A chapter from Joakim Månsson’s Degree Thesis on Communication Problems in Mixed
Crews. It is formatted according to the Degree Thesis rules.
ONBOARD OBSERVATIONS
Differences in communication between Russian and Nordic cultures
Narrative
As noted previously the bridge team on the ship where the observations took place consisted
of individuals from Moldavia, Ukraine, Russia, Finland and Sweden. On many occasions, I,
being Swedish, noticed that when the Finnish officer and I cooperated on the bridge, we used
a way of communicating not familiar to the rest of the bridge team. We all used English as the
working language but the tone of voice, length of sentences as well as body language was
completely different from the others. A sense of nervousness among the non Nordic crew
members could be distinguished, often when in stressful situations such as when navigating
through dense traffic. We tended to use a low tone of voice, tried to speak in calm tones and
tried not to express stress. In contrast, during a similar situation with the Russian officers on
watch, the Finnish officer and I often felt uncomfortable with the loud and fast passed
communications. It appeared that the behaviour of one culture was causing distress to the
other culture and vice versa.
Analysis
The Moldavian, Ukrainian and Russian officers all considered themselves to be Russian. They
share a similar history as they were all closely linked to the Russian Empire and later the
Soviet Union. Great similarities are also shared in terms of their language. In both Ukraine
and in Moldavia there are Russian minorities who speak Russian as their mother tongue. In
research conducted on these cultures, they are found to be similar to each other, especially
when compared to most other cultures.
There are also similarities between the Nordic (consisting of Sweden, Finland, Norway,
Denmark and Iceland) cultures. All these countries share a significant part of history as well.
Cultural bonds are clearly shown in Hofstede’s dimensions where Sweden and Finland score
very similarly to each other, particularly in relation to how they compare to most other
countries.
To communicate, as explained in Chapter 2.2 we also use codes. In the example provided
above, these codes are what we did not manage to fully understand and therefore were unable
to judge the situation properly. This in turn made us feel uncomfortable.
One can argue the Russian officers did not fully comprehend the Nordic style of
communication and therefore could not determine whether or not we had grasped the
seriousness of the situation. We did not use the same powerful and loud language they
themselves would have used to make sure the other officers realised that the situation was
recognized and dealt with. Similarly we as Nordics could not be certain our Russian
colleagues had full control of the situation due to, what we perceived to be, their stressed and
aggressive behaviour.
People in a multi active culture, as explained in Chapter 2.3, are characterised by doing
several things at once, not hesitating to interrupt and by displaying feelings. It is therefore not
strange that there are misunderstandings in communication with people from linear active
cultures. These people are characterised by doing only one thing at a time, who are polite but
direct, concealing their feelings and rarely interrupting others. Gates and Lewis (2006) also
make an important point that individuals in a multi active culture speak most of the time,
while individuals in linear active cultures speak half the time. Multi active individuals are use
to a greater amount of verbal communication than linear active individuals, and therefore may
mistake a more brief verbal communication as being a lack of communication and thus, as in
this case, of not being in control of the situation.
A chapter from Joakim Månsson’s Degree Thesis on Communication Problems in Mixed
Crews. It is formatted according to the Degree Thesis rules.
ONBOARD OBSERVATIONS
Cultural difference due to age
Observation
Something I heard repeatedly from the older and more experienced officers was that sailors
today, who come straight from schools to join their first ship, rarely have the sufficient
amount of experience needed to be a good officer. I also repeatedly experienced a great
barrier between the younger officers and the older ones who usually hold the highest positions
onboard. The top officers often demanded the unquestioning obedience of those of a lower
rank. Some perceived this to be an atmosphere where competence is not recognized but
unquestioned loyalty is rewarded.
Analysis
Until quite recently, most sailors went to sea at an early age, without any maritime training or
a university degree. The profession as a ships officer, or even master, was something you
achieved mostly through gaining a vast amount of experience. In 1978 the first edition of the
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers, STCW, was adopted by the IMO, establishing international standards in these
areas. Due to great differences in prerequisites, caused by for example differences in political
and educational systems in different countries, the requirements set out in the STCW are not
implemented equally. In some countries these standards are goals to be aspired to in the future
whilst in other countries these standards are below the achievable levels. Some nations have
made their officer training into a university degree, other issuers sell their certificate of
competence to those who are willing to pay.
The officers holding the highest positions onboard are usually also the oldest, who have
learned their skills in a very different way from how it is taught today; by experience rather
than through studies. A barrier is therefore created between older and younger crew members
with both seeking to protect and defend the system in which they have invested a significant
part of their lives. Since the officers with the highest rank have the highest authority in a
hierarchical system such as that onboard any ship, the younger officers cannot afford to argue
their case as equals. This often adds to the power distance and hampers the vertical
communication in the hierarchy.
In many national cultures, the obedience and respect of elders is something you learn as a
child. According to Hofstede (2003:32), many societies see this respect as a basic virtue,
“children see others showing such respect and soon acquire it themselves”.
A chapter from Joakim Månsson’s Degree Thesis on Communication Problems in Mixed
Crews. It is formatted according to the Degree Thesis rules.
ONBOARD OBSERVATIONS
Squat incident
Narrative
When leaving a port in the Black Sea, the whole bridge team, including myself, were on the
bridge for a meeting. The Second Officer was having the con and followed the pre-made
passage plan that he had arranged before sailing. The Master ordered us to take a shortcut
over an area of shallow water and the course was altered. After this he resumed the meeting in
the back of the bridge. I notified the Second Officer that I thought it was inappropriate to take
this shortcut considering our draft in relation to the available water depth. He had also noticed
this and agreed, but took no action, neither to alter the course towards safe water nor to
consult the Master. He suggested that it was no longer him having the con, but the Master. As
I observed the under keel clearance rapidly getting lower I decided to notify the Master
myself and disturbed him in his meeting. Clearly unhappy with having a low ranked crew
member questioning his earlier decision, he soon realized that he had to take action. Being
very reluctant to admit so, his alteration of course was not very substantial, and we
consequently suffered from severe squat. (Squat is a hydrodynamic phenomenon attracting
the ship downwards in shallow water according to the Bernoulli’s principle (refer to figure 5).
This causes extremely heavy vibrations and in worst case grounding). We all held our breath
while experiencing the heavy vibrations and loud noises, but after approximately one minute
it stopped, and we had passed on to deeper water.
After this incident, the Second Officer bore the brunt of the blame by the Master and was
consequently relived from most of his duties.
Figure 1. Squat. In the first picture, there is sufficient under keel clearance and the ship floats
by buoyancy. In the second picture, under keel clearance is low. This compresses water
between the hull and sea bed and according to the Bernoulli principle runs faster and exerts a
lower pressure, thus causing ship sag by reducing buoyancy. (Walké & Sémhur, 2008.)
Analysis
Russia, according to Hofstede’s dimensions, can be characterized as a country with a very
large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. As stated previously, organizations
here are often found to be structured as a pyramid. Sweden is a country with a very small
power distance and weak uncertainty avoidance, often resulting in having organizations run
like village markets.
The Second Officer in the case detailed above, automatically handed over the authority of
being the Officer of the Watch to the Master as soon as he came on the bridge. This is because
onboard the ship he is on the top of the pyramid. The large power distance leads to the
unwillingness to question the Master, even though the ship is running into imminent danger.
The Master takes the role of dictator among his subordinates by giving orders despite
technically not being in charge at the time. This creates confusion as to who is really the
officer in charge of the watch and goes against the STCW (IMO, 1997). This convention, set
by the IMO, clearly states that the officer of the watch continues to be responsible for the safe
navigation despite the presence of the Master on the bridge unless it is mutually understood
that he has taken over that responsibility.
In this instance I ignored the hierarchy onboard this ship. This may have been a result of the
low power distance characterizing the Swedish national and organizational culture with which
I am most familiar. This incident also clearly disrupted the harmony among the bridge team as
the Maters as well as other officers, authority was probably perceived as being questioned. On
this occasion it was probably important for the Master to maintain his authority as much as
possible. This is likely one of the reasons why he did not deviate substantially from his
original orders and instead made only a minor adjustment.
The fact the Master himself felt pressured to gain time and therefore take the shortcut, shows
that there is a larger pyramid, one in which the Master is not at the top, within which the
ship’s own pyramid operates. This larger pyramid is likely to be the organization, which in
this case is represented by the shipping company. The Master also used his privilege as a
dictator onboard to effectively delegate the blame for what happened to the Second Officer,
without anyone questioning it.
A similar incident occurred in the Baltic Sea in June 2004 (Swedish maritime safety
inspectorate, 2004), where the Egyptian ship Domiat grounded. The ship was loaded to a draft
exceeding the depth of the sound through which it was routed to pass with almost four metres.
Two of the officers tried to draw the Master’s attention to the problem but were ignored, so
the ship inevitably ran aground.
The subsequent investigation report of the accident concluded that “the Master – officers
interaction showed difficulty in cooperation and an unhealthy hierarchy.” (Swedish Maritime
Safety Inspectorate, 2004.)
A chapter from Joakim Månsson’s Degree Thesis on Communication Problems in Mixed
Crews. It is formatted according to the Degree Thesis rules.
ONBOARD OBSERVATIONS
Distribution of responsibility
Narrative
The Finnish officer was on his first voyage on this ship. He had previously sailed with
multicultural crews, but never with Russians. Many duties onboard were of course carried out
in a different way from how he was used to but soon he acclimatized to most of the routines.
One thing he found very difficult however was the lack of responsibility with which many of
his colleagues performed their duties. In his perspective, they always seemed to act with
reference to the Master or another superior, while he himself took personal responsibility for
his actions.
On one occasion when the ship was about to anchor at the roads of a Mediterranean port, the
anchor was dropped slightly too late and thus, too close to land. The Master, who was in
charge of the anchoring operation, left the bridge once a sufficient number of shackles was let
out, without realising the mistake. This left a very small margin in terms of the ship’s draft in
relation to available depth. Soon the mistake became evident and the Finnish officer notified
his superior colleague. Despite this notification, the warning was not relayed to the Master
because he had been the one in charge of the anchoring operation and would not appreciate
his decisions being questioned.
Fortunately, there was no any damage to the ship, which later proceeded to berth. In this
situation the tide and other factors changing the water level, could easily have caused severe
damage to the hull and propulsion, if hitting the sea bed, with devastating consequences. The
incident made the Finnish officer feel very uncomfortable. He felt that even though he had no
part in the making of the mistake, he still felt he had a personal, and legal, responsibility to
maintain the safety of the ship. In his view, his ability to perform his duty as an officer was
hampered by the organizational culture, where hierarchy, not the requirements of the
situation, triumphed.
Analysis
In a pyramid organization, the person at the top has total overview and control, leaving less
authority for the individuals at successive levels below. Compared to a relatively flat
organizational structure, where authority and thus responsibility is more evenly distributed,
the pyramid structure disables the people in lower ranks from acting in an ad-hoc manner as
required by the situation. Differences in culture can make a person from an adhocratic culture
feel reluctant to fulfil the responsibilities normally assigned him.