U.S. Runway Safety Briefing ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Runway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference John Pallante, ARI-2 October 2002 Global Airspace Characteristics Growing demand for air travel and system capacity Millions of operations a year Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft Thousands of air traffic controllers Thousands of airports Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety Runway Safety Realities Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to Operations Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are Significant Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and Individual Ownership Types of Runway Incursions A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land. The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types. Operational Errors Pilot Deviations Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in: A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate. A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control. Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways) An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft Runway Incursions (All Categories) 500 405 450 400 350 407 338 329 304 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 FY98 66.21 FY99 68.67 FY00 67.68 FY01 65.47 Tower Operations (millions) DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE FY02 est. 64.85 YTD 09/30/02 Distribution by Type of Runway Incursions OE/D 24% V/PD 19% OE/D 22% PD 56% PD 57% FY 1998-2001 V/PD 22% FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02) DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE Runway Incursion Severity Categories Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity Available Available Reaction Reaction Time Time Evasive Evasive or or Corrective Corrective Action Action Speed Speed of of Environmental Environmental Aircraft and/or Aircraft and/or Conditions Conditions Vehicle Vehicle Proximity Proximity of of Aircraft Aircraft and/or and/or Vehicle Vehicle Increasing Severity Increasing Severity Category Category D D Category Category C C Little or no Little no chance of chance of collision but collision but meets the meets the definition of definition of aa runway incursion runway Separation Separation decreases but decreases but there is is ample there ample time and time and distance to distance to avoid avoid a collision a collision incursion Category Category B B Separation Separation decreases and decreases and there is there is aa significant significant potential for potential for collision collision Category A Category A Separation Separation decreases and decreases and participants take participants take extreme action to extreme action narrowly avoid a to narrowly collision, or the avoid a collision event results in a collision Collision An incursion that resulted in a runway collision Category A&B Runway Incursions 80 70 69 67 59 53 60 50 53 = FY02 Perf Limit 37 40 30 20 10 0 FY98 66.21 FY99 68.67 FY00 67.68 FY01 65.47 Tower Operations (millions) DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE FY02 est. 64.85 YTD 09/30/02 Severity Distribution of Runway Incursions A B 3% 8% A 6% B 11% D 47% C 36% FY 1998-2001 Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal). D 61% C 28% FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02) Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL). DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001) Location of Collisions at Towered Airports (1990 – 2001) 66% or 2/3 of runway 2001 A Events 2000 A Events 2001 B Events Traffic Flow 2000 B Events Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001) DAY VMC DAY IMC 2 1 5 0 NIGHT VMC NIGHT IMC Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001) TOTAL OPERATIONS 4 Year Total = 268 Million Annual Average = 67 Million TOTAL INCURSIONS Total Incursions = 1460 Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years INCURSION RATE Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001) LAX STL IAD 34 Incursions 30 Incursions 3 Incursions Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001) 40 No. of Runway Incursions 35 D 30 25 C 20 B 15 A 10 The Benchmark Airports accounted for – 18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period – 26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied SAN TPA BWI CLE DCA HNL JFK MCO SLC LGA MEM SEA SFO IAD CVG PIT EWR CLT IAH PHL STL BOS DEN MSP LAS MIA DTW PHX LAX DFW ORD 0 ATL 5 The Benchmark Airports accounted for – – – – 38% (38/87) A events, 36% (59/163) B events, 35% (178/509) C events, 16% (113/694) D events What the FAA is Doing Current Situation Runway Safety Goals Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001) Pilot Deviations – Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions – Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position and hold instructions Operational Errors – Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways – Runway crossing separation errors Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations – Crosses a runway without communication or authorization – Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions Runway Safety Blueprint 8 Goals – 39 Objectives 1. Education and Training – Safety Seminars 2. Surface Safety Awareness – Mass Mailings 3. Procedures – Modeling and Simulation – Advisory Circulars 4. Data Collection – Surface Incidents – ASRS Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d) 8 Goals – 39 Objectives 5. Communications – Phraseology Workgroup 6. Situational Awareness – Paint Study 7. Local Solutions – Special Emphasis Program 8. Technology – Flashing PAPI – Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X) – Moving Map – LED Lights Technologies ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential – AMASS 18 Commissioned 6 Operational Suitability Demo 13 Remaining – LED lighting Enhances hold position markings at runway/taxiway intersection Omaha system activation July 2002 Summary Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach. People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes. Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions. Backup Slides Approach Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks – What are the types and relative frequencies of different types of error? Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error – Procedures – Technologies Where do we go wrong? Controllers – Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land) – Get distracted – Fail to coordinate (teamwork) – Don’t catch all readback errors – Act human Where do we go wrong? Pilots – Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line up on the runway) – Takeoff without a clearance – Get lost (with and without poor visibility) – Misunderstand the clearance – Act human Resulting in: Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway Other scenarios What Controllers Can Do Optimize teamwork Recognize limitations of human memory and attention Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you plan on it being there for more than a minute Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that the runway is clear Good communication techniques What Pilots Can Do DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation – – – – – LISTEN UP LOOK OUT Airport diagram “out and in use” Is there a runway between you and the gate? Is there an aircraft on final? What Pilots Can Do (cont’d) Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK SOPs and Recommended Practices – Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is received (signal that aircraft is rolling) – Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds Technologies BAA Activities Background – Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement (BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions – Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology – Proceed to technology/solution development phase based on operational transition potential Status – Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001 (summary on next slide) – Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002 System demo - November 2002 BAA Activities (cont’d) Technology/Product Contractor Site Multilateration/IR Sensis and TriMemphis, TN Sensor Fusion Space Minneapolis, Magnetic Sensors Honeywell MN GPS/RF Data Link Veridian Warminster, Vehicle Tracking Engineering PA Status Demonstration conducted in August and October 2001. Demonstration conducted in October 2001. Demonstration conducted in December 2001. Demonstration conducted in November 2001. Ground Marker Airspec WJHTC Addressable Signs/SmartBoard Technology Planning Inc. College Park Demonstration conducted in Maryland October 2001. Airport Radar guns and Runway Status Lights Architecture Technology Corporation Long Beach, Demonstration conducted in CA April 2002. Other Projects (cont’d) Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights – Three phases testing at Omaha LED stand alone LED with motion sensors Special scenarios - TBD – Operational Assessment complete Jan 2003 Other Projects (cont’d) VHF audio alert with motion sensors for noncontrolled airports – Two months data collection at Millard Airport completed in May 2002 – Detection rate and false alert rate need enhancement Other Projects (cont’d) Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) – Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway – System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach – Article 7 Brief August 12, 2002 – Field Demo September 10-12, 2002 Technologies Deployment Short Term – Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators North Vegas Long Beach – Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness Technologies Deployment (cont’d) Mid Term – Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to improve runway safety Sign – TYS LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA 75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center Addressable Long Term – Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports – Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking – Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators
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