remain in custody.
A number of residential, business or community premises are being searched as part of the
investigation in (insert area/areas).
The searches are ongoing.
These arrests and searches are part of an ongoing investigation into XXXXXX related terrorism and
are not in response to any immediate public safety risk.
IF ASKED: Have you arrested named individual? : We do not discuss who we have or have not
arrested.
5. Extremist Speakers (Non Proscribed Groups) Communications Approach
If a council is the lead in any action that is being taken and police are standing by to prevent a
Breach of the peace, the local authority should be the lead for the media strategy.
This evening/yesterday (insert date), representatives of XX Council, supported by officers from the
XXX CTU and XXX Police attended a XXXXX in the XXXX area of XXXXX.
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This followed concerns from the local community about meetings that have been taking place at this
venue in recent months.
A number of individuals were spoken to and informed that they would no longer be allowed to hold
meetings on council premises.
The longstanding support of XXXXXXX (insert area) communities has been crucial in enabling both the
council and the police to take action against a very small number of individuals whose activities are of
concern.
Today’s action was supported by the police and represents a partnership approach to protecting the
communities of XXXXXXX from radicalisation and extremism.
If police have made arrests the media lead should sit with the police in arrest of the arrests. All lines
should be agreed with the investigation team prior to release.
Officers from the XXXX CTU and XXXX today accompanied representatives from XXXX Council to
XXXXX.
This followed concerns from the local community about meetings that have been taking place at this
venue in recent months.
A number of individuals were spoken to by representatives from XXX council and informed that they
would no longer be allowed to hold meetings on council premises.
As a result of disorder that then followed XX people were arrested for public order offences. They are
currently in custody at a XXX police station.
6. Responding to Media Questions About Extremist Speakers
Please note that media queries about Government policy on extremist speakers are handled by the
Home Office, for further guidance please contact the Home Press Office.
Media queries regarding national policing policy should be referred to the Association of Chief Police
Officers Communications Department on 0207 084 8946/47/48.
It is also helpful if you can make the Home Office Press Office and ACPO Communications aware,
where appropriate or necessary, of any media activity in your area/region.
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7. Further Information
For a list of current proscribed organisations visit
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/proscribed-terror-groups-ororganisations--2
For further information on this communications toolkit, contact
[email protected]
National Counter Terrorism Policing HQ Communications.
Annex F
EXTREMIST SPEAKER PROFILE (ESP)
NAME:
NSBIS NUMBER:
Other Reference:
Assessment Grading :
HIGHEST 5 x 5 x 5
HANDLING CODE IN
DOCUMENT
1
NFA / CONTINUED INTEREST / TRANSFER /
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DE-SELECTED.*
Review Date
Section 1 – SUBJECT SUMMARY
Name
DoB
Age
Nationality
Ethnic group
Marital Status
Religion
Home Address
Other Address
URN
NSBIS
Number
Other
Number
CRO
PNC ID
Warning
Markers
Offences
Affiliated Groups /
Ideology
Region / Force
Responsible
Engagement +/Surveillance
Current Operation / IHM
Yes/No
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Operation/s linked to
Photograph
Source of Photograph: Date of Photograph: -
Please complete the relevant section below and highlight it in RED.
This offender is linked to an address within your region and a copy is being supplied for your
information.

An nominal currently held within the xxxxxxx region has been / is visiting a location
within your region.

An extremist speaker currently residing in the xxxxxxxx region is about to be move
to an address within your region.

xxxxxxx region have assessed the intelligence on a nominal and it has now been
assessed as being of continued interest. Please support the ongoing intelligence
collection.
A summary of the intelligence held by ACPO TAM on the individual is contained within this
document and forwarded to you in order that a full threat / risk assessment can be
conducted and any action deemed appropriate initiated.
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Section 2 – INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Background / Family / Associates / Operations / Criminal History / Open Source
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Section 3 – Profile Location and Actions
Profile Locations
No
Date
ESP Transfer reason
Force/Region
SIO / OIC
Action/s taken relating to the intelligence - Section 4
Intel
Source
Ref
Date
Action Taken
Update
Name of Officer
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Section 4 – INTELLIGENCE
Location
of event /
incident
Date of
Report
Date of
Intel /
Incident
Source
Ref
Intelligence
Owning
Force
GPMS
5x5x5
Section 5 – Decision for No Further Action/Continued Interest
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Officer / Date
Continued Interest/No further Action
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