AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES ASSUMED BY PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: THE CASE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS
by
Alexandru Vasile Roman
A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
The College for Design and Social Inquiry
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Florida Atlantic University
Boca Raton, Florida
August 2013
© Copyright by Alexandru V. Roman 2013
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This dissertation would have not been possible without the valuable contribution
of a number of exceptional individuals. I owe a great intellectual debt to my dissertation
committee: Leslie Leip, Ron Nyhan and Cliff McCue. For considering how easily one
can get lost in a theoretical muddle, become disheartened and lose track of time – I could
not have dreamt of a better committee. The value and impact of their guidance reaches far
beyond the constraints imposed by this dissertation. I am also indebted to many other
great minds whom I had the pleasure to meet and who along with my committee have
nurtured my growth as a scholar. Finally, I have been extremely fortunate to have many
wonderful colleagues who have bravely accompanied and supported me in this trying
journey.
I dedicate this dissertation to my family. If there is anything worthy that I can
offer to this world it is a credit to them and a reflection of their education. I also dedicate
this work to all of those who find the strength to stand firm behind their ideals, do good
whenever the opportunity is offered to them and have resisted the corruption of ego.
Although life sometimes makes us do things that we have to do, there are few things that
count as heavy in a man’s identity as honor does. Integrity, among many others, calls for
the power to see the limitations in ourselves and the greatness in others.
iv
ABSTRACT
Author:
Alexandru V. Roman
Title:
An Empirical Analysis of the Roles Assumed by Public
Administrators: The Case of Public Procurement Specialists
Institution:
Florida Atlantic University
Dissertation Advisor: Dr. Clifford McCue
Degree:
Doctor of Philosophy
Year:
2013
This dissertation examines administrative roles within the context of everyday
public administration. Specifically, it studies the relationship between administrative
roles assumed by public administrators and (1) the perceived presence of administrative
discretion, (2) individual level beliefs regarding involvement in policy formulation and
(3) tenure with organization.
This dissertation has a three-fold purpose. First, it delineates the types of roles
assumed by public procurement specialists. Second, it tests whether administrative
discretion, beliefs regarding participation in policy formulation and organizational tenure
are significant in explaining the assumption of certain types of roles. Finally, the
dissertation evaluates the implications for the public procurement process of the
predominance of certain roles.
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The theoretical logic for this dissertation draws on the theory of representative
bureaucracy and role theory. These frameworks suggest that public administrators who
have access to higher levels of administrative discretion would be more likely to assume
a representative type role. Along similar lines, strong expectations regarding one’s
involvement in policy formulation would increase the probability of the enactment by
public administrators of a representative type role. Finally, it is expected that
organizational tenure, through organizational socialization, would decrease the
probability of a public administrator assuming a representative type role.
It is found that administrative discretion, individual expectations and
organizational tenure are indeed important predictors of the assumption of administrative
roles. Administrators who believe that they have access to relatively high levels of
discretion and those who believe they should be involved in policy formulation are more
likely to assume a representative type role. On the other hand, with increased tenure
public administrators are less likely to assume a representative type role.
vi
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE ROLES ASSUMED BY PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATORS: THE CASE OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT SPECIALISTS
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................. x
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 1
Public Procurement ......................................................................................................... 5
The Motivation of the Study and Problem Statement ..................................................... 6
Research Goals and Questions ........................................................................................ 8
Scope of the Research ..................................................................................................... 9
Methodological Approach: Data Collection and Analyses ........................................... 10
Outline of the Argument and Dissertation .................................................................... 11
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................ 13
Theory of Representative Bureaucracy ......................................................................... 15
Empirical Evaluations ................................................................................................... 25
Administrative Discretion and Representative Bureaucracy......................................... 27
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 28
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION .......................................... 30
Institutional Environment .............................................................................................. 30
Roles .............................................................................................................................. 35
Administrative Responsibility Framework ................................................................... 42
Roles of Public Administrators ..................................................................................... 44
vii
Public Procurement Context.......................................................................................... 48
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 51
The Model ..................................................................................................................... 53
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 55
CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY .................................................................................. 57
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 57
Research Questions ....................................................................................................... 57
Assumptions .................................................................................................................. 60
Research Philosophy ..................................................................................................... 61
Population and Sample .................................................................................................. 62
Sampling Procedures and External Validity ................................................................. 63
Instrumentation and Role Constructs ............................................................................ 64
Procedures: Data Collection, Response and Completion Rates .................................... 66
Data Screening .............................................................................................................. 68
Nonresponse Bias .......................................................................................................... 69
Construct Reliability ..................................................................................................... 70
Multinomial Logistic Regression .................................................................................. 73
Significance ................................................................................................................... 74
Checking Normality and Multicollinearity ................................................................... 76
Coding ........................................................................................................................... 79
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 80
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 81
CHAPTER V: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION ............................................................... 82
viii
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 82
Results ........................................................................................................................... 82
Hypotheses .................................................................................................................... 84
Interpretation of Findings .............................................................................................. 88
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 91
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 92
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 92
Implications of the Results ............................................................................................ 92
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 94
Directions for Future Research...................................................................................... 96
Contributions ................................................................................................................. 96
APPENDIX A. IRB Approval .......................................................................................... 99
APPENDIX B. Survey Instrument ................................................................................. 100
APPENDIX C. Message ................................................................................................. 103
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................... 104
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Sources of Social Benefits .................................................................................. 19
Table 2. Roles of Public Administrators ........................................................................... 47
Table 3. The Model Variables .......................................................................................... 54
Table 4. Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses ............................................. 61
Table 5. Role Construct Instrument Items ........................................................................ 66
Table 6. Sample Descriptive Statistics.............................................................................. 69
Table 7.Independent Samples T-test for Equality of Means............................................. 71
Table 8. Construct Reliability ........................................................................................... 72
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics........................................................................................... 77
Table 10. Correlations....................................................................................................... 79
Table 11. Summary of Coding .......................................................................................... 80
Table 12. Model Fit Information and Likelihood Ratio Tests .......................................... 83
Table 13. Parameter Estimates .......................................................................................... 87
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Framework of Administrative Responsibility ................................................... 44
Figure 2. Visual Inspection of Data Normality ................................................................. 77
Figure 3. Distribution of Transformed Variables ............................................................. 77
xi
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Understanding and delineating what makes for an appropriate role of a public
servant within the context of everyday public administration is often the trigger for
heated theoretical debates. The question regarding the roles of public administrators
remains in significant ways fundamental to the nature of the field (Demir & Reddick,
2012; Box, 1992; Selden, Brewer, & Brudney, 1999; Svara, 1999; Waldo, 1984;
Wamsley et al., 1990). The actual terms of the debate are typically drawn around the
levels of discretion that a public servant employs. As such, questions regarding
administrative discretion normally lie at the heart of the efforts of understanding the
richness of roles that one can observe in practice.
In the evolution of public administration theory and practice, a general consensus
has been reached that the investment of discretionary power in administrative
agencies is a fact of life…From street-level bureaucrats who must make decisions
about the direct provision of services, to administrators within agencies who must
translate vague legislative mandates into organizational procedures, discretion is
often a crucial part of public administrators’ job descriptions. (Sowa & Selden,
2003, p. 700)
There is an intricate and interdependent relationship between administrative
discretion, the exercise of professional judgment, and administrative roles, patterns of
behavior assumed by public administrators. Public servants, depending on organizational
and policy contexts, might assume somewhat differing types of behaviors or even
different roles. The presence of administrative discretion and individual level belief
become central in terms of explaining the assumption of a given role type. The levels of
1
administrative discretion can either constrain or facilitate a variety of types of decisions
or behaviors that a public servant could undertake (Selden et al., 1999). At the same time,
however, depending on one’s assumed role, administrative discretion could either be
embraced and sought after, or rejected as normatively undesirable. On the whole,
scholars (Meier, 1993a; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Selden et al., 1999; Sowa & Selden, 2003)
expect that the presence and the institutional acceptability of administrative discretion
significantly impacts the roles assumed by public servants.
The complexity associated with the devolution of governance (Kettl, 2002, 2005)
and the rise of the “contract state” (Cooper, 2003) have made understanding
administrative roles and the manner that the perceived presence of administrative
discretion affects them that much more critical. Within the emerging density of
governance by contract, there are no clear guiding frameworks in terms of responsibility
and proper behavior by public administrators (Kettl, 2002, 2005). As a number of
researchers have noted, depending on the institutional context and personal expectations,
public servants could embrace any one of a number of roles (Selden et al., 1999; Sowa &
Selden, 2003). On regular bases, public servants in similar contexts and position assume
different roles depending on what is considered appropriate (Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2003). They might embrace roles such as those of steward of the public
interest, adapted realist, businesslike utilitarian, resigned custodian or practical idealist
(Selden et al, 1999).The perceptions and assumptions regarding a specific role, however,
become consequential in terms of resulting behavior. The acceptance of any one of these
roles leads to a rather different set of behaviors and varying levels of assumed
responsibility.
2
Holistically, it can be argued that the current form of governance has reached
historically unprecedented levels of complexity (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Kettl,
2002). Some have even argued that the administrative state within its traditional forms
and approaches is simply unable to deliver the performance required by citizens (Behn,
2001, 2003; Hughes, 2003). As such, public servants may be required to take upon a new
array of roles, far more intricate than the traditional “technocrat”; this becomes
particularly significant especially since they are facing conflicting and competing
demands from citizens on daily basis (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2011; Waldo, 1988).
Furthermore, it is now regularly expected of public administrators to be more actively
involved in formulating policy understandings (Demir & Reddick, 2012).
An individual’s perceptions regarding one’s appropriate level of involvement,
then, becomes critical in terms of attempting to explain one’s level of participation in
matters of policy formulation. A public servant could conceivably choose to directly be
involved in formulating policy recommendations or interpretations through one’s
organization, if such behavior is believed to be appropriate. For instance, a public
procurement specialist who believes that it is his or her role to represent the citizens,
would be more likely to deviate from organizational efficiency needs and support
procurement processes that target social outcomes. The latter might also be the case,
when an individual believes that the organization is not doing enough even if social
equity might be a stated organizational goal. The belief of one’s appropriate role is, then,
at the core of explaining behavior both within context that encourage or discourage such
behavior. A procurement specialist, who does not assume such a role, might be less
inclined to place social goals above organizational needs (even if one would be offered
3
the opportunity and discretion to do so). Hence, it could be expected that if public
servants believe that they should be active in formulating policy, they are more likely to
assume a representative type role.
On the whole, this would suggest that within the current administrative context,
public servants, procurement specialists in particular, have to assume roles that they
might not be accustomed to or for which they have not necessarily been prepared.
Understanding the effects of administrative discretion in terms of the behaviors
associated with such roles becomes essential in the efforts to demarcate a normative
placement for discretion in public administration. Without proper understandings of the
effects of administrative discretion on behavior, it becomes difficult to argue for any
organizational change or normative-driven reform. Does the presence of discretion lead
to more policy-active administrators? Do public servants who have higher levels of
administrative discretion assume different types of roles? How does tenure with an
organization affect assumed roles? These are just a few of many intriguing questions
regarding the roles of public administrators that are of interest within the recent
developments in governance. Both the academic and practice literature frequently suggest
professional neutrality as possible settlement for the questions that were raised above.
Yet, as it has been argued by a number of scholars, even the choice of neutrality is
inherently an act of discretion.
Perhaps the most appealing answer to the problem of discretion is for public
administrators to exercise neutral competence. Yet even if neutrality is possible,
the public administrator’s choice to remain neutral is itself a fundament exercise
of bureaucratic discretion. (Selden et. al, 1999, p. 172)
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Public Procurement
Public procurement, on its end, has always been an integral part of public
administration. The progressive movement at the turn of past century, for example,
targeted public procurement as a core demand for the reform efforts in the field (Fry &
Raadschelders, 2008; Thai, 2001; Thomas, 1919). Within the context of “hollowing” of
the state, the area has been associated with even higher levels of significance, not the
least being the fact that it remains one of the few unchallenged channels of direct
economic intervention by government. Generally speaking, public procurement and
contract management have been identified as fundamental dimensions of governance at
all levels (Cooper, 2003). In terms of sheer numbers, procurement spending by U.S.
federal government easily surpasses $750 billion a year (OMB, 2012); while state and
local governments spend around $680 billion (Census Bureau, 2009). Moreover, due to
their nature and ability to partially bypass legislative filibusters, public procurement
ordinances have regularly found themselves at the forefront of attaining social goals,
often outpacing their times and other traditional legislative mandates.
The closer we look at the instrument choices adopted to further many of the most
important social policies of the 19th and 20th centuries, the more public
procurement seems to crop up. The use of government contracts to put social
policies into effect has a long history…It is not too much of an exaggeration to
say that modern procurement systems evolved alongside the development of the
welfare State, and it is hardly surprising that the former was used in part to
underpin the goals of the latter. (McCrudden, 2004, p. 258)
Within a broad effort to expand our understandings of administrative roles and
their relationships with administrative discretion and individual level perceptions about
involvement in policy formulation, this dissertation attends to several goals. In particular,
this study expands our knowledge of administrative roles by focusing on often ignored
5
aspects of theory of representative bureaucracy – administrative discretion, individual
beliefs regarding one’s appropriate level of involvement in policy formulation and
organizational socialization. More specifically, and given the increasing complexity of
government as a “hollow state,” it examines administrative roles within a sample of
public procurement specialists. The research also identifies the variables that are related
to the enactment of specific roles and discusses the broader policy implications of such
behaviors.
There are many serious consequences associated with one’s assumed role that go
beyond the mere implications for individual level preferences. Public administrators who
believe that their role is to represent the public interest are highly likely to challenge
organizational rationality when they believe that such structures conflict with the public
mission of their institutions. The case in point is O’Leary’s (2006) excellent discussion of
guerilla government. On the other hand, public administrators who believe that their role
is to faithfully follow rules and regulations would perhaps be less inclined to make
deviations from organizational routines or to challenge organizational practices. On caseby-case basis, these decisions might appear rather trivial, yet when considered in
aggregate over the course of long periods and within the context of an entire organization
– the criticality of these implications becomes readily apparent.
The Motivation of the Study and Problem Statement
There are several key dimensions that have motivated this study. First, public
procurement, although acknowledged by practice as being strategically of value and, just
by utter impact of the financial outlays, a powerful economic mechanism, rarely receives
6
the academic attention that other areas of public administration typically enjoy (Thai,
2001). Second, public procurement research sometimes suffers from a number of
oversimplifications and perhaps naïve assumptions, not the least curious of them being a
habitual underestimation of the influence of individual preferences and politics (Murray,
2009). Especially grave appears to be the failure to acknowledge the differences between
private and public procurement.
[T]he fundament difference between private and public procurement strategy and
management, that of the political interface, has been overlooked in research. The
role of politicians is not fully understood and sometimes presented in a negative
light. Politicians have major responsibilities for strategic procurement
management as a result of democratic accountability, the need to set strategic
procurement priorities, ensure procurement managers have the will and
competence to deliver aligned procurement strategies, and in the performance
management of procurement strategy implementation. (Murray, 2009, p. 99)
Third, due to the growing size of the “shadow” government (Light, 1999) and the
increasing reliance on non-governmental and third party agreements – responsibility,
especially in terms of discretionary decision-making, becomes progressively difficult to
trace (Kettl, 2002, 2005). The accountability and authority structures within these new
contractual webs differ in important ways from traditional public administration
practices. Within this evolving context of devolving governance and increasing levels of
ambiguity, public administrators are frequently faced with challenges in defining what
represent their appropriate roles. As such, there is a recognizable need to understand the
dynamics behind role assumption within the milieu of current administrative framework.
Fourth, the public procurement literature is dominated in terms of methodology
by case studies. While insightful, the latter approach minimizes the probability of
achieving generalizable results. Finally, and more importantly, there are few studies that
7
challenge traditional stereotypes. McCue and Pitzer (2005) suggested that there is a
tendency with the practice and theory to assume that public procurement is “just
purchasing.” In reality, however, public procurement specialists undertake a large variety
of strategic roles with “just purchasing” playing only a small part.
Research Goals and Questions
Given the current conditions, the necessity for a systematic empirical study of the
administrative roles assumed by public procurement specialists becomes increasingly
obvious. This is especially the case since at the moment there is also only limited
empirical knowledge on how institutional and personal variables are linked to
administrative roles assumed by public procurement specialists.
This study attends to the evaluation and examination of administrative roles
assumed by public procurement specialists and the individual and institutional variables
associated with such roles. More precisely, the research identifies which types of roles
are most commonly assumed by professionals in the field and what are the individual and
institutional variables with significant degrees of association with those roles. Specially,
it examines whether administrators who perceive themselves as having more
administrative discretion are more likely to assume a representative-type role. Along
similar lines, the study evaluates whether administrators who believe they should
participate in policy formulation are more likely to assume a representative-type role.
Here, a representative-type role is understood as an administrator’s set of regular pattern
of behaviors that emphasize involvement in policy formulation for purposes of
8
advocating certain interests or values. For instance, if an administrator believes that
equity should be promoted as the core value of public policy and he or she believes that
his or her role is to promote it, then the public administrator’s pattern of behavior will
emphasize efforts to advocate and enforce equity as a primary administrative value
whenever possible.
Over the course of this dissertation the following broad practice-directed
questions are explored:
1. What are the dominant administrative roles assumed by public procurement
specialists?
2. What are the individual and institutional variables most likely to be related with one’s
assumed role?
3. What are the implications of the predominance of a given administrative role over
others within every day procurement practices?
The empirical examination and conclusions presented here are based on a random
sample of 2,000 administrators drawn from 16,000 members of National Institute of
Governmental Purchasing (NIGP). Although, there are a number of limitations associated
with the target group, at this stage of theory development, it was considered to be
appropriate for purposes of this partially-exploratory study.
Scope of the Research
The study attends to public procurement and public procurement specialists at all
levels of government. Taken together, the research delineates understandings about an
administrative area, which is bound to be associated with significant attention in the
9
future. Procurement decisions at the individual level have important impacts in terms of
policy implementation. Within one’s ability to judge whether a vendor or a service
provider meets a given criteria or whether entering in a relationship with a third party
falls within the social goals established by the organization, a public procurement
specialist can over time be the one who interprets how social goals posed by the
organization are met through procurement.
On the whole, the public procurement community has undertaken major efforts to
professionalize and develop common perspectives and standards among professional
members (Thai, 2001). While a sample of National Institute of Governmental Purchasing
(NIGP) membership could be considered representative of the national population of
public procurement specialists, its members most likely do not provide the richness in
diversity that could otherwise be met in practice. As such, any generalization beyond the
population of NIGP membership should be undertaken under the auspices of typical
academic caution.
Methodological Approach: Data Collection and Analyses
The data used in this dissertation were collected through an electronic survey
using the Survey Monkey platform. The aggregated data with no individual identifiers
were analyzed using IBM SPSS 21. Multinomial logistic regression analysis represented
the statistical method of choice. This methodological approach, an extension of regular
logistic regression, is used for purposes of classification and prediction, and it is
employed in cases when the dependent variable is categorical. It is the preferred method
10
by scholars due to its probabilistic character, limited number of assumptions and
robustness to deviations from normality.
Outline of the Argument and Dissertation
The fundamental argument of the dissertation is constructed around the concept of
administrative roles. Scholars often believe that roles, as identified within the milieu of
institutions, are the outcomes of individual interpretations of what constitutes appropriate
behavior for a specific setting (March & Olsen, 1996, 1998). In the context of
institutional influences and personal backgrounds, in an effort to make sense and place
themselves within the contradictory demands of stakeholders and normative frameworks,
public servants assume different administrative roles. The assumption of a specific role
might be the result of a conscious effort, but also an outcome of pressures imposed by
institutional structures (March & Olson, 1989; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Sowa &
Selden, 2003). One’s assumed role, however, is far-reaching in terms of one’s behavior,
given that once assumed, the role imposes personal and institutional constraints on the
individual’s behavior (Biddle, 1979; Sowa & Selden, 2003). The predictive ability of
administrative roles, then, lies in the fact that one’s pattern of behavior fits a certain
relatively well defined framework, which might be easier to evaluate than analyzing each
individual’s behavior in part (Biddle, 1979, 1986). Representative bureaucracy theory
posits that discretion is necessary for public servants to assume representative-type roles;
furthermore, it is argued that administrators who expect to be involved in policy
formulation would be more likely to assume representative-type roles (Sowa & Selden,
11
2003). Discretion and expectations, then, become central to the efforts to explain
administrative roles.
Beyond this introductory first Chapter, Chapter II provides a detailed discussion
of the theoretical framework that is used to develop and operationalize the research
hypotheses. Chapter III reviews the extant literature in the area and delineates
administrative roles. The primary focus of the literature review is the introduction and
discussion of role constructs as defined by Selden et al. (1999). This chapter
conceptualizes the empirical model. Chapter IV discusses in detail the methodological
approach undertaken in this dissertation. In particular, it presents the survey instrument,
discusses the data collection process, provides an overarching description of obtained
data, operationalizes the dependent and independent variables, and introduces the
statistical method of choice. Chapter V introduces and discusses in detail the core
findings of the research, while Chapter VI concludes the dissertation with a discussion of
findings’ implications, the study’s limitations and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Scholars have long attempted to understand the effects of administrative
discretion and individual perceptions on administrative decision-making, and to develop
normative frameworks within which these forces could be placed (see Frederickson,
1997; Leys, 1943; Mosher, 1968; Sowa & Selden, 2003). The discussion regarding these
relationships is perhaps most evident in theories of political control of bureaucracy and in
theories of bureaucratic politics. Perspectives on political control of bureaucracies
(Burke, 1986; Gormley, 1989; Gruber, 1987; Wilson, 1989) typically attempt to address
whether bureaucracies are responsive and comply with the preferences of constitutionally
based legislative decisions. Normatively these views draw heavily on the implicit
acceptance of administration-politics dichotomy and distinguish between political and
administrative actors. Among the most impactful works in this area is Lipsky’s (1980)
research on street-level discretion. According to Lipsky (1980), public administrators
enjoy at least some level of discretion which they are free to choose to employ or not.
Due to its reliance on theoretical rigor of neoclassical economics, agency theory
(principal-agent model) has received the bulk of academic attention in recent years. The
core idea of this lens is driven by the belief that public administrators, similar to typical
individuals, are motivated by self-interest, hence they cannot be “trusted” or allowed to
be self-guided in their use of discretion (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971; Tullock, 1965;
Wood & Waterman, 1994).
13
Similar to the theories of bureaucratic control, the theories of bureaucratic politics
attribute important discretionary powers to public administrators. What makes
bureaucratic politics perspectives different from theories of bureaucratic control is the
fact that this lens assumes neither a normative nor an empirical dichotomy between
administration and politics. According to scholars (Allison, 1971; Allison & Halperin,
1972; Drucker, 1952; Stone, 2002; Waldo, 1948, 1952) administrative actors are not
neutral agents in the implementation process, but they actively take part in shaping
understandings and in formulating public policies. Representative bureaucracy is possibly
one of the most accepted and important perspectives within this stream of theories.
According to Frederickson and Smith (2003) the theory of representative bureaucracy “is
perhaps the most explicit attempt to address the central problem of democratic
administrative theory raised by Dwight Waldo (1952, 102): How can a theory that
embraces the hierarchical and authoritarian nature of bureaucracy be reconciled with the
seemingly contradictory egalitarian and ultimately inefficient values of democracy?” (p.
61). Out of all perspectives on political control of bureaucracy and bureaucratic politics,
the theory of representative bureaucracy represents the framework that is able to account
most seamlessly for the roles assumed by public administrators within the rigid structures
of bureaucratic institutions. It is due in large part to the latter that the theory of
representative bureaucracy was chosen to provide the theoretical foundation for this
dissertation.
This chapter introduces the theory of representative bureaucracy. It is used to
generate and conceptualize the hypotheses on administrative roles that are examined in
this study. Through the means of a historical evolution, the chapter first traces the
14
emergence and development of the theory of representative bureaucracy. It then discusses
the extant empirical literature and the manner in which it relates to this research.
Theory of Representative Bureaucracy
The conceptualization of the theory of representative bureaucracy is normally
credited to Kingsley (1944), who, within the context of British civil service, argued that a
bureaucratic structure that is representative of the broader social classes would be more
responsive and effective in regards to implementing public policy (Bradbury & Kellough,
2011). The presence of this representative nature insured that, at least partially, the needs
of all social classes would be considered. In his original discussion, Kingsley (1944)
drew conclusions based upon the observation that the shared middle-class orientation of
British ruling party and bureaucracy during World War II facilitated consensus and
collaboration between elected officials and public administrators.
Within a short time from its conceptualization, the framework was picked up and
extended by American scholars. Unlike their British colleague, however, American
scholars were not preoccupied with social class. They were more interested in identifying
accountability frameworks for bureaucratic action and in theorizing the normative
placement of administrative decision-making within the politics-administration
continuum. Driven by Wilson’s (1887) seminal piece, questions of how to make
bureaucrats accountable within a constitutional context and how to insure that they were
not involved in politics, remained at the core of scholarly efforts. Administrative
discretion constituted the primary point of interest. Levitan (1946) suggested that external
controls are ineffective in ensuring bureaucratic accountability. Bureaucratic
15
representativeness, according to Levitan (1946), would provide a much more effective
monitoring mechanism than external controls. Levitan (1946) argued that agencies’
actions would gain in legitimacy and acceptance if their workforce was representative of
the public.
Administrative discretion is typically normatively condemned due to the fact that
it does not sit well with bureaucratic accountability structures. At the same time,
discretion can often be equated with administrative power and ability to shape policy
intentions and interpretations. With increased discretion comes increased ability to
navigate the ambiguousness within legislative frameworks. Long (1952) and Van Riper
(1958), however, believed that American bureaucracy was indeed representative of the
larger population, which would ultimately confer legitimacy to administrative discretion.
Long (1952), in what could be found to be a controversial argument, went as far as to
suggest that bureaucracy might even be more representative than Congress. Scores of
scholars have since endorsed representative bureaucracy as a possible solution to the
challenges that are habitually associated with administrative discretion (Denhardt &
deLeon, 1995; Krislov, 1974; Selden, 1997a; Sowa & Selden, 2003).
In terms of American theoretical thought, nevertheless, Mosher’s (1968)
discussion of representative bureaucracy, specifically the passive-active representation
differentiation, is often considered as a critical turning point. Mosher (1968) suggested
two meanings to the dynamics behind representative bureaucracy. First, by passive
representation (also called descriptive representation) Mosher (1968) understood the
commonalities between the individual makeups and origins of the bureaucrats and the
characteristics of society at large (e.g. gender, race, income, class, religion). Second,
16
active representation was understood as the efforts by the administrators to advocate the
interests of those who they believed to represent. Hence, under Mosher’s (1968)
perspective – a public servant who feels accountable to the public at large and not the
organization will attempt to promote the interests of the “whole people.” Under these
conditions, then, administrative discretion becomes critical, since one cannot “represent”
if one is not able to deviate from institutional norms which traditionally attempt to inhibit
such deviations. Its criticality is due primary to two reasons. First, administrative
discretion is perhaps a necessary condition for representative type behavior. Without the
ability to exert discretion, public administrators cannot undertake advocacy type
behavior. Second, there is a thin line between what constitutes appropriate discretionary
actions and acts of partiality (Lim, 2006; Mosher, 1968).
Mosher (1968) believed that even in the cases when passive representation might
not lead to obvious democratic improvements; the presence of such characteristics in the
administration provides democratic value on its own. Active representation, on the other
hand, was normatively undesirable for Mosher (1968). “It may be noted that active
representativeness run rampant within a bureaucracy would constitute a major threat to
orderly democratic government. The summing up of the multitude of special interests
seeking effective representation does not constitute the public interest” (Mosher, 1968, p.
12).
Krislov (1974) extended the theory through his detailed discussion of
socialization. Krislov (1974) argued that individuals with common demographic
backgrounds, due to their shared experiences, are more likely to defend and advocate the
rights and needs of those who are perceived as similar. Meier, Wrinkle and Polinard
17
(1999), for instance, suggested that if one assumes that within their discretionary
behavior bureaucrats attempt to maximize their own utility, which reflects their own
values and norms, then one would have to accept that such behavior will consequently
reflect the interests of those with whom the public administrators share similar
backgrounds. In essence, then, discretionary administrative behavior will be more
representative of the public interest if such discretion is undertaken by individuals who
reflect the social makeup of the communities they serve.
The literature on representative bureaucracy suggests that administrators from a
given minority social group (e.g. as characterized by gender, ethnicity, socioeconomic
status or something else) can benefit the social group they represent directly through their
behaviors or indirectly through the effects they have on other public servants. Lim (2006)
categorized possible social benefits from public administrators assuming representational
roles into direct and indirect benefits. Table 1 offers a short description of the sources of
these social benefits as identified by Lim (2006).
18
Table 1. Sources of Social Benefits
Direct Sources
Partiality (advocacy)
Shared values and
beliefs
Empathic
understanding
Bias in favor of a given social group and against other groups.
Discretionary behavior in accordance to one's own values and beliefs - intended
or not - serves the interests of the social group with which one associates.
Due to a common social background, administrators not only share but also
understand the values and norms of a specific social group.
Indirect Sources
Checking
Restraint
Resocialization
Public administrators who associate with a particular social group can check the
excesses in behaviors of their colleagues.
Public administrators not associated with a specific social group might restrain
their behaviors for fear of being disapproved of, exposed, or otherwise checked.
With time the mere presence of bureaucrats from minority social groups can lead
to enhanced empathic understanding of their colleagues.
Adapted from Lim (2006)
What becomes readily apparent is that administrative discretion plays a special
part in the theory of representative bureaucracy. Discretion is indeed, as many scholars
have asserted, at the core and indispensable for the theory of representative bureaucracy
(Meier, 1993a; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003). It has been noted that
public servants, through the use of administrative discretion, often exercise political
power (Mosher, 1968; Redford, 1969; Rourke, 1984). In order for a representation type
role to be assumed by an administrator, discretion is believed to be necessary. Some have
constructed normative arguments in its support (Dolan, 2000; Krislov, 1974; Selden,
1997) while others have cautioned against its uncontrollable long-term implications (Lim,
2006; Mosher, 1968). According to Sowa and Selden (2003) “discretion is often a crucial
part of public administrators’ job description” (p. 700). What is of import here is that
roles cannot be properly understood without thoroughly accounting for discretion.
A great deal of research has been dedicated to the study of relationship between
administrative discretion employed by street level administrators and service outcomes
(Kelly, 1994; Lipsky, 1980; Sandfort, 2000), but also the overall implications of
19
administrative discretion for democratic governance (Kelly, 1994; Scott, 1997). In all
cases, administrative discretion was identified as an important factor in delimiting and
explaining observed behavior. Organizational and institutional contexts were also found
important in determining levels of discretionary behavior (Keiser, 1999; Selden, 1997b).
As such, an organization or institution could control one’s acceptable set of behaviors,
hence type of role assumed, by limiting or granting varying levels of discretion. Scholars
have suggested that an individual’s organizational and institutional environment can
“pressure” or “encourage” the public administrator into assuming a given role. The
assumption of specific roles, which exhibits a significant degree of reliance on the levels
of institutionally-granted discretion, has at times been linked to improved policy
outcomes. Meier and Bohte (2001), for instance, found that organizational structures that
allow for more discretion lead to improved outcomes in terms of minority students, where
organizational span of control was used to measure administrative discretion. In the same
vein, Sowa and Selden (2003) found that administrators, who perceived themselves as
having greater discretion, assumed roles that emphasized citizen representativeness.
Although administrative discretion is critical to the theory of representative
bureaucracy, it is rarely explicitly discussed or empirically tested (Meier & Bohte, 2001;
Selden, 1997b; Sowa & Selden, 2003). The presence of discretion as a precondition for
the types of roles assumed by public administrators remains significantly understudied. In
studies of representative bureaucracy, the presence of administrative discretion is usually
presumed to be a necessary condition for understanding the applicability and efficacy of
the theory. However, little attention has been paid to the direct impact of administrative
20
discretion on outcomes, as discretion is usually assumed to be a constant or simply is not
measured (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 703).
The values and perceptions of the individuals represent another commonly
overlooked or taken for granted dimension. One simply cannot leave unchallenged the
relationship between social associations and individual expectations. How individual
expectations influence the assumption of roles, appear to be much more complex than the
typical race or gender links. En ensemble, one simply cannot afford underestimating the
importance of administrative discretion and personal expectations.
In the process of making sense of what is expected in one’s job, individuals
receive certain information from the environment, information that dictates
socially acceptable behavior and shapes how they perceive how they should
behave. However, individuals also have past beliefs, values, and experiences that
serve as filters for how that information is understood. Therefore, individuals’
attitudes and behaviors are constructed in response to cues from environment
[…]. (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 703)
One can never assume that once the individual enters an agency’s environment,
the individual rebuffs all his personal beliefs and identity traits. Yet, at the same time, the
individual is far from “free” to express their own beliefs or values. Public administrators
use their experience and the information they receive from their environments to make
sense of what represents appropriate behaviors and roles for one’s position or context.
Overall, then, there are several broad arguments that become of particular interest
here. First, the theory of representative bureaucracy suggests that public administrators
who are granted or have access to higher levels of discretion are more likely to assume
representation-type roles (Meier, 1993a; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003).
For instance, if a public procurement specialist believes that he or she is able to forgo the
accepted procurement process whenever necessary, he or she is more likely to represent
21
the interest of others (e.g. small businesses, minority groups, immigrants) when found
appropriate. In the case when such roles become inappropriate, an institution could
minimize the probability of assuming a given role by limiting discretion. In essence, then,
an organization could influence one’s role assumption through the effective management
of the levels of administrative discretion available to organizational members. The latter
would mean that institutions, by controlling the levels of discretion, would be able to
dictate behaviors on the part of public administrators. Second, an individual’s perception
regarding what represents appropriate types of behaviors might indeed be more
consequential than one’s association with a specific social group. This would imply that
as a result of institutional habits and pressures, organizational expectations will overrule
an individual’s identification with a certain group in regards to variables that influence
behavior. For instance, a public administrator who is Hispanic might give preference to
his own professional values and education in decision-making over his commonalities
with other citizens who are Hispanic. In essence, while social associations are important,
recent empirical literature suggests that this link might not be as strong as originally
believed (see Sowa & Selden, 2003). Finally, time with the same organization has an
important effect on one’s representation type behavior. One’s longevity within an
organization might lead to changes in one’s behavior or behavior of others in regards to
representative-type roles.
On the other hand, an individual might become socialized by the organizational
environment to the point where the organizational imposed role (if that role is not one of
representation) will supersede representation-type patterns of behavior. For example, a
public administrator who is a female immigrant from Asia and who still maintains strong
22
ties with her community might be inclined to use the available discretion to support the
needs of the community when such opportunities arise. With time, as her tenure with the
agency grows and she becomes more indoctrinated with organizational values, she might
give preferences to organizational values over those of the community with which she
was initially associated with, even in cases when she would have the discretionary option
to behave otherwise.
As it might be expected, the theory of representative bureaucracy is not without
its critics. There are several major shortcomings and lines of criticism targeting the
theory. First, due to the large levels of ambiguity in conceptualizing terms, there is
surprisingly little empirical research in the area (Frederickson & Smith, 2003). Most of
the empirical studies address similar questions and rarely venture beyond traditional
approaches. Second, Lim (2006) was rather critical in his discussion of how partiality is
conceptualized and empirical studies arguing that what the instruments often capture are
things other than partiality. Third, most studies take the relationship between and
individual background and a supposed group as a given. This link, however, is often
weaker and less direct than assumed and seldom tested. Fourth, as Thompson (1967)
argued, organizational socialization raises a significant challenge to the supposed linked
between passive representation and active representation. The mechanism linking passive
representation and administrative outcomes is also highly ambiguous.
For instance, does the presence of passive representation increase the probability
of active representation? Or is passive representation necessary or sufficient for active
representation? Wilkins and Keiser (2006) argued that the important question is not
whether there is a link between passive and active representation, but under what
23
conditions such link exists. Fifth, the effects of active representation are often confused
with those of passive representation and are also commonly overstated. Sixth, the unit of
analysis for most studies is the organization rather than the individual (Bradbury &
Kellough, 2011). Finally, the theory is not conclusive in regards to the differences in
behavior patterns between members of the majority and members of the minority social
groups engaging in active representation. Selden (1997a), Selden, Brudney and Kellough
(1998) and Sowa and Selden (2003) suggested that race and minority status might not be
as significant in explaining behavior as previously thought. “[T]he role accepted by
administrators and the amount of discretion they perceive themselves to have exerts an
impact on the outcomes serving minority interests above and beyond the individual
characteristics of the administrators” (Sowa & Selden, 2003, p. 707). Hence bureaucrats
could take on representation roles regardless of their ethnic or gender characteristics.
Selden et al. (1998) noted:
While minority employees can be expected to embrace this role [representative
role] most often and most closely, nonminority administrators may also adopt it as
a result of their background or socialization…In some circumstances, minority
employees with discretionary authority may avoid the minority representative
role. Regardless of race or ethnicity, moreover, the attachment of public
administrators to the representative role will vary, so that they may not always
make decisions and take actions responsive to the minority
community…employee’s perception of their work role conditions the translation
of demographic (and other) characteristics into policy outputs. (p. 720)
Herbert (1974) suggested that by and large the challenges associated with role
assumption will be present regardless of race. Organizations habitually generate system
of rules that demand and delineate certain behaviors as appropriate. As such, association
with a social minority can be often overridden by organizational expectations.
Holistically, then, public administrators might be grappling with pressures to balance
24
their representative role with the norms of efficiency, hierarchy and bureaucratic
neutrality demanded by the organization.
This section started with the goal of delineating a practical understanding of the
framework within which the hypotheses tested in this dissertation are examined. Taken
together, it is concluded that extant scholarly literature provides a rich and rigorous body
of works on representative bureaucracy. Despite warranted criticism, the framework is
sufficiently well developed in order to provide the grounds for hypotheses generation.
The theory does not necessarily condemn nor encourage administrative discretion, but
simply identifies it as an important factor in the assumption of representative roles,
which, however, in their turn are more likely to be normatively supported. Whether
representative type behavior is desirable or not, does not change the matter that
administrative discretion is important for such behavior to be undertaken.
Empirical Evaluations
As noted previously, the theory of representative bureaucracy has stimulated a
great deal of scholarly research. Although the results are mixed and not always overly
conclusive (Wilkins & Keiser, 2006), with some works suffering from theoretical
ambiguities and at times becoming overly-dependent on a given set of assumptions overall, the body of empirical research is rather sound. Keiser, Wilkins, Meier and
Holland (2002), Meier and Nicholson-Crotty (2006), and Wilkins and Keiser (2006)
found that female administrators, female police officers and female supervisors
respectively, regularly engaged in representation. Improved policy outcomes were noted
in all three cases when female public administrators were involved. Rosenbloom and
25
Kinnard (1977) concluded that high-ranking minorities in the Department of Defense
believed they should be active in addressing the needs of social minorities. Pitts (2007)
offered conclusive evidence that position and ethnic associations play an important part
in influencing an administrator’s representative type behavior. Within education policy
context, for instance, Pitts (2007) identified decreases in school dropout rates with
increased levels of bureaucratic representation. Meier (1993a) and Meier and Steward
(1992) confirmed representative behavior on the part of minority public administrators,
Latino and African American respectively, in Florida school districts. Selden (1997a,
1997b) identified active representation by African Americans, Asian Americans and
Hispanics within Farmers Home Administration county supervisors. Minorities were
more likely to receive positive responses if their cases were reviewed by a public
administrator with similar ethnic makeup.
In terms of individual characteristics, Selden (1997b) and Selden et al. (1998)
identified that minorities were more likely to adopt representative roles. More liberal
orientation and fewer years of experience in federal government were also suggested to
increase the probability of public administrators assuming representative roles. Brudney,
Hebert, and Wright (2000) confirmed race and gender as important drivers of assumed
roles, but also noted organizational context as a critical dimension that influences the
roles assumed by public administrators.
The more recent empirical developments have focused on the conditions under
which representative type roles are assumed by public administrators. Research has
confirmed the significance of contextual compatibility between individual perceptions
and institutional structures. Overall, two main factors have been suggested as critical to
26
the representative bureaucracy to exist. First, the ability to engage in discretion was found
indispensable (Meier, 1993a; Meier & Bohte, 2001; Sowa & Selden, 2003; Wilkins &
Keiser, 2006). Institutional structures, then, play an important part in explaining the
predominance of a certain types of roles. Second, the policy in question should be related
to a specific demographic characteristic (e.g. women administrators on policies relating
to women) (Keiser et al., 2002). For instance women and men identify with their gender
in contexts when “gender” becomes a salient identification, in all other instances men or
women don’t necessary associate with their gender group (Riley, 1988). As such, women
are more likely to assume representative type roles when the policy in questions deals
with women’s interests. Overall, many critical questions remain unaddressed.
Administrative Discretion and Representative Bureaucracy
Administrative discretion has received significant scholarly attention within the
representative bureaucracy literature. Sowa and Selden (2003) defined administrative
discretion as an administrator’s perceived latitude in effecting administrative outcomes.
Meier and Bohte (2001) conceptualized administrative discretion as the ability of public
administrators to command a sphere of influence to take actions that reflect the specific
values they might hold. It has been suggested that an organizational culture is an
important factor in determining levels of discretion and increased formalization is highly
likely to decrease administrative discretion (Kelly, 1994; Scott 1997). A number of
scholars have examined administrative discretion with the context of street level
bureaucrats (Brodkin, 1997; Kelly, 1994; Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 1979; Sandfort, 2000)
and found it to be critical in the undertaking of representative type roles.
27
According to the theory of representative bureaucracy, administrators’
associations with certain social minorities would lead to administrative discretion, that is
their latitude decision-making, being applied toward improving policy outcomes for the
given social minority. Taken together, public administration structures that employ
administrators who are representative of the population at large and allow administrators
to command spheres of influence will generally carry the values of the population that the
public administrators represent.
There is a notable dynamic in terms of the role played by administrative
discretion in the contexts of organizations that are designed to advocate minority interests
and those that are not. In the latter case, administrative discretion is indeed crucial –
without its presence administrators cannot translate their values into policy outcomes
(Meier & Bohte, 2001). In the former case, however, administrative discretion might not
necessarily be so consequential in terms of explaining representative type behavior since
the institution is already designed to encourage representative roles (Meier & Bohte,
2001).
Conclusion
This chapter provided a discussion of the theory of representative bureaucracy.
The case was made that the presence of administrative discretion is indispensable for
explaining the assumption of any administrative role. Individual perceptions, too, have
been suggested to be important in whether someone is more likely to behave in a certain
manner. Although gender and ethnicity have been the two dimensions most often
28
associated with studies of representative bureaucracy, recent literature has shifted focus
to roles and acceptance of roles as a key predictor of representative type behavior.
29
CHAPTER III: THEORETICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION
This dissertation seeks to identify the effects that the presence of administrative
discretion and individual level perceptions regarding one’s involvement in policy
formulation have on the roles assumed by public administrators. It also attends to the
question of whether organizational tenure is an important predictor of role assumption by
public servants. This chapter conceptualizes the empirical model. It starts with a
discussion of the neo-institutional lens and the relationship between institutional
structures and individual behaviors. The discussion then turns to role theory. The chapter
defines roles and links the assumption of roles with institutional structures. Finally, the
chapter introduces the administrative responsibility framework and the five roleconstructs, as suggested by Selden et al. (1999). The discussion concludes with the
introduction of the three core hypotheses and the model.
Institutional Environment
There is an intricate interdependency between administrative discretion and the
roles assumed by public administrators. On the one hand, scholars are concerned that if
public administrators are left to their own devices they will be guided by self-interest,
rather than fulfill the democratic expectations placed on them (Buchanan & Tullock,
1962; Downs, 1957, 1967; Hayek, 2011; Niskanen, 2007; Tullock, 1987). On the other
hand, Wamsley et al. (1990) suggested that inputs from public servants are legitimized by
30
the constitution and the quality of public administration will suffer if their roles are
reduced to simple mechanisms of rigid policy implementation. Within their everyday
experiences public servants rarely place themselves within the extremes of politicsadministration continuum. Usually, they assume roles that represent a combination of the
two perspectives (Frederickson, 1997).
Traditionally, in an effort to instill administrative responsibility and political
control, most institutional structures were constructed in a manner that would restrict
administrative discretion. Driven by the idea that “good” public administration is one that
is not involved in political decision-making, through the years the area has been targeted
by a number of reform initiatives searching to increase efficiency, responsiveness and
responsibility (Frederickson & Smith, 2003). Yet, relatively few discussions actually
attend to the question in terms of the limits of institutional controls and from the
viewpoint of administrators themselves (Selden et al., 1999). Overhead controls, as
Gruber (1987) described, have several significant limitations:
The exercise of control is therefore inevitably affected by those being controlled,
the administrators themselves. The beliefs of these administrators, the roles they
play, the histories of their agencies, and the resources they command all
contribute to the way they will respond to specific efforts at control. As a result, it
is crucial to understand the problem of democratic control from the perspective of
bureaucrats as well. (p. 24)
With the exception of the golden years of the behavioralism, institutions have
always attracted significant levels of academic research. “In a general way, an
‘institution’ can be viewed as a relatively stable collection of practices and rules defining
appropriate behavior for specific groups of actors in specific situations…Practices and
rules are also embedded in resources and the principles of their allocation that make it
31
possible for individuals to enact roles in an appropriate way and for a collectivity to
socialize individuals and sanction those who wander from proper behavior” (March &
Olsen, 1998, p. 948). Institutions became the focus along many disciplines increasingly
so within the neo-institutional perspectives during the 1970s-1980s (Abrutyn & Turner,
2011; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; March & Olson, 1989; Meyer & Rowan, 1977;
Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). To an extent, neo-institutionalism developed as a reaction to
behavioralism. The perspective emphasizes structure and examines how values, ideas,
rules, habits, roles and norms provide the script for one’s behavior and become
institutionalized. Where, institutionalization refers to “the emergence of institutions and
individual behaviors within them” (March and Olsen, 1998, p. 948).
Institutions are perceived as symbolic and behavioral frameworks bound by rules
that motivate certain individual roles (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). In grand lines new
institutionalism holds that despite the ambiguity and density of regulatory constructs they
do provide practical levels of predictability for human behavior. The “newness” of new
institutionalism compared to old institutionalism lies in the fact values and norms are no
longer the main predictors of human behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Individuals
acceptance of institutional values and instructions in general is no longer taken for
granted. Yet, scholars still find that new institutionalism can draw important insights
from old institutionalism (see Abrutyn & Turner, 2011).
Institutional rules constantly reinforce and shape roles. It has been argued that
institutional pressures can be distinguished from other impositions coming from the
social milieu.
32
[I]nstitutional rules may have effects on organizational structures and their
implementation in actual technical work which are very different from the effects
generated by the networks of social behavior and relationships which compose
and surround a given organization. (Meyer & Rowan, 1977, p. 341)
The continuous interaction between rules and behavior leads to roles becoming
rather well defined and difficult to change. Whilst, change in roles is possible – it is
usually incremental in nature. Individuals will adopt behaviors that are seen appropriate
and legitimate to their institutional context (March & Olsen, 1989). March & Olsen
(1989, 1995, 1996, 1998) formulations of “logic of expected consequences” and “logic of
appropriateness” are of particular interest here and have been widely used by scholars.
Where by logic, March and Olsen (1996, 1998) understood ways of seeing and
interpreting things. Institutions confer individuals these specific ways of “seeing” by
shaping their roles and delineating their institutional identities, limiting normative
behavior and decision-making preferences.
Within the tradition of logic of appropriateness, actions are seen as rule-based.
Human actors are imagined to follow rules that associate particular identities to
particular situations, approaching individual opportunities for action by assessing
similarities between current identities and choice dilemmas and more general
concepts of self and situations. Action involves evoking an identity or role and
matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation…Like the
logic of consequences, the logic of appropriateness is explicitly a logic of
individual action. It is specified as a mode of action or justification for an
individual actor. (March & Olsen, 1998, pp. 951-952)
Institutions also provide the individuals with tools to make sense and determine
appropriate behavior under changing environmental conditions. It has been argued that
roles can become so powerful that they provide complete meaning and they can persist
long after the institutional and rational motivations for the role might have disappeared
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). To this extent, formal structures are
33
often less predictive of an organizations processes and operation than informal structure
such as roles (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Meyer & Rowan, 1977).
Despite its wide acceptance, new institutionalism has also drawn important levels
of criticism. Among its critics, Goldmann (2005) suggested that the neo-institutionalism
“has proven compelling because of its consequences for the scholarly community rather
than by virtue of its analytical appropriateness” (p. 35). Goldmann (2005) also
challenged the validity of March and Olsen’s (1996, 1998) “logic” construct, while
Sending (2003) argued that the “logic of appropriateness” is unsustainable as a theory of
action. That is, almost any pattern of behavior or any outcome could be explained as
appropriate depending on the variables or perspectives that one takes. The lens is very
attractive due to its theoretical flexibility, yet this very elasticity is what makes it less
logically rigorous. The latter criticism is consequential in particular due to the fact that it
would imply that the lens isn’t particularly fit to provide clear explanations of behavior.
This would mean that its framework and conceptual makeup might be too vague to be
useful in terms of empirical research. For the purposes of this dissertation, the limitation
will extend to the fact that “what makes something appropriate” under certain
circumstances might not be particularly useful in terms of predicting future outcomes. In
sum, this would imply that the lens allows for a lot of variability in the underlying logic
which would make any individual pattern of behavior possible, hence limited predictive
power.
34
Roles
According to Biddle (1979) role theory developed simultaneously across several
disciplines in the second part of 1920s. It derived its core from the theatrical metaphor
(Biddle, 1986). Those who assume roles are constrained to following a given institutional
“script” and “enacting” expected behaviors. The concept of roles has received intense
academic attention within behavioral sciences. It focuses on individuals and their
behaviors and it provides an accommodating perspective that bridges anthropology,
sociology, social psychology and institutionalism.
From a sociopsychological point of view, one of its most alluring qualities is its
double reference to the individual and to the collective matrix. The concept of role
concerns the thoughts and actions of individuals, and, at the same time, it points
up the influence upon the individual of socially patterned demands and
standardizing forces. (Levinson, 1959, p. 170)
The role concept is regularly applied to the study of consensus, social perception,
formal organizations or role conflict. It assumes that individuals carry commonalities in
their habitual behaviors, which are fairly predictable in cases when the context is known.
Hence, by knowing one’s individual identity and institutional environment - one’s
behavior becomes predictable. “Role theory, then, is a science concerned with the study
of behaviors that are characteristic of persons within contexts and with various processes
that presumably produce, explain, or are affected by those behaviors” (Biddle, 1979, p.
4). Furthermore, “role theory may be said to concern itself with a triad of concepts:
patterned and characteristic social behaviors, parts or identities that are assumed by social
participants, and scripts or expectations for behavior that are understood by all and
adhered to by performer” (Biddle, 1986, p. 68).
35
Scholars typically go to great lengths to emphasize the difference between social
position and roles. Positions can be described as classification of people, while roles are
classifications of behaviors.
The concept of role is related to, and must be distinguished from, the concept of
social position. A position is an element of organizational autonomy, a location in
social space, a category of organizational membership. A role is, so to say, an
aspect of organizational physiology; it involves function, adaptation, process. It is
meaningful to say that a person ‘occupies’ a social position; but it is inappropriate
to say, as many do, that one occupies a role. (Levinson, 1959, p. 172)
Biddle (1986) identified at least five broad perspectives within the study of roles:
functional, symbolic interactionist, structural, organizational, and cognitive. Functional
role theory emphasizes behaviors of individual who occupy social positions (Bates &
Harvey, 1975; Linton, 1936; Parsons, 1951). Actors in their actions are functionally
related to the structures imposed by their position and organizations. Symbolic
interactionist role theory focuses on evolution of roles in terms of their social
interactions, creation of meanings and interpretation frameworks (Mead, 1934; Zurcher,
1983). This second lens focuses on the evaluation of patterns of interpretation, adjustment
and communication between individuals. Actors use symbols with understood and
accepted meanings to communicate among each other (Griffin, 2009). Structural role
theory targets primarily social structures and their relationships with individual behavior
(Mandel, 1983). This framework places social influences as primary determinants of
individual roles. Under this perspective roles are believed to be more of a social pattern
than an individual choice. Under organizational perspective “roles are assumed to be
associated with identified social positions and to be generated by normative expectations,
but norms may vary among individuals and may reflect both the official demands of the
36
organizations and the pressures of informal groups” (Biddle, 1986, p. 73). The works of
Gross, Mason and McEachern (1958) and Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek and Rosenthal
(1964) are usually considered as the starting points for this perspective. It is believed that
organizations are the fertile grounds within which roles are developed and then assumed
by specific actors. Finally, studies of cognitive role theories are interested in the
associations between behavior and expectations (Greenwood, 1983; Hollander, 1985).
Behavior patterns, hence roles, are assumed due to pressure posed by individual and
social expectations (Flynn & Lemay, 1999).
Biddle (1979) delineated five core propositions behind role theory:
1. Certain behaviors are patterned and are characteristic of persons within contexts.
2. Roles are often associated with sets of persons who share a common identity.
3. Persons are often aware of roles, and to some extent roles are governed by the fact of
their awareness.
4. Roles persist, in part, because of their consequences (functions) and because they are
often imbedded with larger social systems.
5. Persons must be taught roles and may find either joy or sorrow in the performances
thereof.
In grand lines, then, a role is defined as patterned human behavior. The most
common delineation of roles is that of behaviors associated with social positions, an
identity extended to a recognizable set of individuals. “Role might be considered an
identity, a set of characteristic behaviors, or a set of expectations” (Biddle, 1979, p. 8).
Levy (1952, p. 159) defined a role as a “position differentiated in terms of a given social
structure”; Cottrell (1942, p. 617) delineated roles as “an internally consistent series of
37
conditioned responses”; a role, per Linton (1945, p. 77), “includes the attitudes, values
and behavior ascribed by the society to any and all persons occupying” a specific status;
Newcomb (1950, p. 280) identified roles as actions of individual “occupants of the
position”; Parsons (1951, p. 25) saw roles as behavior of actors “seen in the context of its
functional significances”; while Katz and Kahn (1966, p. 179) defined roles as “activities
which in combination produce the organizational output.” Roles are formed by
interactions with others and with institutional constraints and an individual’s commitment
can vary across a multitude of roles one usually assumes (Jackson, 1981).
What becomes readily apparent though, is that all current interpretations delineate
roles as “behaviors that are characteristic of persons in a context” (Biddle, 1979, p. 57).
The definition of role is, then, rather accommodating. For instance public servants, police
officers or procurement specialists represent recognizable groups of individuals. Each
group engages in certain characteristic behaviors and when on the job assumes a
particular role that is found appropriate for the organizational context. Institutional
constructs, however, shape one’s context as roles become institutionalized. The role
concept “in connection with societies is usually confined to some institutional or
functional context” (Biddle, 1979, p. 65).
Conceptually, role theory is premised upon the notion that individuals’ behavior is
the product of learning of social norms and expectations. This perspective
contends that in any given position or occupation, individuals exhibit certain
behavior based on their role assumptions. Those role assumptions are both
prescribed by habit, culture, and experience and defined by the individual based
upon his apprehension of the situation. The result is the enacted role. (Cox, Buck
& Morgan, 1994, p. 132)
38
Roles are assumed and enacted as a result of several dimensions. According to
Biddle (1979), expectations are probably one of the most powerful drivers behind roles.
“[R]oles are induced through the sharing of expectations for role behavior. Thus, those
who exhibit the role are stimulated to do so because they learn what behaviors are
expected of them, while others are stimulated through their own expectations to teach and
enforce appropriate behaviors for those who are members for the position” (Biddle, 1979,
p. 5). Role self-expectations, role expectations of others and shared role expectations
among those exhibiting similar roles have all been suggested to influence role enactment
(Biddle, 1979, 1986). Expectations, statements that express reactions “about a
characteristic of one or more persons” are time binding and are formed as “a result of
prior experiences and represent, in some sense, a distillation of those experiences into a
meaningful whole for the subject” (Biddle, 1979, pp. 116-119). Institutional context is
found to be an important factor in shaping role expectations.
Role expectations or demands are conveyed to administrators by other persons
both verbally and nonverbally; they are also expressed formally through job
descriptions, training, and other avenues of socialization. An administrator can
encounter multiple role expectations resulting in cross-pressures and conflicts on
the job. In addition to these “sent” roles, which consist of expectations and
pressures communicated by others, the administrator has a “received” role
consisting of her or his perception of the message sent. (Selden et al., 1998, p.
720, referencing Kahn et. al., 1964)
Context is another significant dimension that dictates whether a role is assumed or
found appropriate, as “most role behaviors are contextually bound” (Biddle, 1987, p. 6).
Context can affect behavior in a multitude of ways. For instance, a public administrator’s
role could be shaped directly by legislative expectations as well in a more subtle ways by
the tools he or she has to use in order to perform according to expectations.
39
The role [of the individual] consist of only those system states and interactions
that are specified for his part in the organization…A complete statement of role
specifies the position and function in the larger organization – through the
definition does not require that all details of a role be explicitly stated or even
understood. (Kuhn, 1974, pp. 298-299)
Hickson (1966) asserted that, under one form or another, organizational theories,
despite their apparently distinct terminologies, differ only in degrees of role specificity
and legitimacy of discretion attributed to behavior. Hickson (1966) argued that the
degrees of role specificity range from complete legitimate discretion to fully specified
role behavior. Frank (1964) suggests three types of roles depending of their specificity:
underdefined, well-defined, and overdefined. Public administration scholars have
associated role specificity with role responsibilities (Selden et. al., 1999). Public servants
with underdefined roles might enjoy more discretion than those with well-defined roles.
Biddle (1979) identified roles around four main dimensions:
1. Roles are behavioral (does not include: sex, race, national origin, attitudes, norms,
values).
2. Roles are performed by individuals.
3. Roles are limited by context.
4. Roles are constructed on behaviors that are characteristic of a set of persons and
context.
Explicit rules are neither necessary nor sufficient to fully guide the behavior of
individuals within organizations. Organization embraces certain models of behaviors,
similar to paradigms, relying on roles assumed on implicit and explicit knowledge. By
being part of the organization one enacts one’s role and the assumption that come with it.
The tacit intersubjective property of paradigms constitutes in effect the
“agreement” between members that enables the orderly production of role
enactment. That is, the structuring of organizational interaction requires members
to rely upon shared but largely tacit background knowledge that is embodied in an
organizational paradigm. Roles as well as the definitions of “problems,”
40
“responsible opinion,” “leadership,” and so on, are afforded by the dominant
model. (Brown, 1978, p. 374)
For Selden et al. (1999) “an administrative role is a cohesive set of job-related
values and attitudes that provides the public administrator a stable set of expectations
about his or her responsibilities” (p. 175). There are several important dimensions to this
definition. First, the attitudes and values are job related. This means that one’s role will
be defined by one’s job and work environment. Second, one’s expectations represent
one’s interpretations of a given set of values. This implies that the actual set of values
need not be objective or empirically tested, all it matters is one’s interpretation of that
given set of values. Finally, and most critically, the set of expectations regarding one’s
role is assumed as being stable. The latter is highly significant, since it would imply that
expectations do not change easily and as such a snapshot analysis would indeed provide
an adequate evaluation of the overall nature of roles in public administration.
While every specific role has a particular set of behaviors associated with it, this
does not exclude that a certain part of the set is also characteristic for another role. Roles
can overlap in terms of behaviors. “Two or more roles are said to be differentiated if they
have but few behavioral elements in common…it is a general notion that may be used not
only to separate performance of persons who occupy different social positions, but also
behaviors of a single person in various contexts. Role differentiation is one of the major
conditions of modern, urban society, and it would be difficult to conceive of formal
organizations without differentiation of its roles and jobs” (Biddle, 1979, p. 75). An
individual can enact multiple roles within one’s role set (Merton, 1949; Sieber, 1974).
41
Administrative Responsibility Framework
Despite significant past and present scholarly attention to the concept of roles,
much remains to be done. There are scores of public administration scholars who have
discussed the administrative responsibility within the politics-administration continuum;
none perhaps as famous and fundamental as the Friedrich (1940) – Finer (1941)
perspectives. In a sense the two scholars have set the extreme endpoints of the debate.
Friedrich (1940) supported a broader role of public administrator with room for
discretionary interpretation, one based on personal and professional constraints. Kaufman
(1956) placed representativeness, neutral competence and executive leadership as the
three main values at the core of development of public administration. Finer (1941), in
contrast, argued that appropriate administrative roles cannot be constructed without
strong external controls.
Yet, despite the predominance of overhead controls they are often found to be
insufficient (Gilbert, 1959) as public servants regularly engage in administrative
discretion and are policymakers in their own right (Lipsky, 1980; Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2003; Meier, 1993b; Shumavon & Hibbeln, 1986). “On balance, even the most
specific and narrowly tailored statutes, executive orders, and judicial edicts appear to
contain the seeds of bureaucratic discretion” (Selden et. al, 1999, p. 173). This
discretionary decision-making ability can have great impacts in cases when a public
servant assumes a role of citizen representative that might call for action against the
course established by the organization. A case in point is O’Leary’s (2006) discussion of
guerilla tactics or how public administrators might sabotage the operation of their own
organizations if they find that the actions of their agencies betray their legislative or
42
democratic intent. Legislative structures cannot completely preclude bureaucratic
discretion from entering the equation on everyday administrative decision-making.
Regardless of overhead controls, politics will still enter the equation through individual
and institutional preferences.
[N]o matter which ideology prevails in a governing coalition, public
administration will always be undermined and corrupted by politicization, and it
is politicized to the extent that the authority delegated to it is open-ended. We
have to grant agencies discretion, but every grant of discretion is a calculated risk
(to a republic), and most jurists as well as political scientists don't appreciate this.
(Lowi, 1995, p. 491)
Denhardt and deLeon (1995) and Selden et al. (1999) argued that the public
administration literature converges along two normative dimensions: accountability
consideration and instrumental goals. Figure 1 provides a visualization of the Denhardt &
deLeon (1995) framework.
The horizontal vector represents the continuum of responsibility that lies between
political accountability and discretionary, pro-active administration. The second vector
captures the continuum between instrumental rationality of managerial efficiency and the
broadness of social equity. At their intersection there is the often cited neutrality.
Holistically the theoretical perspective identifies the continuum along which organization
members relate to the organization and to other members. Selden et al. (1999) relied on
Denhardt and deLeon’s (1995) framework of administrative responsibility when
developing the administrative roles examined in this study.
43
Figure 1. Framework of Administrative Responsibility
Managerial
Efficiency
Political
Responsiveness
Neutratiliy
Pro-active
Administration
Social Equity
SOURCE: Adapted from Denhardt & deLeon (1995, p. 35, Figure 1).
Roles of Public Administrators
Within the context of their work environments, public servants often assume
multiple roles based on gender, race, education, occupation, personal interpretations
regarding who is deserving, and the demands of their agencies (Maynard-Moody &
Musheno, 2003). Still, they share common perceptions about their roles, public values
and the expectations imposed on them “as reflected in the customs and cultures of public
administrators in units of government” (Frederickson, 1997, p. 2). While not overly
cohesive there is a rich body of literature within public administration that addresses
administrative roles. Loveridge (1968) suggested that the behavior of political actors
might be conditioned by their conception of what constitute appropriate roles. To date,
Downs’ (1967) typology of administrative roles is perhaps the most cited inquiry. Downs
44
(1967) identified five ideal types: climbers, conservers, zealots, advocates and statesmen.
Climbers are self-interested and seek promotions, income and aggrandizement of current
office. Conservers are also self-interested, yet they search for job security, power,
prestige, income and oppose any change that could endanger their status. Unlike climbers
and conservers, zealots are driven both by self-interest and by altruistic sentiments.
Zealots are loyal to relatively narrow ideas and policies. Advocates extend zealots’
loyalties to a broader set of functions and ideas. Statesmen are loyal to society and
struggle to fit within an office due to their exigencies and tendency to strongly advocate
certain positions.
Palumbo (1969) discussed role specificity, role conflict and implications in terms
of power, decision-making and ethics. Palumbo (1969) argued that role specificity can act
as a proxy for organizational power. The more specific a role is defined the less
administrative discretion one has, hence it becomes easier for the organization to trace
and control whether one behaves according to expectations. Nalbandian (1981) reviewed
the changes in the public personnel administrator’s role due to changes in professional
identities. Marshall and Stewart (1981) suggested that managers’ perceptions about their
jobs lead them to adopt certain models of behavior that are consequential in terms of
administrative decision-making.
Selden (1997a) analyzed the roles public servants assume within the context of
the idea of representative democracy. Chandler (1984) suggested that the role of an
administrator should be one of “representative citizen” – a trustee of the public good.
Along similar lines, Box (1992), employing a distinction between normative theory and
theory in use, delineated the role of public administrator as a trustee of the public interest.
45
Hite et al. (2006) identified associations between perception of more innovative behavior
and age, gender and experience within public school administrators. A large body of
literature is dedicated to roles of city managers within the context of their political
environment and public policy making (Ammons & Newell, 1988; Box, 1992; Demir &
Reddick, 2012; Kammerer, 1964; Loveridge, 1968; Newell & Ammons, 1987; Newell,
Glass, & Ammons, 1989; Zisk, Eulau, & Prewitt, 1965).
Public administrators assume roles that accommodate the complexity of their
positions, they craft “roles that mediate or resolve the thorny problems encountered in
practice” (Selden, et al., 1999, p. 175). The appeal of an assumed role lies within the fact
that it simplifies the decision-making process; “none of us can be Everyman, and
positional roles provide us a series of convenient behavior patterns to which we can
become habituated that free us form the necessity of deciding constantly among the
trivial details of living” (Biddle, 1979, p. 66).
Selden et al. (1999) asserted that despite much theoretical attention to how public
administrators interpret their roles and their responsibilities, in reality there is only
limited understandings. Selden et al. (1999), based on how public administrators perceive
responsibility, generated five roles: steward of public interest, adapted realist, business
like utilitarian, resigned custodian and practical idealist. Table 2 provides a detailed
breakdown of the five roles.
46
Table 2. Roles of Public Administrators
Role
Stewards of
the Public
Interest
Adapted
Realists
Businesslike
Utilitarians
Resigned
Custodians
Practical
Idealists
Role description
Public administrators "express a desire to participate in the formulation of
good public policy - that is, policies that incorporate the needs and
concerns of all citizens, disadvantaged groups…are more committed to
social and political goals than to policy efficiency...see themselves
serving the public and furthering the public interest, independent of the
goals of elected officials or management" (Selden et. al, 1999, p. 185).
Public administrators "balance equity and fairness with individual
concerns. They express a commitment to both good management and
equity….the expression of these values may be mitigated or influence by
sources external to the individual, such as rules, regulation supervisors,
and legislators....they reject the general value of neutrality...and hold the
ideal social equity as important....they recognize that they must work
within system constraints-rules and proper lines of authority-to survive in
the bureaucracy" (Selden et al., p. 187).
Public administrators "value efficiency as an organizational and
individual goal…they are willing to reject what more senior agency
officials tell them to do….will opt for the most efficient solution,
ensuring the public interest is served…set limits on their quest for
efficiency that prevent them from making exaggerated claims about a
program for the sake of generating support...view efficiency as more
important....they reject an politicization of their role and do not wish to
advance the interests of less privileged or minority citizens...Although
they feel political pressure from elected officials they are ambivalent
about their relationship with these officials (Selden et al., p. 188).
Public administrators "see themselves as neutral agents…who know their
boundaries, which consist of established rules and regulations and
expectations of supervisors and the chief elected officials…they
distinguish the appropriate role of nonelected public employees from that
of elected public officials...they feel no inclination to play a mediator
role" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 189).
Public administrators "see themselves as highly responsible and
professional - working efficiently, quickly, and accurately, while
implementing and advocating policy positions and legislation in the
public interest…they do not believe they are agents of elected
officials...committed to social equity...reject neutrality and the
politicization of the public service" (Selden et al., 1999, p. 190).
Similar to
concepts by:
Lovrich
(1981);
Chandler
(1984);
Wamsley et
al. (1990);
Box (1992)
Nalbandian
(1990); Box
(1992)
Nalbandian
(1990); Box
(1992)
Zimmermann and Allen (2009) replicated Selden et al.’s (1999) approach within a
more homogeneous set of public servants – local recreation administrators. They
confirmed two of the five roles: steward of public interest and adapted realist.
47
There are several important reasons why the constructs suggested by Selden et al.
(1999) were found appropriate for this study. First, the study is among the more recent
and more complete discussions of administrative roles. It is also among the few recent
studies that attempt to bridge role theory and the theory of representative bureaucracy.
Second, it is based on Denhardt and deLeon’s (1995) framework of administrative
responsibility, which is often believed to be one of the better ways of capturing the
complexity of everyday decision-making challenges faced by public administrators
(Selden et al., 1999; Sowa & Selden, 2003). Third, unlike other constructs suggested by
scholars, for instance those by Downs (1967), these five constructs have been generated
specifically from a public administration perspective and are based both on theory and
empirical analysis. In addition, perhaps even more important, the constructs suggested by
Selden et al. (1999) are not constrained to a given policy domain. They allow significant
levels of generalizability that cut across policy sectors and professional associations.
Fourth, Selden et al.’s (1999) constructs have been empirically tested. Finally, the role
constructs are reflective of and encompassing of behavior patterns that would fit within
the theory of representative bureaucracy.
Public Procurement Context
The empirical target of the analysis in this dissertation represents public
procurement. Public procurement typically refers to acquisition, renting, leasing,
contracting, purchasing and contract administration within public administration (Thai,
2001, pp. 42-43). Scholars have long pointed out the importance of public procurement.
Decisions in public procurement are generally linked with important social implications
48
(Collins & Gerber, 2008; Martin, Berner, & Bluestein, 2007) and are accepted as critical
administrative dimensions (Snider, 2006; Thai, 2009). The realization of many policy
objectives is also often dependent on the effectiveness of the public procurement process
(Arrowsmith, 1995; Bolton, 2006; Knight, Harland, Telgren, Thai, Callender, & McKen,
2007).
An increasing complexity of governance since the second part of 1990s has also
led to similar complexities in public procurement (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Cooper,
2003; Ni & Bretschneider, 2007; Romzek & Johnston, 2005). These conditions have
imposed a new and perhaps unexpected set of demands on public procurement specialists
(Thai, 2009). Professionals in the area are now asked to undertake roles that might not
have historically been the domain of public procurement specialists. For instance, it is
now the case that public procurement is seen as strategic and procurement specialists are
expected to assume active leadership roles in determining organizational ends (Snider,
2006).
Public procurement is traditionally believed to be an area dominated by
efficiency, neutrality and professionalization tendencies (Thai, 2001, 2009). Deviations
from neutral competency are often normatively condemned. Therefore, the context of
public procurement provides a rigorous test of the feasibility of role concepts in
generating holistic understandings, as it would test the hypotheses within an environment
that is institutionally constructed to avoid representative-type behavior on the part of
public administrators. If the effect of discretion and individual perceptions can be
identified within this context, then, following Meier and Bohte’s (2001) argument, it can
49
be suggested that the administrative role framework will be able to generate explanations
in environments that are more open to the representative type behavior.
Furthermore, the roles of public procurement specialists are expected to be
relatively well defined. There are several motives for such clear delineation of roles
within the public procurement context. First, federal, state and local legislative constructs
and ordinances provide a fairly strict and detailed description of the expected functions of
a procurement specialist. Second, due to the financial implications of one’s decisionmaking the outcomes are relatively easy to trace. As such, deviations from expected
behavior become easily identifiable. Third, due to recent academic attention towards the
area, the discussion regarding the appropriate roles of public procurement specialists has
noted a significant revival; the latter has led to professionalization and standardization
dynamics (Thai, 2001, 2009). Fifth, despite recent progress in terms of education options,
public procurement, as a profession, remains driven by practice (Snider & Rendon,
2012). Finally, growing memberships and activity levels in professional organizations
such as National Institute of Governmental Purchasing has exposed the procurement
specialists to an increasingly uniform set of expectations.
Public procurement specialists have access to a great sphere of influence in terms
of their decisions. On daily basis they have the ability to qualify whether a vendor or
service provider meets the social criteria imposed by the organization. At the same time,
the procurement professional can serve as policy entrepreneur by advocating changes in
existing practices and thresholds. Although, on the surface it often might appear that
public procurement is a process that is rigid and inflexible, historical evaluations do
indeed show that public procurement is undeniably an important tool in achieving desired
50
social outcomes (McCrudden, 2004). Ability to shape interpretations within these
spheres of influence is then heavily and directly linked to the presence of administrative
discretion. Without access to important level of discretion, public procurement specialists
might not be able to engage in representative type behavior.
Hypotheses
There are several implications that can be derived from theoretical and empirical
applications of the theory of representative bureaucracy. First, while implicitly assumed,
administrative discretion is rarely the focal point of any empirical examination. Second,
individual level expectations regarding one’s assumed role and consequent behavior is
rarely treated outside the race-gender approach within the representative bureaucracy
framework. Third, with time, individual characteristics can be overtaken by
organizational and institutional level influences as the main shapers of individual
behavior. Finally, recent developments have suggested that assumed roles have a greater
explanatory power when it comes to behavior and policy outcome than associations with
specific social minorities. Three questions that then become of particular interest and the
three corresponding hypotheses are:
1. What is the effect that administrative discretion has on the probability of a public
administrator assuming a given role?
H1. Public administrators who believe that that they enjoy high levels of administrative
discretion are more likely than those who believe that they enjoy low levels of
administrative discretion to assume the role of steward of public interest.
51
Within the context of this hypothesis, the relationship between one’s perceived
level of discretion and assumed role is examined. This hypothesis specifically addresses
the importance of administrative discretion for the assumption of representative type
roles.
2. What is the effect that individual level perception about one’s involvement in policy
formulation has on the probability of a public administrator assuming a given role?
H2. Public administrators who believe that they should be involved in policy formulation
are more likely than those who do not believe they should be involved in policy
formulation to assume the role of steward of public interest.
This hypothesis addresses the relationship between personal level perceptions and
one’s consequent behavior. It examines whether individual level perceptions are indeed
powerful predictors of the assumption of administrative roles.
3. What is the effect that organizational tenure has on the probability of a public
administrator assuming a given role?
H3. Public administrators with higher levels of tenure are more likely than those with
lower levels of tenure to assume the role of adapted realist.
The main purpose behind this hypothesis is the evaluation of the relationship
between organizational socialization and the assumption of representative type roles. In
particular, it is expected the longer one is employed with an organization the less likely is
the individual is to assume the role of steward of public interest.
52
The Model
Typically when constructing a model, extant theory and previous studies are
examined in order to determine the variables to be included. The independent variables in
this model, the roles, are based on the conceptualization suggested by Selden et al.
(1999). The five categories are: steward of public interest, adapted realist, business like
utilitarian, resigned custodian and practical idealist. Based on the theory of
representative bureaucracy and literature review the model includes four independent
variables and nine control variables. The independent variables are: perception regarding
one’s level of discretion, tenure, perception of expectations of others and self-expectation
regarding involvement in policy formulation. The hypotheses will be tested controlling
for: position, age, gender, race, education, political ideology, the number years of
government service, current job satisfaction and the number of years in current position.
Table 3 introduces the variables in the model, provides a short description for the
motivation behind their inclusion and offers the authors that partially or fully address the
concepts.
53
Table 3. The Model Variables
Independent
Variables
Perception
regarding one's
levels of discretion
Years with
current
organization tenure
Expectations of
others (regarding
involvement in
policy
formulation)
Self-Expectations
(regarding
involvement in
policy
formulation)
Control Variables
Position
Motivation/General Explanations
Full or Partial Discussion in:
The perception that a public servant has regarding
the levels of discretion he or she possesses
influences one's behavior and type of role
assumed.
It is expected that public administrators who have
been with the current organization for longer are
more likely to be pro-active in terms of policy
involvement (Zimmermann & Allen, 2009). Yet
the theory of representative bureaucracy suggests
that due to organizational socialization public
administrators might abandon their representative
type roles.
“[R]oles are induced through the sharing of
expectations for role behavior. Thus, those who
exhibit the role are stimulated to do so because
they learn what behaviors are expected of them,
while others are stimulated through their own
expectations to teach and enforce appropriate
behaviors for those who are members for the
position” (Biddle, 1987, p. 5). "Most versions of
role theory presume that expectations are the
major generators of roles, that expectations are
learned through experience, and that persons are
aware of the expectations they hold" (Biddle,
1986, p. 69). As such, individuals who expect
themselves to be active in policy shaping are more
likely to assume representation type roles.
Motivation/General Explanations
One's position affects one's behavior. It should be
noted that position and roles might overlap but
they are not identical, "positions are classification
of human beings; roles are classifications of
behaviors" (Biddle, 1979, p. 93).
Younger public administrators are often believed
to behave somewhat different from more
experienced ones.
Selden (1997b); Selden et al.,
(1998); Meier & Bohte (2001);
Sowa & Selden (2003)
Age
Gender
Gender has been suggested as important in
determining one's assumed role. For instance it is
believed that women with access to policymaking
are more likely to be active on feminist matters
when ""policy solutions fail to account for
women's unique needs" (Dolan, 2000, p. 514).
Scholars have argued that women and men assume
different leadership roles, attribute different
rankings to issues and might undertake importantly
different behaviors in similar contexts (Thomas,
1994; Kathlene, 1995; Dolan, 2000).
54
Selden (1997b); Selden et al.,
(1998); Dolan (2000); Sowa &
Selden (2003); Zimmermann
& Allen (2009)
Parsons (1945/1964, 1951);
Kahn et al. (1964); Loveridge
(1968); Biddle (1987);
Nalbandian (1989); Box
(1992); Meier (1993)
Parsons (1945/1964, 1951);
Loveridge (1968); Biddle
(1987); Nalbandian (1989);
Box (1992); Selden (1997);
Selden et al. (1998)
Full or Partial Discussion in:
Kahn et al. (1964); Palumbo
(1969); Kuhn (1974); Biddle
(1979); Dolan (2000); Hite et
al. (2006); Pitts (2007)
Strodbeck & Mann (1956);
Strodbeck et al. (1957);
Rosenbloom & Kinnard
(1977); Biddle (1979); Selden
et al. (1998); Hite et al. (2006);
Selden et al. (1999); Brudney
et al. (2000)
Strodbeck & Mann (1956),
Strodbeck et al. (1957); Biddle
(1979);Thomas (1994);
Kathlene (1995); Selden et al.
(1998); Brudney et al. (2000);
Dolan (2000); Sowa & Selden
(2003); Hite et al. (2006);
Zimmermann & Allen (2009)
Race/ethnicity
Education
Political ideology/
party
identification
Years in
government
service
Job satisfaction
Experience/role
specialization/
years in current
position
One's ethnic background is believed to shape one's
administrative role. Minority administrators are
often expected to be more involved in terms of
policy advocacy.
Scholars believe that education plays an important
role in shaping identities and as a consequence
one's resulting behavior.
It is suggested that in the public sector, one's
political ideology might influence the pattern of
behavior within a given role.
The experience in the public sector is believed to
influence one's outlook on one's role as well as
one's typical behavior.
Scholars assume that there is an association
between breadth of roles and job satisfaction.
As an individual is exposed to same context and
expectation he or she will develop a role
specialization, but focusing on one specific role in
that context.
Herbert (1974); Biddle (1979);
Murray et at., (1994); Selden
(1997); Selden et al. (1998);
Selden et al. (1998); Selden et
al. (1999); Brudney et al.
(2000); Sowa & Selden (2003)
Loveridge (1968); Palumbo
(1969); Rosenbloom &
Kinnard (1977); Biddle
(1979); Selden et al. (1998);
Selden et al. (1999);
Zimmermann & Allen (2009)
Selden et al. (1998); Selden et
al. (1999); Wilkins & Keiser
(2006)
Selden et al. (1999)
Vroom (1969)
Bales (1950); Biddle (1979);
Selden et al. (1999); Hite et al.
(2006)
Conclusion
This chapter has conceptualized the model and the administrative roles to be
tested by this research. It started with a detailed discussion of neo-institutional and role
theories. The administrative responsibility framework and the five roles suggested by
Selden et al. (1999) constituted the focus of the discussion. The reason for such a strong
emphasis on these constructs is due to their significant implications. Depending on which
role a public administrators assumes, he or she will habitually undertake different types
of behaviors. For example, public administrators who believe that they are stewards of
public interest will seek active involvement in the policy process. The ability to command
high levels of administrative discretion is important for them; yet, the mere allowance of
discretion does not guarantee that every public administrator would assume such a role.
On the other side of the spectrum, one would find the resigned custodians. When
55
assuming this role, public administrators identify themselves as neutral agents who do not
have a part to play in formulating policy. Administrative discretion, even if institutionally
possible, is not sought after. One would expect that public administrators who assume
this type of role would be less inclined towards challenging organizational structures and
decisions and would be less likely to engage in representative type behavior.
All three hypotheses suggested in this chapter draw on the insights provided by
the theory of representative bureaucracy while bridging neo-institutional theory and role
theory. In particular they examine the impact that presence of discretion plays on the type
of roles assumed. While, the mere presence of discretion will be mediated by other
factors in terms of its influence, it is still expected that the assumption of representative
type roles is made difficult if institutional structures focus on reducing discretion.
Individual level perceptions, controlled by one’s education, age or social associations,
too, are expected to have significant impacts in terms of the role that one assumes.
56
CHAPTER IV: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This research was designed to examine and identify the relationships between the
assumption of roles by public administrators and institutional and individual variables.
This study was conducted using a cross sectional survey design. Data were collected
through a self-administered survey by means of Survey Monkey. Survey responses were
used to examine the three core research questions of this study and to test three
hypotheses. This chapter details the methodological approach used to evaluate the
relationship between administrative discretion and roles assumed by public
administrators. In particular it details the study’s research questions and hypotheses,
research design, philosophical approach, sampling procedures, external validity, member
review, instrumentation, construct reliability, data collection, statistical technique and
limitations.
Research Questions
This dissertation attends to the following research questions:
1. What is the effect that administrative discretion has on the probability of a public
administrator assuming a given role?
2. What is the effect that individual level perception about one’s involvement in policy
formulation has on the probability of a public administrator assuming a given role?
57
3. What is the effect that organizational tenure has on the probability of a public
administrator assuming a given role?
Within the context of these overarching research questions the following three
hypotheses are tested:
H1. Public administrators who believe that that they enjoy high levels of administrative
discretion are more likely than those who believe that they enjoy low levels of
administrative discretion to assume the role of steward of public interest.
H2. Public administrators who believe that they should be involved in policy formulation
are more likely than those who do not believe they should be involved in policy
formulation to assume the role of steward of public interest.
H3. Public administrators with higher levels of tenure are more likely than those with
lower levels of tenure to assume the role of adapted realist.
The research questions and the subsequent hypotheses are tested based on the data
collected through a survey adapted from the work of Selden et al. (1999). Five
administrative roles, which were also drawn from the work of Selden et al. (1999),
represent five broad and most common roles that a public administrator is likely to
assume within everyday practice. Roles are not mutually exclusive, as an administrator is
able to assume more than one role. However, the extant literature suggests that only one
role will become dominant (Biddle, 1979, 1986; Selden et al., 1999).
The survey participants were asked to self-administer the survey instrument. The
survey instrument, which was reviewed by Florida Atlantic University’s Institutional
58
Review Board and received within the overall context of the study exception status A3
(Appendix A), included a total of 43 items; 20 items were dedicated to role identification.
The participants were given instructions on how to complete the survey on the first page
of the instrument. Additional instructions and explanations were given for each particular
set of items. The model items were measured on a seven-point Likert scale; where 1 was
“strongly disagree” and 7 was “strongly agree.” The on-screen presentation of the survey
was broken down into five distinct pages. The first page included instructions only. The
second page included the role measuring items. The respondents were given twenty
statements and they were asked to indicate their level of agreement with each statement.
The order in which each statement appeared was randomized for each respondent. In a
similar manner the options for question three on page four were randomized. The
randomization of the statements was introduced in order to reduce possible response bias
that might be otherwise induced by the placement of the items. As such, it should be
expected that the answer to one specific statement is not systematically influenced by its
order of appearance or by the statements preceding it. Page four asked respondents to
self-identify within a role type based on provided role description. The last on-screen
page collected demographic and institutional level variables as they pertained to
respondents. The following represents the demographic variables that were collected:
type of government employed by, position, the number of years in current position, the
number of years with current organization, highest level of education, the field of the
highest degree, political ideology, minority association, race, gender and age. The model
and demographic items on page three and page five respectively, were not randomized.
The order of pages and the items on pages four and five was identical for all respondents.
59
Table 4 provides a visual summary of the research questions, hypotheses, dependent and
independent variables.
Assumptions
As it is the case with all empirically driven research studies, there are several
methodological assumptions that become highly critical. First, it is assumed that the
survey instrument can accurately capture, transmit and collect data regarding the
theoretical question in the manner that it was envisioned in the research design. Second, it
is assumed that the nature of the instrument is such that it will not induce high levels of
confusion and will be understood and completed by all those taking the survey. Third, it
is assumed that the survey instrument incorporates the logic and is able to support the
theoretical underpinnings of this dissertation. Fourth, it is assumed that adapting the
survey instrument from its original conceptualization by Selden et al. (1999) has not
introduced any undesirable effects. Finally, and most importantly, it is assumed that the
response provided by public administrators will accurately reflect their actions in
practice, that is, their stated behavior would be representative of actual behavior.
60
Table 4. Summary of Research Questions and Hypotheses
RQs
&
Hs
Independent Variable
RQ1
RQ2
RQ3
administrative discretion
individual perception
organizational tenure
H1
administrative discretion
H2
self-expectations
H3
organizational tenure
Control Variables
Dependent
Variable
Method
holistic analysis
holistic analysis
holistic analysis
position, age, gender, race,
education, political
ideology, years of
government service, job
satisfaction and number of
years in current position.
position, age, gender, race,
education, political
ideology, years of
government service, job
satisfaction and number of
years in current position.
position, age, gender, race,
education, political
ideology, years of
government service, job
satisfaction and number of
years in current position.
administrative
roles
multinomial logistic
regression
administrative
roles
multinomial logistic
regression
administrative
roles
multinomial logistic
regression
Research Philosophy
Extant literature suggests that roles are more stable and hence preferable for
purposes of empirical analysis than individual behaviors. It is believed, that while there
might be a great deal of variation among public servants in terms of their everyday
behaviors, when examining patterns of behavior within role sets, the latter variation is
much more empirically manageable. Individuals might have a difficult time ranking
behaviors however roles are expected to be much clearer and easier to identify. It is
believed that although not perfect, a survey research design would be able to accurately
capture and analyze the assumption of administrative roles.
Most studies on administrative roles have been theoretical in nature and relied on
limited, if any, empirical data. This dissertation supports the argument that there are
61
crucial insights that can be garnered from a systematic large N analysis of the assumption
of roles in public administration. Many of these insights would perhaps go unrealized and
more importantly untested within theoretical or qualitative driven discussions.
Population and Sample
The membership of National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (NIGP)
represents the population of choice for this dissertation. NIGP’s membership is diverse
and includes public administrators who engage in procurement functions on regular basis.
This population is found to be of particular interest for testing the three hypotheses given
the inherent characteristic of the professional settings and the significantly rigid
regulatory and institutional environments. Procurement specialists operate daily under
well delineated procurement ordinances and institutional rules. Within this context,
institutional expectations regarding individual roles and behaviors should be relatively
well defined, stable and clearly delineated at the individual level.
A random sample of 2,000 procurement specialists was drawn from the contact
database of NIGP membership. In January of 2013 NIGP had a total of approximately
16,000 members. The 2,000 contacts were selected from the full list of members using a
random sequence generator in Microsoft Office Excel. The membership structure of
NIGP is fluid, as new members are constantly joining and others are leaving due to
retirement or other personal reasons. NIGP’s membership is also highly diverse in terms
of education, ethnicity, work experience and positional status (NIGP, personal
correspondence). The full list of contacts was obtained directly from NIGP’s research
department.
62
There were several important reasons for selecting this specific population. First,
this represents a professional group within public administration that is rarely the focus of
in-depth theoretical or empirical analyses. Under these conditions, the research could
make claim to important levels of originality. Second, although NIGP membership is
diverse in terms of education, gender, age and ethnicity – due to the professionalization
efforts of the last decade there are rather high levels of consensus regarding professional
standards and expectations (Thai, 2001); hence, it was expected that role behaviors would
be easily identifiable across institutional levels and relatively homogeneous in nature.
Also, given their direct proximity to financial outlays, their actions and decisions are
receiving perhaps higher levels of scrutiny when compared to other public administrators.
On the whole then, the nature of their work contexts resembles a metaphorical “stage,”
which would require that the participants have well defined roles and clear
understandings of behavioral expectations. Finally, within public procurement
representative type behavior is not generally encouraged or supported. Neither is
discretion. Given the latter, it can be argued that the identification of the three
relationships within public procurement is a rather powerful test to the validity of such
associations.
Sampling Procedures and External Validity
The sampling procedures for this dissertation aimed to exploit the benefits of
random sampling. The email addresses were selected using a random number generator
in Microsoft Office Excel. Given the typical response rates for NIGP surveys a large
63
contact sample was believed necessary in order to achieve desired power and
generalizability criteria.
The goal of the employed sample was to provide a representative picture of NIGP
membership. Indeed sample representativeness is often considered to be perhaps more
critical than the sample size itself (Gliner, Morgan, & Leach, 2009). There are two major
concerns with the sample used here. First, even though NIGP boast a diverse membership
it is difficult to infer whether the organization’s membership is representative of the
population of public procurement specialists at large. Second, the NIGP’s membership is
fluid. New members are added and removed almost on daily basis.
Assuming that the population size is finite and is known to be 16,000, following
Yamane (1967, p. 886) the needed sample size for statistical inference is given by the
following formula
Where N is the population size, n is the sample size, and e is the level of
precision. At a 95% confidence level, the size of the needed sample is determined to be
approximately 390.
Instrumentation and Role Constructs
The instrument employed by this study has been adapted from the
conceptualization provided by Selden et al. (1999). Selden et al. (1999) have studied a
diverse group of public administrators who had no apparent professional similarities. The
64
instrument items were broad in their conceptualizations, as such offering important levels
of cross-sectional application. Although in this case, the study was constrained to the
population of public procurement specialist, the survey instrument was found appropriate.
Given the design of the original study no reliability statistics were available. As such, an
important part of this research becomes the provision of a reliability evaluation of survey
instrument.
Each role construct was measured using four Likert-type items. The average
rating for the four items for each construct was used to identify the dominant role
assumed by the public administrator and the responses were coded accordingly. The main
reason for choosing average score rather than total score lies within its ability to provide
a decision even in cases with missing item responses. Hence, even in the case when a
respondent did not answer one of the items within the construct a decision can be made.
In cases when a respondent would have a similar average across items for several
different constructs, the number of answered items was used as the first tiebreaker. For
example, if the respondent cumulated similar averages for two constructs the respondent
was coded in the role within which he or she answered most items. Inter-item variance
was used as the second tiebreaker. All being equal, in cases of equal averages the
respondent was coded in the role that had the smallest inter-item variance. In cases when
neither the average rating, number of completed items nor inter-item variance was useful
in coding, the respondent’s self-identification was used to determine the dominant role.
Table 5 provides the items employed to measure each construct.
65
Table 5. Role Construct Instrument Items
Steward of
Public
Interest
Adapted
Realist
Businesslike
Utilitarian
Resigned
Custodian
Practical
Idealist
I use organizational channels to advocate for policy positions that I find to be important.
I seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of public policy issues that I find to be
important.
I encourage procedures that support greater public access to programs and services.
As an administrator, I encourage certain values over others.
In my work, I try to balance fairness and efficiency concerns.
I am committed to management objectives.
In my work I attempt to reflect most current managerial perspectives.
To survive in the organization, I follow the rules when strictly necessary.
In my decisions, I give priority to efficiency over fairness.
I believe efficiency is the most important goal in my work, even if my supervisors do not
agree.
Regardless of political pressure, I take the decision which is best for my organization.
If it is not the most efficient choice, I do not advance the interests of minority citizens.
I behave according to the wishes of my superiors.
I follow the rules as closely as possible.
I do not assume a public leadership role in policy issues.
In my work, I try to be as neutral as possible.
I primarily implement policy, not formulate it.
I keep politics out of my decision-making.
I am committed to my professional standards.
I attempt to be as responsive as possible.
Procedures: Data Collection, Response and Completion Rates
Before the administration of the survey, a draft of the instrument was distributed
among 14 public procurement specialists with significant experience in the profession.
The individuals were asked to review the instrument in terms of its logical coherence,
language adequacy and congruence with the perspectives in the field. Ten specialists
replied with detailed comments. Taken together, their comments led to a number of
language changes and rewordings. The demand for a more practice oriented language
appeared as a common thread among the comments. The survey instrument, which is
provided in the Appendix B, has been administered using Survey Monkey. The survey
included a cover message (Appendix C) within the body of the invitation email and a
unique individual link to the survey embedded into the text. The invitation message
66
introduced the potential participants to the scope of the research and informed the
recipients that his or her participation was voluntary. It was made clear that no individual
data will be made available. The results will be presented in aggregate terms only.
Typically, it is expected that web based surveys yield lower response rates than
face to face and paper surveys. For education surveys, Nulty (2008) conducted an
extensive literature review and found that the average response rates for paper surveys is
56% whereas for web based surveys it is only 33%; with a trend of decreasing survey
response rates. For internet surveys (not e-email surveys) the general expectation is that
response rate could range anywhere from 0% to 85.3% (Vaux & Briggs, 2006, p. 190).
Furthermore, perhaps somewhat unexpectedly, Medway and Fulton (2012) found that
adding a web option to a paper administered survey actually decreases response rates.
Hence, in case of survey administration, it might be advisable to avoid mixing collection
approaches. What is important to note here, for the purposes of this research, is that for a
survey that is solely web based and administered, without any paper pre-notifications, the
response rates should be expected to be lower than those obtained for paper surveys.
Over the last 5 years, surveys conducted by the NIGP, response rates ranged between
10% and 25% (NIGP, personal correspondence). Surveys that attended to technical and
operational data appeared to result in lower response rates.
The survey’s digital invitation was sent out on February 12, 2013. Reminders
were sent on February 26th and March 11th. A final reminder was sent on March 18th. A
total of 512 individual replied to the invitation to participate. This represents 25.6 %
response rate. Out of the total number of respondents, 493 completed and submitted the
survey, while 19 had started, but only partially completed the survey – hence a
67
completion rate of 96.28%. Although this response rates appears somewhat low, it is
rather characteristic for large N internet surveys and it fits within the overall expectation
for studies driven by NIGP database. The response rate also fits within the overall trend
observed in social sciences.
Data Screening
With the exception of the 19 partially completed responses, data obtained were
not in need of major screening. Only minor refinements were undertaken. For instance, in
certain cases respondent’s used letters rather numbers to indicate their responses. In other
cases, respondents used months rather than years to indicate their tenure within a certain
position or with a given organization. When months were used, the indicated number of
months was transformed in their year equivalent. Finally, in terms of type of position
respondents at times would indicate the actual position they held rather than choose
among the options provided to them. In the latter cases, their answers were recoded
according to the options. For example, if a respondent indicated that he or she was
employed as a “buyer,” he or she would be recoded as a non-manager. Given the fact that
very few cases outside the partially complete responses had missing values, no cases
were deleted from the final data set. The final data set included 493 complete survey
responses.
The general demographic descriptive statistics for the data set a presented in
Table 6.
68
Table 6. Sample Descriptive Statistics
Employed by:
City / town government
State/provincial government
County/regional government
College / university
Special authority / district
School system
Federal government
Other (please specify)
123 (24.9%)
117 (23.7%)
109 (22.1%)
42 (8.5%)
41 (8.3%)
39 (7.9%)
17 (3.4%)
5 (1%)
Position:
Non-manager
Manager
Senior executive/director
246 (49.9%)
182 (36.9%)
65 (13.2%)
Highest Education Level:
Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree
Did not indicate
6 (1.2%)
16 (3.2%)
94 (19.1%)
40 (8.1%)
208 (42.2%)
128 (26%)
1 (0.2%)
Years in current position
Tenure
Years in public service
Population
Age
N
488
490
489
493
482
Political Ideology:
Strongly liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Strongly conservative
Did not indicate
16 (3.2%)
82 (16.6%)
215 (43%)
154 (31.2%)
17 (3.4%)
9 (1.8%)
Race:
White
Black or African American
Other
Asian
Am. Indian or Alaska Native
Native Haw. or Pacific Islander
Did not indicate
387 (78.5%)
71 (14.4%)
18 (3.7%)
12 (2.4%)
3 (0.6%)
1 (0.2%)
1 (0.2%)
Gender:
Female
Male
285 (57.8%)
208 (42.2%)
Mean
6.98
10.87
17.44
9507218.04
50.26
Nonresponse Bias
For any study based on data collected through self-administered instruments,
nonresponse bias can be a serious concern. In order to check for any possible significant
nonresponse bias an independent sample T-test on the average responses for model
variables among early and late respondents was conducted. The survey responses were
ordered based on their time of receipt, with the first 10% labeled as early respondents and
69
last 10% labeled as late respondents. The results for independent samples T-test is
provided in Table 7.
Overall there are no major concerns regarding possible non-response bias. The
only statistically significant difference in means (p<.05) was observed for item 11 –
“Regardless of political pressure, I take the decision which is best for my organization.”
Outside of item 11 no other statistically significant difference in means among early and
respondents was identified.
Construct Reliability
Perhaps the most critical technical aspect of this research lies within the reliability
of the constructs employed to code respondents into roles based on their espoused
agreement with the 20 model items. Internal consistency would require that the items
composing a given scale would have high levels of interrelatedness. Cronbach’s Alpha is
probably the most widely used and accepted measure of evaluating constructs reliability.
Cronbach’s Alpha estimates the consistency of the entire scale (Cronbach, 1951;
Nunnally, 1979).
The typical lower cut-off limit for Alpha is often considered .70, but for
exploratory research and for scales that have not been previously tested levels as low as
.60 are found to be acceptable (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010; Robinson,
Shaver, & Wrightman, 1991). Table 8 provides the Cronbach’s Alphas for the five
constructs.
70
Table 7.Independent Samples T-test for Equality of Means
I use organizational channels to advocate for policy positions that I
find to be important.
I seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of public policy
issues that I find to be important.
I encourage procedures that support greater public access to programs
and services.
As an administrator, I encourage certain values over others.
In my work, I try to balance fairness and efficiency concerns.
I am committed to management objectives.
In my work I attempt to reflect most current managerial perspectives.
To survive in the organization, I follow the rules when strictly
necessary.
In my decisions, I give priority to efficiency over fairness.
I believe efficiency is the most important goal in my work, even if my
supervisors do not agree.
Regardless of political pressure, I take the decision which is best
for my organization.
If it is not the most efficient choice, I do not advance the interests of
minority citizens.
I behave according to the wishes of my superiors.
I follow the rules as closely as possible.
I do not assume a public leadership role in policy issues.
In my work, I try to be as neutral as possible.
I primarily implement policy, not formulate it.
I keep politics out of my decision-making.
I am committed to my professional standards.
I attempt to be as responsive as possible.
I expect to be involved in policy formulation
I believe that my organization's stakeholders expect me to be involved
in policy formulation
I feel that I enjoy a high level of discretion in terms of my decisionmaking
I am satisfied with my job
# of years in current position
# of years with current organization
# of years in public sector
Age
71
t
Sig.
Mean
Diff.
Std.
Error
Diff.
0.348
0.729
0.089
0.256
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.293
-0.448
0.655
-0.102
0.228
0.241
1.391
0.101
0.619
0.810
0.168
0.920
0.537
0.061
0.267
0.020
0.122
0.254
0.192
0.202
0.198
1.332
0.186
0.449
0.337
-0.428
0.670
-0.155
0.362
-1.303
0.196
-0.449
0.345
-2.901
0.005
-0.755
0.260
0.267
0.790
0.092
0.346
-0.021
-0.926
0.980
0.984
1.750
1.146
0.984
0.357
0.329
0.327
0.083
0.255
-0.006
-0.204
0.327
0.286
0.571
0.286
0.310
0.220
0.333
0.290
0.327
0.249
0.204
1.487
-1.255
0.838
0.140
0.212
0.032
0.245
-0.388
0.156
0.165
0.309
-1.531
0.129
-0.469
0.307
-1.682
0.096
-0.490
0.291
-0.715
0.477
-0.204
0.286
-1.455
-1.798
-1.874
-1.932
0.149
0.075
0.064
0.056
-1.704
-3.002
-3.827
-3.736
1.171
1.669
2.042
1.934
Table 8. Construct Reliability
Cronbach's
Alpha
Stewards of Public Interest
Model Item 1
Model Item 2
Model Item 3
Model Item 2
Adapted Realist
Model Item 5
Model Item 6
Model Item 7
Model Item 8
Businesslike Utilitarian
Model Item 9
Model Item 10
Model Item 11
Model Item 12
Resigned Custodian
Model Item 13
Model Item 14
Model Item 15
Model Item 16
Practical Idealist
Model Item 17
Model Item 18
Model Item 19
Model Item 20
Scale Mean
if Item
Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Cronbach's
Alpha if Item
Deleted
16.04
16.27
15.69
15.84
8.683
8.227
9.5
9.857
0.646
0.606
0.606
0.425
0.666
0.687
0.693
0.783
16.5
16.76
16.93
17.62
7.69
7.885
7.101
5.849
0.488
0.497
0.588
0.373
0.597
0.597
0.535
0.731
12.45
12.1
10.77
12.31
13.01
12.48
16.609
14.65
0.61
0.687
0.457
0.508
0.68
0.634
0.758
0.736
15.84
14.73
16.09
15.19
10.444
12.566
9.485
10.711
0.53
0.526
0.547
0.53
0.67
0.686
0.664
0.669
18.35
17.71
16.88
16.91
4.732
5.417
6.445
6.689
0.368
0.453
0.567
0.495
0.685
0.567
0.535
0.57
0.765
0.675
0.763
0.733
0.651
Based on the Cronbach’s Alphas, it can be argued that the constructs are fairly
adequate and exhibit high levels of inter-item consistency. Yet, some improvements
could be made in the cases of “Adapted Realist” and “Practical Idealist” by reevaluating
item 8 and 17 respectively. On the whole, and given the partial-exploratory nature of this
research, the constructs are believed to be sufficiently stable to warrant adequate level of
discrimination among different administrative roles.
72
Multinomial Logistic Regression
Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic regression that
allows for more than two categories of dependent variables to be examined by means of
several independent variables. Multinomial logistic regression uses maximum likelihood
estimation procedures in order to determine the probability of being part of a specific
group (Hair et. al., 2010; Kwak & Clayton-Matthews, 2002; Liao, 1999). The
denomination of multinomial is given due to the fact that for each variant pattern of
independent variables the counts of dependent variable are expected to have a
multinomial distribution (Norušis, 2008b). “This method can handle situations with
several categories. There is no need to limit the analysis to pairs of categories, or to
collapse the categories into two mutually exclusive groups so that the (more familiar)
logit model can be used. Indeed, any strategy that eliminates observations or combines
categories only leads to less efficient estimates” (Kwak & Clayton-Matthews, 2002, p.
404). There are no pre-specified means of building a logistic regression model (Kennedy,
1998).
Multinomial logistic regression is not the only possible methodological approach
to analyzing models with categorical dependent variables, which is the case for this
study. Yet, it is perhaps the most popular one due to the fact that most statistical packages
carry it, estimators are easy to calculate, model result are readily interpretable (Kwak &
Clayton-Matthews, 2002), makes less assumptions and is more robust to deviations of
normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity than other commonly used techniques
(Norušis, 2008b; Hair et. al., 2010). Due to its characteristics and usability the technique
has been growing and popularity and use (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Huck, 2004).
73
In the general case when the dependent variable has J possible values (J-1 logits),
the model typically takes the following form:
Log[P(category) i/P(category)j]=Bi0+Bi1X1+Bi2X2+…+ BimXm
Where:
B0 – intercept
B1 to Bm – logistic regression coefficients
X1 to Xm – independent variables
Significance
A methodological appeal of multinomial logistic regression is that it is robust
against deviations in normality, linearity or homoscedasticity. Multinomial logistic
regression makes fewer assumptions than discriminant analysis and linear regression
analysis, and it is robust when those assumptions are not fully satisfied (Hair et al., 2010;
Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000; Klenbaum & Klein, 2000; Norušis, 2008a). Sample size and
outliers represent critical considerations within the context of multinomial logistic
regression. There are no exacting criteria regarding the minimum sample size, but
scholars typically agree that the sample should be sufficiently large to provide a
minimum of 10 cases per independent variable; larger ratios such as 30:1 provide
improved confidence in the results (Hair et al., 2010; Pedzur, 1997).
The primary assumption of multinomial logistic regression is the independence of
the categories of the dependent variable (Kennedy, 2008; Liao, 1999; Norušis, 2008b).
That is, a strong identification with one role is not associated with identification with
another role; the ratio of the probabilities of any two categories is not influenced
systematically by any other category.
74
In terms of the overall fit of the model, Meyers, Gamst and Guarino (2013, p.
541) suggest five dimensions for evaluating the overall viability of the logit model:
1. -2log likelihood ratio (-2LL)
2. Omnibus chi-square
3. Pseudo R2
4. Hosmer and Lemeshow test
5. Wald test of significant coefficients
The likelihood ratio is used to examine whether or not the addition of independent
variables improves the prediction power. The -2LL has a chi-square distribution. The
omnibus chi-square tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero. The pseudo
R-square statistic provides and additional evaluation approach. The statistic represents
the proportion of dependent variable variability that the independent variables explain.
The pseudo R2 is equal to (1-LL full)/LL reduced, where LL stands for log likelihood.
The Wald test is employed for testing the null hypothesis that each individual
coefficient is 0 for every logit. The Wald test, however, in the case of large coefficients
might fail to reject the null hypothesis (Hauck & Donner, 1977). Enders (2010) warns
that for small sample sizes the Wald test might underperform the likelihood ratio. Given
the latter, the likelihood-ratio test, which performs better, is normally preferred (Agresti,
2007; Enders, 2010; Norušis, 2008b). Pearson residuals are used for purposes of model fit
examinations. Cells with Pearson’s residuals greater than 2 in absolute should raise some
concerns and the researcher is advised to examine the reasoning behind such larger
difference between observed and predicted cell counts. Pearson’s chi-square statistic is
commonly used to evaluate model fit, where the null hypothesis is that the model fits:
75
χ2Pearson = ∑all cells (observed count-expected count)2/expected count
Yet, in cases with multiple covariates and small expected values per cells,
Pearson’s chi-square should not be used since most cases would have unique covariate
patterns (Hosmer & Lemeshow, 2000).
Checking Normality and Multicollinearity
The model includes four independent variables and nine control variables. The
independent variables are: perception regarding one’s level of discretion, tenure,
perception of expectations of others and self-expectation regarding involvement in policy
formulation. The nine control variables are: position, age, gender, race, education,
political ideology, the number years of government service, the number of years with
current organization, job satisfaction and the number of years in current position.
The normality statistics for interval and ratio variables is given below in Table 9
and Figure 2. Inspection of the data reveals that there are some minor concerns regarding
the skewness in the distribution of the number of years in current position and the number
of years in their current organization. The distribution for the number of years in current
position has a kurtosis higher than 2. A logarithmic transformation was employed to
transform the items for both variables. The new distribution of the items is provided by
Figure 3.
76
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholder’s expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Years in current position
Tenure
Years in public service
Age
N
489
493
491
493
488
490
489
482
Mean
4.75
4.36
4.7
5.27
6.9827
10.8726
17.44
50.26
Std. Deviation
1.515
1.568
1.685
1.389
6.08236
8.54306
9.98464
9.327
Skewness
-0.569
-0.37
-0.589
-1.163
1.79
1.069
0.323
-0.552
Kurtosis
-0.443
-0.730
-0.535
0.986
3.798
0.581
-0.775
-0.206
Figure 2. Visual Inspection of Data Normality
Figure 3. Distribution of Transformed Variables
Most importantly however, due to the fact that approximately 93% respondents
indicated that they were either white or black, the race variable was substituted with a
77
dichotomous variable of minority association (whether respondent thought of himself or
herself as a minority). It was believed that whether a person considered oneself as a
minority is more descriptive and provides improved information for the purposes of this
study than the actual race label that one receives.
Although minor deviation from normality and multicollinearity are not as much of
a concern in multinomial logistic regression; there would be much more confidence
associated with the results should they be met. The examination of correlations
coefficients (Table 10) suggests that indeed there are no multicollinearity concerns within
the data, as none of the correlation coefficients is above 0.85.
78
Table 10. Correlations
1
2
1
1. Expectation of policy involv.
.719**
1
2. Stakeholders’ expectations
**
**
.337
.370
3. Administrative discretion
**
.199
.301**
4. Current job satisfaction
.162** .211**
5. Years in public service
-.002
.009
6. Age
-.095* -.021
7. Log (years in current position)
-.057
.017
8. Log (tenure)
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
.271**
.113*
.099*
-.015
-.039
1
.059
.025
.038
.024
1
.508**
.329**
.448**
1
.349**
.288**
1
.642**
1
Coding
As a result of the coding process, there were 67 cases in which a respondent had
similar average across several constructs and one of the tie-breakers had to be employed
for coding purposes. Table 11 provides the summary of the final results of coding
respondents based on their roles.
The coding results suggest that the two most dominant roles within public
procurement are those of “Practical Idealist” and “Adapted Realist.” Almost two-thirds of
the respondents were classified within these two role types. The third most dominant role
with the field is the role of “Steward of Public Interest.”
79
Table 11. Summary of Coding
Role
Practical Idealist
Adapted Realist
Steward of Public Interest
Resigned Custodian
Businesslike Utilitarian
Total
Frequency
150
143
97
68
35
493
Percent
30.40%
29.00%
19.70%
13.80%
7.10%
100%
Limitations
There are a number of possibly significant limitations to the methodological
approach employed in this dissertation that should be noted here. First, the question of
whether respondents are representative of the overall population of procurement
specialists remains an important consideration that should be accounted for when making
any type of generalizing inferences. Second, this represents the first bona fide test of the
adapted survey instrument. As such, its reliability and validity should be considered
somewhat questionable until further research could confirm it under other, perhaps more
trying circumstances. A total of 19 respondents did not complete the surveys. The latter
raises some concerns regarding the language, representativeness and possibly the length
of the survey instrument. Finally, this methodological approach, the study’s sample more
specifically, might make difficult the generalization of the findings to the overall
population of public administration universe. Indeed, it is quite possible that the
population of public procurement specialists differ in meaningful ways from the other
public servants.
80
Conclusion
This chapter introduced the design that was employed for the purpose of teasing
out the relationship between the assumption of administrative roles by public
administrators and individual and institutional variables. The chapter discussed the
study’s research questions and hypotheses, research design, philosophical approach,
sampling procedures and external validity, member review, instrumentation, constructs
validity and reliability, data collection and limitations. Four primary realizations were
detailed. First, the response rate was relatively low when compared to response rates
otherwise obtained by paper surveys; yet, within the context of overall trends in social
science research the response rate is acceptable.
Second, the non-completion and missing data were minor and did not warrant any
significant level of concern. Third, there are important unavoidable limitations to the
methodology employed that raise some questions that should be seriously considered
when generalizing the findings provided here. Finally, and most importantly, based on an
independent sample T-test between early and late respondents, there is no serious
indication of non-response bias. As such, the latter is not a major concern and provides
additional support for the adequacy of the sample in the light of a relatively low response
rate.
81
CHAPTER V: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Introduction
This chapter introduces and interprets the result of the statistical analysis of the
data. The first part of the chapter specifically attends to the model results and the three
hypotheses. The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the interpretation of the
findings.
Results
The multinomial logistic regression model tested here has four independent
variables and nine control variables. The independent variables are: (1) perception
regarding one’s level of discretion; (2) tenure (the number of years with one’s current
organization); (3) expectations of others regarding involvement in policy formulation;
and (4) self-expectations regarding involvement in policy formulation. The nine control
variables are as follows: position, age, gender, education, identification as a minority,
political ideology, the number of years of government service, job satisfaction and the
number of years in current position. The proportional by chance accuracy criteria for this
model, calculated based on the marginal percentages, is 23.93% * 1.25 =29.91%. Table
12 provides the likelihood ratio tests.
82
Table 12. Model Fit Information and Likelihood Ratio Tests
-2 Log
Likelihood
Intercept Only
Final
1403.665
1167.762
Intercept
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Position
Log (years in current position)
Log (tenure)
Years in public service
Education
Political ideology
Minority association
Gender
Age
Chi-Square
Sig.
235.903
Model Fitting
Criteria
-2 Log Likelihood
of Reduced
Model
1167.762a
1178.419
1178.238
1248.669
1171.389
1172.202
1169.809
1179.959
1186.585
1172.604
1173.548
1171.973
1170.620
1169.428
.000
Likelihood Ratio Tests
Chi-Square
Sig.
.000
10.658
10.476
80.907
3.627
4.440
2.047
12.197
18.823
4.843
5.786
4.212
2.858
1.666
.
.031
.033
.000
.459
.350
.727
.016
.001
.304
.216
.378
.582
.797
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced
model. The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis
is that all parameters of that effect are 0.
a
. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the
degrees of freedom.
The overall model appears to be performing fairly well. Expectation about
involvement in policy formulation (p < .05), perceived expectations of stakeholders
(p<0.05), perceived level of discretion (p <.01), the number of years with current
organization (p <.05) and the number of years of public service (p <.01) are found to be
significant in explaining at least one role. No other variable including gender (p>.05),
minority association (p>.05) nor position (p>.05) is found to be statistically significant.
Similarly, job satisfaction (p>.05), education (p>.05) and political ideology (p>.05) are
not found to be significant predictors of one’s role.
83
The likelihood ratio test suggests that the model is statistically significant and
performs better than the comparison model with no independent variables. When
controlling for job satisfaction, the number of years in current position, the number of
years in public service, education, political ideology, minority association, gender and
age – administrative discretion, tenure and self-expectations are identified as powerful
predictors of the assumption of administrative roles. The model classifies correctly 45.8%
of the cases. This is significantly higher than the minimal criteria of 29.91% derived
using marginal percentages.
Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) argued that the goodness-of-fit statistic is not
appropriate when there aren’t multiple cases observed for each of the covariate patterns.
When covariates are not categorical, hence not having unique covariate patterns, which is
the case for the tested model, the goodness-of-fit tests will not have a chi-square
distribution. The latter is due primarily to the small expected values for cells. Given the
number of covariates in this model and the fact that many of them are measured on
interval or ratio scale the goodness-of-fit tests are not found to be appropriate for judging
model adequacy in terms of fitting extant data.
Hypotheses
The empirical research of this dissertation targeted three hypotheses.
H1. Public administrators who believe that that they enjoy high levels of administrative
discretion are more likely than those who believe that they enjoy low levels of
administrative discretion to assume the role of steward of public interest.
84
Statistical analysis suggests that there is sufficient empirical support to confirm the
first hypothesis. It is confirmed that administrative discretion is significant in explaining
the enactment of the role of steward of public interest (Table 13). It is found that those
who believe they enjoy higher levels of discretion are more likely to assume the role of
steward of public interest. Individuals were more likely to be categorized as a steward of
public interest than adapted realist (-1.034, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-1.126,
p<.01), resigned custodian (-1.249, p <.01) and practical idealist (-1.125, p<.01) with
increased levels of discretion. The latter is the case even when controlling for, position,
education, age, gender, minority association and education level.
H2. Public administrators who believe that they should be involved in policy formulation
are more likely than those who do not believe they should be involved in policy
formulation to assume the role of steward of public interest.
Hypothesis two is also confirmed. It is found that public administrators who believe
that they should be involved in policy formulation are more likely than those who do not
believe they should be involved in policy formulation to assume the role of steward of
public interest. Individuals were more likely to be categorized as a steward of public
interest than adapted realist (-.492, p<.01), businesslike utilitarian (-.509, p<.05),
resigned custodian (-.547, p <.01) and practical idealist (-.514, p<.01) with increased
expectations to be involved in policy formulation. The results are confirmed when
controlling for position, education, age, gender and minority association.
85
H3. Public administrators with higher levels of tenure are more likely than those with
lower levels of tenure to assume the role of adapted realist.
It is also found that one’s tenure is significant in predicting one’s assumed role.
Increased number of years with the same organization is likely to increase the probability
of one assuming the role of adapted realist. The finding is not limited to this role only. In
essence increased tenure is more likely to increase the probability of the public servant
assuming any role other than that of steward of public interest. With increased tenure,
individuals were more likely to be categorized as adapted realist (1.518, p<.01),
businesslike utilitarian (1.896, p<.01), resigned custodian (1.580, p <.01) and practical
idealist (1.465, p<.01) than steward of public interest. Indeed, organizational tenure
appears to be inversely related to representative type behavior.
86
Table 13. Parameter Estimates
Rolea
Adapted Realist
Businesslike
Utilitarian
Resigned
Custodian
Intercept
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Position
Log (years in current position)
Log (tenure)
Years in public service
Education
Political ideology
Age
[Minority association =1]
[Minority association =2]
[Gender =1]
[Gender =2]
Intercept
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Position
Log (years in current position)
Log (tenure)
Years in public service
Education
Political ideology
Age
[Minority association =1]
[Minority association =2]
[Gender =1]
[Gender =2]
Intercept
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Position
Log (years in current position)
Log (tenure)
Years in public service
Education
Political ideology
Age
[Minority association =1]
[Minority association =2]
[Gender =1]
87
B
7.138
-.492
.248
-1.034
.178
.295
-.640
1.518
-.066
-.084
-.202
.002
.094
0b
.325
0b
10.394
-.509
.273
-1.126
.119
-.400
-.654
1.896
-.072
-.076
-.548
-.040
.613
0b
-.114
0b
12.447
-.547
-.192
-1.249
.279
-.082
-.474
1.580
-.070
-.344
-.444
-.019
-.163
0b
.128
Std. Error
1.858
.175
.168
.164
.131
.259
.511
.493
.021
.151
.182
.021
.388
.
.334
.
2.500
.234
.229
.196
.183
.433
.768
.784
.034
.218
.274
.030
.519
.
.488
.
2.181
.198
.194
.178
.154
.359
.655
.659
.027
.176
.238
.026
.474
.
.420
Sig.
.000
.005
.140
.000
.172
.254
.211
.002
.001
.580
.268
.906
.809
.
.331
.
.000
.029
.233
.000
.516
.356
.394
.016
.031
.726
.046
.179
.237
.
.815
.
.000
.006
.321
.000
.070
.819
.469
.017
.009
.051
.062
.455
.730
.
.761
Exp(B)
.611
1.282
.356
1.195
1.343
.527
4.563
.936
.920
.817
1.002
1.099
.
1.384
.
.601
1.315
.324
1.126
.670
.520
6.662
.930
.926
.578
.961
1.846
.
.892
.
.578
.825
.287
1.321
.921
.622
4.857
.933
.709
.642
.981
.849
.
1.136
Practical Idealist
[Gender =2]
Intercept
Expectation of policy involvement
Stakeholders’ expectations
Administrative discretion
Current job satisfaction
Position
Log (years in current position)
Log (tenure)
Years in public service
Education
Political ideology
Age
[Minority association =1]
[Minority association =2]
[Gender =1]
[Gender =2]
0b
9.493
-.514
.073
-1.125
.143
.057
-.262
1.465
-.089
-.154
-.182
.005
-.054
0b
.115
0b
.
1.899
.175
.169
.166
.131
.275
.542
.529
.022
.154
.193
.021
.403
.
.347
.
.
.000
.003
.666
.000
.273
.836
.628
.006
.000
.315
.346
.833
.892
.
.741
.
.
.598
1.076
.325
1.154
1.059
.769
4.330
.915
.857
.834
1.005
.947
.
1.122
.
Interpretation of Findings
Over the length of this research, several questions of particular interest to practice
have been addressed. The dissertation was constructed to provide empirical answers to
three important questions.
1. What are the dominant administrative roles assumed by public procurement
specialists?
Taken together the results suggest that the public procurement profession is
dominated by two roles – practical idealist (30.4%) and adapted realist (29%). These two
roles account for close to 60% of patterned behaviors within the ranks of public
procurement specialists. Businesslike utilitarian was identified as the least assumed
administrative role. Only 7.1% of the individuals within the profession are likely to enact
the latter as the dominant administrative role of choice. Somewhat contrary to popular
beliefs present in the literature, resigned custodian (13.8%) is not found to be a dominant
88
role assumed by professionals in the field. Finally, despite the supposed rigidities of
public procurement, almost one in five procurement specialists (19.7%) routinely assume
a representative type role.
2. What are the individual and institutional variables most likely to explain one’s
assumed role?
Empirical results suggest that administrative discretion is indeed, as predicted by
theory of representative bureaucracy, critical for the assumption of administrative type
roles. Individuals who believe they have higher levels of discretion are more likely to
assume the representative role of steward of public interest than any other role.
Representative bureaucracy theory does not offer a conclusive answer whether
administrative discretion is a cause or a facilitator of representative type roles; however,
the results presented here do suggest that its presence is a powerful predictor of the
representative type behavior.
Similar to administrative discretion, individual expectations regarding one’s level
of involvement in policy formulation is found to be a significant predictor of role
enactment. Individuals who expect that they should be involved in policy formulation are
more likely to assume a representative type role.
Organizational tenure and the number of years in public service, as expected,
carry important levels of explanatory power when it comes to administrative roles. Both
appear to be significant predictors in terms of whether a public administrator will assume
the role of steward of public interest or not. Yet, they are found to affect the assumption
of roles in different ways. With increased organizational tenure, public administrators are
89
more likely to assume any other role but that of steward of public interest. On the other
hand, with increased number of years in public service a public administrator is more
likely to assume the role of steward of public interest. As such, it could be argued, that
organizational socialization (as measured by organizational tenure) and public sector
service have opposing effects on the assumption of representative type roles.
Finally, and perhaps more critically, none of the variables that are typically linked
with representative type roles, such as minority association and gender, were found to be
important in explaining the assumption of roles. Similarly, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, neither job satisfaction, age, position nor education was found significant in
predicting the type of role a public administrator would assume. Tenure and the number
of year of public service were found to perform better as predictors of the assumption of
representative roles than variables that usually enter the discussion within the context of
theory of representative bureaucracy
3. What are the implications of the predominance of a given administrative role over
others within every day procurement practices?
The results of the empirical analyses suggest that there are sufficient grounds to
challenge stereotypical accounts regarding public procurement that are present in the
literature. Public procurement professionals, in their assumptions of administrative roles,
are guided by professional standards (practical idealist) and by their understanding that
equity and fairness are important considerations (adapted realist). Furthermore
accounting for the numbers of procurement specialists who routinely assume the role of
steward of public interest, it can be concluded that the majority of administrators within
90
the field reject the value of “neutrality” and habitually attempt to enforce some values
(e.g. professional) over others. The role of resigned custodian and businesslike utilitarian,
which the literature on public procurement would suggest should be among the dominant
roles in the field, turn out to be the least assumed role types.
Taken together, it becomes clear that public procurement, within the context of
the roles assumed my public administrators, is indeed a powerful social mechanism. The
results presented here lend support to the fact that public procurement specialists are
seldom neutral enforcers of procurement ordinances. Administrators in the field, often
allow professional or personal expectations to play an important part in dictating the type
of administrative role that one eventually assumes. As a consequence, public
procurement specialists unavoidably play a critical role in interpreting procurement
policies.
Conclusion
This chapter introduced the results of the empirical analysis. The tested model
was found to perform well and provide increased classification power over the base
model. All three tested hypotheses were confirmed. It was confirmed that individuals
who believe that they enjoy higher levels of discretion were more likely to enact the
representative role of steward of public interest than any other role. Second, it was also
confirmed that individuals who expect to be involved in policy formulation are more
likely to assume the role of steward of public interest. Similarly, the results lend support
to the argument that with increased time with organizations individuals are much less
likely to assume representative type roles.
91
CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION
Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter lies within an effort to integrate the research
undertaken in this dissertation within a comprehensive interpretation of the usefulness of
the findings for practice. The chapter first discusses the implication of the results. The
discussion then turns to the limitations of this study. The chapter concludes with an
exposition of the contributions made here and suggestions for future research.
Implications of the Results
The implications of this dissertation and research are legion. As it often might be
the case, there are more implications with what wasn’t found than with what was actually
confirmed. In general lines this dissertation attempted to clarify the nature of the
dynamics associated with role enactment in public administration. This dissertation
combined in an original manner representative bureaucracy and role theories and set the
modest goal of identifying the role played by administrative discretion, tenure and selfexpectations within everyday behaviors in public service. Taken together, the results
suggest that there is much still to be learned about administrative discretion and that our
current theoretical perspectives on representative bureaucracy might be guilty of being
overly simplistic.
92
First, it was confirmed that administrative discretion might be indispensable for
the enactment of representative behavior. Whether the individual chooses to employ the
discretion or not, it appears that he or she needs to have it first. Hence, although it can be
argued that the trigger for representative behavior might lie somewhere other than
discretion, it becomes difficult to argue against the fact that the presence of discretion
facilitates representative type role enactment.
Second, self-expectations are found to explain the enactment of representative
behavior. Individuals are more likely to assume a representative type role if they believe
they should undertake, as public servants, an active role in policy formulation. The
consequential nature of this finding is directly linked with the fact that self-expectations
are found to be more important than position in terms of predicting role assumption.
Indeed as it has been argued by Levinson (1959) and Biddle (1986) roles are
classifications of behavior and not positions.
Third, and directly pertaining to public procurement profession, this dissertation
has provided evidence that procurement specialists assume a much more diverse set of
roles than the typical anecdotal assumptions generally present within the literature. A
review of the underlining beliefs within the literature in the field would suggests that
public procurement specialists are faithful followers of institutional rules and procedures.
Involvement in policy formulation is often normatively condemned and underestimated.
Hence, the logical expectations would have been that the result would show that resigned
custodian would be the dominant role assumed in the field. Yet, according to the
findings, only approximately 14% of the time, the latter represented the dominant role
93
assumed by professionals in the field. As such, the area is much more vibrant and diverse
in terms of its roles than it is led to believe by the core body of the literature in the field.
Finally, perhaps one of the more important implications of this study can be
located within the matters that were “not found.” Specifically, the failure of control
variables, such as position, gender, education and minority association to reach
significance levels within the model was found to be of particular interest. Although for
specific policy types, gender and minority associations might be significant in explaining
the assumption of representative roles, it appears that for every-day practices, gender and
minority associations are not powerful predictors of role enactment. The latter is bound to
come with heavy theoretical implications in terms of theory of representative
bureaucracy. In particular, it would challenge race and gender as the underlying links of
representative behavior over the scope of routine administrative decision-making. In
essence, race and gender might currently be only local or policy specific triggers of
representative type behavior and not fundamental and unquestioned links.
Limitations
Like any study of this type and scope, it is not perfect and it has it has several
scholarly inadequacies that simply went beyond the researcher’s reach and control ability.
There are several limitations that should be accounted for when interpreting and
attempting to generalize the findings of this study. It is suggested that critical academic
caution is made anytime these findings are extended beyond the scope within which they
have been discussed here.
94
First, as it is characteristic with every study of behavior that is based on selfassessment, the research assumes that the reported behavior by respondents will mirror
their actual behavior. The validity of responses is dependent on minimizing the gap
between what is being reported and actual behavior. Yet, the latter cannot be necessarily
measured. There are sufficient reasons to believe, based on the manner in which the
research was developed and implemented, that the respondents actually behave in the
manner that they claim they do; yet, there are no guarantees.
Second, public procurement professionals perhaps exhibit higher levels of
homogeneity in their behaviors than would be characteristic for the overall population of
public servants. As such, it might be difficult to extend the role dimensions to other
professional areas. Within the later contexts, roles and behaviors might be more
ambiguous and difficult to delineate. As such, it is quite possible that the results
presented here might be a mere outcome of the selected population. Any extension
beyond this population to the broad and diverse universe of public service might be rather
challenging.
Finally, as it is the case for any empirical study, there are methodological
limitations that simply cannot be overlooked. The construct reliability levels, although
acceptable for research that is semi-exploratory in nature, would have been better served
by Alpha levels above 0.80. There is of course more to be done in this regard. In addition,
the response rate raises some minor concerns. Although the results of the independent Ttest show no significant difference between early respondents and late respondents the
generalization of the results would have been on firmer grounds have the response rates
been above 50%.
95
Directions for Future Research
The insights provided by this dissertation offer the fertile grounds for many
possible future research efforts. Further research could attend to the dynamics behind the
“role dissonance” that was uncovered here – that is, the significant difference in selfclassification and classification based on the level of agreement with specific behaviors.
Other interesting results could be garnered from the examination of the role of the field of
study of explaining the emphasis between a perceived dichotomy between policy
formulation and implementation.
Of particular interest, however, would be future research that would examine the
validity of the finding that administrative discretion is more powerful in explaining
routine administrative decision-making than individual level attributes such as age,
gender and race. If future research would confirm the core findings of this dissertation it
would surely provide the foundation that a reexamination of basic assumptions behind
theory of representative bureaucracy is warranted.
Contributions
This dissertation started with the unpretentious goals of attempting to delineate an
empirical understanding of administrative roles. The study targeted primarily the link
between administrative discretion, individual level perceptions, tenure and the enactment
of administrative roles. Yet, despite its apparent modest scope, this dissertation makes
several contributions that could be considered of note.
First, this represents one of a small number of empirical evaluations of
administrative roles. This area to be sure is conceptually messy and difficult to operate it.
96
As such, scholars have preferred to avoid empirical evaluations and have refrained to
theoretical discussions. The latter, while highly valuable, are not able to provide firm
testable outcomes, hence limited in their immediate and direct usefulness for questions of
practice.
Second, this study combines in an original manner representative bureaucracy and
role theories. The dissertation is not a standalone effort, it is inspired by existing theory
and draws heavily on extant empirical analysis specifically that of Selden et al. (1999) –
as such, this research can be viewed as an extension of previous works that adds
additional clarity to a difficult question. Yet, the originality of the methodological
approach to an old question is perhaps another important contribution that this
dissertation makes.
Third, the results of this dissertation provide additional and much needed support
to the recent trend of academic thinking. Scholars have of late begun to argue that neither
race nor gender might be as important in explaining representative behavior as previously
thought. It is now believed that role acceptance and assumption might be a much
improved predictor over race and gender (Sowa & Selden, 2003). The latter two might
remain direct and powerful predictors of administrative behavior within policy specific
contexts, but might fail to explain decision-making dynamics in everyday routine
administration.
Fourth, the empirical research undertaken in this dissertation is unique in several
minor but important ways. Most empirical studies driven by theory of representative
bureaucracy limit their scope to certain type of policies. Rarely does a study wonder
within a more general context. As such, within a broader picture it becomes difficult to
97
understand whether the uncovered dynamics are indeed present outside the specific
policy area. Out of methodological reasoning, this dissertation had to limit its reach to a
professional sub-set of public administration, but unlike most studies in this area it did
not limit itself within the context of imposing policy-specific constraints.
Fifth, specifically related to public procurement, this dissertation manages to put
to rest an important myth present in the literature. For the most part the literature on
public procurement assumes that public procurement is an area that leaves little room for
representative type behavior on the part of its professionals. In addition, it is often
presumed that most of the time procurement specialists will assume roles that would
embrace rules and regulations, hence mimic the role of a resigned custodian. This study
provides empirical support for a valid challenge to such thinking. It appears that public
procurement specialists undertake a number of roles with resigned custodian being
among the least important of them.
Finally, this dissertation sets the ground for a possible rethinking of future
research and perspectives on role enactment by public administrators. For instance,
public administrators’ self-expectations might already capture the expectations of others,
their education and their individual associations. In essence, it is very possible that we are
currently part of an important shift in the nature of public service in which education,
gender and minority associations are becoming less powerful determinants of
administrative behavior. Whether this shift is temporary or a long term occurrence
remains to be seen. What is of important, and what this dissertation makes clear, is that
there are sufficient empirical grounds to challenges gender and minority associations as
unquestionable pylons of our understandings about representative type behaviors.
98
APPENDIX A. IRB Approval
99
APPENDIX B. Survey Instrument
PAGE - 1
Directions: In what follows, you are going to be provided with several statements. Please read each
statement carefully and indicate whether the statement is representative of your everyday experience.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the statement on a scale of 1 to 7.
Where:
1-strongly disagree
2-disagree
3-somewhat disagree
4-neither disagree nor agree,
5-somewhat agree
6-agree
7-strongly agree
1. Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
I seek opportunities to participate in the formulation of public policy issues that I find to be important.
I encourage procedures that support greater public access to programs and services.
As an administrator, I encourage certain values over others.
In my work, I try to balance fairness and efficiency concerns.
I am committed to management objectives.
In my work I attempt to reflect most current managerial perspectives.
To survive in the organization, I follow the rules when strictly necessary.
In my decisions, I give priority to efficiency over fairness.
I believe efficiency is the most important goal in my work, even if my supervisors do not agree.
Regardless of political pressure, I take the decision which is best for my organization.
If it is not the most efficient choice, I do not advance the interests of minority citizens.
I behave according to the wishes of my superiors.
I follow the rules as closely as possible.
I do not assume a public leadership role in policy issues.
In my work, I try to be as neutral as possible.
I primarily implement policy, not formulate it.
I keep politics out of my decision-making.
I am committed to my professional standards.
I attempt to be as responsive as possible.
PAGE – 2
2. Please, indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statements:
If I would have to choose, I would choose to work in this organization again
I expect to be involved in policy formulation
I constantly receive feedback in terms of what is expected of me
I believe that my organization's stakeholders expect me to be involved in policy formulation
I believe that other professionals in positions and organizations similar to mine are expected to be
involved in policy formulation
I feel that I enjoy a high level of discretion in terms of my decision-making
I could face penalties if I get involved in policy formulation
I am satisfied with my job
100
PAGE - 3
3. Please read the five job role descriptions and select the one that accurately captures your current
role:
1. Please read the five job role descriptions and select the one that accurately captures your current role. On
my job, I balance equity and fairness with individual concerns. I am committed to both management and
organization. I work within system constraints, rules and proper lines of authority.
2. On my job, I advocate for policy positions and participate in the formulation of policy. I serve the public
and I attempt to further the public interest. I use my experience to delineate what is in the best interest of the
public.
3. On my job, I am as efficient as possible. Sometimes I challenge what more senior agency officials tell me
to do if it is not best for the organization. I keep my promises and I advance the interest of the minority
citizens only if it is the most efficient thing to do.
4. On my job, I am a neutral agent. I work within the boundaries imposed by rules, regulations and
expectations of those more senior than me and to elected officials. I don't play a mediator role. I complete
the task set for me and I do not participate in policy formulation.
5. On my job, I am as professional as possible. I work efficiently, quickly and accurately. When possible, I
advocate for policy positions and legislation. I support equity and I am not neutral, but I do not act as an
agent of elected officials.
PAGE – 4
4. Where do you work?
Federal government
State/Provincial government
County/Regional government
City / Town government
School System
College / University
Special authority / district
Other (please specify)
5. What position category best describes you?
Non-manager
Manager
Senior executive/director
Elected official
Other (please specify)
6. How many years have you been in your current position?
7. How many years have you been with your current organization?
8. How many years have you been employed in the public sector?
9. What is the population size of the community that you serve?
101
10. Please indicate your highest level of education
Less than high school degree
High school degree or equivalent (e.g., GED)
Some college but no degree
Associate degree
Bachelor degree
Graduate degree
11. Which of the following best describes the field in which you received your highest degree?
Public Administration
Business Administration
Political Science
Economics
Mathematics
Science
Healthcare
Medicine
Computing
Engineering
Technology
Other (please specify)
12. How would you describe your political ideology?
Strongly liberal
Liberal
Moderate
Conservative
Strongly conservative
13. Do you consider yourself a minority?
Yes
No
14. What is your race? Mark one or more.
Mark one or more.
White
Black or African American
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
American Indian or Alaska Native
Other
15. What is your gender?
Female
Male
16. What is your age?
Thank you so much for taking the survey!
Your input is highly valuable.
102
APPENDIX C. Message
Dear [FirstName],
I am writing to ask for your help in a very important dissertation study I am conducting under the
guidance of Dr. Cliff McCue and with the support of National Institute of Governmental Purchasing
(NIGP).
This research represents a collaboration between NIGP and Florida Atlantic University (FAU) that
attempts to address the important question of administrative roles assumed by public procurement
professionals. I would like to ask you to fill out a simple questionnaire that deals with your everyday
experiences. You do not need any specialized information to complete this survey.
The information collected through this study will serve as the basis for my dissertation. Your participation
will help identify and understand the roles played by public procurement specialists in today’s changing
environment of governance.
Participation in this survey is voluntary. To participate, please click the link below. This will take you to
an encrypted site to fill out a questionnaire. It should take about 20 minutes to complete. By clicking the
link below you will be assigned a unique ID that allows me to identify your email address. I will be the
only one with access to the ID and your identifying email address. All responses are anonymous and no
individual responses will be made available.
https://www.research.net/s.aspx
If at some point during the survey you wish not to be included in the study, stop filling out the survey and
close your browser. Once you submit your survey I will assume that you have opted to participate in the
study.
All those who participate in the study will be entitled to a free exclusive copy of preliminary results. I
sincerely believe that you might find it interesting, perhaps even intriguing, how your colleagues perceive
their roles.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact me at any time.
Sincerely,
Alexandru V. Roman
PhD Candidate, ME, MBA, ARM
School of Public Administration
Florida Atlantic University
[email protected]
(954)-839-5666
Thanks for your participation!
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click the link below, and you will
be automatically removed from our mailing list.
https://www.research.net/optout.aspx
103
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