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Unit-4 Exchange
Now we look at 2 consumer market, instead of one.
Assumptions:1. 2 agents that is they are consumers as well as producers & they want to
maximize profits & utility that is we have perfect competition.
2. Goods only.
3. Endowment is fixed & given. It is a case of pure exchange.
Edge worth Box
Graphical tool to analyze 2 consumerβs exchange problem simultaneously.
π π bundle (π₯π΄1 ,π₯π΄2 ) & ππ΅ =(π₯π΅1 ,π₯π΅2 )
A pair of bundles π₯π΄ & π₯π΅ is called allocation & it is a feasible allocation if total
amount of each good consumed is equal to total amount of each available.
π₯π΄1 +π₯π΅1 =π€π΄1 +π€π΅1
for good & similarly 2.
π€π΄1 ,π€π΄2 ,π€π΅1 & π€π΅2 are initial endowments allocation which agent 1 & 2 trade to get
1
final allocation.
The x axis & line parallel to x represents good 1.
1
B
2
Initial allocation w.
At all points above that is for
m
A makes A better off & similarly
π€π΄1
for B. Region M is where both
w
better of β΄ by trading they
2
will consume in that area.
A
1 1
π€π΄
Both hare to be better off to trade with each other. Else there wonβt be any
trade. To consume at any point in m. Each would have to sell one good & buy the
other.
B
2
m
w
A
M is pareto efficient. That is from
M, if one person has to be
Made better off the other has
To necessarily made worse off.
There is no exchange which is
Advantageous to both parties.
This is a pareto efficient allocation.
1
So, a pareto efficient allocation is one where:1. Where there is no way to make all people better off.
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2. One indr. Cannot be made better off w/o making someone else worse off.
3. All gains from trade have been exhausted.
1 areas left.
4. There are no mutual advantageous trade
For this the ICS of 2 agents have to be tangent to each other. From the
tangency condition. We know that pareto efficient point is wee all gains have
been exhaust. The line containing all pareto efficient points is called contract
curve/pareto set it does not depend on initial allocation.
Market Trade
Till non, there were no prices but we need a set of prices π1 π2 where demand of
a good=supplier of a good. Gross demand- a consumer wants of consume (π₯1π΄ π₯1π΅
π₯2π΄ π₯2π΄ ). Net demand- Gross demand- endowment (denoted by e)
β΄ ππ΄1 =π₯π΄1 -π€π΄1 (also called excess dd)
π₯π΄2
π₯π΄2
Excess
dd
π₯π΅2
At any price ππ΄1 β ππ΅1 ,
like in this diagram,
there is excess demand of
good 2 & excess supplier of
good 1 & β΄ disequilibrium
now prices would change
& we will reach to equilibrium.
π₯π΄1
π₯π΅2
Excess SS
B
2
equilibrium
allocation
A
1
This is called market equalize
& competitor equalize &
walrasian equilibrium where the
net or excess demand of good
1 = π supplier of good 1 &
similarly for good 2 at
a given set of prices.
If all consumes are
Choosing best bundle possible then,
MRSA=MRSB = -π1βπ2
A+ prices (π1 *,π2 *)- competitive, Gross demand
for A&B=π₯π΄1 ,π₯π΄2 & π₯π΅1 ,π₯π΅2 .
β΄
π₯π΄1 + π₯π΅1 = π€π΄1 + π€π΅1
πππ π π₯π΄2 + π₯π΅2 = π€π΄2 + π€π΅2
πππ‘ππ ππππππ = π‘ππ‘ππ π π’ππππππ.
β΄ [π₯π΄1 β π€π΄1 ] + [π₯π΅1 β π€π΅1 ] = 0
[π₯π΄2 β π€π΄2 ] + [π₯π΅2 β π€π΅2 ] = 0
&
(at prices π1 *&π2 *)
(at prices π1 *&π2 *)
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Net demand of a good should be zero or the amount:A wants to but = B wants to sell.
ππ΄1 + ππ΅1 = 0 & ππ΄2 + ππ΅2 = 0
Aggregate excess demand for good 1 = z1
π§1 = ππ΄1 + ππ΅1
&
π₯2 = ππ΄2 + ππ΅2
Also at equilibruim prices.
π§1 (π1β π2β ) = 0
&
π§2 (π1β π2β ) = 0
We prove this through walrus law.
Walrus law
π1 π§1 + π2 π§2 = 0
Walrus law status that the value of aggregate. Demand is identically here, that
is zero for all possible prices & not just equalize price.
Proof: demand because it satisfies the budget constraint.
π1 π₯π΄2 + π2 π₯π΄2 = π1 π€π΄1 + π2 π€π΄2
Or
π1 [π₯π΄1 β π€π΄1 ] + π2 [π₯π΄2 β π€π΄2 ] = 0
π1 ππ΄1 + π2 ππ΄2 = 0 -1) {at any priceπ1 π2 }
Value of agentβs net demand must be equal to zero at any price (π1 π2 )
Similarly for B
π1 ππ΅1 + π2 ππ΅2 = 0 -2)
Adding 1+2
π1 (ππ΄1 + ππ΅1 ) + π2 (ππ΄2 + ππ΅2 ) = 0
Or
π1 π§1 + π2 π§2 = 0
{for any price}
And, if demand=supplier in one market that is if π§1 = 0
Then π§2 is necessarily equal to zero. {only for eqm prices}
So, if there are K markets them we need to find prices till K-1 market because
if -1 markets all in equilibrium them with K market would also be in equilibrium.
Relative prices
Walrus law implies that there are only K-1 independent markets & therefore
only K-1 equilibrium & therefore if prices (π1β π2β ) are multiplied by plud yhrm ig
t>0 then all prices change in same manner.
so if π‘ = 1βπ1 therefore we only need to find K-1 prices.
Existence of equilibrium (aggregate excess demand & function is a continuous
function.
Every equilibrium may not have the existence of a competitive equilibrium. But
the additional equilibrium of a continuous function can be used to establish the
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existence of equilibrium that is small changes in price should had to small
changes in demand.
Equilibrium & efficiency (A competitive equilibrium is always pareto &
efficient)
Any allocate on is pareto efficient if A bundles donβt induct with Bβs bundles.
But at market, Aβs pref. should be tangent to his price ratio & similarly with B &
therefore the 2 wonβt induces therefore,
there is no allocation either agent would prefer more than equilibrium bundle,
therefore it is pareto efficient.
π₯ β πππ
π¦ β π. π.
Proof: (π¦π΄1 π¦π΄2 ) (π¦π΅1 π¦π΅2 ) allocation which is a competitive equilibrium but not
pareto efficient
We know π¦π΄1 + π¦π΅1 = π€π΄1 + π€π΅1
-1)
2
2
2
2
Also
π¦π΄ + π¦π΅ = π€π΄ + π€π΅
-2)
1
2
1
2
(π¦π΄ π¦π΄ ) > (π₯π΄ π₯π΄ )
&
(π¦π΅1 π¦π΅2 ) > (π₯π΅1 π₯π΅2 )
]because y > x
We know market equilibrium means an affordable allocation but y is better than
x, therefore it should cost more than x, therefore,
π1 π¦π΄1 + π2 π¦π΄2 > π1 π€π΄1 + π2 π€π΄2 -3)
&
π1 π¦π΅1 + π2 π¦π΅2 > π1 π€π΅1 + π2 π€π΅2 -4)
Adding 3 & 4
π1 (π¦π΄1 + π¦π΅1 ) + π2 (π¦π΄2 + π¦π΅2 ) > π1 (π€π΄1 + π€π΅1 ) + (π€π΄2 + π€π΅2 )
Comparing with 1 & 2
π2 (π€π΄1 + π€π΅1 ) + π2 (π€π΄2 + π€π΅2 ) > π1 (π€π΄1 + π€π΅1 ) + π2 (π€π΄2 + π€π΅2 )
β΄ another condition is that agents should hare convex preferences then there
will always be a set of prices that each pareto efficient is a market equilibrium
This is not possible & therefore this assumption must be wrong. This is the
first theorem of welfare economics. A competitive equilibrium will necessarily
be pareto efficient. It does tell us who gets the gain, just that all gains are
exhausted.
Monopoly
If one consumer tries to act as a monopolist that is A. A knows Bβs demand
curve & therefore will choose a set of prices that makes A as well off as B given
Bβs demand at each price. This is given by Bβs price offer curve. If we draw a
budget line for B, then the line where it intersects Bβs offer curve represents
Bβs optimal πΆ π .
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So, A has chosen that point on Bβs
price offer curve which offers him
highest utility possible. So Aβs that is
tangent to Bβs offer curve & β΄ x
+
Aβs
ic
Bβs
Price offer curve
Through x a budget line is drawn & we see
that it passes through Aβs that is also Bβs
that is which is tangent to price line shows
Bβs
price line shows an area of mutual trade.
offer
W
Bβs ie
curve
β΄ x is not pareto efficient. A would like to sell
more at equilibrium price, β΄ price of good 1 has to be lowered.
Aβs
ic
But a perfectly discriminating monopolist sit is pareto efficient because in that
case, each unit is sold at a different price.
1
B
2
Aβs ic
W
Bβs ic
His that is remains the one with
endowment as he is offered his
max willing as price β΄ his welfare
is constant charged a price for
each unit at which he is indifferent
between buying & not buying & not
buying.
1
A
Efficiency & equilibrium
-2nd welfare theorem
Given pareto efficiency, we can find a set of prices which makes it a competitive
equilibrium.
B
A pareto efficient allocation is where
Aβs that is tangent to Bβs that is K if we
draw a straight line through the
Tangency, we get equilibrium prices which
gives us efficient market.
W
Aβs ic
W
Bβs ic
A
B
But this is not always possible.
X is pareto optimal but a budget
Aβs ic
x
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Bβs ic
y
A
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line canβt give us equilibrium & β΄ there
are no prices at which A & B
will want to consume at x.
Implications of first welfare theorem
Assumptions of this:1. No πΆ π externality because when they are present then a competitive
equilibrium is not pareto efficient. Because even after reaching they
may trade because of externality.
2. Agents actually behave competitively β This may not happen & if not then
agents would not take the prices as given.
3. Perfect competition- without this equilibrium wonβt exist.
Importance of first welfare theorem is that it gives a general mechanismcompetitive market-that we can use to ensure pareto efficient out comes. This
is true for multiple people & goods. When prices are given, each consumer can
determine his demand & the market will function well enough to determine
competitive prices & therefore an efficient out come.
Implications of second welfare theorem
The problems of distribution & efficiency can be separated. The market
mechanism distributes goods & prices allocate them by indicating their relative
scarcities.
Policy makes sometimes & intervene in price decisions to get distributional
equity.
But this leads to distortion as one achieves an efficient allocation by
making prices as reflecting their relative scarcity β΄ in perfect completion, mv=p
decides the amount of good to be consumed.
The amount a person consumes depends upon his wealth & β΄ his endowment &
giving it to other, the state can achieve distributing role.
So, tax based on endowment is non distortionary but tax based on choices is
distortionary.
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But the problem is measurement of peopleβs endowment as most peopleβs
endowment is labor that is the labor they can sell & not the labor they used up
selling. Taxing labor that they sell is like tax based on choices & is β΄
disortionary.
Suppose a state says that each consumes was required his labor time as tax.
Non this is not based on endowment as we donβt care how many hours a person
actually works. This lumpsum tax is non distortionary.
β΄ second welfare theorem says prices should show searcity & all taxes should be
lumpsum.
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