Background Guide - ashmunc ii 2016

Shalom Delegates,
Welcome to the Memshelet Yisrael Delegates, in the JCC: 1973 Yom Kippur War! This
cabinet will simulate the Cabinet under Prime Minister Golda Meir during a state of warfare for
the State of Israel. Bear in mind as per AshMUNC II conference policies, policy papers will be
required to be considered for awards consideration. White Papers for each delegate must be no
more than 750 words max, and should outline their policy proposal from their
department/ministerial position.
I am a senior at George Mason University, pursuing a double B.A. in Government and
International Politics (with a concentration in International Relations) & Conflict Analysis and
Resolution (with a concentration in International Conflict) and Minors in International Security
and History. I have been involved in Model United Nations for around 10 year now, and this will
be the 35th committee that I have chaired. Outside of Model United Nations I am involved with
the Alexander Hamilton Society, Alpha Lambda Mu, the Off Campus Council and I am the
Student Director of the Youth Representative program at George Mason University to the United
Nations Department of Public Information and NGOs. Outside of Mason I serve as the Education
Policy Chair for Youth For National Change (YNC), a national nonpartisan lobbying
organization that lobbies on behalf of youth for issues that affect them.
Delegates, I expect you all to come in with not necessarily with research (though I do
hope you are aware of your position, the year we are in and the results of said events), however I
do expect you all to come in ready to defend the State of Israel from continued Arab aggression.
I challenge you all to utilize every personal directive, communiqué, and joint directive that you
can while in committee to ensure that this Cabinet succeeds in its goal. Should you have any
questions, feel free to email me at [email protected]. I look forward to seeing you all come
April 30th.
Sincerely,
Sarmat Chowdhury
Chair, The Cabinet of Israel
AshMUN II
George Mason University
Background
The 1973 Arab-Israeli war was fought by a group of Arab states (lead by Egypt and
Syria) against Israel from October 6th to October 25th, 1973. The ultimate goal for both Egypt
and Syria was to regain control of the Sinai and the Golan Heights by the end of the war. The
war began on the holy day of Yom Kippur when the group of Arab States decided to do a
surprise attack on Israel. Both Egypt and Israel crossed ceasefire boundaries and entered both the
Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights that Israel had captured in the Six Day War in 1967.
Since then President Nasser of Egypt, had continued on small incursions into Israeli Occupied
Sinai know as the War of Attrition, it only ended in 1970 with the Death of Nasser. Although
Nasser’s successor Sadat ended the War of Attrition, he still plan like Nasser to liberate the Sinai
in order to consolidate his new power. With this in mind Sadat initially tried to use the
diplomatic front to regain the Sinai, however Israel under Prime Minister Meir was very
overconfident after their resounding 1967 victory and refused to hand it back. Thus Sadat looked
towards the path of war to retake the Sinai, and started negotiating with President Assad of Syria
to launch another two-front war against Israel. Both Assad and Sadat tried to get King Hussein
of Jordan to be the third front against Israel in the next war, however Hussein remembered that
Jordan was at the losing end of the stick in the 1967 War by losing the West Bank and refused to
join. When Jordan received intelligence report in October 1973 that both Egypt and Syria will
launch an imminent invasion on Israel, King Hussein informed Israeli Prime Minister Meir about
their reports. However fearing that the US or other Western States will place an arms embargo if
they launch a preemptive strike similar to what France did after the 1967 War, Israel chose to
stay idle footing causing the spiraling events of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
Topic I: The Invasion-Offensive and Defensive Strategies
Since the creation of the Jewish State, the Middle East has seen Israel prove its military
might on the battlefield against the Arab armies. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Six Day War,
and the War of Attrition has shown both the powers in the Middle East and the international
community that Israel and her military are not a force to be taken lightly. However, in a region
that has been on principle been antagonizing towards the existence of a Jewish State in the
region, Israel must remain vigilant in the face of Arab aggression.
Aman, the Israeli Defense Forces Directorate of Military Intelligence has based the
following estimates based on the regional analysis.

Syria will not attack Israel unless Egypt did so as well.

Egypt wants to regain control of all of the Sini

Unless equipped with the military technology needed to best Israel, Egypt will not
move forward with their attack
Though Aman is confident that the Egyptian/Arab forces will not go forward with their
plans, they do believe that an invasion towards Israel proper is a plan that the Egyptians forces
are willing to employ. The intelligence brought before the Cabinet is clear: though an attack in
imminent, intelligence is not clear on when or how the attack against Israel will be initiated. It
will be up to to the members of this body to not only formulate a defensive (or offensive
strategy) for the State, while also ensuring that the day to day activities of the nation are
occurring. While Egypt and her allies and their military ambitions are a concern for this body, it
must also be cognizant of domestic threats, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization
(PLO) and their continual guerilla warfare against the state and the Jewish people. Though a
double theater of warfare is a possibility, ensuring that the PLO does not add to the warfare
operations of the state.
The Prime Minister expects that this Cabinet will be able to ensure both from a political
and militaristic perspective that will best serve the State of Israel and also proves once again to
the regional stability that Israel is not a military power to be trifled with, and will use the Samson
Option of last resort if its absolute survival is at stake.
Questions to Consider:
1. What steps can Israel take to ensure that we are prepared against any incursion by the
UAF (United Arab Forces)?
2. How can Israel ensure that the PLO does not add an extra front to the upcoming
hostilities?
3. Should the Eshkol-Comer memorandum of understanding between the United States and
Israel be maintained in a state of warfare?
Topic II: Diplomacy
There is no doubt within both the government of Israel and the military apparatus that
should an attack be launched against Israel (and when Israel retaliates) that a response, and most
likely an attempt at a ceasefire will be breached by the international community, along with the
proxy war between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
be conflated in the region once again should an attack on Israel occur. Though drawing both
superpowers and the attention of their “Cold War” is not of the interest for the Arab nations,
Israel maintains strong ties with Washington D.C., and could, if needed, employ that relationship
to bring the UAF forces and their governments to the negotiation table to cease hostilities. If
needed, the United States can also be employed in the United Nations Security Council. As the
non-belligerent power in the upcoming conflict, Israel will have more diplomatic sway in
bringing attention to the plight of the Jewish people and the Arab aggression against the
sovereignty of the Jewish state.
Another option that is open to the Cabinet is forging and cultivating relations with nations
outside of the Middle East. These include regions such as Africa, Asia and Latin America could
prove to be useful, especially when considering the role of the Non-Aligned Movement bloc
within the United Nations General Assembly.
At the very least, the Cabinet should consider engaging in a dialogue with some of the
Arab nations in the region. Though the IDF is more than capable of handling the UAF, it would
be a mistake to assume that Israeli lives could be saved if any nation with the region or indeed
the League of Arab States could be persuaded to engage in a dialogue. Finally, utilizing the
relations with both Turkey and Iran, non-Arab Middle East powers, could also be beneficial to
Israel in the conflict.
Questions to Consider:
1. Can Turkish and Iranian relations be utilized to counterbalance the UAF in the Middle
East?
2. Should the United States and the United Nations be used as tools against the aggression
of the UAF to bring them to the negotiation table?
3. How would any diplomatic approach on behalf of the Israeli government be perceived?
4. How to get France to lift its Post 1967 Six Day War arms embargo placed on Israel?