SECURITY
AARMS
Vol. 6, No. 3 (2007) 479–489
NATO and EU: Cooperation or competition?
GÁBOR HORVÁTH
Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, Budapest, Hungary
The author summarizes the development of NATO-EU relationship since the
establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy. He explains the difficulties
of this relationship after the EU enlargement in 2004, giving special attention to the
situation of Cyprus and Malta. He describes the reasons behind the current preference
for cooperation by informal means. He sums up EU military crisis management
operations and provides an insight into current NATO operations, underlining the need
for better cooperation in the field between the two organisations. Turning to the area of
military capability development, he indicates some potential areas for NATO-EU joint
effort. He warns of the possibility of diverging and competing demands in both NATO
and the EU towards the Nations and Member States, which could lead to operational
disasters in the future. Finally, the author concludes by reminding the reader of an idea
describing the EU as the real European pillar of NATO.
Introduction
Since the establishment of the European Security and Defence Policy, as part of the
Common Foreign and Security Policy at the Cologne European Union Council meeting,
in June 1999, the EU has shown remarkable development in the area of external
security policy.
For the first time ever, permanent political and military structures were established
within the EU. As a result of this process, the EU Military Committee and the EU
Military Staff came into being, and a set of crisis management concepts and procedures
have been established.
The Union has defined with NATO the framework for relations between the two
organisations and has also concluded arrangements for the consultation and participation
of third countries in crisis management. However, that same European Council
pronounced that “the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in
order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”.
The arrangements allowing the Union to have recourse to NATO’s assets and
capabilities for military crisis management operations, more commonly known as the
Received: June 28, 2007
Address for correspondence:
GÁBOR HORVÁTH
Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University
P. O. Box 15, H-1581 Budapest, Hungary
E-mail: [email protected]
G. HORVÁTH: NATO and EU: Cooperation or competition?
Berlin Plus arrangements, were concluded in early 2003. This happened just on the eve
of the beginning of the Union’s first operation, named CONCORDIA, in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). CONCORDIA became the first operation
led by the EU with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.
Some months later, ten new acceding states started their preparation for full EU
membership in the form of active observation, among other activities, within the
council working parties dealing with CFSP and ESDP. After one year, on the 1st of
May 2004, the biggest enlargement wave occured, when these countries entered into the
ranks of the EU Member States.
From the outset, it was believed that the political difficulties and implications of the
EU enlargement, impacting on the NATO-EU relationship, would be overcome by time.
Now, four years after the conclusion of Berlin Plus, we are observing a situation where
the naturally expected cooperation of the two organisations is even more restricted than
before 2003, and has almost reached a moribund state. What went wrong?
The aftermath of EU enlargement
After the euphoria of the EU enlargement it became clear very soon that not only new
Member States, but also new national interests and problems had moved into the EU
building. From the point of view of the NATO-EU relationship, the particular
contention associated with Cyprus has quickly become the source of major political
difficulties.
The roots of this problem can be traced back to the almost continuous conflicts
between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the second half of the last century. In an
attempt to remain impartial in this rather sad story, we would only remind one of the
fact, that with the acceptance of the Greek Republic of Cyprus only, as member of the
European Union, this contentious issue has become virtually frozen: apparently Turkey
is not willing to recognize Cyprus without having tangible perspectives for the Turkish
part of the island, and is very reluctant to make any concessions in political terms. In
turn, Cyprus has started to use its veto in the EU, especially in the process of the next
enlargements. As a consequence, the events led to the Turkish suspension of the
accession talks on a number of chapters in late 2006. Turkey has found itself in an even
more difficult situation when negotiating its own accession to the EU. This, in turn,
might generate some political actions in other international organisations, like in
NATO, where Turkey’s position is relatively strong.
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NATO-EU relations suffer from this situation. One of the undesired, and also long
lasting effects is the continuing difficulty of bringing together NATO and EU political
and military bodies. This problem is known as the “participation issue”.
The participation issue stems from the absence of a formal security agreement
between NATO and Cyprus (and between NATO and Malta as well). The security
agreement between NATO and the new EU Member States was built upon the existence
of the security agreement for the participation in NATO’s “Partnership for Peace”
initiative (practically, that agreement was understood to cover the respective new member
states’ activities in their EU context as well, without any change or amendment). Since the
participation of Cyprus in PfP has never been accepted by NATO, no such “PfP security
agreement” exists. In the case of Malta, an unilateral withdrawal from PfP was considered
as termination of the security agreement: however, it is believed that some talks are
ongoing in order to confirm the validity of this approach.
The practical impact of this, and the very heart of the participation issue is that only
25 EU Member States1 are allowed to be present at the formal joint political or military
meetings,2 while on the NATO side all member Nations are present. This issue
complicates the classified information exchange between the two organisations as well,
especially for documents: even if a NATO document is designated releasable to the EU,
it can only be circulated (by EU authorities) to 25 Member States instead of 27. Due to
the very nature of the security requirements, this restriction has had (and is still having)
an increased impact on cooperation with respect to military issues, rather than issues at
the politico-military level. It is believed that the participation issue is becoming more
and more embarrassing for the EU, and although there is no sign for any tangible
progress, this increasing embarrassment seems to underline the acceptance of this
problem as being of a political nature and not only of a military one.
Having said that, we should not forget to mention that NATO and EU military
bodies have made several attempts to unblock the situation. Almost each option to bring
together all Member States and Nations was tested in an informal manner, but it turned
out that informal meetings can not substitute for the formal discussions. The respective
military staffs also engage in intensive staff to staff exchanges, but again, it can only
complement, and not replace, the actual discussions. All in all, as usual, the militarytechnical exchanges can not be decoupled from the political developments, at least not
on a permanent basis.
1
After the 1st Jan 2007 enlargement, when Romania and Bulgaria joined EU as full Member State and thus
the EU became 27.
2 This covers the NAC-PSC and NATO MC/PS-EUMC joint meetings.
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It is therefore obvious, that the problem of security agreement – and with this, the
participation issue – can be solved only through intensive diplomatic efforts at the political
level. However, when issues rise to that high level, other equally important factors come
into play, thus contributing even more to the complexity of the present situation.
Nations and Member States on the ground: military operations
The unresolved political situation described earlier was obviously not the only reason
for the flattening NATO-EU relationship. It merely provided a rather good excuse. In
fact, the blocking problem concerning Cyprus and Turkey might not have been so longlasting, if this fissure was not so useful for promoting some agendas of a number of EU
Member States. This crack has become one of the major engagement areas between
those members states who wish more autonomy for the Union in the context of the
security policy, and those preferring NATO, and with that, the transatlantic link, to
ensure Europe’s security.
Berlin Plus worked well during the planning of the second ESDP military operation
with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, Operation ALTHEA, in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. ALTHEA became a clear success. The safe and secure environment in
Bosnia and Herzegovina is permanently ensured. This success has already led to
considerations on the reduction of force levels, which clearly anticipates the
achievement of the desired military end state relatively soon.
But even the relatively small Operation ALTHEA needed special command and
control arrangements between the appropriate military levels, since there was (and there
still is) a sizeable difference between the EU and NATO operational chains of
command3. The preparations for this operation also seriously tested the differing
interpretations of the agreement. In comparison with CONCORDIA, not only the size
and nature of the operation was different, but also the circumstances in Brussels and
elsewhere. Interestingly, most of the open questions were solved in the field rather
quickly, where the need for practical solutions was more pressing than at higher levels
(and, in fact, the political implications were accordingly less visible). Later, one official
in Brussels even commented that Operation ALTHEA was going well, in spite of Berlin
Plus. None in the field echoed that comment.
3
A specific EU Command Element was created at NATO Joint Forces Command Naples, and has been
inserted into the chain of command between SHAPE and the EUFOR force headquarters. The reason behind
this is that NATO operations in the Balkans are led by JFC Naples, while the default EU Operations
Commander (OpCdr) is DSACEUR at SHAPE, when the operation is conducted with recourse to NATO
assets and capabilities.
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Although ALTHEA – and thus the Berlin Plus agreement – was successful, past
history has shown that the Balkans can not be piecemealed in political terms. Some
argue, that if the EU had been more patient, a better, more comprehensive solution
could have been worked out for the takeover of the NATO operations by the EU in the
Balkans, including both major NATO operations, SFOR and KFOR. In the light of the
events it is difficult to see how the EU could have mustered the necessary assets and
capabilities for such an ambitious undertaking, not to mention its lack of operational
experience. Also, there are views that if ALTHEA had not been launched as a separate
EU operation, there would have been less concern about the spill over effect of the
developments in Kosovo. In accordance with the terms of the old proverb, “each vendor
is wiser after the market has closed”.
After the successful launch of Operation CONCORDIA, the EU started to conduct a
series of autonomous ESDP operations (or activities) of different nature and scale.
Here, we will only mention the military ones: Operation ARTEMIS in mid 2003,
Operation EUFOR RD CONGO in 2006 (both in the Democratic Republic of Congo),
and the support of the African Union peacekeeping force (AMIS) in the Darfur region
of Sudan.
Both undertakings in DRC were limited in scale, scope and time. Operation
ARTEMIS, the first autonomous EU military crisis management operation fulfilled the
expectations: it provided a proof of feasibility in terms of unifying political will and
military means of the EU for such an action. Without underestimating the achievements
of the mission itself, ARTEMIS could be considered rather as an experimental test case
for the EU. It did validate, among others, a number of concepts and procedures
previously adopted, and contributed to the revision of some others. The most important
were those provisions to be revised – in both political and military terms – that dealt
with military rapid response. Therefore later on, the size and nature of Operation
ARTEMIS has set an example for the development of the EU Battlegroups initiative.
Parallel to that, we can also assess that the success of ARTEMIS also provided a
positive feedback to the European Security Strategy that was being drafted at that time.
More controversial experiences were gained in the context of the next military
activity of the Union, the support to the African Union in Sudan. Even the beginning
was difficult: no mechanism existed to send EU military personnel abroad outside of
the framework of an ESDP operation. This problem, although many of its aspects were
rather soon addressed on the requests of some concerned Member States,4 still has not
been entirely solved. In fact, no other international organisation sends military
4
Ireland and Hungary were the first to send “EU” military observers.
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observers and advisors without providing for their sustainment and security. The UN, as
the biggest actor in peacekeeping, has always paid attention to these arrangements.
NATO also supports AMIS, but the cooperation with EU is rather limited to deconfliction (unlike the EU, NATO has not sent military observers to the area). Over the
course of time, both organisations have decreased their activity, and limited themselves
to the role of “clearing house”, where Nations’ and Member States’ donations and
contributions are noted and more or less coordinated.
Many questions marked the start for planning the second autonomous EU military
crisis management operation, Operation EUFOR RD CONGO, in early 2006. Some EU
officials, and perhaps some Member States, would have intended to launch it as the first
clearly EU Battlegroup operation, but the circumstances simply did not correspond to
the political and military criteria set forth for the use of a Battlegroup. For example,
there was no need for rapid military reaction. Therefore, a “classic” force generation
effort took place, and the operation was conducted and terminated without generating
any noticeable strategic or politico-military lessons so far. In other words, Operation
EUFOR RD CONGO apparently could not be used as a new test case for further
development of the ESDP in the operational area. It could, however, contribute to
maintaining the military momentum of the ESDP, in terms of autonomous EU
operations. The reason behind this is that there was a clear perception in Brussels, that
autonomous EU military crisis management operations had suffered a setback from
2004 to early 2006, especially when compared to the diversity of the many civilian
crisis management operations launched by the EU at that time. One could have the
impression that it was not only a useful – although not decisive – operation, but chiefly
a successful “show the flag” mission.
Turning to NATO operations, 2007 could prove to be a decisive year for many
reasons. Although Kosovo will probably acquire a degree of autonomy in political
terms, the NATO military operation (KFOR) is clearly far from the end state. In
Afghanistan, NATO forces of the ISAF mission are literally fighting to establish a safe
and secure environment - and gaining more and more terrain. In both cases (although at
different levels) the need to complement the military operations more with civilian
crisis management capabilities is increasingly clear. EU authorities have already started
to plan a civilian police mission in Kosovo, and have also started to prepare the decision
to have a mission of similar kind in Afghanistan (although the objectives, the nature and
the scope of that mission are still in the preliminary stage of considerations). Iraq,
where NATO is present with its NATO Training Mission (NTMI), is a far less
appropriate place for any ambitious EU operation for the time being. Finally, the only
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NATO operation with respect to Article V, Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR, is
steadily conducted in a rather low profile.
Due to the critical importance of this year in political and operational terms, time
has never been more appropriate to manifest the NATO-EU strategic partnership,
especially in Kosovo and in Afghanistan. The capabilities and means exist, and the
political will is favourable in both institutions to resurrect the moribund NATO-EU
relationship. It is now time to prove that this collective will is able to prevail over
national ambitions and agendas. The stakes are high: a non-cooperative stance would
further widen the gap, and this could result in a state where the gap becomes
unbreachable. Following this negative scenario, those being members in both
organisations would face the bitter necessity of making a choice between the Alliance
and the Union, clearly a choice which most of them will try to avoid having to make.
Capability gaps, competing demands, and only one set of forces
Beyond the actual operations, a lot of effort was made in the field of the development of
military capabilities for crisis management within the ESDP. To this end two Headline
Goals, HLG 2003 and HLG 2010, set up a pool of European forces. However, the
requirements in HLG 2003 were basically aimed at gathering the capability of conducting
an army corps size military crisis management (or in NATO terms: “peace support”)
operation, without any particular objective for developing new capabilities. HLG 2010
was (and is) clearly pursuing the development of new European military capabilities.
In quantitative terms, HLG 2003 was created around a 60000 strong military force,
sustainable for one year in the area of operations. HLG 2010 has not gone beyond this
number, it has only refined the picture: in order to sustain such a force in the field for
such a long time, troop rotation requirements would be about three times the 60000,
which is already close to the total deployable forces within the European Union. These
forces are obviously not available for any given time, because these are the very forces
actually deployed in NATO operations, UN missions and coalition operations - or
simply committed as standby forces of the NRF.5 Some experts remind us that the
number of the currently deployed European forces roughly corresponds to the Headline
Goal(s), a fact which actually renders those goals more credible.6 However, if we look
at it from a different angle, this might equally mean that those forces as a whole would
never be available for the Union from a Headline Goal perspective.
5
6
NATO Response Force
BISCOP, Sven (d.). E pluribus Unum? Military Integration in the European Union
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The obvious solution is the inevitable increase of deployability and sustainability of
national military forces - in NATO terms, increase of the usability of these forces. This
is justified by the trends of the last decade, when the demands for out-of-area operations
have been steadily growing. However, most of the European national administrations
seem unwilling to meet the inherent financial demands that come with supporting these
high ambitions. This rather embarrassing phenomenon is not unique to the EU, as the
difficulties to generate the follow-on rotations for the NATO Response Force have
repeatedly shown.
In qualitative terms, a number of capability shortfalls were identified during the
work on Headline Goal 2003, and most of them were addressed in the format of the
ECAP7 project group. However, it turned out that the bottom-up approach had its limits,
so when the European Defence Agency was created in 2004, most of the gap-filling
projects were re-allocated in the form of an IDP.8 (Only those needing uniquely
doctrinal solutions remained in the hands of the EU Military Committee). The EU has
transformed its capability development efforts to real capability building, although a
tremendous amount of work still lay ahead. Meanwhile, in an attempt to avoid
duplication of effort, a number of capabilities have been coordinated – initially at
leading Nation/Member State level – between ECAPs (later IDPs) and NATO PCC
project teams. Most of the exchanges took place at the meetings of the NATO-EU
Capability Group, a joint forum created in 2003. These exchanges are now slowly
turning into real cooperation between the players (the relevant EU, NATO and national
agencies), overtaking the rather limited scope of (very basic) de-confliction.
Nevertheless, no common decision could ever be made, because NATO and the EU
simply do not have a common body with such an authority.
Like its predecessor, Headline Goal 2010 does not envisage any standing common
military assets, or capabilities (if we don’t count the Operation Centre at the EU
Military Staff), a difference which should be highlighted when a comparison is made
with NATO. Nevertheless, the need for permanently available capabilities remains
valid, especially in the areas of strategic lift and strategic level command, contol,
communications and information (C3I). The issue of strategic airlift has been addressed
on many occasions, although the solutions are still not able to cover the needs for the
forces corresponding to the level of ambition. The same applies to NATO, although
there the latest decision on “pooled” Allied acquisition of C-17 aircraft seems to ease
the burden somewhat. Again, there is only one practical example of some form of
7
8
European Capability Action Plan
Integrated Development Team
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coordination between NATO and EU needs: the SALIS9 arrangement. Beyond the
terms of SALIS, Nations and Member States are on their own. Concerning actual airlift
acquisitions, the European A-400 fleet is still far away from landing proximity.
Another example is the relationship between the aforementioned EU Battlegroup
and NATO Response Force. Although the doctrinal (or conceptual) background is
somewhat different, in the end, both initiatives are aiming at the most capable, mobile,
light land forces of the Nations and Member States. The weak attempts made for deconfliction or coordination of the rosters of these forces failed, as the de-confliction is
to remain with the Nations and Member States.
These examples serve to highlight the dichotomy regarding the responsibilites of the
Nations/Member States, and also the dilemma facing when considering their
commitments to NATO and/or the EU. In sum, both organisations are looking after the
very same high quality portion of the national forces. Since the demands are apparently
competing, it necessarily follows that a reasonable sharing of responsibility must take
place, or else the strategic partnership as such will be plagued by permanent
competition.
Europe’s armed forces are dangerously overstretched. Some of them literally, others
in financial terms. Defence budgets, with some exceptions, are decreasing. The fewer
resources provided for them, the more the danger of non-availability for operations will
be present. No duplication will be accepted or tolerated. Hence, cooperation between
NATO and EU is not merely a diplomatic exercise, but the essential insurance against
future failures resulting from inadequate manning and equiping of Allied or European
undertakings in the field of international security.
Way ahead?
With all of the complexities involved, it is very unlikely that any new Berlin Plus based
EU military crisis management operation will be launched in the near future. In fact, if
all other options have failed to remedy the present situation, Berlin Plus should be rediscussed, no matter how hazardous of an exercise it would be. Most of the players are
well aware of the fact that it probably involves the risk of having more restrictions,
instead of the enlargement of the field of cooperation.
Perhaps the very nature of the cooperation should be re-considered. Some of the
Brussels think tanks are now considering an almost revolutionary new approach.10
They argue that the EU would become the real European pillar of NATO, regrouping
9
Strategic AirLift Interim Solution
See BISCOP, Sven: NATO, ESDP and the Riga Summit: No transformation without Re-equilibration
10
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the European Allies and thus giving a more coordinated and more coherent, sounding
voice of their common needs and interests when talking to their transatlantic partners. It
is hard to believe however, that Member States would subordinate their own interests,
and would be able to accept giving up such a huge portion of their own sovereignty, at
least not until a deeper European integration takes place.
Given the complexity of such enormous change inherent in this potential long term
solution, in the short term it will be necessary to find a means of overcoming the
challenges outlined above, and turn the competition into cooperation.
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