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Three Faces of Identity
Timothy J. Owens,1 Dawn T. Robinson,2
and Lynn Smith-Lovin3
1
Department of Sociology, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907;
email: [email protected]
2
Department of Sociology, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30520;
email: [email protected]
3
Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708;
email: [email protected]
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2010. 36:477–99
Key Words
First published online as a Review in Advance on
April 20, 2010
self, group, situation, social movement
The Annual Review of Sociology is online at
soc.annualreviews.org
This article’s doi:
10.1146/annurev.soc.34.040507.134725
c 2010 by Annual Reviews.
Copyright All rights reserved
0360-0572/10/0811-0477$20.00
Abstract
We review three traditions in research on identity. The first two traditions, which stress (a) the internalization of social positions and their
meanings as part of the self structure and (b) the impact of cultural
meanings and social situations on actors’ identities, are closely intertwined. The third, the burgeoning literature on collective identity, has
developed quite independently of the first two and focuses more on
group-level processes. Unlike previous reviews of identity, which have
focused on the sources of internalized identity (e.g., role relationship,
group membership, or category descriptor), we focus here on the theoretical mechanisms underlying theories of identity. We organize our
review by highlighting whether those mechanisms are located in the individual’s self-structure, in the situation, or in the larger sociopolitical
context. We especially attempt to draw connections between the social
psychological literature on identity processes and the distinct, relatively
independent literature on collective identity.
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INTRODUCTION
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Most reviews of research on identity organize
their presentation around the sources of the
identity (e.g., Thoits & Virshup 1997, Owens
2003). Identities that guide social action can
come from role relationships, affiliation with
social groups, identification with social categories, or personal narratives. Here, we take a
different tack. We highlight the theoretical processes that are the central mechanisms in the
major treatments of identity. These theoretical
mechanisms operate across the identities that
come from the sources listed above.
We first draw a distinction between identity theories that focus on internalization of social positions within a self-structure and those
that focus on how consensual, cultural identity
meanings are implemented within situations
that evoke them. The former theories (e.g.,
Stryker’s and Burke’s Identity Theory) focus on
how stable, internalized aspects of social identities are formed and how they affect behavior as
the social actor moves from one situation to the
next. Implicitly, these internalization theories
assume a socialization process through which
repeated social interactions lead to the development of personalized identity meanings; these
meanings then become incorporated into a stable, trans-situational self-concept. The latter
theories (e.g., Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory
and Heise’s Affect Control Theory) emphasize
how social contexts elicit certain identities and
shape their meanings. These theories focus on
how consensual cultural meanings associated
with identities are imported by actors into local
interactions and how situational environments
shape the localized meanings of the situationally relevant identities. The situation and the
culture within which it is embedded are more
central than any internalized aspect of the actor.
After developing this (somewhat subtle)
distinction between personal, internalized
identity theories and situational, culturally
based identity theories, we then examine a
literature that places the concept of identity at
the group level. Cerulo (1997) reviewed this
literature on collective identity, emphasizing
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its roots in classic sociological constructs like
Durkheim’s collective consciousness, Marx’s
class consciousness, Weber’s Verstehen, and
Tonnies’s Gemeinscaft. Here, we draw out
the connections between this fast-growing
literature (located primarily in the study of
politics, social movements, and culture) and the
more social psychological theories of identity
in the microsociological literature (see Owens
& Aronson 2000, Stryker et al. 2000). Since
the collective identity literature only fleetingly refers to the more social psychological
treatments, we attempt to identify areas where
those connections can enrich both subfields.
Before reviewing our three faces of the identity literature, we illustrate how the concept of
identity is nested in the broader concepts of self
and self-concept. Identity occupies an interesting position vis-à-vis these broader concepts. It
is both a nested component of the more general
self-structures, yet also refers to social positions
that exist outside the individual actor that are
available to be ascertained, enacted, and potentially internalized. This dualism motivates the
organization of our review.
SELF, SELF-CONCEPT, AND
IDENTITY: NESTED CONCEPTS
For theorists who emphasize the internalized
nature of identity within the context of a stable self-structure, the concept of identity is
nested within the more inclusive concepts of the
self and the self-concept. As specified by Mead
(1934), the self is a phenomenon of the human
mind born out of reflexive action, stemming
primarily from a person’s interactions with others. Mead especially stressed the ability to imagine oneself from the standpoint of another person. The self consists of two components: the
“I” and the “me” (Mead 1934). The “I” (or
subject) is the dynamic, novel, spontaneous aspect of the self that constitutes the individual
as knower and actor. The “me” (or object) is
all the learned perspectives a person takes toward him- or herself and the attitudes that the
“I” assumes toward one’s own person, especially
when taking the role of the other. The vast
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majority of work in sociology is on the “me” aspect of the self, which includes the self-concept
and the identities that are incorporated into it.
Once the self emerges in the human organism, a nascent self-concept soon follows.
Rosenberg (1979) defined self-concept as the
totality of a specific person’s thoughts and
feelings toward him- or herself as an object of
reflection. The self-concept (or the “me”) can
be thought to consist of three broad classes
of individual attributes (Rosenberg 1979,
pp. 15–17): self-referring dispositions, physical
characteristics, and identities. Self-referring
dispositions denote the abstract categories
people develop over their life courses and
then use to shape their response tendencies,
including attitudes such as liberalism, traits
such as altruism, values such as patriotism,
and abilities such as athletic skill. Thoits &
Virshup (1997) refer to these elements as one’s
individual identity because they represent ways
to differentiate oneself from others (as opposed
to representing communalities with others
through roles or group membership).
Physical characteristics include one’s external attributes such as being obese, deaf, or tall.
These physical characteristics become sociologically interesting when they are also incorporated into a person’s self-image and thus have
the potential to shape one’s behavior or one’s
social and psychological well-being. They also,
of course, have an external character that influences how others respond to us, shaping their
internalization into the self-concept.
The third component of Rosenberg’s
self-concept is the focus of our review here:
identity. There are four key sources of identity characterizations: personal or individual
identity, role-based identity, category-based
identity, and group membership–based identity. Personal identity is the most elementary
type of identity, defined here as the social
classification of an individual into a category
of one (Rosenberg 1979). It denotes a unique
individual with self-descriptions drawn from
one’s own biography and singular constellation
of experiences. Examples include: I am Roy
Smith, Pat Smith’s spouse; I served in Patton’s
Third Army during World War II; I was born
in Robeson County Hospital at 3:14 PM; my
mother had a cousin named Edna; I drove
the school bus during my junior year in high
school. Although personal identity consists of
unique identifiers and an individual narrative,
it is social and institutional in origin. As such,
soldiers are identified and differentiated from
other soldiers by their names, ranks, and serial
numbers; academics by their names, ranks,
departmental affiliations, and the institutions
from which their highest degree was awarded.
These distinctions are created and organized
by the institutions within which they occur.
As individualized as it is, one’s personal identity information is the basis for one’s other
identities. “If an individual could not be recognized from one occasion to another as the same
person, no stable social relationships could be
constructed” and no other identities could be
formed (McCall & Simmons 1966, p. 65). We
distinguish between these individuated narratives in personal identities and what Thoits
& Virshup (1997) termed “individual identity.” They defined individual identity as selfideas abstracted from one’s biographical details
and framed in terms of broader social categories such as working class, Midwesterner, diabetic, snowbird, or progressive. When such
abstracted self-categorizations are internalized,
they often correspond to group or categorical
identities as described below.
Identities based on role relationships are
the most central in the theories that stress
internalization of identity meaning into the
self-structure. We define role-identity as a social position a person holds in a larger social
structure,1 considers self-descriptive, and enacts in a role relationship with at least one
other person (Thoits 1995). Because it is selfdescriptive and internalized, it becomes part
of one’s self-concept. Role-identities are predicated on recurrent interactions between role
1
Here we adopt Stryker’s (2008) definition of social structure
as socially patterned interactions and relationships noted for
their regularity, resistance to change, and capacity to reproduce themselves.
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partners and provide the self with meaning because they carry recognized role expectations,
whether complementary (teacher-pupil), competing (union negotiator–business executive),
or counter (detective-criminal) (e.g., Hogg et al.
1995, Weinstein et al. 1966).
McCall & Simmons (1966) tended to ascribe
more individual volition to the crafting of one’s
role-identity than do most identity theorists.
To McCall & Simmons, role-identity entailed
the “character and the role that an individual
devises for himself as an occupant of a particular social position,” including “his imaginative
view of himself as he likes to think of himself being and acting as an occupant of that position”
(p. 67; emphasis in the original). Their conceptualization illustrates clearly the internalized,
individuated nature of identity meanings, even
those identities that arise from social structural
positions.
The two final bases of identity are formed
by similarities that we see between ourselves
and others, rather than the role relationships
with another actor. Identities can be based on
perceived membership in a socially meaningful
category (e.g., Arab or American) or on actual
membership in a bounded, interconnected
social group (e.g., a Girl Scout or a member of
Earth First). The distinction between the two
bases is blurred because of the homophilous
structure of interactions (McPherson et al.
2001, 2006): We are much more likely to
interact with those actors with whom we
share salient characteristics. So, being an Arab
American may be an identity that comes from
a category of people, but is likely reinforced
by interactions within mosques or ethnically
identified churches, ethnic neighborhood
enclaves, and other culturally meaningful
group activities.
Our summary of these bases on which identities are formed makes clear why we choose to
organize this review around theoretical mechanisms and the distinct intellectual traditions
that they create, rather than the more common
classification around the source of identity
(e.g., personal/individual, role based, social
category based, group based). First, the distinc-
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tion among the sources is blurry and has little
relationship to how theorists believe that identities organize and motivate action within social
contexts (Smith-Lovin 2007, Burke 2004).
Second, identities are elements of both the social structure and the individual self-structures
that internalize them. While individuals may
incorporate meanings associated by social positions and distinctions into their view of themselves, the menu from which they choose to
do so is created by a larger social environment.
Therefore, some theories of identity operate
at levels other than the self-structure. In particular, this is true of the identity theories that
emphasize situational or contextual elements
(our second section here) and the literature on
collective identity (our third section). Before
turning to these aspects of identities theories,
however, we begin with a review of the
more traditional theories that emphasize
the internalization of identity meanings into
the self-structure.
THEORIES EMPHASIZING
INTERNALIZED
ROLE-IDENTITY MEANINGS
One has no identity apart from society; one has no
individuality apart from identity.
—Nelson N. Foote (1951, p. 21)
The fact that we internalize how others see
us is a core insight of classic symbolic interaction (Mead 1934, Cooley 1902). At least since
Foote’s (1951) classic article on identification as
a basis for motivation, sociological researchers
have focused on how the social positions that
people occupy become stable, internalized
aspects of their self-concepts. In this section,
we examine the class of theories that emphasize
identities that are attached to and internalized
by individuals, particularly, but not necessarily,
in structured role relationships. The theories
covered in this section are Role-Identity
Theory (McCall & Simmons 1966), Identity
Theory (Stryker 1968, 1980), Identity Accumulation Theory (Thoits 1983), and Identity
Control Theory (Burke 1991). However,
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before discussing the specific theories, we
briefly address motivation as it generally
applies to these internalization theories.
Nearly six decades ago, Foote (1951) attempted to clarify role theory by using a social psychology of motivation that both rejected
biological determinism (“the person impelled
from within”) and cultural determinism (“the
person driven from without”) (p. 21). Foote’s
theory of situated motivation is based upon
symbolic interactionist notions of language and
identification. Specifically, language is central
to motivation because it helps shape behavior
by enabling individuals to meaningfully understand and label their past actions in order to formulate present and future outcomes. Through
identification, people appropriate and commit
to particular identities. People have multiple
identities, and their identities give their behavior meaning and purpose. However, because
people also perform roles that are attached to
particular identities, the role/identity nexus is
also an important ingredient in motivation and
choice. Indeed, the very notion of identity in
symbolic interactionism connotes an intimate
linkage between self and role (Burke & Tully
1977) such that human beings are confronted
regularly with choices between alternative commitments and actions.
Two influential mid-range identity theories
were developed in the 1960s to represent the
ways in which structural role positions and their
internalizations guided choices that actors make
in social interaction. Both McCall & Simmons
(1966) and Stryker (1968) attempted to link the
structural-functional insights about role relationships and their functions in larger sociology
that dominated the mainstream sociology of the
day with the dynamic, processual insights about
self that dominated microsociological thinking.
The result was a remarkably fruitful theoretical
tradition that grew out of these two similar perspectives on identity.
Role-Identity Theory
McCall & Simmons (1966) defined roleidentity in dramaturgical language as the
character that individuals devise for themselves
when occupying specific social positions. And
as discussed earlier, they saw role-identities as
stemming from the preferred perceptions that
one has of oneself as one occupies various social positions. In this case, role-identities influence people’s everyday lives by serving as
their primary source of personal action plans.
The theory has a view of people capable of creativity and improvisation in the performance of
their roles, yet within the overall requirements
and restrictions of their social position(s). This
commingling of individuality, idiosyncrasy, and
impulsiveness with behavior constrained by social convention occurs through a dialog between the “I” and the “me” bounded by the
broad dictates of one’s role-identity.
Because people have multiple and often
competing role-identities, which also come and
go during one’s life course, an important theoretical problem in McCall & Simmons’s theory
is to explain which role-identities people value
most and will thus attempt to perform. They
argue that a person’s various role-identities
get organized into a hierarchy of prominence,
where a role-identity’s prominence reflects the
relative value it has for his or her overall conception of one’s ideal self.2 In this way, one’s prominence hierarchy is equivalent to one’s ideal self
(McCall & Simmons 1966, pp. 76–80, 264).
Prominence itself is predicated on many factors.
First, people must assess the degree of commitment they have to a particular role-identity and,
by extension, how much their self-esteem is
bound to its successful activation. That is, commitment signifies how deeply a person stakes
who he or she is by virtue of his or her roleidentity and its performance. This conceptualization is directly relevant to James’s (1890)
definition of self-esteem as the ratio of one’s
perceived success in a particular role-identity
to one’s desired level of success.
2
Their concept of ideal self, which traces back to Horney
(1945), is part wish and part obligation with regard to an
individual’s most personal aspirations and wants for him- or
herself (e.g., to be a distinguished professor, a loving mother,
a successful businessperson).
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Second, when considering their ideal selves
vis-à-vis particular role-identities, people evaluate how their prior actions generally comport
with their role-identity performances and how
much they are living up to their ideal selves.
Third, as a sign of the importance of reflected
appraisals, people try to determine how their
significant others will evaluate and appraise the
role when and if it is activated. Fourth, individuals assess the rewards they may or may not
have received from the prior activation of a roleidentity, a notion consistent with social learning
theory (e.g., Bandura 1977).
Identity Theory
Stryker’s Identity Theory (1968, 1980, 2008)
has been the dominant perspective on self and
identity within structural symbolic interactionism for the past four decades. Since Stryker
(2008) recently offered a focused treatment of
his theory in the Annual Review of Sociology, we
only review its basic form here (see also Owens
2003). Identity Theory sees a multifaceted self
composed of multiple identities arranged hierarchically in an identity salience structure. The
more salient an identity, the higher is the probability of its being invoked in an interactional
situation that allows some agency or choice.
The salience itself is based on two dimensions of
one’s commitment to the identity: interactional
and affective. Interactional commitment is the
extensiveness of the interactions a person has
in a social network through a particular identity (e.g., the number of persons one interacts
with based on the identity). Affective commitment is a person’s emotional investment in relationships premised on the identity (e.g., how
emotionally close others in the role relationship are to the individual). Note that Stryker’s
use of the term “commitment” is more multidimensional and less psychological than the use of
the same concept label in McCall & Simmons’s
Role-Identity Theory above.
In an early empirical test of the theory,
Serpe (1987) showed that college students’
commitments to their student-related identities
at Time 1 impacted those identities’ saliences
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at Time 2, whereas Time 2 student-identity
salience impacted contemporaneous commitment to that identity. This pattern suggested
that commitment precedes salience. However,
the degree of structural freedom students had
in choosing one role-identity over another
(i.e., coursework versus dating) was key. Only
situations involving choice showed the pattern.
More recently, Owens & Serpe (2003) found
that behavioral and affective commitment were
both significantly related to family identity
salience for Hispanics, but only behavioral
commitment was predictive of family-identity
salience for Anglos and blacks. They argued
that the significance of affective commitment
for Hispanics was heightened by the family’s
particular importance for this group.
Finally, Stryker et al. (2005) recently
discussed an ongoing problem in Identity
Theory—how multilevel social structures facilitate or constrain one’s opportunity for,
and the strength of, commitment to particular role-identities (i.e., family, work, and volunteerism). They show that intermediate-level
social structures (e.g., neighborhood or school)
influenced commitment most by fostering ingroup identity-based relationships. Proximallevel social structures, though important, had
less impact than intermediate structures. The
proximal-level represents social embeddedness
in multiple networks of social relations (e.g.,
number of workmates who are also one’s relatives). Finally, large-scale stratification systems
(e.g., gender, race, socioeconomic status) had
the least impact on commitment to a particular
identity.
Identity Accumulation Theory
Thoits (1983, 1986, 2003) drew heavily on
Role-Identity Theory (McCall & Simmons
1966) and Identity Theory (Stryker 1968, 1980,
2008) in her formulation of Identity Accumulation Theory, her description of the importance
that multiple role-identities can have for a person’s psychological and emotional well-being.
Her theory asserts that multiple role-identities
can be psychological resources that help reduce
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emotional distress (depression) and foster
global self-esteem in complex selves. Underpinning Identity Accumulation Theory are two
key assumptions. The first, an essential aspect
of symbolic interactionism, is that identities
provide individuals with meaning and purpose
by answering the question: Who am I? Second,
roles give individuals structure and organization by answering the question: What should
I do? By extension, multiple role-identities
provide the person with an orientation toward
life situations that help foster well-being. As
Ahrens & Ryff (2006) point out, more roles
also are associated with beneficial individual
resources, such as social connections, power,
and prestige. The more options one has to
obtain these resources, the better the outcome.
Numerous recent empirical studies support
the hypothesis linking multiple role-identities
to lower levels of psychological distress
(Kikuzawa 2006, Sachs-Ericsson & Ciarlo
2000, Wethington et al. 2000), fewer physical
health problems ( Janzen & Muhajarine 2003),
or both (Barnett & Hyde 2001). Conversely,
Brook et al. (2008) cited other studies indicating that multiple role-identities can
actually increase or prolong depression when
role-identity demands are incompatible with
other behavioral expectations or when the roleidentity claims too much of a person’s time and
drains her energy. Brook et al. (2008) claimed
that the key to understanding the difference
between positive and negative benefits of multiple roles is the mediating effect of positive or
negative emotions on the interactions between
the number of identities a person holds, their
subjective importance to the person, and how
harmoniously they interact with each other.
Jackson (1997) added an important status
dimension involving race and ethnicity to
Identity Accumulation Theory and showed
that the multiple role-identities were associated
with lower depression and greater happiness
among non-Hispanic white and Mexican
American men and women but not African
Americans. Kikuzawa (2006) added a person’s
location in the life course to race/ethnicity in
a cross-cultural study of depression levels for
Americans and Japanese age 60 and over. She
found that role accumulation (spouse, parent,
and community volunteer) benefited older
Americans’ mental health, but any role beyond
being either a spouse or a parent had no impact
on well-being for older Japanese. Theoretical
understanding of these varying patterns in
different racial, ethnic, and age groups is still
needed.
A common thread running through many
studies of multiple identities, including the
work above on Identity Accumulation Theory,
is the importance of Stryker’s Identity Theory
in the framing of the empirical research. Few,
however, actually employ Stryker’s conceptions
of role interactional and affective commitment
in their empirical analyses. Even among those
who try to hew closely to Stryker’s theoretical conceptualizations, differences in the way
salience and commitment are operationalized
help explain empirical inconsistencies in the relationship between multiple role-identities and
well-being.
Serpe (1987) and Thoits (2003) may offer an
important piece missing in Identity Accumulation Theory: assessing the degree of choice people have in enacting their many role-identities.
If multiple role-identities are a resource, then
the most consequential for well-being should
be the identities a person has some freedom
to choose. For example, the mother role and
worker role are more constraining because they
offer less choice in enacting than the freedom
to choose the PTA role and church choir role.
Identity Control Theory
Whereas Stryker’s Identity Theory focused
on identity choices, Burke developed an
elaboration of the theory to specify how
internalized meanings guided action after an
identity was adopted within an institutional
context (Stryker & Burke 2000). Burke’s (1991,
Burke & Reitzes 1991) theoretical developments are often known as Identity Control
Theory to distinguish them from Stryker’s
more structural focus on commitment and
identity enactment. Burke built on the work
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of Powers (1973) to represent the relationship
between internalized identity meanings and
perceptions of an interactional situation as a
control system or cybernetic feedback loop
[Robinson (2007) provides a recent review of
control theorizing in sociology]. Meanings
are typically measured using bipolar semantic
differential scales (Osgood et al. 1957, 1975).
The dimensions on which meanings vary are
assessed in each institutional context and then
measured at the level of the individual actor.
Consistent with the other internalization
identity theories summarized above, Identity
Control Theory emphasizes the importance of
understanding identity not just as a state or
trait characteristic of the individual, but as a
continuous process of affirmation and reaffirmation in social situations. “An identity process,” according to Burke & Reitzes (1991), “is
a continuously operating, self-adjusting, feedback
loop: individuals continually adjust behavior to
keep their reflected appraisals congruent with
their identity standards or references” (p. 840,
emphasis in the original). Furthermore, Burke
and associates follow mainstream symbolic interactionism by viewing an identity as a set of
meanings applied to the self in a social role
[although later presentations of the theory explicitly expand its scope to consider identities
that come from group or category membership
(e.g., Burke 2004, Burke & Stets 2009)]. These
meaning-sets act as a standard or reference for
understanding who one is in a given situation
and what are the expectations in order to maintain that identity in the eyes of self and others.
When an identity is brought into play in an
interaction situation, a feedback process ensues
via reflected appraisals. That is, a cybernetic
control process balances any identity discrepancies that may arise when a particular identity
standard (the internalized meanings of self in
role, group, or category) is compared to the
identity’s situated meaning via a comparator.
It is hypothesized that people behave so as to
counter and reduce any discrepancy that arises
from interaction. Since actions are generated
to reduce discrepancies, they can vary in
quality, depending on the disturbing events.
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This feature of the theory allows it to describe
how actors respond creatively to circumstances
other than normal role performances.
Identity Control Theory is thoroughly
reviewed in Burke & Stets (2009). Here we
describe only a few studies as exemplars of
this research tradition. In one of the initial
statements of the theory, Burke (1991) posed
a challenge to prevailing views of social stress
by positing that disruption of the otherwise
continuous identity process and the inability to
close the gap between disapproving reflected
appraisals and an identity standard will result
in distress. Burke & Stets (1999) show how
self-processes can influence social structure,
while Stets & Tsushima (2001) have extended
the theory to an examination of the moderating
influence of group-based identities and rolebased identities on how people experience and
cope with the potent emotion of anger. More
recently, Burke et al. (2007) combined Identity
Control Theory, Status Characteristics Theory
(discussed briefly at the end of the next section),
and Legitimacy Theory in an experiment on
how gender factors into leader and subordinate
identity verification. They studied taskoriented groups of four people (two women
and two men) when leadership is conferred by a
higher, legitimate authority (the experimenter).
Among their findings are that female leaders
(who were legitimated by the experimenter
when the group was formed) and males (who
were not legitimated) both had higher levels
of identity verification than others. This study
illustrates an interesting new theme in Identity
Control Theory—the relevance of resources to
the ability of an actor to verify his or her identity
(see Burke & Stets 2009, pp. 79–82, 229–33).
This emphasis on a larger structure brings the
theory closer to the situational/cultural emphasis of the theories reviewed in the next section.
THEORIES EMPHASIZING
CULTURE AND SITUATIONAL
CONTEXT
Presumably, a “definition of the situation” is almost always to be found, but those who are in
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the situation ordinarily do not create this definition, even though their society can be said to do so;
ordinarily, all they do is to assess correctly what
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the situation ought to be for them and then act
accordingly.
—Erving Goffman (1974, pp. 1–2)
The theories of internalized identity meanings
reviewed in the previous section build on the
foundational insight of Mead and Cooley that
we incorporate the social positions that we occupy into our cognitive image of ourselves as
people. Here, we shift attention to theories that
give priority to situational, social structural, and
cultural elements that lie outside the individual. We caution that our categorization here
does not imply competition or contradiction.
Instead, theories (and the conceptualizations
embedded within them) necessarily simplify reality by focusing on some elements to the exclusion of others. So the theories described here do
not reject the idea that social roles, group memberships, and category memberships are incorporated into the self-image. Rather, they emphasize how the elements of situations in which
actors are involved shape their behavioral, cognitive, and emotional reactions, rather than focus on the intraindividual features of identity in
the self-structure that are carried from situation
to situation.
This tradition of emphasizing the importance of situational context for social action
began to develop in its modern form during
the 1950s and early 1960s. It was partially a
response to the sense that symbolic interactionism, and sociological social psychology
more generally, had lost its connection to the
structural focus of the larger discipline (Stryker
2008). Foote’s (1951) influential theory of situated motivation, discussed above, was published
in this period, using the concept of identity to
focus attention on the actor-situation nexus.
Goffman (1959, 1963) emphasized that actors
presented themselves to others in a manner
that served to maintain certain images. His
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life was concerned more with the interactional presentation
of self and how situational context supported or
undermined it than with the underlying character of the “self ” that was being presented [see
Hochschild (1983, appendix A) for a related
discussion]. Similar intellectual movements
were afoot in psychology, as Heider’s (1946,
1958) Balance Theory drew attention to configurations of interaction and their implications.
Situated Identity Theory
An early attempt to develop a formal, empirically testable theory based on this situational
focus was Alexander’s Situated Identity Theory (Alexander & Knight 1971; summarized in
Alexander & Wiley 1981). Building on Heider
and Goffman, Alexander conceptualized situated identities not as properties possessed by
persons or as features located in some external environmental structure. Instead, the situated identity defined the relationship between
an individual and the environment (especially
the other actors within it) at a given time.
Like many situational theories that followed,
Alexander focused initially on relatively simple situations in which actors were assumed to
have similar perspectives; he restricted his experimental work to situated activities that met
that consensus criterion. In his most cited study
(Alexander & Knight 1971), he replicated a classic cognitive dissonance experiment, showing
that the desirability of the situated identity associated with an outcome predicted whether
people chose that outcome, often in violation
of cognitive dissonance predictions. Although
this research tradition is not currently very active, it was a groundbreaking effort to consider
systematically the impact of situational cues on
identity occupancy and social conduct flowing
from that identity. It also pioneered the use
of experimental methods in this domain within
sociology.
We now move to a review of currently
active theories that emphasize the impact of situational and cultural features on social interaction. We discuss two traditions in sociology and
psychology—Affect Control Theory and Social
Identity Theory—that conceptualize the sociocultural environment in very different ways.
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We then briefly discuss Status Characteristics
Theory. Although this theoretical research
program is not based in the identity tradition,
its findings have some important connections
to the phenomena that we explore here.
Affect Control Theory
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To make the connection between the internalized and situational/cultural conceptions of
identity clear, we begin our discussion of the
more situational/cultural conception of identity
with Affect Control Theory (Heise 1979, 2007),
which shares many elements with Burke’s Identity Control Theory. Both theories drew directly on Powers’s (1973) insight that much of
human processing of stimuli from the environment was described by a control system rather
than a direct translation of inputs into outputs.
But even given this shared control imagery, the
subtle differences between the theories are an
excellent demonstration of the distinction that
we make here between personal and social theories of identity. They also illustrate the danger
of making this categorization seem too rigid.
Affect Control Theory was developed by
Heise (1979) by combining two psychological
research programs—Osgood’s work on the
measurement of affective meaning (Osgood
et al. 1957, 1975) and Gollob’s (1968) work
on impression formation—with Powers’s new
ideas about control systems. The resulting
theory had three elements. First, it used
Osgood’s work to create a measurement
system in which meanings were conceptualized on three dimensions of affective
meaning—evaluation (good-bad), potency
(powerful-powerless), and activity (livelyquiet). Measuring meaning on just these three
dimensions missed some nuances but allowed
all the elements of a social event (the actor, the
social action, the object-person at whom the
action is directed, and later emotions, setting,
nonverbal behaviors, status characteristics, etc.)
to be mapped into the same three-dimensional
space. The second element of the theory was an
empirical framework for describing how events
changed the meanings within a situation. Using
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a paradigm developed by Gollob, Heise combined identity labels and social behaviors into
simple event sentences (e.g., the mother slaps
the child) to study how the initial meanings of
the event elements (a mother, slapping someone, a child) would be transformed by their
combination in the event (what do you think—
on the three dimensions of affective meaning—
of a mother who has slapped a child?).
The third element of the theory is the
control system, adapted from Powers (1973),
which it shares with Identity Control Theory.
When social interaction deflects meanings away
from their stable, culturally determined values,
Affect Control Theory proposes that actors try
to create new events to bring the transitory,
situated meanings back into line with the stable, cultural meanings. Deflection of meanings
is defined mathematically, by the summed absolute differences between transient, situated
meanings for event elements (actor, behavior,
and object-person) and the culturally given reference values for each of those elements. The
search for a new event that, when enacted, will
minimize that deflection then becomes a search
for a three-number profile: the evaluation, potency, and activity of a behavior (what could X
do next to remedy the situation?), a new label
for the actor (what kind of a person would do
such a thing?), or a new label for the objectperson (what kind of a person would deserve to
have that happen to them?). Once the profile is
found, one can search a cultural “dictionary” of
affective meanings to find qualitative labels that
fit the affectively appropriate response.
The contrast between Affect Control Theory and the more recently developed Identity Control Theory is described extensively
in Smith-Lovin & Robinson (2006). The
theories differ in their approaches to measurement, formalization, and emotional response.
Here we emphasize only the differences in personal versus situational focus that are key to our
discussion.
The first contrast between the theories is the
reference level that is being maintained by the
control system in each theory. Identity Control Theory’s reference level is the internalized
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meanings that an actor incorporates into the
self-structure. In Affect Control Theory, people try to maintain meanings associated with
the entire situation—their own identities, the
identities of others, actions, and behavior settings (Smith-Lovin 1979). A second difference
flows directly from the first. In Affect Control Theory, the actions of others are explicitly
considered as possible remedies for meaningdeflecting events. In personal identity theories,
the assumption is that people operate to maintain their own identities. Affect Control Theory explicitly considers how a situation in which
meanings have been disrupted can be repaired
by any of the actors that are copresent in a situation, even those who were not involved in the
deflecting event.
Finally, the theories differ somewhat in their
assumptions about the stability of meaning.
Since Identity Control Theory focuses on personal, internalized identity meanings, much of
this research program looks at how these meanings shift as a result of interactions over a
period of sustained interactions (e.g., Stets &
Burke 2005). In Affect Control Theory, meanings are assumed to be quite stable and acquired
through long-term socialization processes from
the culture at large. Most extreme dislocations
of meaning that cannot be resolved behaviorally
are resolved through relabeling a person or action. Since both theories share the core control
imagery of Powers (1973), much research that
supports Affect Control Theory could support
either theory (e.g., Robinson & Smith-Lovin
1992, 1999), as well as self-consistency theories
from psychology. Work that is more distinctive to this theoretical tradition looks at features other than the central actor. For example,
one series of studies examines how emotion displays (which signal transient meanings and deflections from identity) lead to labeling after a
deviant act (e.g., Robinson et al. 1994). Another
looks at how people work to manage the identities of others, even at some cost to their own
self-image (C.L. Rogalin, D.T. Robinson, L.
Smith-Lovin, submitted manuscript).
Since Affect Control Theory focuses on the
situation, it often deals with identities that are
not core to an actor’s self-structure. SmithLovin (2007) reported an experiential sampling
study that found we actually spend most of our
time in such noncore identities. In fact, Affect
Control Theory had no real conceptualization
of a stable, organized self-structure during the
first three decades of its development (Heise
1979, Smith-Lovin & Heise 1988, MacKinnon
1994); it was a theory about roles, identities, and
situated action.
Recent developments, however, make clear
that the boundary between personal and social identity theories is indistinct and everchanging. MacKinnon & Heise (2010) develop
a control theory of the self that is based on Affect
Control Theory. The theory has two elements.
First, actors use a “cultural theory of people”—
the collection of categories and logical implications among them—as a menu of possibilities
for self-identification and understanding others. Second, when self-identity meanings are
deflected in one situation (and if those deflections cannot easily be behaviorally resolved),
then actors seek out other possible identities
in situations that, when maintained, will resolve
the deflection at the level of the self. Therefore,
although it uses the mathematical control system from Affect Control Theory, this new identity theory clearly moves back into the realm of
internalized, personal identity theories by concentrating on how people maintain a stable selfimage over a series of situational encounters. In
this case, they do so by agentically entering situations that place them in different identities
and lead to the experience of self-relevant situated meanings. Notice the similarity to the basic question posed (and answered) by Stryker’s
Identity Theory: How do people choose which
identities to enact, when they have a choice?
MacKinnon and Heise give a more formal answer to this question than Stryker, but they are
definitely building in his domain.
Having discussed how two very similar theories differ in their emphasis on personal versus
social/cultural focus, we now turn to a perspective that focuses on how contextual elements
affect self-meanings that are derived from category memberships. Social Identity Theory
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deals with cognitions about categories of ingroups and out-groups (Tajfel & Turner 1979).
Therefore, it would seem to be the prototype of
an intrapersonal identity theory. However, the
mechanisms described by the theory actually
center on the impact of the social environment
on those cognitions, placing this theory in the
situational/cultural category for our treatment
here. We emphasize those contextual elements
of the theory in our description of it.3
Social Identity Theory
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Social Identity Theory has its roots in work by
Tajfel during the late 1950s and 1960s on the
social factors that influence perception. It was
further developed with Turner in the 1970s and
1980s (Tajfel & Turner 1979, Turner & Tajfel
1982; see also Hogg 1992). Like all the theories we review here, Social Identity Theory
sees social actors as having multiple identities
that get activated by different social contexts.
Here, the emphasis is on category memberships
(e.g., being a Muslim or an Australian). When
a category membership becomes salient (relevant to the social context), self-perception and
conduct become in-group normative. Perceptions of other groups become out-group stereotypical. Depending on the nature of the relationship between the groups (e.g., whether it is
competitive or status-ranked), self- and otherperceptions can shift toward different types of
perceptual discrimination.
Unlike the control theories of identity
reviewed above, Social Identity Theory
assumes a self-enhancement motive. After
self-categorization occurs in the context of a
situation, actors are motivated to make comparisons that favor the in-group (and sometimes
disparage the out-group). The strength of this
tendency varies, depending on the potential for
mobility—it is stronger for immutable ascribed
categorizations (e.g., race, gender, nationality)
3
Other treatments (e.g., Stets & Burke 2000) have emphasized points of overlap between Social Identity Theory in
psychology and Identity Theory in sociology.
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than it is for achieved categorizations (e.g., educational degree status, membership on sports
teams), especially if the higher status is within
reach. Therefore, it is the social environment
and, in particular, the relevant group contrasts
within that environment that determine
what dimensions of self-perception, otherstereotyping, and intergroup competition/
discrimination occur. If I think of myself as an
American and I am in a social context where
the British are my out-group, I might think
of my American self as egalitarian (as opposed
to the class-oriented British). But if I am (still)
an American and I am comparing myself to
an Italian, I might think of myself as orderly
and institution-upholding (as opposed to the
unsettled, fractious Italians). The hypotheses
of Social Identity Theory typically focus on
how variations in the social situation (the
relevant out-groups, the beliefs about the
degree of mobility and social change possible,
etc.) influence the content of the operative
meanings for the in-group (i.e., situated self
meanings) and the out-group (stereotypes and
discrimination).
Notice that in Social Identity Theory, the
concept of salience has a very different meaning
from that in Identity Theory. In Stryker’s Identity Theory, identity salience is a stable part of
the self—a result of commitment (frequent and
affectively valued relationships to others). It is
something that actors carry from situation to
situation. In Social Identity Theory, salience is
conceptualized as the impact of the situation on
self-categorizations. I might be an American in
Paris, but at a Civil War reenactment, I am a
Southerner, and in the American Sociological
Association, I am a professor and a social
psychologist. And in each of these venues,
I might have different meanings for those
categorical identities, depending on the salient
out-group at the time. In comparing Tajfel’s
Social Identity Theory and Stryker’s Identity
Theory, Hogg et al. (1995, p. 263) noted
that Tajfel’s theory put more emphasis on
social context for identity and their meanings,
whereas the sociological Identity Theory
focused on self-structure for motivating the
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enactment of identities and long-term social
experience for the internalized meanings.
To end our section on situational/cultural
theories of identity, we turn to a theory that
is not considered an identity theory at all—the
Status Characteristics Theory branch of the expectation states theoretical research program.
We include the theory in this review not to
cover all of its rich contributions to microsociology, but to highlight the elements of the
theory that deal with the relationships among
identity and interaction. The increasing use of
the theory outside of its scope conditions by
identity researchers justifies its placement here.
Status Characteristics Theory
The intellectual roots of Status Characteristics
Theory are not in symbolic interaction, but in
the exchange tradition (Correll & Ridgeway
2003). When people work together on a task
and will be rewarded jointly for its successful
completion (the scope conditions of the theory), actors are motivated to assess who will
contribute most effectively to the task completion. The actors for whom task expectations
are the highest are given action opportunities,
receive positive evaluations, and have other interactional advantages. Actors’ characteristics
(e.g., gender, race) become important within
a situation when those characteristics are
evaluated by self and others, and are perceived
(either implicitly or explicitly) to be relevant
to expectations about task performance. The
theory’s core mechanism is that group members will exchange deference within the group
interaction for the high-expectation actors’
contributions to the task (resulting in higher
benefits for all group members, including the
lower-expectation ones).
Note, however, the similarities between
Status Characteristics Theory and Affect Control Theory (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1994).
Both theories posit that largely consensual
cultural meanings are imported into a situation
to organize action within that setting. Both
theories suggest that the identities (and, therefore, cultural meanings) that are relevant are
determined by the situation, not by an internal
self-structure. And both provide a generative
account of how action unfolds in the situation,
given these meanings. The fact that Status
Characteristics Theory is frequently now
applied outside of its scope conditions of collaborative, jointly rewarded task orientation—
which nullifies the exchange mechanism—
makes it closer to a situationally based identity
theory than the status-exchange theory of its
origins. Researchers in both the Affect Control
Theory and the Identity Control Theory traditions have used the theory to discuss how status
meanings organize action within social situations (Ridgeway & Smith-Lovin 1994, Rashotte
& Smith-Lovin 1997, Stets 1997, Stets &
Harrod 2004, Cast et al. 1999). For example,
Stets & Harrod (2004) find that actors in
higher-status positions have interactional
resources that allow them to sustain their
identity meanings within situations, avoiding
negative emotions that come with lack of
identity maintenance.
Having reviewed the systematically developed theories of identity and action that
emphasize internalized meanings and situational/cultural elements, respectively, we now
turn to a body of literature on collective identity that has a very different emphasis. Indeed, a review of this literature a decade ago
(Cerulo 1997) barely mentions social psychological theories. Here, we try to summarize
the differing emphasis of this substantial literature on collective identity and to draw out
connections between its treatment of identity
and the social psychological literature reviewed
above.
COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
The solidarity that derives from similarities is at its
maximum when the collective consciousness completely envelopes our total consciousness, coinciding
with it at every point.
—Emile Durkheim (1893)
The sociological literature on collective identity is less organized around distinct midrange
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theories than are the literatures on personal
identity and situated identity. Rather, it is a
wide-ranging literature coming out of a number of traditions, including cultural sociology, social movements theory, feminist sociology, and cognitive sociology. Consequently,
this section of our review is organized around
concepts and process rather than around specific theoretical traditions. We attempt to draw
connections between this vibrant literature
and the midrange microsociological theories
reviewed above.
The internal and situational identity processes reviewed in the section above can lead
identities to serve as an organizational force,
binding us to those with commonalities of interest and providing a social glue that can serve
as a foundation for mobilizing joint action. Collective identities should not be seen as a third
type of identity as much as an attempt by this
literature to highlight another set of identityrelated dynamics at the group level. Both internalized identities and situational identities can
underpin the sense of connection and shared
destiny requisite for collective identification.
Indeed, Nagel (1995, p. 21) refers to the collective variant of ethnic identity as “a dialectic between internal identification and external
ascription.”
Most definitions of collective identity
include a notion of identification with shared
features along with a recognition of shared
opportunities and constraints afforded by those
features (Melucci 1989). Taylor & Whittier
(1999, p. 170) define collective identity as the
“shared definition of a group that derives from
members’ common interests, experiences, and
solidarity.” A sense of we-ness, or connection
to other members of the group/category, is
an essential component of collective identity,
but the concept goes far beyond that. Prentice
et al. (1994) specifically distinguish between
group identities based on common bonds
(attachments to individual group members)
and those based on common identities (attachments directly to the group or category).
The latter form of attachment is necessary to
produce a collective identity.
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Psychologists working in the social identity
and self-categorization theoretical traditions
refer to the “collective self ” as nearly interchangeable with “social identity” as used in
those theories (Brewer & Gardner 1996) and
thus focus largely on its consequences for
self-definition and interpersonal judgment.
Sociological use of the term collective identity
focuses more on its consequences for mobilizing joint action. This is closer to what Heise
(1998) referred to as empathic solidarity. Heise
(1998, p. 197) defines empathic solidarity as
“a reciprocated sense of merged consciousness
and alliance, with faith in others’ commitments
to shared purposes.” Heise argues that when
people take on the same identity, experience
the same reality, and observe one another’s
parallel emotions and collateral behaviors,
a sense of common destiny and empathic
connection arises. It is this phenomenon,
operating at the group level, that makes the
sociological literature on collective identity
distinctive from the microsociological identity
literature that we review above.
Collective Identity and the
New Social Movements
A concern with understanding what mobilizes
joint action motivates much of sociology’s attention to collective identity. Collective identity is a central organizing concept in the literature on new social movements. New social
movement theory (Laraña et al. 1994; Melucci
1989, 1994; Offe 1985; Turner 1969) juxtaposes
modern (post-1960s) movements with earlier
social movements, arguing that contemporary
movements are less about Marxist-style conflict over material interests and more concerned
with identity meanings and other symbolic resources. For example, Turner (1969) related
protest participation to identity dynamics and
referred to the emerging number of “identity
seeking” movements. The identity dynamics
described by Turner focused on personal identities and the identification/disidentification
with various groups. Later researchers refined
the notion of collective identity as a group-level
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phenomenon (Melucci 1989, 1994) central to
giving a group or category the coherence and
energy necessary to mobilize its constituents
into collective action. Nearly a decade ago,
Polletta & Jasper (2001) reviewed the literature
on collective identity and social movements, revealing how identity processes are deeply related to all aspects of social movements, including (a) movement emergence, (b) recruitment
and participation, (c) movement strategy, and
(d) interpretation of outcomes (see Stryker et al.
2000).
Boundary Work
Taylor & Whittier (1999) describe three factors
that contribute to the development of a collective identity capable of motivating group-level
action: (a) the creation of social boundaries,
(b) the development and recognition of social
criteria that account for a group’s structural position, and (c) negotiation of intergroup and intragroup meanings. Boundaries identify who is
and is not a member of a collective, but it is
group consciousness that gives significance to a
collectivity (Taylor & Whittier 1999, p. 179).
In the case of mobilizing collective consciousness in response to a dominant group or oppressive understanding, this significance takes the
form of what Morris (1999) calls oppositional
consciousness. Strategies and practices used by
collectives to create, maintain, and transform
cultural categories are collectively referred to
as boundary work (Nippert-Eng 2002).
Gamson (1995) points out that fixed categories are the basis for both oppression and
political power. Consequently, boundary work
regarding collective identities such as race,
gender, and sexuality can sometimes vacillate
between taking on the goal of deconstructing boundaries (e.g., Lorber 2006) and taking on the goal of fixing the boundaries to
mobilize on the basis of them (e.g., Jenson
1995).
Within this theoretical tradition, Lamont
(1992) offered an in-depth analysis of the symbolic boundaries people draw when categorizing self and others in her comparative study of
upper-middle-class culture in France and the
United States. Her work suggests that boundary work around collective identities operates
multidimensionally and that the relative prominence of those dimensions can vary between
cultural settings (echoing some themes in Social
Identity Theory). Her analysis distinguished
between three types of symbolic boundaries:
moral, socioeconomic, and cultural. According
to Lamont’s research, French social and cultural specialists draw stronger cultural boundaries, while social and cultural specialists in
the United States attend more to economic
boundaries. More specifically, Lamont found
that boundary-drawing activities in the United
States vary with the degree to which they are
embedded in occupational structures that are
dependent on profit-making. U.S. social and
cultural specialists in the nonprofit sector felt
more similar to, and connected with, other nonprofit workers than to other social and cultural specialists who were dependent on profitmaking. In contrast, French social and cultural
specialists identified more with the intellectual
and cultural boundaries around their vocations
and less with the economic aspects.
The boundary work literature focuses
primarily on the strategies and practices that
groups use to construct collective identities
and to manage the symbolic boundaries around
those identities. However, theorists have also
attended to how external structures create
and constrain the emergence and salience of
collective identities. Again, this work picks
up some themes emphasized in the sociocultural/situational theories of identity in
microsociology.
Competition and Contact
Two opposing logics guide the theoretical literature regarding the impact of external forces
on the salience of collective identity boundaries
and the strength of collective identity bonds.
One is that direct competition strengthens
group boundaries and mobilizes collective
identity-based conflict. Competition theory
(Olzak 1994) argues that when economic and
demographic changes lead to a breakdown in
labor market segmentation, the increase in
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intergroup interaction and the intensification
of competition for scarce resources strain intergroup relations and, consequently, increase
collective identification—particularly ethnic
identification. Olzak and colleagues have
amassed considerable support for the idea that
increased economic competition leads to surges
in ethnic protests and collective action (Olzak
et al. 1994, 1996; Soule 1992). Nagel (1995),
on the other hand, found that cultural renewal
among Native Americans has taken place under
exactly the kinds of conditions that are thought
to produce cultural decline. One argument is
that positive economic conditions set the stage
for this renewal. According to Nagel, structural
externalities such as successful land claims,
increases in federal spending, and minority
set aside programs have increased the symbolic and material value of Native American
identity.
In contrast to the idea that increased
interaction and competition foster collective
identification, the cultural division of labor
theory proposes that group solidarity and
collective identity arise when groups are
distinctively positioned in an occupational
structure on the basis of cultural markers
(Hechter 1978, 2000). Occupational segregation increases intragroup interaction relative
to intergroup interaction and consequently
increases commonality of interests and futures.
Thus, when cultural and economic boundaries
overlap, collective identity will arise on the basis
of cultural, rather than economic, similarity.
Okamoto (2003) extended and synthesized
these contrasting arguments into a theory about
the shifting, layered nature of ethnic identities. In a study of the relationship between
economic competition, cultural division of labor, and pan-Asian identity, Okamoto found
that the collective identity boundaries tracked
the patterns of occupational segregation: When
Asian ethnic groups occupy a shared place in
the occupational market, pan-Asian identities
are more likely to emerge and mobilize panethnic collective action. When separate Asian
ethnic groups are segregated into different occupations, the separate ethnic identities remain
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salient and pan-ethnic collective action is suppressed.
Nested Identities
As Okamoto’s work highlights, boundary work
by collectives is not simply a matter of sharpening contrasts between competing groups or emphasizing distinctiveness from a larger oppressive culture. At times collective identification
is a process of crystallizing subgroup boundaries that fractionalize a larger whole, or melding subgroups into larger, cohesive collectives.
Green (1999) describes four groups of sectarian
evangelical Protestants whose efforts animated
the first wave of a Christian Right movement,
but whose intergroup conflicts ultimately contributed to the decline of the movement. The
success of a second wave of the Christian Right
movement, according to Green, was facilitated
by the development of a new collective identity
for these groups.
Similarly, in her study of the emergence of
a pan-tribal Native American identity, Nagel
(1995) described the process by which subgroups can join to form a larger common identity. She referred to ethnic renewal as the
process by which new ethnic identities are
built/rebuilt out of historical social and symbolic systems. Among Native Americans, a
shared history of discrimination and oppression, combined with some of the positive economic externalities described above, created a
common fate among ethnic groups with otherwise distinctive cultural histories. These developments facilitated the collective processes
(e.g., institution building via the establishment
of new organizations and religions) and cultural
practices (development of new shared rituals
and symbols) involved in ethnic renewal.
Identity, Emotions, and Mobilization
Close on the heels of renewed attention to
the role of identity in social movements has
been a revival of interest in how emotions
mobilize joint action. Scholars have recently
become more focused on how emotions create
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solidarity and energize collective bonds (Britt
& Heise 2000, Collins 1990, Gould 2004,
Heise 1998, Jasper 1998). Britt & Heise (2000)
point out that shared emotion is not enough
to generate collective identification and action.
Using arguments from Affect Control Theory,
Britt & Heise (2000) argued that negative emotions that are low energy and low potency (e.g.,
shame and depression) are not useful for activating collective bonds or motivating joint action.
In contrast, negative emotions that are higher
in energy and potency (e.g., anger) can motivate
individual participation in collective actions—
from mild protests to large-scale conflict. To
truly energize a mobilized collective identity,
however, requires both energy and a positive
sense of connection within the collective. Such
mobilization is facilitated, according to Britt
& Heise, by positive, powerful, and energetic
emotions like pride. Britt & Heise argued that
certain emotion transformations (e.g., shame to
pride) are difficult to make without transitioning between more affectively similar emotions
along the way. They illustrated how aspects
of participation in the gay rights movement
could be seen as efforts to transform shame to
fear to anger to pride in an effort to construct
a solidary and energized collective identity.
In a participant observation study of political
avoidance in several volunteer organizations,
Eliasoph (2002) examined the complement to
this process. Eliasoph studied how political disengagement is socially produced in interaction.
Her analysis focused on how individuals balanced ideas of citizenship with feelings of powerlessness. She described the process of “culture
work” done by volunteers working to address
political avoidance by transforming feelings of
powerlessness into expansion of self-interest. In
this way, Eliasoph showed how emotion transformation in an effort to protect personal identity can also inhibit activation and mobilization
of a collective identity.
Collective Identity and Modernity
Much has been written about the relationship
between modernity and contemporary loci of
collective identity. The conventional argument
is that social and institutional complexity of
late modernity (Giddens 1991) or postmodernity (Gergen 1991) has fractionalized the contemporary self. Wimmer (2002) speaks to this
idea in his study of nationalism and ethnicity,
but argues for the opposite relationship. According to Wimmer, contemporary notions of
identity are responsible for the emergence of
modernity. Wimmer distinguishes three positions on the issue of nationalism and ethnicity.
The first is that nations and ethnic groups are
truly modern phenomena. Second, nations and
ethnic groups as we currently understand them
are transitory—what he refers to as “birth pains
of modernity.” Third, national and ethnic identities are perennial and basic to human social
organization. Wimmer then presents what he
describes as a radical modern argument: that
ethnicity nationalism produced modernity as
we understand it. According to Wimmer, it was
the fusion of three notions of peoplehood that
resulted in the modern politicization of ethnicity: (a) the notion of the people as a sovereign
entity—with power by means of political (such
as democratic) procedures; (b) the notion of
people as citizens—with rights and responsibilities; and (c) the notion of people as an ethnic
community bound by common political destiny
and shared cultural features. The commingling
of these notions translated into three modern political principles: democracy, citizenship,
and national self-determination. Wimmer further argues that nations differ in the relative salience of these principles. According to
Wimmer, the French and Swiss emphasize
democracy and rely on the concept of democracy to derive the principles of citizenship and
nationalism. In contrast, Wimmer argues that
Germany, Greece, and Israel stress nationality
and from it derive the principles of democracy
and citizenship.
While social movement theorists focus
on both aspects of collective identity—
common interests/fate and common symbolic
meanings—there is a strong thread in the
modernity/postmodernity
literature
that
documents a shift over time in the relative
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importance of these two aspects in shaping
category-based action. Pre-1960s movements
are presumed to be motivated more by more
structural, ascriptive category memberships
and jointness of interest, whereas post-1960s
movements are thought to be driven more
by meaning-based bonds (Laraña et al. 1994,
Melucci 1994, Offe 1985). This argument about
the trend away from the importance of structurally defined group identities toward more
personally and culturally defined group identities parallels the findings in social psychology
about the transition (over a similar historical
period) from more structural/institutional definitions of self to more personal/dispositional
definitions of self (Turner 1976).
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Fractal Organization
of Identity Dynamics
Collective identities are to groups what social identities are to individuals (Owens 2003,
p. 227). Therefore, collective identity processes
can sometimes mirror the processes described
by the theories about internal and situational
identity dynamics reviewed above. The process
of boundary work, often fueled by competition
or contact, can lead to the development of an
identity, making it available for members of a
category to see themselves as having a common
set of interests or fate. Sometimes new labels
are developed and added to a culture’s “cultural
theory of people” (MacKinnon & Heise 2010),
making them available for individuals to adopt
and incorporate into a self-structure. Further,
intergroup dynamics can lead to situations that
allow groups and/or individuals to adopt different identity orientations at different moments
in a political/social process.
While identity accumulation theory (Thoits
1983, 2003) and self-complexity theory
(Linville 1987) argue that having access to
multiple role-identities can provide the self
with resources that help provide a buffer
against stress, the social movement literature
reveals that collective identities with layers
of nested identities can provide a movement
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with a richer set of resources for mobilizing
effective collective action (Heckathorn 1993,
Lichterman 1999, Oliver & Marwell 1988,
Richards 2004). Moreover, just as multiple
identities within self-structures can sometimes
lead to identity conflict, competing or layered identities within collectives can create
opportunities for conflict and fractionalization.
Richards (2004) illustrates this point with
her examination of the delicate balancing act
required to mobilize and maintain collective
identity in the ethnically and economically diverse women’s movements in Chile. She studied
the relationships between the poor, workingclass pobladoras, the indigenous Mapuche, and
the National Women’s Service (SERNAM).
Nested class and ethnic identities set the stage
for potential fractures among these various
groups involved in the women’s movement.
Both the pobladoras and the Mapuche describe
being left out of the programs implemented by
SERNAM. Pobladoras identified gender as important in explaining their activism—yet initially organized around roles as wives and
mothers. Richards describes how the pobladoras’
self-views became transformed through participation in the movement. Meanwhile, the
Mapuche claims of difference and disadvantage conflicted with SERNAM’s goal of equality/sameness, causing schisms in both discourse
and agendas. Richards’s work showed how
members of the women’s movement navigate
the danger of fragmentation by suppressing the
separate identities in the superordinate collective. This careful negotiation of a coherent,
integrated collective identity echoes the findings of Lichterman’s (1999) study of a sexual
minority activist group as it attempted to create and maintain a solidary collective identity
as a coalition-building network. Lichterman
found that compared to some of its constituent groups, the LGBT coalition-building
group actively avoided reflective discourse and
engaged in more unified talk carefully designed not to raise the specter of difference
or to activate potentially schismatic organizing
processes.
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CONCLUSIONS AND
OPPORTUNITIES
This review, with its unusual structure and its
coverage of the relatively disconnected literatures on identity within the microsociology and
social movements areas, is designed to allow
readers to see opportunities for enriching both
traditions. We deal first with the opportunity
for connections within the microlevel traditions
and then with potential for enrichment across
the two distinct literatures.
The relatively subtle distinction that we
have drawn between theories that emphasize
how self-structures and internalized meanings
organize social life, on the one hand, and how
we import cultural meanings and shape them
within the context of situated interaction, on
the other, points to a need for two types of new
research. While much of the microsociological
literature has used either surveys (to study
self-structure and internalized meanings) or
experiments (to study situated meanings and
how they shift in context), we may need new
study of naturally occurring situations to fully
exploit the linkages between internalized structure and situated action. Some insights from
Stryker’s Identity Theory could be linked to the
fast-growing literature on networks to develop
the linkage between commitment and salience
more fully and to explore how it impacts situated action. The new work by MacKinnon &
Heise (2010; see also Moore & Robinson 2006)
about how people use movement from one
situation to another to maintain fundamental
sentiments toward the self could be linked
to Thoit’s work on identity accumulation to
show how situated action accomplishes mental
health benefits (or, among some categories of
people, fails to do so). Exploring the few competing theoretical predictions from Identity
Control Theory and Affect Control Theory
(Smith-Lovin & Robinson 2006) might allow
us to assess the relative value of emic, individualized meaning measurement (as used in
Burke’s work) and mathematical formalization
(as used by Heise). It might also reveal some
scope conditions for when people privilege
internalized, idiosyncratic meanings over a
definition of situation that is institutionally
imposed.
Connections between the microsociological
literature and the group-level treatment of collective identity are more challenging. The obvious point of departure is that the people who are
motivated by collective identities toward political or social action are undergoing the processes
already well described by the microsociological
theories. This fact alone might provide some
leverage for determining when recruitment, reframing of a social situation, and mobilization
might succeed or fail. More interesting are the
ways in which the collective identity literature
can suggest new topics for microsociological research. Much of this literature focuses on the
structural conditions under which new options
are created for a definition of the situation. The
definition of the situation is a central process
in microsociological identity theories, but it is
rarely studied explicitly. The collective identity
literature’s use of Goffman’s framing concept,
and its attention to the inter- and intragroup
processes that successfully motivate actors to
view a contested situation in a new way, could
point to a useful exploration of these key processes at the microlevel. A second area of potential enrichment comes from the collective
identity focus on the group as a unit that generates social action. As we noted above, there
is a parallel between processes at the individual
and group levels, both in defining situations and
in generating action. Although theorists should
avoid loose analogies, the processes by which
groups manage multiple, nested, layered identities and use particular identities (and the emotional responses associated with them) to motivate organized collective action may mirror the
process of managing nested identity structures
within individual selves. An exploration of this
process might require a refocusing of attention
on group-level studies in microsociology. We
have excellent midlevel theories of group process in sociological social psychology, and they
are becoming increasingly connected intellectually to the issue of identity [see, for an excellent example, Lawler et al.’s (2009) new book
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on affective commitments to groups]. We need
to push these developments to see how groups
organize actions vis-à-vis other outside grouplevel interests.
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings that
might be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2010.36:477-499. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
by Vanderbilt University on 01/03/12. For personal use only.
We thank Tiffani Everett, Steven Foy, Robert Freeland, Elizabeth Hordge-Freeman, Christopher
D. Moore, Victor Ray, Kim Rogers, Daniel B. Shank, and Allison Wisecup for helpful comments
on an earlier draft of this review.
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www.annualreviews.org • Three Faces of Identity
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of Sociology
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Contents
Volume 36, 2010
Frontispiece
John W. Meyer p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p xiv
Prefatory Chapter
World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor
John W. Meyer p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 1
Theory and Methods
Causal Inference in Sociological Research
Markus Gangl p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p21
Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences
Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p49
Social Processes
A World of Standards but not a Standard World: Toward a Sociology
of Standards and Standardization
Stefan Timmermans and Steven Epstein p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p69
Dynamics of Dyads in Social Networks: Assortative, Relational,
and Proximity Mechanisms
Mark T. Rivera, Sara B. Soderstrom, and Brian Uzzi p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p91
From the Sociology of Intellectuals to the Sociology of Interventions
Gil Eyal and Larissa Buchholz p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 117
Social Relationships and Health Behavior Across the Life Course
Debra Umberson, Robert Crosnoe, and Corinne Reczek p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 139
Partiality of Memberships in Categories and Audiences
Michael T. Hannan p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 159
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Institutions and Culture
What Is Sociological about Music?
William G. Roy and Timothy J. Dowd p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 183
Cultural Holes: Beyond Relationality in Social Networks and Culture
Mark A. Pachucki and Ronald L. Breiger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 205
Formal Organizations
Annu. Rev. Sociol. 2010.36:477-499. Downloaded from www.annualreviews.org
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Organizational Approaches to Inequality: Inertia, Relative Power,
and Environments
Kevin Stainback, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, and Sheryl Skaggs p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 225
Political and Economic Sociology
The Contentiousness of Markets: Politics, Social Movements,
and Institutional Change in Markets
Brayden G King and Nicholas A. Pearce p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 249
Conservative and Right-Wing Movements
Kathleen M. Blee and Kimberly A. Creasap p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 269
The Political Consequences of Social Movements
Edwin Amenta, Neal Caren, Elizabeth Chiarello, and Yang Su p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 287
Comparative Analyses of Public Attitudes Toward Immigrants
and Immigration Using Multinational Survey Data: A Review
of Theories and Research
Alin M. Ceobanu and Xavier Escandell p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 309
Differentiation and Stratification
Income Inequality: New Trends and Research Directions
Leslie McCall and Christine Percheski p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 329
Socioeconomic Disparities in Health Behaviors
Fred C. Pampel, Patrick M. Krueger, and Justin T. Denney p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 349
Gender and Health Inequality
Jen’nan Ghazal Read and Bridget K. Gorman p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 371
Incarceration and Stratification
Sara Wakefield and Christopher Uggen p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 387
Achievement Inequality and the Institutional Structure of Educational
Systems: A Comparative Perspective
Herman G. Van de Werfhorst and Jonathan J.B. Mijs p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 407
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Historical Studies of Social Mobility and Stratification
Marco H.D. van Leeuwen and Ineke Maas p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 429
Individual and Society
Race and Trust
Sandra Susan Smith p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 453
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Three Faces of Identity
Timothy J. Owens, Dawn T. Robinson, and Lynn Smith-Lovin p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 477
Policy
The New Homelessness Revisited
Barrett A. Lee, Kimberly A. Tyler, and James D. Wright p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 501
The Decline of Cash Welfare and Implications for Social Policy
and Poverty
Sandra K. Danziger p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 523
Indexes
Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 27–36 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 547
Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 27–36 p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p p 551
Errata
An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Sociology articles may be found at
http://soc.annualreviews.org/errata.shtml
Contents
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