Intelligence and Complexity Theory *
099
Mircea MOCANU, PhD**
The present security environment displays a wide variety of challanges
and sofisticated risks and threats relevant in the field of global security. In
Clausewitzian view, these features underline the uncertainty of the security
environment and an increase in intensity for the risk management activities,
where the intelligence domain contributes significantly. This contribution
reveals the open system characteristics of intelligence, which allows this
activity to be approached from the perspective of system theory.
In this context, the whole risk management problem can also be
considered in terms of the complexity theory, and several concepts of this
scientific discipline are relevant for understanding the role of intelligence and
for improving intelligence support in risk management. Among these, the
concept of «surprise» stands out because of its consequences upon stability
and security at both global and national level.
Key words: intelligence, complexity theory, fractal, surprise, warning,
open system, risk management, operational planning.
1. The increased complexity of the present security environment 1
Comparing with the Cold War times, when the security environment was
conveniently described by the posture of the force structures maintained by the
nations, the present and the future display an eclectic content of the international
security, including diverse components (economic-financial, cultural-religious,
sanitary-epidemiologic, environmental, informational). The economic and
financial crisis triggered in 2008 and agravated in Europe by the case of Greece,
starting with 2011, is already a strong argument for this change.
*
This paper elaborates on sections of Mircea Mocanu, A Novel Vision on the Intelligence Cycle in the
Conditions of the Network Centric Warfare, PhD thesis defended at National Defence University "Carol I",
Bucharest, July 6, 2013.
**
Col (ret) Mircea Mocanu, BE, PhD, has worked as head of Analysis, Military Intelligence, Ministry of
National Defence of Romania, and head Production Branch, IMS INT, NATO HQ, Bruxelles, Belgium. E-mail:
[email protected].
1
This section uses parts of Mircea Mocanu and Ilie Botoş, Long Term Analysis and the Multiple Future Concept,
presented at "Power Balance and Security Environment" conference, Centre for Strategic, Defence and Security
Studies, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, November 17-18, 2011, vol II, pp. 33 - 46.
Among the above mentioned components, the economy stands out as the
most relevant for its impact on the security environment. In that respect, Stephen
Flanagan notices that "the potential of economic globalization to wreak great
turmoil rapidly is becoming more evident"2, and Richard Kugler states that "the
coming era likely will be one in which economics and security share center stage in
determining how the World evolves"3.
An example proving the value of considering points of view pertaining to
areas non-specific to security is the annual study published each January by the
World Economic Forum in Geneva (WEF)4. In the 2011 issue, WEF identifies
35 risk factors inflicting upon the World economy and discusses their likelihood
and economic impact. In the 2012 Global Risks Report, WEF presents the
evolving perception of these risks, which indicates the growth in the likelihood
and impact of the financial-economic risks. The 2013 Report points out to the
dynamics of the risks compared to 2012, which adds value to the estimate. In
2014, the WEF Report underlines the systemic and interdependent nature of the
main 31 global risks. Global conflicts are rated as having among the most severe
economic impacts, along with financial crises and climate change. However,
they have a rather low likelihood, compared to many other risks, among which
failure of global governance, organized crime, terrorism, corruption, migration,
and failed states have a significant impact upon the security environment. In the
2015 Report though, interstate conflicts are considered instead of global
conflicts, probably due to the crisis in Ukraine. In January 2015, conflicts are
assessed very high in both probability and impact, followed closely by water
crises, failure of adaptation to climate change, and unemployment.
2
Stephen Flanagan, Meeting the Challenges of the Global Century, in Richard L. Kugler and Ellen L. Frost
(coord.), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security, Institute for National Strategic Studies /
National Defense University, Washington, DC, 2001, p. 11.
3
Richard L. Kugler, Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles, in Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost,
Op.cit., p. 75.
4
* * *, Global Risks Report 2011, World Economic Forum, p. 3, accessed at 14.10 2011, Global Risks Report
2012, 22.01.2012, pp. 4 - 6, accessed at 27.01.2012, Global Risks Report 2013, 07.01.2013, pp. 4 - 5, 45 - 54,
accessed at 17.01.2013, Global Risks Report 2014, 16.01.2014, pp. 9 - 10, accessed at 19.01.2014, and Global
Risks Report 2015, p. 3, accessed at 30.01 2015, all published at www.weforum.org/reports.
Consequently, there is a growing entropy in international security
developments, which underlines the complexity of today's security environment,
considering complexity in its most general meaning. An increase in the
complexity of the very security structures can also be noticed, since "complexity
is not just in the problem - looking for terrorists or WMD in Iraq - but in the
organization doing the looking" 5.
2. Intelligence system as open system 6
The main meaning of intelligence support to military decisionmakers
places military intelligence as a sub-system of the superior system, the decisionmaking realm, which includes the commanding officer, his staff, the upper
bodies of the National Defence Ministry or other organizations of the Defence,
Law Enforcement and National Security System. So, intelligence support acts
inside another function of security / military, namely the function of risk management or operational planning, respectively: "it is crucial to recognize that
warning [as a function of intelligence] is one piece of a larger risk management
system"7. In the same time, the practical destination of intelligence products,
namely the integration of «actionable» intelligence into decision and concrete
action casts more light upon the relations between intelligence activities and the
realities of the security environment, military organization or operational situation.
Between the decisionmaking system, performing risk management, and
the intelligence sub-system, transfers of all systemic components are conducted:
resource transfers (material, energy, personell), information transfers and
suprastructure transfers (rules, directions, performance reports). The major
5
Paul Bracken, How to Build A Warning System, in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, Managing
Strategic Surprise. Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK, 2008, p. 23.
6
This section uses parts of Mircea Mocanu, Military Intelligence as Open System, presented at the interntional
scientific conference Strategies XXI: "The Complexity and Dynamism of the Security Environment", Centre for
Strategic, Defence and Security Studies, National Defence University Publishing House, Bucharest, November 21-22,
2013, vol II, pp. 276 - 285.
7
Paul Bracken, Op.cit., How to Build A Warning System, in Paul Bracken, Ian Bremmer and David Gordon, Op.
cit., p. 42.
interest interaction - the information exchange - belongs to the general
information flow represented by the classic model of the intelligence cycle,
which includes the phases of Direction - Collection - Analysis - Dissemination.
The interaction between the intelligence structure (J2) and Command and
Control (C2) / the decision-making domain of the security or military system is
basically conducted through two points of the intelligence cycle. One is the
point allowing the transfer of intelligence requirement and beneficiary feed-back
towards J2. The second point is dissemination itself, which marks the delivery of
the intelligence product from J2 to the decisionmakers. These two moments of
the intelligence work are considered to be the most tricky precisely on the
grounds that these «gates» are the very contact points between the intelligence
subsystem and the C2 system, they are not internal links inside one system.
The two «gates» of the intelligence cycle marking the point of entry for
the intelligence requirements and the point of exit for the intelligence products
from the intelligence structures materialize the fact that the intelligence structure
is an open system. So, the conceptual model named intelligence cycle, which
describes the intelligence activity, defines the intelligence flow which crosses
both the intelligence structures and compartments of the beneficiary, which do
not belong to intelligence organisations. Consequently, the beneficiary - actor of
the decisionmaking / C2 system, not belonging to J2 - is, however, integral part
of the intelligence cycle.
The communication gates towards the C2 / risk management superior
system also clarify other two relations between the two systems:
- on one hand, they reveal the mechanism of transfering the Clausewitzian
friction within the operational environment or - writ large - within the security
environment8. Thus, the intelligence support provided by J2 as open system sets
the core role of intelligence as a tool to control the Clausewitzian friction of the
8
Barry Watts argues the persistance of Clausewitzian uncertainty in the conditions of the Information Age in his
paper Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Papers nr. 68, NDU Press, Institute for National Strategic
Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2004.
conflict, even in the phase previous to military engagement, which is outside a
Clausewitzian conflict.
- on the other hand, the communication theory allows us to see a
significant feature of dissemination, the energy transfer, in psychological terms.
This transfer operates in the volitve domain, and activates the motivation to start
action by the decision based on the intelligence products.
It is clear that the intelligence structures have more «windows» to interact
with the exterior, along the links of the intelligence cycle, as follows:
- Firstly, during the phase of Direction, the intelligence activities are
conducted under the authority of the head of the respective structure. However,
the authority of responsible staffs at different levels is also relevant in the
process, and even the authority of individuals with various responsibilities at
lower echelons of the organization. In the reverse sense, the intelligence
structures report to higher authorities on their activity and make suggestions for
organisation development.
- Secondly, during the Collection phase of the intelligence cycle, the
intelligence structure interacts directly with reality, with the security /
operational environment, from where it obtains the necessary data and
information through activities pertaining to the intelligence collection
disciplines. These interactions are alien to the C2 / decisionmaking system, and
represent, from a systemic point of view, injections of information. These
injections generate intelligence products elaborated according to J2 objectives
and procedures, and destined for the decisionmaking system.
Besides their clandestine nature, the complexity and sensitivity of
intelligence collection activities can be explained by the complications entailed
by the transfer of information between two different systems, one of them, the
operational / security system having a high level of entropy.
Thus, the points of contact with the environment outside the intelligence
structures are shown in the model of the intelligence cycle presented in Figure 1.
They underline the open system characteristic of the intelligence structure,
which has significant implications on the research of the intelligence support.
Higher Authorities
Feed-back
Beneficiaries
Intelligence
Support
Dissemination
Direction
Intelligence
Security
Environment
Collection
Structure
Information
Sources
Analysis
Fig. 1. Communication gates between the intelligence structure and the environment
Practically, J2 and the security environment interact both directly and
through the decisionmaking system of the security macro-system, exchanging
information and energy flows meant to control the Clausewitzian friction in
favour of the party served by the intelligence structure.
3. Intelligence support seen through complexity theory
The open system features allow intelligence activities to be framed in
concepts which reflect open system transfers and provide the opportunity to
study intelligence support using the tools of complexity theory. Recent research
intended to support the intelligence processes with objective parameters
associate security systems to the concept of «complex system», this approach
being operational, in a similar manner, to the security environment, in general.
This kind of systems are called complex systems because "their general
behaviour cannot be limited to a sum of features specific to individual
components"9 of the system. The interction of system components generate
system features which do not reflect features of any individual component, and
the system response to stimuli is not linear. This is simple to verify for the
9
Henrik Jeldtoft Jensen, Foreword to James Moffat, Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, CCRP
Series, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2004, p. xi - xiii.
international security environment, especially considering the effects of
globalization and the growth in the relevance of non-state actors.
More exactly, the information flows and the capacity to absorb external
shocks define the security environment and the intelligence organization as
complex adaptive systems.
Complex systems are sensitive to perturbations, even limited, cannot be
studied in isolation, ignoring the relationing with the external environment,
show correlations among distant components of the system and can display
adaptation capabilities, the intelligent systems even learning capabilities10. For
example, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are of utmost importance
mainly by their dovetailed effects than by their immediate impact, because they
triggered a paradigm change in strategic deterrence, a historical transition the
mankind is still living and coping with. Similarly, the colapse of real estate
credits in US revealed malfunctions of the global financial system which led to
the economic-financial crisis triggered last decade, still inflicting the whole
World, and showing only shy signs of departing. The quick action of these
perturbations is facilitated by the specifics of Information Age, is present in
multiple fields, and involve deeply the decision level at national level, as well as
the intergovernmental organizations.
In the military, the Effects Based Operations (EBO) have been dealt
with11 from the following perspectives:
a. Integrated planning strategy, implying speed and continuity;
b. Optimized targeting to serve the intended higher effect;
c. Gaining supremacy (in various domains and engagement spaces) with
speed, to enforce the decisive feature of the effect;
d. Sinergy of power elements in comprehensive approach;
10
James Moffat, Op.cit., Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, pp. 7 - 43.
Joshua Ho, The Advent of A New Way of War: Theory and Practice of Effects-based Operations, Institute for
Defence and Strategic Studies Singapore, December 2003, pp. 9 – 13, accessed at 09.05.2012 at
http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/WorkingPapers/WP57.pdf.
11
e. Interaction and cooperation at all levels with all relevant actors, in order
to overcome the uncertainty generated by a complex and adaptive opponent;
f. Utilization of the Network Centric Warfare (NCW) concept, to secure
the operational sinergy in wider and effective format, by exploiting selfsincronization and distribution of capacities.
This approach sees the enemy also as a complex adaptive system and the
conflict as a relation between such systems, acting and adapting to environment
in a non-linear manner, which gives these systems very low predictibility12.
This approach also allows the most important concepts of complexity
theory to be interpreted with significant benefits in terms of intelligence, and,
this way, they contribute to improvements in J2 activity, especially in the
conditions of today's conflicts and NCW requirements.
4. Relevant concepts from complexity theory
The way mathematics can be applied to complex systems has been
examined by James Moffat, who takes into consideration the laws of non-linear
physics, chaos theory, and terms like state of equilibrum, external constraints,
event correlation. Research shows that relation between complexity and the
information-based conflict is less deterministic than the conflict specific to the
Industrial Age, is less driven by physics and more driven by relations. This
underlines the importance of human involvement in security phenomena. Thus,
in the Information Age, command and control highlight the speed of decision
and action, information distribution and decentralization, which are precisely
core features of NCW.
The forecast of future developments in complex system required
analogies with physical, economic or biologic systems, starting with the very
Brownian movement, simple model of random dynamics. In such cases, open
12
Edward A. Smith Jr., Effects Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War,
CCRP Series, Department of Defense, Washington DC, 2002, p. 26.
systems, which respond to external stimuli / constraints with behaviour changes
show dissipative reactions, undergo internal symmetry breakings, can develop
various modes of behaviour to stimuli (including self-organisation), internal
emergent groupings in time and space, as well as corellations among responses
to perturbations13.
In the military, the over-mathematization of security phenomena, for
example, in the case of implementing EBO, raises the danger of blocking the
system and can lead to the colapse of planning by overcoming the analyst
capability to track a large number of variables quickly enough, especially
considering the unpredictibility of human factor. However, in the absence of any
pressure to prematurely implement EBO in real operations, the mathematic
approach maintains its theoretic value and can provide explanations, solutions,
and valuable tools to increase the risk management effectiveness in security
systems or military planning.
The value of mathematic tools in modeling complexity shows in
researches of issues like the (non-linear) behaviour of open systems which can
absorb energy injections, information flows between open systems, as well as
representation, development and use of knowledge. For long term prognosis in
intelligence, the research of knowledge highlights the mechanisms of corellation
identification in high entropy systems, such as the international security
environment. These investigation methods for the future use procedures based
on the patterns identified in the system behaviour, and on the consideration of all
imaginable perturbation factors capable to alter the evolution of reality. A good
example is the shock test applied by NATO researchers during the Multiple
Future Project conducted by the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) to
generate a projection of the Future Security Environment.
13
James Moffat, Op.cit., Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, pp. 3 – 8.
A quick scrutiny of the way the complexity theory concepts match the
international security system should start with the simplest situation, i.e. the
state of normality or, in military terms peacetime.
In complexity theory language, this corresponds to state of equilibrum to
which complex systems tend to evoluate, by their tendency to establish
assymptotically stable rapports. Intelligence serves this trend by its function of
intelligence support, more exactly by the construction of intelligence
superiority14. This functional category of intelligence support allows both the
understanding of evolutions and correlations within the security environment,
and the support for diplomatic options to solve the tense situations of forestall
conflicts before they degenerate. As mentioned before, the efforts to
assymptotically stabilize the security environment are conducted by information
flows and energy flows. Here, the energy transfer side is represented by the
functional category called warning.
The action of intelligence structures occurs inside the cognitive domain of
NCW, and the decisions taken as a result of intelligence support (and other
informational contributions) contain elements called control parameters in the
complexity theory. These parameters define spaces of possbilities for action
(corresponding to courses of action in military planning), and serve to adjust the
security / operational situation variables in order to reach a minimum of the loss
function defined in risk management, i.e. a minimum of the difference between
the real situation and the desired situation.
Looking at the process in the mirror, the intelligence structure tracks the
control parameters used by the adversary, looking to extrapolate their values
when producing prognoses. In the attempt to leave no possibility uncovered, the
intelligence structures group these parameters according to their effects, in sets
of indicators which correspond to thresholds or stages of the courses of action
14
Three functional cathegories have been proposed by Mircea Mocanu in Op.cit. A Novel Vision on the
Intelligence Cycle in the Conditions of the Network Centric Warfare (2013), pp. 109 - 125: construction of
intelligence superiority, warning, and integration into action.
considered as possible to occur. In the complexity theory, these sets of parameters
correspond to the modes of behaviour specific to complex systems. Given that
the security environment and the security systems are subject to human
intervention, their state function is non-linear. Therefore, its representation by an
«objective function» to be optimised by system theory methods is very
complicated and, I dare say, impossible to apply consistently.
5. Functional intelligence issues in complexity theory terms
The adjustments based on intelligence support allow the intelligence
structures to contribute to the realisation of self-organisation as a characteristic of
the emergent complex behaviour of the international security environment.
By Warning, J2 identifies points of criticality which manifest in time and
space within the security environment / operational situation. By the «anomaly
indications» they seek, intelligence analysts identify possible symmetry breakings
as defined in complex systems. For open systems, the energy injections from
outside may act as nonequilibrum constraints which, in security terms, means
political tensions or military threats, when hostile intentions are present.
Criticality points defined in complex systems lead to «turbulences» which
security systems need to absorb by mitigation measures taken in the risk
management activity, the same way, in open complex systems, "the
nonequilibrum enables the system to transform part of the energy communicated
from the environment into an ordered behaviour of a new type: the «dissipative
structure»"15. Obviously, in the case of the security system of any country,
intelligence activity is the first element to contribute to the dissipation of energy
applied from outside by political pressure or military threat. Therefore, risk
management is an activity specific to a «dissipative system». Analysis is
continued in the evaluation of the probable evolution corresponding to the
15
James Moffat, Op/cit. Complexity Theory and Network Centric Warfare, p. 8.
«trajectory of phase space» specific to the adversary's policy, in a historic
perspective, that is prognosed as the dynamics of the most probable actions.
Similarly, the regime / state called «attractor» in complexity theory, can
be associated to the generally characteristic behaviour of a certain international
actor, its trend to pursuit and achieve its national interests, or, for the operational
domain, its specific military doctrine, its traditional way to wage war. Military
intelligence needs to track adversary's actions considering its attractor, yet
always ready to take into account any action apparently opposite to this
attractor, in order to be able to avoid surprise.
Considering the hostile posture manifested by various actors in the
security environment, surprise, as element of the Clausewitzian friction, presents
a special interest from the point of view of complexity theory, because is exactly
the element capable to trigger a decisive evolution for the state of the security
environment. Recent studies pointed out that surprise will remain a factor of
conflict friction in the future because, "if the roots of surprise lie in aspects of
human perceptions and uncertainties too basic for technological advances to
affect, much less eliminate, then it is difficult to see why this source of friction
would diminish in the magnitude of its prospectives effects on future war"16. So,
the complex character of surprise as an element of Clausewitzian friction is
underlined by the intervention of human component, and this becomes the more
unpredictible, the greater the stress of the unexpected situation is. It has been
stated, however, that "surprise is a feature of complexity, not only one of the
uncertainty"17.
The interpretation I suggest for surprise in terms of complexity theory is
based on the ideea that surprise is meant to increase to maximum the
Clausewitzian friction perceived by the adversary, by generating non-linear
evolutions as difficult to control by the surprised party as possible. Simmetry
16
Barry D. Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Papers nr. 68, NDU Press, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, 2004, p. 42.
17
Paul Bracken, Op.cit., How to Build ..., în Paul Bracken et.al., Op.cit., Managing Strategic Surprise..., p. 23.
breakings and turbulences in complex adaptive systems are similar to
manoeuvres and rhythm breakings as terms used in tactics or in situations of
political tensions / crises, can generate series of quick cascaded events,
apparently incoherent, which are called clusters in complexity theory. "These
clusters or avalanches of local interaction are constantly being created and
dissolved accross the system"18 by the effect of adaptation, specific to adaptive
complex systems or are absorbed in the process of building an order in
nonequilibrum which corresponds to the measures taken in crisis management.
"Such emergent order rises in open systems where energy and/or information
are allowed to flow accross the boundaries of the system"19.
If, however, these clusters overcome the response capability of an actor or
concatenates overwhelmingly, they generate the psychological effect of a major
surprise, which can impact decisively on the success of the military operation or
of a political confruntation. So, the actions with surprise value overwhelm the
surprised party's capability to control the Clausewitzian chaos of the confruntation.
Therefore, adversary's actions become chaotic, in their turn, with no continuity
with previous actions, no coherence, and failing to cover logical zones, thus
leading to a radical change of the previous situation. In complexity theory, such
low predictibility evolutions are called fractals or fractal evolutions, and
examples of them are from the simplest, like the rise of a grass blade or the
thunder, to the most complicated, like natural cataclisms or historic revolutions.
I propose the association of the concept of surprise, from the military or
security domain, with the concept of fractal / fractal evolution from the complexity
theory, on the ground of the chaotic, unmenageable feature, and of the decisive
nature of surprise events upon the state of the system, at the level such events
occur. The dimensions and gravity of the strategic surprise impact causes the
radical change of the political or operational situation, panic following non18
James Moffat, Adapting Modeling and Simulation for Network Enabled Operations, CCRP Series, Department
of Defense, Washington DC, 2011, p. 26.
19
Idem.
linear evolutions, apparently disproportionate, which break the previous events'
logic. Concrete examples can be the breaking of the front, panicked withdrawal,
the loss of troop control, leading to capitulation - in the military domain - or the
dissolution of central institutions, anarchy, fall of the government, monarch's
abdication or president's resignation, or the loss of national sovreignty - in the
political realm.
Aiming to control the Clausewitzian friction, intelligence support
significantly contributes to the efforts to control the complexity of the security /
operational environment. This action is conducted along the lines of the three
functional cathegories proposed for the intelligence support to decisionmaking:
- firstly, during the periods of low Clausewitzian friction, corresponding
to the state of normality of the complex adaptive system, intelligence
support contributes to bulding informational dominance by the
functional category I termed construction of intelligence superiority.
Thus, intelligence structures contribute to situation awareness and to
secure the base for security system's option to generate, when necessary,
turbulences or clusters opposing adversay's interests, or even decisive
fractal evolutions to surprise the adversary in order to bend his will;
- then, as the Clausewitzian friction increases, when a threat is identified
or a risk escalates, intelligence support assures avoiding surprise by the
functional category called warning. Practically, the intelligence structure
contributes to own security system protection by diminishing or
eliminating the possibility that the system be subject to turbulences or
fractal evolutions which might overcome system's control capcitity.
Also by warning, the intelligence structures identify vulnerabilities of
the opponent and favourable conditions able to be exploited in a certain
situation as opportunities for decisions aiming to surprise the adversary
by planning turbulences or events which can trigger fractals beyond
adversary's capabilities to control;
- thirdly, during maximum Clausewitzian friction periods, for example
during major international political crises or armed conflicts, the
intelligence structures, operating closely or even integrated with the other
operational planners in C2, deliver at high pace products containing
«actionable» intelligence. Such valuable contents integrates immediately
into action to contribute to the control of the turbulences or fractal
evolutions that the own system faces. This way, intelligence contributes
to the construction of an order in non-equilibrum, i.e. to crisis
management, respectively to operational planning and military action.
Conclusions
Following the interpretation of intelligence role in the transfer of
Clausewitzian friction to the adversary and the argumentation for the open
system feature of the intelligence structures, the research into complexity theory
allows rephrasing intelligence role using today's thoretical concepts of wide
generality.
The natural interpretation of the complexity theory concepts in terms of
intelligence activities facilitates the development of theoretic constructions and
conceptual progresses useful for improving the crisis management efforts or
intelligence support for military decision.
Therefore, the research of intelligence domain through complexity theory
eyes is worth to be followed by the the study and interpretation of C2 / crisis
management / operational planning from the same scientific prespective.
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