STATE v MOARO 2008 3 BLR 35 HC
Citation: 2008 3 BLR 35 HC
Court: High Court, Lobatse
Case No: Crim Trial No 51 of 2006
Judge: Kirby J
Judgement Date: February 18, 2008
Counsel: M Mokgosi with her S Mbikiwa for the State.rnT Rubadiri for the accused.rn
Flynote
Criminal law - Murder - Defence - Insanity as defence - Onus on accused person to establish
insanity at relevant time - Onus need not be discharged out of accused's own mouth - Expert witness
testimony establishing the accused having suffered psychotic episode when killing deceased.
Headnote
The accused was charged with murder for stabbing the deceased in the neck with a knife. The
accused raised the defence of insanity.
Held: (1) The central issue was whether the accused, at the time of the incident, was not criminally
responsible because he was incapable, through a disease affecting his mind, of understanding what
he was doing.
(2) The expert witness concluded that the accused was suffering from anti-social personality
disorder as an on-going condition. The accused's F behaviour in killing the deceased was not simply
anti-social but could be described as a brief psychotic episode.
(3) The onus was on an accused person to establish his insanity at the relevant time in order to rely
on the defence. State v Saamu [1989] B.L.R. 191 approved.
(4) The onus of proving insanity need not be discharged out of the G accused's own mouth. In this
matter the real evidence of the accused's state of mind came from the government psychiatrist.
(5) The proper basis, with reasons, must be laid for the expert's opinion, who must provide guidance
on matters outside the judge's normal field of knowledge.
(6) It had been established on a balance of probabilities that in all likelihood the accused had
suffered a psychotic episode when he had killed the H deceased.
Case Information
Cases referred to:
Desai and Another v The State [1985] B.L.R. 582
Motswaiso v The State [1990] B.L.R. 667
State v Gaopatwe [1997] B.L.R. 522
State v Kgosinaga [2007] 2 B.L.R. 772, CA
State v Masinga [1990] B.L.R. 47
A
State v Modisaotsile [1993] B.L.R. 102
State v Mothibamela 1968-1970 B.L.R. 251
State v Saamu [1989] B.L.R. 191
TRIAL of accused charged with murder. The facts are sufficiently stated in the judgment.
B
M Mokgosi (with her S Mbikiwa) for the State.
T Rubadiri for the accused.
Judgement
KIRBY J:
The accused has pleaded not guilty to the murder by stabbing of his C cousin Lungile
Ndlangamandla. She died on the morning of 27 February 2006 in her home in New Canada,
Gaborone, and following formal admissions made by the defence it is common cause that the cause
of her death was shock resulting from a single stab wound to the neck inflicted with a large kitchen
knife by the accused.
The court was informed that the accused was raising the defence of D insanity, and the central issue
in the trial was whether at the time of the incident he was not criminally responsible because he was
incapable through a disease affecting his mind of understanding what he was doing, or of knowing
that he ought not to do what he did.
Unchallenged evidence was led and witness statements were admitted which establish the following
sequence of events before and after Lungile's E death.
The accused, at 23 years old, had just completed his third year at Monash University in South
Africa. He had failed his examinations but had not yet informed his parents of this and was staying
at home prior, they thought, to returning to college. On the evening of 26 February 2006, he drove to
the house of his aunt on an errand for his mother. He was to collect rental, F which he did, and he
was also given money by his aunt to settle her water and power bills. He arranged to return the next
morning to bring back computer software he had borrowed from the deceased.
The next morning, 27 February 2006, shortly before 9 am the accused drove to the deceased's home,
where she was alone. He knocked and was admitted. He was on good terms with his cousin, though
not in any relationship, G and they chatted, he said, about academic issues. Both had failed and an
argument developed over who had failed worst. The only living witness as to what transpired
thereafter is the accused and his version of events, despite earlier denials which I will advert to later,
is as given in an admitted confession made before a judicial officer on 3 March 2006, and repeated
on oath in evidence before this court. I will quote his own words in the confession: H
'... we sat there continuing our conversation which built up to an argument. I unnecessarily lost
my temper because of the argument. I slapped her and she fell down. Her face turned
bluish/purplish. I got scared. I don't know what happened with my head. I was confused
KIRBY J
A
thinking she is dead. I went to the kitchen and got a knife and put it in her neck. From there I
ran to the bedroom and got T-shirt. I wanted to commit suicide using the T-shirt. I found the T-shirt
not to be suitable. I went back and got a blue bag. I realised the blue bag string could not work. I
covered her neck with the T-shirt I got from the bedroom. I then removed the knife from her neck. I
took the knife and her cellphone. In B confusion I then strode off driving round town aimlessly.'
It is noteworthy that this statement was made shortly after the event, and before the accused had
undergone any psychiatric counselling.
While driving around, the accused threw away the cellphone and the knife, one near Botec building
and the other near the Department of Supplies. C Both were thrown into areas of bush and thick
grass, a good distance apart, from where they were later recovered. It was the evidence of the
accused that he wished to commit suicide with the knife but abandoned this idea as it would cause
more pain to his family.
After driving about for several hours, the accused stopped at the home of his friend Moeketsi. He
could not, he said, bring himself to tell Moeketsi D what had happened and they had a light lunch
together. Moeketsi told the court that the accused was perfectly normal and showed no unusual
emotion whatever. The accused requested Moeketsi to accompany him to his cousin's house to
deliver receipts and they arrived at New Canada shortly after 1 pm. He entered first then called
Moeketsi to come. The body of Lungile lay in the living room. Her throat was cut and her jeans
were E partially pulled down. There was no sign of a struggle. The burglar guard was open, and the
front door unlocked. The police later established that the deceased's cellphone was missing.
Moeketsi drove the accused's vehicle to call the police, leaving the accused phoning a relative. In his
absence, the accused called a neighbour, Samuel Mosweu, who observed that the deceased was
wearing blue jeans and a multi-coloured headscarf. Later F the deceased's uncle, Phillip Bulawa,
arrived and covered Lungile's lower body with a blanket to preserve her modesty. When the police
arrived, they made detailed observations and photographed the scene. Beneath the deceased's head
was a red blood soaked T-shirt, and wound around one of her legs was the long drawstring of a blue
shopping bag. There was no multi-coloured headscarf. When the neighbour and Moeketsi were
shown the G photographs, both were clear that the body had been moved from the position where
they had seen it. The headscarf was gone, the red T-shirt was now there, and also the blue bag,
which they had not seen before. From the evidence and the statements he made, it could only have
been the accused who interfered with the body.
A post-mortem examination conducted by Dr S A Mapunda subsequently H confirmed the cause of
death as being a deep stab wound to the neck, which severed the jugular and carotid arteries. There
were no other injuries to her head, although the doctor confirmed that a fall on her head would not
necessarily have left visible signs. There was no evidence that she had been sexually molested.
On the morning of the next day, 28 February 2006 the accused's cousin Mbakiso (the son of Phillip
Bulawa) received an SMS message on his cellular
KIRBY J
phone. It read 'I killed Lungile because of what her brother owes me.' A The message made no
sense, and it was reported to the police. After obtaining records from the service provider the police
were able to establish that the SMS message had been sent from the accused's phone, although using
a different sim card to his usual one. The accused was taken in on 1 March 2006 for questioning. He
first denied sending the message, then admitted he had done so, stating this was done 'to make his
own investigations.' He had B bought another sim card and inserted it in his phone for that purpose.
He denied killing Lungile.
On 2 March 2006 the accused asked that his uncle be brought and, in his presence, he confessed to
killing Lungile and told the police what had happened. He was taken before a judicial officer and
made a full confession. On his indications, the kitchen knife and Lungile's cellphone were
recovered C from the bush.
Up to that point in the sequence of events, the offence of murder seemed to be clearly established.
The death of the deceased was unlawfully caused by the accused. Prima facie, malice aforethought
was shown by the circumstances of the quarrel, by the nature of the murder weapon, and the depth
and location of the fatal blow. There were, however, some unexplained D features of the case, and
some apparently irrational behaviour on the part of the accused - the lack of real motive for the
crime, other than a minor quarrel, the presence of the blue bag on the deceased's leg, the intended
(and quite impracticable) use of a T-shirt and shopping bag for the purposes of suicide, and the
sending of Mbakiso's SMS message.
Against that background the prosecution called a specialist psychiatrist, E Dr N K Leech, to the
stand. Dr Leech has 22 years' experience in his profession and has assessed numerous cases. He was
the only expert witness called either by the state or by the defence as to the accused's mental state.
He began his assessment of the accused in February 2007, seeing him on three to four occasions,
and also interviewing friends and family members. Initially he suspected epileptic seizures, and he
sent the accused to undergo F an electro encephalogram, or brain scan, to test for this condition. The
results showed no abnormality in this regard. He then formed the opinion that the accused was
suffering from anti-social personality disorder (ASDP), a condition, characterised by inability to
form loving relationships, criminal and anti-social behaviour, lack of remorse, and sudden bouts of
rage, which leads over time to stress and impairment. He ranked the disorder as mild to G moderate.
Dr Leech produced an initial report on 21 June 2007, and at the request of the defence, and by order
of the court, he conducted a further and more detailed assessment thereafter. This he summarised in
a second report dated 8 November 2007. In compiling this report he had the benefit of further
interviews, and sight of the witness statements and the album of H photographs. In the earlier report
he related the version of events first told to him by the accused. It now appears that this was a false
version, namely that he was attacked by Lungile with the knife in question, and that he stabbed her
with the same knife in his own defence. In later interviews, reflected in the second report, the
version in his formal confession statement was given, which is now accepted by the State as being
the true version.
KIRBY J
A In his reports the doctor identified a number of typical indicators of ASDP which he found
present in this case, namely:
(1) A difficult birth, the accused having been delivered by vacuum extraction following foetal
distress.
(2) Extended periods of maternal separation during early childhood (when
abroad studying for several years).
B
his mother was
(3) A history of mental instability in the family which could provide a genetic link (his paternal
uncle is a schizophrenic, his maternal great-grandmother had dementia, and his mother suffers from
hypertension).
(4) A pattern of petty domestic criminal and antisocial behaviour (the doctor was informed of
alleged cases of theft of cellphones and C electronic equipment, forgery, and arson - some 14
instances of the latter offence, apparently committed out of anger).
(5) A tendency to sudden bouts of rage arising from minor incidents (as when he tried to strangle
to death a dog which bit his ankle).
(6)
The absence of remorse for his actions.
He concluded in his written reports that the accused was suffering from D anti-social personality
disorder as an on-going condition and that, in killing his cousin, he may well have been acting
impulsively in a bout of rage brought on by this condition. He was, at the time of the incident, able
to discern between right and wrong, and he was (and is) fit to plead.
Under examination and cross-examination Dr Leech modified this E opinion in a number of
respects. He was also able to shed light on some of the aspects of the accused's behaviour after the
event. The deceased's jeans were displaced, the accused told him, when he tried to pull her body by
the legs. The initial falsehoods told to the police and to him by the accused were likely to be an
attempt to shift the blame for his offence to others. This was behaviour typical of an ASDP patient,
and also explained the sending of the F made-up SMS message to Mbakiso. It was possible that he
was reconstructing events which he knew had taken place but could not explain (known in
psychiatry as confabulation). This would be the case if, as he stated, he was in a state of confusion,
which could be true. He found the accused's version that he had inserted the knife into the deceased's
neck when she was already lying down and incapacitated to be possibly true, because if she had
been G standing she would have sprayed blood over a far greater area.
The accused explained that he became annoyed because he thought the deceased was demeaning
him. The doctor told the court that it would not surprise him if this led the accused to kill the
deceased, since, being afflicted by ASDP, even a minor argument could lead to him killing. There
was a real likelihood of him repeating this behaviour in the future.
H In response to a direct question from state counsel as to whether in his professional opinion the
accused appreciated what he was doing at the time, the doctor answered:
'To some extent, I would say yes.'
He revealed that after the second assessment he received a letter from the accused (who was
remanded in prison custody) requesting to see him as he
KIRBY J
wished 'to face reality and clean my conscience.' He did go, and found that A the accused was
unhappy to have been diagnosed with a mental disorder and sought a proper explanation for the
bouts of rage he experienced from time to time. It emerged that he had recently fought with another
prison inmate who insulted him. It was the doctor's opinion that the accused's condition was better
addressed in a prison environment than in a mental hospital. B
Under cross-examination, Dr Leech modified his opinion still further on the ability of the accused to
distinguish right from wrong at the moment when he stabbed Lungile. When questioned as to the
accused's degree of sanity as soon as he became enraged, the doctor answered that he could not say
what that degree was but he opined that, on realizing what he had done, the accused's anger may
have subsided, leaving him to behave subsequently C as he did. His seemingly irrational acts of
tying a blue bag to the deceased's leg and considering suicide by means of a T-shirt could be
attributable to confusion brought on by his mental condition.
There then occurred the following exchange between counsel for the defence and the doctor (the
relevant portions being quoted here): D
Mr Rubadiri: There is a possibility that he did not realise what he was doing in that rage?
Dr Leech:
There is that possibility.
Mr Rubadiri: The accused said he was very confused and did not know what was going on in his
mind?
Dr Leech:
It is difficult to say. I'm not clear if there would be confusion.
of proportion.
E
Anger would be out
Mr Rubadiri: Could he have formed an intention to cause the death of the deceased?
Dr Leech:
This happened on impulse suddenly. I don't think there is intention.'
F
Finally, in response to re-examination by State counsel and to questions from the court, the doctor
explained that in the case of an ASDP patient an impulsive bout of rage can equate to a moment or
interlude of madness. While such a patient is not certifiably insane, such an incident can amount to a
psychotic episode, rendering the patient temporarily insane. The accused's behaviour in killing his
cousin was not simply anti-social, it could be G described as a brief psychotic episode. His initial
desire to commit suicide was not necessarily indicative of remorse, since there could be suicide
without remorse. It was his observation that the accused showed neither emotion nor remorse arising
from what he had done, and this is confirmed by his mother, who described his demeanour as 'just
emotionless, with a flat expression'. She also confirmed that he was subject to mood swings
and H fits of rage.
The accused gave evidence in his own defence and was vigorously cross-examined. He repeated the
account of his actions given in his confession to the judicial officer and added more detail on the
argument which preceded Lungile's death. She had, he said, accused him of disclosing her results to
her classmate and called him 'a useless someone.' He related his action
KIRBY J
mechanically but had no logical explanation for some of them, such as why he 'put a knife in her
neck' when he thought she was already dead or how he could consider committing suicide using a Tshirt. This time he denied tying the blue bag to her leg. This was a pointless contradiction with his
explanation to the psychiatrist that he did not know why he put it there. Certainly, if it was a lie, it
could not assist him in feigning insanity. Like the accused's B mother, I was struck by the total lack
of emotion he displayed when testifying. He told the court he regretted his actions but his expression
was flat. To many of the prosecutor's questions, he replied that he had been confused, or he did not
know the answer or he thought it might be so. At the same time, he admitted all the most serious
allegations - that he stabbed Lungile in the neck, that he stole her cellphone and that he disposed of
the cellphone and C the knife in the bush. I formed the impression that he was telling the truth as he
recollected it, or as he had reconstructed how he felt it must have been. Being by this time aware of
the symptoms of ASPD, he did not attempt to claim them for himself or to emphasise them. Some
he negated, saying for example that he did feel remorse and denying a previous history of petty antisocial acts. His own explanation was that pressure over his failed exams D had built up and caused
his actions. In short, he was reluctant to admit that he suffered from a mental disorder, although his
own actions and behaviour were strongly indicative of this. Even to the direct question from his
counsel as to whether he believed ASPD had caused him to become enraged, he would answer only
equivocally, 'I think so.' And when the prosecutor put it E to him that at the time he stabbed the
deceased he knew what he was doing, he again replied only, with the words 'I don't think so', instead
of making an outright denial. He repeated several times that he was in a state of confusion at the
time and that this continued for some time thereafter. He told the court that in his own mind he still
could not work out why he stabbed Lungile. Finally, in response to a question from the court, the
accused F conceded that after hearing the doctor's full explanation he was now satisfied that he did
suffer from ASPD.
A
That then is the evidence upon which the court must determine whether the accused acted with
malice aforethought when he committed this act, or whether he was suffering from a disease of the
mind so as to preclude malice and free him from criminal responsibility.
The guiding section in this regard is s 11 of the Penal Code (Cap 08:01),
G
which provides that:
'11. A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if at the time of doing the act
or making the omission he is through any disease affecting his mind incapable of understanding
what he is H doing, or of knowing that he ought not to do the act or make the omission; but a person
may be criminally responsible for an act or omission, although his mind is affected by disease, if
such disease does not in fact produce upon his mind one or other of the effects mentioned above in
reference to that act or omission.'
Mrs Mokgosi, for the Directorate of Public Prosecutions, concedes that the accused has been shown
to suffer from anti-social personality disorder.
KIRBY J
It is her argument, as I understand it, that he is nonetheless criminally A responsible because he has
not discharged the onus upon him to prove on a balance of probabilities that at the time he stabbed
the deceased he was, due to that condition, either incapable of understanding what he was doing, or
incapable of knowing that he ought not to do so. Put in another way, he must establish on a balance
of probabilities that he was insane at the moment when he stabbed the deceased. B
I do not doubt that ASPD is a disease affecting the mind for the purposes of the section, and the state
does not argue otherwise. Dr Leech explained that diseases of the mind are routinely referred to as
mental disorders in psychiatry. There are many of these, such as schizophrenia, epileptic seizure,
and ASPD. Mental illness is defined as any disorder or disability of the mind, and includes any
arrested or incomplete development of the mind C (see Dada and McQuoid-Mason Introduction to
Medico-Legal Practice (Butterworths Durban 2001), at p 104). And as Dendy-Young CJ put it in
State v Mothibamela 1968-1970 B.L.R. 251 at p 252:
'The term "disease of the mind" comprehends mental disorder of any kind which manifests itself
in violence even though the disorder be temporary D only.'
The onus on an accused person to establish his insanity at the relevant time in order to be afforded
the protection of s 11 derives from s 10 of the Penal Code, which states that every person is
presumed to be of sound mind and to have been of sound mind at any time which comes into
question, E until the contrary is proved. The nature of that onus was considered by Gyeke-Dako J in
State v Saamu [1989] B.L.R. 191 at p 200H-201C.
He expressed the view, with which I respectfully agree, that:
'... the principle is well settled that where the accused raises insanity as a defence the onus is on
the defence to establish such insanity on the balance F of probabilities. This of course does not
mean that once the defence of insanity is raised, the prosecution is discharged from its legal duty of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubt ... the burden which shifts on the
accused is one of introducing sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind....
The prosecution in that case would have failed to prove the essential G ingredient of mens rea in the
offence.'
Dendy-Young CJ put it another way in Mothibamela's case (supra) at p 252 where he said:
'According to the general principles of the law it is for the accused to establish that, on the
balance of probability, his mind was at the time H disordered. But if the accused does succeed in
discharging that onus then it is for the prosecution to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, that the
violence in question was not attributable to that disability.'
Mrs Mokgosi argues that the accused has failed to discharge his onus. His evidence was equivocal
as to his state of mind when he stabbed the deceased,
KIRBY J
A and he at no time claimed to have been insane when he did so. Rather, he attempted to explain his
conduct in other ways. There is some force in this argument, but the real evidence of his condition
came from the State's own witness Dr Leech. The onus of proving insanity need not be discharged
out of the accused's own mouth. Indeed, often this will not be possible if he is insane; Again the
words of Gyeke-Dako J are apposite, this time in B State v Masinga [1990] B.L.R. 47 at 51 where
he said:
'Such proof in my judgment, need not come directly from [the accused]. The accused may
decline to give evidence, sworn or unsworn in support of his claim to insanity. He may remain silent
and call a witness or witnesses to testify to the unsoundness of his mind or as happened in this case,
he C may accept and rely on the facts as proved by the prosecution and invite the court to draw the
necessary inference from those ... facts ... that he was of unsound mind when he committed the
offence alleged against him; and therefore not criminally responsible for his act...'
In that case, too the real evidence of the accused's state of mind came
psychiatrist.
D
from the Government
It is argued that expert evidence is given as an aid to the court in arriving at its decision and is not
binding on the judge. This is no doubt so. A proper basis, with reasons, must be laid for the expert's
opinion, who must provide guidance on matters outside the judge's normal field of knowledge. It
would be wrong for a judge to blindly accept an expert's opinion without providing E proper reasons
for doing so. See, for example Desai and Another v The State [1985] B.L.R. 582 at p 583;
Motswaiso v The State [1990] B.L.R. 667; State v Modisaotsile [1993] B.L.R. 102 at p 105, and
State v Gaopatwe [1997] B.L.R. 522 at p 524.
Mrs Mokgosi argues that in this case the evidence clearly reveals that the accused knew precisely
what he was doing when he stabbed the deceased, he F took steps to dispose of the incriminating
evidence in order to cover his tracks, and he attempted to divert the blame for this atrocity onto
others. He also had a clear recollection of what transpired and knew that his actions were wrongful.
Any evidence of Dr Leech to the contrary, she argues, is vague, speculative, and inconclusive.
Accordingly, she argues little weight should be accorded to his final view that it was probable that
the stabbing G occurred during a psychotic episode arising from the accused's anti-social personality
disorder and triggered by a perceived insult in regard to his intelligence.
I take a different view of Dr Leech's evidence, and of the evidence as a whole as analysed above. Dr
Leech is a psychiatrist of many years standing, and although called as a witness for the state, it was
his duty to place before H the court all symptoms, background, and conduct which could assist the
court in arriving at a proper understanding of the accused's condition at the time of the incident. This
I consider he did, fairly and to the best of his ability on the available evidence. It is true that he
initially expressed the opinion in his written report that at the time of the incident the accused was
able to discern between right and wrong. But he was honest enough to admit that this opinion was
not cast in stone, answering first that 'to some extent,
KIRBY J
the accused appreciated what he was doing,' and then conceding finally that A 'he may or may not
have been aware what he was doing.' His conclusion in the end was that this happened on impulse
and he did not think any intention was present. The accused's behaviour was not merely anti-social.
It was a brief psychotic episode, or a moment of temporary madness.
Dr Leech was at pains to lay a proper basis for his conclusions. He gave considerable attention to his
examination of the case, interviewing the B accused on several occasions, seeing his friends and
relatives and perusing the witness statements and the photograph album as well as sending the
accused for an EEG test. He identified a string of symptoms and background features which were
indicative of anti-social personality disorder, and Mrs Mokgosi fairly conceded that his diagnosis
was correct. The case clearly concerned him a great deal, and he was steadfast in his view that
the C accused was a danger to society. He could have another episode and kill again even on slight
provocation. That does not, however, establish that when he killed the deceased he acted with
malice aforethought. Rather, it is the contrary.
I hold that the defence has established on a balance of probabilities that in all likelihood the accused
suffered a psychotic episode when, in a brief D interlude of madness he killed the deceased by
inserting a table knife into her neck as she lay on the floor of her home in New Canada. The State in
turn has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that in doing so he had the necessary malice
aforethought to constitute the crime of murder.
In a situation such as this the court is directed by s 160 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act
(Cap 08:02). This reads as follows: E
'(1) Where an act or omission is charged against any person as an offence and it is given in
evidence on the trial of such person for that offence that he was insane so as not to be responsible
for his action at the time when the act was done or omission made, then, if it appears to the court
before which such person is tried that he did the act or made the F omission charged but was insane
as aforesaid at the time when he did or made it, the court shall return a special finding to the effect
that the accused was guilty of the act or omission charged, but was insane as aforesaid when he did
the act or made the omission.
(2) Where a special finding is returned in a magistrate's court such court shall report to the
High Court which shall report further to the G President and, where a special finding is returned in
the High Court, the High Court shall report direct to the President and in either case the court
returning such finding shall meantime order the accused to be kept in custody as a criminal lunatic
in such place and in such manner as it shall direct.
(3) The President may order such person to be confined during his
safe custody.'
H
pleasure in a place of
I hold that the accused did stab the deceased to death, but that at the time he did so he was insane
due to a psychotic episode brought on by the mental disease of anti-personality disorder.
I accordingly make the following order, as guided by the judgment of
KIRBY J
Tebbutt JP in State v Kgosinaga [2007] 2 B.L.R. 772, CA and I note for the benefit of his
Excellency the President that the Government psychiatrist has expressed the view that the accused's
condition may best be addressed in a prison environment rather than in a mental hospital.
A
The order of the court is as follows:
(1) A special finding is entered that the accused Taboka Tsotso Moaro is guilty of the act of
killing Lungile Ndlangamandla, but was insane when he did so.
B
(2) The court reports this special finding to His Excellency the President so that His Excellency
may order that the said Taboka Tsotso Moaro be confined during his pleasure in a place of safe
custody.
(3) In the meantime the court orders that the said Taboka Tsotso Moaro be kept in prison
custody in Gaborone as a criminal lunatic.
C
Accused guilty of killing deceased, but insane.