ELECTORAL REFORM
A submission from the de Borda Institute to the Parliament of Canada
Special Committee on Electoral Reform
www.deborda.org
RECOMMENDATIONS
A.
Any decision-making process should be multi-optional, the vote should be preferential, and
in the count, every preference cast by every voter should be taken into account.
B.
The list of options should include the Quota Borda System, QBS.
INTRODUCTION
It was good to see that the voters in the PEI plebiscite are enabled to cast more than one preference.
In some instances, as in the UK, voters are presented with just a binary choice. In this instance in
2011, then, the British electorate was given a choice of either the alternative vote AV1 or first-pastthe-post, FPTP. Neither of them is PR. As this Institute pointed out to the UK’s Electoral
Commission, asking a PR supporter if they wanted AV or FPTP is like asking a vegetarian if they
would like beef or lamb. Accordingly, in Canada, the question should be multi-optional and
preferential.
The next question concerns that of how the votes should be counted, for on this so much depends.
Accordingly, the first part of this submission analyses a voters’ profile, to show how some counting
procedures are distinctly better than others. The second part relates to an electoral system which, it
seems, has not yet been considered: the Quota Borda System, QBS.
1
PREFERENCE VOTING IN DECISION-MAKING
Consider an electorate of 14 persons with preferences on the four options – A, B, C and D – as in
Table I.
A VOTER’S PROFILE
TABLE I
Preferences
14 voters and their
preferences
5
4
3
2
1st
A
D
C
B
2nd
B
B
B
C
3rd
C
C
D
D
4th
D
A
A
A
Opinions on option A, with five 1st preferences but nine 4th preferences, are polarised; D is a little
less divisive; C is more acceptable; and B, the 1st preference of only two but the 2nd of every-one
else, best represents the collective will.
1
Also known as instant run-off voting, IRV, in the USA; as preference voting, PV, in
Australasia; and sometimes in the UK as the single transferable vote, STV.
Possible voting methodologies include two forms of single-preference voting: plurality voting and
the two-round system, TRS; and two of preference voting: AV (or IRV, PV or STV), and a points
system, the modified Borda count, MBC2.
In a plurality vote, the results are A 5, B 2, C 3 and D 4; so the winner is A. Plurality voting can be
hopelessly inaccurate.
is a plurality vote plus a majority vote. With A and D in the second round, the outcome is A 5
D 9, and D is the victor. TRS, then, can also be imprecise.
TRS
In AV, option B is eliminated, and its 2 votes go to C, so the score is now A 5, C 5 and D 4. That’s
the end of D, and its votes go (not to B, which is no longer in contention but) to C for scores of A 5
and C 9; so C comes out on top. In effect, AV is a series of plurality votes, so it too can be
capricious.
Lastly, in an MBC, preferences are turned into points – A 29, B 44, C 36, D 31 – and the most
popular option is B. The MBC takes all the preferences cast by all the voters into account, so little
wonder that it is “the soundest method of identifying the [option which] is most generally popular…
or at least the most acceptable.”3
In this example, then, the democratic outcome could be A or B or C or D; it depends on which
voting procedure is used. But the MBC is the most accurate and, therefore, the most democratic.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF AN MBC
Consider an MBC vote in which the final list consists of five options. In such a ballot, he who casts
only a 1st preference gives his favourite just 1 point. She who casts two preferences gives her
favourite 2 points (and her second choice 1 point). While he who casts all five preferences gives his
1st preference 5 points, (his second choice 4, his 3rd 3, etc.). So all cast preferences are translated
into points, and the option with the most points is the winner.
In the referendum campaign before the vote, the protagonist knows that success depends on points.
She will therefore want her supporters to cast full (or nearly full) ballots. She will also want her
erstwhile (majoritarian) opponents to give her option at least a middle preference. So it will be
worth her while to talk positively to (almost) everyone.
As in New Zealand’s referendum on electoral reform in 1992, the final choice of options shall be
the charge of an independent commission. In effect, then, the MBC can be the catalyst of consensus.
Experience shows that most people on most occasions opt to submit a full or nearly full ballot.
Those who do so in effect recognise the validity of the other options and the aspirations of the
supporters. And, as just noted, campaigners and activists are encouraged, by the very mathematics
of the count, to cross the party and even ethno-religious divides.
2
The BC/MBC is a preferential points system of voting, primarily designed for use in decisionmaking. In a ballot of n options, a voter may cast m preferences where
n ≥ m ≥ 1.
In a BC, points are awarded to (1st, 2nd … penultimate, last) preferences cast as per the rule
(n, n-1 … 2, 1),
which might incentivise the voter to vote for his/her 1st preference only.
In an MBC, points are awarded as per the rule
(m, m-1 … 2, 1),
and this encourages greater participation.
3
The late Professor Sir Michael Dummett, 1997, Principles of Electoral Reform. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p 71.
2
THE QUOTA BORDA SYSTEM
There is considerable concern, not least in the US, that the introduction of a more pluralist party
system could see the emergence of political parties based on race or religion. With QBS, however,
such fears are mitigated, as the voter is encouraged to submit a full ballot. In a six-seater
constituency, for example, the voters could be asked to submit (a maximum of) six preferences.
Consider, then, a hypothetical constituency in Bosnia in which the three dominant religious groups
– Catholic, Moslem and Orthodox – are in an approximate ratio of 30:30:30. Any one group will
know that it can probably expect to get two persons, or at the most three, elected. Therefore, as in
PR-STV, each party will be incentivised to nominate only as many candidates as it thinks it can get
elected. Accordingly, each religious grouping will endeavour to nominate no more than three or
four candidates. In order to complete a full ballot, every voter will thus be encouraged to cross, not
only the party and gender divides, but also at least one ethno-religious chasm.
In effect, QBS works like an MBC. Success depends upon either a quota of top preferences and/or a
good score of (those preferences turned into) MBC points. The candidate is thus encouraged to
campaign across the above divides.
shares another property with PR-STV: proportionality is determined by whatever the voters
consider to be paramount. If a quota of voters gives its 1st preferences to a particular candidate
because of her gender, then she will get elected. If global warming dominates the political agenda,
then again, a quota of voters may achieve due representation. In any conflict zone, therefore, QBS
will be appropriate, even when the cause of that conflict has faded into the history books.
QBS
3
CONCLUSION
The US presidential campaign and the UK’s brexit vote were both examples of base politics, of
divisive campaigns, of democracy at its worst. There again, binary voting is exclusive, so no-one
should be surprised by the fact that it provokes division.
In contrast, the MBC and QBS are both inclusive. Furthermore, the MBC is non-majortiarian. At best,
the option which proves to be the most popular is the one with the highest average preference, and
an average, of course, involves every voter, not just a majority of them.
As is said repeatedly in conflict zones, the democratic process is a vital part of the peace process.
The vote, therefore, should itself be ‘peace-ful’ and, in voting, the voter should be able to, as it
were, engage in an act of reconciliation.
It is thus submitted that the MBC and QBS could not only facilitate a more consensual polity in
Canada, they could also help as an example for those parts of the world where democratic powersharing is perhaps the best hope of peace.
Peter Emerson
The de Borda Institute
Belfast
N Ireland
9.11.2016
www.deborda.org
0044(0)7837717979