Eliciting Reliable Willingness to Accept Responses S. Chilton, M. Jones-Lee, R. McDonald, H. Metcalf Economics Newcastle University Business School OUTLINE Background/Motivation Optimum WTA Experiment/Survey: WTA responses for two health complaints - Methods - Results Conclusions BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION (1) Many health/environmental valuations – theoretically & ethically more appropriate to elicit WTA (rather than WTP) measures But WTA rarely adopted (particularly for policy applications). Why not? Well-documented problems (WTA/WTP gap; implausibly large WTA; unfamiliarity; non-budget constrained…etc..) To (i) pass judgement on these problems and (ii) use WTA measures we require WTA (& WTP) to be robust and reliable “Much” experience with WTP; relatively less with WTA. Paper addresses this failing. BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION (2) Subsample 1 1 mth 3 mths £ £ Mean WTA 175 4807 Std. Dev 208 8614 Median WTA 100 2000 n 58 Subsample 2 1 mth 3 mths £ £ Subsample 3 1 mth 3 mths £ £ 130 1932 106 1555 189 2866 133 2400 50 600 50 750 155 155 ELICITING OPTIMAL WTA: RATIONALITY SPILLOVERS Method Artefactual field experiment/contingent valuation survey, Newcastle 2009, n=155 2 health complaints “Rationality Spillover” effects”(Cherry et al., 2003; Seested Nielsen 2010) Respondents gain an understanding of min WTA & the elicitation mechanism in an incentivised setting which is ‘carried over’ to health valuation questions economically optimum (“truthful”) responses OPTIMAL WTA: THE (2nd PRICE AUCTION) MECHANISM SELLING A FLAT IN AN AUCTION The key point: If you sell, you receive the SEALED BID AMOUNT, not your reserve price. The bidding process: Is your reserve price more than, equal to, or less than, the sealed bid? More than DON’T SELL - Keep the item - Get no money Equal to SELL - Receive the sealed bid amount - This is equal to your reserve price Less than SELL - Receive the sealed bid amount - This is more than your reserve price. OPTIMAL WTA: INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY PROPERTY Why you should give your true minimum willingness to accept: If your reserve price is MORE THAN your true value ... If the sealed bid is more than your true value (e.g. £100k) but less than your “greedy bid” (e.g. £1m), you cannot sell even at a price you’d like to accept, so you miss out on the money. If your asking price is LESS THAN your true value... If the sealed bid is less than your true value (e.g. £100k) but more than your “giveaway bid” (e.g. £50k), you have to sell for less than you think the flat is worth. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: OPTIMAL RESPONSES Purpose Stage 1 & (Hypothetical): Introduce “rules” of the game, truthful 2 Selling a Flat/Teddy, revelation = best strategy, role of the (secret) sealed bid within the second price auction Discussion 3 (Real): Selling a Draw Experience of selling using the mechanism, Entry Ticket, Experiment elicitation of minimum WTA in an incentivised context 4 (Hypothetical): Health Elicitation Valuation, WTA Survey of monetary values from respondents with an understanding/intuition of the economic meaning of ‘minimum WTA’. STAGE 3: INCENTIVISED ‘TEACHING’ EXPERIMENT Based on the Plott and Zeiler (2005) mechanism (shown to generate theoretically predicted results) Participant given 2 tokens (2 rounds) which could be used to gain entry to a prize draw and recorded his/her ‘reserve price’ (minimum WTA to sell each token and forego draw entry), knowing it would be compared to a sealed bid, already randomly selected from a box of 100 bids ranging from £0.01 to £1.00 and visible at the front of the room. If his/her ‘reserve price’ was lower than or equal to this sealed bid they sold the token but received the higher (or equivalent) sealed bid. If higher, s/he did not sell the token and it was put into the draw. Supported by an ‘aide memoir’ STAGE 4: CONTINGENT VALUATION SURVEY (WTA 1 week, 1 month, 3 months) Stomach Complaint The symptoms are: a) You will have some slight discomfort whilst eating; b) You will have some pain in your stomach at certain times in the day; c) You will feel slightly ‘under the weather’; d) Your normal daily activities will be otherwise unaffected. The problem is self limiting, i.e. will go without any treatment after this period Throat Complaint of time. The symptoms are: a) You will have a slight sore throat; b) You will have some difficulty talking; c) You will feel slightly ‘under the weather’; d) Your normal daily activities will be otherwise unaffected CV WTA SCENARIO Imagine you have a health problem. Doctor tells you it will heal by itself in a given period of time. But: treatment available - remove all symptoms immediately Problem: manufacturer is temporarily unable to make enough Has been decided that the best way to cope with this problem is to ask those who will not be treated to accept money for putting up with the symptoms. Amount has already been decided - the ‘preset amount’. Not yet released but doctor will get it later today. WTA SCENARIO (cont.) System: Let doctor know the lowest (minimum) amount you would accept to ‘put up with the symptoms’. Let’s call it your ‘reserve price’. Later - doctor will compare RP with the preset amount to see whether you value immediate recovery more than the money on offer, so he can make the right decision for you (money or treatment). If RP ≤ preset amount, you receive money (but have to put up with symptoms) - the preset amount rather than your RP. If RP > preset amount, you get treatment but receive no money Remember: ask too much - you may not be eligible for the money (preset amount may be lower than RP). Ask too little - you may get the money & not receive the treatment, even if you would prefer it as the preset amount is too low for you. So the preset amount works just like the sealed bid in the earlier questions. MEMORY JOGGER: HEALTH VALUATION Is your reserve price... MORE THAN LESS the preset amount TREATMENT - Get the treatment - Get no money EQUAL TO the preset amount MONEY - Receive the preset amount - This is equal to your reserve price. - Get no treatment. THAN the preset amount MONEY - Receive the preset amount. - This is more than your reserve price. - Get no treatment MEM. JOGGER: HEALTH VALUATION (cont.) The key points: 1. Once you have told your doctor your reserve price, the rules determine whether or not you get treatment or money. 2. If you receive any money, you receive the PRESET AMOUNT, not your reserve price. 3. There’s NO POINT OVERSTATING what you’d accept o GET THE TREATMENT when you would prefer the money. There’s NO POINT UNDERSTATING what you’d pay. o GET THE MONEY when you actually think recovery is worth more to you. RESULTS WTA Stomach Mean WTA Throat 1 week 1 month 3 months 1 week 1 month 3 months 130.75 579.39 1932.77 106.31 522.25 1555.32 (Std. (189.61) (1280.10) (2886.67) (133.25) (1001.44) (2400.07) Deviation) Ratio to 1 week Median Ratio to 1 week 1 4.43 14.78 1 4.91 14.63 50.00 250.00 750.00 50.00 200.00 600.00 1 5.00 15.00 1 4.00 12.00 REGRESSION ANALYSIS (E.G. STOMACH) Tobit Regression WTA Stomach condition N=363 LR Chi2 (8) = 74.46 Prob > Chi2 = 0.00 Pseudo R2 = 0.012 Log Likelihood = -3127.99 Independent variable Duration Gender Age Number in Household Further Education Job Type Experience of the complaint Perceived current health state Constant Coefficient Standard error t P>|t| 140.88 196.86 12.40 131.57 452.03 212.14 17.80 170.04 6.03 81.80 190.31 113.89 7.91 1.16 2.06 1.61 2.38 1.86 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.11 0.02 0.06 344.35 173.70 1.98 0.05 94.23 150.91 0.62 0.53 -2133.38 586.48 -3.64 0.00 CONCLUSIONS Plott & Zeiler (2005) – based mechanism, rationality ‘spillover’ effects plausible and well-behaved WTA responses Adds to the small but growing body of evidence on the potential for incorporating economic experiments into valuation studies (here, as a ‘teaching’ device) to generate more robust data on public preferences May be possible to reconcile the BCA mismatch (desire WTA; ask WTP) Health – but transferable to all public sector domains. ‘Do-able’ but requires careful planning and sufficient survey time– face to face, approx 1.5 hours. Is it a price ‘worth’ paying?
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