Master Thesis
MSc. in Finance & International Business
Academic Advisor:
Baran Siyahhan
Author:
Waheed Faiz
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES ISLAMIC FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS ARE FACING IN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES
Department of Business Studies
Aarhus School of Business
University of Aarhus
November 2011
Abstract
Nowadays, we hear about the resistance of Islamic finance to latest global financial crisis and
about the continuous growth of Islamic financial institutions. We can daily hear and see public
authorities in the western countries having some heated discussions about introducing Islamic
finance in their countries and on making amendments in their financial regulatory frameworks.
While these discussions continue, the establishment and growth of Islamic financial institutions
in these western countries, with prevailing conventional financial regulatory system, are under
question. This thesis tries to look closer at the measures to be taken and changes to be made from
both, the western regulatory authorities and Islamic financial institutions, in order to come up
with suggestions on how this problem could be solved, paving the way for the establishment and
growth of Islamic finance in these countries. First, the challenges Islamic financial institutions
are facing globally and particularly in the western countries are addressed and theoretically
analyzed. Then, in the same way opportunities are addressed and analyzed. The analysis shows
that Islamic finance has indeed some internal challenges, in the form of weak corporate
governance practices, lack of products for liquidity risk management, lack of standardization in
the products, and the relative small size of the majority of Islamic financial institutions compared
to conventional institutions. On the western regulatory authorities’ side, the analysis shows that
the existing regulatory framework is not compatible with Islamic financial institutions’
operations. This thesis suggests that first of all these regulatory authorities resolve the issues
related to double taxation and VAT of some IFIs’ products. It also suggests Islamic financial
institutions to address the above mentioned challenges in order to attract the positive attention of
the critics.
Key Words: Shariah, Islamic, Western, Regulatory, Riba
Abbreviations
IFI – Islamic Financial Institutions
CFI – Conventional Financial Institutions
AAOIFI – Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
IFSB – Islamic Financial Services Board
IMF – International Monetary Fond
WP – Working Paper
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council
SPV – Special Purpose Vehicle
IIRA – Islamic International Rating Agency
IIFM – International Islamic Financial Market
IILM – International Islamic Liquidity Management
ISDA – International Swaps and Derivatives Association
OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
LIBOR – London Inter Bank Offer Rate
DCR – Displaced Commercial Risk
IAH – Investment Account Holder
UIA – Unrestricted Investment Accounts
RIA – Restricted Account Holder
PER – Profit Equalization Reserve
IRR – Investment Risk Reserve
BCBS – Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
OIC – Organization of Islamic Cooperation
M&As – Mergers and Acquisitions
Table of Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... ii
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................................................... iii
1.
Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Research Question .............................................................................................................................. 4
1.2 Delimitation ........................................................................................................................................ 5
1.3 Structure of the thesis ........................................................................................................................ 5
1.4 Methodology....................................................................................................................................... 6
1.5 Data review ......................................................................................................................................... 6
2 Literature review ........................................................................................................................................ 7
2.1 The concept of Halal and Haram in Islam ........................................................................................... 7
2.2 Principles of Islamic finance ................................................................................................................ 8
2.2.1 Interest (Riba) .............................................................................................................................. 8
2.2.2 Gharar .......................................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.3 Maysir........................................................................................................................................... 9
2.3 Islamic finance products ..................................................................................................................... 9
2.3.1 Partnership based mode of financing ........................................................................................ 10
2.3.2 Trade based modes of financing ................................................................................................ 11
2.3.3 Rental based modes of financing ............................................................................................... 13
2.4 Derivatives ........................................................................................................................................ 14
2.5 Insurance ........................................................................................................................................... 15
2.5.1 Takaful ........................................................................................................................................ 16
2.6 Zakat.................................................................................................................................................. 16
2.7 Sukuk ................................................................................................................................................. 17
2.8 Istisna ................................................................................................................................................ 18
2.9 Theory behind the Islamic finance .................................................................................................... 19
2.10 Leading organizations ..................................................................................................................... 21
2.10.1 Shariah Boards ......................................................................................................................... 22
2.10.2 AAOIFI ...................................................................................................................................... 23
2.10.3 IFSB........................................................................................................................................... 23
2.10.4 IIRA ........................................................................................................................................... 24
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2.10.5 IIFM .......................................................................................................................................... 24
2.10.6 IILM .......................................................................................................................................... 25
3 Challenges and their possible solutions ................................................................................................... 26
3.1 Corporate governance ...................................................................................................................... 26
3.1.1 Agency theory ............................................................................................................................ 29
3.2 Risk Management ............................................................................................................................. 30
3.2.1 Shariah compliance risk ............................................................................................................. 31
3.2.2 Operational risk.......................................................................................................................... 33
3.2.3 Market risk ................................................................................................................................. 35
3.2.4 Credit risk ................................................................................................................................... 36
3.2.5 Liquidity risk ............................................................................................................................... 38
3.2.6 Displaced commercial risk ......................................................................................................... 42
3.3 Central Banks .................................................................................................................................... 43
3.4 Regulative challenges........................................................................................................................ 45
3.5 Public policy and taxes ...................................................................................................................... 47
3.6 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 49
4 Opportunities ........................................................................................................................................... 50
4.1 Market development ........................................................................................................................ 51
4.2 Product development ....................................................................................................................... 54
4.3 Consolidation and M&As .................................................................................................................. 55
4.4 Concluding remarks .......................................................................................................................... 58
5 Summary and final conclusion ................................................................................................................. 58
5.1 Overview of the thesis ...................................................................................................................... 59
5.2 summary ........................................................................................................................................... 60
5.3 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 61
5.4 Limitation of the study ...................................................................................................................... 63
References .................................................................................................................................................. 63
Books, Papers and Articles: ..................................................................................................................... 63
Website Links .......................................................................................................................................... 70
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1. Introduction
Islamic banking has drawn an increasing attention around the financial world in recent years,
especially in light of Global financial crisis starting in late 2000s. Global financial crisis have
caused the downfall and casualties of well-known and trusted conventional financial institutions
(CFIs) all over the world such as Lehman’s Brothers and UBS, which in return have raised the
interest of the general public on Islamic Banking also in the Western part of the world. Islamic
banking system has since its establishment in 1970s been expanding its principles through the
entire world, but in light of global financial crisis it has experienced a double digit growth rate
with worldwide assets close to 1 trillion (IMF, WP/11/156).
Although Islamic banking is one of the fastest growing segments in the financial world it is still
in its infancy stage, at about 1 percent of the global banking system. When compared to the
conventional financial system it certainly faces many challenges. The most important challenge
it is facing now is the fact that it operates in economies driven by interest, which is not compliant
with Islamic banking principles. The regulation and policies of the Western world are created
and fit the conventional banking system. In order for Islamic banking to become an alternative in
the world’s financial system there has to be introduced regulatory measures removing the
obstacles to the development of Islamic banking, such as central bank support, taxes and public
policy. These kinds of regulatory measures taken by UK have shown that it is possible for
Islamic banking to operate and grow its activities in such economies. In this relation, my
preliminary research suggests that Islamic finance has enormous potential for further expansion
when including non-Muslims as target group.
On the other hand I have, in my research, faced many ambiguities about Islamic banking from
reputable researchers in the financial world. El-Gamal et al. (2005) for example, have concluded
that Islamic finance simply seeks to replicate the functions of conventional financial instruments
and is primarily a form of rent-seeking legal arbitrage (IMF, WP/11/156). Being a Muslim
myself and a finance student, the ambiguities and the above mentioned problems which are
facing the growth of Islamic banking in the western world motivated me to research more in this
field.
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The aim of this thesis is to get insight into Islamic banking, its opportunities, its challenges, and
to find out whether Islamic banking is an alternative to the conventional banking or just a
replication of the conventional system.
1.1 Research Question
The majority of the literature related to Islamic finance in the Western world is country related.
They only examine the role of Islamic finance in a respective country according to its Muslim
population. I would like to gather all these studies and give a comprehensive overview of
opportunities and challenges that Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) face in the world. In the
course of my research on Islamic finance, I found that UK is the only western country in the
world that has benefitted from the growth of this market. One of the reasons, which have been
explained by many researchers, is the large Muslim population in this country. While countries
like USA, Germany, France and Spain all have relatively large Muslim population, the Islamic
banking is just at the introduction stage. One problem here is non-compatibility of Islamic
banking with the established financial order of these countries. The other is the limited effort of
these countries to encourage the introduction of Islamic finance.
The above mentioned led me to following problem statement:
What regulatory measures do the Western world countries must take, and what institutional
changes IFIs must make, in order for Islamic finance to thrive and prosper in the Western world
not only for Muslim but also non-Muslim consumers?
To provide a basis for concluding on this problem statement, the following research questions
will be answered:
-
Which regulatory changes have to be taken into consideration by legislators in the
Western world for encouraging and integrating IFIs into the prevailing system?
-
Which institutional changes have to be taken into consideration by major Islamic banking
and finance organizations, in order to make Islamic finance attractive to non-Muslim
consumers and compatible with the conventional financial system in the Western world?
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1.2 Delimitation
Islamic finance is a nascent industry compared to the conventional financial industry, therefore
there are numerous challenges and opportunities connected to its future development. This thesis
is focused only on the challenges and opportunities that are of vital importance for the
establishment and future growth of Islamic finance in the western world, therefore, other specific
challenges and opportunities of secondary importance will not be discussed in this paper. As
Islamic financial industry tries to gain a stronger foothold in the western world both with the
capital and money markets, the focus of this thesis is on Islamic finance industry as a whole and
not on a particular market. Though, it should be noted, that there are vast numbers and types of
products provided by Islamic financial institutions in the Muslim countries, as in the
conventional system. But due to the size and limit of this thesis, only those products will be
focused on which are of direct interest and have potential for growth in the western world in near
future. Furthermore, it will be too much for this thesis to mention all potential markets for the
Islamic finance in the western world. Therefore, this paper will only focus on few of those
countries that offer the best prospect for Islamic finance growth.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
The thesis structure is summarized in the brief descriptions of chapters below. Chapter two starts
with an outline of the Islamic finance, its theory, products and institutions, in order to provide the
reader with fundamental theoretical background of the Islamic banking, and to gain an
understanding of the terms and services that Islamic finance provide. Then, the challenges and
opportunities facing the Islamic finance globally, and particularly in the western world, will be
discussed and analyzed in chapters three and four.
Chapter three will focus on the following challenges and their possible solutions:
-
Corporate governance
-
Risk management
-
The role of central banks
-
Regulations
-
public policies and taxes
Chapter four will focus on the following opportunities and how to exploit them:
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-
Market development
-
Product development
-
M&As
The final chapter will conclude the findings and make some final remarks regarding what is need
to be done, from both the Western legislators’ side and Islamic financial organizations’ side, in
order for Islamic financial services to thrive and prosper in the prevailing conventional financial
systems.
1.4 Methodology
The problem statement in this thesis is going to be answered through a theoretical analysis on
basis of both primary and secondary data. The level of this analysis will be on industry level and
not firm level because the challenges and opportunities mentioned in this paper are not firm
specific. It is necessary to get an in-depth knowledge about all the possible existing
theories of Islamic finance, meaning that the research approach will be qualitative and
exploratory in order to obtain greater understanding of Islamic finance, and to define the
challenges and opportunities that it faces in the Western world. As Blumberg (2005) states, a
new investigations often start with qualitative studies exploring new phenomena. Although
Islamic finance is not a new phenomena in itself, the aim of this thesis which looks for a new
perspective on this matter have not been studied thoroughly yet, which makes the chosen
research approach the most appropriate.
1.5 Data review
This thesis is mainly a desk research project. Therefore, almost all the information for this
project is gathered from the databases of international financial institutions, books, academic
articles in newspapers and magazines. The short list of academic databases which are used
frequently are as follows: IMF, World Bank, Cambridge Journals Online, EBSCOhost, ELIN,
JSTOR, Oxford Journals Social Sciences, ProQuest and SSRN. Most of these databases were
available through the ASB’s library portal. The others were available directly.
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2 Literature review
We are going to start this part by reviewing the principles of Islamic finance and the
definitions of its products. Then the theories behind the Islamic finance will be reviewed. The
main part of this chapter is based on books which are mentioned in the List of References.
2.1 The concept of Halal and Haram in Islam
The concept of Halal (lawful/permissible) and Haram (unlawful/impermissible) introduced by
the religion of Islam is in fact the foundation of Islamic finance. Both Halal and Haram are used
by Muslims throughout the world and refer to anything that is considered permissible and lawful
under religion, and what is forbidden and punishable according to Islamic law respectively.
For many Non-Muslims the two words are related to food and beverages that a Muslim is
allowed or prohibited according to Islam. However, for Muslims these words can be found in
every aspect of their life, it applies to everything from speech, dress code, the way they behave,
to their manner and dietary.
The above mentioned social and ethical concept reigns supreme also in the Islamic finance and
economy. Halal includes a long list of legal and permitted business activities, and Haram
includes a long list of forbidden and inadmissible business activities. This Halal and Haram list is
not complete because Muslim scholars in many countries have some differences in interpretation
of what is allowed and what is forbidden, especially when a new product comes into the market.
Many IFIs have created their own Shariah boards1 that issues opinion on new products available
in the market, which add significantly to the differences in interpretations of what is Halal and
what is Haram. Some of these general activities which Muslims are not allowed to invest in are
mentioned below:

Alcohol, cinema (immoral), gambling, pork products, pornography, tobacco and of
course Riba (interest).
Actually, these prohibited activities are not always prohibited. For example investing in alcohol
activities is not allowed, but when the same alcohol is used for the protection of life, like
alcohol-based antiseptics, it is allowed. Another example states that in one case the financing of
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Shariah boards are comprised of independent experts (mostly Islamic academics and economists). Will be
elaborated on in the following chapters
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a major luxury hotel was allowed where the casino was forbidden, but the sale of alcohol within
the hotel was allowed because it was deemed necessary for its economic viability, and as long as
it was not sold to Muslims (Novethic, WP, 2009).
2.2 Principles of Islamic finance
As it is obvious from its name, the Islamic finance system compared to western conventional
system is related to the religion of Islam. The principles of Islamic finance are based on three
main factors which are mentioned in the Quran and are an important part of Shariah 2 and Islamic
jurisprudence. They are Riba, Gharar and Maysir, which are explained in detail below.
2.2.1 Interest (Riba)
In Islam it is not allowed to either receive or pay any interest on transactions involving money.
This prohibition essentially implies that the fixing in advance of a positive return on a loan, as a
reward for waiting, is not permitted by Shariah. This prohibition has not been confined to Islam.
According to Visser (2009, p. 39), based on passages from the Bible, the Christian Church at
various times took a strong stand against demanding and paying interest. Also in the Old
Testament, Jews were forbidden to demand interest on loans from their own but they could
charge interest on loans given to foreigners. Perhaps, best definition of Riba is given by Iqbal
and Molyneux:
”In its basic meaning, Riba can be defined as anything (big or small), pecuniary or nonpecuniary, in excess of the principal in a loan that must be paid by the borrower to the lender
along with the principal as a condition, (stipulated or by custom), of the loan or for an extension
in its maturity. According to a consensus of Islamic jurists it has the same meaning and import
as the contemporary concept of interest. (Iqbal and Molyneux, 2005, p. 9)
2.2.2 Gharar
Translated directly from Arabic it simply means uncertainty or risk. Gharar is as important in
Islamic finance as Riba. Compared to Riba, Gharar is more difficult to define clearly in financial
transactions. It is one of the most difficult tasks for the experts in Shariah boards in many IFIs to
agree upon when there are new products available on the markets. in this relation, Iqbal and
2
Islamic law – the fundamental religious concept of Islam, namely its law, systemized during the 2 nd and 3rd
centuries of the Muslim era equal to 8th-9th centuries AD. (Encyclopedia Britannica)
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Molyneux (2005, p. 14) state that, “jurists make a distinction between two kinds of Gharar:
Gharar ahish (substantial) and Gharar yasir (trivial). The first kind is prohibited while the
second is tolerated since this may be unavoidable without causing considerable damage to one
of the parties. In many cases, it is simply not possible to reveal all information (not because the
seller wants to hide anything, but because it is in the nature of the product). The buyer has to
trust the seller”. It is Gharar yasir (trivial) that sometimes causes problems for Shariah boards to
agree upon. To prevent Gharar in a transaction, the full implications of this transaction must be
clearly known to contracting parties. In other words there must not be “asymmetric information”
between parties because it breaches the principle of Islamic law. Elgamal (2006, p. 58) states
that, Gharar translated conceptually by professor Mustafa Al-Zarqaa means “trading in risk,
which cannot be defined”. He further gives us examples of naked options, financial futures, and
derivatives that are not backed by tangible and verifiable assets.
2.2.3 Maysir
Maysir is closely related to Gharar. In some papers about Islamic banking these two principles
are used interchangeably even though there is a difference between these two principles. Where
in Gharar the main focus is on uncertainty, Maysir, translated from Arabic “gambling”, focuses
on and prohibits transactions that are based on one side’s gain at the cost of the other.
Conventional banking products such as life insurance are prohibited in Islamic finance as it
comes under Maysir. When gambling, the player pays a certain amount of money in the hope
that he will gain much larger amount, similarly the conventional life insurance policy where the
assured hopes for a chance to make a gain.
The three principles mentioned above are the main principles of Islamic finance. However, there
are some general rules under which financial transactions become void in Islamic finance. This
could be a contract which involves immorality, which involves illegality against public policy,
which foundation or substance is unlawful or illegal, or any other contract or agreement which
directly or indirectly is contrary to the divine principles of Shariah.
2.3 Islamic finance products
A large number of products are available in Islamic finance, and the number is growing as
demand for more Islamic compliant products grow throughout the world. Broadly speaking,
Islamic commercial law is based on three modes which serve as the basic building blocks for
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other more complex financial products. These three modes are partnership based, trade based,
and rental based modes of financing. Nearly all Islamic finance products come under these three
modes. The use of each mode is dependent on the purpose and size of transactions, but all of
them are based on principle of Riba prohibition. One thing to remember is that, as mentioned
earlier, as a result of the difference in interpretation not all of new products are universally
acceptable. The three mentioned modes are covered in details below.
2.3.1 Partnership based mode of financing
Partnership based or Profit-and-Loss-Sharing (PLS) mode suggests an equitable sharing of risks
and profits between the parties involved in a financial transaction, and include Mudarabah,
Musharakah and other hybrid products. Theoretically, Mudarabah and Musharakah are the most
desirable forms of Islamic financing.
2.3.1.1Mudarabah
Mudarabah is an agreement between a lender (bank), who acts as an investor, and a borrower,
whereby the borrower can mobilize the borrowed amount for his business activity. If profits are
made they will be shared between the lender and borrower according to the mutually agreed
ratios. In the case of loss the lender shares the losses in proportion to his contribution. Elazrag
Hussein (2010) gives a good example; “an Islamic bank lends money to a client to finance a
factory, in return for which the bank will get a specified percentage of the factory’s net profits
every year for a designated period. This share of the profits provides for repayment of the
principal and a profit for the bank to pass on to its depositors. Should the factory lose money, the
bank, its depositors and the borrowers all jointly absorb the losses”.3
2.3.1.2 Musharakah
Musharakah is in its basic a business partnership or joint venture between two parties where one
party could be a bank and the other party its customer. It is effected for a particular period like a
few months, year or more than a year. Both parties agree on a certain percentage of the profit to
be given to each party. The profit of the bank must not exceed the percentage of its investment in
the Musharakah. The losses, if incurred, will be divided based on strict proportion to the equity
participation ratio, i.e. to the capital contributed by each party. For example, if the bank invests
65 % and the customer 35 %, they must share the loss in the same ratio. “All parties, including
3
Elasrag, Hussein, Global Financial Crisis and Islamic Finance (April 17, 2010). http://ssrn.com/abstract=1591563
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the bank, have the right to participate in the management of the project, but equally, all parties
have the option to waive such right. All parties agree through negotiation on the ratio of
distribution of the profits generated from the project, if any. This ratio need not coincide with the
ratio of participation in the financing of the project”. (Venardos 2005, p. 76). Musharakah is
used by financial institutions for asset and/or real estate financing, working capital financing, and
etc.
Both Mudarabah and Musharakah are closely related products. Mudarabah differs from
Musharakah in the way that only bank is the investor here, whereas in Musharakah all parties
invest in the project. In Mudarabah management is the prerogative of the investor, whereas in
Musharakah all partners can manage the project based on a pre-specified agreement. And finally,
in Mudarabah the customer does not bear losses if incurred, whereas in Musharakah profits and
losses are shared based on the percentage of the investment.
2.3.2 Trade based modes of financing
Trade based modes of financing became available in the market much later than partnership
based mode, but its products gained dominance among other products very quickly. Because it
targeted a much larger group of investors, both private and business customers, and it also is
safer for both parties to invest in this mode of financing, compared to partnership based mode.
2.3.2.1 Murabaha Finance
Murabaha is an agreement between a bank and its customer. The customer requests the bank to
purchase or import commodities on his/her behalf, with a promise to buy them from the bank at
purchase price plus profit margin of the bank, and to be paid on deferred installments. One of the
most used forms of Murabaha by Islamic banking customers is home financing. Murabaha could
be named as the locomotive of Islamic finance because it was after the introduction of Murabaha
that Islamic banking assets grew at double digits. But there are numbers of critics among
prominent scholars criticizing Murabaha’s compliance with Shariah. As Usmani states, “It
should never be overlooked that originally, Murabaha is not a mode of financing. It is only a
device to escape from ‘interest’ and not an ideal instrument for carrying out the real economic
objectives of Islam. Therefore, this instrument should be used as a transitory step taken in the
process of Islamization of the economy. And its use should be restricted only to those cases
where Mudarabah and Musharakah are not practicable.” (Usmani 1998, p. 104).
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This statement can be confirmed by looking at a problem that Murabaha contains. The problem
is that the customer’s promise to buy commodities from bank once the bank has bought it, cannot
be binding since this would be a contract in which neither side is obligated immediately to
perform. The solution to this problem, that Shariah boards has come with, is allowing banks to
take collateral against losses incurred from a customer’s breach of promise.
2.3.2.2 Salam Finance
As mentioned before, Shariah does not permit selling what you do not own but Salam is exempt
from this condition. In Salam, as long as the commodity is specified by both quality and quantity
and at full payment at spot, it is allowed to sell it in a given future date. The seller is obliged to
have the commodity by the end of contract. If the seller does not have the commodity in hand at
the time of execution of the contract, he/she must buy it in the market. Salam is similar to
forward contracts in conventional financial system with the difference that in Salam the entire
amount must be paid when signing contract. Salam is used by IFIs in agricultural financing, preshipment export finance, and project financing. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005, p. 25), have stated
four basic rules that govern Salam:
1. The price should be paid in full at the time of the contract.
2. Goods whose quality or quantity cannot be determined by specification cannot be
sold through the contract of Salam. An example is precious stones.
3. Goods can be sold only by specifying the attributes. They cannot be particularized
to a given farm, factory or area.
4. The exact date and place of delivery must also be specified.
There are also three major risks connected with the use of Salam, as mentioned by Venardos
(2006, p. 77), which according to him reduces the Salam’s value as a financing vehicle.
1. The risk of default by seller which could just partially resolved by obtaining some
form of security from the seller.
2. The bank’s need to liquidate the goods after delivery, an inconvenience made
more serious by the Islamic legal rule that a Salam buyer cannot sell the expected
goods before actually taking possession of them. But this is also resolved by
Shariah boards, who allows banks to sell the goods with conditions that the new
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contract is unconnected to the first one (buying goods from seller), and that the
goods are of exactly the same description, quantitatively and qualitatively, and
with the same due date.
3. Requirement of Shariah that if at the time of delivery the seller can neither
produce the goods nor obtain them elsewhere, the buyer has only two choices:
either withdraw his offer, or wait for the goods to become available later, with no
compensation permitted for the delay. In either case, the buyer loses all or much
of the profit from the use of his money.
2.3.3 Rental based modes of financing
Rental based modes of financing have existed since the beginning of Islam. It was used mostly in
relation with agricultural products. Ijarah have been the only type used in this mode, but with
time and the development of new products financial institutions have added other more
complicated products under this mode. The main idea of this mode is that the financial institution
purchases an asset for its customer and then hands it over to him/her on rental basis. This can be
an operational asset, where IFI act as warrantor of the asset or financial asset, and where the
customer deals directly with the supplier so the ownership titles remains with the IFI until it is
transferred to the customer. The two most used products in rental based mode of financing are
Ijarah and Diminishing Musharakah.
2.3.3.1 Ijarah finance
Ijarah is much equivalent to leasing agreement in conventional financial system, but with a
difference that Ijarah does not involve interest bearing contracts and they should be Shariahcompliant. When translated from Arabic, Ijarah means to provide something on rent. Venardos
(2006, p. 170) define Ijarah as; “a contract under which the bank leases equipment to a customer
for a rental fee. It is pre-agreed that at the end of the lease period the customer will buy the
equipment at an agreed price from the bank, with the rental fees already paid being part of the
price”.
Ijarah is the most used type of product, not only among rental based mode products but also
among all products provided by IFIs, when it is concerned the acquisition of assets for
businesses. Ijarah have generally been used by private customers for financing consumer goods
like homes and automobiles. But recently it has gained popularity among business customers in
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relation with project and transportation financing. Ijarah is used for almost everything that could
be leased, but some certain items that is prohibited in Shariah and a few others like fuel, food and
etc. are not included in Ijarah.
2.3.3.2 Diminishing Musharakah finance
As with Musharakah, diminishing Musharakah is a business partnership with the difference that
in diminishing Musharakah, at the end of partnership, one part becomes the full owner of the
asset in a predetermined mechanism agreed upon, when the contract is signed. The transfer of the
ownership is determined by a leasing agreement where the lessee purchases the ownership on a
pro-rata basis through periodical lease payments. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005, p. 22) describe
diminishing Musharakah as a contract between a financier (the bank) and a beneficiary in which
the two agree to enter into a partnership to own an asset, but on condition that the financier will
gradually sell his share to the beneficiary at an agreed price, and in accordance with an agreed
schedule. Diminishing Musharakah is increasingly used in sectors like housing and real estate,
project finance, and construction. Diminishing Musharakah takes different shapes according to
the shape of the transaction. A general rule is that when a customer wants to buy a commodity
he/she approaches the IFI which agrees to join into partnership. The customer has to pay at least
10-20 percent of the price, according to IFIs requirements, and the rest is paid by the IFI. The
share of IFI is then divided into units which the customer has promised to purchase one after
another in a predefined schedule. During this process the IFI gains on rent claimed according to
its proportion of share.
2.4 Derivatives
CFI derivatives include call and put options, futures, forwards, and swaps and are used for
hedging, arbitrage, and speculation. From the Shariah point of view most of the derivatives
provided by CFIs are deemed to be Haram i.e. prohibited for IFIs because these kinds of
transactions refer to the commodities that might not be in seller’s possession. IFIs seemingly
allow derivatives for the purposes of hedging and arbitrage, but prohibit their use for speculation
or gambling. As mentioned before, Islam prohibits Gharar and Maysir (gambling and
speculation). However, the need for a mechanism that could help IFIs customers to manage
unnecessary risk has prompted Islamic jurists and scholars to come up with some standardized
liquidity and risk management products, directly based on the generally accepted Islamic
14
financing modes. A number of products are similar to conventional financial products, Forward
or futures contracts (a combination of Salam and Murabaha), call (Arbun) and put options, total
return or currency swaps and etc., but completely within an Islamic framework. As the numbers
of different derivatives grow in Islamic finance, the criticism is also growing from different parts
of the world by Islamic jurists and scholars arguing, that these kinds of products are not in full
compliance with Shariah. Jobst (2007) States that; “Shariah scholars take issue with the fact that
futures and options are valued mostly by reference to the sale of a non-existent asset or an asset
not in the possession of the seller, which negates the Shariah. Shariah principles, however,
requires creditors (or protection sellers) to actually own the reference asset at the inception of a
transaction.” Anybody who is familiar with the rules of Shariah can see that the idea behind
these derivatives goes against the very pillars of Islam. Therefore the creation and development
of such products are one of the most challenging tasks for Islamic finance practitioners. The size
of the Islamic derivative market is not known but is quite small and derivatives are much less
widely available to IFIs than to CFIs (Visser 2009).
2.5 Insurance
Insurance is one of the much discussed products in Islamic finance. Some hardliners in Islam
condemn any kind of insurance arguing that insurer-insured relationship involves Gharar and
Maysir and is not allowed in Islam. “Conventional life insurance was already declared
unacceptable in 1903 by some prominent Islamic scholars in the Arab countries. This was
followed in 1978 by a resolution of the Fiqh4 Council of the World Muslim League and in 1985
by one from the Fiqh Council of the Organization of the Islamic Conference declaring that
conventional insurance as presently practiced is Haram (O.C. Fisher 2001)”. (Visser 2009, p.
102). Moderate Muslim scholars, on the other hand, argue that as long as Gharar and Maysir are
separated from insurance product it is in compliance with Shariah. They state that in particular
business activities such as construction, transport and investment services, the professional
liability insurance is not involving Gharar and Maysir. Takaful is such an insurance product that
does not involve Gharar and Maysir.
4
Islamic Jurisprudence
15
2.5.1 Takaful
Translated directly from Arabic, Takaful means cooperative or mutual insurance. Takaful is
developed by Muslim scholars and economists because the conventional insurance contains
Gharar which is forbidden in Islam. The main idea behind Takaful is that both insurer and
insured are viewed as contributors to the pool of money which they voluntarily have agreed to
share in case of loss incurred to one of them. “Islamic insurance, or Takaful, differs from
commercial insurance in that it is a cooperative form of insurance, though the actual business
operations may be left to commercial firms, who act as managers, or agents, with the policy
holders as their principal” Hans Visser (2009, p. 104). First a Takaful company is organized by
IFIs, then both insurers make a periodic payment to the Takaful company which it maintains in
individual accounts for each member, and these amounts can be invested in other Shariah
compliant products during the contract period. There are three major Takaful models and they
are as follows:
1. Mudarabah – derived from the Mudarabah contract, the Takaful company acts as the
operator and share in the returns from the investments of the Takaful fund according to a
predetermined profit-sharing arrangement. If there is no profit, the operator will receive
no compensation for management services.
2. Wakalah – insurers appoint the Takaful company as their agent or manger to handle all
the activities of the Takaful fund in accordance with established guidelines. A
predetermined fee compensates the agent or manager.
3. Mixed model – under this model the Takaful company will be assured compensation
under the Wakalah contract and will receive a share of profit under a Mudarabah contract
as well.
2.6 Zakat
Zakat is one of the five pillars of Islam which are obligatory on every Muslim. It is the fourth
important pillar among them. Translated directly from Arabic it means “purity”.
IFSB define
Zakat as follows: “The amount payable by a Muslim on his or her net worth as part of his or her
religious obligations, mainly for the benefit of the poor and the needy. Paying Zakat is an
obligatory duty for every Islamic adult Muslim, whose wealth Finance exceeds a certain
threshold” (IFSB 2007). Zakat becomes obligatory when the individual’s wealth, after deducting
16
all the costs or any amount he/she owe somebody, exceeds the price of approximately 85 grams
of pure gold in today’s money. The individual is obliged to pay 1/40th of it as Zakat which is
equivalent to 2,5 %. Zakat has been the centre of much discussion among Islamic scholars. Some
IFIs make donation of their yearly income to the Zakat centers in Muslim countries voluntarily,
in accordance with their organizational charter, and others are required by law. However, as
Maali et al. state; “Because the Quranic injunction to pay zakah predates large corporations, the
varying tax levels specified in the Shari'a apply largely to individuals. Consequently it is debated
whether zakah should even be applied to business organizations.” (Maali et al 2006, p. 275).
According to Hassan5 paying Zakat, as one of the pillars of Islam, is a compulsory contribution
by individuals. Furthermore, it contradicts the intention of Zakat because IFIs are simply not
aware of the individual depositor’s or investor’s financial condition. To impose compulsory
Zakat payment by IFIs, he argues, will lead to the discrimination against IFIs and will shift
equity investors’ preference to the conventional banks.
2.7 Sukuk
Due to its similarity to conventional interest-based bonds’ characteristics Sukuk are often
referred to as Islamic bonds. Like bonds, the holders of Sukuk are entitled to a regular stream of
coupons and a final payment at maturity. However, in principle it is wrong to refer to Sukuk as
Islamic bonds because the conventional bonds are debt transactions while Sukuk are asset-based
and/or asset-backed. The difference in asset-based and asset-backed is risk associated with them.
The asset-backed is much less riskier than asset based. The asset-backed Sukuk resemble the
equity position in conventional system because they own a part of the underlying asset, while
asset-based Sukuk are closer to debt position because the holders of asset-based Sukuk do not
own the underlying asset and have recourse to the originator in case of default. AAOIFI define
Sukuk as certificates of equal value representing undivided shares in the ownership of tangible
assets, usufructs and services or (in the ownership of) the assets of particular projects or special
investment activity (AAOIFI). Sukuk are used mostly to finance large investment projects. After
the introduction of Sukuk they are increasingly used by IFIs in order to manage their liquidity
because these securities are typically short term in nature, ranging from three months to one year
and which can be liquidated easily in the secondary market. As mentioned before, IFIs are not
5
http://gulfnews.com/business/banking/scholar-against-compulsory-Zakat-on-islamic-banks-1.98342 accessed on
10/6-2011
17
allowed to use the available conventional instruments for liquidity management as they are
interest based and therefore not in compliance with Shariah. The Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) countries have prohibited trading of Sukuk in the secondary market arguing it involves
Riba. Therefore, Salam-based Sukuk and the likes are typically held to maturity in this region
while in other regions leading by Malaysia the secondary market for Sukuk is growing. Although
Sukuk is in its infancy stage, first issued in the late 1990s, the increasing use of it as a liquidity
management instrument has contributed to the fast growth of Sukuk market. Most of Sukuk
offering have been asset-based or Ijarah. Ijarah-based Sukuk have medium- to long-term
maturities, carry a put option, and can be traded in the secondary market. In a typical Ijara Sukuk
structure, the originator sells assets to the Sukuk issuer, a bankruptcy-remote special purpose
vehicle (SPV) created to act as a trustee for investors acquiring the assets (Iqbal and Mirakhor,
2007). Sukuk returns are tied to the cash streams generated by underlying assets held in SPVs.
This cash stream can be in the form of profit from a sale, profit from a rental (Ijara), or a
combination of the two. The conventional asset securitization process is used in structuring
Sukuk. The Sukuk is a nascent product as well as the whole Islamic capital market is very young,
therefore new Sukuk products are evolving around the world. In this relation AAOIFI issued a
statement in 2008 stating that IFIs must avoid involvement of Sukuk in debt-related operations.
2.8 Istisna
Istisna is used in financing goods that are not yet ready for sale and will have to be manufactured
according to certain agreed criteria and requirements, with payment on agreed terms. IFSB
(2008) defines it as an agreement to sell to a customer a non-existent asset, which is to be
manufactured or built according to the buyer’s specifications and is to be delivered on a specified
future date at a predetermined selling price. The IFI agrees to construct and to sell the project to
be constructed at the bank’s selling price to the customer and thereafter it requests a third party
to construct the project; Upon completion, the contractor will hand over the project to the IFI or
the IFI will authorize the contractor to deliver the project directly to customer. Istisna is used in
services such as tailoring, architect and construction projects, industrial equipment, plants and
machinery, ships and aircraft, contract or asset financing, in pre-shipment exports financing and
usable in all other situations where goods have to be manufactured before sale. Under these
transactions the payment can be flexible depending on the agreement between the bank and the
client; the price can be paid up front, according to manufacturing process, at completion or
18
installments after completion (Hassan and Lewis 2007, p. 178). Istisna is perhaps one of the most
flexible products available by IFIs. Istisna offers greater future structuring possibilities for
trading and financing. The contract can be cancelled at any time by any party given a prior
notification time before starting the manufacturing process, but not later than that.
2.9 Theory behind the Islamic finance
The concept of Islamic finance has existed since the emergence of Islam. However, it was not as
developed and systematic as today before late 1970s. The main idea of Islamic finance is perhaps
best described by Iqbal and Molyneux (2005, p. 6). They state that under Islamic jurisprudence
there are two kinds of rulings, the worship ruling which governs the relationship between man
and Allah, and the second being mutual dealing rulings which governs the relationship among
mankind. The general principle of mutual dealing rulings is that, everything is permitted unless
clearly prohibited, which includes the principle of Halal and Haram discussed earlier. They call it
the “Doctrine of Universal permissibility”. Iqbal and Molyneux (2005, p.7) further state that; “In
addition to the Doctrine of Universal Permissibility, Islam permits the contracting parties to
agree on any conditions as long as they do not violate any Sharijah ruling. …We call this the
‘Golden Principle of Free Choice’. As may be seen, this principle gives a very wide scope for
designing contracts”.
They argue that; “the purposes of such prohibitions are to provide a level playing field to protect
the interests of weaker parties, to ensure justice and fairness and in general to ensure mutual
benefit for the parties as well as society at large, and to promote social harmony”.
As mentioned before, theoretically, Islamic finance is based primarily on the avoidance of Riba
(interest), Gharar (speculation), and Maysir (uncertainty) and exercising profit and loss sharing,
which is touted as the foundation upon which all IFIs are based. Furthermore, there should not be
pure economical interest in transactions. They must contribute to the social harmony. They must
be balanced between equity and debt, and the trade of debt must be avoided which is explicitly
expressed in the pillars of Islamic banking. Although this way of doing business has existed from
the dawn of Islam, the theoretical and systematic development of Islamic finance began only
after the World War II, when majority of Muslim countries achieved their political and
economical freedom from the colonial powers. Majority of these newly independent countries,
with a nationalistic mood, wanted to transform their financial institutions to Shariah compliant
19
institutions. But it was not an easy task because by that time the conventional western financial
system had been rooted in these countries. After the World War II, Muslim scholars, economists
and jurists had been working hard together, in order to uncover the forgotten by centuries
practice of conducting Islamic financial affairs, and to create and advance a modern Islamic
based mode of financing business transactions. According to most of literature found about
Islamic finance the first modern IFI in the world is mentioned to be created by a Germaneducated Egyptian banker Ahmad an-Najjar, named Mit Ghamr bank, by 1963. The bank earned
profits through its profit and loss sharing partnership products without involving Riba. AbdulRahman states; “He was distressed to see the poor farmers in his small village of Zefta/Mit
Ghamr in the Egyptian Nile Delta lacking the funds needed to finance the purchase of seeds,
farm animals needed to plough the land, cattle, animal feedstock, and simple pumps—even to
finance their subsistence and basic needs until the crop was cultivated and sold on the market.
The bank expanded its operations throughout the Egyptian farmland and became very popular
until it was nationalized by the government of the late president Nasser”. Abdul-Rahman (2010,
p. 192)
However, it is a well-known fact that the first IFI was established in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia in
1956 by the name of Tabung Hajj. It was a savings organization primarily established to finance
the Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). This fund rapidly gathered huge amount of savings which it
invested in a way that was in compliance with Shariah in sectors agriculture and real estate. It
has become the oldest Islamic financial institution in modern times6. According to AbdulRahman (2010, p. 193) it is important to know that most of the Malaysian Muslim religious
leaders received their religious education in the 1950-1960s in Egypt. The success of these IFIs
among ordinary Muslims had already attracted prominent figures in the Islamic world by 1970s.
This success, combined with the wealth gathered from jump in oil prices and the creation of OIC
(Organization of Islamic Countries), created the incentives in establishing the first international
Islamic bank, Islamic Development Bank, followed by the first commercial Islamic bank, Dubai
Islamic Bank. Following the establishment of these two banks there was a boom in establishment
of IFIs in Middle East: countries like Egypt, Sudan, Kuwait and Bahrain having large sums of oil
money established Islamic banks one after another in late seventies.
6
Islamic Development Bank (2007)
20
Khan and Ahmad (2001) state that theoretically, it has been an aspiration of Islamic economists
that on the liability side, Islamic banks shall have only investment deposits. On the asset side,
these funds would be channeled through PLS contracts. Under such a system, any shock on the
asset side shall be absorbed by the risk sharing nature of investment deposits. PLS dominates the
theoretical literature of Islamic finance. However, the practice of IFIs has become different from
the theoretical aspirations with the predominance of trade based operations. In past decade these
institutions began to spread their markets beyond the region by establishing international
investment banks not only in Muslim countries but also in the western world, especially in
Europe with the UK as centre.
2.10 Leading organizations
In the beginning the industry focused all its attention on retail, which was followed by
commercial banking activities. The next step, capital market activities, took a bit longer time to
be developed, but it began to boom in a very short time and this boom attracted more and more
actors into this business, especially western countries in the mid 1990s. As the Islamic finance
industry attracted more and more countries and the public interest grew all over the world,
central banks and regulatory authorities in these countries began to call for regulations and
supervision of the Islamic finance industry. Another additional problem that followed the boom
in IFIs was the difference in products available by these institutions. IFIs in the beginning of
1970s began increasingly to consult experts in Islamic law in order to be sure if their product
were adherent to Shariah. However, there was need for a standard setting so the products at least
could be of same content, if not the same name. All these problems led to the establishment of
Shariah boards within the IFIs. But this was not enough because the inconsistencies in
interpretations of different Shariah boards in IFIs led to the fact that some transactions were
Shariah compliant in the rules of one board and not compliant with Shariah in the rules of other
board. Therefore, international standard setting organs such as Accounting and Auditing
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), Islamic Financial Services Board
(IFSB), Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA), and International Islamic Financial Market
(IIFM) were found to facilitate, by issuing international standards and guidelines, the
homogeneous interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence and dealing with corporate governance
issues. Recently the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corp (IILM) has been
established to assist institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their liquidity
21
management issues in an efficient and effective manner. These main bodies of Islamic finance
are explained in detail in the following subchapters.
2.10.1 Shariah Boards
It should be stressed that Shariah board is not a standard setting body in itself, but assist other
regulatory and standard setting organizations in establishing and maintaining a good governance
practice among IFIs. Shariah board is a committee of Islamic scholars whose job is to verify if
the new products presented by IFIs comply with Shariah. These scholars’ functions are similar to
members of boards in conventional corporations, i.e. they are not employed be IFIs but receive
honoraria, and they have the right to be members of Shariah boards in different IFIs
simultaneously. The latter is because there are few dozen countable Shariah scholars who are
familiar with both Islamic law and modern financial needs in the world. Although the numbers of
such scholars are growing, they still lag behind the growth of the industry need. The first ever
Shariah board was established by Egypt’s Faisal Islamic Bank in 1976 and soon other IFIs
followed this example. Today Shariah boards of IFIs are required by law in majority of Islamic
countries, and even if it is not required by law, Shariah boards have become an important part of
IFIs. However, lately Shariah boards have been criticized by many economists for being a part of
corporate governance or agency theory problems in IFIs because of conflict of interests. To
tackle these kinds of problems Malaysia as the first country in the world has regulated scholars to
be member of the Shariah board of maximum three IFIs simultaneously. AAOIFI standards have
defined Shariah boards’ duty as directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the IFIs in
order to ensure that they are in compliance with Shariah principles. AAOIFI standards have also
made it mandatory for all IFIs to elect their Shariah board members through the shareholders
annual general meeting upon the recommendation of the board of directors, taking into
consideration local legislation and regulations. Furthermore it states that these members should
not be chosen among directors and majority shareholders of the IFIs (AAOIFI 2003, governance
standards). According to Algoud and Lewis (2001, p. 81), maintaining and formalizing the
internal regulatory role of Shariah boards is considered vital as these internal bodies are best
placed to assist their individual organizations in achieving Shariah compliance, and thus play an
important role in the overall regulatory environment.
22
2.10.2 AAOIFI
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is an
Islamic international autonomous non-profit making corporate body that prepares accounting,
auditing, governance, ethics and Shariah standards for Islamic financial institutions. It was
established in accordance with the Agreement of Association which was signed by Islamic
financial institutions on 26 February 1990 in Algiers (Iqbal and Molyneux 2006, p. 60). The
AAOIFI has a two-tiered organizational structure in order to separate the standard-setting
function from financing the organization, so that the standard setters are not subject to a conflict
of interest. IFIs are not obliged to adapt AAOIFIs standards and guidelines. However, regulatory
and supervisory authorities around the world are increasingly relying upon them and align their
standards according to it. For example many Shariah boards consist of at least three scholars who
have a comprehensive financial expertise and education in legal questions according to AAOIFI
standards. The AAOIFI provides guidelines for IFIs when/if they face difficulties in
interpretations, or understanding of issues related to new financial products. So far the AAOIFI
has issued 25 standards in accounting, 5 in auditing, 7 in corporate governance and 2 codes of
ethics (AAOIFI 2010). The AAOIFI is focusing on the auditing and accounting side, where
processes and transactions need to be handled differently from conventional banking practice.
2.10.3 IFSB
To ensure the sound and stable development of the Islamic financial industry, it needs to be
supported by a strong regulatory and supervisory framework. To fulfill this requirement, the
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) was established in 2002. The IFSB is an international
body hosted by Malaysia. It has the important mandate of developing the prudential standards in
accordance with the unique features of the Islamic financial institution (Iqbal and Molyneux
2006). IFSB was established under the sponsorship of the International Monetary Fund, and in
close cooperation with IMF and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, has become one of
the most influential international organizations that promote Islamic finance and its standards.
IFSB tries to adapt the existing standards and guidelines of the mentioned organizations and
adjusts them in accordance with the Shariah principles to IFIs. The IFSB's focus is very much on
the standardization of procedures and the way Shariah rulings are interpreted across the industry.
Since its establishment the IFSB has issued 17 standards, guiding principles and technical notes
in the areas of risk management, corporate governance, transparency and market discipline, and
23
etc. IFSB is closely cooperating with the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, International
Organization for Securities Commissions and the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors (IFSB 2011).
2.10.4 IIRA
The Islamic International Rating Agency (IIRA) started operations in July 2005 to facilitate
development of the regional and national financial markets by delineating relative investment or
credit risk, providing an assessment of the risk profile of entities and instruments. This should be
an integral part of the decision process employed by institutional investors.7 IIRA assists the
Islamic financial services industry to gain recognition locally and internationally as strong and
capable financial institutions, adhering to greater standards of disclosure and transparency. Its
mission is to support the development of the regional capital market and to improve its
functioning. IIRA has become an alternative to the international rating agencies and it aims to
become a reference on which investors and financiers can rely to achieve “Quality” in terms of
compliance with the related Shariah rules and principles for Islamic financial services. IIRA is a
profit making body and it works like its conventional counterparts, charging a set fee per piece of
work.
2.10.5 IIFM
International Islamic Financial Market (IIFM) is the global standardization body for the Islamic
Capital & Money Market segment of the IFIs. Its primary focus lies in the standardization of
Islamic
financial
products,
documentation
and
related
processes.8
The Agreement to establish the IIFM was signed in November 2001 by the Governors of the
Central banks /Monetary Agencies Malaysia, Bahrain, Indonesia, Sudan, and the President of the
Islamic Development Bank. It began its operation in 2002. Its main objectives are:
1. To spur the establishment and development of an international financial market
based on Shariah rules and principles
2. Addressing the issue of liquidity management in IFIs
3. Developing an active secondary market, and
7
8
http://www.iirating.com/about_profile.asp accessed on 12/6-2011
http://www.iifm.net/default.asp?action=article&id=126 accessed on 15/6-2011
24
4. Creating the environment that will encourage both Islamic and non-Islamic
financial institutions to actively participate in a secondary market and the
information of new traceable instructions.
IIFM will also act as the focal point for the harmonization of Shariah interpretations in the global
financial market and enhance the cooperative framework among IFIs globally. In September
2006 the IIFM signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA), with an eye to developing a master agreement for documenting
privately negotiated Shariah-compliant derivatives transactions. In march 2010 the ISDA/IIFM
Tahawwut master agreement was launched. It is a completely new framework document though
the structure of the document is similar to the conventional ISDA Master Agreement. However,
the key mechanisms and provisioning such as early termination events, closeout and netting are
developed based on the Islamic Shari’ah principles.9
2.10.6 IILM
The International Islamic Liquidity Management Corp (IILM) is a collaborative effort by 11
central banks or monetary agencies from countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran,
Luxembourg and the United Arab Emirates, as well as two multilateral organizations to assist
institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing their liquidity management. The
IILM has been established to assist institutions offering Islamic financial services in addressing
their liquidity management issues in an efficient and effective manner. This institution addresses
one of the fundamental problems of Islamic financial institutions: the provision of adequate
liquidity in times of stress. The IILM is expected to issue high quality, triple A-rated liquid,
tradable and low risk Shariah-compliant financial instruments at both the national level and
across borders, to enhance the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial markets. The
instruments of the IILM will be utilized in liquidity management as eligible collateral for
interbank transactions and central bank financing, or through trading of IILM instruments (either
within the same country or cross border) in the secondary market. As the IILM is intended to
facilitate cross-border liquidity management, its instruments shall be denominated in major
reserve currencies such as the US dollar and the euro. This is to ensure access to a large pool of
global investors and broaden the range of its holders, thereby enhancing the prospects for active
9
http://www.isda.org/media/press/2010/press030110.html accessed on 15/6-2011
25
secondary market. If the assets can be traded through the IILM, then much fewer of these assets will be
held by the institutions.
3 Challenges and their possible solutions
While the Islamic finance has experienced a double digit growth for the last decade around the
world, there are some challenges, especially in the western world, that raises questions about the
long-term growth of Islamic finance. Furthermore, IFIs, in the aftermath of financial crisis
became overly exposed to real estate and related sectors. The Sukuk market has also been
affected, and while some recovery is in sight, sovereign issuers are outnumbering corporate ones
at present. The challenges to be discussed in this chapter include corporate governance, risk
management, the role of central banks, regulations, and public policies and taxes. It should be
stated that these challenges, are relevant to this thesis, and their possible solutions are going to be
discussed in detail in this chapter.
3.1 Corporate governance
Considering the size of Islamic finance, very little has been researched and discussed about
corporate governance in IFIs, since their establishment in late 1970s. According to recent
estimates, there are over 600 IFIs operating in more than 75 countries worldwide, and the
number is growing10. Corporate governance plays a vital role in design and promotion of the
principles of accountability, fairness and transparency of the corporations to ensure and protect
investors’ interests. IFIs have been lately criticized from different parts of the world for the lack
of accountability and transparency, especially in last decade, after some huge scandals took place
in relation to several respected IFIs. The biggest scandal involved Dubai Islamic Bank in 2009
where lack of corporate governance practices resulted in a fraud case involving $501 millions11.
These scandals attracted the attention of different economists, scholars and institutions to
research and work on the improvement of corporate governance practices in IFIs. IFIs’ structure
are more complicated than those of conventional corporations, and therefore critics argue that
IFIs must try even harder to design and implement more robust corporate governance practices
and mechanisms, tailored to ensure good behavior and protection of shareholder’ interests. Khan
10
http://arabnews.com/economy/islamicfinance/article405998.ece On 20/07-2011
http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/crime/dubai-islamic-bank-dh1-8b-fraud-case-referred-to-court-1.56801
accessed on 27/07-2011
11
26
and Sharif (2008) argue that: “The level of good governance required by sharia principles
arguably transcends that of conventional financial systems, as Islamic financial principles
categorize an IFI as a trustee of its investors. As such, the IFI must be transparent, act fairly and
be held accountable to the investors. Considering the significant amount of wealth currently
entrusted to IFIs and their role as the trustees of their investors, is it time for the introduction of
more robust corporate governance practices tailored specifically for IFIs?” While conventional
systems’ corporate governance practices are globally converging, governance practices of IFIs
are diverging. According to Khan and Sharif (2008), this is due to regulators responsible for
supervising IFIs have taken a non-prescriptive approach. Rather than setting criteria and
standards which IFIs must comply with to be authorized and licensed to carry out Shariahcompliant activities, the onus is placed on the individual IFIs to put adequate measures in place
to ensure that the services and products they offer accord with Islamic principles. The numbers
of corporate governance models in conventional finance system are exhaustive. However,
generally they can be divided into two different approaches, the Anglo-Saxon and the European.
The Anglo-Saxon approach is shareholder-oriented and the European approach is stakeholderoriented. Islamic finance system is closer to European approach. According to Iqbal and
Mirakhor (2004), the governance model in the Islamic economic system is a stakeholder-oriented
model whereby governance structure and process at both the system and the firm levels protect
the rights of all stakeholders who are exposed to any risk as a result of the firm’s activities (Iqbal
and Molyneux 2005, p. 119). But Islamic economists and scholars are divided into three groups
concerned with which corporate governance approach is best for the future growth of IFIs. The
first group is proponents of the European model arguing that the essence of the Islamic corporate
governance necessarily has a wide commission, with obligations extending beyond shareholders
and embracing financiers, employees and customers as European approach does (Malekian and
Daryaei 2010). The second group is proponents of the Anglo-Saxon approach arguing that the
economic organization and business and commercial practices in majority of Muslim countries
are inherited western colonial powers practicing the Anglo-Saxon approach of corporate
governance. This implies that in actual practice, many Islamic corporations adopt the AngloSaxon approach (Hasan 2008). They argue that it is for the best of IFIs to work on the adaptation
of the Anglo-Saxon approach which also make it easier for them to enter the western financial
world and compete with the existing conventional system. The third group is opponents of the
27
both above mentioned approaches. They argue that the IFIs’ structures are completely different
of those in conventional corporations. The depositors in IFIs are also stakeholders whose interest
is also at stake, and they do not generally get much attention in the Anglo-Saxon as well as
European approaches. In IFIs it is the depositors rather than shareholders who provide a
preponderantly large proportion of funds (Chapra and Ahmed 2002). Therefore, the third group
promotes the idea of a completely different approach which could be consistent the IFIs’
structure. The problem with the third group is that they have not yet managed to create a solid
model of corporate governance. In the context of Islamic corporate governance, there are a few
studies have been carried out particularly Islamic financial institutions to come up with
alternative models of corporate governance. The studies seem to suggest that Islamic corporation
may adopt a totally different model of corporate governance or a modified version of the
Stakeholder-oriented model as an alternative for its corporate governance framework (Hasan
2008).
Therefore, both AAOIFI and IFSB, together with other national regulatory institutions, pursue
and work on common regulatory policies to upgrade IFIs’ corporate governance regime to
international standards. They have issued several regulatory guidelines and codes of corporate
governance. They both stress the need for more specific governance practices for IFIs and are
working on guiding principles intended to help IFIs establish and improve their corporate
governance frameworks and assist regulators in assessing such frameworks. Almost all of these
regulatory guidelines however have a non-prescriptive approach. Therefore, it is of high
importance that Shariah boards assist these regulatory and standard setting organizations in
establishing and maintaining a good governance practice among IFIs. A study conducted by
Vinnicombe (2010) in Bahrain showed high levels of compliance with AAOIFI standards in
some areas, and relatively low levels in other areas by IFIs. The relatively low levels of
compliance are related to the Mudarabah and Zakat which are part of the agency problem of IFIs.
Corporate governance covers many issues such as stakeholder theory, management
compensation, board of director’s role and disclosure and etc. The issue that has been most
discussed and criticized, especially by western regulators, has been the conflict of interest
between the parties involved in the contractual relationship, the so called “Agency problem” or
“principal/agent problem”. Hart, O (1995:678) notes that; “Corporate governance issues arise
28
in the corporation in two situations namely whenever there is an agency problem of conflict of
interest involving members of the organization such as board of directors, managers and
shareholders and cost of business are such that agency problem cannot be dealt with through a
normal contract”. This thesis is concerned with the agency problem, as it is directly related to
the actual problem of IFIs.
3.1.1 Agency theory
Agency theory is one of the most researched and discussed issues in conventional corporate
governance. A series of corporate scandals which shook the world in 1990s, especially in the
United States with a huge scandal related to Enron, gave a further boost to the number of
researches followed by guidelines and regulations concerned agency theory. In Islamic finance
corporate governance the agency problem is of primarily concern. The theoretical structure of
IFIs, which share profits and losses on both their asset and liability sides, pose a greater need for
transparency to its investment account holders (Iqbal et al. 2007, p. 7). They further explain it as
follows; “This is due to the agency problem faced by the investment account holders when they
share in profit and loss of the bank, which themselves are the consequence of trade and
investment decisions of the managers and shareholders of the banking firm. Bank shareholders
(or their appointed management), as agent for investment account holders, exercise control over
investment decisions. Unless their interests and risk profile is aligned with that of the depositors,
agency problem will remain.” Another twist to this agency problem, they add, is provided by the
current practices of Islamic banks pertaining to rate of return smoothing which creates another
kind of agency problem for the equity holder of the banks, and also leads to weakening of market
discipline for the managers12. Furthermore, a number of agency problems are encountered in the
contractual structure of Islamic banks which may also affect the CSR disclosure presented by
Islamic banks in their annual reports (Iqbal et al. 2007, p. 226). In addition Safieddine (2009), by
conducting one of few important empirical researches in this field, highlighted the specific
agency problems that current corporate governance practices by IFIs face in the Gulf
Cooperation Council member countries. He revealed the following deficiencies in corporate
governance practices of IFIs which could potentially result in agency problems:
12
The problem is explained in detail on Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis.
29

The establishment of a governance committee or an audit committee is not common
among IFIs, and a clear internal audit functions are not properly established.

Investment accounts holders and other investors lack access to relevant information and
influence on management decisions.
The latter deficiency suggest that, while investment accounts holders entrust managers with their
money and exclusively bear the risk of the projects’ failure, they are not able to monitor the
performance of their investments or to oversee the activities undertaken by the management, thus
leaving some agency problems unresolved (Safieddine 2009).
In light of the above mentioned problems, Chapra and Ahmed (2002) conclude that the
governance mechanisms that aim at safeguarding the interests of shareholders in conventional
corporate structures might not be sufficient in the setting of IFIs. Also Safieddine (2009)
concludes that; “The implications reveal that a model of conventional and idiosyncratic
governance practices that preserves both the foundations of Islamic finance and the rights of all
investors, including investment account holders is much needed to be developed by regulators
and adopted by Islamic banks given the implications on performance and the development of the
industry.” Another problem which recently is being underlined by critics is the conflict of
interest arising from relations of top management and Shariah boards. As in many IFIs Shariah
scholars are being appointed by shareholders also influenced by top management, some Shariah
scholars may feel pressure and threat of losing their position in the board, and hence approve
products Shariah compliant while they are non-compliant. In future this approval could lead to
enormous costs including litigations, loss of revenue and, not least, decline in the IFI’s
reputational image. This particular problem is more highlighted by the fact that in majority of
IFIs Shariah boards are not subjected to disclosure rules. In order to cope with this problem there
is a need for more transparency and disclosure in Shariah boards.
3.2 Risk Management
Risk management is the identification and quantification of risks connected with the specific
business, then taking care of those risks and if possible reducing or preventing them. Islamic
finance industry has grown rapidly and today includes, as its conventional counterpart, a diverse
range of financial products. Compliance with Shariah precludes IFIs from risks that are common
in conventional system with their debt trading. However, for the same reason, Shariah
30
compliance, IFIs are exposed to their own unique and systematic risks. In addition to some
general operational, credit and market risks, similar to their conventional counterpart, IFIs, as a
result of their specific structure and rapid growth, are exposed to risks by equity holders more
than debt holders. According to Iqbal and Greuning (2007, p. 172), it is crucial for IFIs to
develop a comprehensive risk management framework, as there is growing realization among
IFIs that sustainable growth depends critically on it. General factors that currently make the
operation of IFIs riskier, not only in western countries but also in majority of Muslim countries,
and consequently less competitive and less profitable than their conventional counterparts, are
Shariah compliance risks, operational risks, market risks and credit risks. As Khnifer (2010)
notes: “Recognizing and mitigating Shariah risk, which is sometimes not understood very well
even by some industry experts, is not especially different from managing market risk, credit risk,
liquidity risk and operational risk.”. It should be noted that all risks mentioned above could be
correlated and influence each other. For example, during the contract life, the risk inherent in a
Murabaha contract is transformed from market risk to credit risk13. In IFIs’ portfolios, it is often
challenging to distinguish between risk categories. It is generally difficult to distinguish between
the market and credit risks attached to a financial transaction abiding by the rules of sharia. In a
large number of contracts, risk categories of a different nature are entangled. In order to highlight
special issues in each type of risk, the nature of these risks will be discussed separately in detail
below.
3.2.1 Shariah compliance risk
The compliance of IFIs’ products with Shariah means that many risk hedging instruments which
are available for CFIs, such as futures, forwards and options are not available for them and this is
a risk in itself. In addition, sometimes IFIs also need to meet regulatory requirements for risk
measurement and capital of western countries which contradicts Shariah compliance. Shariah
compliance risks are risks that arise from the IFIs’ failure to comply with the Shariah principles.
Sometimes complex products, having gone through a long process of development, are rejected
by the Shariah boards for non-compliance with Shariah, which can cause additional costs to IFIs.
Some practitioners have suggested involving Shariah scholars in the earlier stage of product
13
State Bank of Pakistan, “Risk Management Guidelines for Islamic Banking Institutions” available on
www.sbp.org.pk accessed on 20/07-2011
31
development process. However this suggestion have been criticized by others arguing that it
could only lead to a more executive role of Shariah scholars hence adding more problems to
already existing corporate governance issues. As IFIs are focusing more on establishing
themselves in western countries, they are increasingly exposed to the risk of creating products
that are not Shariah compliant. There is a growing concern among scholars that it will increase
Shariah compliance risks, and that the direct consequence of these risks will be losing
conservative customers and thus decline in profits. Islamic banks are heavily reliant on the
loyalty of their depositors. Furthermore, it can lead the IFIs into a serious problem. Once the
more conservative depositors withdraw their funds, it could raise doubt of other depositors on the
credibility of the IFI and consequently, affected by rumors, even non-Muslim depositors will
rush to withdraw their deposits. In 2007 and 2008 criticism from some prominent Islamic
scholars on several Sukuk issuances led to a massive reduction in global issuance volumes
(Wyman 2009). During the global financial crisis, many solid banks witnessed how fragile and
helpless they are against bad rumors.
In order to lessen this kind of risk, AAOIFI have
introduced several special programs directed to Shariah scholars, to increase the number of
qualified Shariah advisers who also understand how the international financial system operates.
Firoozye (2009) notes that in recent years IFIs have become increasingly sensitive to Shariah
compliance risk, as more and more respected Islamic scholars began to openly criticize certain
types of Islamic banking practices. Firoozye (2009) considers the recent ruling on Tawarruq14 by
OIC Fiqh Council as the most significant Shariah risk event; “Tawarruq is firmly embedded in
the Islamic Banking system in a great many countries and an undiversified revenue stream for
many IFIs. Meanwhile, while all other cases involved questions that could be clarified by
broader consensus, or lower court rulings which could be overturned, there are no means of
overturning OIC rulings, although they are not binding. Consequently, this ruling could then be
seen as one of the largest examples of Shariah Risk in recent history, attempting to nullify
billions of dollars of yearly transactions in one fell swoop”. Even though Malaysia continued the
issuance of Tawarruq after the rulings, with a minor difference made, it had an effect on the
international trade.
14
Tawarruq is an arrangement in which one party sells a commodity to the other party on deferred payment at
cost plus profit. The other party, namely, the buyer, then sells the commodity to a third party on cash with a
purpose of having access to liquidity (State Bank of Pakistan)
32
In order to manage Shariah risks there is an urgent need of developing and implementing
appropriate mechanisms and adequate systems of control to ensure that new products are in full
compliance with Shariah internationally. Khnifer (2010) states that Shariah risk management is
identical in process and procedures to general risk management, of which there is an abundance
of professional reference works to refer to for guidance. He suggests Basel II as the ultimate riskmanagement system, which is now nearly universal in identifying, measuring, and protecting
against any and all risks that affect a bank’s operations. Another group of Islamic academics
suggest that risk management system in IFIs must be developed according to the unique structure
of IFIs, and not to be a copy of conventional system. They argue that Shariah risk management
begins ex-ante from the actual products that ultimately receive fatwa. Laldin (2009) suggest that
risk management systems that start prior to the Shariah board certification must be developed,
i.e., at the stage when a bank is engineering a new product and designing its relevant contracts.
Ibrahim states further that IFIs must strengthen a controlling system where identification and
assessment of Shariah risk would be systematically monitored and controlled in order to avoid
non-compliance of Shariah. Similar to the first suggestion, IFIs are increasingly recruiting
employees that are also familiar with Shariah law. This practice helps them to identify Shariah
compliance risk, if any, at a much earlier stage.
3.2.2 Operational risk
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) define operational risk is the ‘risk of direct or
indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, related to people, technology
or from external events. Iqbal and Greuning (2008) define operational risk as; “Operational risk
also includes the risk of failure of technology, systems, and analytical models. It is argued that
operational risks are likely to be significant for Islamic banks due to their specific contractual
features and the general legal environment.” Due to the latest global financial crisis, operational
risk of financial institutions has lately been one of the most discussed issues among economists.
The late global financial crisis proved that some major financial institutions in the world are
exposed to operational risk. IFIs are exposed to similar and some additional risks which stem
from their specific contractual features. According to IMF (WP/02/192) The administration of
PLS modes imply several activities that are not normally performed by conventional banks,
including the determination of profit-and-loss-sharing ratios on investment projects in various
sectors of the economy, as well as the ongoing auditing of financed projects to ensure proper
33
governance and appropriate valuation. These operations of IFIs together with the growing
complexities of banking regulation and supervision, and the additional layer of Shariah
compliance, require complex suites of Islamic banking software, structured to conform to legal
and regulatory as well as strict Shariah requirements. Khan and Ahmed (2001) state that
operational risk in IFIs is relatively higher and more serious than credit risk and market risk.
They believe it is because of new nature of Islamic banking, and that a lot of the issues related to
the operations are not instituted. These issues include the legal risk involved in contracts, the
understanding of the modes of financing by employees, producing computer programs and legal
documents for different instruments, etc. Furthermore, they argue that; “Operational risk in this
respect particularly arises as the banks may not have enough qualified professionals (capacity
and capability)
to conduct the Islamic financial operations. Given the different nature of
business the computer software available in the market for conventional banks may not be
appropriate for Islamic banks. This gives rise to system risks of developing and using
informational technologies in Islamic banks.”
As mentioned before, the IFIs are facing the shortage of professional employees and this has
forced them to hire experts with conventional banking background, especially in the western
countries. However, structure of IFIs’ products is more complicated than conventional.
Therefore, the above mentioned problem must be of high priority. IFIs must set up a sound
internal training system that professionally trains employees in identifying and dealing with
operational risks. Effective management of operational risk in IFIs in the western countries needs
extremely skilled employees, with both conventional and Islamic banking background. These
employees must be trained in administrating and conducting Islamic financial operations
professionally, especially the profit and loss modes identified by IMF as one of the most
important issues in dealing with operational risk. The assessment of this risk is a difficult task
and unique to IFIs. After the global financial crisis international regulatory authorities have
focused much on the enhancement of the operational risk management practices. The Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision has lately specified, in its regulatory standard, requirements
that safeguard financial institutions against operational risk. To fulfill the requirements of the
Shariah as well as the Basel III, it is necessary to create a large pool of highly qualified
professionals and experts with in-depth knowledge of not only the Shariah and its objectives, but
also dual financial systems. In addition they should be properly trained in using IT systems as
34
part of the implementing processes and self-regulating the products and services offered by IFIs.
IFSB has announced that it will revise its rules to enhance Shariah banks’ capital in line with
Basel III reforms.15 IFIs are interested in implementing Basel III because they are already wellcapitalized compared to CFIs. In addition, the regulatory and supervisory framework of IFIs will
converge to the global standards, and thus increase their competitiveness in the western world.
Despite this enthusiasm from IFIs, they are at the same concerned with the lack of distinction
between CFIs and IFIs in the Basel III Capital Accord. The distinct operational risks in IFIs such
as PLS activities, profit smoothing and other particular needs are not addressed.
3.2.3 Market risk
In the risk management guidelines of the State Bank of Pakistan16 Market risk is defined as the
risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions arising from movements in market prices i.e.
fluctuations in values in tradable, marketable or leasable assets (including Sukuk) and in offbalance sheet individual portfolios (for example restricted investment accounts). It states also
that, the risks relate to the current and future volatility of market values of specific assets (for
example, the commodity price of a Salam asset, the market value of a Sukuk, the market value of
Murabaha assets purchased to be delivered over a specific period) and of foreign exchange rates.
IMF (WP/02/192) has identified four major issues related to the market risk exposure of IFIs.
They are:
1. Commodity Price Risk
2. Equity Price Risk
3.
Interest Rate Risk, and
4. Exchange Rate Risk
According to Khan and Ahmed (2001) IFIs consider market risk to be the least risky. They argue
that it could be because of the structure of IFIs’ products and Shariah compliance that forbid
engaging in sale of debt and Riba. The prohibition of Riba in Islamic finance has resulted in less
risk from interest rate changes. Still, IFIs are indirectly affected, to a lesser degree, by interest
rate risk through the mark-up price of deferred sale and leased based transactions. IFIs use the
15
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/bank_189707.html accessed on 4/8-2011
State Bank of Pakistan, “Risk Management Guidelines for Islamic Banking Institutions” available on
www.sbp.org.pk accessed on 20/07-2011
16
35
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) as a benchmark in their Murabaha and Ijarah
transactions. IFIs are exposed to commodity price risk because of the same products. The
inventory items must be carried by IFIs until the Murabaha and Ijarah transactions are
completed, thus an increase in the underlying items expose IFIs to commodity price risk. IFIs are
exposed to equity price risk through their profit and loss sharing contracts, precisely Mudarabah
and Musharakah. The capital invested in these contracts does not constitute a fixed return and in
the event of lower profit or even loss this capital is exposed to impairment. And finally, IFIs are
exposed to exchange rate risk in almost the same way as CFIs.
To manage market risk in IFIs, Hasan and Antoniou (2004) propose to employ Value at Risk
model which is used by major conventional trading institutions for market risk management.
This model is used to measure market risk in general, but other risks like foreign currency,
commodities, and equity risks are also measured. They argue that IFIs’ market risks are almost
similar to market risk of CFIs, thus it could be used with advantage by IFIs. On the other side,
IFSB have stated in its guideline that IFIs shall have in place an appropriate framework for
market risk management (including reporting) in respect to all assets held, including those that
do not have a ready market or are exposed to high price volatility.
3.2.4 Credit risk
Credit risk is a risk that arises from the change in net asset value due to changes in the perceived
ability of counter parties to meet their contractual obligations. From this definition, it is obvious
that this kind of risk could be found in every single product offered by financial institutions, but
with a different degree of exposure. CFIs are exposed to this kind of risk mostly in their lending
activities, while IFIs, due to their profit sharing structure, are exposed to it in majority of their
products. IFSB has defined credit risk in IFIs as potential that counterparty fails to meet its
obligations in accordance with agreed terms (IFSB 2005). Iqbal and Greuning (2008, p. 120)
define credit risk as the chance that a debtor or issuer of a financial instrument—whether an
individual, a company, or a country—will not repay principal and other investment-related cash
flows according to the terms specified in a credit agreement. Inherent to banking, it means that
payments may be delayed or not made at all, which can cause cash flow problems and affect a
bank’s liquidity. Despite innovation in the financial services sector, more than 70 percent of a
bank’s balance sheet generally relates to this aspect of risk management. For this reason, credit
36
risk is the principal cause of bank failures. If we take in to consideration just the profit and loss
products of IFIs (Musharakah and Mudarabah), they are much more risky than loans given by
CFIs. In profit and loss transactions Shariah states that a party which has no capital invested in
the contract does not have to share the losses. In transactions which end with losses it is IFIs that
must cover the most of it. In addition, they may not charge penalties due to default of payments
by the customer or nor they can require collateral to reduce risks as in CFIs. Theoretically, as
mentioned before, Shariah states that profit and loss sharing products must be based on the
concept of brotherhood, equal treatment and mutual trust. IFIs followed this concept in 1970s
while operating mostly locally in small towns or cities. But as the customer numbers grew and
IFIs began to expand their activities in the western world, this concept was not applicable
anymore because this concept begun to be misused increasingly by customers. High level of
moral hazard, adverse selection and IFIs’ limited competencies in project evaluation and related
techniques forced IFIs to rely more on other products than profit and loss sharing. At the same
time different types of risk management systems were invented to safeguard IFIs from credit
risk. According to Iqbal and Greuning (2008, p. 120): “the techniques used by Islamic banks to
mitigate credit risk are similar to those used by conventional banks. However, in the absence of
credit-rating agencies, banks rely on the client’s track record with the bank and gather
information about the creditworthiness of the client through informal sources and local
community networks.” IFSB (2005) lists exposed products as follows: accounts receivable in
Mudarabah contract, Musharakah, Salam contract, Ijarah and Sukuk held to maturity in the
banking book. In order to manage credit risk properly, the State Bank of Pakistan has come up
with the following principles in their latest guideline17:
1. IFIs shall have in place a strategy for financing, using various instruments in compliance
with Shariah, whereby they recognize the potential credit exposures that may arise at
different stages of the various financing agreements.
2. IFIs shall carry out a due diligence review in respect of counterparties prior to deciding
on the choice of an appropriate Islamic financing instrument
3. IFIs shall have in place appropriate methodologies for measuring and reporting the credit
risk exposures arising under each Islamic financing instrument.
17
State Bank of Pakistan, “Risk Management Guidelines for Islamic Banking Institutions” available on
www.sbp.org.pk accessed on 20/07-2011
37
4. IFIs shall have in place Shariah-compliant credit risk mitigating techniques appropriate
for each Islamic financing instrument.
3.2.5 Liquidity risk
Iqbal and Greuning (2008, p. 150) define liquidity risk as follows; “It represents a bank’s ability
to accommodate the redemption of deposits and other liabilities and to cover the demand for
funding in the loan and investment portfolio. A bank is said to have adequate liquidity potential
when it can obtain needed funds (by increasing liabilities, securitizing, or selling assets)
promptly and at a reasonable cost.”
From the above it means that liquidity risk arises when there is a possibility that an asset or a
position in a portfolio cannot be converted quickly to liquid assets, or when institutions have
difficulties with obtaining cash at reasonable cost for their short-term liabilities. This was one of
the main causes of recent global financial crisis. During the crisis we have witnessed some
intense discussions and arguments on improving financial institutions’ liquidity management
practices by central banks and fiscal authorities throughout the world. Even though IFIs have not
been affected as much as CFIs by the global financial crisis, they have become the centre of
fiscal authorities and central banks’ attention in the western world because of their restricted
access to the short-term and medium-term funding options. Prohibition by Shariah law from
borrowing on the basis of interest in case of need, and the absence of an active interbank money
market have restricted Islamic banks’ options to manage their liquidity positions efficiently.
Malaysia, the leading Islamic finance innovator, has been actively promoting the establishment
of interbank and secondary market for IFIs. In fact Malaysia established the first Islamic
interbank money market in the world as well as secondary market. But according to Khan and
Porzio (2010, p. 101) even though interbank and secondary markets exist to some extent,
designing and developing Shariah compliant instruments for them has proven to be conceptually
difficult. The liquid nature of banks’ liabilities, related to the predominance of deposits of shortterm maturities, predisposes the system to hold substantial liquid assets and excess reserves.
Difficulties in defining the rates of return on these instruments have also constrained the
development of money and interbank markets. The absence of well organized, liquid interbank
markets, that can accept banks’ overnight deposits and offer them lending to cover short- term
financial needs, has exacerbated banks’ tendencies to concentrate on short- term assets. The lack
38
of a cross-border liquid market infrastructure and instruments for the management of liquidity
risk has been a long-standing challenge for the IFIs. According to Parker (2011), the need and
urgency for establishing a global Islamic liquidity management scheme is underlined by the fact
that the global commodity Murabaha market, which constitutes the main underlying transactions
of an Islamic liquidity management system, is estimated at a staggering $1.2 trillion. Iqbal and
Greuning (2008, p. 154) state that limited availability of a Shariah-compatible money market,
secondary market for debt instruments and intra-bank market are the leading causes of liquidity
risk in IFIs.
3.2.5.1 Interbank market
As its name suggests, the interbank market is a market through which banks lend to each other.
Like the discount market this provides individual banks with an outlet for surplus funds and a
source of borrowing to manage their liquidity. The loans are normally for very short periods,
from overnight to fourteen days, though some lending for three, six months and one year occurs.
The rate of interest paid on interbank loans is known as London Interbank Offered Rate or
LIBOR. Unlike other instruments ‘traded’ in the money markets, interbank deposits cannot be
bought and sold between third parties (Howells and Bain 2007, p. 129). While the interbank
market is well-developed for CFIs, this market is not acceptable for IFIs because it involves
interest which is prohibited by Shariah. Access to interbank money markets for short-term
borrowings gives considerable flexibility to banks to manage their short-term liquidity problems.
As a nascent industry, IFIs have some shortages in comparison with their conventional
counterparts. As mentioned above, Malaysia, the leading Islamic finance innovator, has been
actively promoting the establishment of interbank and secondary market for IFIs. Creating
Shariah compliant interbank market is not an easy task, but Malaysia has managed to introduce
several products since the establishment of first interbank market in 1994. According to Visser
(2009, p. 127) the following are successful products introduced by Malaysia:

Mudarabah interbank investment - periods of investment run from overnight to 12
months. These investments earn a share of the profits for investment of one year of the
investee bank, at a negotiable profit-sharing ratio. Mudarabah interbank investments
replace Certificates of Deposit and are issued and traded by the banks.
39

Government Investment Issues - The Malaysian central bank opened a window to
purchase and sell GII on the secondary market, at prices set by them. For financing a
government budget deficit that is not attributable to specific projects, one solution is to
borrow in the form of loans at zero per cent and offer gifts (dividends), at the discretion
of the issuer, in recompense.

Islamic Accepted Bills - these resemble bankers’ acceptances and are based on Murabaha
(mark-up). A bank selling a good under a Murabaha contract draws a bill of exchange on
its client and may sell the bill to a third party at an agreed price. Outside Malaysia is not
universally accepted as Shariah-compliant.
Venardos (2010, p. 244) suggests that short-term Sukuk, mostly commodity Murabaha, can serve
as money market instruments for liquidity management and collateral in money market
transactions, promoting interbank lending activities between IFIs. In Malaysia, GIIs and
Malaysia Islamic treasury bills, eligible for statutory liquidity reserve requirements, allow IFIs to
hold liquid paper.
3.2.5.2 Secondary market
Existence of secondary markets for financial instruments is also an important source of liquidity.
In the existence of the secondary markets the primary markets function more efficiently. In order
for secondary markets to function properly, there are some basic conditions that must be met in
the form of standardized regulations and clearly established rules so that both parties in a
transaction know their responsibilities. There must be a well established and globally
harmonized trading system. These are characteristics that Islamic secondary market still lacks.
Iqbal and Mirakhor (1995) state that all things being equal, a certificate holder would rather
participate in a well structured and well regulated secondary market instead of trading in a poorly
run market. While countries like Malaysia, GCCs and UK are trying hard to develop well
functioning Islamic secondary markets, these markets do not even exist in most of other Islamic
countries, and where they exist they are unorganized or are regulated by laws and regulations.
Some countries do not even allow the establishment of secondary markets arguing it is not in
compliance with Shariah. Another problem in developing a strong secondary market is the lack
of Shariah-compliant products. One of the reasons being the strong appetite for Islamic products
by investors, to the extent that each issue is always over-subscribed and those bought are kept
40
until maturity so little room is left for a secondary market. According to Iqbal and Molineux
(2005, p. 127), also predominance of debt-based modes of financing has made it difficult for IFIs
to transform these financial modes into negotiable financial instruments. Once a debt has been
created, it cannot be transferred to anyone else except at par value. This renders the whole
structure of the Islamic financial market highly illiquid. This is one of the major obstacles in the
development of secondary markets in Islamic financial instruments. They suggest that to develop
Islamic secondary markets, equity-based financial instruments and securitization modes must
become wider applicable and negotiable instruments based on Ijarah, Salam and Istisna are being
developed. Visser (2009, p. 56) agrees and explains how Musharakah partnerships can be
securitized so they can be traded in secondary markets. If the underlying assets are not mainly
liquid assets and the price of these certificates would reflect the nominal value of the assets, the
trade would be Shariah-compliant. Shariah scholars seem to agree that a minimum of 50 per cent
of the assets should be non-liquid. He further elaborates that Ijarah-based Sukuk can also be
traded on the secondary market. Islamic secondary market faces challenges from both sides; first
from Muslim scholars who mean that secondary markets are not Shariah compliant and second
because it also have to compete with established and a well functioning conventional secondary
market. Developing Shariah-compliant products for the secondary market is a complicated in the
form of voluminous documentation, double or triple contracts on a single asset, and elevated
legal risks which make them expensive and time-consuming compared to conventional products.
CFIs with Islamic windows that do not care about Shariah compliance as much as IFIs do, would
prefer to conduct their operations in conventional markets instead of Islamic secondary markets.
However, efforts are being made, to develop the Islamic secondary market with better structured
products and tweak the rules and regulations, capable of meeting the above mentioned
challenges, by many leading Muslim and non-Muslim countries. Latest, in October 2010, in a
landmark global initiative, the International Islamic Liquidity Management (IILM) was
established with 14 founding shareholders, comprising the 12 central banks of Indonesia, Iran,
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as two multi-lateral institutions, the Islamic Development
Bank and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector18. IILM is expected
to issue high quality Shariah-compliant financial instruments at both the national level and across
18
http://www.islamicfinance.de/?q=taxonomy/term/3034 accessed on 30/8-2011
41
borders, to enhance the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial markets. These
instruments will be utilized in liquidity management as eligible collateral for interbank
transactions and central bank financing, or through trading of IILM instruments in the secondary
market. As the IILM is intended to facilitate cross-border liquidity management, its instruments
shall be denominated in major reserve currencies. This is to ensure access to a large pool of
global investors and broaden the range of its holders, thereby enhancing the prospects for active
secondary market.
3.2.6 Displaced commercial risk
Displaced commercial risk (DCR) is a distinct and specific feature of IFIs. IFSB (2005) 19 define
DCR as the risk arising from assets managed by IFI on behalf of investment account holders
(IAH), which is effectively transferred to the IFI’s own capital because the IFI follows the
practice of forgoing part or its entire Mudarib20 share of profit on such fund, when it considers
this necessary as a result of commercial pressure in order to increase the return that would
otherwise be payable to IAH’s. It should be noted that IAHs are generally divided into two
types; Unrestricted Investment Accounts (UIA) – the funds are invested at the discretion of the
IFIs, and Restricted Investment Accounts (RIA) – the funds are invested in a pre-agreed manner
with customers. Measures taken by IFIs in order to deal with DCR are called “Smoothing” the
returns. Smoothing returns is more generally found in connection with UIAs since they are
considered a Shariah-compliant substitute for conventional deposits.21 IFIs are less exposed to
DCR in countries with predominant Muslim population and Islamic financial services. However,
in the western world, in order to compete with the CFIs and to mitigate potential withdrawal of
funds by depositors, the IFI may confront commercial pressure to pay returns that exceed the rate
that has been earned on its assets financed by investment account holders. In the western
countries the existence of rational depositors, that indifferently position Islamic banking and
conventional banking is one of the most important issues because these depositors can take
their funds anytime and place the funds in the conventional banks when interest rate is
high. The IFIs are ready to forego part or its entire share of profit in order to retain IAHs and
dissuade them from withdrawing their funds. According to Venardos (2010, p. 79), the funds
19
IFSB “Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) offering only
Islamic Financial Services”
20
A Mudarib is the person or party who acts as entrepreneur. In this case the IFI.
21
IFSB 2010 GN-3 “Guidance Note on the Practice of Smoothing the Profits Payout to Investment Account Holders”
42
from the depositor and IAHs form more than 60% of the total source of funds for the IFIs. To
ensure that the account holders remain with the IFI, depositors and investors must be assured of a
competitive rate of return for their fund placements. Kaouther et al. (2010) state that; “in theory,
the profits are shared in pre-agreed ratio and all losses on assets financed by the investment
funds are to be borne by IAHs, except in the case of misconduct, negligence or breach of
contracted terms by the IFIs. In practice, the concept of sharing the actual profits with
IAHs is far from being the common practice of IFIs. Under commercial pressure or
regulatory pressure, the majority of IFIs absorb a proportion of losses normally borne by IAHs
in order to mitigate potential massive withdrawal of funds.”
Four most used smoothing methods used by IFIs are following (IFSB 2010):
1. IFI’s Mudarib fee – IFI gives up part of its management fee in order to absorb
expected losses
2. Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) - reserve is built up by setting aside amounts
from the investment profits before allocation between the shareholders and
the unrestricted IAH and the calculation of the Management fee.
3. Investment Risk Reserve (IRR) – Reserve is built up by setting aside amounts
from the investment profits attributable to the UIAH, after deducting the
IFI’s management fee.
4. Retained earnings – make a transfer from shareholders’ current or retained
profits to a UIAH.
All four methods used above are subject to governance issues and lack of transparency,
especially the PER and IRR methods. IFSB (2010) has addressed these issues and tried to come
up with recommendations on how to improve transparency and deal with governance issues. The
list of recommendations is extensive compared to the limitations of this paper and will not be
mentioned here.
3.3 Central Banks
In conventional financial economy, beside the regulative support, the role of central bank is
crucial for liquidity management for CFIs, and perhaps even more important is the role of lender
of last resort. Unfortunately, this is not the case for IFIs. The challenge for IFIs is that their
43
operational procedures must comply with Shariah, and as mentioned before, Shariah prohibits
Riba (interest). This non-compatibility prevents central banks from controlling of giving support
to IFIs. While in most Muslim countries with developed financial markets, Shariah compliant
practices, such as government investment issues (GII) in Malaysia and central bank securities in
GCC, that reduces this non-compatibility evolves slowly, the connection between IFIs and
central banks in the western world is non-existent except a couple of countries. Shariah
compliance impedes IFIs’ access to financial transactions in central bank money in the western
countries. In addition, the limited capital of IFIs and their limited economical influence in the
western countries leads to the marginal recognition by the central banks. The reliance on central
banks in western world, even for liquidity management, is still low as most short-term borrowing
facilities that are available in Muslim countries have not been adapted by them. The Islamic
financial instruments that are currently being traded in the majority of Muslim countries’ markets
on the basis of bay’ al-dayn (sale of debt) are the green bankers acceptances22, Islamic accepted
bills, Islamic mortgage bonds, and Islamic private debt securities. In addition, financial
institutions can sell government investment issues to the central bank, as and when required, to
meet their liquidity needs. In turn, financial institutions can buy Shariah-compliant investment
issues from the central bank (Iqbal and Greuning 2008 p. 155). Another problem facing IFIs is
the requirements of central banks to keep some of commercial banks’ deposits with them. While
central banks in majority of Muslim countries have aligned these requirement according to
Shariah, central banks is western countries pay interest on those deposits which is cannot be
accepted by IFIs. As IFIs have to hold comparatively larger proportion of these deposits with
central banks, the unavailability of profit earnings on these accounts significantly affects their
profitability. With the growing importance of Islamic finance in the world, central banks in
western countries inevitably have to implement practices and some operating instruments that are
available by central banks in Muslim countries. Malaysian central bank’s is perhaps one of the
best practices they could look up to. Malaysian central bank has developed an integrated and
well-functioning dual banking system. It maintains separate current accounts and clearing
accounts for IFIs and CFIs. In addition, the financial safety net framework in Malaysia
encompasses the lender of last resort facility and a comprehensive deposit insurance system that
22
Banks may purchase BA issued by other banks (inclusive of conventional banks) provided that it is: An export or
sales BA and/or drawn to finance “Halal” goods or commodity (Malaysian Central Bank).
44
provides coverage for both conventional and Islamic deposits. Iqbal and molyneux (2005, p. 117)
state that countries that host Islamic banking and financial institutions have a real interest in
dealing with this problem, and this can only be done through a coordinating body which
produces and enforces sound regulatory and supervisory standards, and which would be tailored
to the needs of Islamic banking and finance. They suggest that, it is important that the IFSB
works in close coordination and understanding with international standard-setters, such as the
Basel Committee, to develop standards that are suitable for supervision of Islamic banks, yet
acceptable to international bodies.
Theoretically, there is nothing that makes central banks in Islamic financial system differ in a
major way from their conventional counterpart.
In practice however, majority of Muslim
countries’ central banks do not take their essential role of initiating and fostering the
development of money and capital markets that are Shariah compliant as their conventional
counterparts do. Thomas et al. (2005, p. 207) point out that, the central banks in Muslim
countries do not have an effective role in regulating the standards and practices for IFIs. As a
result, their accounting practices were inconsistent and the financial statements were not
transparent due to inadequate disclosure. Greuning and Iqbal suggest (2008, p. 56) that western
central banks could collaborate and use the experience of IMF in implementing Shariah
compliant practices for IFIs; “IMF worked closely with the Central Bank of Sudan to transform
the central banking operations to conform with the Shariah….Beginning in the late 1990s the
IMF began to assist Muslim countries in establishing multilateral institutions and to facilitate
cooperation among them, notably on issues such as establishing an Islamic money market, an
Islamic capital market, and an international Islamic banking and financial supervisory and
standard-setting institution.” In relation to central bank challenges, there are also some
regulatory challenges to be considered, and they are discussed in the following subchapter.
3.4 Regulative challenges
As a nascent and constantly developing industry Islamic finance faces different kinds of
regulative challenges. Besides, Muslim countries are constantly implementing new rules and
regulations that sometimes contradict each others. The legal and regulatory practice governing
IFIs varies across countries. According to Chapra and Ahmed (2002), Islamic Research and
Training Institute (IRTI) revealed that the regulatory and institutional environment for Islamic
45
banks does not appear to be adequate and the variation is also relatively greater between
countries. This indicates that there are a number of issues confronted by the authorities with
respect to the regulation and supervision of Islamic financial institutions. They identify three
issues; the first relates to the removal of all the legal obstacles that hinder the rapid expansion of
Islamic financial institutions. The second is about the clarification, harmonization and
codification of standards of Islamic finance as much as is possible, and about ensuring the
compliance of these institutions with these standards. And the third issue relates to
implementation of the guidelines provided by the Basel Committee. In addition, Hassan and
Chowdhury (2004) argue that financial services regulators and central banks cannot take on the
responsibilities for Shariah compliance, but they should ensure proper procedures for ensuring
compliance are in place. They should also be aware of what Shariah law implies, and follow the
moves to arrive at international Shariah classification standards. Regulators should concern
themselves with corporate governance issues that involve examining the remit of the Shariah
advisors. They underline that with the increasing internationalization of IFIs, regulators must
focus on improved transparency.
After the global financial crisis, different regulatory architectures for conventional financial
sector are being implemented around the globe. Islamic finance has not been forgotten either.
Especially in the western world, with the rapid growth, increasing public interest and
establishment of Islamic windows by major CFIs, the focus has also shifted to Islamic finance.
The regulatory challenges faced by IFIs in western world are of the same type as mentioned
above but much complicated. There are several other regulative issues that hold Islamic finance
back in western countries. Even in UK which has created an attractive environmental and
regulatory framework for the Shariah compliant products in secondary market, and several other
initiatives to introduce and to attract Shariah compliant products, PLS products of IFIs, where
the return of account holders is not guaranteed, have not been permitted because it does not fit
UK’s financial regulations. In the case of U.S., it is the set of restrictions placed on the range of
permissible investments that commercial banks may hold and different regulatory authorities that
IFIs must convince before they can start their operations (Rutledge 2005). Furthermore, the
secular law of western countries does not understand the rulings of Shariah boards either.
Regulators need to know exactly the role of Shariah board, whether it is advisory or executive. It
makes them reluctant to support the establishment of IFIs. The lack of regulatory support with
46
specific legal and policy framework continues to hold the rapid expansion and acceptance of
Islamic finance back in western world.
All of the above mentioned challenges are reflected upon the IFIs as a competitive disadvantage
compared to CFIs. IFIs suffer from application of such rules and regulations well fitted to CFIs,
and require tailor made regulation for their unique products. Organizations like AAOIFI and
IFSB are developing a range of prudential and regulatory standards to solve this problem, in
cooperation with leading western countries like Luxembourg and UK. Islamic finance enjoys the
support of the Luxembourg Government, which set up a special Task Force in 2008 to identify
obstacles to the development of Islamic finance and how to remove them23. The Central Bank of
Luxembourg is the only member of the IFSB from EU and the central bank of Luxembourg is a
founder member of the newly established IILM. There are currently 22 banks in the UK, of
which 5 are stand alone Shariah-compliant banks, offering Islamic finance products, exceeding
that of any other Western country.24 As Parker (2011) states; “The irony is that the UK has more
enabling legislation to facilitate Islamic financial products and institutions than most Islamic
countries”.
The new challenges set out under Basel III are currently being actively addressed by the IFSB to
ensure continued operation under globally accepted norms. In addition, IASB requires each
organization to comply fully with IFRS in order to be considered as following IAS (Abd El
Razik 2009). In 2011, there has been growth in the trading of Islamic financial products from
Middle Eastern and far eastern jurisdictions to Europe. Most notably, Dubai has increased
trading of Sukuk and other products to France and Germany due to tax advantages 25. The above
mentioned developments hint to the growing acceptance of Islamic finance and increasing
willingness of western countries to develop tailor made regulations to IFIs’ operations.
3.5 Public policy and taxes
The importance of public policies is critical for promotion and success of nascent industries. The
growth opportunity as well as the challenges facing the development of the Islamic financial
industry needs supportive and targeted public policies both at the national and especially in the
23
http://www.lff.lu/products-services/islamic-finance/ accessed on 3/9-2011
http://arabnews.com/economy/islamicfinance/article448955.ece?service=print accessed on 5/9-2011
25
http://events.centralbanking.com/events/static/how-to-regulate-islamic-financial-markets-and-products
accessed on 7/9-2011
24
47
international levels. Growing importance and increasing assets of IFIs globally will eventually
attract the attention of public policy makers and institutions interested in introducing alternative
financial products, but without proper public policies this process will happen too slowly. In
contrast to the conventional system, the Islamic financial system is based on the active
participation of public policy institutions, regulatory and supervisory authorities, and Shariah
authorities (Iqbal and Greuning 2008, p. 187). In majority of Muslim countries IFIs, have taken
an intensified program to familiarize the public and policy makers with the functions of Islamic
finance. It is expected that awareness and understanding of Islamic finance by both the public
and regulators will strengthen the demand for and supply of Islamic financial services. Even in
Muslim countries general public and policy makers are not completely familiar with the Islamic
financial products. The reason can be traced to the political and economical dependencies of
these countries to western colonial powers and their conventional financial system in the past.
According to Ahmed (2002, p. 120) the case is worse in western countries where IFIs have faced
multiple problems with mainstream regulations. For instance, treatment of Ijarah in Islamic
banking system is recognized as normal leasing instead of mortgage which changes the concept
of Ijarah from purchasing the asset by the bank and leasing it to customers to a normal lease of
real estate26. Also, imposing taxes by non‐Muslim governments on Zakat, leads to double
taxation. Zakat is treated as a non-operating expense in IFIs financial statements and
consequently has no influence on their net income. The same applies to Murabaha transactions.
IFIs pay VAT twice on Murabaha mark-up.27 Thus, IFIs are required to pay regulatory fees
which results in double payments to meet the dual regulations of Islamic and conventional
system. Public policy involvement in tax framework has proven to have positive consequences
for the development of Islamic finance in the countries with prevailing conventional system.
Since the early 2000s the EU countries, for reasons of wider public policy, have introduced a
series of tax and legislative changes specifically designed to remove obstacles to the
development of Islamic finance. So far only UK and Luxembourg have been successful in
creating a friendly environment for Islamic finance over the past decade, and this has largely
been achieved by effective public policy. Schoon (2009) concludes in her country report that
26
As property would be bought and sold (legal title transferred) more than once. Thus stamp duty would
otherwise be payable initially when the bank purchased the property and again when the legal title is transferred
to the customer upon repayment of the loan to the bank.
27
An example is shown in the Appendix 2
48
although large, international banks generally offer Islamic financial services, no other
governments have so far announced any plans to review and, where required, amend their
regulatory, legal or tax framework.
3.6 Concluding remarks
As a nascent industry, IFIs face numerous challenges both locally and internationally that raises
questions about the long-term viability of Islamic finance, including building its presence in the
international capital market to compete with the conventional banks. This will require much
more co-operation between IFIs, not only locally but also internationally. By looking at
challenges discussed in this chapter, it is apparent that a lot of variation exists among IFIs’
products and the way they are legally constituted. Strength of an Islamic financial system
requires institutionalized regulations and universally accepted standards to promote stability and
consistency. First of all it is essential to ensure a strong legislative base for the establishment of
IFIs in majority of leading non-Muslim countries. Furthermore, the success of IFIs in the global
scene requires the establishment of a universal framework to regulate and stabilize IFIs. There is
no institution for Islamic finance, like Basel Committee of the Bank of International Settlements
is there for conventional system, to promote a strong framework ensuring harmonization and
universally accepted standards. Institutions like IFSB and AAOIFI are trying to construct
uniform standards for IFIs and encourage IFIs to comply with Basel III requirements. However,
in order to overcome global challenges specifically related to IFIs, these institutions must
enhance their multilateral cooperation with BCBS and ensure appropriate environment,
conditions and level playing field for IFIs.
The tax treatment of certain IFIs’ products remains unclear and unfavorable as compared with
their conventional counterparts in majority of western countries. Even in the UK which is the
leading western country in establishing the Islamic financial market, tax treatment of some
products remains unclear. Islamic International standard setting organizations should cooperate
and provide assistance to policy makers and national standard setting organizations on how to
augment the national financial architecture with a new regulatory framework that consider
institutional differences.
With regard to IFIs, there is the need for more specific governance practices to improve controls
and transparency. Although national and international standard setting organizations are working
49
on guiding principles intended to help IFIs establish and improve their corporate governance
frameworks and assist regulators in assessing such frameworks, there is the need for more
prescriptive approach. IFIs must also work together to improve their risk management systems to
ensure the stability and soundness of Islamic financial system. There is an urgent need of
developing and implementing appropriate mechanisms, adequate systems of control to address
specific and unique characteristics of risks involved in Islamic finance.
4 Opportunities
The strong performance of the IFIs during the global financial crisis has grown the interest of
investment community, consumers and intermediaries investors around the world and is
increasingly gaining ground in western countries. Majority of large western conventional banks
have opened Islamic financing windows. Despite the regulatory hurdles presented by operating
in a non-Muslim financial environment IFIs have experienced double digit growth also in the
western countries. The growth of Islamic finance partly reflects demand from Muslim minority
communities residing in these countries, but also non-Muslim population of these countries is
increasingly using IFIs as a viable alternative to the CFIs. Latest legislative acts creating
favorable tax and legal conditions for the development of IFIs, in countries such as Australia,
Germany and France shows the growing importance of Islamic finance in the global financial
world. As a nascent industry, Islamic finance is constantly changing and evolving. The Islamic
debt market so far has been the most rapid growing segment of Islamic finance, even though it
suffered significant jitters in the wake of the Dubai debt crisis in2009/10. IFIs leaded by
Malaysia have been gearing up for further expansion by continuing to develop, refine and market
innovative Islamic financial instruments, on both the asset and liability sides. Many new Islamic
financial products have been developed and are increasingly used in financial market activities,
including equity and bond trading and investment, Islamic insurance, Islamic syndicated lending.
Innovation plays a big part in the growth of Islamic finance globally. In order to prosper and
become more competitive within the mainstream financial system worldwide IFIs must grab the
opportunities and exploit this momentum. The four opportunities that will be looked at and
discussed in this chapter are Market development, Product development and M&As. The first
two are based on the Ansoff’s matrix. The Ansoff’s matrix provides the knowledge of products
50
and market choice available to the organizations, or in this case industry, when they wish to grow
intensively (Kotler et al., 2003).
4.1 Market development
The consequences of global financial crisis, European sovereign debt crisis and the latest
Middle-East unrest urge IFIs turning to fresh sources and new markets for growth. Several
Islamic and also non-Islamic countries, around the globe, have taken initiatives in creating more
liquidity, enhancing market transparency and re-evaluating their domestic legislation with a view
to develop Islamic capital markets. While the CFIs suffer ratings downgrade, mistrust from
consumers and fiscal shortfalls due to the global financial turmoil, Islamic Finance has proved to
be a more stable and promising finance sector. However, the above mentioned events have also
highlighted the Islamic finance’s long-standing challenge in liquidity management. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, the challenges of liquidity management are caused by the
limited availability of Shariah-compatible capital markets. IFIs have difficulties managing their
liquidity properly due to lack of well functioning Islamic capital markets. Ali (2008, p. 30) points
out that; “capital markets at individual country level are underdeveloped in many OIC28
countries and segmented. Of the 57 OIC-member countries only 21 have stock markets of any
significance that are covered in the World Development Indicators of World Bank in
2006…Different Muslim countries have adopted different practices in relation to various Islamic
capital market product and services which is a result of the varying interpretation on various
Shariah issues across jurisdictions.” However, in the past five years as a result of global
financial crisis the development of Islamic capital markets have been accelerated by both
Muslim and non-Muslim countries. International Islamic standard setting organizations such as
IFSB, AAOIFI, IIFM and recently established IILM have joined forces with western regulatory
and standard setting organizations in order to further develop the nascent Islamic capital markets.
The collapse of some prominent Western financial institutions and a general crisis of confidence
in the conventional system have created an upsurge of interest in Islamic finance from western
countries. Global financial markets are more than ever linked together and this applies naturally
to Islamic capital markets. In order for western investors to have any alternative choice of
investment opportunities or risk management tools a global Islamic capital market is required. As
Islamic finance plays an increasingly important role in mobilizing deposits and providing
28
The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
51
financing in the western world, the development of an Islamic capital market allows the
corporate sector to source some of their financing needs. The development of Islamic capital
markets is an integral part of global capital markets development because it adds to the
efficiency of mobilization and allocation of resources internationally. A dynamic and vibrant
Islamic capital market can immensely contribute in overcoming the current recession the world
is facing. The leading IFIs in the world together with Islamic regulatory and standard setting
organizations need to embrace this potential opportunity and not let it slip away. They must work
hard together to enable the expansion and development of international Islamic capital markets
by means of standardizing contracts and documentation of Islamic financial products that are
Shariah compliant but at the same time compatible with the conventional system predominant in
the western world. Furthermore, they need to collaborate with the public and regulatory
authorities in the west because Islamic capital markets may have prospects only if these
authorities will take interest in it, and because without the development of specialized legislation,
it will be difficult for an Islamic capital market to function. It is important to promote the
economic benefits of Islamic financial instruments, and to position them as an alternative form of
financial transactions that may be interesting to a large count of businessmen and investors in the
western world. Insufficient understanding of its essence by regulatory authorities or investors,
including ambiguous attitude towards the Islamic financial products will impede the
development of Islamic capital markets. While the Islamic primary market is functioning better
and is expected to grow,29 its secondary market needs attention, not least because a sustainable
and vibrant secondary market promotes and sustains a well functioning primary market. The
existence of different opinions and Shariah interpretations on the permissibility of specific
financial products is a reality that confronts any attempt to establish commonly accepted
standards for products and practices for the secondary markets. On the other hand, shortages of
Shariah compatible instruments, the lack of qualified market makers and the limited
dissemination of information and data have impeded the development of well-functioning
secondary markets where long-term instruments can be traded. UK and Luxembourg have
recently canceled their planned sovereign issuance of Sukuk, which are considered as one of the
29
http://www.qfinance.com/capital-markets-best-practice/the-international-role-of-islamic-finance?page=3#s4
accessed on 10/9-2011
52
major catalysts for the development of secondary markets, reasoning “not value for money” 30.
Issuance of the Sukuk depends much on the political and regulatory flexibility to reduce issuance
costs. Therefore, government initiatives in this regard especially by easing laws related to
ownership and taxation is very important. The growing interest of non-Muslim investors for
Sukuk investments adds to the need for both sovereign and commercial issuance of Sukuk. These
factors reinforce the imperative for a higher level of standardization of Islamic financial products
which would reduce issuance and transaction costs, hence overall level of confidence in Islamic
financial products. IILM which has heralded to be savior to the Islamic secondary market is
expected to issue its first short-term commercial paper, with the minimum size of USD300
Million, at the end of 2011 in order to meet growing investor demand for Shariah-compliant
products in the secondary markets. But the issuance of these papers will hardly cope with the
demand. As it is presently common in the market, these issuances will be held to maturity by
investors due to the lack of alternative opportunities to invest in. Therefore, it is necessary for the
development of secondary markets and the capital markets in general that leading IFIs and
countries such Malaysia and GCC countries take the initiative to issue high quality Shariahcompliant financial instruments at both the national level and across borders, to meet the demand
of the market and to provide it with the much needed tools for development. London, as the first
secondary market-maker for Sukuk31, could join this initiative which could further strengthen its
position as one of the major contributor to the development of Islamic finance. As one of the
world’s leading financial centre with its enormous experience London is well placed to act as a
catalyst in the further development of Islamic capital markets. As Anwar and Miller (2008) state;
“The UK financial services industry has a proven record of developing and delivering new
products and a large pool of legal, accounting and financial engineering skills on which to draw.
Several of these firms have now established or expanded offices in other Islamic centers. English
law is already the preferred legal jurisdiction for many Islamic finance transactions”. At present
products are increasingly being developed in London and then marketed in other countries,
especially in the Middle East because of their strong ties.
30
http://islamicfinanceturkey.blogspot.com/2011/05/capital-markets-fragile-sukuk-market.html accessed on 13/92011
31
London set up the first ever secondary market for trading Sukuk in 2006.
53
4.2 Product development
The increasing demand for more Shariah compatible instruments by consumers not only in
Muslim countries but around the globe have urged IFIs to focus more on product innovation to
meet the growing demand. The development of new products is one of the most important
elements for IFIs to prosper and become more competitive within the mainstream financial
system worldwide. From the establishment of the first IFI in 70s through the new millennium in
2000, majority of Islamic financial products were developed in response to the demands within
Muslim communities. However, from 2000 to present there have been significant innovations in
the Islamic financial system from developments within the broader financial markets. Different
Islamic financial instruments have been introduced that have made it possible to provide equal
attractive Shariah-compliant alternatives to conventional financing requirements, competitive in
terms of both cost and service quality. While in the beginning the major obstacle to the
innovation of Islamic financial products have been Shariah compliance, today IFIs face
numerous other obstacles that they have to tackle in the product development process. As the
global financial markets are increasingly becoming interconnected, Islamic finance customers
face new challenges in their business transactions. A key challenge for IFIs today is to develop a
Shariah compliant instrument that is also acceptable within conventional financial system and
regulatory frameworks of western countries. This particular challenge has been more highlighted
by the limited number of both financial professionals with Shariah knowledge and/or Shariah
scholars with expertise in international finance. Although the increasing establishments of new
financial courses combined with Shariah law in educational institutions, in both Muslim and
non-Muslim countries, provide a new generation of practitioners who understand how the
modern Islamic legal system, Western regulations, and international finance integrally function
in a global economic system, they cannot keep up with the pace of the rapid growing Islamic
finance industry and provide enough banking professionals. It should be stated that innovation
does not only mean the creation of new products. Innovation also means enhancing existing
product features in order to accommodate changes in market dynamics and customer needs. At
present, innovation in product structuring is far more important to Islamic financial institutions
than introduction of new products, to keep the momentum of growth and development of
monetary and secondary markets. IFIs must seek to establish greater standardization and
harmonization of their products globally. Shariah rulings differences in different countries or in
54
different regions impede IFIs in introducing products that are accepted globally. For example,
products such as Murabaha and Istisna introduced by Malaysia are very popular and tradable in
the bond market of South Asian countries while it is not so popular in GCC countries. This is due
to an apparent conflict of Shariah rulings on the tradability restriction of these products. It is time
for Islamic financial products to be launched internationally and not locally or regionally. This
can be achieved by standardization and harmonization of Shariah rulings across the globe, as
mentioned previously. This standardization and harmonization will also help IFIs’ structured
products in the capital markets. Structured products are a combination of debt securities and
derivatives, like conventional products, but again due to differences in Shariah rulings these
products are accepted in some markets and rejected in others. Furthermore, when engineering
these products the approval from different Shariah boards take a lot of time and efforts, which
affect the cost considerably making them less competitive than their conventional counterparts
(Bennett 2011). In many CFIs with Islamic windows the staff that was used engineering
conventional structured products is being shifted to Islamic windows departments to develop
Islamic structured products. This practice however criticized by majority of Islamic banking
professionals and scholars as being a blind replication of products from the conventional
financial system dressed with an Islamic veneer. They argue that, this practice firstly is not timeand cost-efficient because of additional approval of different Shariah boards, secondly in the
long run, it will only lead Islamic financial system to the same risks and problems that
conventional system if faced with. Considering the above mentioned problems, there is an urgent
need for the development of international regulatory measures on standardization and
harmonization of products. Product development in Islamic finance must accelerate in order to
grow and compete with the conventional financial system, but it must be based on creativity and
constructive thinking, while remaining true to Shariah principles, and avoiding imitation of
conventional products. Products developed must be based on the core Islamic finance theory, and
that is profit and loss sharing, otherwise Islamic finance will only add to the existing problems
world is faced with after global financial crisis.
4.3 Consolidation and M&As
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) in conventional financial system have a long history and now
a days is very common in countries around the globe. These M&As activities find place both
domestically and internationally. With the help of M&As in the financial sector, the CFIs have
55
achieved significant benefits of economies of scale. The first wave of M&As in conventional
financial system in the U.S. occurred during 1895-1900 and it was characterized as horizontal
mergers, when merging entities are involved in the same kind of activities. These mergers
happened because there was fast growth in the industry, institutions wanted to build market
power, and new technology was available.32 While these characteristics are similar to those
Islamic finance are described with at present, M&As in this industry are far lesser and in some
regions even non-existent. Even in the GCC countries which have too many IFIs operating in
the region, and where multinational institutions with Islamic windows are crowding out local
smaller IFIs, the M&As trends are not seen. For the better part of the last five years, there have
been repeated calls for consolidation33. Financial analysts around the globe have been calling for
more consolidation and/or M&AS to take place in Islamic finance industry. They believe that
IFIs are small and are struggling for growth compared to CFIs, therefore there is an urgent need
for IFIs to consolidate/merge and create much larger institutions in order to compete with CFIs
internationally. In recent study conducted by IMF (WP/10/201), the analysis shows that large
Islamic banks fared better than small ones as a result of better diversification, economies of
scale, and stronger reputation. Based on this study the paper suggests that development of the
industry might be achieved through establishing large, well-managed Islamic banks that can
compete with existing banks. Indeed, by merging into larger institutions IFIs could enhance their
efficiency, profitability and competitiveness both locally and internationally. It should be stated
that in the financial industry size do matter. As Kahf (2004) states; “The financial sector is like a
jungle where the fatter the prey the larger the predator animal that is needed to devour it. The
bank that enters the market with huge capital is able to find higher return investments, in
addition to it being able to instill greater confidence in investors, thus making them to come
forward to it with their investments”.
In the latest publication by A.T.Kearney (2010), the reason for low interest in M&AS in the
region is explained as IFIs experiencing easy double-digit organic growth were too expensive for
a profitable acquisition or mergers for that matter. It states also that after 2008, as the economic
crisis continues to hamper growth and the market becomes more crowded, the need for
32
Bartholdy, J. 2010, Mergers and acquisitions, lecture slides distributed in Advanced Corporate Finance at The
Handelshoejskolen i Aarhus, Denmark.
33
http://gulfnews.com/business/banking/the-need-for-consolidation-of-gcc-insurers-should-be-heeded-1.858335
accessed on 25/9-2011
56
consolidation in the industry is increasing. But despite the low asset prices, merger and
acquisition (M&A) activity has been limited and one of the major hurdles is mentioned to be
regulative issues.
However, during the global financial crisis more and more liberalization of the financial sector is
seen in the GCC countries and other predominantly Islamic financial regions. The central banks,
Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) for example, and other regulatory institutions are increasingly
encouraging consolidation by local and cross-border M&As.34 Furthermore, the planned merger
of two Bahraini banks, intended to create the largest Islamic lender in the kingdom, is seen as
encouraging consolidation and breaking down the psychological blocks to M&As in this region
35
. Indeed, this kind of deal can be a start to chain-reactions in the region driving the Islamic finance to
the next level of industry maturity and eventually encourages IFIs to cross border M&As. At present,
majority of IFIs in the GCC region are state owned and there are strict ownership restrictions in majority
of these countries which limits foreign ownership which impede consolidation and M&As. However,
GCC countries are increasingly adapting the experience of South Asian countries such as Malaysia and
Indonesia that have taken the leadership in Islamic finance with deregulations and easing of restrictions
on foreign ownership. These countries have experienced greater competition and innovative products and
have attracted major international players from around the globe as a result. In order to be more
competitive with other regions GCC countries will have to ease restrictions on foreign ownership and
encourage private banking and wealth management services. Another way for consolidation and M&As to
find place, in order to make IFIs larger, is mandatory consolidations. IFSB (2007) have predicted that
Market-driven as well as mandatory industry consolidation, in particular through mergers and
acquisitions, is expected to take place in view of the small capitalization of most Islamic banks. In the
past some countries such as Sudan and Pakistan had announced mandatory programs for strengthening the
capital of banks and of mergers to the extent to which this is necessary for the purpose (Chapra and Khan
2000). This has worked in the past and could be necessary for other countries, especially in the GCC
countries, to announce such programs if market driven consolidation or M&As does not happen. It is
necessary for the viability, competitiveness and further growth of IFIs in the international environment.
34
UK Trade & Investment Sector briefing (2011): “Financial & Professional Services opportunities in
Kuwait” available on http://www.globaltrade.net/f/market-research/pdf/Kuwait/Banking-Finance-and-InsuranceFinancial---Professional-Opportunities.html 5/10-2011
35
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/17/banks-middleeast-idUSL5E7JE04I20110817 accessed on 8/10-2011
57
4.4 Concluding remarks
During the global financial crisis Islamic finance proved to be more resilient and came out of it relatively
unscathed. This has attracted not only the attention of latent Muslim countries generally but also many
conventional investors around the globe. In order to grab this opportunity and exploit this
momentum for the growth becoming more competitive within the global mainstream financial
system, IFIs must become more pro-active in market development, product development and
consolidation in the international markets. Discussing these opportunities in this chapter, it could
be concluded that in order to grab this opportunity there is an urgent need for IFIs, especially
those located in the GCC region, to come up with a new strategy that is not building solely on
organic growth. In some parts of the world, primarily South Asia, there are evidences that a new
strategy for IFIs where the growth which previously was based on local or regional organic
growth, is now being transformed into a global positioning strategy. Malaysia for example has
chosen to actively exploit the mentioned above opportunities. They have a high rate of product
innovation, eased the foreign ownership requirements in the financial sector in order to attract
international investors, and in collaboration with them, to develop new markets. And finally,
they encourage consolidations and M&As through their recent deregulations. These actions have
also encouraged other countries to be more proactive exploiting these opportunities. However,
although these transformations are taking place in the Islamic finance industry, IFIs have, with
some exceptions, a number of years to go before they reach the stage when they can compete
with major CFIs globally. Perhaps the most damning concern so far is that majority of western
countries are taking too much time to make changes in their financial regulations so that IFIs
could operate properly. The long process of engineering Shariah compliant structured products
for the monetary and secondary markets, and which is also acceptable within conventional
financial system, and regulatory frameworks of western countries add to this concern. It seems
though that global demand for IFIs’ products is growing, and this market driven demand will
eventually speed up both exploitation of the mentioned opportunities by IFIs and deregulatory
measures taken in the western world.
5 Summary and final conclusion
This chapter includes an overview of the structure and concepts of this thesis and serves to
summarize the result of the theoretical analysis that we went through in the preceding chapters.
58
5.1 Overview of the thesis
As was stated at the beginning the purpose of this thesis was to give a comprehensive overview
of opportunities and challenges that Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) face in the world, and to
explore the reasons behind the slow growth of Islamic banking in the Western world. More
specifically, the objective of this thesis was to come up with suggestions for both IFIs and
western regulatory authorities, after looking at the challenges and opportunities the Islamic
finance is facing in the world, on how to pave the way for further growth of Islamic finance
globally, particularly in western countries including non-Muslim customers. This objective led
me to the following research question:
What regulatory measures do the Western world countries must take and what institutional
changes IFIs must make, in order for Islamic finance to thrive and prosper in the Western world
not only for Muslim but also non-Muslim consumers?
The challenges discussed in chapter three and opportunities in chapter four have partly answered
the above mentioned statement which will be summarized in the conclusion. Furthermore, to
help answering the research question, it was also partly necessary to get an in-depth
knowledge about all the possible existing theories and concepts of Islamic finance. It was
evident though, from the review of the available theoretical literature in the chapter two, that
there are as many different theories and concepts of Islamic finance as there are schools of
thoughts in Islam because Islamic finance is based upon religion. These schools of thought have
different interpretations of basic Islamic concepts. The concept differs also from region to
region, from fundamentalists dreaming of Islamic financial industry just for Muslims and saving
Islamic world from western capitalism, to banking professionals who see it as an ethic and viable
alternative to conventional financial industry. But in order to sum up, overall Islamic finance
builds up upon the main principle of Islam which is Halal (permissible) and Haram
(impermissible). Three main concepts which modern Islamic finance is based on are part of the
Haram principle, mentioned in the chapter two, and are followings:

Prohibition of interest (Riba) - fixing in advance a positive return on a loan, as a reward
for waiting, is not permitted.

Gharar - there must not be “asymmetric information” or uncertainty between parties.
59

Maysir – prohibition on transactions that are based on one side’s gain at the cost of the
other.
5.2 summary
Islamic finance has experienced a rapid growth during the last few decades, but this growth has
mostly been organic. With most IFIs being state owned or being aided by state, this organic
growth did not meet any competition locally or in their regions. Only, with the beginning of the
new millennium, with deregulations taking place in majority of Muslim countries, and IFIs
expanding their operations internationally, they started increasingly to meet competition from
larger CFIs with Islamic windows. As the introduction part of this thesis indicated, IFIs have
taken this competition seriously, and without doubt, the recent global financial crisis has played
into the hands of IFIs. While the global financial crisis has discredited the conventional financial
system, hurting some of the largest CFIs, and still does, the Islamic financial system has been
experiencing growth, except some small IFIs that were hit when crisis touched real economy.
The contribution of knowledge and experience of some leading western countries to Islamic
financial industry in financial matters has also had its impact on the growth of Islamic finance,
especially of the UK. Due to their resistance to the crisis IFIs are facing rising demand for their
services not only from Muslim investors but also from conventional investors, with the
increasing popularity around the globe. Islamic finance is being actively discussed by experts
both in the public and private sectors in majority of western countries. While there is demand for
Islamic finance in majority of western countries, public authorities are divided on introducing the
elements of Shariah-compliant finance to their country by making regulative changes. In fact,
this division of public authorities in the western world, in large part, is due to some challenges in
compatibility with the existing financial systems, rigorous practices of IFIs’ operations and the
way they are run, which are used against them by oppositions. With only minor changes in their
practices, in some cases large changes, but still Shariah compliant, IFIs can successfully remove
these barriers and provide a much better ground for the supporters of Islamic finance in these
countries. Chapter two highlighted some general problems existing in the theory of Islamic
finance in the form of differences in the interpretations of some basic Islamic concepts which
then is transferred to products available by IFIs. In the following chapters, chapters three and
four, some specific challenges and opportunities related to the further growth of Islamic finance
and its establishment in the world, specifically western world, were addressed and analyzed.
60
These analyses helped me and made it possible for me, to come up with the following
suggestions on what must be done from both IFIs and western countries’ side to pave the way for
further growth of Islamic finance globally, and especially in western countries which includes
non-Muslim customers. This has also been the objective of this thesis.
5.3 Conclusion
The challenges and opportunities reviewed in the last two chapters were all somehow related to
one particular problem, which make it priority number one, and that is regulatory issues. The
prevailing legal systems in the western countries, including some Muslim countries, are
predominantly based on the conventional financial system which makes it difficult for IFIs to
establish themselves and compete on the same playing field as CFIs in these countries.
Especially, issues related to double taxation of some IFIs’ products must be resolved. IFIs have
been recognized as an alternative investment opportunity and resistant to the global financial
crisis, and considering the economic situation in majority of western countries, with CFIs’
damaged reputation, it is in the interest of public authorities to provide an alternative investment
opportunity for the general public. Therefore, it is up to the western countries regulatory
authorities to take the initiative and introduce a series of tax and legislative amendments,
specifically designed to remove obstacles to the development of Islamic finance, focusing in the
first place on tax and VAT issues related to products provided by IFIs. Further, central banks or
other regulatory institutions in these countries, in cooperation with institutions such as AAOIFI,
IFSB or the central bank of Malaysia in this case, could establish joint special task forces in
order to remove the regulatory obstacles for the PLS operations of IFIs, which are considered not
compatible with the banking requirements of these countries, because these products are an
important part of Islamic financial industry. Finally, the lender of last resort or central banks in
these countries must develop Shariah compliant alternatives, used for example by the central
bank of Malaysia, in dealing with deposits of IFIs required to be kept with them. By acting
proactively these authorities could prevent and lessen risks related to the operations of IFIs hence
future instabilities in their financial markets, because Islamic finance growth eventually will be
market driven and in the near future IFIs will be in the too big to be ignored class.
From IFIs’ side, the issues that must be addressed are as important as mentioned above. It is
though difficult to prioritize here because all issues are much or less equally important.
61
Regardless of priorities, IFIs must address these issues as soon as possible in order to benefit
from the current situation. IFIs must improve their corporate governance practices and define the
precise role of Shariah boards. Operating in countries which have focused so much on this issue,
and have some of the strongest corporate governance practices, requires IFIs to improve their
practices otherwise experienced investors in these countries will stay away from them, especially
when they meet an industry that they know less about. IFIs should adapt their standards to
international set of standards and guidelines like OECD’s, which is also followed by CFIs, as
much as possible. In the same time, IFIs must address the issue of risk management, and
especially the vital issues of liquidity and credit risk management, which will eventually lessen
their dependence on the central banks of western countries. IFIs should support and cooperate
with IILM, which has solely been established for this purpose, to enhance capital market
functions and thus provide themselves with a solid liquidity management structure. They can
also increasingly use products such as Sukuk, famous also among conventional investors, as
mechanisms of liquidity management, but to do so the issuance of these kinds of products must
be improved and approved by IFIs globally. This leads us to the next issue that must be
addressed by IFIs, specifically product standardization. IFIs must seek to establish greater
standardization and harmonization of their products globally, by harmonizing the Shariah rulings
across the globe. The existence of different rulings on a certain product will only discourage
western investors from investing in such products, especially when they are new in this field.
Finally IFIs must seek to consolidate. It must start within Islamic countries in regions where
market is overcrowded such as GCC countries. When Islamic finance has problems establishing
themselves in western countries in advance, the small size of these IFIs will make it much harder
or even impossible. Once IFIs get larger in size they will also be welcomed with open arms
everywhere, this will also make it easier for public authorities to make amendments their
regulatory requirements considering the amount of investments. In the second phase, these larger
IFIs will have the capability of merging or acquiring financially distressed conventional
institutions in the western countries and convert them to IFIs.
There are plenty of other suggestions, but in my opinion the above mentioned are most important
issues that must be addressed from both sides and as soon as possible in order to pave the way
for continuing growth of Islamic finance in the world, with focus on the western countries. Other
62
challenges and opportunities mentioned in this thesis could, to some extent, be met by market
driven demand itself.
It should be acknowledged that Islamic finance is still a nascent industry thus in constant
development, therefore the growth of IFIs in the world and particularly in the western countries
must be monitored. As the time passes, future studies could be made in this relation, with more
empirical data on the performance of IFIs in these countries available, to get a better insight on
the suggestions discussed in this thesis, whether affirming or disaffirming them.
5.4 Limitation of the study
During the writing of my thesis I encountered on more challenge relevant to the topic, but due to
space and time considerations this challenge was not discussed. The challenge is unfamiliarity
and the negative picture of Islam among majority of non-Muslims in western countries. Due to
some reasons, general public in the western countries have developed a common misconception
about Islam as religion. This misconception could seriously impede the growth of everything that
is connected with Islam hence Islamic finance.
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