KULTURA I WARTOŚCI
NR 2 (2012)
RECENZJE
s. 88–92
LESZEK KOPCIUCH
Eugene Kelly, Material Ethics of Value: Max Scheler
and Nicolai Hartmann, Springer 2011, p. 253.
Springer published in the yesteryear a new book of Eugene Kelly Material Ethics of Value: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann (Phaenomenologica,
volume 203).
Professor Eugene Kelly, a lecturer on the Department of Social Sciences in the New York Institute of Technology, is a famed and esteemed American
scholar interested for the contemporary German philosophy and especially for
the conceptions belonging to the phenomenological ethics and axiology. Prior
he published inter alia such studies as: Max Scheler (1977); Structure and Diversity: Essays In the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler (1997);
Material value ethics: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann (2008, the article) 1.
The latest, third book of professor Kelly continues his previous research
concerning the phenomenological ethics. In his previous publications the main
person and an object of analyses was first of all Max Scheler. In reviewed book
the general view is constructed basing on the philosophy of Max Scheler and
Nicolai Hartmann. The book is very good published, has 253 pages, aside from
the main text it contains a large bibliography including the English and German
books and papers and the name and subject index. The Intruduction (“The legacy and promise of Scheler and Hartmann”) wrote Philip Blosser, author of
many valuable analyses concerning the philosophy of Max Scheler2.
A general aim of professor Kelly is the orderly and systematical reconstruction and analysis of main theses formulated in the material value-ethics by
1
E. Kelly, Max Scheler, Twayne Publishers, Boston 1977; Structure and Diversity:
Essays in the Phenomenological Philosophy of Max Scheler, “Phaenomenologica”, Vol. 141,
Kluwer, Dordrecht 1997; Material Value-Ethics: Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, „Philosophy Compass” 2008, Nr 3/1, p. 1–16.
2
Ph. Blosser, Scheler’s Theory of Values Reconsidered, [in:] Phenomenology of Values and Valuing, ed. by J. G. Hart, L. Embree, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht–
Boston, 1997, p. 155–168; Scheler’s Ordo Amoris, [in:] Denken des Ursprungs, Ursprung des
Denkens. Schelers Philosophie und ihre Anfänge in Jena, hrsg. von Ch. Bermes, W. Henckmann, H. Leonardy, Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie, Bd. 3, Königshausen & Neumann,
Würzburg 1998, p. 160–171; Scheler and „Values that Belong to the Ethical Sphere”, [in:]
Selected Essays from North America, part 1, ed. by L. Embree and T. Nennon, „Phenomenology” 2005, Vol. 5, Zeta Books, Bucharest 2005, p. 99–126.
LESZEK KOPCIUCH – E. KELLY, MATERIAL ETHICS OF VALUE...
M. Scheler and N. Hartmann. Kelly endeavor also to synthetic demonstrate
some differences and parallels appearing in the positions of both philosophers.
Indeed at the beginning already Kelly notes (p. 3–6) several fundamental ideas
which distinguish both theories (especially a theological problem and a question of the moral subject) but he also holds that the material ethics of value is
the innerly compatible project: „Material value-ethics, we will argue, is a coherent and synthetic effort to establish ethics upon a fundamental phenomenological axiology. It offers a systematic means towards a personal response to
the Socratic question, how should we live? There are many incompatible ways
of living successfully and happily, but they are all founded in the right
knowledge of the values themselves” (p. 16). Kelly notes that both conceptions
despite of differences do have a complementary character and they both can be
used to found the moral theory. It must be accent that Kelly analyses mostly
these moments of Scheler and Hartmann axiology which do have direct importance for the exactly ethical solutions.
The book is composed of 10 chapters (1. The idea of Material ValueEthics; 2. The Phenomenology of Value; 3. The Orientation of Human Beings
Toward Value; 4. Value and Moral Value; 5. Action Theory and the Problem
of Motivation; 6. Goodness and Moral Obligation; 7. The Concept of Virtue
and Its Foundation; 8. Virtue Ethics; 9. The Phenomenology of the Person. 10.
Ethical Personalism). Each chapter contains many detailed analyses and considerations which in their own detailedness right reflect the spirit and the specificity of texts of phenomenological ethics. Aside from the analyses concerning
theories of Scheler and Hartmann Kellys’s book contains also chapters concerning ethical and axiological ideas of Edmund Husserl and Dietrich von Hildebrand.
For the detailedness of Kelly’s analyses I canntot discuus all its moments in this place. But I have to agree with the most interpretations proposed
by author. It refers especially to his considerations concerning Scheler’s and
Hartmann’s idea of the emotional value-cognition (chapter 2), Scheler’s and
Hartmann’s critique of moral relativism and very precise demonstrate of detailed kinds of virtues and moral (chapter 7–8) . The same I must to say about
Kelly’s considerations concerning the relation between moral and non-moral
value as well as considerations referring to the human subjectivity and personality. Thus I must to agree with statement of Philip Blosser which notes that
Kelly’s book represents a milestone in the history of phenomenological moral
reasoning and material-value ethics” (s. XIV).
However more in details I would like to discuss a question concerning
the human freedom and the structure of human moral motivation. Kelly analyzes these questions basing on the position of Scheler first of all. But he states
also clearly that it is impossible to present in this book the detailed distinctions
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LESZEK KOPCIUCH – E. KELLY, MATERIAL ETHICS OF VALUE...
and considerations appearing in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann because
his standpoint has not only phenomenological but also an ontological character:
„His view on the problem of freedom is too detailed to be given adequate
treatment in a book on material value-ethics, which may proceed on the mere
hypothesis of genuine or ontological personal freedom” (p. 56).
On the one hand Kelly notes indeed that the standpoint of Scheler in
this matter contains many troubles but on the other hand he criticizes interpretation formulated by M. Palacios (in the paper Vorziehen und Wählen bei
Scheler)3. Palacios holds that Scheler takes the Socratic positions and in this
way runs into the fallacy of ethical intellectualism: „Yet how can one develop
such moral insight if a conditio for it is moral goodness itself? Palacios believes that Scheler does not resolve this antinomy” (s. 103). But, as constates
Kelly, Palacios misinterprets the true Scheler’s position because Scheler distinguishes between the only rational knowledge about values ( the ethical
knowledge ) and the emotional feeling of value. And only this emotional feeling recognizes really the value and only in this feeling is value self-given.
Kelly accents also that Palacios does not take into account that in Scheler’s
opinion value may be given with very different degrees of clarity and distinctness. And Sokratic identity of moral knowledge and moral activity (the main
thesis of the ethical intellectualism) refers only to situation when the value is
self-given: „Palacios does note that Scheler says that willing or conation is determined morally only when a value is self-given. He notes only that, according
to Scheler, the value-component in a conation is given with perfect clarity and
distinctness. […] But there is no doubt that Palacios has conveyed a fundamental feature in Scheler’s position: the deeper our acquaintance, through reflective
acts of feeling and preferring, to the realm of values, the greater our moral vision and the greater our capacity for virtue, that is, our determination to strive
after what ideally ought to be in the various situations of life. Thus not conation as such, but morally good conation, is determined by whether a value is
self-given” (p. 102).
The critique proposed by Kelly is efficient and convincing. However I
hold that it rebuts the way of Palacios argumentation only and do not refer to
the essences of reproach directed by Palacios to Scheler. In point of fact, as I
think, the standpoint of Scheler concerning the question of free will and its
place in a structure of human motivation is incorrect. First of all, as I mean,
Scheler does not accept the human negative freedom in the relation to conation
because he holds that conation is an origin of every human activity. But the
3
J.-M. Palacios, Vorziehen und Wählen bei Scheler, [in:] Vernunft und Gefühl. Schelers Phänomenologie des emotionalen Lebens, ed. by Ch. Bermes, H. Henckmann, H. Leonardy, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, p. 135–146.
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statement that value- feeling determines human will only when value is selfgiven does not resolve the problem of freedom in Scheler at all. This statement
opens it only and places it in a clearly light. The moral freedom, in my view, is
ever based on the negative free will of person! Right when value is self-given
human being must have this negative freedom in relation to this self-given value. In other case person will be free only when she does not know the value in
its self-presentation. Such freedom would be founded on the moral ignorance.
And all true emotional value-knowledge would be determining. This standpoint
has no sense. Thus I do represent the moderate motivations-internalism. Scheler, as I mean, represented this internalism in most radical form.
Still I agree with Kelly saying: „Clearly, another model than scientific
naturalism is required if we are to solve the problem of human freedom and
moral responsibility. It is not to point to criticize Scheler for not having solved
the problem of human freedom; no on has” (p. 55). On the one hand we have
to say that the question of the relation between human freedom and moral values belongs to the most important ethical problems because this freedom
founds ever an ethical character of human action. And on the other hand we
must to state that conceptions formulated in the German material value-ethics
do not resolve this problem. It refers not only to Scheler, but also to theories
proposed by Nicolai Hartmann, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Hans Reiner. Hildebrand speaks about several kinds of freedom, eg. direct freedom, indirect
freedom and cooperative freedom. The direct freedom means the human capability to initiate an activity. An act is also direct free when is a source of the
existence of other acts or states of things. Analogy an act is cooperative free
when existence of other acts do not depend from it but it can modify other acts
which already exist. And an act is indirect free when it prepares an basis for
other acts or states of things. The indirect freedom is characteristic for human
action and answers given by human will. Hildebrand says: „Nur der Wille allein ist frei in dem strikten Sinn, daß er in unsere unmittelbare Macht gegeben
ist, die affektiven Antworten sind nicht frei in diesem Sinne. Wir können keine
affektive Antwort durch ein fiat hervorbringen, noch sie durch unseren Willen
kommandieren wie irgendeine Tätigkeit. Liebe z.B. ist uns immer als ein Geschenk verliehen”4. The relationship between human freeedom and affective
answer is not identic with the relation between freedom and human will. Hildebrand, however, do not refuse the freedom of affective answer at all. Firstly,
the person can sanction or disavow this answer. Secondly, the person cannot to
produce such answer arbitrarily but she can prepare conditions to make possi-
4
D. von Hildebrand, Ethik, 2. ed., Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart Berlin Köln
Mains 1974, p. 213.
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LESZEK KOPCIUCH – E. KELLY, MATERIAL ETHICS OF VALUE...
bility of this answers. The personal freedom exists so both in the answer of
human will as in the emotional (affective) answer of human heart.
However the theory of Hildebrand induces, in my view, several valid
difficulties. What is a source of human decision vis-a-vis value? Such decisions, says Hildebrand, are ever descended from the personal fundamental attitude. But what determines this attitude? How is it chosen? A value and valuecognition cannot fulfil this role because the value and its cognition determine
only when the person accepted already the specific attitude...
Therefore I hold that Scheler’s and Hartmann’s theories of freedom do
not have the same importance and validity, even if we accept that a problem of
freedom is in totality insoluble. Analyses formulated by Hartmann are more
precise than analyses proposed by Scheler. Hartmann, as I think, begins his
analyses in this place in which Scheler have it already finished.
The question of moral freedom and structure of human motivation is
only one of many detailed problems analyzed in book of E. Kelly. Many important considerations appear also eg. in the context of Scheler’s and Hartmann’s personalism.
In the English writings the book of Eugene Kelly parallels of the analyses published in Poland in the Polish language (eg. J. Galarowicz, Phenomenological ethics of value (Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand)5; P. Orlik, Phenomenology of the axiological consciousness (Max
Scheler – Dietrich von Hildebrand6; L. Kopciuch, Freedom and values. Max
Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von Hildebrand – Hans Reiner7; W.
Prusik, Phenomenology of the value. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann8.
No doubts that the Polish reader will find in the book of professor Kelly
an important complement of Polish phenomenological and axiological analyses.
LESZEK KOPCIUCH, habilitated doctor, lecturer in the Chair of the History of Modern
Philosophy,
Maria
Curie-Skłodowska
University
in
Lublin.
E-mail:
[email protected].
5
J. Galarowicz, W drodze do etyki odpowiedzialności, Vol. 1: Fenomenologiczna etyka wartości (Max Scheler–Nicolai Hartmann–Dietrich von Hildebrand), PAT, Kraków 1997.
6
P. Orlik, Fenomenologia świadomości aksjologicznej (Max Scheler – Dietrich von
Hildebrand), Wyd. IF UAM, Poznań 1995.
7
L. Kopciuch, Wolność a wartości. Max Scheler – Nicolai Hartmann – Dietrich von
Hildebrand – Hans Reiner, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 2010.
8
P. Prusik, Fenomenologia wartości. Max Scheler i Nicolai Hartmann, Wyd. Naukowe USz, Szczecin 2011.
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