Center for European Policy Analysis
April 2, 2013
Report No. 35: Visegrád Defense Cooperation: From Mutual
Support to Strengthening NATO and the EU.
A Polish Perspective
By Robert Kupiecki
I
n June 2012, Poland took over the rotational
annual presidency of the Visegrád Group
(V4).1 The V4 is the cooperation platform of
four Central European states: the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. Since its creation at
the beginning of the 1990s, the Group has grown
from the position of a systemic transformation and
transatlantic integration engine for its member
states to a promoter of practical and multidimensional regional cooperation. It is currently
deeply anchored in mechanisms, projects and
priority objectives of both the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).
In terms of V4 defense cooperation, increasing
synergies between member states’ capabilities
build-up is perhaps the key focal issue of the Group.
coordination. With a few small exceptions, there
are no formal governing bodies within the Group.
Its operational capacity is based on clear lines of
communication among member states and the
trust the rotational presidency is endowed with.
The high-level meetings’ conclusions, supported by
dedicated thematic working groups provide political
guidance and proper implementation mechanisms.
Thus, the four countries’ ownership is guaranteed
during all stages of the process.
On the Way to NATO and the EU: The Security and
Defense Dimension
The identity of the Visegrád Group in the area of
security and defense was forged in the parallel
processes of the V4 member states’ accession to
NATO and the EU. This was a fundamental goal
of our four states in the 1990s. The underlying
process, as a part of a profound transformation
of state structures, policies and procedures, also
required the modernization of the entire defense
systems of our countries. It included mainly the
introduction of civilian control of the military,
as well as a comprehensive organizational and
technological transformation of the armed forces.
The process was supported by the preparatory
mechanisms developed by NATO, including the
“Partnership for Peace” program. Equally important
were regional consultations and the sharing of good
The day-to-day activities of the V4 follow a
process-based philosophy and avoid temptation to
over-institutionalize its strategic orientation and
The Visegrád Group was formally established by a
Declaration signed on February 15th, 1991 by the Presidents
of Poland, Hungary and then Czechoslovakia: Lech Wałęsa,
Josef Antall and Vaclav Havel. The Declaration reaffirmed the
will for enhancing regional political, economic, defense and
social cooperation and its coordination with the European
institutions. Following the break-down of Czechoslovakia into
two sovereign states on January 1, 1993, the Czech Republic
and Slovakia became V4 members.
1
Dr. Robert Kupiecki is Deputy Minister of Defense at the Polish Ministry of Defense, and former
Ambassador of Poland to the United States.
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practices, organized within the Visegrád Group.
The Group’s informal profile facilitated an efficient
exchange of experience on all aspects of our
reform process, and served to build trust among its
members.
soft-power potential. They highly value the
indispensable bond between Europe and the United
States. Security considerations play a major part in
this shared perspective. Among others, the Visegrád
countries highlighted this prior to the 2012 NATO
Chicago Summit in the joint Declaration of the
Ministers of Defense and the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs “Responsibility for a Strong NATO” (April
6th, 2012), in the Litomerice Declaration of the
Ministers of Defense (May 4th, 2012), as well as in
the Joint Statement of March 6th, 2013, by the V4
Ministers of Defense and their French and German
colleagues.
The Visegrád countries share a
very similar perspective on
Euro-Atlantic security.
The V4 also played a key role in supporting
Slovakia’s NATO accession, as the country was not
included in the first wave of NATO enlargement in
1999 — it was a goal of the Polish-Czech-Slovak
brigade formed in 2001-2005.
All V4 states agree that whenever NATO accepts
new responsibilities, it must remain capable
of delivering on its fundamental mission as set
out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This
position is clearly reflected in the newest NATO
Strategic Concept adopted by the Heads of
State and Government in Lisbon in 2010. The
Visegrád Group believes that it is crucial to match
these political declarations with NATO’s military
credibility. Thus, NATO defense planning needs
to retain highest quality, and be reflected in
existing military capabilities. This is of particular
importance today, when economic austerity has
forced many allies to cut their defense budgets. We
expect collective defense to be properly reflected
not only in resources and capabilities, but also
in the allies’ policies for the interoperability of
NATO forces, so vividly demonstrated in many
operations throughout the last two decades. Even
more so, given that in 2014 NATO plans to wind-up
its International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
operation in Afghanistan, which has been the
vehicle for interoperability build-up and its ultimate
test for over a decade. And last, but not least, what
binds capabilities, training and interoperability is
proper NATO infrastructure, wisely reflecting the
geographical diversity of the allies, and ready to
V4 Contributions to Euro-Atlantic Security
The year 2004 — marked by Slovakia’s accession to
NATO and the subsequent membership of all four
countries in the EU — changed the orientation of
the Group, as the Visegrád countries’ key objective
of integration within the Euro-Atlantic structures
had been achieved. Consequently, their main
focus has shifted to making effective and creative
contributions to strengthening NATO and the
EU, as these two organizations became primary
instruments for the security and defense policies of
all V4 states.
The Visegrád countries share a very similar
perspective on Euro-Atlantic security. They want
an effective NATO capable of defending its allies
and projecting security wherever legal basis,
political consent and the security interests of all
allies permit. They are interested in a gradual
development of the EU’s role in the field of
defense and security corresponding to its growing
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receive augmentation forces and serve out-of-area
deployments. There is no glass wall separating
these two missions.
operations in Iraq after 2003, most of them under
Polish command and as a part of the Center-South
Division. And as we display solidarity toward others
we expect it from our allies as well.
The Visegrád Group pursues close
cooperation in matters of the EU’s
Common Security and Defense Policy
The financial crisis in Europe and the United
(CSDP) as well. We are certain that
States poses one of the key challenges
it can strengthen the global position
to our security today.
of the EU in a cost and policy-wise
way, while avoiding unnecessary
duplication of NATO programs and
initiatives. It is of key importance to adopt a more
The V4 countries are also committed to the
effective, combined military and civilian approach to
promotion of further enlargement of NATO and
crisis management, to improve operational planning
the EU, and to both organizations’ partnership
and execution mechanisms, and to develop
policies. In the past, they have supported candidate
capabilities through multinational projects. The V4
countries in both organizations, in particular the
is also interested in enhancing the competitiveness
Baltic States and the Balkan countries, and have
of the European defense industry. The process
shared their own transformation experience. And
should benefit the entire sector, including small and
they continue to support NATO’s and EU’s openmedium-sized enterprises, help in technological
door policy today. With regard to the partnership
progress on an EU-wide scale and provide access
policy, the Group’s priority within NATO is to
to new technologies. All these matters are
develop relations with the Eastern European
discussed and debated within the Visegrád Group
countries, especially NATO’s special partners Russia,
in preparation for the EU Summit this December,
Ukraine and Georgia. From the V4 perspective, the
where the Heads of State will take-up security and
development of these relationships must aim at
defense issues for the first time since 2008.
building transparency and trust in defense (Russia)
and at supporting the transition of the security and
Active involvement of the V4 states in NATO and
defense sectors (Ukraine and Georgia). Within the
the EU includes their participation in multinational
EU, V4 states are involved in the Eastern Partnership
operations, including the most demanding one
and in the cooperation effort with the Western
in Afghanistan. During KFOR in Kosovo, the V4
Balkan countries.2 The Visegrád Group agrees that
accounted for approximately seven percent of all
continued enlargement of NATO and the EU, and
forces; during the EU’s military operation Althea in
the organizations’ cooperation with partners in
Bosnia and Herzegovina — for close to 13 percent;
the neighboring regions, are good investments in
and for about 10 percent in Mali, Africa. Poland, the
European and global security and stability.
Czech Republic and Hungary take part in NATO’s Air
Policing mission for the Baltic States, and Hungary
2
The Eastern Partnership Initiative is EU’s program for
will support neighboring Slovenia as of 2013. All
cooperation with Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia,
the V4 countries also took part in stabilization
Azerbaijan and Armenia, set up in 2009 on the initiative of
Poland and Sweden.
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Enhancing Defense Cooperation
more than $40 billion on capabilities development,
from short- and mid-range air and missile defense,
through command and control systems, to other
projects for all services. The magnitude of the
Polish defense efforts not only invites open-minded
cooperation with interested and technologically
capable foreign partners, but prompts concrete
actions to synergize and facilitate a cost-effective
approach to our regional defense cooperation.
The only limit to joint or coordinated V4 capability
build-up is our ability to fully grasp the existing
opportunity and translate it into common projects.
The current financial crisis in Europe and the
United States poses one of the key challenges to
our security these days. Significant reductions of
defense budgets have pushed NATO and the EU to
seek multinational solutions in the development
of defense capabilities and to take advantage of
opportunities offered by regional cooperation. In
2010–2011, decisions were made to implement
two initiatives: NATO’s “Smart Defense” and the
EU’s “Pooling and Sharing.” They provide for the
development of military capabilities, jointly funded
by groups of member states and ensure mutually
guaranteed access for other nations to commonly
developed defense capabilities. The V4 nations have
supported these initiatives from the beginning.
They should, however, by no means be used as
an excuse for further cuts in defense budgets or
for eliminating military capabilities necessary for
responding to large-scale traditional threats.
Multinational cooperation in developing defense
capabilities is never easy. It requires an ability to
set common objectives, followed by negotiations
and the implementation of changes in legislation,
procedures and doctrines. It is exposed to a number
of challenges: political (maintenance of sovereignty
and protection of the national industry), legal
(regulations which rule out cooperation), financial
(scarce funds available and
avoiding a free-rider effect)
The only limit to joint V4 capability build-up is our and military (guaranteed
access to defense
ability to fully grasp the existing opportunity
capabilities and security
and translate it into common projects.
of supplies). However, the
ultimate wisdom of regional
defense projects, is based
The reduction of defense budgets has become a
in a negative sense on preventing the erosion of
trend in many European countries as well as in the
underfunded national capabilities and in a positive
United States. In Poland, however, legal provisions
sense, on the assumption of a certain cost-benefit
which allocate a certain percentage of Gross
ratio and the positive impact regionally developed
Domestic Product (GDP) to defense (1.95 percent),
capabilities will have on NATO and the EU.
combined with stable economic growth, have
guaranteed regular increase of defense spending.
V4 Multinational Projects
This solution ensures predictability and stability of
The V4 has performed in-depth reviews of national
funding for our armed forces, including their midmilitary modernization plans. The most promising
and long-term modernization. We are also steadily
areas of cooperation include ammunition,
transforming the structure of our budget by cutting
countering improvised explosive devices, armored
consumption costs and increasing modernization
fighting vehicles, individual soldier equipment and
funds. Within the next decade we plan to spend
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arms, and integrated command and support and
battlefield imaging systems. We expect specific
programs to be identified shortly. The main criterion
in selecting such projects is their ability to fill gaps
in the national capability development plans. Using
this as a starting point, we will further identify
projects likely to enhance cooperation in other
areas, involving all phases of their development
— from research, through manufacture to their
operational stage. This approach will serve to
bolster the interoperability of our armed forces,
joint exercises, training and logistics.
Polish Air Force Academy in Dęblin, with a view
to complete the process and begin the instructor
training in early 2014.
The new cyber defense projects that will be
launched as part of the Smart Defense initiative
are also on our radar screen. This too is a job for
a V4 task force, as we want to make sure that
these efforts are complementary and provide for
synergies of our national efforts.
In addition, the existing threats to our operational
engagement have raised our awareness of the need
to identify solutions for protecting soldiers against
IEDs. And finally, given the geographic proximity
and joint participation in NATO and EU operations,
the V4 will also seek opportunities for logistical
cooperation.
Smart Defense and Pooling and Sharing Projects
An important portion of the Polish V4 Presidency
has been focused on identifying ways and means
for joint V4 participation in NATO Smart Defense
and EU Pooling and Sharing projects. In different
configurations, the V4 countries participate in
nine ongoing Smart Defense projects and are
working together to establish seven more. We
see huge potential in the Multinational Chemical,
Biological Radiological and Nuclear Defense
Battalion (MN CBRN Bn), as well as in shared
logistics, the development of a training network for
forward air controllers, cyber defense, counter-IED
technologies, air defense and helicopter training.
Training and Exercises
Joint training and exercises have been identified
as another priority for V4 cooperation. As a result,
the Visegrád countries will contribute to the
development of the Connected Forces Initiative
(CFI) approved at the 2012 NATO Summit in
Chicago. The objective of the CFI is to intensify
education, training and joint exercises in order to
ensure that allies maintain their interoperability and
ability to execute a broad range of operations after
the end of the ISAF mission.
Poland is the lead country in the MN CBRN Bn. In
Fall 2012, the Group agreed on the scope of the
project and confirmed the declared allocation of
national elements to the battalion. The battalion is
expected to reach military readiness in 2016, and it
should be deployable in NATO and EU exercises and
operations — among others as part of the NATO
Response Force. In addition to the V4 countries, the
project will include Romania, Italy and Slovenia.
The V4 nations agree that the allies’ exercises
should take many forms, including the LIVEX
formula, which involves the participation of active
troops. In particular, we endorse the proposal to
organize the annual NATO Response Force (NRF)
exercise in such a format. Joint exercises should also
support the pursuit of so-called visible assurance,
for instance by selecting different areas of the NATO
territory, including some in Central Europe. In this
regard, we are satisfied that our region will soon
host two major exercises: “Steadfast Jazz” 2013 in
Poland is also working to create a regional
multinational training center for forward air
controllers (JTAC) at the training center of the
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Poland and Latvia, NATO’s biggest training initiative
so far, which will be key for forging the practical
aspects of the CFI; and “Capable Logistician” 2013
in Slovakia, which will test the performance of NATO
support units and their partners, including those
from Russia.
In the future, we will consider the participation
of the Visegrád Battlegroup in regional, EU and
NATO exercises, including CFI exercises. We are
also considering a potential continuation of the
Battlegroup after the 2016 rotation by ensuring its
regular participation in EU Battlegroup rotations,
possibly with a two-year cycle. Ultimately, it could
give rise to joint military contingents deployable in
future crisis response operations.
The Visegrád Group is also considering how to
better use and provide access to national training
infrastructure, and to offer participation in national
exercises to other allies. For instance, Poland is
ready to invite other countries to take part in
the biannual exercise of the combined forces
“Anaconda” (with upcoming editions in 2014 and
2016), which have already involved units from,
among others, the United States and Canada.
The formation of the Battlegroup will certainly be a
driving force for operational, logistical and training
cooperation among our countries. The process
should serve to reinforce the interoperability of our
armed forces and to foster further cooperation.
High-Level Political Commitment
As part of the CFI, we will also strive to better use
NATO’s military infrastructure and the Centers of
Excellence located in our countries. In this context,
Poland sees potential for enhancing the role of the
Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin in the
practical implementation of the CFI. As it groups all
four Visegrád countries, the Corps could become a
regional CFI center.
The growing intensity of V4 defense cooperation
is a result of the deliberate, strategic choice of
V4 leaders. It is based on the assumption that
increased defense cooperation will yield benefits
well beyond our armed forces. It could contribute,
inter alia, to the strengthening of industrial ties
as well as to boosting cooperation in the areas of
research and development.
V4 Battlegroup
In June 2012, when Poland took over the V4
Presidency from the Czech Republic, Polish
President Bronisław Komorowski and Prime
Minister Donald Tusk proposed that defense
becomes one of the priority areas for V4
cooperation. This idea received strong political
support from our partners and as a result V4
defense cooperation has been given high political
prominence and visibility.
The creation of an EU Battlegroup, to be operational
in 2016, is a major regional project of the V4. The
letter of intent was signed during the Polish V4
Presidency and Poland will be the lead country
providing key capabilities (command and tactical
such, among others). The Battlegroup will be
composed of around three thousand soldiers,
half of them from Poland. In operational terms,
the Battlegroup is expected to be an independent
tactical unit with intelligence and logistical
capabilities ready for independent operations in
a hostile environment and rapidly deployable. It
will be implementing the EU Rapid Reaction Force
concept.
Most recently, on March 6th, 2013, the V4 Heads
of State and Government met in Warsaw with the
President of France and the Chancellor of Germany.
Prior to that meeting, the Defense Ministers met
to discuss defense cooperation and their findings
were then presented to the Heads of State. The
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joint statement adopted by the ministers at
these meetings confirms the willingness of the
six countries to contribute to the development of
European defense capabilities to strengthen NATO
and the EU. In order to cope with the challenges
of the global financial crisis, the states are ready
to make better use of different mechanisms for
regional cooperation, including the V4 and the
Weimar Triangle. Smart Defense and Pooling and
Sharing will also remain the main areas to look
to for greater synergy in multinational defense
cooperation.
Smart Defense and Pooling and Sharing initiatives,
we have identified projects for future synergies.
Training and exercises will also be an important part
of our cooperation, and to this aim, we will rely on
the Szczecin Corps and the preparations for the EU
Battlegroup in 2016.
We are certain that a stronger Visegrád Group
means a stronger NATO and EU. This is the
overarching objective of all our efforts, and we want
them to be congruent with the European capability
development. This has been demonstrated among
others by the presence of the leaders of France
and Germany and their Defense Ministers at the
March 2013 V4 Summit in Warsaw. Their debates
frame security and defense within a larger vision
for the future of Europe, which is also clearly
reflected in the V4 Declaration “Cooperation in
Developing Capabilities, and Solidarity in Sharing
Responsibilities,” issued by the Visegrád countries’
Ministers of Defense. The Declaration sends a clear
political signal of support for regional defense
cooperation, strengthening the vision of Europe
secure, whole and free.
Conclusion
Twenty two years since its creation, the Visegrád
Group has proved useful both to our four countries
and to the other NATO allies and EU member states.
A stronger Visegrád Group means
a stronger NATO and EU.
The V4 facilitated the smooth integration of Poland,
the Czech Republic and Hungary within NATO
and the EU, and it passed a solidarity test when
Slovakia was not included in the first wave of NATO
enlargement in 1999. It has subsequently helped to
promote stability and security in Europe’s Southern
neighborhood and in the Baltic countries. It has also
made an active contribution to the development of
NATO and EU cooperation with partner countries,
particularly in Eastern Europe.
We have recently entered another stage of the
Visegrád Group’s development, by taking measures
to improve our defense and military contributions
to NATO and the EU. This mainly concerns defense
capabilities, whose development will increasingly
have to rely on regional groups. As part of the
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Annex
We wish our defence cooperation to help in
achieving the goal of the “NATO Forces 2020”
project adopted at the Chicago Summit.
Maintaining the allied forces’ interoperability will
be a major challenge in this respect, especially since
we are all confronted by the termination of ISAF in
2014. NATO intends to meet this challenge through
the Connected Forces Initiative, to which we are
all committed. We are determined to enhance
our cooperation in the realm of military training,
education and exercises, as evidenced by our
participation in this year’s major NATO exercises:
Steadfast Jazz in Poland and Capable Logistician in
Slovakia. We support the Alliance exercise policy
that covers a wide spectrum of possible military
operations. NATO Response Force should be a
flagship in this endeavour.
Cooperation in Developing Capabilities, Solidarity
in Sharing Responsibilities
Joint statement of the Ministers of Defense of the
Czech Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the French Republic, Hungary, the Republic of
Poland and the Slovak Republic after their meeting
in Warsaw.
March 6, 2013
While the consequences of the global financial
crisis will keep on impacting our military budgets,
strengthening multinational defence cooperation
is an objective on which we should all focus.
We remain committed to work actively on
strengthening European defence capabilities that
will contribute to the development of the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the
strengthening of NATO.
Our cooperation supports the efforts aimed at
improving competitiveness of the European defence
industry, making it more capable of delivering
key military capabilities through technologically
advanced projects. To this end, we support a more
sustainable, innovative and competitive European
Defence Technological and Industrial Base that
values small and medium-sized enterprises.
Developing capabilities and strengthening the
European defence cooperation
We are determined to develop military and
defence cooperation between our countries and
also through the use of regional cooperation
mechanisms, including the Visegrad Group (V4) and
the Weimar Triangle.
The European Air Transport Command (EATC),
as well as the Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)
are important examples of pooled resources in a
restricted operational and budgetary environment.
The “air-to-air refuelling” project led by the
European Defence Agency is also a promising new
initiative, as well as Multinational Aviation Training
Centre (MATC) developed under the auspices of
NATO’s “Smart Defence”.
We are determined to turn NATO’s “Smart Defence”
and the EU’s “Pooling and Sharing” initiative into
effective and efficient responses to the decreasing
defence spending, at the only condition that it
does not become an excuse for any weakening of
national defence commitments.
Being operationally efficient through flexibility and
responsiveness
NATO and the EU should work closely together
to ensure that their respective initiatives are
complementary, mutually reinforcing and focused
on delivering the required capabilities, while
avoiding unnecessary duplications.
We confirm, ten years after CSDP first deployment,
our full support to EU military operations and
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civilian missions. They have proven the ability
of the EU to act in the field, including on an
autonomous basis, and demonstrated their
importance within the implementation of a
comprehensive approach to tackle complex crises.
Mali shows that we live in a world where defending
our interests and security will increasingly depend
on the ability to launch military operations quickly
and effectively.
We are in favor of increasing the usability of the EU
Battlegroups. The “Weimar Battlegroup”, currently
on stand-by, is effective thanks to the military
collaboration of Germany, Poland and France. The
planned 2016 “Visegrad Battlegroup”, which will
gather the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Slovakia, demonstrates that our forces can be used
in multiple yet complementary frameworks.
This Report is a publication of the Center for
European Policy Analysis (CEPA), a Washington,
DC-based research institute devoted to the
study of Central and Eastern Europe. Material
published in the Article is original, exclusive to
CEPA and not reproduced from outside sources.
We expect the December 2013 European Council
to further guide the overall development of
the CSDP including operations, capabilities and
industrial areas, as described in the conclusions of
the December 2012 European Council. The Foreign
Affairs / Defence Council, which will take place
on 23 April 2013, represents an important step
to maintain the current political dynamic in this
regard.
The views expressed are those of the author and
do not necessarily reflect the opinions of CEPA.
Center for European Policy Analysis
1225 19th Street NW, Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
www.cepa.org
© 2013 by the Center for European Policy
Analysis, Washington, D.C. All rights reserved.
Decisive steps forward have to be made in asserting
a common political will to act and to tackle the
threats to our security. This should come together
with the ability to act together. Our cooperation
is a means to improve burden sharing both on a
European and on a transatlantic level.
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