ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Runway Safety/Incursion Conference

U.S. Runway Safety Briefing
ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM
Runway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference
John Pallante, ARI-2
October 2002
Global Airspace Characteristics
Growing demand for air travel and system capacity
Millions of operations a year
Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft
Thousands of air traffic
controllers
Thousands of
airports
Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety
Runway Safety Realities


Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events
Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant

Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to
Operations

Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are
Significant

Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and
Individual Ownership
Types of Runway Incursions
 A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle,
person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of
required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land.
 The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of
the following error types.
Operational Errors
Pilot Deviations
Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
An operational error (OE) is an
action of an Air Traffic
Controller (ATC) that results in:
A pilot deviation (PD) is an
action of a pilot that
violates any Federal
Aviation Regulation. For
example, a pilot fails to
obey air traffic control
instructions to not cross
an active runway when
following the authorized
route to an airport gate.
A vehicle or pedestrian
deviation (VPD) includes
pedestrians, vehicles or
other objects interfering with
aircraft operations by
entering or moving on the
runway movement area
without authorization from air
traffic control.


Less than the required
minimum separation between
two or more aircraft, or
between an aircraft and
obstacles (obstacles include,
vehicles, equipment,
personnel on runways)
An aircraft landing or
departing on a runway closed
to aircraft
Runway Incursions (All Categories)
500
405
450
400
350
407
338
329
304
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
FY98
66.21
FY99
68.67
FY00
67.68
FY01
65.47
Tower Operations (millions)
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
FY02
est. 64.85
YTD 09/30/02
Distribution by Type of Runway
Incursions
OE/D
24%
V/PD
19%
OE/D
22%
PD
56%
PD
57%
FY 1998-2001
V/PD
22%
FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
Runway Incursion Severity Categories
Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity
Available
Available
Reaction
Reaction
Time
Time
Evasive
Evasive or
or
Corrective
Corrective
Action
Action
Speed
Speed of
of
Environmental
Environmental Aircraft and/or
Aircraft and/or
Conditions
Conditions
Vehicle
Vehicle
Proximity
Proximity of
of
Aircraft
Aircraft and/or
and/or
Vehicle
Vehicle
Increasing
Severity
Increasing
Severity
Category
Category D
D
Category
Category C
C
Little or no
Little
no
chance of
chance
of
collision but
collision
but
meets
the
meets the
definition of
definition
of aa
runway incursion
runway
Separation
Separation
decreases but
decreases
but
there is
is ample
there
ample
time
and
time and
distance to
distance
to avoid
avoid
a
collision
a collision
incursion
Category
Category B
B
Separation
Separation
decreases and
decreases
and
there is
there
is aa
significant
significant
potential for
potential
for
collision
collision
Category A
Category A
Separation
Separation
decreases and
decreases
and
participants take
participants take
extreme action to
extreme action
narrowly avoid a
to narrowly
collision, or the
avoid
a collision
event results
in a
collision
Collision
An incursion that
resulted in a
runway collision
Category A&B Runway Incursions
80
70
69
67
59
53
60
50
53 = FY02 Perf Limit
37
40
30
20
10
0
FY98
66.21
FY99
68.67
FY00
67.68
FY01
65.47
Tower Operations (millions)
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
FY02
est. 64.85
YTD 09/30/02
Severity Distribution of Runway
Incursions
A B
3% 8%
A
6% B
11%
D
47%
C
36%
FY 1998-2001
Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities
(FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal).
D
61%
C
28%
FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)
Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities
(VNY & LAL).
DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE
Category A and B Runway Incursions
(CY 2000 and 2001)
Location of Collisions at Towered
Airports (1990 – 2001)
66% or
2/3 of runway
2001 A Events
2000 A Events
2001 B Events
Traffic Flow
2000 B Events
Runway Collisions Met. Conditions
(1990 - 2001)
DAY VMC
DAY IMC
2
1
5
0
NIGHT VMC
NIGHT IMC
Frequency and Rate of Runway
Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)
TOTAL OPERATIONS
4 Year Total = 268
Million
Annual Average = 67
Million
TOTAL INCURSIONS
Total Incursions = 1460
Average No. of
Incursions = 5 per
airport over 4 years
INCURSION RATE
Average Rate = 0.55
incursions per 100,000
operations
Airport complexity influences the number and
rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)
LAX
STL
IAD
34 Incursions
30 Incursions
3 Incursions
Severity Distribution at the 32
Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 –
2001)
40
No. of Runway Incursions
35
D
30
25
C
20
B
15
A
10

The Benchmark Airports accounted for
– 18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million
out of 332 Million) at towered airports
over the 4 year period
– 26% (383) of all the runway incursions
in the 4 year period studied

SAN
TPA
BWI
CLE
DCA
HNL
JFK
MCO
SLC
LGA
MEM
SEA
SFO
IAD
CVG
PIT
EWR
CLT
IAH
PHL
STL
BOS
DEN
MSP
LAS
MIA
DTW
PHX
LAX
DFW
ORD
0
ATL
5
The Benchmark Airports accounted for
–
–
–
–
38% (38/87) A events,
36% (59/163) B events,
35% (178/509) C events,
16% (113/694) D events
What the FAA is Doing

Current Situation

Runway Safety Goals
Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions
Primary Performance Factors of
Runway Incursions (1997-2001)

Pilot Deviations
– Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short
instructions
– Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position and
hold instructions

Operational Errors
– Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting
runways
– Runway crossing separation errors

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations
– Crosses a runway without communication or authorization
– Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions
Runway Safety Blueprint
8 Goals
– 39 Objectives
1.
Education and Training
– Safety Seminars
2.
Surface Safety Awareness
– Mass Mailings
3.
Procedures
– Modeling and Simulation
– Advisory Circulars
4.
Data Collection
– Surface Incidents
– ASRS
Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)
8 Goals
– 39 Objectives
5.
Communications
– Phraseology Workgroup
6.
Situational Awareness
– Paint Study
7.
Local Solutions
– Special Emphasis Program
8.
Technology
– Flashing PAPI
– Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X)
– Moving Map
– LED Lights
Technologies

ARI sponsoring technologies with
industry-wide potential
– AMASS

18 Commissioned
 6 Operational Suitability Demo
 13 Remaining
– LED lighting

Enhances hold position
markings at runway/taxiway
intersection
 Omaha system activation
July 2002
Summary

Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that
requires a multi-dimensional approach.
 People make mistakes – even the most intelligent,
well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people
make mistakes.
 Education, training and procedures are important
solutions, but they are always susceptible to human
error. To be successful, a balanced approach also
requires improvements in airport design and
technology, and a determination to take ownership of
the issue of runway incursions.
Backup Slides
Approach

Analyze the incident data to determine areas
of greatest risks
– What are the types and relative frequencies of
different types of error?

Identify mitigation strategies for managing
human error
– Procedures
– Technologies
Where do we go wrong?

Controllers
– Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that
they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or
cleared to land)
– Get distracted
– Fail to coordinate (teamwork)
– Don’t catch all readback errors
– Act human
Where do we go wrong?

Pilots
– Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line
up on the runway)
– Takeoff without a clearance
– Get lost (with and without poor visibility)
– Misunderstand the clearance
– Act human
Resulting in:


Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking
off or landing
Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing

Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position
and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway

Other scenarios
What Controllers Can Do





Optimize teamwork
Recognize limitations of human memory and
attention
Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you
plan on it being there for more than a minute
Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that
the runway is clear
Good communication techniques
What Pilots Can Do

DON’T “mind your own business” – do
whatever you can to increase your
awareness of the airport operation
–
–
–
–
–
LISTEN UP
LOOK OUT
Airport diagram “out and in use”
Is there a runway between you and the gate?
Is there an aircraft on final?
What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)

Both pilots should listen for clearances to land,
taxi, and take-off
 When in doubt, about your position or your
clearance - ASK
 SOPs and Recommended Practices
– Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is
received (signal that aircraft is rolling)
– Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off
and have been lined up and waiting for more than
90 seconds
Technologies
BAA Activities

Background
– Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology
solutions
– Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology
– Proceed to technology/solution development phase based
on operational transition potential

Status
– Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001
(summary on next slide)
– Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002
 System
demo - November 2002
BAA Activities (cont’d)
Technology/Product Contractor
Site
Multilateration/IR
Sensis and TriMemphis, TN
Sensor Fusion
Space
Minneapolis,
Magnetic Sensors
Honeywell
MN
GPS/RF Data Link
Veridian
Warminster,
Vehicle Tracking
Engineering
PA
Status
Demonstration conducted in
August and October 2001.
Demonstration conducted in
October 2001.
Demonstration conducted in
December 2001.
Demonstration conducted in
November 2001.
Ground Marker
Airspec
WJHTC
Addressable
Signs/SmartBoard
Technology
Planning Inc.
College Park
Demonstration conducted in
Maryland
October 2001.
Airport
Radar guns and
Runway Status Lights
Architecture
Technology
Corporation
Long Beach, Demonstration conducted in
CA
April 2002.
Other Projects (cont’d)

Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights
– Three phases testing at Omaha
 LED
stand alone
 LED with motion sensors
 Special scenarios - TBD
– Operational Assessment complete
 Jan
2003
Other Projects (cont’d)

VHF audio alert with motion sensors for noncontrolled airports
– Two months data collection at Millard Airport
completed in May 2002
– Detection rate and false alert rate need
enhancement
Other Projects (cont’d)

Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)
– Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an
aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or
other critical position on the runway
– System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach
– Article 7 Brief
 August
12, 2002
– Field Demo
 September
10-12, 2002
Technologies Deployment

Short Term
– Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and
Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA
approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard
Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and
high traffic intersections to increase the
awareness of pilots and vehicle operators
 North
Vegas
 Long Beach
– Phase in automatic control such as loops and
motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness
Technologies Deployment
(cont’d)

Mid Term
– Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to
improve runway safety
Sign – TYS
 LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA
 75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center
 Addressable

Long Term
– Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports
– Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic
Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground
vehicle tracking
– Integrate existing and future certified warning
equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and
aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and
vehicle operators