产业经济学专业研究生英文参考资料选录
References for Industrial Organization
于 立 整理
东北财经大学
Note:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Tirole = J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
HIO = R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds. Handbook of Industrial Organization, New
York: North Holland, 1989.
Laffont & Tirole = J. -J. Laffont & J. Tirole, A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and
Procurement, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
Armstrong et al. = M. Armstrong, S. Crown, and J. Vickers, Regulatory
Reform--Economic Analysis and British Experience, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994.
I. The Theory of the Firm
A. Theory
1. Tirole, Introduction and The Theory of the Firm.
2. Chandler, ''Organizational Capabilities and the Economic History of the Industrial
Enterprise,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives, 6 (Summer 1992), 79-100.
3. R. Coase, ''The Nature of the Firm,'' reprinted in G. Stigler and K. Boulding, eds.,
Readings in Price Theory, Irwin, 1952, 33 l-351.
4. S. Grossman and O. Hart, ''The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical
and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (August 1986), 691 -796.
5. B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, ''The Theory of the Firm," in HIO.
6. B. Klein, R. Crawford, and A. Alchian, ''Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process,'' Journal of Law and Economics, 21 (October
l978), 297-326.
7. O. Williamson, The Economic institutions of Capitalism, Free Press, 1985, Chapters 3-6
(especially 1 and 3).
B. Empirical Evidence on Asset Specificity
1. E. Anderson and D. Schmittlein, ''Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical
Examination," Rand Journal of Economics, 15(Autumn 1984), 327-343.
2. P. Joskow, ''Vertical Integration and Long Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-Burning
Electric-Generating Plants," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, I (Spring
1985), 33-80.
3. P. Joskow, ''Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical
Evidence from Coal Markets," American Economic Review, 77 (March 1987), 168-l85.
4. P. Joskow, ''Asset Specificity and the Structure of Vertical Relationships: Empirical
Evidence," Chapter 8 in O. Williamson and S. Winter, The Nature of the Firm: Origins,
Evolution, and Development, Oxford 1993, 117-137.

此资料根据 MIT R. Schmalansee （施马兰西）和 P.L. Joskow（乔斯考）两位教授提供的资料整理。
1
5.
6.
K. Monteverde and D. Teece, ''Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the
Automobile Industry,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 13 (Spring 1982), 206-213.
A. Shepard, "Contractual Form, Retail Pricing and Asset Characteristics in Gasoline
Retailing," Rand Journal of Economics, 24(Spring 1993), 58-77.
II. Monopoly Pricing
A. Basic Monopoly Pricing and Durable Goods
1. Tirole, Chapter 1 (including supplementary section).
2. M. Pesendorfer, ``Retail Sales. A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets,'' mimeo.
B. First and Third Degree Price Discrimination
1. Tirole, Sections 3.0 - 3.2
2. Katz, M., "The Welfare Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Intermediate
Goods Markets," American Economic Review, 77, (March 1 987), pp. 154-67.
3. Schmalensee, R., ''Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree
Price-Discrimination,'' American Economic Review, 71 (March 1981), pp. 242-47.
4. Varian, H., ''Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,'' American Economic Review, 75
(September 1985), pp. 870-5.
5. Perry, Martin, ''Forward Integration by ALCOA: 1888-1930," Journal of Industrial
Economics, 29 (l), September 1980, pp. 37-53.
C. Second Degree Price Discrimination
1. Tirole, Sections 3.3 - 3.5.
2. Maskin, E. And J. Riley, "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of
Economics 15 (Summer 1984), pp. 171-96,
3. Oi, W., ''A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey-Mouse Monopoly,''
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85 (February 197l), pp. 77-96.
4. McAfee, P., J. McMillan, and M. Whinston, ''Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity
Bundling, and Correlation of Values,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104 (May 1989),
pp. 37l-83.
5. Blackstone, E., ''Restrictive Practices in the Marketing of Electrofax Copying Machines.
The SCM Corporation Case,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 23 (March 1975), pp.
189-202.
6. Shepard, A., ''Price Discrimination and Retail Configuration,'' Journal of Political
Economy, 99 (February 1991), pp. 30-53.
7. I. Ayers, and P. Siegelman, "Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New
Car,'' American Economic Review, 85 (June 1995), 304-321.
8. Borenstein, S. and N. Rose, "Competition and Price Dispersion in the U.S. Airline
Industry," Journal of Political Economy, 102 (August 1994), 653-683.
III. Estimating Demand (and Supply)
1. Deaton and J. Muellbauer, Economics and Consumer Behavior, Parts 1 and 2.
2. S. Anderson, A. De Palma and J. Thisse, Discrete Choice Theory of Product
Differentiation, Chapters 2-5.
3. D. Epple, "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Estimating Demand and Supply
Functions for Differentiated Products, Journal of Political Economy, 95 (February
1987), 59-80.
2
4.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes, ''Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp. 841-890.
5. A. Petrin, "Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan'',
mimeo.
6. Goldberg, P.K., ''Product Differentiation and Oligopoly in international Markets: The
Case of the U.S. Automobile Industry,'' Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 4, July 1995, pp.
891-952.
7. S. Ellison, I. Cockburn, Z. Griliches and J. Hansman, "Characteristics of Demand for
Pharmaceutical Products: An Examination of Four Cephalosporins,'' Rand Journal of
Economics, 28, Autumn 1997, 426-446.
8. J. Hausman, "Valuation of New Goods under Perfect and Imperfect Competition,'' in
The Economics of New Goods, T. Bresnahan and R. Gordon (eds.) and comment by T.
Bresnahan.
9. J. Hansman, "Reply to Prof. Bresnahan," mimeo.
10. T. Bresnahan, "The Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War: Valuing New Goods, Identifying
Market Power, and Economic Measurement," mimeo.
IV. Introduction to Strategic Behavior and Static Competition
A.
B.
Introduction to Strategic Behavior
1. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization:
An Introduction and Overview,'' in HIO.
2. Tirole, pp. 205-208 and Chapter 11.
Prices and Output
1. C. Shapiro, ''Theories of Oligopoly Behavior," in HIO.
2. Tirole, Chapters 2.1 and 5.
3. D. Kreps and J. Scheinkman, ''Quantity Precommitment and Bertrand Competition Yield
Cournt Outcomes," Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 326-337.
4. Klemperer, P., "The Competitiveness of Markets with Switching Costs," Rand Journal
of Economics, 18 (Spring 1987), pp. 138-50.
5. Sutton, J., and A. Shaked, ''Relaxing Price Competition through Product
Differentiation,'' Review of Economic Studies, 49 (January 1982), pp. 3- 14.
6. D. Stalil, "Oligopolistic Pricing with Heterogeneous Consumer Search,'' International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 14 (April 1996), 243-268.
V. Dynamic Competition
A. Theory
1. Tirole, Chapter 6.
2. Rotemberg, J. J. and G. Saloner, "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During
Booms,'' American Economic Review, 76 (June 1986), 390-407.
3. K. Bagwell and R. W. Staiger, "Collusion over the Business Cycle,'' Rand Journal of
Economics, (Spring 1997), 82-106.
4. Brock, W. and J. Scheinkman, "Price-Setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints,''
Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 37 l-82.
5. Green, E. and R. Porter, ''Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price
3
Information,'' Econometrica, 52 (January 1984), pp. 87-100.
6. Maskin, E. and J. Tirole, "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly II: Price Competition,
Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles," Econometrica, 56 (May 1988), pp.571
-99.
7. Bernheim and M. Whinston, "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," Rand
Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990), l-26.
8. Stigler, G.J., "A Theory of Oligopoly," Journal of Political Economy, 72 (February l964),
pp. 44-61.
B. Empirical Evidence
1. R. Porter, ''A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Economic Committee, 1880-l886," Bell
Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), 301-314.
2. G. Ellison, ''Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee,'' Rand
Journal of Economics, 25 (Spring 1994), 37-57.
3. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Narrative Evidence on the Dynamics of Collusion: The
Sugar Institute Case, " mimeo.
4. R. Grether and C. Plott, ''The Effects of Market Practices in Oligopolistic Markets: An
Experimental Examination of the Ethyl Case,'' Economic inquiry, 22 (October l984),
479-507.
5. M. Levenstein, "Price Wars and the Stability of Collusion: A Study of the PreWorld War
I Bromine industry,'' The Journal of Industrial Economics, June 1997, 117-138.
6. S. Borenstein and A. Shepard, ''Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets,'' The Rand
Journal of Economics, Autumn 1996, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 429-451.
VI. Empirical Studies of Firm Conduct
A. Inter-Industry Studies
1. F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,
Chapter 11.
2. R. Schmalensee, ''Interindustry Studies of Structure and Performance,'' in HIO.
3. Demsetz, H., "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry and Public Policy,'' Journal of Law
and Economics, 16, (1973), l-10.
4. I. Domowitz, R. Hubbard and B. Petersen, "Business Cycles and the Relationship
Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins," Rand Journal of Economics,
17(Spring 1986), 1-17.
5. R. Schmalensee, ''Do Markets Differ Much?" American Economic Review, 75 (June
1985), 341-351.
6. M. Salinger, "The Concentration-Margin Relationship Reconsidered,'' Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 287-335.
B. Theory of Conduct Parameters
1. T. Bresnahan, "The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified," Economics Letters, 10,
1982, 87-92.
2. L. Lau, "On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness from Industry Price and Output
Data,'' Economics Letters, 10, 1982, 93-99.
3. J. Panzar and J. Rosse, "Testing for 'Monopoly' Equilibrium," Journal of Industrial
Economics, 35 (June 1987), 443-456.
4
4.
C.
K. Corts, "Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power,'' Journal of
Econometrics ???
Industry-Specific Studies of Firm Conduct
1. T. Bresnahan, "Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power,'' in HIO.
2. R. Coterill, "Market Power in the Retail Food Industry: Evidence from Vermont,"
Review of Economics and Statistics, 68 (August 1986), 379-386.
3. A. Nevo, "Measuring Market Power in the Ready-to-Eat Cereal Industry,'' mimeo.
4. T. Bresnahan, "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The
1955 Price War,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 35 (June 1987), 457-482.
5. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Testing Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar
Industry, 1898-1914,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Summer 1 998), 355-377.
6. C. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,'' mimeo.
7. Baker, J. and T. Bresnahan, ''Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market
Power," Antitrust Law Journal, Vol.61, 1992,pp.3-16.
VII. Entry
A. Basic Theory
1. Tirole, Sections 7.l-7.2
2. Mankiw, N.G. and M.D. Whinston, "Free Entry and Social Inefficiency,'' Rand Journal
of Economics, 17 (Spring 1986), pp. 48-58.
3. Anderson, S., A. de Palma, and Y. Nesterov, "Oligopolistic Competition and the Optimal
Provision of Products," Econometrica, Vol. 63, No. 6, November 1995, pp.l281-1302.
4. Sutton, J., Sunk Costs and Market Structure, MIT Press, 1991, Chapters l-2.
5. B. Jovanovic, ''Selection and the Evolution of Industry," Econometrica, (May 1982),
649-670.
6. Banmol, W.K., J.C. Panzar, and R.D. Willig, ''On the Theory of Perfectly Contestable
Markets," in J.E. Stiglitz and G.F. Mathewson, eds., New Developments in the Analysis
of Market Structure, MIT Press, 1986.
B . Empirical Evidence
1. T. Bresnahan and P. Reiss, ''Entry and Competition in Concentrated Markets,'' Journal of
Political Economy, 99 (October 1991), 977- 009.
2. Comments on Bresnahan and Reiss, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Special
Issue on Microeconomics, 3 (1987), 872-882.
3. T. Dunne, M. Roberts, and L. Samuelson, ''Patterns of Firm Entry and Exit in U.S.
Manufacturing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 19 (Winter 1988), 495-515.
4. Berry, S. and J. Waldfogel, ''Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting,"
June 1996.
5. S. Berry, ''Estimation of a Model of Entry in the Airline industry, " Econometrica, 60
(July 1992), 889-918.
VIII. Strategic Investment
A.
General Considerations
5
1.
2.
Tirole, pp. 207-8, Chapter 8.
J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, '`Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic
Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, 93 (June 1985), 488-511.
3. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "The Fat Cat Effect, the Puppy Dog Ploy and the Lean and
Hungry Look,'' American Economic Review, 74 (May 1 984), 36 1 -366.
4. R. Gilbert, ''Mobility Barriers and the Value of Incumbency," in HIO.
B. Capacity, Product Differentiation, beaming Curves, Contracts
1. A. Dixit, ''The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence,'' Economic Journal, 90 (March
l980), 95-106.
2. R. Schmalensee, ''Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry,'' Journal of Political
Economy, 89 (December 1981), pp. 1228-38.
3. J.R. Gelman and S.C. Salop, ''Judo Economics. Capacity Limitation and Coupon
Competition,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 315-25.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Capital as a Commitment: Strategic Investment to Deter
Mobility,'' Journal of Economic Theory, 31 (December 1983), 227-250.
5. R. Schmalensee, ''Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast Cereal Industry,'' Bell
Journal of Economics, 9 (Autumn 1978), pp. 305-27.
6. K. Judd, ''Credible Spatial Preemption," Rand Journal of Economics, 16 (Summer 1985),
pp. 153-66.
7. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, "Learning by Doing and Market Performance,'' Bell Journal
of Economics, 14 (Autumn 1983), pp. 522-30.
8. P. Aghion and P. Bolton, "Entry Prevention Through Contracts with Customers,''
American Economic Review, 77, June 1987, pp. 388-401.
9. T.E. Cooper, "Most-Favored Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion,'' Rand Journal of
Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 377-88.
10. J. J. Laffont, P. Rey and J. Tirole, "Network Competition I: Overview and
Nondiscriminatory Pricing,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 29 (Spring 1 998), l -37.
C. Empirical Evidence on Strategic Investment
1. J. Chevalier, "Capital Structure and Product Market Competition: Empirical Evidence
from the Supermarket Industry,'' American Economic Review, June 1995.
2. M. Lieberman, "Post Entry investment and Market Structure in the Chemical Processing
Industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 18 (Winter 1987), 533-549.
3. G. Hurdle, et al., "Concentration, Potential Entry, and Performance in the Airline
Industry,'' Journal of Industrial Economics, 38 (December 1989), 119-140.
4. R. Smiley, "Empirical Evidence on Strategic Entry Deterrence,'' International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 6 (June 1988), 167- 180.
IX. Information and Strategic Behavior
A. Limit Pricing
1. Tirole, Sections 9.0 - 9.4.
2. P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Limit Pricing and Entry Under Incomplete Information: An
Equilibrium Analysis,'' Econometrica, 50 (March 1982), 443-460.
B. Predation
1. Tirole, Sections 9.5 - 9.7.
6
2.
P. Milgrom and J. Roberts, ''Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence," Journal of
Economic Theory, 27 (August 1982), pp. 288-312.
3. G. Saloner, ''Predation, Merger, and Incomplete information," Rand Journal of
Economics, 18 (Summer 1987), pp. 165-186.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''A 'Signal-Jamming' Theory of Predation,'' Rand Journal of
Economics, 17 (Autumn 1986), pp. 366-76.
5. P. Bolton and D. Scharfstein, ''A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in
Financial Contracting,'' American Economic Review, 80 (March 1 990), pp. 93- 106.
6. Benoit, J.P., ''Financially Constrained Entry in a Game of Incomplete Information,"
Rand Journal of Economics, 15, pp. 490-99.
7. J. Oulover and G. Saloner, ''Predation, Monopolization and Antitrust," in HIO.
C. Empirical Studies of Information Asymmetries and Predation
1. D. Cooper, S. Garvin and J. Kagel, "Signaling and Adaptive Learning in an Entry Limit
Pricing Game,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 28 (Winter 1997), 662-683.
2. D. Genesove, "Adverse Selection in the Wholesale Used Car Market,'' Journal of
Political Economy, 101 (August 1993), 644-665.
3. M. Doyle and C. Snyder, "Information Sharing and Competition in the Motor Vehicle
Industry," mimeo.
4. T. Hubbard, "Consumer Beliefs and Buyer and Seller Behavior in the Vehicle Inspection
Market,'' mimeo.
5. J. McGee,'' Predatory Price Cutting The Standard Oil (NJ) Case,'' Journal of Law and
Economics, l (October 1958), 137-169.
6. D. Genesove and W. Mullin, "Predation and Its Rate of Return: The Sugar industry,
l887- 1914," NBER Working Paper 6032, 1997.
7. D. Weiman and R. Levin, ''Preying for Monopoly: Southern Bell," Journal of Political
Economy, 102 (February 1994), 103-26.
8. Kadiyali, V., ''Entry, Its Deferrence, and its Accommodation: A Study of the U.S.
Photographic Film Industry," The Rand Journal of Economics, Autumn 1 996, Vol. 27,
X. Advertising
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Tirole, Sections 2.2-2.4, 7.3
M. Stegeman, ''Advertising in Competitive Markets,'' American Economic Review, 81
(March 1991), 210-223.
F. M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance,
Chapter 18.
Kwoka, J. ''Advertising the Price and Quality of Optometric Services,'' American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 1984, 211 -216.
P. Ippolito and A. Mathios, ''Information, Advertising and Health: A Study of the Cereal
Market,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1 990), 459-480.
D. Ackerberg, "Advertising, Learning, and Consumer Choice in Experience Good
Markets: An Empirical Examination,'' mimeo.
XI. Auctions
1.
P. McAfee and J. McMillan, ''Auctions and Bidding," JEL, June 1987, pp. 699-738.
7
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
P. Milgrom, "Auctions and Bidding: A Primer," JEP, Summer 1989, pp. 3-22.
K. Hendricks and R. Porter, ''An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric
Information,'' American Economic Review, December 1 988, pp. 865-83.
R. Porter, ''The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions,"
Econometrica, 63 (January 1995), pp. 1-27.
R. Porter and D. Zona, "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," JPE, June
1993, pp. 5 18-38.
P. Bajari, "Econometrics of the First Price Auction with Asymmetric Bidders," mimeo.
J.-J. Laffont, H. Ossard, and Q. Vuong, ''Econometrics of First Price Auctions,'' EM, July
1995, pp. 953-80.
J. Kagel, R. Harstad and D. Levin, ''Information Impact and Allocation Rules in
Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study, "Econometrica, 55 (1987),
pp. 1275- 1304.
J. Kagel, ''Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research,'' in J. Kagel and A. Roth, eds.,
The Handbook of Experimental Economics.
XII. Technological Change
A. Research and Development
1. Tirole, Sections 10.l - 10.5, 8. l.3
2. G. C. Loury, ''Market Structure and Innovation,'' Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93
(1979), pp. 395-410.
3. D. Fudenberg, R. Gilbert, J. Stiglitz, and J. Tirole, "Preemption, Leapfrogging, and
Competition in Patent Races," European Economic Review, 22 (1983), pp. 3-31.
4. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, ''Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New
Technology,'' Review of Economic Studies, 52 (1985), pp. 383-401.
5. Symposium on Patent Policy, Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Spring 1990).
B. Standardization
1. J. Farrell and G. Saloner, "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation,'' Rand
Journal of Economics, 16 (1985), pp. 70-83.
2. M. Katz and C. Shapiro, ''Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network
Externalities," Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), pp. 822-841.
C. Diffusion of Technologies
1. Rogers and Shoemaker, The Diffusion of Innovation: A Cross-Cultural Approach, Free
Press, 1971.
2. G. Ellison and D. Fudenberg, "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political
Economy, 101 (1993), pp. 612-643.
D. Empirical Studies
1. A. Pakes, "Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent
Stocks, Econometrica, 54 (July 1986), 755-784.
2. M. Trajtenberg, "The Welfare Analysis of Product Innovations with an Application to
Computed Tomography Scanners," Journal of Political Economy, 97 (April 1989),
444-479.
3. G. Saloner and A. Shepard, "Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An
Empirical Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines," Rand Journal
8
4.
5.
6.
of Economics, 13 (Autumn 1995), 479-501.
T. Hubbard, "Why Are Process Monitoring Technologies Valuable? The Use of
On-Board Information Technology in the Trucking Industry," mimeo.
E. Mansfield, "How Rapidly Does New industrial Technology Leak Out?" Journal of
Industrial Economics, 34 (December 1985), 217-223.
N. L. Rose and P. L. Joskow, ''The Diffusion of New Technologies. Evidence from the
Electric Utility industry," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Autumn 1990), 354-373.
XIII. Managerial incentives and Firm Behavior
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Tirole, pages 34-55.
B. Holmstrom, "Managerial Incentive Problems - A Dynamic Perspective,'' in Essays in
Honor of Lars Wahlbeck, 1982.
S. Grossman and O. Hart, "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of
the Corporation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 11 (Spring 1980), 42-64.
A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control,'' Journal of
Political Economy, 94 (June 1996), 461-488.
O. Hart, "The Market Mechanism as an Incentive Scheme,'' Bell Journal of Economics,
14 (Autumn 1983), 366-382.
C. Fershtman and K. Judd, "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic
Review, 77(December 1987), 927-940.
R. Masson, "Executive Motivation, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance,"
Journal of Political Economy, 79 (December 1971), 1278- 1292.
P. Healy, "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions,'' Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 7 (April 1985), 85-107.
XIV. Antitrust: Overview
1.
2.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Executive Summary of the Antitrust
Laws." Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 319.
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, 1992, "Introduction to EC Competition Law,''
Kaye, Scholer's Antitrust Deskbook, NY, pp. 237-242.
XV. Antitrust: Horizontal Mergers
A. Policy Issues
1. Materials on Time-Warner/Turner Merger (mimeo). Available from Graphic Arts as Part
A of the 14.272 Readings Packet.
B. Theory and Evidence
1. J. Farrell & C. Shapiro, "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American
Economic Review, 80 (March 1990), 107-126.
2. Robert D. Willig, "Merger Analysis, Industrial Organization Theory, and Merger
Guidelines," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1991, pp.
281-332.
3. B.E. Eckbo, "Mergers and Market Concentration Doctrine Evidence from the Capital
Market," Journal of Business, 58 (July 1985), 325-349.
4. R. McAfee & M. Williams, "Can Event Studies Detect Anticompetitive Merger?"
9
Economic Letters, (1988), 199-203.
5. R.A. Prager, "The Effects of Horizontal Mergers on Competition: The Case of the
Northern Securities Company," Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Spring 1992), 123-133.
6. G.L. Mullin, J.C. Mullin, and W.P. Mullin, "The Competitive Effects of Mergers: Stock
Market Evidence from the U.S. Steel Dissolution Suit," Rand Journal of Economics, 26
(Summer 1995), 314-330.
7. S. Bhagat, A. Shleifer, & R.W. Wishny, "Hostile Takeovers in the 1980s: The Return to
Corporate Specialization," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics,
1990. 1-84.
8. M. Pesendorfer, "Horizontal Mergers in the Paper industry,'' NBER Working Paper 6751.
October 1988
C. Horizontal Merger Policy
1. US Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (revised April 1992).
2. J. Hausman and G. Leonard, "Economic Analysis of Differentiated Product Mergers
Using Real World Data," mimeo, October 25, 1996.
3. David Scheffman and Pablo Spiller, "Econometric Market Delineation,'' Managerial and
Decision Economics, Vol. 17, 165-178 (1996)
4. G.J. Werden and L.M. Froeb, "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products
Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy,'' Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 10 (October 1994), 407-26.
5. S.C. Salop, L.J. White, F. M. Fisher, & R. Schmalensee, "Symposium: Horizontal
Mergers and Antitrust," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1 (Fail 1987), 3-54.
6. S. Dalkir & F.R. Warren-Boulton, "Prices, Market Definition, and the Effects of Merger:
Staples-Office Depot (1997),'' in J.E. Kwoka, Jr. and L.J. White, eds., The Antitrust
Revolution: Economics, Competition, and Policy, 3rd ed. Oxford: Oxford University
Press (1999), pp. 143-165.
XVI. Antitrust: Vertical Relations & Vertical Restraints
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
Tirole, Chapter 4 (including supplementary section).
J.A. Ordover, G. Saloner, & S.C. Salop, "Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure," American
Economic Review, 80 (March 1990), 127-142.
Benjamin Klein, "Market Power in Aftermarkets," Managerial and Decision Economics,
Vol. 17, 143-164 (1996).
Carl Shapiro, "Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak,'' Antitrust
Law Journal, Vol. 63 at 483 (1995).
O. Hart and J. Tirole, "Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure," Brookings Papers
on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1990, 205-286.
P. Rey and J. Stiglitz, " The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition,"
Rand Journal of Economics, 26 (Autumn 1995), 431-451.
M. B. Lieberman, "Determinants of Vertical Integration: An Empirical Test," Journal of
Industrial Economics, 39(September 1991), 451-466.
S.J. Ornstein & D.M. Hanssens, "Resale Price Maintenance: Output Increasing or
Restructuring? The Case of Distilled Spirits in the United States," Journal of Industrial
Economics, 36 (September 1987), 1-18.
10
9.
F. Lafontaine, "Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results,'' Rand
Journal of Economics, 23 (Summer 1992) 263-283.
XVII. The Political Economy of Regulation
1.
R. G. Noll, ''Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation,'' in R. Schmalensee &
R. D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam NorthHolland, 1989, Ch. 22, 1253-1287.
2. Armstrong et al, Chapter 1.
3. G.J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic regulation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 2 (Spring
1971), 3-21.
4. S. Peltzman, ''The Economic Theory of regulation after a Decade of Deregulation,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 1989, 1-60.
5. R.A. Posner, ''Taxation by Regulation,'' Bell Journal of Economics, 2 (Spring 1971 ),
22-50.
6. R.A. Posner, ''Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, 5
(Autumn 1974), 335-358.
7. J.Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in J.Q. Wilson (Ed.), The Politics of
Regulation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
8. J.P. Kalt & M. A. Zupan, "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics,"
American Economic Review, 74 (June 1984), 279-300.
9. R. Prager, "Using Stock Price Data to Measure the Effects of Regulation The Interstate
Commerce Act and the Railroad industry,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 20 (Summer
1989), 280-290.
10. T. Romer de H. Rosenthal, "Modern Political Economy and the Study of Regulation," in
E. E. Bailey (ed.), Public Regulation: Perspectives on Institutions and Policies,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987, 73-116.
11. B.R. Weingast & M.J. Moran, ''Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control?
Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission," Journal of Political
Economy, 91 (October 1983), 765-800.
12. M. McCubbins, R. Noll, & B. Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as instruments of
Political Control,"Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3 (1987), 243-277.
XVIII. Government versus Private Ownership
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
J. Wickers & G. Yarrow, "Economic Perspectives on Privatization,'' Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 5 (Spring 1991), 111-132.
F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Wishny, " Privatization in the United States,"
Rand Journal of Economics, (Autumn, 1997), pp. 447-471
D.E.M. Sappington & J.E. Stiglitz, "Privatization, Information and incentives,'' Journal
of Policy Analysis and Management, 6 (1987), 567-582.
Laffont & J. Tirole, Chapter 17.
Shleifer & R.W. Wishny, ''Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109
(November 1994), 995-1026.
R. Teeples & D. Glyer, ''Cost of Water Delivery Systems: Specific and Ownership
Effects," Review of Economics and Statistics, 69 (August 1987), 399-408.
11
7.
Galal, L. Jones, P. Tandon, and I. Vogelsang, Welfare Consequences of Selling Public
Enterprises, Oxford. Oxford University Press, 1994, Chapter 23.
8. Boardman & A. Wining,"Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments,"
Journal of Law and Economics, 32 (April 1989), 1-33.
9. P. Murrel (ed.), "Symposium on Economic Transition in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(Fall 1991), 3-217.
10. M. Boycko, A. Shleifer, and R.W. Wishny, "Privatizing Russia," Brookings Papers on
Economic Activity, 1993, 139-192.
11. P.L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, and N. Tsukanova, ''Competition Policy in Russia During
and After Privatization,'' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics,
1994, 301-381.
XIX. Efficient Regulation of Monopolies
A. The Natural Monopoly Problem
1. W.J. Baumol, J.C. Panzar, & R.D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of
Industry Structure, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace Javanovich, 1982, Chapter3, 4, and 7.
2. R. Schmalensee, The Control of Natural Monopolies, Lexington. D.C. Heath, 1979,
Chapters 1 and 2.
3. W.W. Sharkey, The Theory of Natural Monopoly, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982, Ch. 2 and 4.
4. A. E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, Volume 1, New York: John Wiley, 1970,
Chapters 3-7.
B. Optimal Pricing with Full Information
1. R. Braeutigam, "Optimal Policies for Natural Monopolies," in R. Schmalensee & R. D.
Willig (eds.), Handbook of industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam. NorthHolland, 1989, Chapter 23, 1290-1345. (useful overview and general reference)
2. S. Brown and D. Sibley, The Theory of Public Utility Pricing, Cambridge. Cambridge
University Press, Chapter 3.
3. A.E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation, Volume 1, New York: John Wiley, 1970,
Chapter 2.
4. M.A. Crew & P. R. Kleindorfer, The Economics of' Public Utility Regulation,
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, Chapters 3 and 4.
5. R. Park & B. Mitchell, Optimal Peak Load Pricing for Local Telephone Calls, Rand
Corporation (R-3404-1-RC), March 1987.
6. W.J. Baumol, J.C. Panzar, & R. D. Willig, Contestable Markets and the Theory of
Industry Structure, San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, Javanovich, 1982, Chapter 8.
7. R.B. Wilson, Nonlinear Pricing, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, Chapters 4
and 5.
8. W.W. Sharkey and D.S. Sibley, ''Optimal Non-Linear Pricing with Regulatory
Preference over Customer Types," Bellcore Discussion Paper 75, January 1992.
9. G.R. Faulhaber, "Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises," American
Economic Review, 65 (December 1975) 966-977.
10. K. Palmer, " A Test for Cross Subsidies in Local Telephone Rates: Do Business
Customers Subsidize Residential Customers," Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (Autumn
12
1992), 415-431.
11. A.B. Atkinson & J.E. Stiglitz, Lectures on Public Economics, New York: McGraw-Hill,
1980, Lectures 12 and 15.
12. R.R. Braeutigam, ''Social Optimal Pricing with Rivalry and Economies of Scale,'' Rand
Journal of Economics, 15 (Spring 1984), 127-134.
C. Rate of Return Regulation
1. R. Schmalensee, ''An Expository Note on Depreciation and Profitability under Rate-of
Return Regulation,'' Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1 (September 1989), 293-298.
2. W.J. Baumol & A.K. Klevorick, ''Input Choices and Rate-of Return Regulation. An
Overview of the Discussion,'' Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1
(Autumn 1970), 162-190.
3. E.E. Bailey, Economic Theory of Regulatory Constraint, Lexington D.C. Heath, 1973.
D. Institutions and Mechanisms for Asymmetric Information
1. P.L. Joskow & R. Schmalensee, ''Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities,'' Yale
Journal on Regulation, 4 (December 1986), 1-49.
2. Laffont & Tirole, Introduction, Chapters 1 & 2, Chapters 3 & 9 are recommended.
3. J.-J. Laffont, "The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After,'' Econometrica, 62
(May 1994), 507-537.
4. A. Shleifer, "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," Rand Journal of Economics, 16
(Autumn 1985), 319-327.
5. Armstrong et al, Chapters 2 & 3 and Section 4.4.
6. D. Baron, "Design of Regulatory institutions and Mechanisms,'' in R. Schmalensee &
R.D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam NorthHolland, 1989, Chapter 24, 1347-1447.
7. T. Lewis & D. Sappington, ''Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Demand,"
American Economic Review, 78 (December 1988), 986-998.
8. R.J. Gilbert and D.M. Newbery, ''The Dynamic Efficiency of Regulatory Constitutions,''
Rand Journal of Economics, 25 (Winter 1994), 538-554.
E. Price Caps and Related Regimes
1. Armstrong et al, Chapter 6.
2. M. Crew and P. Kleindorfer, "Incentive Regulation in the United States Some Lessons,"
Journal of Regulatory Economics, May 1996, pp. 211-226.
3. R. Schmalensee, ''Good Regulatory Regimes," Rand Journal of Economics, 20 (Autumn
1989), 417-436.
4. Armstrong et al, Chapter 9.
F. Auction-Based Approaches
1. H. Demsetz, ''Why Regulate Utilities'' Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (April 1968),
55-66.
2. Laffont & Tirole, Chapters 7 and 8.
3. P.C. Cramton, ''Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995), 267-343.
4. B. Chakravorti, W.W. Sharkey, Y. Spiegel, and S. Wilkie, ''Auctioning the Airwaves: The
Contest for Broadband PCS Spectrum," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
4 (Summer 1995), 345~373.
13
XX. The Effects of Economic Regulation and Deregulation
A. Overview
1. P. L. Joskow & N.L. Rose, ''Economic Regulation and its Effects," in R. Schmalensee &
R.D. Willig (eds.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam: NorthHolland, 1989, Ch. 25, 1450-1506.
2. P. L. Joskow & R.G. Noll, ''Economic Regulation during the 1980s," in M. Feldstein
(Ed.), Economic Policy During the 1980s, University of Chicago Press, 1994. (Useful
general survey and reference)
B. Access Pricing
1. Laffont & Tirole, Chapters 5 and 6.
2. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, ''Creating Competition Through interconnection: Theory and
Practice," Journal of Regulatory Economics. November 1996, pp. 227-256.
3. J.-J. Laffont and J. Tirole, "Notes on Access Pricing and Competition in
Telecommunications" (mimeo).
4. J.-J. Laffont, P. Rey, and J. Tirole, "Network Competition: I. Overview and
Nondiscriminatory Pricing,'' Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 1-37.
5. J.-J. Laffont, P. Rey, and J. Tirole, "Network Competition: II. Price Discrimination,''
Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 38-56.
C. Telecommunications
1. Armstrong et al., Ch. 7.
2. D. Kridel, D. Sappington and D. Weisman, "The Effects of incentive Regulation in the
Telecommunications Industries: A Survey, ''Journal of Regulatory Economics, May
1996, pp. 269-306.
3. S.G. Donald & D.E.M. Sappington, ''Explaining the Choice Among Regulatory Plans in
the U.S. Telecommunications industry,'' Journal of Economics & Management Strategy,
4 (Summer 1995), 237-265.
4. A.D. Mathios & R. P. Rogers, ''The Impact of Alternative Forms of State Regulation of
AT &T Direct-Dial, Long-Distance Telephone Rates," RAND Journal of Economics, 20
(Autumn 1989), 437-453.
5. S. Greenstein, S. McMaster, & P. Spiller,"The Effect of incentive Regulation on
Infrastructure Modernization: Local Exchange Companies' Deployment of Digital
Technology," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4 (Summer 1995),
187-236.
6. J. Hausman, "Taxation By Telecommunications Regulation,'' September 30, 1997
(mimeo)
7. W. E. Taylor & L. Taylor, ''Postdivestiture Long-Distance Competition in the U.S., "
American Economic Review, 83 (May 1993), 185-190.
8. P.W. MacAvcy, "Tacit Collusion Under Regulation in the Pricing of interstate LongDistance Telephone Services," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 4
(Summer 1995), 147-185.
9. S. Kahal, D. Kaserman and J. Mayo, ''Is the `Dominant Firm` Dominant? An Empirical
Analysis of AT & T's Market Power," Journal of Law and Economics, October 1996, pp.
497-517.
14
D. Electricity
1. G. Stigler & C. Friedland, "What Can Regulators Regulate?" Journal of Law and
Economics 5 (October 1962) 1-16.
2. S. Peltzman, ''George Stigler's Contribution to the Analysis of Economic Regulation."
Journal of Political Economy, October 1993, pp. 819-832.
3. G.A. Jarrell, ''The Demand for State Regulation of the Electric Utility industry,'' Journal
of Law and Economics, 21 (October 1978), 269-295.
4. P. L. Joskow, "Inflation and Environmental Concern. Structural Change in the Process of
Public Utility Price Regulation," Journal of Law and Economics, 17 (October 1974), 29
1-327.
5. W. Hendricks, "The Effects of Regulation on Collective Bargaining in Electric Utilities,''
Bell Journal of Economics, 6 (Autumn 1975), 451-465.
6. R. Green and D. Newbery, ''Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market," Journal
of Political Economy, 1992 (100), PP 929-953.
7. C. D. Wolfram, "Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,''
American Economic Review (forthcoming).
8. C. D. Wolfram, "Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of
Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales,'' Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29,
NO. 4, 703-725, Winter 1998.
9. David Newbery, "Competition, Contracts and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market,''
Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 29, No. 4, 726-749, Winter 1998.
10. F.A. Wolak, "An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Hedge Contracts on Bidding
Behavior in a Competitive Electricity Market, mimeo, October 1998.
11. Paul Joskow and Jean Tirole, "Transmission Rights and Market Power: Part I - Financial
Rights, Part 11 - Physical Rights,'' mimeo, December 1998.
12. F.A. Wolak & R.H. Patrick, ''The Impact of Market Rules and Market Structure on the
Price Determination Process in the England and Wales Electricity Market," mimeo,
Stanford University, June 1996.
13. D. Newbery and M.G. Pollit, "The Restructuring and Privatization of British CEGB -Was it Worth It?'' Journal of Industrial Economics, September 1997, pp. 269-303.
14. P.L. Joskow, ''Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity
Sector," Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 1997, pp. 119-138.
15. S. Borenstein, J. Bushnell, and C.R. Knittel, "Market Power in Electricity Markets:
Beyond Concentration Measures,'' University of California Energy Institute, PWP-059,
July 1998.
16. W.W. Hogan,"Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission,'' Journal of
Regulatory Economics, 4 ( 1992), 2 1 1-242.
17. P. L. Joskow, N.L. Rose, and C.D. Wolfram, ''Political Constraints on Executive
Compensation: Evidence from the Electric Utility Industry,'' Rand Journal of Economics
(Spring 1996).
E. Cable Television
1. A.B. Jaffe & D.M. Kantner, ''Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises:
Evidence from the Effects of Deregulation," Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Summer
1990), 226-234.
15
2.
R.A. Prager, "Firm Behavior in Franchise Monopoly Markets," Rand Journal of
Economics, 12 (Summer 1990), 211-225.
3. J.W. Mayo & Y. Osuka, "Market Power of Local Cable Television Franchises. Evidence
from the Effects of Deregulation," RAND Journal of Economics, 22 (Autumn 1991),
396-410.
4. R.N. Rabinovitz, ''Market Power and Price increases for Basic Cable Service Since
Deregulation, Rand Journal of Economics, 24 (Spring 1993), 1-18.
F. Transportation
1. T.W. Gilligan, W.J. Marshall & B. R. Weingast, ''The Economic incidence of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the ShortHaul Pricing Constraint,'' Rand Journal of Economics, 21 (Summer 1990), 189-210.
2. N.L. Rose, ''Labor Rent Sharing and Regulation: Evidence from the Trucking Industry,''
Journal o Political Economy, 95 (December 1987), 1 146-1178.
3. N. L. Rose, "The Incidence of Regulatory Rents in the Motor Carrier Industry," Rand
Journal of Economics, 16 (Autumn 1985), 299-318.
4. J.S. Heywood & J.H. Peoples, "Deregulation and the Prevalence of Black Truck
Drivers," Journal of Law & Economics, 37 (April 1994), 133-156.
5. D. Card, "Deregulation and Labor Earnings in the Airline industry,'' MBER Working
Paper 5687, Cambridge, MA, July 1996.
6. D. M. Kennet, "Did Deregulation Affect Aircraft Engine Maintenance? An Empirical
Policy Analysis,'' RAND Journal of Economics, 24 (Winter 1993), 542-558.
7. S. Borenstein, "The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 6 (Spring 1992) 45-74.
G. Banking Regulation
1. A. Marcus, ''Deregulation and Bank Financial Policy," Journal of Banking and Finance,
8 (December 1984), 557-565.
2. R.S. Grossman, "'Deposit insurance, Regulation, and Moral Hazard in the Thrift
Industry: Evidence from the 1930s," American Economic Review, 82 (September 1992),
800-821.
3. R. S. Kroszner & R.G. Rajan, ''Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the U.S.
Experience with Universal Banking before 1933," American Economic Review, 84
(September 1994), 810-832.
4. R.G. Hubbard and D. Palia, "Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S.
Banking Industry,'' Journal of Financial Economics, 39 (1995), 105-130.
5. R. S. Kroszner and P. E. Strahan, "The Political Economy of Deregulation Evidence
from the Relaxation of Banking Branching Restrictions in the United States," University
of Chicago Center for Research in Security Prices Working Paper 460, November 1997.
XXI. "Social" Regulation: Externalities, Risks, and Asymmetric
Information
A. Overview
1. H. K. Gruenspecht & L. B. Lave, "The Economics of Health, Safety, and Environmental
Regulation," in R Schmalensee & R. D. Willig (Eds.), Handbook of Industrial
16
Organization, Volume 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1989, Chapter 26, 1507-1550.
(useful overview and general reference; will not be discussed explicitly).
2. W. K. Wiscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Chapter 14,
248-301.
3. W.K. Viscusi, ''The Value of Risks to Life and Health," Journal of Economic Literature,
31 (December 1993), 1912-1946.
B. Environmental Protection
1. M. Weitzman, ''Prices vs. Quantities,'' Review of Economic Studies, 41 (1974), 477-491.
(if you haven't seen this in micro sequence).
2. E. Kwerel, "To Tell the Truth: Imperfect information and Optimal Pollution Control,"
Review of Economic Studies, 44 (1977), 595-601.
3. M .L. Cropper & W. E. Oates, "Environmental Economics: A Survey," Journal of
Economic Literature, 30 (June 1992), 675-740.
4. W. Oates, P. Portney, & A. McGartland, "The Net Benefits of Incentive-Based
Environmental Regulation," American Economic Review, 79 (December 1989),
1233-1242.
5. T. H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reforming Pollution Policy,
Washington: Resources for the Future, 1985.
6. P. L. Joskow, R. Schmalensee, and E. M. Bailey, "The Market for Sulfur Dioxide
Emissions," American Economic Review, 88 (September 1998) 669-685.
7. P. L. Joskow & R. Schmalensee, "The Political Economy of Market-Based
Environmental Policy: The 1990 U.S. Acid Rain Program," Journal of Law and
Economics, April 1998.
8. R. Schmalensee, P. L. Joskow, A. D. Ellerman, J. P. Montero, and E. M. Bailey, "An
Interim Evaluation of Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Trading," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 12(Summer 1998) 53-68.
9. R.N. Stavins, "What Can We Learn From the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from
SO2 Allowance Trading,'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (Summer 1998) 69-88.
10. H. Sigman, "Midnight Dumping. Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil,"
Rand Journal of Economics 29 (Spring 1998) 157-178.
11. R. Becker and V. Henderson, "Effects of Air Quality Regulation on Decisions of Firms
in Polluting Industries," National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 6160,
September 1997.
12. R. Schmalensee et al, "Symposium on Global Climate Change," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 7 (Fall 1993), 3-86.
13. B.P. Pashigian, "Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests are Being Protected?''
Economic Inquiry, 23 (October 1985), 551-584.
C. Health and Safety Regulation
1. W. K. Wiscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, Chapter 13.
Chapter 12 is recommended.
2. S. Borenstein and M. Zimmerman, "Market incentive for Safe Commercial Airline
Operation,'' American Economic Review 78 (December 1988) 919-935.
3. D. Dranove & D. Meltzer, ''Do Important Drugs Reach the Market Sooner?'' Rand
Journal of Economics, 25 (Autumn 1994), 402-423.
17
4.
L.G. Thomas, ''Revealed Bureaucratic Preference: Priorities of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission," Rand Journal of Economics, 19(Spring 1988), 102-113.
18