Introduction
When Antun Sa’adeh established his party in 1932, there were too many
manifestations and issues that engulfed women in his society. Women were placed
below men in every category, were discriminated against in every domain and were
not supported by law in many cases. They were excluded from politics and denied
entry into high-paying jobs and into the “corridors of power”, whether in governance,
business or other public domains. In some underprivileged areas, girls were denied
education. Those who received secondary education were denied higher education,
which was considered as privilege enjoyed by men. It must be noted that by the late
nineteenth century, “it was comparatively rare to find women of any class in the
Middle East who had more than an elementary education”1 as many conservative
opponents of women’s education believed that it was pointless to educate women
because they would not make any use of it since their natural role was to be wives
and mothers. Moreover, the education of women was viewed as a dangerous
business and a challenge to male authority. Many were “reluctant to allow women to
be educated outside the home fearing a loss of control over their ideas and
activities.”2
It was owing to the establishment of embryonic state education system and the
spread of mission education by Western missionaries, both Protestant and Catholic,
from Britain, Europe and the United States, that colleges and secondary schools for
girls became popular for the elite groups of all religions. However, Syrian girls “were
actively insisting that they be allowed a college education and were asking for
admittance to the [American] University [of Beirut]”, which was recognized as an
institution of higher learning for male students.3 In her article, which focused on the
experience of Syrian women with the American Presbyterian Mission in Lebanon,
Ellen Fleischmann reported that “girl graduates from the secondary schools began to
ask why the privilege of higher education was denied them when their brothers
enjoyed privileges which had been open to men for more than fifty years”. 4 She
added: “In 1920, the American University of Beirut (AUB) faculty voted ‘reluctantly’ to
allow women to enter the schools of medicine, dentistry and pharmacy” under the
condition that there were at least three women who would be enrolled together.5 The
acceptance of women students to the university and consequent introduction of
coeducation was an experiment and not a deliberate act. The American University
did not intend to encourage coeducation, but it reluctantly opened its doors to
women to satisfy three demands: of women eager to receive liberal education or to
pursue professional training at the university, of market demand for female medical,
and educational personnel, and of a generation of alumni or faculty members who
1
Graham-Brown, Sarah. Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East 18601950, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 192.
2
Ibid., p. 194.
3
Fleischmann, Ellen. “The Impact of American Protestant Missions in Lebanon on the Construction of Female
Identity, c. 1860- 1950”, Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, vol. 13. No. 4, 2002, p. 415.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
1
wanted higher education for their daughters.6 During the turbulent social and political
conditions of 1920s Lebanon, several generations of women students entered the
American University of Beirut as regular students and earned their degrees after
facing ambiguous treatment and numerous challenges.7 From the late 1920s to the
1940s, women were admitted to universities in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq.
However, educational opportunities were extremely limited for everyone. Education
was strictly class specific and “was a vehicle for introducing few elites into the ranks
of the civil service, an area beyond the sphere of women at the time.” 8 It was only
after the achievement of national independence that education was made free of
charge and became expanded and broadly recognized as a vehicle for the
advancement of the individual and society.
The plight of Women in Lebanon is part of a bigger social and political problem
prevailing in many countries of the Arab world, which share common characteristics
of underdeveloped societies - politically, economically, socially and culturally. The
existing structures of these countries contribute to the subordinate position of
women. The prevailing ideological structure, which finds expression through specific
patterns of behaviour and practices, is based on ancestral traditions and filled with
superstitions. It derives its strength from religious practices and laws. Religion and its
institutions define the citizen, as a legal subject, and directly affect the gendering of
citizenship. As Professor Suad Joseph argues, “the sacred authority of religion has
underwritten the gendering of citizenship also by its subsidization of patriarchy.” 9
The socio-economic structure, on the other hand, is backward and it has prevented
women from potentially participating in the production of goods. The economies and
labour markets of many of the large urban cities of the Arab World have been unable
to absorb the growing labour force, leading to unemployment. Female
unemployment rates in urban areas are considerably higher than male rates. In
times of crises, women are denied entry into stable and high-paying jobs and are
encouraged to take up insecure and low-paying jobs in the informal sector. They are
not treated on an equal basis with men in the public sphere of work. Poor women, in
particular, are vulnerable to poverty, especially in times of economic crises. As
Professor Valentine M. Moghadam maintains:
Because of gender differences in literacy, educational attainment,
employment, and income, women are especially vulnerable to poverty during
periods of economic difficulty or in the event of divorce, abandonment, or
widowhood. Such vulnerability may be exacerbated by the cultural norm of
the male breadwinner and female homemaker ideal, the lack of government
programs to involve low-income women in the labor force, and Muslim family
6
Kobiljski, Aleksandra Majstorac. “Women Students at the American University of Beirut from the 1920s to the
1940s”, in Okkenhaug, Inger Marie & Flaskerud, Ingvild (eds) Gender, Religion and Change in the Middle East –
Two Hundred Years of History, Oxford: Berg, 2005, p. 70.
7
See ibid., pp. 67 – 84.
8
Al-Sanabary, Nagat. “Continuity and Change in Women’s Education in the Arab States”, in Fernea, Elizabeth
Warnock (ed) Women and the Family in the Middle East- New Voices of Change, Austin, Texas: University of
Texas Press, 1985, p. 93.
9
Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2000, P.
13.
2
laws that discriminate against women with regard to inheritance and
encourage female dependence on male “guardians” in the family.10
Accordingly, women are extremely affected, vulnerable, unprotected and denied their
basic rights. They are considered, as one author states, “weak, incapable creatures,
mere shadows of their men, their main duties being toward their husbands and
toward the preservation of the species”.11
The purpose of this study is twofold: first, to highlight the low status of women in the
Arab world, in general, and in geographical Syria in particular. Status, in this context,
refers to women’s ranking in the existing social structure in comparison to men. For
this purpose, it will investigate the various factors responsible for the inferior
conditions of women in the Arab world and discuss some manifestations of
domination over women. The second objective of this study is to highlight the
participation of women in the national struggle launched by the Syrian Social
Nationalist Party in Syria.
10
Moghadam, Valentine M. “Urbanization and Women’s Citizenship in the Middle East”, in The Brown Journal
of World Affairs, Fall/Winter 2010, Vol. XVII, issue 1, p. 27.
11
Kamal, Zahira. “The Development of the Palestinian Women’s Movement in the Occupied Territories:
Twenty Years after the Israeli Occupation”, in Sabbagh, Suha (ed.) Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West
Bank, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, P. 79.
3
I
Controlling women:
Historical and cultural factors
In many countries of the Middle East, regardless of their historical evolution, social
composition and economic structures, women do not enjoy the same rights as do
men although the constitutions in these countries guarantee the equality of all
citizens and stipulate that there shall be no discriminations among citizens on the
basis of sex. Middle Eastern states often declare their commitment to the principle of
equality between men and women, which is inscribed in the Charter of the United
Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This principle of equality,
however, is not respected in many countries of the Middle East. Women’s human
rights are systematically denied by each of these countries despite the diversity of
the political systems that exist there. In her assessment of women’s position in
Lebanon, Professor Suad Joseph observed that:
Middle Eastern societies have adopted most of the principles of the Western
nation-state in their constitutions, and the ideas have continued to influence
political actors, ideologies, and practices in the region. Middle Eastern states
and political actors, however, have greatly departed from the model,
particularly in arenas affecting women.12
The law in countries of the Middle East discriminates against women and denies
them equal rights with men with respect to citizenship, marriage, divorce, child
custody, and inheritance and with respect to education and participation in social,
economic and political life. Women are recognized as citizens in name but seldom in
fact. Women in almost all Arab countries are still not allowed to transfer their
nationality to their children. In spite of their right of inheritance, as stipulated by the
Shari’a that women shall inherit half of what a man inherits, custom in the Arab
world, particularly in rural areas, has removed this right altogether. In reality, woman
resigns her right to inherit land to one of her male relations, whether she wants to or
not. In the panel code, women are discriminated against and receive double the
penalty for the same crime of ‘honour’. As far as the penalty is concerned, the
humanity of women is not taken into consideration. The priority is to avoid scandal.
The lives and experiences of Jordanian women provide a good example of the unjust
differentiation between the sexes. Women in Jordan are deprived by discriminatory
laws of being equal partners within the family unit. Although the Jordanian
Constitution guarantees equality to all Jordanians before the law with no
12
Joseph, Suad. “Women between Nation and State in Lebanon” in Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcόn, and Minoo
Moallem (eds) Between Woman and Nation: Nationalists, Transnational Feminisms, and the State, Durhan and
London: Duke University Press, 1999, p.164.
4
discrimination among them in rights and responsibilities, and although the state
grants women rights as citizens, these rights, however, are “diminished” and can
only be exercised through mediators: the males in the family (i.e., husband, brother,
father), who have control over their actions and conduct. The imposition of an
intermediation between women and the state is necessitated by the assumption that
women are economically dependent on men and they need protection, and that they
are incapable of making free choices, thus, they are not to be trusted. As Abla
Amawi puts it:
The law assumes that a woman is incapable of making decisions or being
trusted. As a result, her husband is the direct link with the state not only on
her behalf but also on behalf of the children. As a “full” citizen, only through
him can they acquire their names, nationality, passports, bank accounts, and
place of residence; be registered in the family registry; acquire health
insurance, social benefits, and marriage of the girls within the family; and, by
extrapolation, become citizens themselves. These combined inequalities only
work to subordinate the status of women within the family and society.
Within the family a woman’s role is enforced as the caregiver who cannot
equally manage the family’s affairs.13
Before 2005, women in Kuwait were not allowed to vote. The electoral law restricted
the right to vote and run for office to Kuwaiti men who were more than twenty-one
years of age. Women’s education was not considered by the male community to be
as important as that of boys. Men “had little interest in giving women more than a
basic religious education”.14 The first primary state school for girls in Kuwait was set
up in 1937. Secondary-level classes were introduced at two primary schools for girls
in 1952. This was not enough for many young women who wanted a separate
secondary college and wished to pursue higher education. The present status of
Kuwaiti women lags behind that of Kuwaiti men. As far as the nationality law is
concerned, Kuwaiti women who are married to foreign husbands, can neither confer
their nationality on their legitimate children nor transfer their nationality to their
husbands although Kuwaiti men can do this for their foreign wives and the children of
such marriages.15 The children and non-Kuwaiti husbands of Kuwaiti women are
recognized and treated as expatriates: they have no right to remain in the country
unless they receive residence permits from the state. These children are not allowed
admission to government schools. Basically, it is assumed that a Kuwaiti woman
married to non-Kuwaiti man ceased to be a Kuwaiti. Kuwaiti women, moreover, “are
forbidden by law to marry non-Muslims, a prohibition not enjoined on men.”16 Kuwaiti
women have been unsuccessful in their individual and collective attempts to secure
rights for their foreign spouses and children. Both the government and the all-male
National assembly remained unyielding to their demands and unwilling to amend the
existing social laws that marginalize women and deprive them of their citizenship
rights.
13
Amawi, Abla. “Gender and Citizenship in Jordan”, in Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle
East, op. cit., p. 182.
14
Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait – The politics of Gender, London: Saqi Books, 2001, p. 50.
15
Al-Mughni, Haya and Tétreault, Mary Ann. “Citizenship, Gender, and the Politics of Quasi States”, in Joseph,
Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 240.
16
Ibid., p. 245.
5
It is the duty of men to protect and support their wives (and children) and to ensure
their sexuality is under control. As protectors and keepers of women, husbands or
fathers “can forbid their wives or daughters to work outside the home, and there is
absolutely nothing that Kuwaiti women can do under these circumstances to
exercise their constitutional right to employment.”17 In return for their right to
maintenance (nafaqa), Kuwaiti women must obey their husbands and rear their
children as stipulated by the personal status law, which is based on the Maliki
interpretation of Islam.18 Women, accordingly, are not seen as individuals in their
own right but as family members whose economic existence is entirely dependent on
the male head of the family and whose rights and duties are defined in relation to
their kinsmen. Women need permission from their husbands or parents to travel
outside the country or to visit friends at night. “Unmarried women, regardless of their
age, are expected to live with their families.”19 Similarly, those women who live
without the protection of men, fully in charge of their own lives, are likely to damage
their reputation and loose society’s respect. As Haya Al-Mughni and Mary Ann
Tétreault note:
In fact, nothing can be more damaging to a woman’s reputation than leading
her own life and taking control over her body and mind as a free individual
disconnected from family obligations. Indeed, the term free carries negative
connotations. It is associated with immoral, loose behaviour. A free woman is
referred to as wasika, which means dirty, unclean. A free woman loses her
self-respect and also finds herself socially marginalized with neither men nor
women wishing to associate with her.20
The family is recognized by the Kuwaiti constitution as the basic unit of society, and
its members must live together under the protection of the family’s patriarch. The
state, it is argued, “supports the subjugation of women to patriarchal control and
insists on women’s identity as family members to maintain a balance between
modernity and tradition.”21 The state provides welfare assistance to low- and middleincome families headed by men. Welfare programs include public housing, rent
subsidies, low-interest loans to encourage men to build their own homes and
subsidies for water and electricity. Such programs are conditional, if applied for by
17
Ibid., p. 248.
In their attempts to interpret the Qur’an and the Hadith, Muslim legal scholars and theologians in various
parts of the Islamic empire came with different interpretations. By the tenth century AD, four recognized and
equally valid schools of Sunni Islamic law emerged, representing to some extent the different regional origins
of the schools, and named after their dominant legal scholars: The Hanafi after abu-Hanifah, the Maliki after
Malik ibn-Anas, the Shafiˊi after Muhammad ibn-Idris al-Shafiˊi and the Hanbali after Ahmad ibn-Hanbal. The
variations that exist between the four schools of law are only on matters of insignificant details. In general, the
body of legal thought embodied in the writings of those four schools was recognized as absolutely correct,
authoritative and infallible. To contradict it became heresy. Today, different countries of the Middle East
follow one or another of these four schools. The most representative school of Shi’a Islam is the Jaa’fari
school, attributed to Imam Jaa’far AlSadeq.
19
Al-Mughni, Haya and Tétreault, Mary Ann. “Citizenship, Gender, and the Politics of Quasi States”, op. cit., p.
247.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid., p. 254.
18
6
women. Haya Al-Mughni and Mary Ann Tétreault maintain that “as compared to their
male counterparts, Kuwaiti women who receive welfare assistance must be
unemployed and demonstrate an absence of male support. Working women and
those with husbands and fathers judged able to support them are not eligible to
receive welfare assistance.”22 In the wage sector, Kuwaiti women receive lower
wages than the male average even when they have higher educational qualifications
than men.23 Women who receive monthly welfare assistance (i.e., income support
and rent subsidies) because they are recognized as heads of households are denied
access to houses and required to live, on a temporary basis, in isolated blocks
owned by the state and located in areas characterized by high rates of violent
crimes. They will stay there until their financial situations improve or they remarry.
In Saudi Arabia, where Islam was born at the end of the sixth century AD, women
are not allowed, under customary law (ˊurf), to drive cars and are completely
secluded and underemployed.24 Women are not permitted to travel or check into a
hotel or even undergo surgery in a hospital without a written permission from a father
or husband. Segregation of women from unrelated men is considered as a supreme
social value and outlawed in all public places. Public space is male space, whereas
women belong to the private domain. Mona AlMunajjed described the restrictions on
women in public spaces:
Almost all public places have areas that are restricted to women. Restaurants
have special family dining rooms for women, and hospitals have separate
waiting rooms for women. There are shopping centres exclusively for women,
and certain boutiques in Jeddah have a closed door with ‘For Ladies Only’ written
on it. Buses are divided into two sections to create a separate seating area for
women. Banks have women-only branches. The zoo in Riyadh sets aside three
days for women and three days for men.25
It is worth noting in this context, that Saudi Arabia, which is recognized as highly
patriarchal society and as a monarchy headed by the Al-Saud royal family, has no
constitution in the standard meaning of the term. Its fundamental law is drawn from
the Islamic shari’a, as interpreted by the religious conservative movement:
Wahhabism.26 Its political structure is a unique blend of tribal custom and religious
22
Al-Mughni, Haya and Tétreault, Mary Ann. “Citizenship, Gender, and the Politics of Quasi States”, op. cit., p.
245.
23
Ibid.
24
On 6 November, 1990, forty-seven Saudi women, highly educated, some with doctorate degrees, were
arrested in a “driving demonstration” in defiance of the ban. A fatwa was issued declaring that women’s
driving was contrary to Islam. These women were forced to sign a statement declaring that they would never
drive again. They were blacklisted and threatened; they lost their jobs and were not allowed to leave the
country. Following this “driving incident”, the minister of Interior, Prince Nayif, issued a law prohibiting women
from driving. Consequently, what had been forbidden as a matter of custom now became a prohibition under
force of law. See Zubur, Sherifa. “Women and Empowerment in the Arab World”, in Arab Studies Quarterly,
Vol 25, No. 4, fall 2003, p. 25. See also Altorki, Soraya. “The Concept and Practice of Citizenship in Saudi
Arabia”, in Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 232.
25
AlMunajjed, Mona. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, Houndmills: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1997, p. 33.
26
This religious movement was founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the eighteenth century who,
after being persecuted in his home town of Ainiyya found refuge with Emir Muhammad ben Saud, the ruler of
Dariya. An alliance took place between the two men to bring about a return to a former era of happiness: the
7
law. Even the official education policy of the kingdom places Islam at the center of
the curriculum and ensures that the Wahhabi worldview is explicitly propagated to
students through the schools’ mandatory religious studies program. Any mixes of the
sexes, the Saudis believe, “is morally wrong and not in accordance with the
teachings of the Quran”.27 Thus, all educational facilities are strictly segregated. Girls
and boys attend separate schools from the age of six and therefore duplicate
schools are needed in all towns. Strict segregation even exists at universities and
girls watch lectures on closed circuit television and interact with their [male]
professors through telephones installed in their classrooms; girls can see the
lecturer, but he cannot see them. They utilize the library once a week when male
students are barred. Indeed segregation, as Mona AlMunajjed contends, “is a deeply
ingrained social custom in the country and the principle of coeducation is widely
rejected.”28 Women have no right, according to official and traditional standards, to
mix or socialise with unrelated men. A young PhD sociologist states:
Segregation is not only in schools or work, but in everything else: weddings
are segregated, hospitals are segregated (in certain areas), restaurants are
segregated... This is why the idea of mixing is very hard to accept, and it will
require generations to change the traditional mentality.29
It is unacceptable for Saudi women and prohibited under any circumstance to work
with men in the same location. In fact, the state prevents them “from working in all
spheres except teaching in female schools and nursing.”30 Apart from teaching and
hospitals, their employment options are limited to women-only service businesses
and to professions or businesses in which they can work at home.31 Furthermore,
they can work within commuting distance of a job as they are not allowed to ride in a
car alone with a hired driver, unless a mahram accompanies the employee.32
Despite having the same level of education and qualifications, those Saudi Arabian
women who work earn less than men in similar jobs. Their marriages are arranged
by parents. Very rarely, a female national is allowed to marry a non-Saudi Arabian
‘Golden Age of Islam’. It holds that “the true Muslim community is one that lives in conformity with God’s
laws, with the life and practice of the prophet Muhammad as the model for emulation.” The movement’s
founder argued that “the basis for knowing God’s laws and for knowing the model for emulation was the
Quran and Hadith, read literally, without reference to historical context, without interpretation, and without
reference to commentaries after the first three centuries of Islam’s judicial heritage.” See Doumato, Eleanor
Abdella. “Education in Saudi Arabia: Gender, Jobs, and the price of Religion”, in Doumato, Eleanor Abdella &
Posusney, Marsha Pripstein (eds) Women and Globalization in the Arab Middle East: Gender, Economy &
Society, Boulder: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003, p.241.
27
Kamla Nath. “Education and Employment among Kuwaiti Women”, in Beck, Lois & Keddie, Nikki (eds).
Women in the Muslim World, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1978, p. 177.
28
AlMunajjed, Mona. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, op. cit., p. 36.
29
Ibid., p. 45.
30
Altorki, Soraya. “The Concept and Practice of Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”, in Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and
Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 230.
31
In the public sector, women employed as teachers, lab technicians, nurses, doctors, administrators, social
workers and professors.
32
A mahram is a woman’s closest male relative and her guardian, usually her father or husband, or someone
to whom the woman could not be legally married. According to a Hadith attributed to the prophet
Muhammad: “A man must not be alone with a woman unless he is her mahram”. See Doumato, Eleanor
Abdella. “Education in Saudi Arabia: Gender, Jobs, and the price of Religion”, op. Cit., p. 246.
8
male, “but she must first receive both the permission of her male kin and the state.” 33
Soraya Altorki sheds some light on the disadvantaging of Saudi Arabian women:
Saudi Arabian women are disadvantaged by many legal and customary
restrictions. Their testimony is worth half that of men in courts of law, and
they inherit much less than do males. It is easier for men to divorce them;
women must endure a lengthy, complicated process to initiate divorce, losing
custody of their children to their former husbands at the ages of five (boys)
and seven (girls). They may not travel without their husband’s permission,
and then they must be accompanied by a male relative whom they may not
legally marry. They are subject to physical abuse by men and have no
recourse to the government, which declares that such matters are an internal
family affair.34
Generally speaking, the violations of Saudi Arabian women’s rights are worse there
than in other Arab countries. According to one expert who, in 1995, participated in a
roundtable on “Arab Women and the Future of the Middle East”, “the treatment of
women there constituted gender apartheid just as the treatment of black people in
South Africa constituted racial apartheid”.35 A good example of such treatment can
be drawn from the Mecca girls’ school fire that occurred on March 11, 2002.
Fourteen schoolgirls were killed when they were trying to escape the burning
building which was overcrowded and had inadequate exits and safety equipment.
The religious police (the Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention
of Vice known as the mutaween) prevented the girls from escaping and forced them
back into the building because they were not properly covered (i.e., not wearing their
correct Islamic abayas).
The condition of women in the Arab world is inferior compared to the status of
women in other regional group in the world. Discriminatory laws and practices
against women exist in family law, in penal law, in citizenship law and in every
domain violating their rights, which are part of universal and mandatory human
rights. Sadly, women in many countries of the Arab world “do not have legal
recourse in cases of domestic violence”36 and may still require a male's permission
to marry, divorce, or work. Some women to this day, Halim Barakat asserts, “suffer
forced marriage, honor crimes, clitoridectomy, and other forms of abuse.”37
Moreover, women face systematic discrimination in laws and social customs and
suffer from a lack of information and awareness about their legal rights as citizens or
their ability to access services and policies that they could use to empower
themselves. The gap between educated and uneducated women is huge. One of two
women in the Arab world, it has been asserted, is illiterate.38 Women’s illiteracy
33
Altorki, Soraya. “The Concept and Practice of Citizenship in Saudi Arabia”, p. 224.
Ibid., p. 231.
35
Hoveyda, Fereydoun. “Arab Women and the Future of the Middle East”, in American Foreign Policy Interests,
27: 419-438, 2005, p. 433.
36
Nazir, Sameena & Tomppert, Leigh (eds). Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship
and Justice, New York: Rown & Littlefield Publishers, 2005, p. 2.
37
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p.
102.
38
Kamla Nath. “Education and Employment among Kuwaiti Women”, in Beck, Lois & Keddie, Nikki (eds). Op.
cit, p. 420.
34
9
affects not only adult women, but young girls as well. Girls in poorer areas of the
Arab world have been denied education owing to many factors which include lack of
schools or transportation, family controls over daughters, and limiting females’
appearances in public owing to the honour perception. However, there are welleducated women in many domains. In fact, women in many countries of the Arab
world are fairly well educated compared to women in other parts of the world. Over
the past 15 years, women in countries of the Arab world have made gains in access
to education, literacy and university enrolment. Yet “their participation in the
workforce and in the political process is low based on any standards”. 39 In fact, it has
been asserted that their participation in the political life is the lowest in the world.40
There were many factors inherent in societies of the Arab world which affected
gender inequality, relations and roles and contributed to the dark cavity of slavery in
which women plunged. Patriarchy, religion, tradition and tribalism were among these
factors. The next sections examine patriarchy and religion as factors responsible for
the subordination status of women.
Cultural & traditional factors
There are a variety of social, cultural and historical factors that influence gender
relations in Arab societies. The power exercised by men over women is usually
reinforced by traditional gender role belief systems. Traditional values and loyalties
to tribalism, clan and the family contribute to the subordination of women. The family,
in particular, remains a relatively cohesive institution at the centre of social and
economic life in traditional and contemporary Arab societies. It is the basic unit of
society and a source of social, political and economic security. This institution, which
embodies a network of interdependent kinship relations, is patriarchal and
hierarchical in structure on the basis of sex and age, where “the young are
subordinate to the old and females to males”.41 Further, this institution is headed by
the top [male] authority: the father, who assumes responsibility for the family and
expects respect and unquestioning compliance with his instructions. Family
structures have been central to citizens’ political identities and necessary to their
survival and access to goods and services. In fact, Men, in most of the Middle East,
“have been constituted as citizen through their roles as heads of patriarchal
families.”42 Family honour is highly valued and plays an important role in controlling
the behaviour of family members, especially women. A person’s public recognition
and his or her dignity, identity and status are linked to his family. A person’s
behaviour and actions affect his or her family as a whole, and the reputation of the
family as a whole is borne by each of its members.43
The tribe (Qabila), which still exists in several Arab countries and which assumes the
collective responsibility over individual actions and behaviour strengthening kinship
and tribal allegiance, is patriarchal also in its structure. Within the tribal structure,
39
Ibid., p. 419.
Nazir, Sameena & Tomppert, Leigh (eds). Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship
and Justice, op. cit., p. 2.
41
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 102.
42
Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 16.
43
Joseph, Suad & Slyomovics, Susan (eds). Women and Power in the Middle East, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001, p. 6.
40
10
relationships are governed by the absolute authority of the paternal will of the father
or the tribal leader (the sheikh) who defines the direction and object of the individual’s
allegiance. Normally, the tribe is divided into a number of clans (ˊashiras). Each clan
(ˊashira) is further sub-divided into family groupings known as hamoula or fakhd, a
lineage. These would consist of all those people who are related within five
generations. They take the name of their shared male ancestor. Members of the
same fakhd “may share a sense of collective responsibility for property and person,
and may own property in common.”44 They also define their social identities by their
tribal affiliations and share a common reputation expressed in the code of honour.
The kin group is the tightest grouping and its members are relatives through three
generations. The paramount sheikh of the whole tribe, would normally be the chief of
one of the more powerful clans, is chosen by the tribal council for his ability, wisdom
and natural powers of leadership. The relationship of a tribal man (a Bedouin) and
his kin group is best described by Shirley Kay:
A bedouin’s life was dependent on his kin, and his kin were dependent on him.
Neither could fail the other and retain their honour. If a Bedouin was killed,
his whole kin were responsible for avenging his murder. If, on the other hand,
he killed someone else, every member of his kin bore the responsibility for the
shedding of blood and might be killed in revenge. A man’s honour could be
stained by an act of one of his kin; the honour of the whole group could be
forfeited by one of its members.45
The family and the tribe have contributed to the expansion of patriarchal relations
and their application to other social institutions. As Professor Halim Barakat notes:
The same patriarchal relations and values that prevail in the Arab family
seem also to prevail at work, at school, and in religious, political, and social
associations. In all of these, a father figure rules over others, monopolizing
authority, expecting strict obedience, and showing little tolerance of dissent.
Projecting a paternal image, those in positions of responsibility (as rulers,
leaders, teachers, employers, or supervisors) securely occupy the top of the
pyramid of authority. Once in this position, the patriarch cannot be dethroned
except by someone who is equally patriarchal.46
Similarly, Religion and sectarianism in particular, shape societies in the Arab world
and reinforce the role of the family as a basic unit of social organization and
production. In fact, sectarianism, as a social organization of a community of affiliates,
prevails in the eastern Arab world and interconnects with tribalism, economic
interests and politics at the expense of religion as a spiritual, moral and unifying
force. “The social reality in the eastern Arab world”, Halim Barakat contends, “is one
of sect rather than religion. Arabs must contend with more or less separate
communities of Sunnis, Shi’as, Druze, Alawites, Syrian Orthodox, Maronites, Eastern
Catholics, and the like. These sectarian affiliations are comparable to – indeed,
inseparable from – tribalism or ethnicity. All three divisive subcategories of society
relate in similar ways to systems of economic interdependence, political
44
Bates, Daniel G. & Rassam, Amal. Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 2nd edition, 2001, P. 266.
45
Kay, Shirley. This Changing World, the Bedouin, New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978, pp. 78-79.
46
Joseph, Suad & Slyomovics, Susan (eds). Women and Power in the Middle East, op. Cit., p. 23.
11
arrangements, and social movements.”47 By the same token, Leila Djabari comments
on the widespread of sectarianism and its effects on the concept of equality among
citizens in general and on the rights of women in particular. She states:
Different confessional groups have proliferated in all Arab countries.
Adherents of each confession submit their family concerns to the religious
hierarchy, all of whose sources of authority and fundamentals differ. The law
of personal status is not uniform and makes a distinction not only between
men and women individually, but also between different groups of men and
women. This conflicts with the concept of equality among citizens enshrined
in most constitutions of the Arab world, manifested most clearly in the
principle of equality before the law. Some Arab countries, with complete
confessional cantonisation, such as Sudan and Lebanon, suffer particularly in
this respect.48
In Lebanon, sectarian pluralism became a foundational pillar of the independent
Lebanese state. The seventeen sects recognized in Lebanon were represented in
parliament and government agencies, according to the Lebanese Constitution of
1926, which was adopted with little modifications by the Lebanese Republic, founded
in 1943. Prior to Lebanon’s independence, and specifically during the eighteenth
through twentieth-century, the various religious communities were claimed and
manipulated by the colonizing Europeans states for footholds within the Ottoman
Empire:
The French claimed the Maronites as their protected community; the English
claimed the Druze; the Russians, the Greek Orthodox; the Ottomans, the
Sunnis – with each state vying to privilege their client “community”. From
these politically designed religious categories emerged elites willing to be
constituted and to constitute themselves and their “communal” institutions in
terms of the shifting grounds of political sectarianism that was emerging. 49
Sectarian pluralism in Lebanon has been seen by many as the critical obstacle to
democracy and gender equality and as the major cause of the Lebanese Civil War
(1975 -90) and earlier political and sectarian conflicts. Its hegemony in Lebanon,
Profesor Suad Joseph maintains, “is seen in its repeated deployment to explain
Lebanese history, state structure, politics, social organization, and citizenship laws. It
has been used to justify what has been done, what can be done, and what cannot.” 50
As a belief system, religion functions as a mechanism of control. Religious texts are
interpreted and used by many from the perspective of their respective social classes
and in accordance with their needs or in order to legitimize and preserve the
prevailing order. In politics, religion is used as a coercive and repressive force to
maintain the socio-political order and to enhance the control of the ruling classes
over the masses. Moreover, the privileged ruling classes and the fortunate segments
of society resort to social and psychological repression in the name of religion. In
other words, they use religion to justify their privileges and convince others that
existing social relations and inequalities are God-made and governed by laws of
47
Ibid., p. 125.
Djabari, Leila. “The Syrian Woman: reality and Aspiration”, in Afshar, Haleh (ed.) Women and Empowerment:
Illustrations from the Third World. Houndmills (UK): MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998, p. 112.
49
Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., P. 112.
50
Ibid., p. 113.
48
12
nature. Arab societies have traditionally assigned women a subordinate status
because, first, women are secluded and continue to occupy the private domain of the
household. Second, limited roles and few professional careers are available to
women. Third, women are kept marginalized and discriminated against by laws.
Fourth, “buttressed by the prevailing religious ideology, which considers women to
be a source of evil, anarchy and social disorder (fitna), and trickery or deception
(kaid), the prevailing standard of morality stresses values and norms associated with
traditional ideas of femininity, motherhood, wifehood, and sexuality.” 51 The role of
patriarchy and religion in the subordination of women is explored in more details in
the following:
Patriarchy
Generally, patriarchy refers to the domination of males over women in the social
organization of everyday life. It is defined as the “principle of male dominance that
forms both a structural and ideological system of domination in which men control
women.”52 In their inquiry of patriarchy in ancient Rome, Carol Gilligan and David A.
J. Richards offer a definition of Patriarchy, which summarizes its gist:
Patriarchy is an anthropological term denoting families or societies ruled by
fathers. It sets up a hierarchy – a rule of priests – in which the priest, the
hieros, is a father, pater. As an order of living, it elevates some men over
other men and all men over women; within the family, it separates fathers
from sons (the men from the boys) and places both women and children
under a father’s authority.53
Patricharchy is practiced within the family environment, where men have the power
to determine the status, privileges, and roles of women and children within the
family. It is also practiced publicly in society and even by the state and within the
economy, where women had no involvement in decision-making processes. Women
are subjected to physical, psychological and sexual violence and driven into
arranged and forced marriages. Such attitudes are rooted in the ancient system of
patriarchy, which developed in the Middle East between 3100 and 600 BCE and
which remained, according to scholars, the core obstacle to equality and democracy
in the Arab world.54 Prior to the rise of urban societies in the valleys of the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers in the southern half of modern Iraq, women, according to
archaeological evidence, were held in esteem and elevated to dominant positions for
their role in the advance of culture, particularly in the discovery of agriculture. In
Mesopotamia that became the centre from which civilization radiated to the rest of
the region, women, due to their early contributions in agriculture and their role as the
major suppliers of food for the community, were often recognized and rewarded with
greater prestige than men. Mesopotamian legends offer examples of women held in
51
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 102.
Chow, Easther Ngan-ling, and Berheide, Catherine White (eds.) Women, the Family and Policy: A Global
Perspective. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994, p. 14.
53
Gilligan, Carol & Richards, David A. J. The Deepening Darkness: Patriarchy, Resistance, and Democracy’s
Future, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 22.
54
See Sharabi, Hisham. Neopatriarchy: A Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988; and Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit.
52
13
prestige and recount their important tasks and positions.55 For example, one of the
most important goddesses of Sumer, Inanna, was associated with water; the most
valuable resource in this arid region. Bilulu was the goddess associated with rain and
thunder. Other female deities were associated with different aspects of agriculture
and the harvest. For example, Ninlil was a goddess in a farming community. She
was the daughter of the goddess of grain and of ripening barley. Similarly, Nissaba
was the goddess of cereal and grass. In Mesopotamian religious beliefs, moreover,
goddesses shared the responsibility for creation with gods and were associated with
the beginnings of life as was the case with the goddess Ishtar. Studies of the ancient
cultures show that “supremacy of a goddess figure and elevated status for women
were the rule rather than the exception – in Mesopotamia, Elam, Egypt, and Crete,
for example, and among the Greeks, the Phoenicians, and others.”56
The patriarchal family and male dominance emerged with the spread of the warrior
cultures. According to some scholars including Gerda Lerner, “the importance of
increasing the population and providing labor power in early societies, led to the theft
of women, whose sexuality and reproductive capacity became the first “property” that
tribes competed for.”57 Male dominance was further entrenched with the increasing
importance of military competitiveness and the growth of complex urban centers.
This gave rise to a class-based society in which the patriarchal family “became
institutionalized, codified, and upheld by the state.”58
In the patriarchal family, women were designated the property of men, who
controlled their sexuality and made female sexual purity (virginity in particular) an
economically valuable property subject to negotiation. According to Gerda Lerner,
patriarchy, in its narrow meaning, “was a system in which the male head of
household had absolute legal and economic power over his dependent female and
male family members”.59 In its wider meaning, however, patriarchy means ‘the
manifestations and institutionalization of male dominance over women and children
in the family and the extension of male dominance over women in society in
general”.60 Men, as this definition implies, hold power in all the important institutions
of society whereas women are deprived of access to such power. In households,
men made decisions about marriage arrangements and the type of work that family
members must perform. Women were under the protection of husbands and other
male relatives and were exchanged or bought in marriages and slavery for the
benefit of their families. They were exploited as workers, as providers of sexual
services, and as reproducers. Ensuring a woman’s honour and chaste behaviour
was important to protect man’s reputation and property. It is through the man that
women can have, or be denied, access to resources and the means of production. It
is also through the father and husband that women can access a class and be
considered “respectable”. A woman’s sexual behaviour could affect her access to a
class. Breaking the sexual rules could at once declass a “respectable” woman and
mark her “not respectable”. Women “were considered a form of property; in fact, a
55
Nashat, Guity & Tucker, Judith E. Women in the Middle East and North Africa – Restoring Women to History,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. 14 – 18.
56
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1992, p. 12.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 238-239.
60
Ibid., p. 239.
14
man could sell his wife and children to pay his debts”.61 In the earliest period of the
patriarchal tribes of Biblical history, the wife is listed in the Decalogue “among a
man’s possessions, along with his servants, his ox, and his ass”.62 In that period,
moreover, “the father also could sell his daughter into slavery or prostitution”. 63 The
head of the family, moreover, had the right to dedicate his daughter to the gods; in
which case she became a priestess residing in the temple. Throughout the period of
successive city-states that dominated the Mesopotamian region, “power and
authority resided exclusively with the husband and father, to whom wife and children
owed absolute obedience.”64 According to the Code Hammurabi, man had absolute
rights and power over his wife, children and slaves and he could substitute them for
himself in case of indebtedness or punishment.65 A man could easily divorce his
wife, particularly if she had not borne children. He could decide whether the wife
received anything following the divorce. If the wife committed adultery, she was
punished by death, but it was the husband’s decision to let her live. Men were
allowed to have sexual intercourse with slaves and prostitutes. Obvious similarities
with many of the Mesopotamian laws, it must be noted, existed in Hebrew law.
Mesopotamia, Syria, and other regions of the Middle East were subjected to
successive invasions, first by the Achaemenid king Cyrus II, then by Alexander, then
by the Parthians, and finally by the Sasanians, who reigned from 224 C.E. until the
Muslim conquest in 640 C.E. The cultural and social changes that followed these
successive invasions led to a decline in the status of women and the spread of
practices implying their further devaluation.66 Such practices were evident in the
spread of veiling and the confinement of women as well as in the maintenance of
large royal harems as the case under Alexander, who captured the harem from
Darius of Persia, and under the Sasanians. During Sasanian times, “harems grew
vastly larger and were kept by the elite as well as by royalty, their size reflecting the
owner’s wealth and power.”67
In pre-Islamic Arabia, women were enslaved and treated no better than a
commodity. They “were considered chattel that could be sold into marriage and
retained no legal standing.”68 They could also be inherited as a possession; “when a
man died his elder son or other relations had a right to possess his widow or widows,
marrying them themselves if they pleased, without settling a dowry on them, or
marrying them to others, or prohibiting them from marriage altogether.” 69 The French
ethnologist Germaine Tillion saw endogamy70 as the basis for the oppression of
women in patrilineal society. Long before the rise of Islam, “endogamy kept property
(land and animals) within the lineage and protected the economic and political
61
Crocco, M.S., Pervez, Nadia and Katz, Meredith. “At the Crossroads of the World: Women of the Middle
East” in The Social Studies, May/June 2009, p. 108.
62
The Decalogue is recognized by scholars as the basic law of Jewish monotheism. See Lerner, Gerda. The
Creation of Patriarchy, op. cit., p. 168.
63
Ibid.
64
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 13.
65
Ibid., p. 14.
66
Ibid., p. 17.
67
Ibid., p. 19.
68
Quoted in Beitler, Ruth Margolies & Martinez, Angelica R. Women’s Roles in the Middle East and North -Africa, Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood, 2010, P. xx.
69
See Holy Qur’an, English trans. With Arabic text by Maulana Muhammed Ali (Lahore, 1978), f.n. 554 to verse
4:19, p. 194.
70
Endogamy is the practice of marrying within the lineage.
15
interests of the men.”71 Polygamy was prevalent and subject to no rule or law. Men
had the right to an unlimited number of women. A man could marry more than 10
wives at the same time, as physical enjoyment was the object of marriage. Incest
was also practised, with fathers marrying their daughters.72 When Islam came into
being, some injustices in pre-Islamic Arabian society were corrected and women
were provided with certain legal rights, although royal Muslim harems increased in
size vastly. For example, “Islam banned female infanticide, entitled women to
contract their marriage, receive dower, retain control of wealth, and receive
maintenance and shares in inheritance”.73 When Muslim family laws were codified
and modernized much later, male members of the kin group were given control over
key decisions affecting their women’s lives.
Male power and dominance were not only restricted to the family, but extended to
society in general. Bentley and Ziegler noted: “Men also dominated public life; with
rare exceptions men ruled as kings and pharaohs, and decisions about policies and
public affairs rested mostly in men’s hands”.74 Over time, the household (the private
space) came to be identified with women and the public sphere with men, who
managed the resources of society and determined its moral code. The private/public
space dichotomy is in fact a characteristic of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region, as asserted by Fatima Sadiqi and Moha Ennaji. They state: “The
overall socio-cultural context of MENA region is generally characterized by a spacebased patriarchy whereby men are associated with the public space and women with
the private space.”75 They add:
It is within this conception of space that gender identities are constructed and
power negotiated in the MENA region. Private space is culturally associated
with powerless people (women and children) and is subordinated to the public
space, where men dictate the law, lead business, manage the state, and
control the economy of the household, both national and domestic.76
The gender system in the Arab world, accordingly, is shaped by patriarchy, which
privileges males and elders and affects much of the social order. The system of
patriarchy, under which women acted and shaped their lives, survived for nearly four
thousand years. This system could only function with the cooperation of women.
Gerda Lerner argues:
This cooperation is secured by a variety of means: gender indoctrination;
educational deprivation; the denial to women of knowledge of their history;
the dividing of women, one from the other, by defining “respectability” and
“deviance” according to women’s sexual activities; by restraints and outright
71
Moghadam, Valentine M. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, 2nd edition,
Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003, p. 121.
72
AlMunajjed, Mona. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, op. cit., p. 12.
73
Ibid.
Quoted in Crocco, M.S., Pervez, Nadia and Katz, Meredith. “At the Crossroads of the World: Women of the
Middle East” in The Social Studies, May/June 2009, p. 108.
75
Sadiqi, Fatima & Ennaji, Moha (eds.). Women in the Middle East and North Africa, New York: Routledge,
2011, p. 3.
76
Ibid.
74
16
coercion; by discrimination in access to economic resources and political
power; and by awarding class privileges to conforming women. 77
According to patriarchal rules, which are widely held and observed in Middle Eastern
and North African families, “females are generally taught to respect and defer to their
fathers, brothers, grandparents, uncles, and, at times, male cousins”. 78 On the other
hand, “males are taught to take responsibility for their female kin, and elders are
taught to protect and take responsibility for those younger than themselves”. 79 The
role of the woman is to be a submissive wife, mother or sister and to always report to
a man such as her husband, her father or her brother. As a girl, she is treated
differently from boys. A boy’s birth is an occasion for noisy congratulations, whereas
a girl’s birth is unwelcomed and perceived as an occasion for mourning and
disappointment rather than for celebration. From an early age, she is taught to be
obedient and would be punished if she refuses to do what her family demands of
her. She is taught to be shy and polite and careful about her appearance and the
way she dresses as well as how she talks, plays or behaves. When she reaches the
age of puberty, the family regulates her behaviour and movement both inside and
outside home and prevent her from mixing with boys. Her honour, from then on,
must be supervised, hidden and controlled as “she is a threat to the feeling of
security of the man.”80 Magida Salman describes the stage of puberty:
Puberty constitutes the end of childhood and the beginning of seclusion in the
narrow world of the feminine space: a world of Harem, even if the latter does
not exist in its traditional forms. It is enough to take a quick look into the Arab
coffee houses, where only the males gather in large numbers, or to walk, any
evening, in the districts catering for leisure and entertainments, in order to
grasp the dimensions of that segregation which has created two worlds
impervious to each other and which keeps young men and young women
apart in the Arab world. The consequences of this separation can be seen in
women as well as in men.81
An adolescent girl must not lose her virginity. If she does, she would be liable to be
punished with physical or ‘moral’ death. A girl should be the guardian of the family
honour by being virginal and pure. She must not have any aspirations; her education
is seen as a waste of time and effort because ‘girls are destined for the kitchen’ and
the only way for them to have a meaningful life is marriage. Thus, girls are brought
up and prepared for their roles, usually predetermined by the family, to be good
wives and mothers, willing to carry responsibilities, to sacrifice themselves for others
and to accept their unjust treatment without complaints.
Patriarchy in the Arab world is so resilient and does not have just one form or one
site, the domestic.82 It permeates Arab society at many levels. It is produced
throughout social life, particularly the family; which is the basic unit of society and
77
Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy, op. cit., p. 217.
Joseph, Suad & Slyomovics, Susan (eds). Women and Power in the Middle East, op. Cit., p. 2.
79
Ibid.
80
Salman, Magida. “The Arab Woman”, in Salman, Magida, Kazi, Hamida, Yuval-Davis, Nira, al-Hamdani, Laila,
Botman, Selma, & Lerman, Debbie. Women in the Middle East, London: Zed Books Ltd, 1987, P. 9.
81
Ibid., p. 7.
82
Joseph, Suad. “Patriarchy and Development in the Arab World” in Gender and Development, Vol. 4, No. 2,
June 1996, p. 14
78
17
“the center of Arab social organization and socioeconomic activities.” 83 Kinship,
which sustains a person’s sense of self and identity and which shapes their position
in society, “transports patriarchy into all spheres of social life.”84 Patriarchy is also
produced through the economy, politics, the legal system and religion. Males and
seniors control households, wealth and resources within the family and are
considered to be financially responsible for their women and junior relatives.
Women’s economic contributions to their households are considered less important,
or deemed under, that of men and elders. Males, moreover, control over kinship
labour and are considered the primary owners and decision makers of their family’s
businesses and enterprises. In all Arab countries, men have superiority in specific
jobs and professions and control the better-paid and higher-status positions. Men
are also favoured over women in terms of inheritance rules, which are basically
religious and are executed by male religious clerics. Suad Joseph describes this
male’s privilege:
Inheritance rules in the Arab world favour male descendants and patrilineal
members over females. In most Muslim legal systems, daughters do inherit,
but they inherit less than sons. But many Muslim women never claim or
obtain their full inheritance, in deference to their brothers. Land tends to be
given to males. Some women accept this as insurance for the future, should
they need to return to their father’s or brother’s household in case of divorce
or widowhood.85
The social organization and structures of countries of the Arab world remain
obstacles to change the status of women:
It seems that the tribal-patriarchal structures of most Arab nations, which
give privileged and dominant roles to men while keeping women in inferior
and segregated situations, constitute the main obstacle to change.86
The political system enhances patriarchy in the Arab world. Political leaders who
hold positions of power are enormously males. As noted by Suad Joseph:
The political system also reinforces patriarchy in that males and seniors
constitute the overwhelming majority of political power-holders, as heads of
state, members of parliament, government officials, and members of political
parties.87
Political leaders, moreover, reinforce patriarchy by using patriarchal kin terms. For example,
kings or presidents of state often refer to themselves as ‘fathers of the nation’; heads of
political parties identify themselves as ‘fathers’ of their political movements.88 The same
political leaders facilitate the way to their kin to access political resources and ensure that
their sons would inherit them in their positions of power. As Suad Joseph puts it:
Arab political leaders often ensure that their sons follow them as heads of
political parties or as members of parliaments. Heads of state and state
83
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 97.
Joseph, Suad. “Patriarchy and Development in the Arab World” in Gender and Development, op. cit., p. 15.
85
Ibid.
86
Hoveyda, Fereydoun. Op. cit., p. 428.
87
Joseph, Suad. “Patriarchy and Development in the Arab World”, op. cit., p. 17.
88
Ibid.
84
18
agencies give their kin government positions. The privileging of relatives in
access to government resources is so normal in most Arab countries that it
not only goes unnoticed when practiced by political leaders, but is accepted as
a political principle. People come to feel that their rights of access to the state
come not from citizenship, but from specific relationships which link them to
resources and services.89
Religion
Religion in the Arab world provides ideologies that reinforce patriarchal kinship and
contribute to the oppression of women. Christianity, Islam and Judaism recognize
men and women as equals spiritually, however, they grant men authority over
women because men are responsible to support women. In many of its verses, the
Qur’an asserts male authority and stipulates that men are in charge of women and
manage their affairs because they spend of their property for their support. The
Qur’an states: “Men are the maintainers of women, with what Allah has made some
of them to excel others and with what they spend out of their wealth.” (Surat alNissa: 34).
In Judaism, God, or Yahweh, was identified with male authority. In fact, all
monotheistic religions prevailed in the Middle East and Mediterranean regions
enjoined the worship of a god referred to by a male pronoun. Hence, Karen
Armstrong notes: “Even though monotheists would insist that their God transcended
gender, he would remain essentially male.”90 Judaism’s patriarchal ideas permitted
the practice of polygamy, concubinage and strong male privilege in marriage and
divorce and prohibited women to inherit or play a role in religion. Jewish patriarchal
ideas and attitudes towards women were related to mores and laws that developed
and existed in Mesopotamia; where a series of cultures and peoples rose and fell
and where the Hebrews probably originated. Women were sanctioned by Christianity
in a similar way to its predecessor – Judaism, except that Christianity rejected other
ideas fundamental to Judaism such as polygamy. 91 Judaism and Christianity, which
both emerged in the ancient Middle East, share creation stories; such as that of
Adam and Eve, that have been influential in shaping attitudes toward women.92
According to the biblical account, Eve was created from Adam’s rib. Eve, moreover,
is seen by some as the first sinner who caused Adam’s downfall. Both religions,
moreover, emphasized the roles of women as mothers and wives. Christianity, in
particular extolled the virtues of virginity and sexual purity in women.93 The Christian
ideals of celibacy and worldly renunciation, the superiority of virginity over marriage
and reproduction, the intrinsic value of the individual, the equal spiritual worth of all
people, man and women, slaves and masters were, according to Ahmed, “in some
ways subverted ideas fundamental to the reigning patriarchies of the age.” 94 Women
were persuaded [by Fathers of the Church, particularly Jerome] to renounce
89
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
Armstrong, Karen. A History of God. New York: Knopf, 2004, p. 50.
91
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
92
Clancy-Smtih, J. Exemplary Women and Sacred Journeys: Women and Gender in Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam from Late Antiquity to the Eve of Modernity, Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 2006, p. 7
93
Quoted in Crocco, M.S., Pervez, Nadia and Katz, Meredith. “At the Crossroads of the World: Women of the
Middle East”, op. Cit., p. 109.
94
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
90
19
marriage for continence. A few women were able to avoid marriage, and
consequently, escape direct male domination and elevate to the Christian ideals to
gain immediate rewards on earth and achieve control over their lives. Some saintly
women, determined to dedicate their lives to Christ, fled to monasteries, disguising
themselves as men. They lived there and worked as men in order to attain the higher
level of spirituality. For the majority of women, however, such pathways were not
available. They were cursed to bear children in sorrow and to be under the power of
their husbands.95 The prevailing Byzantine mores, determining the lives of Byzantine
women in the early Christian era, were totally oppressive and restrictive. In her
historical research on women in Byzantine society, Leila Ahmed maintained that the
prevailing mores, life-styles and attitudes towards women meant that they should not
be seen in public, but kept as “cloistered as prisoners”. 96 They were always
supposed to be veiled, strictly secluded and suitably chaperoned. Appropriate
conduct for girls entailed that they be neither heard nor seen outside their home.
Furthermore, while the birth of a boy was received with cries of joy, the birth of a girl
was not, and girls could be engaged and given in marriage as early as infancy.97
Some of the oppressive customs toward women practiced in Byzantine society were
borrowed from the Persians and the Greeks. Greek society, the most direct
predecessor of Byzantine society, “had a well-developed system of male dominance,
which was also oppressive toward women.”98 In Athens in the classical period (500323 B.C.E.), men and women were segregated and led separate lives. While
“respectable” women stayed at home to manage the household and care for
children, men spending most of their days in public areas. Women were in fact
praised for their silence, invisibility and submissiveness.99 To clearly demonstrate the
position of women in Greek society, it is best to recall Aristotle’s views on women as
his influence was widespread and his theories “in effect codified and systematized
the social values and practices of that society.”100
According to Aristotle, women are inherently and biologically inferior to men in both
mental and physical capacities by “nature”.101 The male, he contended, “is by nature
superior, and the female inferior; and the one rules and the other is ruled.”102 “The
rule of men over women”, he conceptualized, is like “the rule of the soul over the
body, and of the mind and the rational element over the passionate.” 103 Aristotle
considered the female contribution to thought an inferior one, and added: “the male
contributed the soul and gave form to the secretion of the female, which merely
provided the material mass.”104 Moreover, Aristotle describes the purpose of
marriage, and consequently the function of women in it, as to provide a man with
heirs.
95
Ruether, Rosemary Radford. “Misogynism and Virginal Feminism in the Fathers of the Church”, in Ruether,
Rosemary Radford (ed.) Religion and Sexism: Images of Woman in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, New
york: Simon & Schuster, 1974, p. 159.
96
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 26.
97
Ibid., pp. 26-27.
98
Ibid., p. 28.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid., p. 29.
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
20
The spread of Christianity did not spell a general improvement for women. The
church viewed abortion and contraception as sinful. Sexuality was legitimate only for
procreation. This attitude “formed part of a broader negative ethos concerning the
body and sexuality.”105 The main concern of Christian theologians was women’s
sinful sexuality and the shamefulness of the female body, which had to be totally
concealed. For them, ‘women came to symbolise either the temptress Eve (the
whore), responsible for man’s fall from Grace, or the Madonna, the sexually chaste
virgin mother of God.”106 Such ideas meant that women represented a danger if seen
by men and, therefore, they had to be concealed and veiled and were subjected to
either absolute seclusion in convents or nearly strict seclusion within their homes,
where they assume their socially accepted roles of childbearing or clothes-making.107
Fathers of the church (such as Augustine, Origen, Chrysostom and Tertullian),
whose writings were the basis for so much of Byzantine culture, revitalised these
misogynistic practices. Women, in their opinion, “were the offspring primarily of Eve
and would lead a man astray either intentionally or by their nature alone.”108 They
reflected the view of the female as “inferior, secondary, defined entirely by her
biology, and useless to man – and, worse, as causing sexual temptation, corruption,
and evil.”109 The fourth-century preacher and bishop of Constantinople, John
Chrysostom, for example, regarded woman as ‘a necessary evil’. 110 For his part,
Augustine believed that women were simply a source of sexual temptation and God
created them of no use to man... if one excludes the function of bearing children.” 111
For Tertullian, women were merely the gateway of the Devil and bore the primary
responsibility for man’s fall and sin. He wrote:
You are the Devil’s gateway. You are the unsealer of the forbidden tree. You
are the first deserter of the divine Law. You are she who persuaded him whom
the Devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God’s
image, man. On account of your desert, that is death, even the Son of God
had to die.”112
Islam was introduced by the Prophet into a social environment that devalued women
and was already patriarchal. The new religion identified itself with the prevailing
traditions. It “incorporated many of the biblical stories, from Noah and the flood
through to Mary’s Immaculate Conception, as well as all of the Judeo-Christian
prophets.”113 Since its inception, however, Islam as a new religion with a reformist
nature addressed the rights of women and attempted to change existing practices
and attitudes towards them. During the pre-Islamic period: al-Jahiliyah (the period of
ignorance), women in general were enslaved and treated as an object of inheritance.
People could buy and sell women as slaves. Infanticide of baby girls, female
105
Ibid., p. 35.
Quoted in Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, The Barn (UK): Berkshire Academic Press, 2011, P.71.
107
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 35.
108
Hill, Barbara. Imperial Women in Byzantium 1025-1204: Power, Patronage and Ideology, New York: Pearson
Education Limited, 1999, p. 17.
109
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 36.
110
Hill, Barbara. Imperial Women in Byzantium 1025-1204: Power, Patronage and Ideology, op. cit., p.17
111
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 36.
112
Quoted in ibid.
113
Quoted in Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, op. cit., p. 71.
106
21
circumcision and incest were practiced by the pre-Islamic tribal society. Polygamy
was also practiced and unlimited. Men, especially tribal chiefs and leaders, had no
restrictions on the number of wives they could have. They had also absolute rights
over women in matters of divorce, although some women of high status in society
could stipulate conditions at the time of marriage that would be able to exercise the
right to divorce. A woman had absolutely no right to inherent from her husband’s or
her father’s property or any other relative property. Inheritance was not meant for
women and small children, but for the men only.114 It is worth noting, however, that
women of pre-Islamic Arabia participated in the contests of poetry which promoted
the skills of language and verse. They also participated fully in war and “were
present on the battlefield principally to tend the wounded and to encourage the men,
often with song and verse.”115
The seventh-century Islam rejected those practices and attitudes towards women
“which were derogatory, iniquitous and unjust from the human point of view.” 116 It
dissuaded people to abandon the barbaric custom of burying their female infants
alive. It also granted women clear and explicit rights and privileges which they had
never enjoyed and which were unheard of in other constitutional systems for
centuries to come. Such privileges included the right to own property, pursue
education and knowledge, express opinion freely, keep maiden names, ask for a
man’s hand in marriage, refuse marriage, get divorced, participate in public life,
inherit property, contract, enterprise, earn and possess independently. In fact, Islam
recognized women as equally accountable to God in glorifying and worshiping Him
and as full and equal partners with men in the procreation of humankind. “All
believers are equal”, the Prophet declared. A woman’s role is not less vital than a
man’s role. He is the father; she is the mother, and both are essential for life. Her
human nature is neither inferior to nor deviant from that of men. Thus, the Qur’an
acknowledges the female as an independent personality, who possesses human
quality and is worthy of spiritual aspirations. Many assert that Islam granted woman
rights that match beautifully with her duties and that both her rights and duties are
equal to those of man but not necessarily or absolutely identical with them. Whatever
the case, the Prophet himself stipulated that ‘He who honours women is honourable,
he who insults them is lowly and mean’.117
Over time different people and scholars attempted to interpret the religious texts [the
Qur’an and the Hadith]118 in ways that give men superiority and control over women.
Men, as noted by Crocco, Pervez and Katz “came to interpret the sacred texts in
ways that were negative for Muslim women as a means of consolidating their power
over women.”119 Among those men, in particular, were the traditional Islamists who
perceived women’s roles as distinct from men’s roles and should be confined to
114
Engineer, Asghar Ali. The Rights of Women in Islam, 2nd ed., USA: New Dawn Press, inc., 2004, p. 36.
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 69.
116
Engineer, Asghar Ali. The Rights of Women in Islam, op. cit., p. 43.
117
Al-Afghani, Said. Al-Islam wa-l-Mar’a, Damascus, Matba’at at-Taraqqi, 1945, p. 55.
118
The Hadith is a collection of the sayings, teachings and interpretations of the Qur’an by the Prophet
Muhammad. These were recorded by the Prophet’s closed companions, known as the ‘Sahaba’. The Hadith
also contains stories from the Prophet’s life that serve as an example of moral and spiritual excellence that all
Muslims are called upon to take as a model. See Mona AlMunajjed. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, op. cit, p.
10.
119
Crocco, M.S., Pervez, Nadia and Katz, Meredith. “At the Crossroads of the World: Women of the Middle
East”, op. Cit., p. 130.
115
22
domesticity and motherhood because of their inherently different nature of men.
Women, according to such traditionalists (such as Sheikh Hassan Al Banna - the
Head of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Sheikh Muhammad Mutawalli
Sha’rawi, an Egyptian scholar), are “basically emotional, sentimental, and weak
humans whose primary duty is in the home.”120 Furthermore, the traditionalists
interpret the Qur’an and use every ruling of the Islamic law as a source to justify that
women are “minors” who need to be controlled and protected by men, whom God
created as stronger and superior to women. Abbas Mahmud Al Akkad, one of the
most conservative of Muslim traditionalists and a well-reputed Egyptian writer,
“rejects the principle of equality between men and women, and argues that due to
biological differences men are superior to women.”121 Citing evidence from the
Qur’an, he asserts that God favours men over women.122 Thus, women, seen as
weak, precious and sensitive beings, must be placed under male control for their
protection and maintenance and to ensure that they adhere to moral standards.
Their roles are specified as mothers and caregivers whose duties are to nourish and
nurture the family and try to please and obey their husbands, fathers, or sons,
whoever may be the head of the household. It is their responsibility, moreover, to
preserve the honour, reputation and status of the family. Veiling and restricting them
to the domestic sphere, therefore, are also necessary in order to protect them from
the harsh realities of the outside world. Men duties, on the other hand, are to protect,
control and support women financially and to be their guardians in all matters.
The impact of misinterpreting the religious texts on the lives of women has been
noted by different observers and writers. In her study on Egyptian women, Soha
Abdel Kader stated:
Although all historical accounts point to the fact that women in the early days
of Islam in Arabia and the countries that came under the influence of the
Arabs played an active role in the social and political life of the community, in
later periods the misinterpretation of the Qoran and other Islamic literature
led to the deterioration of family life and of the lives of women. This was
particularly true during the time of the Turks. Egypt came under the rule of
the Turks and part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517; the Turks’ exaggerated,
formal interpretation of the Quran, especially its clauses relating to women,
resulted in the issuing of a large number of administrative edicts oppressive to
them. Turkish women led very secluded and passive lives, and this became the
lot of Egyptian women for several centuries and up to the end of the
nineteenth century.123
Although its teachings meant reform and progress regarding the status of women,
Islam, however, reinforced patriarchal kinship relations – with Allah (God) as the
ultimate patriarch. The late Professor Hisham Sharabi wrote:
120
Stromquist, Nelly P. (ed.) Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, New York:
Garland Publishing, Inc., 1998, p. 117.
121
AlMunajjed, Mona. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, op. cit., p. 28.
122
He refers to verse 228 of AlBaquara 2: ‘and for Women Shall be Similar Rights in Fairness And Men Have a
degree over them’.
123
Abdel Kader, Soha. Egyptian Women in a Changing Society, 1899-1987, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
1987, p. 8.
23
The greatness of Mohammed’s political achievement rests in his success... in
integrate[ing] existing social and psychological bonds into the structure of the
new Muslim community. The Islamic ummah [community] turned out to be
nothing more than a super-tribe, the projection of the universal tribal ethos.
God, in the image in which Mohammed portrays Him, is a psychologically
familiar figure. Submission, the basic relation of pristine patriarchy, is here
given its most powerful ideological expression. Under Muhammad,
submission, Islam, for that is what it means, is to the tribalised ummah
symbolised by God.124
Religious institutions and clerics in all churches of the Middle East, who are
exclusively males, have supported patriarchy through their support of hierarchical
family relations and the authority of kin males and elders over females and juniors:
Religious institutions have tried to integrate persons in their families by
teaching respect of family elders and have celebrated sacrifice of self for
family love. The ongoing use of kin idioms (“father”, “mother”, “son”,
“daughter”, “brother”, “sister”) by most religions similarly has reinforced kin
patriarchy.125
Religious institutions of both Islam and Christianity have supported patriarchy by
privileging patrilineality and kin endogamy. These institutions assume that children
belong to their fathers and their fathers’ lineages, and thus, they support the claims
of the father’s lineage over a mother’s claim to children. All religious sects in
[Lebanon] presume that children will follow the religious affiliation of their fathers.
Muslim religious institutions encouraged marriage, among Muslims, between
paternal parallel cousins. Moreover, they disallowed Muslim women to marry nonMuslims and gave men more choices in marrying non-Muslims. Women, in
particular, have been impacted by the regulations of the religious institutions which
determined whom and how they can marry. As Professor Suad Joseph puts it:
This practice has made the consequences of intermarriage negligible for men
but often profound for women. Muslim and Christian women, but not men,
usually have lost their religious identities in intersectarian marriages. 126
The intersection of patriarchy and patrilineality enhances the power of male elders
over women of the lineage and increases the range of men with authority. A father’s
brothers, for example, “can have authority over their nieces and nephews, and male
cousins can have authority over their female counterparts.”127
In the Middle East, moreover, there is a widespread delegation of family law to
different religious courts, leaving women without a common civil recourse. Thus,
women in different religious communities often experience different legal realities
from which they have no civil alternatives. As Yolla Sharara argued, “women in
124
Sharabi, Hisham. “The Dialectics of Patriarchy in Arab society” in Farsoun, S. (ed.) Arab society: Continuity
and Change, London: Croom Helm, 1985, pp. 93-94. Quoted also in ibid., p. 72.
125
Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., P. 13.
126
Ibid., p. 14.
127
Joseph, Suad & Slyomovics, Susan (eds) Women and Power in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 3.
24
Lebanon have not felt the impact of the state in their lives so much as they have felt
the impact of the men of their religious communities.”128
128
Quoted in Joseph, Suad (ed). Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. cit., P. 20.
25
II
Controlling women:
Manifestations
The concept of human rights gained prominence in the modern era with the
establishment of the United Nations in 1948. Women, as a result of their vigorous
fight and lobbying efforts, are now included in the vision of the Universal Human
Rights to which every person on the planet is entitled “without distinction of any
kind,” including distinction based on sex.129 The adoption in 1979 of the United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) constituted a historic contribution in the field of women’s human rights.
CEDAW obliges state parties to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise. It also
binds state parties to modify cultural patterns of behaviour and attitudes in order to
create new standards of equality and non-discrimination in private as well as public
life. In doing so, women would be entitled to equal enjoyment with men not only of
civil and political rights but also of economic, social, and cultural rights.
Remarkable progress has been made in making women’s human rights visible and
in expanding the international human-rights agenda to include some gender-specific
violations. Important gains were made in the realization and promotion of women’s
human rights as a result of numerous regional meetings and international
conferences (such as the Vienna and the Beijing conferences), which addressed
women’s concerns and focused on abuses of their human rights. The Vienna
Declaration called upon the United Nations General Assembly to oppose violence
against women in public and private life. In paragraph 18, it stated that “Gender
based violence and all forms of sexual harassment and exploitation, including those
resulting from cultural prejudice and international trafficking, are incompatible with
the dignity and worth of the human person, and must be eliminated.” 130 Similarly, the
Platform for Action from the Beijing conference reaffirmed and extended the
commitments to promote and protect women’s human rights and to “combat and
eliminate all forms of violence against women in private and public life.” 131 Women
also made inroads in the recognition and protection of their human rights as a result
of the growth of women’s movement and the proliferation of women’s nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Third World countries, which lead to the
further establishment of U.N. programs and initiatives with respect to the
advancement of women and their achievement of full equality.
129
The Universal Declaration in 1948 reaffirms the United Nations Charter’s postulate of the equal rights of
women, stating that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” {Art. 1) and that
“everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any
kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status.” See Rosa Briceño. “Reclaimimng Women’s Human Rights”, in Stromquist, Nelly P. (ed.)
Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, op. cit., p. 50.
130
Ibid., p. 56.
131
Ibid.
26
Nevertheless, women, in many parts of the world including the Middle East, still
suffer from various forms of gender-based violence and human rights abuse. They
remain vulnerable to abuses that are not solely political, but “involve the denial of
economic, social, and cultural rights, including access to employment and credit, to
adequate food and housing, and to education and health care.” 132 Violence against
women, particularly their abuse by intimate male partners, is a pervasive social
phenomenon that results in physical, sexual and psychological harm or suffering to
women. Many experts assert that violence against women “is not about sex; it is not
even about conflict. It is about control. It is not an aberration; rather, it is an
extension of the ideology that gives men the right to control women’s behaviour, their
mobility, their access to material resources, and their labor, both productive and
reproductive.”133
In many parts of the world women suffer physical and psychological harm from
practices rooted in culture and tradition. This chapter focuses on controlling women
in the Arab world. It aims to demonstrate that the subjugation of women, including
violence in many forms, is so widespread and so deeply entrenched in cultural and
religious traditions. Hence, practices such as violence against women (including
rape, domestic battery and honour killing), polygamy, female genital mutilation and
the veil, which reinforce existing power structure, are justified as forms of protection
or control of women.
Violence against women
Generally speaking, “violence against women is a manifestation of historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which is portrayed in male
control of material resources and the consequent physical and psychological
domination of women by men”.134 Domestic violence is a serious and widespread
problem in countries of the Arab world. The killing of women for illicit sexual contact
out of marriage, or so-called ‘honour crimes’, is a form of domestic violence that will
be discussed later. Other forms of domestic violence are manifested in the suffering
of women from violent behaviour at home, in wife beating, and in all sorts of physical,
sexual and psychological abuses by male relatives.
Women are physically abused and beaten by their male partners and are supposed
to tolerate violence. Sometimes they are brutally battered or murdered by male
family members in the name of family honour. They are discouraged, if not
forbidden; by traditions to reveal their abuse; which is considered a private family
issue, to public knowledge. They are not even permitted “to inform other family
members, or close friends and relatives about the problem because of the sanctity of
the family.”135 In many cases, they are blamed for being treated unjustly and battered
by their husbands: “Only women who do not know how to manage their husbands
get beaten”.136 Thus, wife beating is perceived as “a ‘fault/deviance’ of women
132
Ibid., p. 52
Charlotte Bunch, Roxanna Carrillo and Rima Shore. “Violence Against Women”, in Stromquist, Nelly P. (ed.)
Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, op. cit., P. 60.
134
Al-Jawaheri, Yasmin Husein. Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, op. cit., p. 110.
135
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera; Baker, Ahmad M. “Wife-Abuse in the Palestinian Society: A Social
Phenomenon or a Social Problem?” in Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), Spring 1997, Vol. 19, No. 2, p 44.
136
Ibid., p. 45.
133
27
because of their refusal to submit to their husbands’ wishes.”137 It is not a problem in
need of external intervention, but “a solution to the problem of women’s
disobedience to their husbands.”138 In Palestinian society, it is accepted that the
husband, being the head of the family, beats his “misbehaving” wife and teaches her
lesson. A contemporary Arab writer has this to say on this subject-matter:
It is permitted for the man to beat his wife if she disobeys him in bed, if she
leaves the house without reason, if she refrains from applying cosmetics when
he wants her to apply them, or if she neglects her religious duties.139
Those wives who disobey their husbands’ orders, who leave the house without
permission and who do not conform to their expected roles of being ideal wives and
mothers should be beaten by their husbands to bring them back to order, as some
Palestinian women have reported:
Of course a woman deserves to be beaten and sometimes she deserves to be
killed if she does things wrong, like going out without telling her husband, or
leaving her kids to play on the street or she does not keep her house. I mean if
you come to her house and it is a mess, then she must be taught. Her
husband, must teach her how to do things right, he must talk to her, shout at
her, and even, if she does not listen, he should hit her. Why not? If she can’t
learn maybe after getting some good slaps she might learn and become a
better housewife and mother.140
Many incidents of domestic violence and sexual abuse, including incest and rape,
against women remain unreported. Such practices are accepted and not challenged.
Victims of domestic violence may not involve the legal system owing to ‘traditional’
societal attitudes and for fear of more abuse. Occurring violence between intimate
partners is viewed as normal behaviour or as a discrete family matter. The tendency
to “devalue” the deviant aspects of domestic violence and emphasize its “normal”
ones is justified at times as being an action of love as expressed in proverbs such as
“beating a loved one is like eating sweets” (tharb al-habib, zbib).141 Other times, it is
justified as being a religious duty assigned by God to men for being guardians,
protectors and maintainers of women. The Qur’an encourages differential treatment
for the sexes although many of its verses allude to the fact that men and women are
created as equal mate and are to treat each other with affection and compassion
within the bonds of marriage. In verse 34 of Surat Al-Nissa, the Qur’an states:
Men are the protectors and maintainers of women because God has made
one of them to excel the other... The righteous women will accept this
arrangement obediently, and will honour their husbands in their absence, in
137
Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid., p. 45.
139
Haddad, E. “Palestinian Women: Pattern of Legitimation and Domination” in Nakleh, K. and Zureik, E. (eds.).
Sociology of the Palestinians, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980, p. 150.
140
Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, op. cit., p. 137.
141
Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Nadera; Baker, Ahmad M. “Wife-Abuse in the Palestinian Society: A Social
Phenomenon or a Social Problem?” op. cit., p 44.
138
28
accordance with God commands. As for the women who show rebellion, you
shall first enlighten them, then desert them in bed, and you may beat them as
a last resort. Once they obey you, you have no excuse to transgress against
them. God is high and most powerful (Surat Al-Nissa, Verse 34).
The array of laws, practices, and customs prevalent in the Arab world pose major
obstacles to the protection of women or the punishment of abusers. In some
countries, it has been asserted, “laws exist that actually condone domestic
violence”.142 Under Iraqi law spousal violence is forbidden and may lead to
prosecution. However, Article 41 of the Iraqi Penal Code No. 111 of 1990 authorizes
husbands to beat their wives for ‘educational purposes’.143 Moreover, in some
countries men who rape women are encouraged legally to marry their victims. In
fact, “women are often coerced by social pressure to marry their rapists in order to
avoid the social stigma associated with being raped”.144 A raped woman may be
spared from the death sentence if her family decides to take a legal course of action
to revenge its honour, however, the raped woman falls victim to the injustices of the
legal system. A good illustration of this is drawn from the Palestinian legal system.
According to Article 308 of the Palestinian Criminal Code “charges and subsequent
legal actions will be dropped against the rapist if he marries the victim. And the
Public Prosecution Office reserves the right to reactivate the charges, if the offender
divorces the victim within the first three years of the marriage.” 145 In this case, AbuDuhou concludes:
The woman suffers triple victimisation. Firstly, she is sexually assaulted and
raped. Secondly, she is victimised not once, but twice by the legal system:
which denies her right to seek help and protection as a legal independent
identity, and then forces her to marry her rapist, allowing him to violate her
legally for at least three more years. Hence, the rapist is rewarded with free
access to his victim with a compulsory term of three years, while the victim is
given a life sentence with hard labour!”146
The laws of some countries that criminalize rape, such as Lebanon, tend to be
lenient toward men and do not apply to marital relationships. There seems to be no
laws in any country of the region which clearly outlaw domestic violence in all its
forms and ensure that those guilty of domestic abuse are punished.
There are several complex social and cultural factors that have contributed to
violence against women in the Arab world. Sometimes the threat and fear of violence
142
Nazir, Sameena & Tomppert, Leigh (eds). Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship
and Justice, op. cit., p. 7.
143
Al-Jawaheri, Yasmin Husein. Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, London: I.B.
Tauris, 2008, p. 111.
144
Nazir, Sameena & Tomppert, Leigh (eds). Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa: Citizenship
and Justice, op. cit., p. 7.
145
Al-Bakary, H. “Legal and Social Reality of Women in the West Bank” in Al-Haq (ed.), Women, Justice and
Law. Ramallah:Al-Haq, 1995, pp. 111 (in Arabic).
146
Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, op. cit., P. 54.
29
prevents women from seeking employment, or compels them to accept low paid
home-based exploitative labour. Increased levels of violence are attributed to
situations of economic and political upheaval and to the sense of insecurity that
accompanies times of political strife, conflict and economic disturbance. Following
the Turkish army invasion of Cyprus in 1974, many Greek Cypriot women were
subjected to the violence of the enemy. Women lost their purity and innocence and
were deprived of the male protection on which they were totally dependent. One of
the consequences of the 1974 war, as reported by Maria Roussou, “was the creation
of categories of ‘problem’ women: raped, refugees, enclaved, war widows, wives of
missing persons.”147
Women are vulnerable to violence, harassment and intimidation due to increases in
poverty, unemployment and hardship, lack of economic resources, and the denial of
socio-economic rights. During the years of economic sanctions on Iraq, particularly,
many women were victimized and subjected to all kind of physical and psychological
harassment. They were robbed on the streets, abducted, raped and murdered.
Moreover, many women were forced to resort to humiliating ways of earning money
around the streets of Baghdad. Prostitution and pimping became a widespread
occurrence. As this was illegal, security forces of the regime of Saddam Hussein
punished and reportedly killed a large number of women for engaging in prostitution,
pimping and soliciting. In its 2003 report on human rights practices, the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights and Labour (2004) said that “Iraq’s security forces had
allegedly beheaded at least 130 women between June 2000 and April 2001, along
with an additional number of men suspected of facilitating prostitution”.148 According
to Amnesty International, numerous women and men were decapitated in front of
their family members and “the victim’s heads were displayed in front of their homes
for several days”.149 This brutal action was terrifying for those who might have
engaged in prostitution out of despair. It certainly left hurtful scars on every Iraqi
woman.
Honour killing
Honour killing is a widespread phenomenon in the Arab world. Many crimes are
committed against women in the name of honour or for breaking the social and
cultural mores governing sexuality. The family considers itself directly responsible for
defending its honour, which is connected to the perceived behaviour of girls and
women. In countries of the Fertile Crescent, in particular, females are strictly kept on
the watch by their male relatives in order to safeguard a family’s honour. For a
woman who violates her honour, violates the honour of her kin. J. G. Peristiany
describes honour and shame among Cypriots, highlighting woman’s most important
duty:
Woman’s foremost duty to self and family is to safeguard herself against all
critical allusions to her sexual modesty. In dress, looks, attitudes, speech, a
woman, when men are present, should be virginal as a maiden and matronly
as a wife… for an unmarried woman, shame reflects directly on parents and
147
Roussou, Maria. “War in Cyprus: Patriarchy and the Penelope Myth”, in Ridd, Rosemary & Callaway, Helen
(eds) Caught Up in Conflict: Women’s Responses to Political Strife, Houndmills: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1986,
p. 26.
148
Al-Jawaheri, Yasmin Husein. Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, op. cit., p. 115.
149
Ibid.
30
brothers, especially unmarried ones, who did not protect or avenge her
honour.150
This attitude, however, is more prevalent in Jordan, Palestine and Iraq and probably
originates from Bedouin tradition. Yasmin Al-Jawaheri describes this phenomenon:
In Iraq, fear of scandal occupies a major place in people’s lives; hence
upholding the honour of the family and protecting it from rumour is a vital
responsibility. A woman‘s sexual contact outside marriage is considered the
worst that could ever happen to injure her family’s reputation.151
The culture of upholding the honour and reputation of the family and its women is
also noticeable in Palestine. In his book, which provides a general overview of the
culture and the customs of the Palestinians, Samih K. Farsoun notes that “patriarchy
was upheld by a value and discourse of honour (sharaf or ‘ard).”152 The responsibility
of upholding this honour rests, mainly, in the family’s women, who are expected “to
exhibit modesty in demeanor and dress, self-restraint, self-effacement, sexual
chastity before marriage and fidelity after, and obedience to male guardians,
husbands, and elders.”153 From her part, Diane Baxter examines the ideology of
honour among West Bank Palestinians. The honour ideology, in her opinion, “is “a
way-of-life” and “a set of expectations about the appropriate ways for men and
women to “be” in the world.”154 She adds: “Honour ideology imparts responsibilities
and rights, regulates, restricts, disciplines, and denies. It calls for certain beliefs,
attitudes, and behaviours while devaluing or prohibiting others.”155 As far as women
are concerned, they are expected to carry out their daily lives in a respectful way,
avoiding “male space” and upholding values such as modesty in dress and
comportment, virginity until marriage and fidelity, in order to gain honour and
maintain their families’ reputation. Thus, “honour accrues to women who are
considered obedient daughters, accommodating sisters, supportive wives, reliable
and devoted mothers, good housekeepers and cooks, reasonable (though the bar for
women is much lower, given their emotional and imprudent nature), and
hospitable.”156 Women may receive the supreme punishment by their male relatives
for their real or perceived violations of honour.
Honour crimes “are the manifestation of culturally inherited values that impose on
women socially expected behaviour that is derived from prevailing patriarchal norms
and standards”.157 Trespasses on this expected behaviour by women is not
tolerated. As one author states: “Honour is what makes life worthwhile: shame is a
150
J. G. Peristiany, “Honour and Shame in a Cypriot Highland Village,” in J. G. Peristiany, ed., Honour and
Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society, University of Chicago Press, 1966, p. 182.
151
Al-Jawaheri, Yasmin Husein. Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, op. cit., p. 113.
152
Farsoun, Samih K. Culture and Customs of the Palestinians, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2004,
p. 38.
153
Ibid., pp. 38-39.
154
Baxter, Diane. “Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture” in Anthropological
Quarterly, Summer, 2007, Vol.80, p. 746.
155
Ibid.
156
Ibid., p. 748.157
See a report titled “The legal and social status of Palestinian women” prepared by Women Centre for Legal
Aid and counseling, in http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_articles=278 p.4.
31
living death, not to be endured”.158 Thus, every year, hundreds of women and girls in
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine are punished or murdered by male relatives in
order to cleanse the honour of the family, which is very dependent on a woman’s
virginity. According to ‘Arab” cultural mores and customs, a woman who loses her
virginity before marriage brings everlasting shame upon her own family and loses
her chance of finding a suitable husband. She may be punished with physical death,
or moral death. Arab society considers the very honour of a girl, and her family, is
linked to the preservation of her virginity. The very fine membrane called a hymen is
highly valued and perceived as the most cherished and most important part of a girl’s
body. As noted by the renowned Egyptian woman doctor, writer and novelist Nawal
El Saadawi: “An Arab family does not grieve as much at the loss of a girl’s eye as it
does if she happens to lose her virginity. In fact if the girl lost her life, it would be
considered less of a catastrophe than if she lost her hymen”.159
The vast majority of men in the Arab world insist on virginity in their partner at
marriage. Few men, however, understand that “the hymen varies in texture, size and
consistency from one girl to another, just as the male sexual organ differs from man
to man”.160 A girl whom nature has provided her with an elastic hymen which does
not bleed on the first night of marriage can be unfortunate and humiliated. Moreover,
a girl whose delicate hymen was torn away and lost by a minor accident during
childhood would also suffer a miserable fate on her first night of marriage. Such a girl
is incapable of proving her innocence of any sexual relation because her hymen is
not intact. This led El Saadawi to speak of a distorted concept of honour in Arab
society:
A man’s honour is safe as long as the female members of his family keep their
hymens intact. It is more closely related to the behaviour of the women in the
family, than to his own behaviour. He can be a womanizer of the worst calibre
and yet be considered an honourable man as long as his womenfolk are able
to protect their genital organs. There are certain moral standards for females
and others for males, and the whole of society is permeated by such double
moral standards. At the root of this anomalous situation lies the fact that
sexual experience in the life of a man is a source of pride and a symbol of
virility; whereas sexual experience in the life of women is a source of shame
and a symbol of degradation.161
An average of one woman per month is reportedly killed in Lebanon by a close male
relative who claims “she has soiled the honour of the family by committing adultery
or engaging in pre-marital sexual relations”162 or even by marrying and divorcing
without the consent of the family. In Palestine, 38 cases of femicide or ‘honour’
158
Shirin J.A. Shukri. Arab Women: Unequal Partners in Development, op. cit., p. 1.
Nawal El Saadawi. The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World, Trans and edited by Dr. Sherif Hetata,
London: Zed Press, 1980, P. 26.
160
Ibid., p. 28.
161
Ibid., p. 30.
159
162
Gattas,
Kim.
“Beirut
hosts
‘honour
killing’
http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_article=138
32
in
conference”,
in
crimes were documented between 1996 and 1999.163 Some observers put the figure
much higher. They agree that each year the number of honour-killings in Palestine
(including the West Bank and Gaza) fluctuates between twenty and forty. 164
According to Kahaled al-Kidra, the former Palestinian Attorney General in Gaza,
“society considers a man who commits this crime a hero.”165 In Iraq, an estimated of
4000 women and girls were victims of ‘honour killings’ during the 1990s. This was
due to the fact that the Baˊathist regime of Saddam Hussein had reinforced and
legitimated the tribal practice of killing women for ‘honour crimes’ after a long period
of being outlawed. It has been argued that the Iraqi regime promulgated the
legislation in order to gain the support of Iraqi’s tribal leaders and religious
fundamentalists, in preparation for the invasion of Kuwait.166 On the other hand,
Saddam Hussein was accused of using the ‘honour’ ideology in the service of his
regime and its suppression of political opposition. Women, although granted equal
rights with men, “became a tool of male repression through the agency of state rape,
which the threat of subjecting them to public disgrace, which meant humiliation and
damaged reputation for their families. As reported by the special Rapporteur of the
United Nations’ Commission on Human Rights:
Security personnel would sometimes rape a young woman in order to later
use her as an informant under the threat that her non-compliance would
result in the revelation of her rape, thus subjecting her to public disgrace and
ostracism. It has been alleged that some of these rapes were recorded on
video-cassettes to be given to the victim’s family in the event of noncompliance. Other women were reportedly raped simply as an act of insult or
vengeance directed against their families. Testimony received from former
Iraqi security officers corroborates these allegations. (UNESCO 1992, 24-25)167
At any case, the ‘honour crimes” were committed by close male relatives such as
fathers, brothers and uncles. On many instances, women are killed on suspicion of
having committed adultery, and before any facts have been established. Such a
crime often occurs secretly, but within the intimate circle of the family. The majority of
women killed in honour crimes are teen-agers, who “become victims of family
revenge for being raped, sometimes by a relative, or on the suspicion of having been
involved in a sexual relationship, or even for speaking to an unrelated man or dating
without parental permission. Even a girl who is raped is blamed for having been
raped and is seen as having harmed the family’s reputation.168 Palestinian journalist
Rula Sharkawi commented:
163
See a report titled “The legal and social status of Palestinian women” prepared by Women Centre for Legal
Aid and counseling, in http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_articles=278 p.4.
164
Baxter, Diane. “Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture” op. cit., p. 753.
165
Quoted in Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, op. cit., P. 53.
166
Al-Jawaheri, Yasmin Husein. Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions, op. cit., p. 113.
167
Quoted in Ismail, Jacqueline S & Ismail, Shereen T. “Gender and State in Iraq”, in Joseph, Suad. (ed.) Gender
and Citizenship in the Middle East, op. Cit., p. 197.
168
Mattar, Shafika. “Rana Husseinin: Created a New Beat Honor Crimes in Jordan”, see
http://www.womensenews.org/story/journalist-the-month/030508/jordans-husseini-created-new-beathonor-crimes
33
Many girls are raped each year and the dilemma continues to remain hidden.
In some cases, even the raped girl’s male family members are not told for fear
of her brothers or father will kill her as the only way to ‘cleanse’ the family
honour... Women who have been raped are often seen as participants in
immoral acts, even though, as the word “rape” suggests, the girl or woman
was forced against her will and without her consent.169
Those women who are accused by their relatives of bringing dishonour to their
families are rarely given the opportunity to prove their innocence. In a recent case, a
16 years old girl, Kurdistan Aziz, in the Kurdish part of Iraq sought protection from
the police after eloping with her boyfriend to Arbil. Kurdistan was turned over to her
father, after the father allegedly bribed the police officer. As soon as she was
released, the family chose to kill their daughter to reclaim the “honour” of the
community from the “shame” supposedly brought upon them. The girl “was stoned to
death by her family, while the local authorities reportedly refused to intervene in what
they perceived as a ‘tribal issue’.”170 “Women’s testimony is often not believed, and
women are held accountable for their own victimization, even when there are
witnesses”.171 Women have no right to decide their own fate. They are treated as
property with no rights of their own. They are considered, according to Professor
Tahira Shahid Khan, “the property of the males in their family irrespective of their
class, ethnic, or religious group. The owner of the property has the right to decide its
fate”.172 She adds, “The concept of ownership has turned women into a commodity
which can be exchanged, bought and sold”.173
Is honour killing promoted by the teachings of Islam? In fact, there is nothing in the
Quran that stipulates or sanctions killing. The complicated issue of honour killing cuts
deep into the history of Arab societies. It dates back to pre-Islamic era and stems
“from the patriarchal and patrilineal society’s interest in maintaining strict control over
designated familial power structures”.174 In pre-Islamic Arabia, it must be noted,
women lived in a subordinate position under the guardianship of their tribal males. A
woman was considered personal property, with no freedom of choice and no power
to control her fate. The birth of a daughter was regarded as a disgrace and a matter
of shame. The practice of baby female infanticide (al-waad ‫ )وأد البنات‬was quite
common in Arabia, especially among the Kindah, Rabi’a and Tamim tribes.175 Girls
169
Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank, op. cit., p. 47.
Quoted in Ahmed, Huda. “Iraq”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and
North Africa, New York: Freedom House, 2010, p. 171.
171
Zuhur, Sherifa. “Women and Empowerment in the Arab World”, in Arab Studies Quarterly Vol. 25, No. 4,
Fall 2003, p. 33
172
Quoted in Hillary Mayell. “Thousands of Women Killed for Family ‘honor’”, in National Geographic News,
February 12, 2002.
173
Ibid.
174
Ruggi,
Suzanne.
“Honor
Killings
in
Palestine”,
in
http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_article=63
170
175
Girls were a source of embarrassment if they were captured as prisoners by the enemy during tribal feuds
or falling into prostitution. Thus, a daughter is killed immediately after her birth or by the age of five to relieve
parents from the economic burden she represented, and to relieve the tribe from any shame she could cause
later. She was customarily buried alive or hurled down to death from a hill-top. Female infanticide was also
practiced by the Greeks and the Romans, especially among the Roman aristocracy. The discarding of female
34
were seen as liabilities to the tribe and needed to be married off because they could
contribute little to the family’s wealth and power. Whereas boys were considered
assets because they had the ability to uphold and maintain tribal traditions and they
could enhance the family’s position in society.176 The persecution of girls has
persisted in the Arab world mainly due to the prevailing existence of the honourshame ideology. Accordingly, women are vulnerable in the Arab world because they
live in societies characterized by tradition, tribalism, and a culture of ignorance that
turns a blind eye to practices such as honour-killings. The practice of honour killing is
a manifestation of inherited tradition or customary law (‘urf). The concept of women’s
rights is not culturally relevant to patriarchal societies.
Polygamy
Polygamy, which means having more than one wife at a time and which constitutes a
special form of violence against women, is still practiced in all Arab societies. In Iraq,
the imposition of UN economic sanctions during the 1990s left an ugly mark on
society and led to an increase in polygamous marriages. In the context of desperate
economic conditions and insecurity, high rates of unemployment, and gender
imbalance, marriage for a large number of Iraqi women became an unattainable
dream. The desperate situation “not only narrowed a woman’s chances of choosing
a marriage partner but also reduced her ability to refuse to be a second wife”.177
Depriving women of the opportunity for income earning and their seclusion from
public life encouraged the spread of polygamous marriages. “With the increased
economic insecurity”, one author states, “polygamous marriage has become a
means of economic and social security, not only for the woman but probably also for
her family”.178 The same author presents a case study of Rafah, 21 years old and
university graduate, whose middle-class family went through an extremely vulnerable
situation in its living standards. The family agreed to give Rafah into a polygamous
marriage to a 52 year-old businessman with five children in exchange of keeping the
family in his house and giving them some cash for living costs. Rafah spoke of her
reactions:
First, I thought I would rather kill myself than marry this man. Then I thought,
killing myself would only save me but by marrying him, all my family would be
saved. I learned to forget about myself. It was the only option that could save
my whole family from imminent starvation, especially as Hanan [her sister]
was still hoping to travel abroad. There was no space for me to think twice.179
Polygamy is defended as one of the blessings of Islam. The Quran, however, is
opposed to this ancient practice, which dates back to pre-Islamic times.180 The Basic
infants was implicitly codified by the Roman law: fathers were required to raise all their sons but only one
daughter. See Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 35.
176
Crocco, M.S., Pervez, Nadia and Katz, Meredith. “At the Crossroads of the World: Women of the Middle
East” in The Social Studies, May/June 2009, p. 110.
177
Ibid., p. 104.
178
Ibid., p.103.
179
Ibid.
180
Before Islam, polygamy was widely practiced in the world and regarded as a symbol of male virility, power
and domination. “It was exercised by Babylonians, Greeks, Persians, and Arabs. Indeed, many pre-Islamic
religions such as Judaism acknowledged polygamy among its adherents. It was also the tradition of all
35
Law in the Quran, as Professor Qamaruddin Khan asserts, is that of monogamy, that
is:
In the very beginning of creation God decreed that one man unite with only
one woman in marriage and form the basic human bond in social relations.
This is why He created one Adam and one Eve and married them together to
start the human race. He did not create several Eves for one Adam.181
The fundamental institution of marriage, as it can be inferred from the Quran, is built
between one man and one woman, and not between one man and many women.
The male and the female are equal because both, as emphasized in the Quranic
verse (4:1), are created by God independently from the same single soul. Women
were not created as subservient to men. God says: “And of His signs is that He
created for you, of yourselves, mates, that you might repose in them, and He has set
between you love and mercy” (30:21). The word “mates” in this verse does not mean
one man mating with several women at the same time. Rather, it means “pairs”. It is
not possible for a man to distribute love and mercy between several wives. It is
against human nature. Both man and woman Professor Qamaruddin Khan
concludes, “can enjoy peace, comfort, and happiness in marriage only if this
relationship is established on the principle of one husband and one wife; it is only
this principle that can inspire mutual confidence, love, and mercy in conjugal life”.182
Furthermore, polygamy prevents the development of any genuine female solidarity
as married women usually see their co-wives as rivals and feel threatened and
insecure. It also allows a man to fulfil his sexual appetite, at the same time
preventing him from developing strong conjugal bonds with individual women. 183 On
the other hand, children in polygamous situations are deeply affected and likely to
experience the same sense of rejection, emotional and/or psychological pain and
material deprivation, as their mothers will. This feeling is reflected in the following
comment made by a Palestinian young woman whose father is married to three
wives:
Sometimes my father doesn’t remember all of his children since he has so
many. Sometimes he doesn’t even know that the child standing in front of him
is his own... At school i feel very inferior and insecure when my classmates
find out that my father is married to more than one woman. I feel
ashamed.184
The permission of Polygamy was extracted from the Quran by Muslim jurists who
regarded it as a divine recommendation and as a fundamental right of the male. This
right restricted polygamy to a maximum of four wives provided the husband was
capable of treating each of his spouses equitably. The basis of polygamy is this
famous verse:
Prophets except Jesus.” Quoted in Western, David J. Islamic “Pure Strings”: The Key to the Amelioration of
Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle East, The Air force Law Review, no. 61, Jan 2008, p. 116.
181
Khan, Qamarudding. Status of Women in Islam, New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1990, p. 16.
182
Ibid., p. 18
183
Shirin J.A. Shukri. Arab Women: Unequal Partners in Development, Aldershot (England): Avebury, 1996, p.
15.
184
Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank, Boulder, Colorado:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, p. 108.
36
Marry of the women who seem good to you, two, three, or four, and if ye fear
that ye cannot do justice [to so many] then one (only)...185
Males in Muslim society throughout the world gratefully received this
recommendation and saw it as licence to marry four wives taken the Prophet as an
example. Prophet Muhammad, it must be noted, had several wives.186 At the age of
twenty five, he married his forty five years old employer: Khadijah, a wealthy widow
of high standing in the community who owned a caravan, which traded between
Mecca and Syria, and who became his first convert. Khadijah remained
Muhammad’s only wife for twenty-three years until her death. She was to him not
only a wife, but also a companion. He found in her all the inspiration and
encouragement which he desperately needed, especially in the first few years of his
struggle in his prophetic mission. Much later, Muhammad set his own remarriage to
Sawda and ‘Aisha. The former was a Muslim widow; the second was the six-year-old
daughter of Abu Bakr, his most important supporter and immediate successor. This
marriage was not consummated until after the Muslims had migrated to Medina by
the time ‘Aisha was no more than nine or ten. It was reportedly “taken as a way for
the Prophet to honour his friend who ultimately became the first Caliph upon
Muhammad’s death.”187 Commonly known as Um Al Mo’mineen (the mother of the
Believers), ‘Aisha was a good speaker. Muawieh reportedly said: “I have not heard a
more able speaker than ‘Aisha.”188 As the Prophet’s wife, “she was the means for the
transmission of his religious teachings (Hadith), especially to women.”189 Three
months after his marriage to ‘Aisha, Muhammad married Hafsa, daughter of another
closest support: ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab and a widow who had lost her husband in the
battle of Badr. The majority of Muhammad’s wives subsequently were widows of
Muslims slain in support of Islam.
Gradually after the death of the Prophet and with the passage of time, polygamy
transformed from assisting destitute women to fulfilling selfish male needs. Males in
Muslim societies, as one observer commented, exploited the permission of polygamy
by taking multiple wives “for reasons of power, prestige, pleasure and revenge”. 190
Indeed, Polygamy has a psychological effect on the self-esteem of men and women.
As one researcher argues:
It enhances men’s perception of themselves as primarily sexual beings and
emphasizes the sexual nature of the conjugal unit. Moreover, polygamy is a
way for the man to humiliate the woman as a sexual being; it expresses her
inability to satisfy him.191
185
Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond The Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1987, p. 46.
186
In her book: The Wives of the Prophet, Dr. Ā’isha ˊAbd al-Rahman (her pen-name Bint al-Shati’) gives short
studies of the lives and characters of twelve women who were married to the Prophet, ten of whom outlived
him. Several of his marriages were made with the objective of turning his tribal enemies into his friends. See
Bin al-Shati’. The Wives of the Prophet, trans Matti Moosa and D. N. Ranson (Lahore 1971) p. xvii.
187
Western, David J. Islamic “Pure Strings”: The Key to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the Middle
East, op. cit., p. 119.
188
Mogannam, Matiel E. T. The Arab Woman and the Palestine Problem, Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion
Press, Isnc., 1976, p. 34.
189
Ibid.
190
Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank, op. cit., p. 107.
191
Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond The Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, op. cit., p. 48.
37
This recommendation, however, is not endorsed by all, but it is seen as a
misinterpretation of a Quranic verse. The permission was not given as a general
licence to practice polygamy. Rather, it “was given in a special historical situation
brought about by a recent war, on account of which a large number of Muslim
women and children had become orphans”, Professor Qamaruddin Khan argues. 192
It was addressed only to the guardians of the widows and orphans in the beginning
of Islam in Madinah. Therefore it “must be regarded as a temporary measure, and it
cannot be interpreted as a permanent law in the Shariah”.193
Men are still finding ways to continue the practice of polygamy, which was originally
adopted by Islamic law as a temporary measure to protect widows. Islamic law,
however, offered women some options such as the right to choose. A woman,
supposedly a proposed second wife, could reject the marriage proposal. Additionally,
a first wife can always refuse to be a part of a polygamous relationship by including
that condition in her marriage contract. Furthermore, women can choose to end
polygamy by divorce, but this may not be so easy. To obtain a divorce, a woman
must go before a qadi (judge) in court and have legal justification proving with the
assistance of “acceptable” witnesses that “her husband was either impotent, showed
a lack of piety, or did not perform his Islamic duties.”194 If the wife is able to prove her
case, then the qadi might grant her the divorce “without compromising her financial
rights.”195 Otherwise, the wife could only agree with her husband to khul divorce,
which is known as the woman’s right to repudiation. This type of divorce is different
from that of talaq in that if a wife is granted a khul divorce by a judge, she must forfeit
any alimony, and most of the time she must also pay back her mahr (dowry).
For a man, divorce can be very simple. He can divorce his wife(s) by repudiation,
which can be revocable or irrevocable based on the manner in which it is performed.
A man can still remarry his wife during the waiting period of idda; which is normally
three menstruations equated to three months, but if a woman is pregnant, the waiting
period is extended until after the birth of the baby. 196 According to the Qur’an, a man
can remarry his wife after he has repudiated her three times. After the third time,
however, he is not allowed to have her back until after she has married another
husband and the new husband has divorced her.197 Like polygamy, the unconditional
right to repudiation (talaq) is seen as a device to humiliate the woman. This right is
also extracted from the Quran and performed by Muslim males to break the marriage
bond without any justification. Repudiation deals with the instability of the male’s
sexual drive. Its function is to prevent the male from losing his sexual appetite
through boredom. “It aims at ensuring a supply of new sexual objects, within the
framework of marriage, to protect him against the temptation of zina”.198
192
It was derived from a passage from the Quran which was revealed after the tragic event of the Battle of
‘UHUD’ when seventy Muslims were killed, when their total strength was only seven hundred. See Shirin J.A.
Shukri. Arab Women: Unequal Partners in Development, op. cit., p. 21.
193
Ibid.
194
Western, David J. Islamic “Pure Strings”: The Key to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the
Middle East, op. cit., p. 123
195
Ibid.
196
A “statutory waiting period following a divorce or a husband’s death during which a woman is not allowed
to remarry.
197
Western, David J. Islamic “Pure Strings”: The Key to the Amelioration of Women’s Legal Rights in the
Middle East, op. cit., p. 122.
198
Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond The Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society, op. cit., p. 49.
38
Circumcision of Girls
The harmful procedure of circumcising girls at the age of seven or eight is still a
widespread practice in a number of Arab countries, particularly in Egypt and the
Sudan, under the name of Islam. According to a study conducted in 2008 by the
German charity WADI, “female genital mutilation (FGM) occurs almost exclusively in
the Kurdistan region [of Iraq], where more than 60 percent of women have
undergone the procedure.199 This barbaric custom was pre-Islamic in origin, inherited
from an untraceable past and practised in many countries of the East and West. As
asserted by many, “genital excision existed long before the establishment of Islam in
622 AD. Nor, contrary to popular opinion in some countries, is female genital
excision even mentioned in the Koran”.200 This practice, however, is not universal
throughout the Muslim world and some Muslims reject it and believe that there is no
religious justification for it. Although circumcision did not originate with Islam, it
seems that the custom was absorbed into Islamic culture and spread with it. Thus, it
has been imposed on young female children in the belief that it is good for one’s
health and conducive to cleanliness and ‘purity’ and that it preserves a girl’s virginity
and chastity after marriage. Behind circumcision, which involves the amputation of
the clitoris, El Saadawi asserts, “lies the belief that, by removing parts of girls’
external genital organs, sexual desire is minimized. This permits a female who has
reached the ‘dangerous age’ of puberty and adolescence to protect her virginity, and
therefore her honour, with greater ease”.201 This cruel operation causes shock, pain,
severe haemorrhage and inflammatory conditions and leads sometimes to loss of
life. Leaving aside the pain and fear which must in themselves, cause a permanent
trauma, circumcision has very serious physiological and psychological
repercussions, which can be life-long. Apart from permanent sexual frigidity, “it often
leads to urinary or gynaecological infections, abortions or sterility, painful menstrual
periods, cysts, abscesses in the vulva and even cancers. The narrowing of the
vaginal orifice alone can cause sterility, not to mention obstetric complications”.202
199
Ahmed, Huda. “Iraq”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North
Africa, op .cit., p. 185.
200
Sanderson, Lilian Passmore. Against the Mutilation of Women: The Struggle to end unnecessary suffering,
London: Ithaca Press, 1981, p. 56.
201
Nawal El Saadawi. The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World, op. cit., p. 33.
202
Juliette Minces. The House of Obedience: Women in Arab Society, Translated by Michael Pallis, London: Zed
Press, 1982, p. 54.
39
Excision and infibulations make a significant contribution to infertility and lead to
difficulties at sexual intercourse such as painful intercourse (dyspareunia) or lack of
intercourse (apareunia). They also affect the quality of the sexual relationship and
lead to marital disharmony. A few women, it has been reported, “never have
intercourse as a result of very tight infibulations: such difficulties can lead to
divorce”.203 Genital mutilation leads to further complications during pregnancy and
childbirth as “vaginal examination in pregnancy and during labour is difficult”.204 A
Sudanese medical practitioner, Nahid F. Toubia, reveals that she witnessed
hundreds of women suffering from vasicovaginal fistulas.
It is a humiliating condition whereby women are constantly leaking and
smelling of urine and are rendered untouchable by their community. It was
never explained in medical school that the high incidence of this condition
was directly connected to infibulations, although its incidence is repeatedly
recorded in medical papers and specialized journals.205
Dr Toubia blames the totally male oriented curricula for this aggression against
female sexuality. She asserts that no information is given about female circumcision
in private and government schools in Sudan. The topic of female circumcision,
moreover, is ignored in the medical schools of the Sudan and Egypt and “the clitoris
as a functioning organ is never mentioned in teaching.”206
Circumcision produces mental health problems and injuries, according to Taha
Baasher, a Regional Adviser on Mental Health, WHO Eastern Mediterranean
Region. Even the minor operations of excision can be a traumatic experience for
many girls. The psychological effects persist for a long time. As reported by Lilian
Sanderson, “some have attested to feelings of guilt, a sense of inferiority, referring to
the operation as ‘painful, cruel and criminal’. Others have complained of
disfigurement and the infringement of their basic human rights as women”. 207 The
operation of circumcision has too many effects beyond its direct physical
complications. These effects can be seen in women’s severe sexual frustration, fear
of sexual desire, and a humiliating sense of shame and guilt and the lack of
assertiveness and confidence. Dr Nahid Toubia articulates her observation of these
psychological effects and others:
As we worked in gynecology clinics filled with hundreds of women desperately
seeking a solution to their chronic pelvic infection or sub-level fertility, we
realized exactly what this meant to them in a place where a woman’s fertility
defined the reason for her existence. With time, we also learned to define
these women as neurotic, depressed, or as malingerers. We were never
taught that these women lived an extremely frustrated sexual life, that many
were trying to avoid their marital duty (as they see it) of giving sexual
pleasure to their husbands for fear of the pain from the scar of pregnancy and
203
Sanderson, Lilian Passmore. Op. cit., p. 40.
Ibid.
205
Toubia, Nahid F. “The Social and Political Implications of Female Circumcision: The Case of the Sudan”, in
Fernea, Elizabeth Warnock (ed) Women and the Family in the Middle East- New Voices of Change, Austin,
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1985, p. 154.
206
Ibid., pp. 153-154.
207
Sanderson, Lilian Passmore. Op. cit., p. 40.
204
40
its complications. Others were desperate to fulfull their womanhood and
prove themselves worthy by bearing children. All felt guilty, inadequate, and
in constant state of depression.208
The Veil
One symbol of male authority is the veil, or the hijab209, which is a piece of cloth that
men have imposed on women to veil themselves when they go into the street in
accordance with the Qur’anic verse 53 of sura 33. This verse of hijab was revealed
to the Prophet Mohammad in his nuptial chamber while celebrating his marriage to
his cousin Zaynab Bint Jahsh. The Prophet was reportedly annoyed and irritated by
some inconsiderate and boorish visitors. All invited guests of his Muslim community
to the wedding ate and departed, except three impolite men who continued to chat
without concern for his impatience and his desire to be alone with his new wife.
Being polite, the Prophet waited impatiently for his visitors to leave. Upon their
departure, God revealed the verse on the hijab to the Prophet. While reciting the
verse, the Prophet drew a sitr [curtain] between himself and the only man in his
house who was still there: Anas Ibn Malik.210 By doing so, the Prophet instituted
seclusion and created a distance between his wives and his thronging community on
their doorstep. As Ahmed puts it:
He [the prophet] was, in effect, summarily creating in nonarchitectural terms
the forms of segregation – the gyneceum, the harem quarters – already firmly
established in such neighbouring patriarchal societies as Byzantium and Iran,
and perhaps he was even borrowing from those architectural and social
practices.211
A series of verses were revealed, following verse 53 of sura 33, which prescribed the
hijab to be worn by free women and the wives and daughters of the Prophet to make
them recognized and prevent them from being harassed. In Medina, the recourse to
hijab was a response to sexual aggression experienced by women, whatever their
status. It was recourse to protect free and aristocrat women from being harassed in
the streets, pursued by men who subjected them to the humiliating practice of
ta’arrud.212 The wives of the aristocrats and powerful men veiled their faces to
distinguish themselves from slaves and in order not to be harassed.
The veil, however, antedated the emergence of Islam. It was a social fixture of the
ancient civilizations of the Middle East with which the Arabs interacted during and
after their conquest of the Sassanid (Persian) empire and parts of the Byzantine
Empire. It was already a custom entrenched in the mores of the times and inspired
208
Toubia, Nahid F. “The Social and Political Implications of Female Circumcision: The Case of the Sudan”, op.
cit., p. 154.
209
The word hijab derives from the verb hajaba which means “to hide”. According to Fatima Mernissi, the
concept of the word hijab is three-dimensional: the first is a visual one: to hide something from sight. The
second dimension is spatial to separate, to mark a border, to establish a threshold. And the third is ethical: it
belongs to the realm of the forbidden. See, p. 93.
210
One of His Companions who witnessed this event and reported it. See ibid., pp. 85-87.
211
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 55.
212
It Literally means “taking up a position along a woman’s path to urge her to fornicate” to commit the act of
zina. See ibid., p. 180.
41
by a sense of class or religious consideration.213 It entered the legal codes of
Mesopotamia around 1500 BCE. The wearing of veiling was made a privilege and a
mark of distinction or status reserved, according to the laws of some Middle Eastern
societies, for married women and slaves [concubines] living in the house of a free
man.214 The Assyrian law code (Middle Assyrian Law § 40) of the 13th century B.C.E.
distinguished between women according to their sexual activities. It clearly made the
distinction between respectable and non-respectable women, allowing the former to
veil and prohibiting the latter from doing so. As Gerda Lerner states:
Domestic women, sexually serving one man and under his protection, are
here designated as “respectable” by being veiled; women not under one
man’s protection and sexual control are designated as “public women”, hence
unveiled.215
The Assyrian law, moreover, specified the punishment for violators such as a harlot
who veils herself, a slave girl who is caught wearing a veil, or the man who fails to
report a violation of the veiling law. 216 The law aims to discourage men from
associating socially with women defined as “non-respectable”.217 Accordingly, the
veil served to mark the upper classes and differentiate between “respectable” and
“non-respectable” women. That is, as Leila Ahmed infers, “use of the veil classified
women according to their sexual activity and signalled to men which women were
under male protection and which were fair game.”218
Many assert that at the time of the rise of Islam segregation of the sexes and the veil
were in use in Sasanian society, India, ancient Greece, the Christian Middle East
and Mediterranean regions. In her research, Leila Ahmed reports that the veil was in
use in many Mediterranean regions and the reason behind it was social rather than
religious:
Veiling was apparently not introduced into Arabia by Muhammad but already
existed among some classes, particularly in the towns, though it was probably
more prevalent in the countries that the Arabs had contact with, such as Syria
and Palestine. In those areas, as in Arabic, it was connected with social status,
as was its use among Greeks, Romans, Jews, and Assyrians, all of whom
practiced veiling to some degree.219
Nazli Fathi-Rizk, who taught a variety of History courses at Cairo American College,
traced the historical and cultural foundations of the veil. She wrote:
It all started with the Arab conquests which carried Islam to lands
fundamentally different from Arabia, to urbanized societies with already
213
Women had an inferior position in the Empire of the Sassanids. The harems were widespread and women
were strictly segregated from men. Anti-female laws set a new standard for denying the autonomy of women,
who could be loaned out as concubines at the will of their husbands. Sassanid women were generally
uneducated, housebound, and lacked financial resources.
214
Mernissi, Fatima. Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, Oxford (UK): Blackwell,
1991Hoveyda, Fereydoun. Op. cit., p. 109.
215
Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p.135.
216
The law distinguished between the slave woman and the slave concubine. The latter must veil herself when
she goes out on the street with her mistress and must be treated as a respectable woman.
217
Lerner, Gerda. The Creation of Patriarchy, op. cit., p. 134
218
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 15.
219
Ibid., p. 55.
42
established scriptural and legal traditions, and which were much more
restrictive towards women than the Arabian surrounding. Islam interacted
with the mores of these conquered lands, adopting what was consonant with
the male centered perspective, and burying what had survived of jahiliyah
(time of ignorance as referring to pre-Islamic times in Arabia) women’s free
will. With the integration of variegated ethnicities and religious communities
within Dar El Islam, and the subtle intrusion of regional local customs and
perspectives within Islamic beliefs, enormous social changes occurred,
encompassing all aspects of life, and affecting relationships between men and
women.220
The veil was initially introduced to the women in the family of the Prophet following
the revelation of the verse of the hijab during the fifth year of the Hejira (AD 627).
Throughout Muhammad’s lifetime, the new custom of veiling, like seclusion, was
observed only by his wives. How this custom spread to the rest of the community is
not clear. Following the Muslim conquest of the adjoining territories, which put Islam
in contact and interaction with different civilizations and customs and Arab tribes
began to settle in urban centres, the veil, according to Leila Ahmed’s analysis, was
adopted by a process of assimilation of the mores and customs of the conquered
peoples. It became associated with Muslim women of upper classes that no one has
yet ascertained in much detail.221 However, Ahmed contends that:
The Muslim conquests of areas in which veiling was commonplace among the
upper classes, the influx of wealth, the resultant raised status of Arabs, and
Muhammad’s wives being taken as models probably combined to bring about
their general adoption.222
Over time, according, the veil became associated with Muslim women of upper
classes and provided an indication for others that the veiled women belonged to a
particular socioeconomic class and thereby should be esteemed and unmolested. In
other words, it provided a form of protection for women to remain respected and
respectable. Women of lower classes adopted veiling, partly to replicate the dress of
upper-class women. With the spread of Islam, veiling travelled to countries where it
was not an indigenous practice such as Malaysia. The veil, in its different forms and
shapes, became a revealing mark of Muslim women throughout the world. Veiling
and sex segregation became part of the Islamic gender system, legitimated on the
basis of the Shari’a. For the Bedouin, however, the adoption of the veil offered
protection from the burning sun and whipping sandstorms.
The use of veil by Muslim women must be viewed in terms of the clothing rules of
Islam. Clothing, according to the books of law, fikih, must not expose the anatomical
features of the female body but, rather, should hide them. Clothing must hide the
feminine attributes so men cannot be tempted. It is necessary for women to veil in
order to protect themselves from being looked at and become the object of men’s
gaze. Those who view veiling as Qu’ranic point to the passage that urges women
“not to display their beauty and adornments, but to draw their head cover over their
220
Fathi-Rizk, Nazli. “The Veil: Religious and historical foundations and the modern political discourse”, in
Sadiqi, Fatima & Ennaji, Moha (eds.). Women in the Middle East and North Africa, op. cit., p. 30.
221
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 5.
222
Ibid., p. 56.
43
bosoms and not display their adornment”.223 The veil, however, is not just a piece of
cloth, as noted by Nilüfer Göle: “It is indeed the attempt to reduce the attractions of
any woman to the lowest possible degree in her behaviour, conversation, and in
ways of sitting and standing”.224 Moreover, as the sexuality and beauty of women
represent threats to the social order, they “must be kept hidden in order not to cause
disorder and intrigue”.225 Hence, “clothing fulfils a moral function in Islam, the
preservation of the honour of women”.226 When a Muslim woman veils herself, she is
not only exercising control over her behaviour and limiting her appeal, but she is also
maintaining her purity and defending her honour. Nilüfer Göle added: “A Muslim
woman who prefers veiling is in fact the defender of her honour”. 227 Whatever the
case, the veil, as far as dress styles are concerned, “assumed a number of styles
that varied by country, ethnicity, tribe, social class, urban-rural residence, and level
of education, among other factors. In some communities, women covered their head
and breasts in an enveloping scarf, in others, they covered their whole body,
including their face, in one garment.”228
For Saudi women, the veil functions as a means of preventing ‘fitnah’229 and as a
protective shield from the eyes of unrelated men. Women wear it to protect
themselves from the attention of the opposite sex and to maintain interpersonal
distance essential to “Ird” (honour and reputation of a woman), where a woman
might be exposed to encounters with non-kin males. Thus, in Saudi Arabia, “the veil
is linked to elements of chastity, purity and decency. It acts as a safeguard, a means
of security and a defence mechanism for the preservation of family honour.” 230 For
other women in Saudi Arabia, the veil represents a form of identification that they are
Muslims. They wear it as a symbol of a nationalist trend and as identification with the
norms and the values of the Saudi culture. Some women wear it “as a sign of
defiance showing their disappointment in and rejection of Western values and the
emancipation of the West.”231 A 29 year old single Saudi woman who was educated
in London, the veil is not a sign of subjugation:
I think that it is very wrong to believe that the veil for the woman of Saudi Arabia
is a sign of oppression or retardation or subjugation as the West believes... and it
does not mean at all that we hold a secondary status as all the Westerners want
to believe. These are all false assumptions built against us.
She added:
I wear the veil, because for me it is a sign of personal and religious choice. It is
because I lived in the West, and I saw all the corruption and immorality in their,
as they call it “liberated society” of illicit sex and drug abuse, that now i am more
223
Quoted in Beitler, Ruth Margolies & Martinez, Angelica R. Women’s Roles in the Middle East and North
Africa, op. cit., p. 117.
224
Nilüfer Göle. The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling, USA: The University of Michigan Press, 1996, p.
93.
225
Ibid.
226
Ibid.
227
Ibid.
228
Bates, Daniel G. & Rassam, Amal. Peoples and Cultures of the Middle East, op. cit., p. 232.
229
Fitnah derives from the verb ‘fatana’, meaning to seduce, to lead into temptation. It refers to the
fascination and sexual attraction felt by a man at the sight of a pretty woman.
230
AlMunajjed, Mona. Women in Saudi Arabia Today, op. cit., p. 53.
231
Ibid., p. 56.
44
convinced of our local traditions and I am more attached to them. I want to
preserve my Arab-Islamic identity, and for me, this is a way to show it.232
In Kuwait, the use of veil was tied to the idea of honour and chastity. A woman’s
honour was strictly dependent on her veiling. Women who belonged to respectable
families were forbidden to uncover their faces to strangers. Until 1960, they were not
allowed to go shopping or to be driven around the town in a private car, without
being veiled. Being unveiled was morally unacceptable and considered an act of
dishonour. A husband killed his wife, as reported by Ina Roberston, who lived in
Kuwait in the 1930s, for allowing herself allegedly to be seen by an unrelated man:
Dana was married to a husband who had borrowed money. The creditor
finally decided to humiliate him by saying that he had seen his wife’s face that
morning. On hearing this, the husband turned quickly on his heel, his heart
aflame with anger against the wife who would so dishonour his name. Dana,
who was cooking over the charcoal brazier, smiled as he approached. The
smile was scarcely frozen into terror before a club came down on her head
and killed her.233
In Iraq, women are being forced to wear the veil. In the pre-Saddam period, many
women wore western dress in their jobs and in schools and universities. Women
were free to choose what they wear; whether to wear western-style and make-up or
the black abaya. In fact, many women had never worn the scarf. With the fall of
Saddam’s regime, Iraqi women have been forced to wear the veil. Insurgents and
religious extremists resort to violence and death threats to compel women to wear
the veil. They target those who are unveiled and wear make-up, those “who are well
educated and in the professions, and who work with organizations connected with
the coalition forces”.234 The insurgents’ methods of coercion and repression against
women are rape, acid and assassination. Dead bodies of girls and women are
reportedly “found in rivers and on waste ground with a veil tied around the head, as a
message”.235A bright, highly intelligent young student from Babylon University, south
of Baghdad, Hilla, was, as told by her professor, raped and murdered because she
refused to wear the veil.236 As reported by Lesley Abdela:
The professor spoke of the mess made of her body. He has since told his
daughter she must wear a scarf or leave university. He doesn’t want her to
wear the scarf nor does he want her to leave university, but he is terrified for
her life.237
Non-Muslim women in many geographic locations of Iraq are being forced into
wearing the veil. A group of men have approached a Christian lawyer, Ishaq, in the
northern city of Mosul on the street on her way to work and threw acid in her face.
Threats and attacks like this have frightened thousands of Christian women and
forced them to give up paid work or to make sure they are accompanied to work by a
brother, a male driver or a guard.
232
Ibid., p. 57.
Quoted in Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait – The politics of Gender, London: Saqi Books, 2001, p. 46.
234
Lesley Abdela. “Iraq’s war on women”, 17 July, 2005, in http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflictiraqconflict/women_2681.jsp.
235
Ibid.
236
Ibid.
237
Ibid.
233
45
To veil or not to veil has been a persistent issue in some countries of the Arab world.
To many, the veil has been associated with national backwardness, as well as
female illiteracy and subjugation. In a paradox to this, more and more educated
women, even working women (especially in Egypt), took the veil and argued that it
protected them and facilitated their presence in public. Other women embraced the
veil as a commitment to their faith and traditional values and reiterated that they
should be respected. In its various permutations, the veil “has become the
distinguishing mark of the Islamist woman” and “the line of demarcation between the
Islamist/Islamic community and other communities, a shield against the slings and
arrows of imperialists and against the male gaze”. 238 During the early days of the
Algerian war for independence against the French, the veil was convenient to
militants and political activists. Women, as they escaped the indecent searches of
the French military, used the all—encompassing veil (their long robes) to hide
political leaflets and arms.239 In Cyprus, EOKA, the Greek Cypriot guerrilla army,
used women as couriers in the 1950s. In some countries, like Saudi Arabia and
Afghanistan under the Taliban, compulsory veiling has been a mechanism of social
control: the regulation of women. In Turkey, the veil reflected a rebellion against the
imposed secularism of the Western world. Similarly, in Iran, during the revolution
against the Shah, wearing the veil became a symbol of rejection of the regime, which
was seen as fostering Westernization and as opposing religion. Even those women
who would not wear a veil during their daily lives or who would object to wearing one,
donned it voluntarily; while participating in demonstrations or on days of mourning for
the martyrs of the revolution, to express their anti-government position and to
demonstrate the unity of the opposition.240 During the Iraq-Iran war, moreover,
women in Iran “were constantly harassed by zealots if they did not adhere strictly to
Islamic dress and manner”.241 Equally, those women who resisted wearing the hijab
in Iraq were reprimanded to “feel shame before the corpses of the martyrs of
Karbala”.242
In the West, Muslim women wear the veil to assert their identity or to show their
solidarity with their counterparts in the Middle East. Many intellectuals inspired by
socialist ideas or liberal political thought, advocated the emancipation of women
through unveiling, formal education and elimination of seclusion. In 1899, Qasim
Amin, a respected judge and an important public figure of the Egyptian male
establishment, published his work: Tahrir al-Mar’a (The Liberation of Woman), in
which he attacked the practice of female seclusion and veiling and advocated that
women must regain their legitimate rights accorded to them by Islam. In 1901, he
published his second major feminist work, al-Mar’a al-Jadida (The New Woman),
advocating women’s rights. Following Amin’s footsteps, prominent writers and
reformers began to promote women’s education and criticize social and cultural
practices oppressive to women, most prominently Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid in Egypt,
Amin al-Rayhani in Lebanon, and the poets Maˊruf al-Rasafi and Jamil Sidqi al238
Moghadam, Valentine M. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p.
160.
239
Fluehr-Lobban, Carolyn. “Toward a Theory of Arab-Muslim Women as Activists in Secular and Religious
Movements” in Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring 1993, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 91-92.
240
Betteridge, Anne H. “To Veil or Not to Veil: A Matter of Protest or Policy”, in Guity Nashat (ed). Women and
Revolution in Iran, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983, pp. 121-122.
241
Valentine M. Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 27.
242
Ibid.
46
Zahawi in Iraq. This latter poet and writer appealed to the Ottoman Government in
Istanbul to open a school for girls in Iraq. He was fired from his position as professor
of law after publishing a newspaper article in which he advocated the removal of the
veil and condemned fathers’ control over their daughters’ marriage decisions.
Similarly, the Turkish author Ahmad Mithat Efendi used his novels to attack “social
ills” such as forced marriage, concubinage, and polygamy. 243
243
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, in Meriwether, Margaret L. & Tucker, Judith E. A Social history of Women & Gender
in the Modern Middle East, Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1999, p. 99.
47
III
Women in the Fertile Crescent
Women in the Arab world do not constitute a uniform, homogeneous group, although they
may share common problems. Countries of the Arab world may have a similarity of
religion and cultural background and may share common characteristics of
underdeveloped societies - politically, economically, socially and culturally. However,
women’s status, roles, rights and lifestyles are not the same in all countries of the Arab
world or even in the countries of the Fertile Crescent. They differ from one society to
another; they also differ from one socioeconomic class to the other. In the following, brief
reviews of women in countries of the Fertile Crescent are presented. These reviews address
issues of women’s rights and freedoms and their equal access to education, justice (at all
levels), health services and information that can be used to empower themselves in all areas
of their civic and political lives. These reviews, moreover, address, to a certain degree,
women’s participation in education, employment, community life, the judiciary, national
government and the parliament. They also demonstrate how women are treated in the
penal code and family law; how they are protected from domestic violence at home and
from gender-based violence and discrimination outside the home; and to what extent do
they have the right to inheritance, have the freedom of movement and have full and
independent use of their income, assets and property.
Women in Lebanon
In Lebanon, which is recognized as a democratic state and a major regional centre
for culture, education, health and finance and which is known for its advanced status
of modernism, politics is reserved for men and conceived of within a patriarchal
framework. The division of roles and behaviour between men and women in
Lebanese society was described by Yolla Polity Sharara in terms of a male public
sphere versus a female private realm:
Of course, in the 1960s we were no longer living in the era of the veil.
Lebanese society, despite its reputation for Westernization and
modernism, was nonetheless still carefully partitioned; boys’ schools
and girls’ schools, girls’ games and boys’ games, motherhood and
homemaking for women, professional work for men. This division of
roles and behaviour, seldom transgressed in practice, was instilled very
early on within the family. Boys were openly preferred to girls, and girls
were intensively prepared for their role as wives and mothers.
Housekeeping skills and docility were the qualities most appreciated in
a marriageable young girl. Women and politics were two opposite
poles, or two spheres which never intersected. Politics was ‘public’,
‘outside activity’, ‘history’. A woman was everything that was most
private, most eternal and ‘ahistoric’; the ‘within’, the ‘at-home’ that
everyone, boy or girl, found in the home; the mother.244
A woman’s status in Lebanon is often determined by her sectarian affiliation. Women
cannot make too much use of their civic and political rights. They do not possess the
244
Sharara, Yolla Polity. “Women and Politics in Lebanon”, in Forbidden Agendas: Intolerance and Defiance in
the Middle East. (Selected and introduced by Jon Rothschild), London: Al Saqi Books, 1984, p. 157.
48
same citizenship rights as men. They are relegated by law to a secondary level of
citizenship, although article 7 of the Lebanese constitution asserts the equality of
rights and duties for all citizens regardless of gender. Lebanon, as stated in its
constitution, “is committed to apply the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in all
domains without exception,” and to take into consideration international treaties and
their provisions before national laws and legislation. In practice, however, genderbased discrimination persists in some laws and policies, which have not been
challenged as unconstitutional.245 The Lebanese Nationality Law and the penal code
exemplify such discrimination. For example, foreign husbands of Lebanese women
and their children have no right to obtain Lebanese nationality; even upon the
father’s death. Women and men are treated differently in relation to honour crimes,
adultery, and rape. Perpetrators of honour crimes receive reduced sentences. Such
crimes, it must be noted, occur in conservative environments, especially in remote
areas, more than in the capital or other cities. Women may be subject to domestic
violence which is not specifically prohibited by law. The authorities tend to keep
away from interference in private domestic matters as meddling in such matters is
forbidden, regardless of one’s religion. NGOs usually work with and help battered
women and victims of domestic violence.
Personal status laws, which are governed by religious tribunals, apply to different
women from different sects. There are seventeen different Personal status laws for
the seventeen formally recognized sects. The absence of civil personal status and
the delegation of legal authority over matters of personal status to the sectarian
communities and their institutions meant that women are unequal not only to men in
general, but also vis-à-vis each other. Women experience different legal realities
depending on their religious or sectarian affiliations. Non-Muslim women, for
example, inherit, in accordance to the 1959 Civil Law of Inheritance, the same as
male heirs, whereas Muslim women receive half of the male inheritance as stipulated
by the rules of Shari῾a. Moreover, polygamous marriages are prohibited by Christian
courts while they are tolerated within Muslim communities. Some religious courts
“require battered wives to return to their homes, where they risk continued abuse by
their husbands.”246 In addition, social and family pressures and sometimes a lack of
financial means compel many women to stay in their abusive marriages. The
absence of a common set of civil laws meant that women [and men] had no recourse
to the state in their disputes with the sectarian laws, which are perceived as absolute
and nonnegotiable. This sectarian and patriarchal apparatus does not reinforce
national unity nor does it promote equality for women. The government, by entrusting
of “pseudo-divine laws” to religious sects, Najla Hamadeh argues, “undermines the
state’s role in promoting social cohesion and ensuring equal treatment for all its
citizens”.247 An optional unified, civil personal status law would certainly offer an
alternative to the existing religious personal status laws and would give Lebanese
citizens the freedom of choice without directly antagonizing religious leaders. Such
an optional civil law was proposed by the late President Elias Hrawi in 1998 as well
as by the SSNP parliamentary bloc. The bill was approved by the cabinet, but it was
strongly opposed by all religious leaders, and the parliament finally blocked it.
245
Khalaf, Mona Chemali. “Lebanon”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East
and North Africa, op. cit., p. 252.
246
Ibid., p. 262.
247
Najla Hamadeh is a Professor of Philosophy at the American University of Beirut. See Khouri, Ghada.
“Caught in the middle: women in Lebanon”, in http://www.mediterraneas.org/article.php3?id_article=84
49
Women in Lebanon have the legal right to use their income and assets
independently, but “the prevailing patriarchal system and the stereotyped role
assigned to women in the private sphere often prevents them from making such
decisions on their own.”248 In most cases, a woman’s financial choices are heavily
influenced and/or decided by her husband, father, brother or other male relative.
Women in Lebanon may drive and vote and may own their businesses, but they
have been excluded from politics for many years.249 The few exceptions were
widows of Parliament members and daughters or wives associated with particular
zu’ama families or prominent male politicians.250 Three women were elected to the
parliament in 1992. This number remained the same in the elections of 1996 and
2000, but rose to six in 2005. In the 2009 elections, the number decreased to four
because two of the incumbent female members, both widows of former presidents,
stepped aside to allow their sons to contest the seats. Only one of the male heirs
succeeded. Before 2004, there were no females in the Lebanese cabinet. In 2004,
two women (Leila Solh Hamadeh and Wafaa’ Diqa Hamzeh) were appointed Minister
of Industry and Minister of State, respectively, but they remained in office for only six
months. In the subsequent two cabinets, only one woman was appointed as a
cabinet member. In 2005, Nayla Moawad became Minister of Social Affairs. In 2008,
Bahia Hariri, sister of assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Harriri, became Minister of
Education. No Lebanese woman has ever been able to become president of the
republic, speaker of the parliament, or prime minister.
Although Lebanese law gives women the right to vote and participate in politics, their
political involvement remains minimal and marginalized. Women began somehow to
engage in political protests and participate in sit-ins and other civic activism.
Generally speaking, however, they tend to dissociate themselves from politics and
pay attention to the private realm. When they join political parties, they tend to work
on committees concerned with providing social services. Mona Chemali Khalaf
explains the factors responsible for their political disengagement.
Prevailing patriarchal views on gender roles, reinforced by the blending of
political and religious identity, discourage female political participation,
and women have difficulty matching the financial resources of male
incumbents during electoral campaigns.251
Women in Syria
The status of women in Syria is somehow different from other countries in the Arab
world. Since 1963, Syria has been dominated by the Arab Socialist Ba’th Party,
which has invested some efforts to improve the rights of women. This party
embraced the ideals of equality and national unity and, at its takeover in 1963,
proclaimed its ideological platforms promoting gender equality and equal access to
248
Khalaf, Mona Chemali. “Lebanon”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East
and North Africa, op. cit., p. 264.
249
Women in Lebanon obtained the right to vote in 1953.
250
Mirna Boustany was the first female to gain a parliamentary seat. In 1963, she only gained that seat after
the death of her father, whom she was elected unopposed to replace.
251
Khalaf, Mona Chemali. “Lebanon”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East
and North Africa, op. cit., p. 269.
50
education and employment. Although Islam is the official state religion in the Syrian
constitution, the Syrian government, driven by the ideology and policies of the Ba’th
party, adopted ‘secularism’ in its official discourse on gender roles and womanhood
and declared education to be one of the main pillars in the development and
modernization of the Syrian state. This seems a paradox: Syria, according to its
constitution is a Muslim country. Its president must be a Muslim, but at the same
time he [Assad] is the general secretary of a secular party that strives to build a civil
society. The Syrian government has endeavoured to make women’s education a
symbol of modernity for women have an obligation to society and, as citizens, they
should enjoy the same rights and duties as their male compatriots. Syrian women
who are educated and professional, especially those who are in urban centres, enjoy
a degree of freedom equivalent to their counterparts in, for example, Latin American
countries.252 According to the Syrian constitution of 1973, which forbids
discrimination on the basis of gender and presents women as equal to men,
The government guarantees all opportunities for women to allow them to
make an active and full contribution to political, social, economic, and cultural
life. It works to eliminate the restrictions prohibiting their development and
participation in the development process and in building up society253.
Accordingly, the Syrian woman must enjoy a status of freedom and of total equality
with the Syrian man in every sphere of life. In politics, according to Article 46 of the
constitution, woman is granted her political rights in full and entitled to fill the highest
political offices. Indeed, Syrian women have secured a relatively large presence,
higher than in most neighbouring countries, in the unicameral parliament, the Majlis
al-Chaab, or People’s Assembly. In the national elections of April 22, 2007, there
were 1,004 female candidates running for the parliament’s 250 seats. Thirty-one
women were elected, representing 12.4 percent of the chamber. In 1976, a female
culture minister was appointed for the first time to the cabinet. Although, the
government set its goal to increase the proportion of women holding decision-making
positions in all branches of the government, women are still under-represented in
high-level executive and ministerial positions. Men dominate the national political
scene and hold the majority of decision-making positions. Similarly, Syrian women
are entitled to apply for any sphere of employment or education at any level without
being discriminated against. They should receive equal pay for equal work. They are
also guaranteed, by the Labour Law, opportunities and conditions of employment
that are equal to those for men. Thus, the State is obliged to provide such
opportunities to achieve this equality in practice. Indeed, the Syrian government
encouraged women to enter the workforce and employed increasing numbers of
them in the public sector. This tendency, however, has been less obvious in the
official discourse since the end of 1990s. The Syrian government, due to a
combination of socioeconomic changes, no longer has an interest in mobilizing
educated women as public employees. The economic recession of the 1980s and
enormous population growth combined with rapid urbanization resulted in high rates
of unemployment. These factors together with the increased role of Islam in Syrian
society forced the Syrian regime to portray women in the roles of wives and mothers
252
Moghadam, Valentine M. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 12.
Quoted in Sparre, Sara Lei. “Educated Women in Syria: Servants of the State, or Nurturers of the Family?” in
Critique: Critical Middle Eatern Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 3-20, Spring 2008, p. 7.*
253
51
and encourage them to assume such roles at home.254 Thus, the majority of Syrian
women are housewives, and those who participate in the workforce are generally
employed in sectors like education and agriculture.255 In 2004, an estimated 49.1
percent of female labor force worked in agriculture.
Compared to urban women, rural women are particularly marginalized and unable to
access the benefits available to white-collar employees. The majority of them are
engaged in unpaid and informal agricultural labor; working more than 15 hours a
day. Girls in particular are pressured to provide unpaid domestic and agricultural
labor. This leads to higher school drop-out rates. Lack of schooling compounds
female rural workers with respect to marriage, inheritance and other matters as they
are less likely to be aware of their legal rights. Thus, in response to social or family
pressure, rural women usually cede their property rights or their inheritance to their
brothers to keep it in the family. Such practices exacerbate women’s financial
dependence on men.
Although women enjoy the right to manage business independently and control their
income and assets, family pressure or a lack of confidence drive them sometimes to
entrust male relatives to take care of such matters.
In contradiction with the spirit of the Syrian constitution which is based on principles
of human rights in their loftiest sense, the Syrian laws pertaining to personal status
“place the woman within her family, in a situation of subordination and effective
dependence on her patron and on the males of the family.”256 Man is given
discretionary authority over woman. He also enjoys parental authority as parental
rights are granted only to him. According to such rights, the children are his children
only. “The mother’s rights are limited to nursing the children in the early years under
the supervision and in the interest of the father.”257 The man, according to the law,
can divorce his wife as and when he wishes without conditions. The woman can be
denied access to her children and to avoid that she has no choice except submitting
to the arbitrariness of her husband and abandoning her rights in other spheres. The
man can legally prohibit his wife from working outside the home, and if she does so
without his permission he can withhold financial maintenance. Moreover, Articles 131
and 132 of the labor law prohibit women from working at night or in fields that are
injurious to their health or morals, excluding fields like medicine, entertainment, and
air travel.258 A husband may prevent his wife from leaving the country with their
children. Syrian women married to noncitizen men, moreover, are prohibited, in
accordance with the nationality law, from passing on their citizenship to their
children, while men do not face such restrictions. Children of such marriages lack
access to free education and health care, which are considered rights of Syrian
citizens. These discriminatory provisions of the nationality law affect the assimilation
of the Palestinian refugees, who fled their homes since 1948. They also affect the
recent Iraqi refugees totalling about 1.5 million persons. Discriminatory provisions of
the penal code and the personal status law remain unchanged and still affect women
in areas of adultery, domestic violence and spousal rape. These provisions
254
255
Ibid., pp. 9-19.
Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, op. cit., p. 471.
256
Djabari, Leila. “The Syrian Woman: reality and Aspiration”, op. Cit., p. p. 110.
Ibid.
258
Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa, op. cit., p. 472.
257
52
discriminate against women with respect to the definition and evidentiary
requirements of adultery. A man may present any form of evidence before the judge,
while a woman can only submit written evidence, such as a written confession by the
husband. Women also face higher minimum of sentences than men for certain
crimes, such as committing adultery. Women are treated as equal to men before the
civil and criminal courts, but in Shari’a courts they are not treated as full persons.
Religious minorities, it must be noted, are governed by their own sectarian laws.
Hence, a woman’s testimony in Shari’a courts is worth only half that of a man.
Furthermore, Muslim women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslim men under
the personal status law. Muslim men do not face such restriction. Syrian women still
face threats to their physical security as a result of the prevalence of domestic
violence in society. Te problems of honour killings and trafficking in persons are
recognized at the official level. The government has begun to acknowledge the need
to amend the laws. Nevertheless, little has been done, it has been asserted, to
actually outlaw these practices.259
According to personal status law, Muslim women are not free to marry without the
permission of their wali, or guardian, who is generally the father or a mahram, a close
male relative. The signature of a wali and two witnesses are a requirement for a
marriage contract. Many marriages continue to be arranged between families.
Women may be pressured to consent to a marriage for economic reasons or
because their family desires the match. Although women are permitted by the law to
negotiate their rights within the marriage contract, many women, particularly those
who are poor or illiterate – are not aware of their rights. Overall, women are
pressured by social customs not to demand too much.
Derived from medieval-patriarchal concepts as well as from the codes of the three
Semitic religions and their different subdivisions, these laws of personal status “are
characterised by inflexibility and are no longer consistent with modern developments
or progressive changes in the nature and functions of the family.” 260 These law,
moreover, failed to keep up with developments in international law or to absorb the
‘agreement on the abolition of all forms of discrimination against women’, issued by
the United Nations in 1986.
Women in Palestine
As in many countries of the Middle East, the family in Palestine remains the most
important and dominant social institution of society. Through this structured and
patriarchal institution, persons inherit their religious affiliations, social class and
cultural identities.261 Individuals, moreover, resort to their families for security and
support. Boys and girls are educated, socialized and trained within the family to
accept their roles and gender identity in life. The Palestinian woman cannot be
separated from her place within the family. The institution of the family is a major
force in shaping a woman’s identity, determining her marriage and destiny as well as
her relationship to people inside and outside her family. In the absence of the state
support afforded to other women in the Middle East, many Palestinian women are
completely dependent upon their families for the basic support necessary to survive.
When men leave home to work abroad, women assume the difficult responsibility for
259
Ibid., p. 462.
Djabari, Leila. “The Syrian Woman: reality and Aspiration”, op. Cit., p. 112.
261
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 98.
260
53
raising children on their own with the aid of the extended family. Palestinian girls are
subject, from an early age, to the authority of male family members. They learn their
position in the family by observing their mother and other female relatives. They also
learn that men dominate the family. In this context, it has been argued that
“Palestinian society is characterized by patriarchy that gives men control over
women’s bodies and behaviours throughout their entire lives.” 262 Patriarchy is
sustained and legitimised by ideological, religious and cultural factors as well as by
legislation and institutions. It “not only ensures that women have no way of changing
their lives, but also provides the rules, regulations, values and beliefs which reinforce
and maintain their subordination.”263 Girls have little or no opportunity to express
their own desires when the matter is related to marriage, work or education. It is the
father who determines whether his daughter will marry, work, or get an education.
When girls reach puberty, they begin to endure the stress of being repressed and
treated differently from boys by the family. Their parents start to restrict their
movements and monitor their behaviour. A woman is expected to behave modestly
and contribute to her family’s honour by ensuring an indisputable reputation for
sexual purity. A woman’s misbehaviour affects the reputation of her family in a
profound way and may leads to feelings of embarrassment, humiliation and shame.
As Diane Baxter observes:
A damaged reputation leaves a family vulnerable. Losing honor- particularly
over the sexual misbehaviour of its women- means families are exposed to
ridicule and derision. Their dreams of a “good life,” of establishing and/or
maintaining their dignity and their “right” to social, political, and economic
well-being are threatened. They see their destiny in jeopardy. Most families
will go to great lengths to rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the
community.264
If a woman is suspected of an illicit sexual contact, she would be scarified in order to
preserve her family’s honour and reputation. In fact, “[honour] is primarily considered
the purview and responsibility of the family” and “families who achieve honourable
status are respected, even if individual family members aren’t liked.” 265 Men,
however, are seen as the protectors of the family’s honour against slander and,
therefore, are responsible of ensuring women’s chastity by keeping them covered up
and out of sight as much as possible. The honour of families and especially the
virtue of their women are acknowledged as being the responsibility of the whole
community. Anyone in the village or neighbourhood can report violations of propriety
to the women’s father or husband. In this sense, the honour of the family is
determined by what other people say. Cheryl A. Rubenberg asserts that “gossip is
the primary process by which society enforces the honour code on the individual”. 266
Girls’ lives are greatly affected by gossip. A girl’s worst fear is being talked about.
Her marriage prospect is entirely dependent upon her reputation. Not wanting to be
the object of gossip and rumours, girls and women restrain themselves to an
262
Quoted in Ruth Margolies Beitler and Angelica R. Martinez. Women’s roles in the Middle East and North
Africa, California: Greenwood, 2010, p. 83.
263
Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, op. cit., P. 6.
264
Baxter, Diane. “Honor Thy Sister: Selfhood, Gender, and Agency in Palestinian Culture”, op. cit., p. 746.
265
Ibid., pp. 746-747.
266
Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank, op. cit., p. 43.
54
extreme extent. They live up to expectations and avoid gossip, which may damage
their reputation.
The culture of shame prevailing in Palestinian society restricts women’s freedom of
movement and prevents them from working. Women who work in the formal sector
are expected to avoid unnecessary interactions with male co-workers and keep their
relationship with them strictly business. The culture of shame also prevents teenage
girls and young women from going out to purchase clothes or even to attend schools
and incites them to welcome early marriage as a means to ensure their honour.267
As Cheryl Rubenberg comments:
Concerns about female honor prevent many girls from doing a variety of
things – including finishing school, riding a bicycle or playing sports, riding in
a serveece (a “mixed” taxi), visiting friends or participating in social activities
(nonexistent in the villages anyway), learning to drive a car, and working. It
silences them, imposes physical/psychological isolation, encourages early
marriage, and creates a myriad of other problems.268
“Flirting” with men is barred. “Dating” is generally forbidden. It is often difficult for a
woman to live on her own. Women are expected to marry, have children and assume
new responsibilities and duties as required by in-laws and a new husband. Upon
marriage, women move from the custody of their fathers and brothers to the custody
of their husbands and their families. Joining a new household may be a difficult
transition that leaves a new wife in a very vulnerable position, assuming
responsibilities for several members of her husband’s family and expected to bear,
without complaint. The woman is expected to be dependent on her father’s family or
her husband’s family throughout her life. If her husband dies, she would remain in
the custody of his family. If he divorces her or fails for some reason to protect her,
she would return to the charge of her father’s family. Failure to conceive and produce
children could result in divorce. Divorce, however, carries a social stigma such that
many Palestinian women would rather suffer in silence than end their marriage.
Although the number of girls attending schools in the West Bank and Palestinian
villages has dramatically increased over the past 100 years, this has not brought
about an overall change in women’s social position and prescribed roles or in their
status within the family. The formal educational system seems to reinforce and
reproduce traditional patriarchal hierarchies, gender roles, relations and ideologies.
Through its pedagogic methods, traditional and dogmatic curriculum, capricious
corporal punishment and the explicit and implicit values it inculcates, “girls are
confronted with essentially the same institutional program for their role in society as
they received during the initial phase of their socialization”.269 Women are projected
as housewives in nurturing and passive roles and as unequal to men and dependent
on them. They are very rarely portrayed in professional or decision-making roles. In
267
They fear that they would be blackmailed by the Israeli authorities through the dreadful practice of iskat.
During the intifada, the Israelis “would photograph girls in a store dressing room while trying on clothes or in a
café. They would then doctor the photographs to make it appear that the girls were engaged in unacceptable
behaviour and use the pictures to pressure the girls to inform on their male family members”. This practice
seems to terrify the entire female population and cause extreme psychological devastation. See ibid., p. 169.
268
Ibid., p. 48.
269
Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait – The politics of Gender, op. cit., ibid., p. 155.
55
short, the educational system “is a reflection of the nature of patriarchal relations that
characterize family, society, and polity”.270
Women in Kuwait
During the pre-oil era Kuwaiti women lived in strict seclusion and were controlled and
devalued by their men. They never did any nondomestic work. They lived within the
harem271 served by slave women and could only meet other female relatives of the
extended family, who were their neighbours. In her book: Women in Kuwait, Haya alMughni reveals that “the [Kuwaiti] women of wealthy families lived in their own
courtyards, secluded from the outside world and confined to a section of the house
where there were no windows so that their voices could not be heard”. 272 She adds,
women “were also strictly forbidden to leave their courtyards, except occasionally to
visit their relatives”.273 The veil was a way of controlling women, in addition to
seclusion. To be respected and respectable, a woman was obliged to veil her face.
Uncovering her face to an unrelated man was considered an act of dishonour. A
woman could face painful punishment and endanger her life if she dared to uncover
her face or if it was rumoured that she had committed a moral offence. A man had
the right to punish any woman who brought his family into disrepute and no legal
action would be taken against him.274 The situation of Kuwaiti women during the preoil era was summarized by Kamla Nath:
Religion and custom demanded that women be covered from head to foot in
black. A girl was veiled at puberty and was married soon after. Marriages
were usually with cousins. Polygamy was common. Besides the four wives
that a man could have under Islamic law, he could keep slave women.
Women grew up, got married, and died in the harem.275
The above situation has changed after the oil boom began. As a result of the oil
wealth, the Kuwaitis modernized their lifestyles and “Kuwait was transformed from a
small, traditional Arab sheikhdom of carrier-traders, fisherman, pearl divers, and
Bedouins into a modern city-state with large commercial and financial institutions”.276
Now, Young Kuwaiti Women move about freely in the streets unveiled and dressed
in the latest Western styles. They receive free education, attend universities and
participate in economic activity and modern service occupations with the
encouragement of their wealthy government. Despite the modernization of the
Kuwaiti community, the mass education of women and their participation in the
modern service sector in large numbers, there still exist many inhabitations, attitudes
and practices which hinder the complete social and political emancipation of women
as well as their wider participation in employment and various economic activities.
Major changes occurred in customs regarding marriage. Traditional arranged
marriage, whereby girls get married at a very young age and without their consent, is
270
Ibid., p. 159.
The word hareem comes from the Arabic word haram, meaning “sanctuary” or “holy place”. It also means
“the forbidden”. Hareem mainly means the separate quarters for women within the household, or the women
themselves and their children.
272
Al-Mughni, Haya. Women in Kuwait – The politics of Gender, op. cit., ibid., p. 45.
273
Ibid.
274
Ibid., p. 46.
275
Kamla Nath. “Education and Employment among Kuwaiti Women”, op. cit., p. 174.
276
Ibid., p. 174.
271
56
no longer the norm. Girls have much greater opportunity for meeting men and for
choosing their husbands from among several young men who propose to them.
Their choice, however, is often limited to cousins or men belonging to the same tribe.
After marriage, they no longer live with their joint families, but in separate adjacent
houses where they can be under strict observance of the extended family. Generally
speaking, Kuwaiti women prefer to work in the government service and particularly in
the education sector. Some have prejudices against certain jobs such as personal
secretary, saleswoman, telephone operator, or television artist, where they would be
required to work closely with men or appear before the general public. For the same
reasons and social inhibitions women are discouraged to join the Kuwaiti diplomatic
service or to accept employment in foreign countries. Moreover, women still
complain that they are being dominated by men at work as well as in the home and
“that men would not allow the participation of women at the crucial policy – and
decision- making levels”.277 Some women believe that their male bosses are junior to
them and less qualified. While women never reach the top of the ladder, they
complain that men go up faster and reach the higher decision-making positions only
because they are men.
Women in Jordan
The status of women in Jordan is no better than the status of women in other countries of
the Fertile Crescent. Family, clan and tribal ties constitute an important part of the social
fabric of the kingdom. The existence of such structures underpins a conservative society and
their considerations are basic to understand society and politics in the kingdom. The
advancement of the status of women is impeded by family obligations and social traditions.
One of such obligations is the observance of family honour, which resides first and foremost
in women. For many women, considerations of family honour mean that their mobility
outside the home is restricted to acceptable reasons. According to social customs prevalent
in rural areas of the kingdom, “many women do not visit the doctor alone, especially if they
are unmarried.”278 Most of them depend financially on their fathers or husbands to pay for
their medications. Female civil servants receive health insurance for themselves and their
dependents. Article 321 of the Jordanian penal code prohibits abortion and prescribes jail
penalties for women, and doctors, who perform abortion on themselves or on others.
Abortion is only performed in special circumstances to preserve the life or health of the
mother. Women, particularly if they are single, are discouraged by social traditions from
living alone. However, more single, widowed, or divorced women, mainly in the upper
middle class, are now defying these norms by choosing to live independently.
Women’s participation in NGOs is said to be on the rise, but remains relatively low. Their
representation in the media sector remains also low, particularly in senior, decision-making
positions. It is feared by some within the conservative establishment that calls made by
women’s groups for social rights, such as equality, independence, and the right to work
might lead to the destruction of the family unit.279 Family honour, affects women’s mobility
outside the home.
277
Ibid., p. 183.
Husseini, Rana. “Jordan”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North
Africa, op. cit., p. 216.
279
Ibid.
278
57
Women in Iraq
Advocates of women’s rights in Iraq began their struggle for equality at the beginning of the
20th century. Under the monarchy, “girls’ and women’s education was mainly restricted to
upper-middle-class and middle-class urban families.”280 Illiteracy rates were extremely high
and the majority of the population, particularly in rural areas, had no access to any form of
education. However, co-education of students of different religious and ethnic backgrounds
was the norm at the time. Most Iraqis struggled to survive under harsh economic conditions
and social injustice. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, women and girls were active across
the political spectrum. They participated in demonstrations, strike, and underground
political activism and had been involved in humanitarian assistance and welfare work.
Baghdad was the centre for cultural and artistic experimentation and new movements and
many educated women of middle-class and upper-class backgrounds were open to new
ideas and concerned with modernity and a critique of tradition.281 As a result of mounted
rallies and demonstrations organized by political and cultural organizations, women
managed to secure some progressive rights regarding marriage, inheritance, polygamy, and
child custody after General Abdel-Karim Qassim seized power in 1958 and passed a new
personal status law in 1959.
In 1963, Qassim was overthrown and killed by his comrade, Abdel-Salam Arif with the help
of the Ba’ath Party. Later, Arif reversed Qassim’s personal status law and reintroduced a
new one based on the Islamic Shari’a. After the Ba’ath Party took power in 1968, women
gained additional rights particularly in the areas of education and employment. In 1969, the
Ba’ath Party established an official women’s organization, namely: the Federation of Iraqi
Women, in order to promote its revolutionary and socialist principles. This federation had
branches in every neighbourhood, province and rural area. It opened literary centres, held
driving workshops and offered classes in art, music, sewing, cooking and crafts. Its aim was
to help women become more independent and capable of supporting their families. In
1980, Iraqi women received the right to vote.
During the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 and due to the war-related manpower shortage, the
Ba’ath regime urged women to fill vacant positions in the government, schools, universities,
farms and factories. Women were encouraged to seek education in every field considered
helpful to the country, even in traditional male domains like the military and various
mechanical, electrical, and other technical fields. Despite all the progress women achieved
because of the war, many suffered by the trauma of the war. It has been claimed that
“those suspected of disloyalty – and often their extended families and associates – were
imprisoned, exposed to torture, raped in front of male relatives, or executed. Others were
released from prison with chronic illness.”282 The war had a huge impact on women and
children, leaving many of them widows and orphans. Killed soldiers’ widows received help
from the government and were compensated with a sum of money, but the government’s
efforts to help widows and disabled soldiers, decreased dramatically toward the end of the
war due to the country’s huge debts and devastated economy.
280
Al-Ali, Nadje Sadig. Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present, London: Zed Books, 2007, p. 62.
Ibid., p. 70.
282
Ahmed, Huda. “Iraq”, in Kelly, Sanja & Breslin, Julia (eds) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North
Africa, op .cit., p. 159.
281
58
After 1990, the Iraqi government made a number of reactionary legal changes that
disadvantaged women. Some of these changes allowed men to practice polygamy and
afforded leniency to men who committed “honour crimes”. These changes and others were
part of Saddam’s attempt to win the support of tribal and religious leaders after the 1991
Shiite uprising in the south, which was brutally suppressed and led to the deaths of
thousands of Iraqi men, women, and children and weakened the regime after its defeat in
the Persian Gulf War. During the UN economic sanctions imposed on Iraq since August
1990, women suffered increased discrimination in government offices as well in the private
sector. Many were forced to work as prostitutes and were trafficked to nearby countries for
the purposes of sexual and labor exploitation. Huda Ahmed, an Iraqi journalist, comments
on the sufferings of women during this phase of Iraqi history:
Women, including female students, endured sexual exploitation and harassment
to provide food and clothing for themselves or their families. Many families were
forced to marry off or effectively sell their young daughters for money. Inflation
exacerbated the economic and social breakdown, as did corruption that infected
every government entity.283
The deteriorated situation in the 1980s and 1990s because of the war and devastating
economic sanctions compelled many women to leave school and get married or engage in
low-paying jobs to ease the economic burden on their families. Moreover, the sectarian
violence that escalated in Iraq between 2005 and 2007 claimed the lives of many families.
An estimate of one million people including men and women, were killed for political,
ethnic, sectarian and economic reasons. Violence against women was reportedly “increased
– particularly instances of honour killings, rapes, and kidnapping – forcing women to stay at
home and limiting their employment and educational opportunities.”284 Women have
suffered torture, mutilation, rape and other forms of inhuman treatment. Some have been
forced to flee their homes in large numbers to safer areas. Mass emigration has drastically
reduced the Christian population. Furthermore, some women, out of widespread poverty,
have fallen victims to sexual exploitation and temporary marriage, as in the case of mut’ah
marriage, which is often carried out secretly without the knowledge of the participants’
families and in exchange for a certain amount of money. Some women continue to be
threatened, harassed or attacked by insurgents, militias, and security forces for not wearing
hijab (head covering) or for not adhering to a strict interpretation of Islamic behaviour and
dress code, and sometimes to dissuade them from working. Some have been victimized for
driving and for walking or talking with unrelated males. Some women are reportedly
“abducted by insurgents, raped, and then forced to become suicide bombers to save their
honour.”285 It has been claimed that “several sick and pregnant women were killed by U.S.
soldiers looking to ward off insurgent attacks, or by the attacks and bombings
themselves.”286 All in all, Iraqi women’s living conditions, particularly after the US-led
invasion in 2003, have worsened on a variety of levels and many have become widowed,
displaced, or unemployed. In her book, which is based on life stories and oral histories of
Iraqi women, Nadje Sadig Al-Ali sums up how seriously Iraqi women were affected by the
war, sanctions, political repression and deteriorating economy:
283
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 160-161.
285
Ibid., p. 171.
286
Ibid., p. 184.
284
59
After the end of the war, and under the sanctions in the 1900s and early 2000s, a
radical shift took place in terms of women’s diminishing participation in the
labour force, restricted access to education, inadequate health care and other
social services, as well as greater social conservatism and restrictions. Women
were increasingly pushed back into their homes as unemployment rates
skyrocketed, the economy faltered and the infrastructure collapsed.287
Iraqi women continue to face many obstacles and challenges with respect to their rights
despite attempts made by the post-Saddam leadership to create an equitable democratic
system. Women remain under-represented in the legislature, the national government and
the judiciary although “article 49 of the 2005 constitution states that electoral laws should
‘aim to achieve’ a 25 percent minimum quota for women in the parliament.”288 The drafted
2005 constitution prohibits any laws that contradict Islam, which is designated as the official
religion and its shari’a as the foundation of legislation. This leaves the door open to
discriminatory treatment of women rooted in traditional views and conservative
interpretations of Shari’a by the various members of Parliament most of them belong to
various Islamic political parties. Although article 14 of the constitution states that Iraqis are
equal before the law and bars discrimination based on “gender, race, ethnicity, nationality,
colour, origin, sect, belief or opinion, or economic or social status”, there is no practical
enforcement of this principle under the current circumstances. The ongoing violence in the
country obstructs the operation of the legal system in general.
Domestic violence is a growing problem in Iraq and victimized women risk further harm if
they speak out or seek justice. Anyhow, women in general lack information sources about
their rights to access justice. Although media outlets continue to broadcast talk shows and
other programs with lawmakers, judges and lawyers explaining the legal system, and
although all Iraqi have unrestricted access to online information, most women do not access
such information sources because of prevailing poverty, violence, the country’s weak
infrastructure and the lack of basic services like telephone and electricity. The situation is
worse in rural areas, where women live within closed patriarchal families, have no
education or low level of educational attainment and have little contact with outsiders.
Many female journalists, women’s rights activists and members of NGOs were targeted or
killed for their progressive ideas and/or writing on insurgents, for appearing on radio or
television and for criticizing strict rules imposed on women. In December 2008, a leading
activist and promoter of women’s rights in Iraqi Kurdistan, Nahala Hussein al-Shaly289, was
found shot and beheaded in her home in Kirkuk. Her brutal murder was seen as an act
aimed at intimidating women organizing for equality.
Iraqi women are not always treated fairly and equally by the justice system as far as the
issues related to honour killings, rape, and personal status law are concerned. A man who
kills his wife or close female relative and her partner after catching them in an act of
adultery is offered leniency by the penal code. Sometimes, perpetrators are released
without being charged. Many honour crimes go unreported and families tend to conceal
such crimes by burying the victims and attributing their deaths to militia violence or other
causes. The government remains silent and shows no interest of interference in such cases
287
Al-Ali, Nadje Sadig. Iraqi Women: Untold Stories from 1948 to the Present, op. cit., pp. 266 – 267.
Ahmed, Huda. “Iraq”, op. cit., p. 179.
289
Nahla Hussein al-Shaly, a 37 years old and mother of two, was the leader of the Kurdistan Women’s League,
the women’s wing of the Kurdish Communist party.
288
60
that are treated as private matters. Rape is treated as a private offence and the defendant,
according to the penal code, is excused in cases of rape and sexual assault if he marries his
victim. As a result, Iraqi women are not only vulnerable to continuous domestic violence,
sexual harassment, and killings, but they are unprotected and overwhelmed by deep feeling
of fear, frustration, injustice and powerlessness. Sometimes, this feeling leads distressed
women to believe that the only escape is suicide. The number of women who committed
suicide by burning themselves was about 133 in 2006.
Women in the workplace are vulnerable to summary dismissal and often face discrimination
in promotions. They must adapt themselves to their workplaces, which are mostly
characterised as male-dominated and hostile environments. Although the law protects
working women from sexual harassment in the workplace, in practice the law is not
enforced, and most women lack any knowledge of their labour rights and conditions. But
even if they have the knowledge about their rights, in most cases they are reluctant to make
any complaints or accusations, feeling humiliation, threats of violence, or social
consequences. In regards to inheritance rights, Iraqi women usually face pressure to give up
their inheritance to brothers or other family members. Women are reluctant to take their
matters to the court and prefer to resolve any dispute privately.
Many Iraqi women and men are unlawfully arrested and detained in crowded prisons for
months or years without trial or access to a lawyer. Although women are detained in
separate prisons, some female inmate still allege that they are sexually assaulted, tortured,
beaten, and raped by official guards and investigators seeking confessions.290
290
Ahmed, Huda. “Iraq”, op. cit.,p. 164.
61
IV
Social change
The majority of women in the Arab world lack control over their lives both within and
outside the home. This reflects and reproduces gender inequality in the household
as well as in society. The solution to this problem, as recognized by many
intellectuals, activists and policy makers, is the advancement of women on the
political, economic, social and legal fronts through the process of empowerment. The
question arises: What constitutes empowerment and what does it aim? Perhaps a
helpful way to understand the complex and controversial notion of empowerment,
which is widely used, is to consider few definitions advanced by different intellectuals
and organizations.
Empowerment, according to Robert Chambers, “means that people, especially the
poor people, are enabled to take more control of productive assets as one key
element. Participation, decentralization and empowerment enable local people to
exploit the diverse complexities of their own conditions and to adapt to rapid
change.”291 From her part, Marilee Karl asserts that empowerment is not something
that can be given to people. Rather, it is a process involving individuals and groups.
She says, “The process of empowerment is both individual and collective, since it is
through involvement in groups that people most often begin to develop their
awareness and the ability to organise to take action and bring about change.” 292 The
World Bank defines empowerment as “the process of increasing the capacity of
individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired
actions and outcomes.”293 Similarly, the definition of empowerment offered by the
United Nations (UN) system includes the following components:
Women’s sense of self-worth; their right to have and to determine choices;
their right to have the power to control their own lives, both within and
outside the home; and their ability to influence the direction of social change
to create a more just social and economic order, nationally and
internationally.294
Some studies have characterized empowerment as “a multilevel process involving
the individual, organizational, and policy levels. At the individual level, the process
involves raising consciousness and developing skills”, so women become aware of
their power relations and decision-making ability by actively participating in the
process of development;295 at the organizational level, empowerment occurs when
women mobilize themselves and work collectively through activism and grassroots
movements in order to change their economic and social environment and improve
291
Quoted in Shamshad, Ahmad. “Women’s Empowerment in India: Rhetoric and reality”, in Moghadam,
Valentine M. (ed.) From Patriarchy to Empowerment, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2007, p. 140.
292
Quoted in ibid.
293
Ibid.
294
Datta, Rekha & Kornberg, Judith (eds). Women in Developing countries: Assessing Strategies for
Empowerment, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, p. 4.
295
Ibid., pp. 4-5.
62
their socioeconomic status and overall empowerment and leadership in the
community. In this respect, Rekha Datta and Judith Kornberg maintain that
“empowerment occurs most definitely when women mobilize themselves and take
leadership positions in work settings and in the community.”296 At the policy level,
empowerment occurs by enabling women to have more power over resources and
decision-making and by facilitating their participation in society and public life, in the
process of development and in “drafting, enacting, and enforcing legislation that
seeks to redress gender discrimination.”297 Women’s empowerment should not be
regarded solely from a political perspective; rather it should be viewed as a
comprehensive process encompassing economic, education, health, law and other
aspects of life including the social and cultural domains. It is a multidimensional
process that aims to challenge patriarchal ideology; to transform the socioeconomic
and political structures and institutions in society that reinforce and perpetuate
gender discrimination and social inequality; and to enable disadvantaged women to
have control of their lives by achieving basic capabilities, legal rights, access to
material and informational resource, and participation in key social, economic,
political and cultural domains.
For women, accordingly, empowerment is not something that can be granted.
Rather, it is a multidimensional, long and difficult process. This process is captured
effectively in the following paragraph:
Empowerment is a process, not an event, that challenges traditional power
equations and relations. Thus, the empowerment of women requires a set of
assets and capabilities at the individual level (such as health, education, and
employment) and at the collective level (such as the ability to organize and
mobilize to take action to solve their problems and in political
representation).298
The process of empowerment requires a change in the mind-set of the people and
seeks to redress gender discrimination; to challenge patriarchy and traditional power
relations; and to enable women to develop their skills and abilities in order to have
control of their lives. The Platform for Action of the United Nations Fourth World
Conference held in Beijing in 1995 is a call for action to promote social change in the
direction of gender equality and realization of women’s human rights and to
empower women economically, politically, and culturally. The platform dedicated a
section to women in power and decision making and made recommendations to
enhance women leadership skills and to promote the development of young women
leaders. How this goal can be achieved? It can be safely maintained that any plans
for action must be preceded by an understanding of existing opportunities, resources
and limitations for self-development and by a critical analysis of how culture and
tradition contribute to the devaluation of young girls and women in their society. More
importantly, the development of young women leaders and their participation in
decision making require, as Sharifah Tahir argues “men and women to challenge
existing realities and practices, social and political structures, and policies that
296
Ibid., p. 5.
Ibid., p. 4.
298
Shamshad, Ahmad. “Women’s Empowerment in India: Rhetoric and reality”, in Moghadam, Valentine M.
(ed.) From Patriarchy to Empowerment, op. cit., p. 141.
297
63
discriminate against women.”299 However, enhancing women’s leadership and
decision-making skills should take place, first of all, in the education system,
beginning in elementary school and continuing through all educational levels. 300
Other intervention strategies can be developed, which may include:
a) Leadership training workshops that address young women’s particular
concerns and “teach them how to go about practical matters such as
organizing, communicating, lobbying, advocating, networking, cooperating,
strategic planning, and resource mobilizing.”301
b) Mentorship programs that inspire young women and enable them to learn
successful techniques from more experienced and established women
leaders.
c) Internship/fellowship programs that allow young women to learn and practice
leadership skills while gaining other valuable experiences and insights.
d) Experience sharing programs and opportunities through which young women
share experiences and information with each other, compare strategies and
learn from their successes and failures.
e) Dialogue between young women and experienced leaders, policymakers and
professionals in various fields. The dialogue will enable young women to hear
various opinions and perspectives and to get their own concerns heard.
f) The formation of networks that provide young women with support and
opportunities to exchange information, to access resources and to share
knowledge and experiences.
All in all, the development of young women leaders must target young women of
all walks of life and must involve their active participation at all levels (i.e., in the
planning, implementation and evaluation of programs). Moreover, successful
intervention strategies and programs must be incorporated into existing private
and public institutions to be sustained. Young women leaders and their
supporters must adopt an effective advocacy to address their needs and to
generate much-needed support. As Sharifah Tahir recommends:
There is a strong need for effective advocacy to achieve long-lasting changes
for girls and young women. Young women leaders and their supporters must
raise awareness of young women’s issues, and must change perceptions and
attitudes in the family as well as in society at large. They must persuade
decision makers in the social and political domain to place girls and young
women at the heart of policy-making. They must insist that economic
development projects and educational policies take the needs and
contributions of young women into account. In other words, they must
become politically active on all levels.302
Women’s empowerment can be supported by the growing influence of
nongovernmental women’s organizations, by telecommunications and entertainment
technologies, by internet and the information revolution and by globalization in
299
Tahir, Sharifah. “Leadership Development for young Women”, in Afkhami, Mahnaz & Friedl, Erika (eds)
Muslim Women and the Politics of Participation. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1997, p. 87.
300
Ibid., p. 87.
301
Ibid., p. 88.
302
Ibid., p. 92.
64
general. The process of globalization303 may have negative social and economic
impacts on women, as seen in the feminization of poverty, in increased gender
inequality and in deteriorating working conditions and unsafe working environments.
In fact, the lives of women in many third world countries have been dramatically
affected by changes in the global economy since the 1980s. Structural adjustment
implemented by, and imposed on, many developing countries together with trade
liberalization and the removal of state regulations, changing production practices and
the expansion of large companies and transnational corporation, and new areas of
export specialization “have all generated an increased demand for low-paid, ‘flexible’
female labour.”304 Female employment has become more extensive and
concentrated in the ‘informal’ sector. Through subcontracting and outsourcing,
women often find employment in smaller firms, workshops or at home with the
immediate employer usually a kinsman or a relative. Their work “is often insecure,
temporary or part-time, with little protection and few fringe benefits.”305 The effects of
the feminization of labour markets are seen in new demands imposed on women’s
time and in the perpetuation of their marginalization and exploitation.
Other negative impacts of globalization can be seen in the attempt of the
multinational capitalism to establish, through the new technology of communications,
a global culture and a global market of consumers “who develop similar needs,
similar interests, similar desires, and similar habits of living: that is, similar patterns of
consumption. These patterns of consumption are constituted by a similar outlook,
similar values and ideas.”306 Women in South as well as in the North are looked
upon as bodies to be exploited. The mass media foster conceptions of sex; as a
commodity, a thriving industry, and materialistic beauty, which is absorbed by the
conscious and subconscious mind. Women are urged to buy make-up and other
material products such as perfumes, earrings, body conditioners, fashion and so
forth in order to conform to the beauty mentality and the new culture of the
postmodern capitalism. Women, particularly in the so-called Third World countries,
are being used, exploited and subjected to a range of coercive technologies and
drugs, which have often destroyed their health and lives. Their basic physical and
mental needs – such as food, education, health, employment, social, economic and
political participation, and a life free of violence - are neglected.307
However, globalization may offer women enormous opportunities and lead to new
forms of empowerment and participation in the social and political process which
help to raise their awareness and level of activism. This is reflected in local NGO
support for women’s initiatives, in the growth of grassroots groups and organizations
run by women, and in the increasing influence of the new communications
technologies and satellite networks, promoting political activism and creating higher
expectations for individual participation in the political process. Telecommunications
and internet access, by bringing news and information to people in different regions
303
Valentine M. Moghadam defines globalization as “a complex economic, political, cultural and geographic
process in which the mobility of capital, organizations, ideas, discourses, and peoples has taken on an
increasingly global or transnational form.” See ibid., p. 2.
304
Afshar, Haleh & Barrientos, Stephanie (eds) Women, Globalization and Fragmentation in the Developing
World, Houndmills (UK): Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 5.
305
Ibid., p. 4.
306
Newson-Horst, Adele (ed.) The Essential Nawal El Saadawi: A Reader, London: Zed Books, 2010, p. 86.
307
Ibid., p. 85.
65
where access has previously been tightly controlled, allow people communicate with
each other in ways never before possible. They also provide people with access to
the information necessary to think critically about the performance of their
governments and express their views and discontent. Opportunities are also
reflected in the increased recognition by some international organizations, including
the United Nations, of the importance of gender. There has been international
support and a new push to recognize women as individuals entitled universal human
rights as opposed to having rights defined by religious or family values. Women’s
organizational activities that seek to improve women’s legal protections through law,
research and public education have been encouraged by international support. As
Professor Valentine M. Moghadam notes:
Globalization has given rise to contradictory tendencies and trends, including
hegemonic discourses of neoliberal capitalism, backlash discourses of
fundamentalists and communalists, and counter-hegemonic discourses of
women’s rights. The latter have been promoted by women’s movements, the
UN Decade for Women, and feminist research and are inscribed in such
international conventions as the UN’s 1979 Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the Cairo Declaration of 1994,
which produced an agenda for women’s reproductive health and rights; and
the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 1995, which presented a
broad agenda for women’s rights and participation.308
The Beijing conference appreciated and endorsed the linkage between the three
major and interrelated themes of equality, development, and peace that began with
the Mexico conference in 1975, which proclaimed 1976-1985 the United Nations
Decade for Women. The Mexico conference proclaimed the 1975 International
Women’s Year to be devoted to intensified action to promoting equality between men
and women and ensuring the full integration of women in the total development effort
as well as increasing their contribution to the strengthening of world peace. Equality
for women meant “the realization of rights that have been denied as a result of
cultural, institutional, behavioural, and attitudinal discrimination.” (Nairobi ForwardLooking Strategies, paragraph 11).309 Similarly, development, as a goal, meant total
development incorporating all dimensions of human life as well as “the physical,
moral, intellectual, and cultural growth of human beings.”310 The advancement of
equality and development contribute to the advancement of peace, which entails “not
only the absence of war, violence, and hostilities at the national and international
levels, but also the enjoyment of economic and social justice, equality, and the entire
range of human rights and fundamental freedoms within society.” 311
The advancement of women can also occur through revolutions. A revolution, as
defined by Samuel P. Huntington, “is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic
change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions,
308
Afshar, Haleh & Barrientos, Stephanie (eds) Women, Globalization and Fragmentation in the Developing
World, op. Cit., pp. 2-3.
309
Moghadam, Valentine M. “The United Nations Decade for Women and Beyond”, in Stromquist, Nelly P.
(ed.) Women in the Third World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, op. cit., p. 480.
310
Ibid.
311
Ibid.
66
social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.” 312 Large-scale
social revolutions or more limited political revolutions both can bring about social
change and have effects on the advancement of women. Valentine M. Moghadam
argues that “modernizing revolutionary states have been crucial agents in the
advancement of women by enacting changes in family law, providing education and
employment, and encouraging women’s participation in public life”. 313 The Iraqi
Ba’ath regime provides an example of radical measures undertaken and producing
social transformation. In its radical phase during the 1960s and 1970s, the Ba’ath
regime implemented land reforms and established a welfare state for the urban
working classes and the poor. It also offered free education to combat illiteracy and
gave women the right to have careers and participate in civic activities. Accordingly,
“the [Ba’athist] revolution produced one of the best-educated intelligentsias in the
Arab world”.314
War and political conflict can also have varying implications for societies and for
women. Wartime conditions can radically transform the position of women in the
work force and bring about change in their economic and political status. The Middle
East has encountered numerous wars and political conflicts since the 1940s, with
varying consequences for societies. The Iran-Iraq war, which lasted eight long years
(1980-1988), had its effects on women in both countries. In October 1982, the Iraqi
minister of defence ordered the arrest and detention of wives and children of
deserters.315 Women were also victimized by public policy. The government offered
special grants to men to marry war widows: “For marrying a woman with a middleschool certificate a man received a grant of 200 dinars, for a high-school graduate
300 dinars and for a university graduate 500 dinars”.316 Women were also affected
by the ever-increasing allocation of government expenditure to defence, at the
expense of health, education and services. On the positive side, more women found
opportunities for employment in the civil service while a large proportion of the male
population was concentrated at the war front. Such opportunities, although
diminished eventually, were non-existent and had been denied by Islamist
ideologues.
The impact of political conflict can be best seen in the case of the Palestinians,
whose expulsion from their towns and villages by Zionists “caused changes in rural
Palestinian life and the structure of the family”.317
As a result of Jewish settlements in Palestine during the British rule and the issuing
of the UN Partition Plan in 1947, which called for the partition of Palestine into two
separate states: one Jewish and one Palestinian, the hostilities broke out between
the Palestinians and the Jews. This led to the Jewish occupation of 79 percent of the
land of Palestine and, consequently, to the declaration in 1948 of the establishment
312
Huntington, Samuel P. “Revolution and Political Order”, in Goldstone, Jack A. (ed.) Revolutions: Theoretical,
comparative, and Historical Studies, 3rd edition, Melbourne: Wadsworth, 2003, pp. 37-38.
313
Valentine M. Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p.22.
314
Ibid.
315
Ismail, Jacqueline S & Ismail, Shereen T. “Gender and State in Iraq”, in Joseph, Suad. (ed.) Gender and
Citizenship in the Middle East, op. Cit., p. 198.
316
Quoted in ibid.
317
Valentine M. Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 24.
67
of the State of Israel.318 One immediate result of the Palestinian-Jewish war was the
mass deportation by direct military assault of many thousands (726,000 people) of
Palestinians from their cities and villages; most of which were demolished. Fleeing
Palestinians were dispersed into refugee camps in the remaining areas of Palestine
in the West Bank (6,257 km) and the Gaza Strip (378 km) and in neighbouring Arab
countries such as Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Palestinians, accordingly,
suffered by being politically exterminated and expelled from their land and by living in
exile as refugees while their land and properties were confiscated by the newlyestablished Israeli government without respect to their rights or desire to return to
their homes.
In 1967, another war broke out between Israel and the neighbouring Arab countries.
This war ended with the loss of more Palestinian territories (West Bank, Gaza Strip
and Sinai Peninsula) and Syria’s Golan Heights. An additional 405,000 Palestinians
fled their homes and lost their livelihood for a second time in their lives.
As a result of the 1948 catastrophe (Nakba) and the subsequent catastrophes,
Palestinian women found themselves out of their space and time, in the heart of
exile, and being “victims of a disfiguring oppression on various levels” and subject
with the whole Palestinian people to systematic destruction.319 Palestinians, as one
author describes their lot, “lost their environment, properties, and balance; they were
cut in all directions with nothing to pull them together apart from the horrors of the
catastrophe.” 320Since the 1948 great catastrophe, Palestinian women were forced to
take their place in the front lines and to join in the national struggle for liberation.
They were forced also to develop personal, gendered and national strategies to
overcome their tragedy and to advance their social, economic, and cultural status. In
the wake of the 1948 exodus of refugees, Palestinian women engaged themselves in
welfare activities providing social services for the needy and the poor. This nurturing
role in women’s activism continued into the early periods of 1967 Israeli occupation.
In the early 1970s, Palestinian women became actively involved in the resistance
movement and engaged in grassroots committees and diverse social relief work and
activities across class and gender issues in order to improve the situation for women
and increase their mobilisation in the resistance movement. As asserted by
Valentine M. Moghadam, “in the 1970s Palestinian women’s political activity and
participation in resistance groups expanded, whether in Lebanon, the West Bank,
Gaza, universities, or refugee camps”.321 For a long time, the Palestinian people
lived under occupation and suffered a severe lack of power and control over their
land and their social and national affairs. After twenty years of living in humiliation
and poverty under harsh military laws, the Palestinians in West Bank and Gaza Strip
took to the streets in 1987, resisting the occupation forces in an unprecedented
uprising or intifada against oppression and occupation.
318
At 4 o’clock of the 14th of May, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, leader of the Jewish National Council announced
the formation of the state of “Isreal”.
319
Ibrahim, Nassar. “Palestinian Catastrophes: Women between the Dynamics of oppression and Resistance”
in
The
Alternative
Information
Centre
(AIC),
Saturday,
27
September
2008.
(http://www.alternativenews.org/english/index.php/nassar-ibrahim/1363-palestinian-catastrophes-womenbetween-the-dynamics-of-oppression-and-resistance)
320
321
Ibid.
Valentine M. Moghadam. Modernizing Women: Gender and Social Change in the Middle East, op. cit., p. 24.
68
Since this prolonged Palestinian uprising, which lasted for six years, Palestinian
women began to participate in political and social activism, organize themselves into
independent political groups and economic cooperatives and occupy a dominant
presence in the public sphere, which had previously been considered inappropriate.
Women were required to assume urgent and unfamiliar roles “as political activists,
political prisoners and the sole providers for the family.” 322 One Palestinian activist,
Samira, described the involvement of the Palestinian woman in the national struggle:
Under the cover of the national struggle, you could say, women have been able to leave
their traditional places, their incarceration, their homes. In many cases, when the
husbands were jailed, the women have had to go out and work to support the family...
But gradually, it become clear to me that the Intifada is a people’s war, and so women’s
participation has become accepted. Before, the men looked upon women as weak. Now
they’ve seen that women can stand up to soldiers, can face being wounded or martyred.
Women have proved their ability to endure suffering, even more than men can if you ask
me. All this has had its effect. Women have become freer now than they’ve ever been
before.323
The physical involvement and participation of women in the intifada alongside men
led to a major change in activities considered permissible for women. Their
appearance in public political functions such demonstrations or marches organized
by the national movement and their roles as protectors of their men when the IDF
soldiers attempted to arrest them “shook the old ideas of dependent women whose
honour lay in their remaining hidden from the public eye”.324 Women rushed out to
take part in demonstrations and clashes, throwing themselves between soldiers and
the young men, trying to protect them from physical assault or arrest. Their success
in protecting men led one scholar to comment that “it has become dangerous for
men to participate in demonstrations or marches in the absence of women”. 325
Women also engaged in well-organized marches and in spontaneous
demonstrations of their own, “expressing their outrage at violence by soldiers or
Jewish settlers, at arrests or killings, at the deaths and wounding of women and
children, and at the miscarriages attributed to tear gas released from canisters
thrown into homes or hospitals”.326 Women were exposed to arrest and were
confronted with the threat of sexual violence. They were even beaten or shot by IDF
soldiers in their homes, while attempting to protect male relatives from arrest.
Moreover, women became active in philanthropic organizations and mixed-gender
neighbourhood committees organizing food production projects and other important
social services and necessities to communities under curfew and the severe living
and social conditions of occupation. Many university-trained women managed during
the intifada to fill leadership positions that might otherwise have been reserved for
men. This was made possible by the removal of much of the male leadership from
the public sphere by the IDF. The new visibility of women leaders and their
322
Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, op. cit., p. 26. See also Taraki, L. Palestinian Society: contemporary Realities and Trends. Birzeit:
Women’s Studies Programme, Birzeit University, 1997.
323
Quoted in Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories, op. cit., p. 16.
324
Philippa Strum. “West bank Women and the Intifada: Revolution within the Revolution”, in Suha Sabbagh
(ed.) Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, P. 65.
325
Quoted in in ibid., p. 66.
326
Ibid.
69
engagement in political discussion led to a change in the attitude of some women,
who demonstrated that, “the public sphere was as much the sphere of women as of
men”.327
In short, the intifada challenged established traditional structures and social
relationships within Palestinian society and generated an atmosphere of social
change.328 Owing to their participation in the labour force and their efforts and
activism on behalf of the national cause, Palestinian women became a force to be
reckoned with. Being aware of their responsibilities under occupation, toward their
families and the Palestinian people as whole, Palestinian women confronted the
Israeli soldiers with courage and often risked their own lives to save their men from
arrest or beatings. They also played a pivotal role in mobilizing and strengthening the
structures and institutions of civil society which enabled Palestinians to sustain a
livelihood and resist occupation.329 Additionally, Palestinian women, particularly
those activists, began to recognize the impact of their involvement in the intifada on
their lives, popular image and status as women. Moreover, many activists “began
debating issues related to the democratisation of Palestinian society”. 330 They
questioned the absence of gender issues from the national discourse and
endeavoured to formulate strategies for social liberation alongside those for national
liberation. Although Palestinian women were more politically and economically aware
of their situation and paid less attention to social issues and their status in society,
since the intifada, Salaiba Sarsar noted, “women have become more vocal about
their rights. For them, as represented by the leaders of the Women’s affairs
Technical Committee, national liberation and women’s liberation go together. Both
complement and supplement each other.”331
In conclusion, Palestinian women have been acting in supportive roles to men in the
battles of national struggle. They have sacrificed a lot, with the men, in the hope to
remove all forms of oppression and achieve liberation of the homeland. While most
women continue to play traditional roles in the family and society, some have been
advocating openly for the rights and concerns of women on economic, health and
social issues (such as equal rights in marriage, divorce and inheritance) as well as
on matters related to their representation in decision-making posts. Women’s
achievements, since the inception of the intifada, are many. Their unity and
continuous efforts to formulate their demands and rights through active participation
in society and public life, and the prospects of creating statehood with a constitution
that stipulates social justice and gender equity all carry a hope for a better future.
Suheir Azzouni, the former Director General of a well-respected nongovernmental
organization: Women’s Affairs Technical Committee expressed her optimism about
Palestinian women’s potential and power. She wrote:
Palestinian women remain to be the fruits of a revolution. Many are their achievements
in a short period. Their unity around women’s issues gives them power. The creation of
327
Ibid., p. 70.
Dajani, Souad. “The Struggle of Palestinian Women in the Occupied Territories: Between National and Social
Liberation” Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring 94, Vol. 16, Issue 2, p. 18.
329
Ibid.
330
Abu-Duhou, Jamileh. Giving voices to the voiceless: Gender-Based Violence in the Occupied Palestinian
Territories, op. cit., p. 32.
331
Sarsar, Saliba. “The Empowerment of Palestinian Women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, in Datta, Rekha
& Kornberg, Judith (eds). Women in Developing countries: Assessing Strategies for Empowerment, op .cit., p.
148.
328
70
statehood from scratch also carries within it the hope of more social justice. To what
degree this social justice will be reflected within the emerging Palestinian state will only
be revealed by time.332
332
Quoted in Sarsar, Saliba. “The Empowerment of Palestinian Women in the West Bank and Gaza Strip”, in
Datta, Rekha & Kornberg, Judith (eds). Women in Developing countries: Assessing Strategies for Empowerment,
op .cit., p. 156.
71
V
The woman question in the nahda period
The woman question was a core issue during the nahda (renaissance) period which
commenced in the first half of the 19th century and lasted until World War I. The
political, economic and cultural interaction between Europe and the Middle East had
a profound impact on the region. This encounter was brought about by many factors,
particularly through the arrival of unprecedented numbers of Europeans merchants,
travellers, soldiers and diplomats, warships, and missionaries in the Levant. In fact,
Western missionary and educational activities spread in Lebanon, particularly among
its substantial Christian population, the majority of which felt a close affinity to the
Christian peoples of Europe. The Napoleonic expedition to Egypt in 1798 ended the
isolation of the Arab world from the west and brought a welcoming contact between
Europe and the Arab countries since the Crusades, “especially as the French came
not only with an army using the latest technology then available, but also with teams
of translators and scientists who were enormously active during their short stay in
the area.”333 In addition to the teams of experts who accompanied Bonaparte and
undertook a thorough and systematic survey of Egypt and its resources, an Arabic
language press; the very first Arabic printing press to enter Egypt, was also brought
from the Vatican for the publication of French proclamations in Arabic.334 Added to
this, the army in the Ottoman Empire and in Egypt was re-organized along Western
lines with the help of foreign military instructors. The interchange between Europe
and the Middle East was also brought through pilgrimage to the sanctified lands of
Syria (including Palestine) and through the tourist trade, which developed by the
activities of Thomas Cook’s enterprise and other travel agencies, bringing tourists
and travellers to the Holy Land. It was also an outcome of diplomatic missions and
travellers to Europe as well as students from Cairo, Istanbul and Syria who were
sent to Paris and London to study French and English, and acquire European
knowledge and technologies.
Muhammad ‘Ali who, 1801, came to Egypt with the Ottoman forces to help drive out
the French, managed to become, in 1805, Egypt’s new ruler (1805 - 1848),
superficially under Ottoman suzerainty, and to create a dynasty which ruled Egypt
until its last descendant, King Farouk. With the aim of strengthening and modernizing
Egypt after freeing it from Napoleon’s short-lived occupation (1798 – 1801) and after
getting rid of the Mamluks in a notorious massacre,335 the ambitious Muhammad ‘Ali,
embarked on building up a powerful regime and creating an army on the French
model, introducing far-reaching changes necessary to such an army. Being an
admirer of French innovation, and as part of the endeavour to catch up with the
333
Cachia, Pierre. “Translations and adaptations 1934 – 1914”, in Badawi, M. M. (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature
- The Cambridge History of Arabic literature, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 24.
334
Badawi, M. M. (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature, ibid., p. 4.
335
The Mamluk beys were warlords who had established military households where they trained boys and
young men who had been captured or brought from Caucasia to be their pages, bodyguards, servants and
military retainers. They engaged in lucrative trade (especially in Yemeni coffee) and used their military force to
collect taxes and effectively control the country. In 1978, the French invaders ousted them from their
mansions in Cairo, cut off their trade routes with Arabia and Yemen and drove them to the south.
72
modern world, he sent student missions to Europe (mainly to France) to learn
military and engineering sciences and technologies.336 On the other hand, he
opened a number of modern “schools and colleges for men, employing European
teaching methods and presenting European subject matter, medical and military
training in particular.”337 He also founded the Cairo School of Languages for the
teaching of Italian, French and English as well as for the purpose of translating
books and lessons taught by foreign experts in his schools. Moreover, he introduced
a printing press that printed scientific, technological and literary translations of
European works as well as Arabic classics.
Shaykh Rifa’a Raf’i al-Tahtawi (1801 – 1873), a graduate of al-Azhar (the centre of
Islamic learning), was assigned to be the Imam of an educational mission that
Muhammad ‘Ali was sending to France. Tahtawi immersed himself in the study of
French and in the translation of Western books into Arabic. In 1839, he published a
descriptive book: Takhlis al-Ibriz fi Tafseel Bariz (A Paris Profile) in which he wrote
about his observations and experiences in France and his contact with intellectual
circles. He recommended that Egyptian girls should be given the same education as
boys, arguing that this was the practice in the strongest nations, that is, in European
ones. Tahtawi was also appointed director of the School of Languages, which
produced a number of distinguished translators and writers.338 An increasing number
of young Muslims, who travelled to Europe began to speak of how Europe, “the
smallest of the continents”, achieved modernization and superiority through its
mastery of the sciences. Mustafa Sami, a former chief secretary of the Ottoman
embassy in Paris, published an essay in 1840, in which he noted with astonishment:
Every European, man and woman, can read and write. All of them, men and
women alike, get at least ten years of schooling. There are special schools where
even the deaf and dumb are taught to read and write. Thanks to their science,
Europeans have found ways of overcoming plague and other illnesses, and have
invented many mechanical devices to mass-produce various items.”339
While the Middle East region was experiencing uneven socio-economic, political and
technological transformation, many of the educated indigenous elites raised serious
and critical questions about their societies and the reasons for their weakness in the
face of European preponderance. A debate by indigenous elites raged throughout
the nineteenth century and was concentrated in particular on gender roles, the
education of women and their rights. A few intellectuals favoured complete emulation
of European ideas and ways of life in order to transform their societies and ensure
the future of the region. Others, such as traditional conservatives and radical
fundamentalists, opposed the embracement of European’s ideas and styles and
argued that any turning away from existing norms and values is not necessary, but
destructive and would mean further surrender to European designs. Of course
336
The first educational mission was sent in 1809 to Italy to study printing.
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 133.
338
Badawi, M. M. (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature, op. cit., p. 9.
339
Quoted in Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong?, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 76.
337
73
between these contradictory trends there was a wide range of opinions on the
transformation of societies.
Several studies have focused on various aspects of the woman question throughout
the nahda period, particularly during the second half of the 19 th and early period of
the 20th centuries. Most of these studies focused on Egypt as a case study, in
particular, and paid far less attention to [Greater] Syria. The debate concerning
women’s issues, however, first came to the fore in [Greater] Syria, drawing into its
orbit leading intellectuals, readers and members of the general public and
permeating peripheral areas of [Greater] Syria. It continued in Egypt well into the 20 th
century. The importance of this geographical perspective was emphasized by Fruma
Zachs and Sharon Halevi:
Many pioneers of Arab journalism hailed from this region [Syria], and they
dominated the field until the early 20th century. Greater Syria, and in particular
Beirut, its economic and cultural center, was in the latter half of the 19th century
a hub of intellectual ferment, which found expression in the growing numbers of
bookstores, printing presses, literary salons, and scientific societies. Only
following the repressive measures of the Hamidian regime (1876–1908) was the
debate relocated to Egypt, where exiled Syrian intellectuals, writers, and
journalists were joined by their Egyptian counterparts.340
The second half of the 19th century was characterized by a sense of “collective
consciousness” and awakening caused by sweeping social, economic, cultural and
political transformations within the Ottoman Empire as well as by the increased
European presence and influence in the region. In fact, the number of Europeans
residing in Egypt and the spread of European schools and missionary activity
increased particularly as a result of Muhammad Ali’s various projects. His liberal
attitude towards Europeans affected their influence in the region, particularly during
his army’s occupation of Syria, which resulted in a remarkable increase in French,
British and American missionary and educational activities. 341 Muhammad Ali’s
grandson Khedive Ismail (1863 – 1879) was interested in modernizing and providing
popular education, especially education for girls. He permitted a large number of
Christian missions to establish schools, where many children received their
education in a European language, mainly French.342 His wife, Princess Sheshmi
Effet set up the Sania Secondary School for Girls. His son, Prince Fuad, later to be
Khedive, “founded the Egyptian University in Cairo with the help of his sister,
Princess Fatma Ismail, who donated her land and jewels.”343 Missionary schools not
only produced a new female readership, but also “stimulated women to write and
Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria: Readers and
Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858 – 1900”, in Int. Journal of Middle East Studies. 41 (2009), p.
616.
341
The Americans founded the Syrian Protestant College (for boys) in 1847 which became the American
College in 1866, later to be named the American University of Beirut; the Jesuits transferred their College (the
University of St Joseph) to Beirut in 1874; missionary schools for girls were also opened.
342
Badawi, M. M. (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature, op. cit., p. 10.
343
Lanfranchi, Sania Sharawi. Casting off the Veil – the Life of Huda Shaarawi, Egypt’s First feminist, edited by
Dr John Keith King, London: I.B. Tauris, 2012, p. 41.
340
74
publish themselves” and “to rethink their roles in family and society.” 344 Moreover,
the missionaries’ activities have undoubtedly contributed significantly to literacy and
the awakening of the women of the Middle East in general and to printing and
publishing in particular. Missionary magazines and publications extolled the
accomplishments of Western culture, which began to play an ever-increasing role in
the cultural make-up of the Arab world. Many Syrians and, sometimes whole
families, such as those of al-Yaziji, al-Bustani, Taqla and al-Naqqash, became
associated with translations and adaptations as well as with serious journalism of a
general cultural and literary type. Anyhow, Intellectuals and reformers were
attempting to come to terms with such transformations as well as with liberal and
secular ideas of modernity and the encroachment of Western institutions and
structures of domination, which were beginning to penetrate the Middle East. Male
and female graduates of missionary schools and Western institutions were naturally
more receptive to Western ideas and played a pioneering role in westernization.
Male reformers, in particular, have raised their voices protesting about women and
promoting improvements in their status. They initiated debate on women’s status in
various forums, including the press. Women, however, were not merely the objects
of this debate, rather they themselves, energetically engaged in these contestations,
challenging some of the criticisms levied against their sex by conservative male
polemicists, and sought to promote women’s rights and education by contributing
articles to women’s journals as well as to general-interest mainstream press.
Moreover, women made invaluable contributions to discussions about social, political
and literary trends of the day. The opportunity to engage in such discussions with
men was provided in the revived tradition of literary [evening] salons founded and
run by women from wealthy families in Syria and Egypt, who studied in missionary
schools, and were thus exposed to European culture, or who travelled to Europe to
study, and were consequently influenced by their interaction with European women
while staying abroad and frequenting Parisian salons.
The debate on women’s rights and roles in Syria during the second half of the 19 th
century was articulated particularly in journals and newspapers such as Hadiqat alAkhbar (the Garden of News)345, al-Jinan346, al-Muqtataf (The Gleaning)347 and
Thamarat al-Funun (1875 – 1908).348 Since its inception, al-Jinan covered issues
concerning marriage, female education, and the social role of women. It debated
various issues related to women and their lives. Several women, among them
influential figures of the time, such as Adelaide al-Bustani and the Aleppo-based
reputed author and poet Mariyana Fathallah Marrash (1838 –1919); sister of poet
Fransis Marrah (1837 – 73) and known for her salon, published their writings in the
journal and attracted a large female readership. In an elegant and richly textured
344
Helen Murre-van den Berg. “Nineteenth-century Protestant Missions and Middle Eastern Women: An
Overview”, in Okkenhaug, Inger Marie & Flaskerud, Ingvild (eds). Gender, Religion and Change in the Middle
East: Two Hundred Years of History, Oxford: Berg, 2005, pp. 112 - 113.
345
A biweekly journal started in Beirut in January 1858 by Khalil al-Khuri (1836 – 1907) with the assistance of
some other intellectuals, among of them was Salim Nawfal.
346
This was founded by Butrus al-Bustani (1819 – 83) who had a keen interest in women’s issues and had long
supported their education. It was circulated throughout Syria and Egypt.
347
A monthly journal founded in 1876 by Yaˊqub Sarruf (1852- 1927) and Faris Nimr (1857 – 1951), both
graduates of the American Syrian Protestant College.
348
The driving force behind this journal was ˊAbd al-Qadir al-Qabbani (1847 – 1935), a well-established scion of
a wealthy Beiruti-Muslim family.
75
article, entitled “The Beauty Spots of the Garden”, Mariyanna Marrash defended her
sex from the insults of poets who, in her opinion, at times characterize women as
“cowardly and avaricious”. She suggested that instead of blindly imitating male
qualities, women should develop their own noble qualities, such as high moral
standards and knowledge.349
Wastin Masarra of Alexandria, whose husband “permitted” her to read al-Jinan described in
her 1871 article how she was impressed and influenced by reading articles and stories
written by women, particularly by Maryana Marrash. Inspired by the latter’s article, Masarra
appealed to her female readers to insist on their right to enter “the gardens of culture and
knowledge” as well as the sciences, despite possible male discouragement.350 This
knowledge, she reasoned, “will enable them to improve men, better raise their children,
and thereby gain men’s respect and love.”351
The first Arabic newspaper in Syria, Hadiqat al-Akhbar, was published and edited by
a 22-year-old intellectual: Khalil al-Khuri in 1858, who saw himself as “a missionary
bringing modern civilization to his Syrian community.”352 This paper was secular and
modern in its approach and was committed to female education and to disseminating
ideas of Syrian identity as well as to promoting Syria “as a single geographically
unified region with its own socio-cultural characteristics, history, and economy.”353 AlKhuri, recognizing the importance of his female readers, wrote editorials on issues
such as the education of women, the need to expand education, the need to
modernize the Arabic language and to learn Western science. He also published
works written specifically by women and translations of European literature,
particularly popular French works and stories that appealed to women or dealt with
them.
In 1882, al-Muqtataf, although devoted to the advancement of the arts and sciences,
began publishing articles on various aspects of the woman question including
women’s education, their role in children’s education and in the medical profession,
and biographical sketches on notable women written by well-known intellectuals. In
1883, Shams Shadada of Zahle wrote an article berating members of her sex for
their indifference and failure to exert themselves and work hard enough to push
women further. Women, she argued, satisfied themselves with trifles instead of
taking the path set out for them by writers such as Salma Tannus, Maryam Jurji
Ilyan, Yaˊqub Sarruf, and Salim al-Bustani.
An example of al-Muqtataf’s biographical sketches was a short piece on al-Khansa’,
the 7th-century eminent poetess354, published in 1885 by Maryam Nimr Makariyus
Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria: Readers and
Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858 – 1900”, op. cit., p. 620.
350
Ibid.
351
Ibid.
352
Zachs, Fruma. “Pioneers of Syrian patriotism and identity: A re-evaluation of Khalil al-Khuri’s contribution”,
in Beshara, Adel (ed.) The Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity, Routledge: London,
2011, p. 98.
353
Ibid., p. 97.
354
Al-khansa’s real name was Tamadur, daughter of Omar Al-Harith, of the Mudar tribe. She was not only a
great poetess of her day, but also an ardent patriot. She embraced Islam when her two young brothers were
killed in tribal fighting. She sent her four sons to join in the forces in defence of Islam. The four sons were killed
in the well-known Qadisia battle, which took place in the fourteenth year of Al-Hijra. Al-Khansa’s poetry
outlived many later generations.
349
76
(1860 – 88), who had previously lectured on her life to the female of her literary
society Bakurat Suriya (The Dawn of Syria). Having benefited from her mother, who
was determined to educate all her children, Makariyus highlighted the impact of
mothers on the intellectual lives of their daughters. She also emphasized to her
readers “the importance of reading as a way to build a moral character and gain
useful knowledge of the world.”355 Thus, she suggested that her readers peruse
enlightening texts, such as those on the lives of outstanding women, and not just
entertaining ones, such as novels.
In the 1880s, al-Muqtataf published writings by men who were critical of women’s
quest for equality and who argued in favour of male physical and intellectual
superiority over women. In 1886, Amin Abu Khatir of Zahle criticized women’s
increasing demands for equality while they have neglected many of their domestic
duties. In the same year, Najib Antunyus of Alexandria responded to Wadiˊ al-Khuri
of Beirut who was in favour of greater equality of women. Antunyus argued that
“because women’s physiological makeup differs from that of men, full equality will
never be achieved.”356 In 1887, Shibli Shumayil (1850 – 1917) initiated a debate
using biological argumentation and drawing heavily on his medical training and on
the findings of European and American thinkers and scientists. He regarded men as
having superior physical and intellectual attributes over women whose “weaker”
bodies and “slower” mental cognition result in their more devious and cunning nature
and their ability to use only the “weapons of the weak”. 357 Four women responded
quickly to Shumayil’s attack. M. A. Y. of Damascus objected to Shumayil’s
comparison between women and lower species of animals and insisted that the
woman is capable of exceeding the man in knowledge and morals even if she may
not be equal to him in physical strength.358 Rahil Hajjar of Cairo rejected the validity
of Shumayil’s argumentation, stressing that his “facts” were merely opinions. From
her part, Maryam Makariyus judged Shumayil’s article as “disrespectful and even
insulting to women” and suggested that “men of his stature should be even more
careful with their words.”359 Maryam Matar of Cairo adopted a more forceful tone in
her response, challenging men to provide the proof of their abilities. She pointed out
that ‘although women are quite capable of doing the same work as men, men cannot
claim to exhibit the same proficiency in women’s work.”360 Shumayil felt compelled to
confute the “ladies” challenging him. He contended that the two sexes are different,
but each plays a vital role in society. Equality between the two, according to him, is
impossible. Woman follows after man and his development. Her “natural place” is
that of man’s helpmate.361 The debate initiated by Shumayil led to a modification in
argumentation. As stressed by Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi, “traditional modes
of argumentation and justification based on philosophy and religion made way for
more secular and scientific arguments, a shift that paralleled similar changes in
Europe and America.”362
Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria: Readers and
Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858 – 1900”, op. cit., p. 622.
356
Ibid., 623.
357
Ibid.
358
Ibid., p. 624.
359
Ibid.
360
Ibid.
361
Ibid.
362
Ibid.
355
77
The interest in women and their welfare and education was certainly a concern of
several women societies that were active in Beirut, Damascus and Palestine at that
time. The efforts of these societies were primarily religiously based and driven by
notions of Christian charity or by “a sentiment of noblesse oblige on the part of the
wealthy toward the less fortunate.”363 Akhawat al-Mahabba (Sisterhood of Love), a
women’s charitable society was active in Damascus. In 1847, they ran a school,
hospital and sanatorium, as well as a hostel for wayward girls in Damascus.364
Another women society was founded in Bikfayya in 1853. Similarly, in 1857 a
women’s charitable society, Sayyidat al-Mahabba (ladies of Love), was established in
Beirut. In the same period, Zahle was the home town of a Jesuit-backed women’s
educational society. The Orthodox Aid Society for the Poor was the first woman
association established in Acre (Palestine) in 1903. This society helped poor young
girls and provided them with clothes and trousseau items. Small boarding schools
were established in the 1840s, like the girls boarding with the De Forest and Whiting
families in Beirut and Abeih. In the 1850s and 1860s, the Kaiserswerth Deaconesses
introduced girls’ orphanages in which “immediate relief from poverty and destitution
formed the prime incentive, especially after the intercommunal wars in Lebanon in
1860.”365 The spread of foreign (Christian) missionary schools in Syria with the
primary aim of achieving conversions, among Muslims, Jews and local Christian
communities, had a great influence on the development of women’s education. As
Sarah Graham-Brown comments: “These schools certainly played an important part
both in providing educational opportunities for women and also in raising internal
debates on the issue of whether, and to what extent, women should be educated.” 366
The interest in women and their education was shared by men’s cultural societies,
which organized several cultural discussions and forums pertaining to them. In 1849,
the Syrian Society for the Acquisition of Sciences and the Arts (al-Jamˊiyya al-Suriyya
li-Iktisab al-ˊUlum wa-l-Funun) held a cultural and educational meeting in which alMu’allim Butrus al-Bustani (1819 - 1883) addressed the participants.367 In his lecture
on “the Education of Woman”, al-Bustani advocated empowering women “with a
broad and solid education to enable them to carry out their marital, maternal and
domestic duties for the benefit of their family, society, and nation.” 368 He stressed
that educating women would make them more virtuous. 369 Al-Bustani, it must be
remembered, was a remarkable modern intellectual with a widespread reputation
363
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 102.
364
Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria: Readers and
Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858 – 1900”, op. cit., p. 618.
365
Helen Murre-van den Berg. “Nineteenth-century Protestant Missions and Middle Eastern Women: An
Overview”, in Okkenhaug, Inger Marie & Flaskerud, Ingvild (eds). Gender, Religion and Change in the Middle
East: Two Hundred Years of History, Oxford: Berg, 2005, p. 108.
366
Graham-Brown, Sarah. Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle East 18601950, p. 200.
367
This society operated in the years 1847 – 1852, and included among its members Nakhla Mudawwar, Khalil
Mishaqa, Nasif al-Yaziji and Butrus al-Bustani, who collected eighteen of the lectures given, and published
them as a book in 1852. See Zachs, Fruma. “Pioneers of Syrian patriotism and identity: A re-evaluation of Khalil
al-Khuri’s contribution”, in Beshara, Adel (ed.) The Origins of Syrian Nationhood, op .cit., p. 96.
368
Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria: Readers and
Writers Debate Women and their Rights, 1858 – 1900”, op. cit., p. 618.
369
Quoted in Graham-Brown, Sarah. Images of Women: The Portrayal of Women in Photography of the Middle
East 1860-1950, p. 201.
78
and network. He was an “educator and editor; a disseminator of ideas; but even
more, an authoritative voice who naturalized an epistemology essential to modernity
and capitalism.”370 In the wake of the sectarian massacres in Lebanon, in 1863, he
established al-Madrasah al-wataniyah (the National School), “the first secular school
in the Arab world” that “maintained a multi confessional student body and faculty”,
whose members were the intellectual pantheon of Syria.371
From his part, Fransis Marrash advocated women’s education and argued that the
best way to drive a woman to civilization is to educate her for “the woman is the sole
from which springs human life; she is the source of education, morals and
manners.”372 However, Marrash argued that a woman should only seek knowledge
that is helpful to man. He was not keen about allowing women to delve into the
sciences. Doing so, it will lead a woman not only losing her femininity but also “even
position[ing] herself above man.”373
Asˊad Yaˊqub al-Khayyat (b. 1811), an associate of al-Bustani’s group, which also
included leading members of the Beirut intelligentsia such as Mikha’il Mishaqa and
Nasif al-Yaziji, argued in favour of the liberation of women and emphasized the need
for their education in his travelogue, Sawt min Lubnan (Voice from Lebanon).374
Jibra’il Sadqah wrote an article “On the Rights of Women” in the first volume of alJinan. In it he asserted the mental and physical equality of men and women and
viewed the two genders as complementary, likening them to different parts of the
body.
The subject of women was discussed by male intellectuals in Egypt and was
intertwined with other issues that these intellectuals considered important to society,
including nationalism, social and political reform and the need for Muslim societies to
follow the path of progress and catch up with the relative advancement of European
societies. Shaikh Muhammad ‘Abdu (1849 – 1905) was among the most influential
writers on reforms and education with respect to women. He was a committed and
well grounded religious thinker of considerable reputation associated with al-Azhar.
He advocated widespread education and contributed to the founding of Muslim
benevolent societies and private committees for the purpose of establishing schools.
He argued for modernization and reforms in the intellectual and social fields and
called for a revival of ijtihad, or independent investigation of religious texts, and for
elevation of women’s status and changes in marriage practices. It must be noted that
‘Abdu was a student of the well-reputed figure in both Egypt and Turkey as well as in
Iran: al-Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839 – 1897), who wanted to revive Islam
from the condition of “ignorance and helplessness” and urged in his teachings and
writings for the acquisition of modern sciences and for adaptation to the demands of
the modern world. While editing a newspaper, Al-waka’i͑ al-missriyya and writing in a
weekly publication, Al-manar, in the 1880s and early 1900s, ‘Abdu addressed in his
370
Sheehi, Stephen. “Butus al-Bustani: Syria’s ideologue of the age”, in Beshara, Adel (ed.) The Origins of Syrian
Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity, op. cit., p. 61.
371
Ibid., p. 59.
372
Quoted in Fruma Zachs and Sharon Halevi “From Difāˊ Al-Nisāˊ to Mas’alat al- Nisāˊ in Greater Syria”, ibid.,
p. 620.
373
Ibid.
374
Ibid.
79
articles the need for legal reforms and modernization with respect to women and for
a return to the essentials of Islam. Polygamy and slavery, in his opinion, do not
belong to the essentials of Islam. The former, for example, was necessitated by the
conditions of the day. The original intent of the Qur’an was monogamy, not
polygamy; this intent had been ignored. He argued that it was Islam, not the West,
as the Europeans claim, that first honoured woman and granted her equality.
However, ‘Abdu advocated the pursuit of genuine transfer from the Western world of
knowledge, skills and other developments in social reform. At the same time, he
deplored “the facile, unthinking imitation of Western ways – in dress, furniture,
architecture, and the consumption of expensive luxuries.” 375 In 1869 and 1875,
Shaikh Ahmad Rifa’i al-Tahtawi and ‘Ali Pasha Mubarak, encouraged by the state,
published books in which they advocated education for women, using justification
from the Qur’an and Hadith.
In the second quarter of the nineteenth century, Egypt was witnessing economic and
technological transformations and lively intellectual ferment; where women’s feminist
consciousness began to emerge in the writings of women of privilege and education
who lived in the secluded world of the urban harem and began to contest the Islamic
justification for their seclusion. From the 1890s, and with the broadening of
opportunities for education and work for women, feminist consciousness and
discourses were widely expressed in the rise of women’s press and journalism, salon
debates and the appearance of women’s biography writing. According to Marilyn
Booth, a historian and literary critic, “biography helped to prepare the ground for, and
then to support, an organized feminist movement in Egypt and the accelerating entry
of women into a range of professions.”376 In her book May Her Likes Be Multiplied,
Booth has explored the writing of biography in Egypt from the late nineteenth century
to the mid-twentieth century and through which women explicated and explored their
situations and their hopes, and debated their ideas on social change. She concludes
that:
Nearly a century ago, some “Famous Women” biographies seemed to question
the links between sacred law, patriarchy/family, and new notions of citizenship
in a nation-state. They questioned the authority of the father and husband over
the daughter's and wife's future plans. They emphasized women's struggles as
individuals while also stressing the value of women's relational work.377
In Egypt, a group of Syrian female intellectuals were active in Egypt’s turn-of-thecentury public culture. They worked in women’s printing and press, founded
magazines and literary salons, and produced letters and essays on issues, such
equality, education, work, women’s rights veiling and unveiling and nationalism.
Their call for more education for women was clearly noticeable. Syrian men and
women, it must be noted, led the [Arab] Nahda movement and “played a critical role
in the intellectual and political life of Egypt from the 1870s on, pioneering the
Egyptian press and serving in the government. Moreover, Syrians, many of whom
had fled to Egypt to escape Ottoman oppression, launched some of the most
important early newspapers, including the pro-French al-Ahram and the pro-British
375
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 140.
Booth, Marilyn. May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt: Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, the conclusion.
377
Ibid.
376
80
al-Muqattam.”378 Syrian women, in particular, contributed to the emergence of new gender
awareness and paved the way for the secluded middle- and upper- class female world to
claim roles in the public sphere. They also helped lay the groundwork for the publication of
Qasim Amin’s Tahrir al-mar’a (The Liberation of Women), which will be discussed later. As
noted by Professor Margot Badran, an expert on feminism in Egypt, “most of the first
generation of women (born in the middle of the nineteenth century) who had led the way in
breaking out of domestic confinement to take on new roles were Christians of Syrian
origin.”379 Among the elite Syrian immigrant women who started and largely written
women’s magazines was Labiba Hashim from Beirut (c. 1880-1947), the editor of Egypt’s
longest-running women’s magazine: Fatat al-sharq.380 Hashim wrote short narratives about
Syrian women living in Egypt celebrating their achievements and experiences. Her magazine,
additionally, produced narratives of “women so varied in era and experiences as exemplary
subjects claiming linkage to the Syrian lands.”381 Hind Nawfal (1860 – 1920) was the founder
of the first Arabic women’s journal, al-fatat (The young woman), which, from the start,
declared its concerns and dedication “to advancing the women of Egypt along the path that
European women were taking” and to publish “whatever was of interest to women.”382
Indeed, women found in al-Fatat, a new forum for discussing and spreading their concerns.
In its first year of publication in Alexandria in 1892, al-fatat printed articles to women like
Zeinab al-Fawwaz, Labiba Habiqa, Mohga Boulos, who all stressed the importance of
educating both men and women and encouraged women to gain education and to look
upon journalism and writing as a responsibility. Egyptian and Syrian immigrant women
published their articles and works in magazines edited and published by men. In 1891,
Zeinnab Fawwaz [of modest Lebanese origins] advocated work for women in the
occupations of men as a basic right. Citing examples of eminent public women and eastern
queens such as Cleopatra, Zenobia and others, she insisted that there was nothing in
[Islamic] religious law or in any of the divinely ordered systems of law prohibiting women
from working outside the home in “men’s occupations.”383 In 1894, Zeinnab Fawwaz
published a huge encyclopedic volume al-durr al-manthur fi tabaqat al-khudur (Scattered
Pearls in the Lives of the Harem Dwellers) in which “she brought together the lives of about
450 eastern and western women famous for their literary and social accomplishments.”384
Her biographical volume contained also a piece by Taimuriyya who made a solid case for
female education and its benefits. Education, she argued, “would enhance women’s abilities
to manage the home. Men would be able to “lean upon” such educated women.”385
Fawwaz’s book, as inferred by Marlyin Booth, a historian and literary critic, served as a
source of inspiration and information for editors of women’s magazine of that time. 386
378
Baron, Beth. Egypt as a Woman: Nationalism, Gender, and Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press,
2005, p. 28.
379
Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam - Secular and Religious Convergences, Oxford: Oneworld Publications,
2009, p. 67.
380
It was founded in Cairo in 1906.
381
Booth, Marilyn. “Constructions of Syrian identity in the women’s press in Egypt”, in Beshara, Adel (ed.) The
Origins of Syrian Nationhood: Histories, pioneers and identity, Routledge: London, 2011, p. 224.
382
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 141.
383
Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam - Secular and Religious Convergences, op. cit., p. 61.
384
Cooke, Miriam. “Arab women writers”, in M.M. Badawi (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature, op. cit., p. 447.
385
Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam - Secular and Religious Convergences, op. cit.,pp. 59 – 60.
386 Booth, Marilyn. May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt: Berkeley and Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 2001, pp. 28 – 30.
81
Fifteen years before the appearance of Fawwaz’s al-Durr al-manthur, Maryam Nasr Allah
al-Nahhas, a Syrian from Tripoli, printed in Alexandria Maˊrid al-Hasna’ fi tarajim mashahir
al-nisa’ (An Excellent Exposition on the Biographies of Famous Women). Women like
Miriam Makarius, Salma Qusatli, Mariya Tuma and others all raised their voices with
questions on the need for education for all, on the need for change toward acceptance of
Western styles and on redefining the role of women as well as on a whole range of matters.
By the 1890s, women’s opinions and ideas were evident in the press and were part of the
fabric of intellectual life. Women, through participation in journalism, were echoing the
questions that social reformers were asking: Why women were denied education and
professional opportunities? As a result, visible changes and a Europeanization culture had
taken place in society as observed and commented by many. Women now are more visible
in public places, more literate, particularly in Cairo, and openly pursuing a range of
professional activities. Changes, moreover, affected women’s dress, particularly the veil,
which became lighter and more transparent among upper-class women. These women
became accustomed to being unveiled when they traveled to Europe. Rashid Rida (1865 –
1935), an influential thinker and editor of a periodical publication: al-Manar (The
Lighthouse) and a devoted disciple of Jamal al-din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abdu
commented on these changes, claiming that “the imitation of European ways could be
observed among the upper classes and those that followed them from the people.”387
At a time of visible social change in Egypt, Qasim Amin, a son of an Ottoman-Egyptian elite
and a French-educated upper-middle-class lawyer who found inspiration in Europe and
became a passionate advocate of women’s rights, published, in 1899, The Liberation of
Women, which provoked intense and furious debate.388 In his work, which was translated
into many languages, Amin condemned the lives of harem women in Egypt, advocated the
abolition of the veil and pushed for changing the position of women through a package of
reforms - in education, marriage and divorce – within the framework of Islam, arguing that
educated women would help the nation develop. The problem as seen by Amin stemmed
from “tradition” and religion, and the main enemy was ‘backwardness”, rather than
“foreignness”. To him, the veil and segregation “symbolized the backwardness and
inferiority of Islamic society.”389 The institution of harem, he contended, was “an instrument
for the oppression and even imprisonment of women.”390 It was also a symbol of the utter
contempt in which men held women and a means for stripping them of all human attributes
and reducing them to one office only, that of satisfying male sexual urges.” 391 Believing in
the inherent superiority of Western civilization and the inherent backwardness of Muslim
societies, he urged his Egyptian nation and Muslim countries generally “to abandon its
backward ways and follow the Western path to success and civilization.”392 To achieve that,
387
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 142.
According to Leila Ahmed, Amin’s book, which represented the rearticulation of the colonial thesis of the
inferiority of the native and Muslim and the superiority of the European, “triggered the first major controversy
in the Arabic press: more than thirty books and articles appeared in response to its publication. The majority
were critical, though the book did please some readers, notably members of the British administration and
pro-British factions.” Thus, Ahmed refuses to identify Amin as the father of Arab feminism. To her, “Amin
might more aptly be described as the son of Cromer and colonialism.” See Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in
Islam, op. cit., p. 162.
389
Ibid., p. 161.
390
Abdel Kader, Soha. Egyptian women in a Changing Society, 1899 – 1987, op. cit., p. 21.
391
Ibid.
392
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 156.
388
82
in his opinion, required changing women and educating them for the education of women
would promote companionate marriages. He wrote: “The grown man is none other than his
mother shaped him in childhood,” and “it is impossible to breed successful men if they do
not have mothers capable of raising them to be successful.”393 An “ignorant mother”, in his
opinion, could not “transform her child’s personality to include good qualities” if she were
unaware of such qualities.394 Amin, however, was haranguing, conservative and patriarchal
in his position regarding women. Not only, he described their condition and practices in
often offensive and crude ways, but he also recommended that women needed some
education “to enable them to fulfill their function and duty in life as wives.” 395 Amin offered
more elaboration on the wife’s duty:
It is the wife duty to plan the household budget… to supervise the servants… to
make her home attractive to her husband, so that he may find ease when he
returns to it and so that he likes being there, and enjoys the food and drink and
sleep and does not seek to flee from home to spend his time with neighbors or in
public places, and it is her duty – and this is her first and most important duty –
to raise the children, attending to them physically, mentally and morally. 396
Amin’s writings had impact upon his peers and reached beyond the Arab world, influencing
Iranian intellectuals; such as Seyyid Hosein Taqizadeh.397 His book, however, was under
severe attack from every conservative quarter, raising a heated debate on women and
making of the women question a major national concern transformed into a full-fledged
feminist movement. Mustafa Kamel, the editor of Al-Liwa newspaper and the founder of Alhizb al-Watani, criticized Amin’s ideas and stated that they shook the foundation of Muslim
society. Khedive Abbas Helmi II pronounced his dissatisfaction. Shaikh Ali Yusif, in whose
newspaper Al-Muayyid Amin had published his book as a series of articles, was forced to
publish an apology and disclaim any connection with Amin. Indeed, as one author noted:
“Amin’s book produced a greater reaction than any other book published at the time. No
less than thirty books and pamphlets were written to refute his ideas or attack him
personally.”398
In response to criticism of The Liberation of Women, Amin wrote The New Woman, in
which he defended his position and extended his ideas, by relying less on arguments based
on the Qur’an and Hadith, and using instead arguments of European intellectuals. The
following passage is taken from The New Woman:
European used to have the same opinion of women that we have today: that
women are inferior due to their mental deficiencies, their low status in religion,
and their primary role as temptresses and agents for the Devil. They used to say
393
Quoted in ibid.
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 100.
395
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 159.
396
Quoted in ibid.
397
Seyyid Hosein Taqizadeh was a Parliament representative and editor of the pro-Revival newspaper, Kaveh,
in which he praised Qasim Amin and other Islamic reformers to change the ‘pathetic position of Muslim
women.’ See Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the
Modern Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 99.
398
Quoted in Khater, Akram Fouad. Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 2004, p. 58.
394
83
that woman, “long of hair, short of mind,” was created for no other reason than
to serve man. European scholars, philosophers, poets, and religious leaders
considered it foolish to educate women. Moreover, they scoffed at the woman
who abandoned her household for intellectual pursuits. They accused such
women of intruding on what they called “men’s domain.”
When the veil of ignorance was finally lifted from European men, they admitted
that they themselves were instrumental in the inferior position of women, and
that they had not allowed them to change and develop. They also realized that a
woman was a human being like them, that she had the right to enjoy her
freedom and to use her capabilities, and that depriving a woman of beneficial
experiences was unacceptable.
These changes initiated a new phase for the Western woman. She started
cultivating her mind, refining her manners, and gradually gaining her rights. She
participated with men in human affairs and was a partner in their search for
knowledge, a listener in church, a contributor to literary debates, a participant in
scientific meetings, and a traveller to various countries. In a short time, that
female who had been animal-like – decorated with ornaments, garbed in
fashion, and immersed in amusement – was replaced by a new woman who was
a sister to man, a companion to her husband, a tutor to her children – a refined
individual.
This transformation is all we intend. We hope that Egyptian woman achieves this
high status through the appropriate avenues open to her, and that she will
acquire her share of intellectual and moral development, happiness, and
authority in her household. We are convinced that if this goal were achieved, it
would prove to be the most significant development in Egypt’s history.399
By the early twentieth century, intellectuals, men and women, began to debate the issue of
women within the context of modernity, which was understood to encompass
“technological progress, secularism, the rule of law, women’s emancipation, and a
monogamous family system.”400 A few women with a feminist consciousness and vision
moved more fully into life beyond the household and set to erode the institution of female
seclusion, to confront patriarchal control and oppression of women and to encourage other
women to follow. In Egypt, three pioneering women set out to claim roles in the public
spheres in the context of everyday life and in different ways. The three women were: Huda
Sha̕arawi (1879 – 1947), Nabawiyya Musa (1890 – 1951), and Malak Hifni Nasif (1986 –
1918). They moved into the public realm and embarked in their new roles, as teachers,
writers and speakers (and as an organizer in the case of Huda Sha̕arawi), to advocate the
public education of girls, promote the equitable employment of Egyptian women and pave
the way for their equal access to social, economic, and political opportunity.
Huda Sha̕arawi was a daughter of a wealthy Egyptian landowner and politician, Muhammad
Sultan Pasha, widely known as the ‘King’ of Upper Egypt. She was educated by tutors in the
399
Quoted in ibid., p. 75.
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 98.
400
84
harem and frequently visited women’s salon of her friend Eugénie Le Brun Rushdi401 and
participated in its debates that widened her feminist awareness.402 As a young woman well
versed in both oriental culture and Western academic subjects and with a clear vision of life,
she played an important role in the intellectual life of elite Egyptian women and contributed
to the formation of the Intellectual Association for Egyptian women in 1914. She organized
successful public cultural lectures for women to which she invited Marguerite Clément, a
professional French lecturer, Malak Hifni Nasif and May Ziyadeh to speak on women issues.
Huda was also active in various philanthropic projects (such as the Muhammad Ali
Dispensary) organized by Egyptian women that aimed to provide health care and education
to some of Cairo’s poorer women. In 1919, Sha̕arawi became active in the national
movement and helped organize a large women’s demonstration, supporting strikes,
collecting funds and raising morale until independence. From 1923 until her death, Sha̕arawi
led an organized and public feminist movement, demanding women’s equality and social
reform. She founded the Egyptian Feminist Union (EFU), which ran, in addition to a
dispensary for poor mothers and children, a centre for domestic instructions and a
handicraft workshop. The EFU also campaigned for girls’ secondary schools and demanded
an end to state-regulated prostitution. Huda and her colleagues published a statement
listing nine main principles of the EFU. The first three of which were: a) to seek to elevate
the intellectual and moral standards of Egyptian women; b) to enable them to obtain social,
political, legal and moral equality with men; and c) to obtain the right to higher education
for girls.403 In 1923, Sha̕arawi led a delegation of Egyptian women to a feminist conference
of the International Union of Women in Rome.404 Upon her return, she dramatically
removed her face veil as an overt and confrontational political act in public (at the train
station in Cairo). All the women who were waiting to welcome the delegates also removed
their veils. The scene was magnificent as reported by the media. In 1925, she founded a
French-language magazine: L’Égyptienne, which gave her a platform for the publication of
her political views on feminist and other subjects.405 In 1926, Huda became a member of the
executive committee of the International Alliance of women, IAW.
401
Eugénie was the French wife of Hussain Rushdi Pasha, a prominent Egyptian official, who became later
Egypt’s Prime Minister. Rushdi married Eugénie in 1892 in France, where he was studying. When he brought
his wife to Egypt, she set about describing Egyptian Muslin society and customs to her French readers. Her
books were much appreciated in the West.
402
At age thirteen, and under pressure of her family, Huda was betrothed to her 39 years old cousin, Ali
Shaarawi, as a second wife. Huda relented reluctantly to this marriage fearing that her refusal to marry her
cousin might kill her mother, who originally planned this marriage in order to prevent her daughter being
asked to marry one of the Khedive’s protégés and to preserve the family’s lands and estates. The marriage was
not a happy one and Huda lived apart from her husband for seven years. She reconciled with him when she
was twenty-one. She then had two children with him. See Lanfranchi, Sania Sharawi. Casting off the Veil – the
Life of Huda Shaarawi, Egypt’s First feminist, op. cit., pp. 15 – 28.
403
Ibid., p. 104.
404
Huda was accompanied by two colleagues: Céza Nabarawi, a gifted writer, and Nabawiya Musa, a powerful
intellect, an assiduous scholar, and accomplished in Arabic.
405
One of the crucial subjects that Huda and her magazine campaigned for was the abolition of the unfair
treaties that maintained the capitulations. These treaties were originally signed by the Ottoman Empire with
European powers, whereby Western nationals were not subject to local law. Thus, according to the
capitulatory laws, foreigners resident in Egypt were subject to their own courts rather to the Egyptian ones.
The Egyptian Government was prevented from taking effective action against brothels, most of which were
owned by foreigners. Huda articulated her stand against the capitulatory laws on the pages of her magazine
and at meetings of the International Council of Women.
85
Malak Hifni Nasif, known by her pen name, Bahithat al-Badiya (Searcher in the desert), was
born in 1886, into a middle-class Cairo family. Her father was a well-known scholar and
lecturer, educated at al-Azhar and Dar al-̕Ulum. Malak’s brother, Majd al-Din, encouraged
her education and wrote a brief biography of her, in which he noted that his father “was not
saddened by her birth”.406 Malak, after giving up teaching, following her marriage, as
required by the discriminatory government regulations, lived with her husband in his desert
home near the Fayyum oasis.407 Encouraged by her father, who insisted that she would be
allowed to write and give talks, she maintained a public presence through her writings as
well as occasional speeches and lectures. However, induced by her personal experience with
marriage and her incompatible husband who had little respect for the marriage bond, Malak
took up the fight for women as her life cause. She defended women’s rights, advocated
their education and encouraged families to educate their daughters. She demanded that
women be allowed to pray in mosque like men, as they had in the early days of Islam. She
founded a feminist club and delivered a famous speech to the Legislative Assembly in which
she put a list of demands for the improvement of women’s position. In a series of articles for
Al-Jarida, she discussed many of women’s problems, which Qasim Amin had discussed in his
books and generated heated controversies, and she considered polygamy, which reflected
her personal experience, as the very worst of all women’s ills; these articles were collected
in a book Women’s Issues in 1910. Malak’s life-long friend, May Ziyadeh described how
greatly Malak was influenced by Qasim Amin, although Malak rejected such influence and
thought of herself as more conservative than Amin. Ziyadeh believed Malak “to be Amin’s
daughter in thought and daring and his pupil in advocating reform in women’s affairs.”408
Malak’s premature death in 1918 at the age of thirty-two, was lamented by people of
progressive views as well as by conservative men from al-Azhar. At her memorial service,
“words of praise were said of her that had never before been spoken of a woman in
Egypt.”409
.
Nabawiyya Musa was born in 1886, shortly after the death of her father, and was raised by
her mother on the military pension of her army colonel husband. After completing a teacher
training course in the Saniyya School, she struggled and fought her family and the colonial
[British] educational authorities, to obtain a baccalaureate degree, an effort that surely
contributed in her feminist evolution. With difficulty, she triumphed over the objections and
obtained a permission from the Ministry of Education to sit for the examination, after
preparing for it privately due to the unavailability of secondary schools for girls. In 1907, she
received her diploma, but no other women were permitted to sit for this examination again
for twenty-one years, until independence was declared in 1922.410 Being a rebellious to a
prevailing culture in a patriarchal society where women were pushed into marriage,
Nabawiyya remained single, dedicating her life to the profession of education, which
became her lifelong cause and the field for her activism. At the age of thirty-four,
Nabawiyya published, in 1920, a brave short treatise called al-Mar’a wa al-̕amal (Woman
406
Quoted in Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam - Secular and Religious Convergences, op. cit., p. 69.
Malak discovered that her husband was already married to a cousin, of whom he was very fond and by
whom he had a daughter. His hoped that by marrying Malak that she would educate his beloved daughter,
since there were no schools for girls in the Fayum.
408
Abdel Kader, Soha. Egyptian women in a Changing Society, 1899 – 1987, op. cit., p. 66.
409
Ibid., 67.
410
Badran, Margot. Feminism in Islam - Secular and Religious Convergences, op. cit., p. 71.
407
86
and work), supporting education and work for women, while upholding prevailing moral
values. At the peak of her life, at the age of fifty-two, she published her autobiography:
Dhikriyyati (My memoirs), which in the opinion of the feminist historian Margot Badran,
was “a treasure trove” and “a major document in the history of Egyptian feminism” that
“describes concrete ways in which Egyptian women were oppressed in the early twentieth
century and how one woman overcame structural and behavioural modes of
oppression.”411
The famous writer May Elias Ziyadeh (1886-1941), who became known as “Miss May”, was
of Lebanese-Palestinian origin. She was born in Nazareth on 11 February 1886 to Elias
Ziyadeh, who had moved to Palestine from his native Lebanese village of Shatoul, and Nozha
Mu’ammer, a well-educated Palestinian woman. At the turn of the century, the Ziyadeh
family migrated to Egypt and settled in Cairo, where Elias became the owner of a successful
newspaper, al-Mahrusa. May was a well-educated woman of exceptional intellect. In her
father’s successful newspaper, she started publishing her poetry in both French and Arabic
under the pen name Isis Copia. She published her prose poetry (shi̕r manthur) as well as
other literary pieces in Arabic newspapers and magazines like Al-Hilal, Al-Ahram, Al-Siyasa
and the Lebanese magazine Al-Zuhour. Her famous poetic prose work Ayna Watani?
(Where is My Homeland?) reflected her feeling of being an outsider in a society traditionally
dominated by men.
May turned out to be a prolific writer, contributing to the modernization of Arabic language
and thought in nearly every field. Having mastered at least five languages, she skillfully
translated novels from English, German and French into Arabic. She wrote sensitive
biographical studies of three pioneer female writers and poets: A̕isha al-Taymouriyya;
considering her as “the first to call for gender equality”,412 Malak Hifni Nassif and Warda alYaziji. According to Marilyn Booth, May Ziyadeh “was the first Arab woman to write fulllength biographies in Arabic of other Arab women, a “first” in which she took pride, an act
that shaped her life and her understanding of it.”413
May also experimented with the genre of short stories and consistently championed
women’s rights in her books and lectures. Being herself an activist for the emancipation of
women, she collaborated with Huda Sha̕arawi and, in her essays she criticized specific
traditions like those that drove women into frequent divorce and remarriage and that
“required women to wear black and practice seclusion and mortification as a sign of
mourning.”414 She urged men and society as a whole to let women perform work as through
work a woman will develop her faculties and assert her independence by insuring her means
of living. In her opinion, work leads to love and stimulates the heart. As she states:
There is only one door leading to the love that heals and comforts. It is work,
work, work. Work which opens the mind, stimulates the heart, fills time, soothes
the temper, gives a sound, useful outlet to confused emotions. Let woman
411
Ibid., p. 91.
Cooke, Miriam. “Arab women writers”, in M.M. Badawi (ed.) Modern Arabic Literature, op. cit., p. 444.
413
Booth, Marilyn. May Her Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt. op. cit., see the
prologue.
414
Ghorayeb, Rose. “May Ziadeh (1886 – 1941)”, Signs, 5:3 (1979: Winter), 376.
412
87
occupy herself with whatever task needs a helping hand. Let her perform any
work, let her practice any art that she feels seriously inclined to practice. It
makes no difference whether she works to make a living or to seek recreation.
The type of work also has no importance, whether it be intellectual or manual,
sewing, embroidering, teaching, housekeeping or selling in a store. The
important thing is to work earnestly, diligently, with the sincere desire to succeed
and achieve thoroughness and perfection. There is no such thing as superior and
inferior work. Every occupation, every task is noble if it is well done and useful to
society.415
In Cairo, May ran the most famous literary salon in the Arab world during the 1920s and
'30s. Open to men and women of varied backgrounds and modelled on the French example,
the salon attracted the greatest writers, poets and intellectuals of the region. Among
those who attended the frequent gatherings were Khalil Mutran, Abbas Mahmud Al-̕Aqqad,
the Azharite Shaykh Mustafa ̕Abd al-Raziq, Shibli Shumayyil, Ya̕qub Sarruf, Antoine AlJumayyil, owner of Al-Zuhour, Taha Hussein, Nile poet Hafez Ibrahim and the “Prince of
Arab Poets,” Ahmad Shawqi.416
Unveiling and Veiling
In March 1928, Nazira Zeineddine, a 20-year-old urbanized Druze daughter of judge
Said Bey Zeineddine, a scholar of Islamic religion and jurisprudence and the first
President of the High Court of Appeals in Beirut, published a book of legal and
theological scholarship entitled Unveiling and Veiling (al-Sufur wa al-hijab).417 In this
book, which landed like a bombshell and attracted hostile criticism and supporters at
the same time, Zeineddine articulated her radical views on issues of Islamic law and
condemned the veil, which was still widespread in Lebanon and the rest of
geographical Syria and worn primarily by urban and elite rural women. In her
opinion, the veil was not Islamic but a holdover from pre-Islamic times. She argued
that “women’s veiling (hijab) violated the spiritual message of Islam, which generally
favoured equal rights between men and women”.418 In her opinion, the veil
dehumanized women, rendered them “invisible and deprived them of value and
basic human rights”.419 It prevents women from entering fully into the life of the
community and contributing to its progress. Nazira, it must be noted, grew up in an
intellectual environment, attending a variety of French and Catholic schools and
colleges. She received the best secular education and at home she studied Islamic
scriptures with her father who taught her the intricacies of the texts and how they
worked and encouraged her education and intellectual development. At home, she
415
Ibid., p. 378.
Al-‘Aqqad mentions the names of more than thirty personalities who were regular guests in May’s
weekly Tuesday salon gatherings. See Abas Mahmud al-Aqqad, Rijal ‘Araftuhum. Cairo 1963, p. 162.
See also Ziegler, Antje, “May Ziadeh Rediscovered”, http://leb.net/isis/z/ziegler.html, (originally
published May 1997).
417
Zeineddine, Nazira 1998 (1928). Al-Sufur wa al-hijab. Muhadarat wa nazarat fi tahrir al-mar’a wa altajaddud al-ijtima’i fi al-‘alam al-islami (Unveiling and Veiling. Lectures and Views concerning the
Liberation of Women and Social Renewal in the Islamic World). Introduction by Bouthaina Shaaban.
Damascus: Dar al-Mada.
418
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000, p. 127.
419
Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2010, p.
46.
416
88
met and debated learned men, especially religious scholars, whom she impressed
by her clear intellect and knowledge. Nazira read women’s journals and was
acquainted with feminist writers such as the Lebanese–Palestinian May Ziyadeh
(1886 – 1941) and Egyptian Malak Hifni Nasif (1886 -1918), known by her pen
name, Bahithat al-Badiya (Searcher in the desert), who argued that women should
be educated in order to further their own personal development.420 She was also
influenced by modernist reformers, particularly by the author of The Liberation of
Women (1899): Qasim Amin, who had said that Islam demands the use of reason
and who attacked the conservative and religiously trained ‘ulama, characterizing
them as “grossly ignorant, greedy, and lazy” and take no interest in the intellectual
sciences.421 In fact, to prove that the veil is an insult to men and women, Nazira
quoted Amin and asked God to be merciful to him and to bless his pen. She wrote:
It [the veil] greatly harms the two sexes that every man continues to insult his
mother, daughter, wife, and sister, suspiciously accusing them of bad morals
and keeping them confined to a cage, as the venerable Qasim Amin said,
‘With their wings cut off, heads bent down, and eyes closed. For him (man) is
freedom and for them (women) enslavement. For him is education and for
them ignorance. For him is sound reasoning and for them inferior reasoning.
For him is light and open space and for them darkness and imprisonment. For
him are orders and for them obedience and patience. For him is everything in
the universe and for them part of the whole he has captured.’ 422
Zeineddine appealed publicly to the French High Commissioner Henri Ponsot to
“save the weakened Muslim woman and lift her from the dark abyss of slavery where
she was arbitrarily plunged, contrary to the Book of God”.423 Zeineddine deplored the
ulama’s monopoly on personal status law and explicitly called for the precedence of
civil law over religious law in issues of the veil and personal status. She labelled the
ulama [the shaykhs] as “obstinate” and “mafia” that was so self-satisfied that nothing
could shake their convictions “even if Eve their foremother and the Virgin Mary were
to appear before them with their faces uncovered as proof that women should not
veil they would not believe”.424 In her open letter she pleaded for the French High
Commissioner’s help in assuring the shaykhs that the veil was a social and not a
religious matter. She urged the French to support “poor Muslim women who have
been treated in a way that contradicts the Book of God, the Sunna of his Prophet,
the rule of reason and the norms of society”. 425 She summarized her book’s
implications for the state’s social and political policy:
That men and women should mix socially because it would foster moral
progress; that both sexes should be educated together and at the same level;
that Islam calls for democratic government, meaning that both men and
420
Malak Hifni Nasif, a poet and writer, was the daughter of an Egyptian intellectual associated with
Muhammad Abduh’s circle who held important government posts and taught in institutions of higher
education [al-Azhar University].
421
Ahmed, Leila. Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate, op. cit., p. 156.
422
See an extract by Nazira zeineddine titled “Unveiling and Veiling: on the Liberation of the Woman and Social
renewal in the Islamic World”, in Badran, Margot & Cooke, Miriam (eds) Opening the Gates: A Century of Arab
Feminist Writing, London: Virago Press, 1990, p. 275.
423
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens, op. Cit., p. 132.
424
Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, op. cit., p. 47.
425
Ibid., p. 74.
89
women should participate in it and vote; that, in the same democratic spirit,
male and female Muslims must be free to study the Qur’an themselves, and
not be bound by the interpretations of an official and oppressive class of
conservative ulama; and that the Qur’an recommends clothing that is most
appropriate for the well-being of all Muslims, regardless of whether it is worn
also by non-Muslims.426
Zeineddine followed the footsteps of Aisha al-Taymuriya (1840-1902)427, Qasim
Amin428, and other Arab reformists by championing women’s rights and their
inclusion in public space. To her, the seclusion of women undermines a whole
society. Her clear message was that “no society can progress while its women are
not respected and their rights are not protected”.429 For her, “women are not deficient
in reason and religion before covering their faces, only afterwards”. 430 They “are
inherently rational and pious”.431 As evident in many verses and quotations of the
Qur’an and Traditions, Nazira affirmed, “men and women were equal in every way
and above all in intellect”.432 In line with the Druze faith, it must be noted, Nazira
believed in the supremacy of ‘aql, intellect or reason, and considered it as “essential
to the humanness of all human beings”.433
Zeineddine’s book was a phenomenon and seen “as part of the dialogue about
culture, religion, society, and politics in the middle east that emerged at the end of
the nineteenth century and focused in many ways on gender roles.” 434 The book was
welcomed by prominent personalities and hailed as an inspiration to action. It was
reprinted within two months and translated into several languages within a year.
However, it ignited a heated debate that lasted for about two years. It received praise
and condemnation in the Arab press as well as in newspapers and magazines from
South America, the United States, India, Brazil, Argentina, and Europe. The Sunni
scholar, Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, later to become Lebanon’s prime minister, urged young
women “to uncover their faces and to take part in the awakening launched by the
"Zeineddine girl” whose valuable book provided guidance, not evil”.435 The Syrian
Prime Minister Taj al-Din al-Hasani wrote Nazira a note in which he thanked her for
sending him this “unique and precious gift that I will cherish as the best reminder of
your grace, literary skill and praiseworthy effort expended on behalf of the progress
of women”.436 The Egyptian king Fu’ad congratulated her and sent her a poem
426
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens, op. Cit., p. 132.
427
‘A’isha Taymur was a distinguished poet of nineteenth-century Egypt. She was a member of the TurkishEgyptian upper class. From 1872 to 1878, she acted as a court translator and companion to royal female guests
from Persia. Egypt was then under the rule of Khedivectyz Ismail. In 1874, ‘A’isha published a work, Mi’rat alta’amul, criticizing the conduct of upper-class men toward their wives. She is considered by some the first to
raise the idea of gender equality.
428
Egyptian reformer and lawyer known for his advocacy of women’s emancipation and hailed as the “father
of Egyptian feminism”.
429
Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, op. cit., p. 55.
430
Ibid.
431
Ibid.
432
Ibid., p. 57.
433
Ibid., p. 37.
434
Khater, Akram Fouad. Sources in the History of the Modern Middle East, op. Cit., p. 100.
435
Quoted in Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, op. cit., p. 46.
436
Quoted in ibid., p. 60.
90
entitled “The Voice of Truth”.437 Similarly, the Egyptian women’s movement
magazine hailed the book. The feminist activist Huda Shaˊarawi thanked her for “this
impassioned cry for the liberation of women... Our sex is honoured and made proud
by the likes of you”.438 One described Unveiling and Veiling as containing “a
cannonball shot at the army of darkness, the army of backwardness, and she will
have a huge influence on the leadership of that army.” 439 Another addressed Nazira:
“you did not bring new weapons; rather you fought them with their own weapons.” 440
Several labelled her as a mujahida for her fight against the Muslim woman’s veil.
Hostile reviews saw the book as a criticism of mainstream Sunni Islam. The Mufti of
Beirut had privately promised Nazira to be her ally and sent her a signed poem of
praise.441 However, after the publication of the book, he published a refutation
(Legality of the Veil) in which he condemned Zeineddine’s scholarly effort and her call
for unveiling: “The call to lift the veil is a call to wickedness” and is a “bad innovation”
made by “modern women who smash the pillars of chastity and honour”442 Shaykh
Mustafa al-Ghalayini (1886 – 1944), a professor at the Islamic College of Beirut was
a vigorous opponent to Zeineddine and her greatest critic. In July 1928, he published
a book-length refutation entitled Views on the book “Attributed to Miss Nazira
Zeineddine” in which he claimed that it was not Miss Nazira who had written Unveiling
and Veiling but rather a team of men.443 He talked about her connections to the
French and accused her of treason, of being the dupe of a foreign conspiracy to
make Muslims doubt their religion, their history and their social and national life. To
save Islamic religion, Ghalayini urged women to obey the dictates of official
interpretations of Islam and to restrict their lives to their private homes and
families.444
Nazira did not keep quit. Within less than a year, she published another book,
entitled The Girl and the Shaykhs: Views and Debates about “Unveiling and Veiling” and
the Liberation of the Intellect and the Liberation of Women and Social Renewal in the
Islamic World (1929). The book, dedicated to women in general, contained extracts
from the numerous reactions and reviews and many words of praise she had
received for her first book. Nazira’s purpose of the book was to refute the religious
authorities, particularly Shaykh al-Ghalayini’s accusations, to dissect their critiques of
her book, and to contest their misleading claims about what she had written.
Opinions concerning the veil polarized between secular nationalists and religious
populists. Some women voiced their opinions in magazines praising Zeineddine for
her courageous stance against “reactionaries”. They saw the veil as a sign or rather
the cause of backwardness. Others saw the veil as a bulwark of Islamic culture and
rejected any change in Islamic law. They believed that Islamic law granted women all
the rights they need. The trauma of the veil was not felt more deeply in Egypt and
Turkey, where it was well on the way to disappearing, more than in Syria and
Lebanon.
437
Ibid., p. 64.
Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, op. cit., p. 64.
439
Ibid., p. 80.
440
Ibid.
441
Ibid., p. 66.
442
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens, op. Cit., p. 133
443
Cooke, Miriam. Nazira Zeineddine: A Pioneer of Islamic Feminism, op. cit., p. 69.
444
Thompson, Elizabeth. Colonial Citizens, op. Cit., p. 134.
438
91
Conservative shaykhs attacked Nazira and her writings and advocates of unveiling.
The bookstores that sold her books were targeted. Syrian clergymen (shaykhs)
called for mandatory veiling. In early 1928 mosque preachers in Damascus launched
a strong campaign against unveiling. While, newspapers maintained silence on this
issue, Islamic populists mounted violent attacks upon unveiled women. In repeated
incidents, “men threw acid upon elite women who were deemed insufficiently
covered or who wore European-style clothing”.445 Similar incidents occurred in
Lebanese towns where “men attacked women with acid, razor blades, and iron
prongs for not veiling sufficiently”.446
While some secular nationalists continued to support Zeineddine and unveiling,
many rallied to the opposition. Some reformers decided to withdraw from discussing
this question for a time. The calls for legal reforms by Nazira Zeineddine and other
women’s groups were doomed. One author summarized the outcome:
Women’s campaigns for suffrage and legal reforms failed, and both
nationalists and the French sacrificed women’s rights to cooperation with
powerful politicians and religious patriarchs. In Lebanon control of
personal status was given to the courts of the multiple religious
denominations, where it remains.447
445
Ibid., p. 136.
Ibid., 136.
447
Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East – Past and Present, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 2007, p. 96.
446
92
VI
Change with the SSNP
Was Antun Sa’adeh concerned with the women question? Did he fight against the
discrimination of women? Did he promote their emancipation? And to what extent
has his ideology contributed to social and cultural transformations in women’s lives?
In order to answer these questions, we need to look at what occupied Sa’adeh
throughout his career? Certainly, the women question, if it occupied his mind, was
not his main concern. His main pre-occupation was the revival of his entire Syrian
nation. Thus, in order to understand his concern vis-à-vis women, we must look at
his national project on the whole and his aims as far as his nation are concerned. In
the light of understanding his overall aim and objectives, we may be able to assess
his position vis-à-vis women.
Born in 1904, Antun Sa’adeh grew up in a highly cultured family and in a village that
had a reasonably active intellectual life and a comparatively highly educated
population. Influenced by his immediate social milieu and the political circumstances
of the time, which were coloured by the devastating World War I, Sa’adeh looked
internally for solutions to perceived social, cultural, and political ills existing in his
society. To him, the main issue in his fragmented and subjugated country was the
loss and confusion of national identity and the absence of any political unity and
aspirations for political strength and for a better life.
Sa’adeh’s aim was to lead his society towards a just, good and beautiful life. He
says: “We are not like those who direct their attention to the beyond existence.
Rather, we are like those who aspire by their own nature to achieve a beautiful and
sublime existence in this life and to ensure the continuity of this life as beautiful and
sublime.”448 This he wanted to achieve by raising his people to higher levels of
morality and values such as liberty, justice, right, goodness, duty, responsibility, and
equality. This vision of Sa’adeh was not easy to achieve in a society full of social
problems and psychological hurdles. The situation was so irremediable taking into
consideration the existing maladies such as sectarianism, communal disharmony,
religious fanaticism, tribalism, feudalism, corruption, exploitation, discrimination, fear,
submission, and conflicting traditions, to name a few. Sa’adeh’s solution was simple:
to replace the existing order by a new system delivered by a national party void of
discrimination. This solution is illustrated by Adel Beshara:
The plan was simple enough: to take on the might of the existing order
through a ‘Party’ of devoted, dedicated, selfless, even puritan men and
women, united in a common cause. It was no easy task by any stretch
of the imagination, but the power of Sa'adeh's thought, his single
mindedness of purpose, and the trenchancy of his analyses carried the
day through. The idea grew into a vision, the vision into a party, and
the party into a living organ. Not a lifeless dogma, but a vision for
action. After that there was no turning back. Everything else was now
trifles, hypocrisy, and “parson’s talk”. Victory was the only
commandment to observe.449
448
449
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr (The Ten Lectures) (Beirut: SSNP, 1976), p. 107.
Beshara, Adel. “Will the Real Antun Sa’adeh Please Step Forward!”, in Al-Mashriq, Vol 10, No 37, June 2011,
93
In his speech of June 1, 1935, Sa’adeh articulated in clear terms his party’s basic
strategy and aim. Firstly, he defined his party as “an idea and a movement
concerned with the life of a nation in its entirety”.450 By this definition, Sa’adeh wants
us to know that his party is not concerned with a particular group of society, be it
religious, family, class or any other partial group of society. Rather, it is a party for
the whole Syrian nation as evident in its aim and principles, which address all
Syrians on an equal basis. Secondly, Sa’adeh explains that “in this important work
we shall meet many difficulties, internal and external, which we must overcome,
beginning with the first, namely the internal, because we cannot overcome the
external difficulties completely except after having conquered the internal ones”.451
Among the internal difficulties he refers to the “decadent beliefs” and “conflicting
traditions” and the effect of these in resisting the national unity of the people. Adel
Beshara describes the outdated beliefs and Syria’s state of affairs:
The Syria that Sa’adeh addressed was heir to an antiquated beliefsystem whose main elements were confessionalism, clannism,
tribalism and other forms of primordial loyalties all wrapped up in a
doctrine derived from several conflicting sources. Within the framework
of this doctrine, almost every facet of Syrian society had remained
stagnant, that is until its exposure to Western ideas and values during
the nineteenth century, which, however, created more confusion.452
Sa’adeh aimed to eradicate the social maladies, corrupt principles and the chaos
that were responsible for his people’s distressing state: “We are a movement that is
on the offensive; we are a movement that has introduced new teachings with which it
attacks the evil and chaos that are responsible for the people's present sorrowful
state”.453 He wanted to overcome the decadent beliefs and improve men and
women’s lives and their social, political and economic situations. Men and women,
according to Sa’adeh, are victims of the existing situation of his nation. They both
suffer from the same social, legal and political conditions and both endure
discrimination, oppression and injustice. Backwardness, fragmentation and decadent
beliefs are not confined to a particular social group, but are affecting the whole
society. Therefore, Sa’adeh declares:
That the Syrian Social Nationalist party has found a means of
overcoming these difficulties by its system (nizam) which breaks down
both the traditions that oppose the unity of the nation and individual
psychologies which oppose the psychological individuality of the
nation.454
Sa’adeh, unlike Qassim Amin, was not a mere advocate of women’s emancipation.
Rather, he was a national reformer on all levels and concerned with the cause of the
entire nation and its liberation from external and internal threats. The individual, be it
pp. 78 – 79.
450
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 30.
451
Ibid., p. 31.
452
Beshara, Adel (ed). The Origins of Syrian Nationhood, op. cit., p. 357.
453
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 24.
454
Ibid., p. 31.
94
a male or female, was to be freed from traditional constraints and to find liberty and
realization through the nation and specifically through an open and modern society;
a society that strives for knowledge, justice, freedom and peace and that fights
oppression and injustice.455 Sa’adeh’s solution, therefore, does not address women
in isolation. Rather it targets the whole society and seeks the general good and
welfare of all its members. It aims to free his nation from colonialism; to create a
secular and democratic state void of oppression and discrimination of any kind; and
to change the pattern of the social, economic and political life of his people. On many
occasions Sa’adeh reiterated his position that principles exist for the sake of peoples
and to assist society and improve its life.456 He also emphasized that his goal is to
“cater to the interests of his people”457 and “to work for the public good within a
peaceful and free context”458 for “life and its beauty, goodness and loveliness are the
ultimate end.”459 Hence, it can be safely maintained that the SSNP is an agent of
change that aims to generate through its national doctrine a sense of national
consciousness that would be essential for the complete crystallization of the nation
and that would lead to its national renaissance. The aim of the national renaissance
is to improve the lives of all Syrians and lead to the welfare and modernization of
their society.
Without the national consciousness, which is a feeling of the unity of national life and
national destiny, the nation may face adverse consequences. In this regard,
Professor Nassif Nassar asserts: “If this feeling is absent or stagnant, the nation’s
personality will suffer and its ability to express its will, rights and interests will be
greatly diminished.”460 To Sa’adeh, “one of the major factors in the absence of Syrian
national consciousness or its weakness is the overlooking of the genuine character
of the Syrian nation as manifested in the intellectual and practical contributions of its
people and their cultural achievements.”461 Therefore, the process of national revival
must derive its inspiration from Syria’s great past and its contributions to human
civilization.
Furthermore, Sa’adeh’s solution envisages men and women to be empowered not
only by national consciousness but also by knowledge and to be engaged and
participants in production. Sa’adeh says: “Every citizen should be productive in one
way or another.”462 He adds:
The aim of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party is the achievement of a
sound national unity which enables the Syrian nation to excel in the
struggle for existence. This unity cannot be realized if either the
economic or social order is not sufficiently wholesome. Justice in the
455
See Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The Man, His
Thought – An Anthology (UK: Ithaca, 2007), p. 533.
456
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., pp. 37 – 38.
457
Sa’adeh, Antun. Al-Athar al-Kamilah - 1938 (Complete Works), vol. 4, Beirut: Fikr, 1980, p. 38.
458
Sa’adeh, Antun. Al-Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works), vol. 1 (1921 – 1931), Beirut: SSNP Information
Bureau, 2nd edition, 1982, p. 342.
459
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 173.
460
Nassar, Nassif. “sa’adeh and the concept of Regional Nationalism”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The
Man, His Thought – An Anthology (UK: Ithaca, 2007), p. 32.
461
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 78.
462
Ibid., p. 140.
95
judicial, social and economic spheres is an essential condition for the
triumph of the Syrian Social Nationalist Movement.463
A question arises: What are the foundations of the new society as envisaged by
Sa’adeh? The answer to this question lies in the basic and reform principles as well
as in the aim of the SSNP, which was founded to effect a national revival and to
serve a fundamental, complete and never-ending cause, that is, the cause of the life
of [Syrian] society and its continuity and progress towards the better and most
beautiful. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to outline the aim and principles of
the SSNP. However, their essence will be summarized under five headings: National
unity, social unity, equality, secularism and democracy.
1- National unity:
The first basic foundation of Sa’adeh’s new society rests on the grounds of national
unity, which embraces not just a political integration but the whole life of the
community – economic, social, cultural and political. It entails that Syria, as a distinct
geographical unit, is for the Syrians (men and women) and that its unique cause,
which represents the interests of the social community, is an integral national cause
completely distinct from any other cause. According to Sa’adeh, the Syrian nation
denotes a single unified society living in a distinguished natural environment known
historically as Syria, or as the Arabs, who were conscious of its internal unity and
being one geographical unit, named it, the Fertile Crescent.464 The Syrian people are
the final outcome of a process of interaction among all the groups and stocks that
settled in the Syrian environment and interacted with it throughout a long history. 465
This principle, as asserted by Sa’adeh, is not based on race or blood, but rather on
the natural social unity derived from homogeneous intermixing. In fact, Sa’adeh
believes that “all civilised nations are a mixture of races and the idea of pure blood
ties, besides being “a myth with no truth to it in any nation whatsoever” is a barbaric
form of loyalty.”466
The unity of the nation is achieved through the organic correlation between the
nation (the people) and its homeland. “It is within the national territory that the unity
of national life and participation in its activities, interests and aims are attained”,
Sa’adeh contends.467 The spiritual unity of the social national life of all the groups
who settled in the Syrian environment and interacted with it, is the force that creates
the nation to which alone loyalty should be pledged. Without this spiritual unity the
nation might be subjected to foreign intervention and exploitation and “might fall an
easy prey to the intrigues of some other sovereign power pursuing interests
conflicting with, or that might conflict with, the interests of the Syrian people.”468
Spiritual unity, moreover, strengthens the national unity of the nation because it
463
Antun Sa´adeh, The aim and principles of The Syrian Social Nationalist Party, Beirut: SSNP, 1981, p. 81.
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 67.
465
Sa´adeh believes that “the common stocks, Cana´anites, Chaldeans, Arameans, Assyrians, Amorites, Hittites,
Metanni and Akkadians, etc..., whose blending is an indisputable historical fact constitute the ethnic-historicalcultural-psychological basis of Syria’s unity whereas the Syrian Fertile Crescent constitutes the geographiceconomic-strategic basis of this unity.” See ibid.
466
Sethian, Robert D. “Sa’adeh and Syrian Nationalism”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The Man, His
Thought – An Anthology, UK: Ithaca, 2007, p. 91.
467
Antun Sa´adeh, Nushu’ al-Umam (the genesis of Nations), Beirut: Dar Fikr, 1978, p. 157.
468
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 54.
464
96
welds together its ethnic and religious groups and assimilates the various
immigrants. As one author puts it:
A strong spiritual unity must unite the entire nation for the development of its
own spirit, temperament and genius. This entails the removal of all causes of
dissension and the breaking down of barriers among the different sects. It
also involves the assimilation by the nation of “immigrants who are
homogeneous with the original Syrian composite” and who, after the passing
of sufficient time, “may dissolve in the nation and lose their special
bigotries”469
The existence of different minorities and their differentiations represent a great
obstacle to the unification of Syria. One researcher has noted: “The various groups
have formed the habit of thinking of themselves as Kurds, Druzes, Circassians,
Armenians, Assyrians, Alawites, Maronites – indeed, as anything else but
Syrians.”470 This tendency was encouraged by the successive dominating and
Mandatory powers by giving the various groups administrative recognition and by
expressing a clear consideration for “protecting the minorities”. As a result, “the
protection of minority rights became a favoured concept of the League of Nations,
and the Mandatory justified its policy of partition and division as a necessary
measure for the guaranteeing of these rights.”471 Sa’adeh’s solution was to foster a
common life among the various groups and minorities and to create “a strong, unified
national spirit to ensure the establishment of the necessary loyalty for cooperation in
the cause of the rights of the nation and the defence of its welfare.”472
2- Social unity:
The Syrian nation, Sa’adeh maintains, is one society.473 This constitutes a basic
principle of the SSNP and is supplementary to national unity. The absence of social
unity entails the absence of common interests and the spread of conflicting loyalties
and negative attitudes. On the contrary, “through social unity, the conflict of loyalties
and harmful attitudes will disappear to be replaced by a single healthy national
loyalty ensuring the revival of the nation.”474 Unfortunately, people in Syria have
been divided and subdivided into different groups under the influence of foreign
interference and missionary, of the temporal power of the clergy and their desire to
maintain their position, and of sectarian differentiation, fear and loyalties. One
researcher has observed:
Each group has developed its own interests, and considers its problems as its
own distinct and separate from others. This peculiar form of isolationism has
prevented the various sections of the population from developing a strong
469
Sethian, Robert D. “Sa’adeh and Syrian Nationalism”, op. cit., p. 93. See also Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat
al-’Ashr, op. cit., p. 69.
470
Ibid., p. 93.
471
Ibid.
472
Ibid., p. 113.
473
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr, op. cit., pp. 99 – 101.
474
Ibid., p.
97
feeling of solidarity, from emerging an allegiance superior to their immediate
group loyalty.475
Sa’adeh upholds the unity of the whole society by eliminating any divisions, negative
attitudes and “breaking away” tendencies adopted by any of the religious and ethnic
variety in Syria and by disallowing the isolation, separation and persecution of any
religious, social and political group in society. According to his principles, there
should be no oppression to any ethnic, linguistic or religious minority, nor be any
exclusion of any social group, including women, from the political and social life of
the nation. “Forcing minority groups to submit to the majority is the act of individuals
who are completely ignorant of the principles of the rise of nations.”476 Instead,
constant dialogue, national collaboration, mutual trust and tolerance should prevail
and a sense of national concord and unity should be generated within society to
ensure its progress and integrity. Sa’adeh asserts that “internal tolerance is at the
basis of every society that does not want to decline.”477 This principle, Sa’adeh adds,
is similar to Jesus’ preaching love to avoid disintegration as “every kingdom is split
into parts ends in dissolution and every house falls apart collapses.”478 The
justification of this principle is evident, according to Sa’adeh, in “the success of the
European and American nations that was the result of their following the teachings of
Jesus who stressed the qualities of compassion and leniency. Islam, in turn,
reiterated those two qualities in the Qur’an and the Hadith.”479 Thus, all citizens and
ethnic or religious groups within society must unite and cooperate together in the
name of the national interest, which supersedes every other interest. After all, there
could be no democracy in society without a national unity. The national society, as
envisaged by Sa’adeh, must principally be characterized by its genuine unity,
tolerance and social cohesion.
3- Equality:
Sa’adeh refused to allow the various religious laws known as the Personal status
laws prevailing in Lebanon and other entities of the Fertile Crescent to dictate the
lives of individuals. He also refused the interference of religious clergy and
institutions to interfere in socio-political matters. This stance of Sa’adeh does not
imply that he was anti-religious:
Religion recognizes no national interests, because it is concerned with a
community of believers dominated by a central religious authority. In this
respect, religion is transformed into a temporal, political and administrative
affair, control over which is monopolized by a sacred religious body. This is
the primitive aspect of religion which was suited to the barbaric or semibarbaric state of mankind in olden times; but is no longer suited to modern
civilized life. It is this aspect of religion that the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
475
Sethian, Robert D. “Sa’adeh and Syrian Nationalism”, op. cit., p. 110.
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol. 8, p. 19.
477
Ibid., vol. 9, p. 157.
478
Ibid.
479
Ibid., pp. 158 – 159.
476
98
is combating, not the theological or philosophical ideals pertaining to the
mysteries of the soul and of immortality, the creator and the supernatural. 480
In order for equality to prevail in society, the existing sectarian laws that divide
citizens and treat them differently must be thrown away and replaced by a uniform
civil law emanating from a collective will, not from a transcendental will or from any
authority established by divine right. To him, all citizens should be equal before the
law and should enjoy civil, political and social rights regardless of their wealth,
status, gender or religious affiliation. “They all should be considered equal within the
nation, with equal rights and duties”.481
Social unity represents the foundation for a national state with a uniform civil
legislation. It forms the basis for citizenship and the guarantee of the equality of
rights for all citizens. Moreover, through the principle of equality, the various ethnic
and religious groups would be levelled and there would be no domination of an
ethnic/religious majority over other minorities in the state. In his explanation of the
first reform principle, Sa’adeh argues:
National unity cannot be achieved by making the state a religious one
because in such a state rights and interests would be denominational in
nature pertaining exclusively to the dominant religious group. Where such
rights and interests are those of a religious group, common national rights
and interests will not materialize. Without the community of interests and
rights there can be no unity of duties and no unified national will. 482
Sa’adeh adds, “on the basis of this legal national philosophy, the SSNP has
succeeded in laying down the foundations of national unity and in actually realizing it
within its ranks.”483
From this it can be inferred that the SSNP considers every citizen a member in the
national democratic state and every citizen is a full citizen. It does not favour men
over women. It treats both equally and as full members of society. Article 9 of its
constitution stipulates that “every Syrian man or woman may be admitted to
membership in the Syrian national Party upon the fulfilment of the following
qualifications:
a)
b)
c)
d)
That he or she is over 18 years of age.
That he or she is not over 40 years of age, unless by special permission.
That he or she is not a criminal against society or against the nation.
That he or she embraces Syrian nationalism and accepts the principles of the
Syrian National party and its discipline.
e) That he or she is prepared to take the oath of membership and abide by it”.
There is no single article or clause in the constitution of the SSNP or in any of its
rules and regulations that discriminates between men and women. All articles of the
constitution refer to all Syrians and address all members of the party regardless of
480
Quoted in Sethian, Robert D. “Sa’adeh and Syrian Nationalism”, op. cit., p. 102. See also Antun Sa´adeh, AlMuhadarat al-’Ashr (The Ten Lectures), op. cit., pp. 122 - 123.
481
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 9, p. 280.
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr (The Ten Lectures), op. cit., p. 125.
483
Ibid.
482
99
their sexes. Indeed, since its inception, the SSNP treated women as equal members
to men and allowed them to hold positions of responsibility.
4- Secularism:
Sa’adeh’s intellectual discourse and his practical approach are definitely secular.
The man is recognized as the founder of a secular movement per excellence, although
he rarely used the word “secularism”. “Just as he avoided political classification such
as “the Right” and “the Left”, Rabee’h Debs notes, “similarly he might have preferred
not to adopt the word “secularism” in order to emphasize cultural independence not
only in concepts but in language as well.”484
Sa’adeh’s secularism is evident in almost all of his writings as well as in his views of
life as a whole. It constitutes an integral part of his philosophy of Syrian nationalism
and a solid foundation of his proposed social national state. Its issues occupied his
mind throughout his career. In his discourse, he tackled matters related to the
question of secularism and how to advance it in his society, which is characterized
by religious pluralism. As Professor Daher asserts:
There is no problem pertaining to secularism and its implementation in
his own society that he did not tackle, whether it is posed by the nature
of religion or the nature of values, whether it arises on the level of
theory or the level of practice, whether it is of a socio-political or
philosophical nature.485
Hence, it can be safely maintained that as a social reformer, he laid down the
foundations of national unity by advocating a complete process of secularism, based
on a rational and unified system of laws. This process is concerned with the basic
foundations of society and not limited to a particular aspect of its life. It involves:
1- The separation of religion from the state;
2- Debarring the clergy from interference in political and judicial matters; and
3- Removal of the existing barriers between the various sects and confessions.
Sa´adeh’s secularism, accordingly, separates politics from religion and aims to build
a national state on modern non-religious bases. The reason is simple: “Theocracy or
the religious state is incompatible with nationhood because it stands for the
domination of the whole community of believers by an ecclesiastical authority, such
as the Papacy or the Caliphate.”486 Another is this: “When there is no separation
between religion and state the government rules in the name of God not of the
people.”487 Moreover, with a political system based on sectarianism, society is led to
fragmentation, hatred and futile civil wars: “we have suffered clearly from hatreds,
but they were the hatreds of a sect against another sect..”488
Some Muslim traditionalists believe that secularism is foreign to Islam and has no
place in the life of a Muslim. As the Lebanese Council of ‘Ulama declared in 1976:
484
Rabee’h Debs, “Secularism in Sa´adeh’s Thought”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The Man, His Thought – An
Anthology, UK: Ithaca, 2007, p. 326.
485
Daher, Adel. “Some Distinguishing Aspects of Sa’adeh’s Thought”, in Beshara, Adel (ed) Anutn Sa’adeh: The
Man, His Thought – An Anthology, op. cit., p. 284.
486
Antun Sa´adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-’Ashr (The Ten Lectures), op. cit., p. 122.
487
Ibid., p. 120.
488
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol. 8, p. 29.
100
“Secularism is a system of principles and practices rejecting every form of religious
faith and worship.”489 To enlightened people, however, secularism is not a borrowed
concept from the West, but it has genuinely emerged out of and in response to
urgent needs in a pluralistic society such as Lebanon. As Professor Halim Barakat
asserts:
Secularism is not necessarily atheistic or anti-religious. On the contrary, it
may contribute to the creation of a better climate for the development of
greater spiritual purity when religion is outside the arena of power politics.
Instead of being used as a tool of control and instigation or reconciliation,
religion could pursue the more enriching enterprise of achieving its central
sublime goals.490
Sa´adeh’s secularism is not an alien product or an imitation of foreign secular
modes which eliminate religion and promote atheism, or try to restrict religion to the
private sphere while recognising the existence of a ‘god’ that has no say in people’s
worldly affairs. On the contrary, it is an indigenous trend rooted in the cultural
heritage of Syria and its desire to free itself from foreign rule and overcome its social
and political fragmentation. It follows the footsteps of early nationalists of the Nahda
period, who espoused secularism for the sake of national unity. In his “nationalist
writings”, Amin Rihani rejected the sectarian idea and called for its replacement with
the nationalist idea, warning against the partition of Syria. He identified himself as
“Syrian first, Lebanese second, Maronite third...” He declared:
I am [a] Syrian who ... wishes to see a constitutional decentralized
government in Syria who believes in the separation of religion from politics
because I realize that the obstacle to national unity is religious
partisanship.491
Similarly, Butrus al-Bustani, who founded his own school: Al-Madrassa al-wataniyya
on national principles, called for replacement of sectarianism with nationalism. In his
Nafir Surriyya, he promoted the cause of secularism, stating:
As long as our people do not distinguish between religion, which ought to be
a relationship between the believer and his creator, and civilizations, which
represent relationships between fellow citizens and government ... and do not
draw a dividing line between these two contrasting principles... it is not [to
be] expected they will succeed in either or both of them together.492
From his part, Shibli Shumayyil (1850 – 1917), a graduate from the Syrian
Protestant College and reputed to have first introduced the theories of Darwin to the
Arab world through his writings in Al-Muqtataf, “saw science as the key to unlock the
secret of the universe” and believed that social unity “involved the separation of
religion from political life since religion was a cause of division.” 493 Farah Antun
91874 – 1922), who migrated from Tripoli to Cairo in 1897 and was influenced by
the works of Ernest Renan, propagated his ideas through a study of the twelfth489
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 138.
Ibid., 143.
491
Quoted in ibid., p. 253.
492
Quoted in ibid., p. 247.
493
Tamimi, Azzam. “The Origins of Arab Secularism”, in Tamimi, Azzam & Esposito, John L. (eds) Islam and
Secularism in the Middle East, London: Hurst & Company, 2000, pp. 22 - 23.
490
101
century great philosopher of Islam: Ibn Rusd; known in the West as Averroes. Like
that of Shumayyil and other Syrian modernists of the time, his aim was “to lay the
intellectual foundations of a secular state in which Muslims and Christians could
participate on a footing of complete equality.”494 Thus, he took the effort to prove the
invalidity of what he termed ‘the inessential part of religion’: the body of laws. He
also argued that science and religion should each be assigned to its proper sphere.
In fact, since the Nahda period, many Egyptian and Syrian intellectuals exposed to
European culture and impressed by the accomplishments of Europe, such as Rifaˊat
al-Tahtawi, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi, Ya’coub Sarrouf, Salama Musa, Nimr
Faris, Jurji Zaydan, Nicola Haddad, Gibran Khalil Gibran and several admirers of the
West have adopted secularism and worked for national unity while the West aimed
at fragmentation of the Arab world. In actual fact, it was not until the middle of the
nineteenth century that secularism entered the intellectual debate in the Arab world,
which began to witness “gradual intellectual, social and political changes as a result
of the impression left by the modes of thought and conduct brought to the area by
the Western colonialists.”495
Sa’adeh’s secularism, therefore, is a genuine trend that respects religion and
freedom of religious beliefs and considers all citizens as equals before the unified
law of the state. Sa’adeh declares: “Our attack on religious factionalism of any sect
is not an attack on religion itself or on anything related to religious beliefs. Each
individual is free in his beliefs, but we aim to keep religion far away from sociopolitical matters, which should remain subject to change depending on the needs of
the nation.”496 Religion, in his opinion, must be banished from the realm of worldly
affairs and confined to spiritual matters (in a religious sense), worship and the
salvation of man’s soul. Similarly, the clergy should have no dealing with the social,
political and economic problems of the state as their religious knowledge does not
allow them to contribute to the solution of our worldly problems. Instead, they should
only address matters related to the province of faith and worship, to man’s religious
duties and to spiritual salvation, and they provide guidance to those who seek it from
them. He says:
For the clergy to deal today with the social, political and economic problems
of nation-states would be like the clergy attempting, in old times - when the
cleric was thought to possess a mysterious power over matter and spirit,
originated from the ignorance of those primordial generations, to cure
physical and psychological ailments. But as the advance of the art of medicine
made it impossible for the magician cleric to take the place of the expert
doctor... likewise the advance of sociology and the art of politics made it
impossible for a bishop or patriarch to take the place of a sociologist or an
expert on politics or economics.497
494
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 16.
496
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 10, pp. 16 - 17.
497
Sa’adeh, Antun. Al-Mas’alah al-Lubnaniyyah (The Lebanese Question), in Silsilat al-Nidham al-Jadid, Beirut:
SSNP Department of Culture, 1976, p. 121.
495
102
The source of legislation in the national state, according to Sa´adeh, is human
reason, which is the supreme and principal authority. God has given man this power
of recognition and comprehension, not to be paralyzed or shackled, but to think
about problems, to determine aims in life and to attain those aims. Social
nationalism, Rabee’h Debs asserts, “accepts nothing but reason and science as
laws in the temporal and practical affairs of life.”498 Hence, clergymen should not
interfere in the political affairs of the state but devote themselves to divine matters
and to preaching values.
In conclusion, Sa’adeh called for secular reform in the political and the legal-judicial
spheres and “saw secularization not only as a prop for social and spiritual unity in a
multi-religious society, but also as something sanctioned by philosophical reason.”499
He envisaged the Social National State to be free from the direct and indirect
interference of ecclesiastical bodies in civil and political matters and to have a unified
system of law so all citizens can be equal before the one law of the state regardless
of affiliations and gender. Moreover, in his torn apart society where all religious
denominations were transformed into socio-political entities competing for political
influence and for economic benefits, he conceived of the national state, firstly, “to be
neutral vis-à-vis conflicting religious creeds or religious groups”.500 Secondly, “not
only must it be neutral and refrain from making any religion its official religion, but
also it must take on the task of actively fostering religious tolerance and combating
sectarianism.”501 Full secularism is urgently needed to achieve national unity and to
secure a modern, viable, equitable and integrated society where all citizens are
united and treated equally. These goals and benefits of secularism are stressed by
Halim Barakat:
The promotion of rationality and scientific thinking, the liberation of women
from discriminatory traditions, the enhancement of modernity, the liberation
of religion itself from government control, and the democratization of the
state and other institutions should also result from the adoption of
secularism.502
5- Democracy:
Upon his return from Buenos Aires in 1947, Sa’adeh was asked by a journalist:
“What kind of a Syrian state are you striving for?” Sa’adeh replied: “a democratic,
parliamentarian and secular republic.”503 The foundations of such republic (or Syrian
State) are laid down in his reform principles and in many of his explanations.
Whatever the case, democracy, it can be said, is a basic foundation of Sa’adeh’s
new society. To him, nationalism rests on the democratic principle and the national
state is a democratic state that “exists to serve the people.”504 As he puts it: “The
democratic state is definitely a national state, since it rests, not on an external
ideology or imaginary will, but on a public will resulting from a feeling of participation
498
Rabee’h Debs, “Secularism in Sa´adeh’s Thought”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The Man, His Thought – An
Anthology, op. cit., p. 327.
499
Daher, Adel. “Some Distinguishing Aspects of Sa’adeh’s Thought”, op .cit., p. 284.
Ibid.
501
Ibid.
502
Barakat, Halim. The Arab World: Society, Culture, and State, op. cit., p. 138.
503
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 14, p. 64.
504
Ibid., vol. 3, p. 50.
500
103
in the same socio-economic life.”505 By the same token Sa’adeh reiterates: “The
democratic state is not representative of past history, or old traditions, or the will of
God, or bygone glory, but it represents the interest of the people living the same life
as manifested in the public will, in effective, not acquiescent, consensus.” 506
Sa’adeh’s democracy is grounded in the importance of human beings because,
firstly, it expresses the will and interests of the people sharing the same existence in
society. Secondly, it requires absolute trust of citizens in each other and above all in
their leaders, “for public welfare can only be achieved when the people trust their
representatives. Trust is at the heart of the democratic system.”507 Thirdly,
democracy rests on the responsibility of citizens for their nation and their will to act
conscientiously in society and to care about the public good. Fourthly, it harbours the
sovereignty of the people who should be permitted to progress freely and make their
own decisions concerning their fate.508
In Sa’adeh’s analysis, accordingly, democracy is a good system for society to run
itself because it allows people “to make decisions for themselves, freeing them from
any kind of tutelage.”509 It provides for liberty and the equal right of all citizens to be
free. It also constitutes an inseparable component of modernity and a protection
from tyranny. Sa’adeh stood against oppression prevailing in Syria and autocratic
regimes exerting censorship on the press and banning protests and demonstrations.
He founded his party to fight injustice and oppression of the people by the rulers and
the subjugation of his country by the French mandate. In 1947, he attacked the
Lebanese government for intervening so blatantly in the electoral process and
denying citizens their political rights and civil liberties:
The Lebanese administration is corrupt, for justice is manipulated by the
rulers, and the newspapers are being persecuted and shut down by the
government in a very irresponsible manner. By so doing, they are
handicapping the freedom of the voters. In addition, the government is
resorting to cheating, bribing and forging for the purpose of swaying the
electoral results in its favour. Under such conditions, both the Parliament and
the cabinet cannot claim to be representative of the people. 510
Rigged elections, Sa’adeh affirmed, “are a symptom of governments that are ruling
through means of oppression and terror.”511 Professor Sofia A. Sa’adeh summarizes
her father’s stand on civil liberties:
According to Sa’adeh, oppression of the rulers belongs to the past. Modern
movements demand freedom of speech, the freedom of the press and
freedom from arbitrary arrest, the right to organize oppositional parties, and
the right to vote in genuinely competitive elections.512
505
Antun Sa´adeh, Nushu’ al-Umam (The Genesis of Nations), English version, printed by the Cultural Department of the
SSNP: Beirut, 2004, p. 229.
506
Ibid., p. 230.
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 4, p. 137.
508
Ibid., vol 5, p. 131.
509
Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, in Adel Beshara (ed.) Antun Sa´adeh: The Man, His
Thought – An Anthology (UK: Ithaca, 2007), p. 532.
510
Quoted in ibid., p. 517. See also Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 14, p. 108.
511
Quoted in ibid.
512
Ibid., p. 516.
507
104
The best guarantee to civil liberties, according to Sa’adeh, is the capacity of the
citizens to defend their rights against possible abuse. This capacity is certainly
enhanced through education so the democratic spirit permeates every aspect of
social life. Sa’adeh does not see democracy flourishing in an illiterate society.
Hence, the education of citizens is imperative so they would be able to follow
discussions concerning public issues and make rational decisions when voting. In
addition, citizens can deal with change without fear of the unknown if they are
equipped with the necessary skills, knowledge and education. “One of the main
reasons for the establishment of his party”, as Sofia A. Sa’adeh asserts, “was to
educate citizens about their political rights. In Sa’adeh’s mind, democracy is
intimately connected with rational discourse.”513 Thus, education should develop
reason and the capacity for rational thought and action. It should also prepare
individuals to understand and acknowledge others as subjects.
Not only did Sa’adeh defend civic and human rights and freedom of political
expression and association, but he also championed the right to vote freely, urging
citizens for the largest turnout at the polls and encouraging women specifically to
vote. He also condemned the attempts to deny emigrants the right to vote for
sectarian reasons and demanded the government to allow those Lebanese citizens
living abroad, men and women, to vote as well. To him, the parliament can be truly
representative of people when it allows the representation of non-sectarian parties
with programs and when it relies on the support of the people and represents their
will and interests. The parliament members, moreover, must be knowledgeable in
the economic, social and political affairs; they must produce transparent and clear
policies for the benefit of the people and for the advancement of society and they
must place public interest above their personal interest. If the freedom to establish
political parties is suppressed by the government and if competition during elections
is revolved around persons, not parties and programs, the parliament cannot be
considered a representative body of the people.514
The democratic nature of the Syrian Social National State is evident in Sa’adeh’s
defence of civil rights and the individual freedoms of citizens as well as in his
condemnation of governments that censor public opinion and forbid citizens from
expressing their points of view. No government, according to Sa’adeh, should act as
an oppressor and forbid the sacred rights of citizens. A nation would be living in
abnormal conditions if denied freedom of political expression and association. 515 He
argues that “a government that refuses to grant its citizens the freedom of opinion
and association, and the freedom to create political parties, is a government that has
no representative value.”516 He also affirms that the sacred rights of each citizen in
the state, which include the right to think, and believe, and propagate his beliefs, the
right to make public his thoughts and creed, and the right to associate in order to
discuss those creeds and thoughts; the right to form an opinion about the
government and its different systems, and convey such opinions to other citizens,
must all be respected because they “would allow the people to progress towards a
better system, better guiding principles, and better political conditions.” 517
Furthermore, Sa’adeh urged for tolerance, mutual understanding and honesty
513
Ibid., p. 518.
Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, op. cit., pp. 518 – 519.
515
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol. 2,, p.195.
516
Ibid., vol. 3, p. 51.
517
Quoted in Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, op. cit., p. 521.
514
105
among citizens within society. To him, “honesty is the beginning of the road towards
reform. It paves the way for citizens to trust each other.”518
In conclusion, Sa’adeh was a national reformer on all levels: political, social and
individual. His aim was to rescue his society from its internal and external threats
and transform it into a modern and open society. “His dream”, as Professor Sofia
Sa’adeh states, “was to free society from colonialism, and to free the individual from
traditional constraints, be it tribal, sectarian or racist.”519 He rejected all political
systems that led to the oppression of people, be they totalitarianism, fascism,
feudalism, racism or autocracy. Instead he favoured democracy and advocated a
secular state that promotes the welfare of its citizens, treats them equally and
safeguards their civil and political rights.
518
519
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol. 9, p. 180.
Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, op. cit., p. 531.
106
VII
Sa’adeh and Women
Since the time Antun Sa’adeh worked with his father in journalism until his execution
in 1949, he always promoted the emancipation of women and saw that for
democratization to prevail in society women must be given their freedom and
equality. His writings reveal that he was against their oppression at home and
against their discrimination within society. He looked at women as equal partners to
men and as participants in the activities of the public domain. Women, in his opinion,
constitute half of society and they must be treated as equals to men. They should not
be confined to the private sphere, but they should be active participants in production
and national struggle. “National activity should not be restricted to men. Production
cannot be considered national unless women participate in it and become active
members of society.”520 In speech and writing, Sa’adeh addressed all Syrians
without any discrimination and sought to mobilize men and women and win their full
participation in the national struggle. While in jail from early February to early May
1936, Sa’adeh completed writing his book: The Genesis of Nations, which he dedicated
“to the men and women of the mighty national renaissance who are striving for the
life, existence and glory of Syria.”521 Furthermore, in a speech at a social function
organized by female Syrian Social Nationalists in 1938, Sa’adeh announced: “When
I thought about the abilities of Syrian men, I thought also about the ability of the
Syrian woman, which had been a fundamental factor in our progress and
advancement in all periods of our particular history and in that civilization which we
spread to the whole world”.522 Indeed, if we turn the pages of Syrian history, we find
many a woman who became an able queen, an effective leader and able politician, a
`brave soldier, a talented scholar, a reformer of a high calibre and exceptional
courage.
Sa’adeh was well acquainted with the contemporary cultural current and with the writings of
many reformers and intellectuals, particularly the scholars of the Nahda period, who
promoted liberal and secular ideas of modernity and who sought the salvation of ‘Arab’
women since the nineteenth century. He was certainly familiar with the writings of May
Ziyadeh, particularly her book al-Musawat523, which was the subject of one of his analytical
articles: “Nazarat fi al-Musawat” (Views on Equality), published in al-Jaridah in 1922.524 In
fact, Sa’adeh, despite his divergent opinion with May on certain views, he praised her
innovation, style and methodology and labeled her a “great scholar” and a “blessing
from Providence for a defeated nation…”525 He wrote: “No great scholar was born
among the women of Syria during the last centuries such as Marie Ziyadeh.526
520
Quoted in ibid., p. 530.
See. Antun Sa’adeh. Nushu’ al-Umam (The Genesis of Nations), Beirut: SSNP, 1976.
522
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 4 (1938), 1st edition, Beirut: SSNP Cultural Department, 1980, p. 54.
523
Reprinted in May Ziadeh: The Complete Works, Volume 1, compiled by Salma al-Houffar al-Kouzbari,
(Beirut: Nawfal Publications, 1982).
524
Full text in Antun Sa´adeh, Al-‘Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works) vol. 1 Marhalat ma Qabl al-Ta’sis (19211932) (The Stage Prior to the Formation of the SSNP), compiled by the Cultural Department of the SSNP,
Beirut, 1975, pp. 36-47.
525 Antun Sa´adeh, As-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri (Intellectual Struggle in Syrian Literature) (Beirut: SSNP,
1960), p. 181. Other great figures of ancient and modern times mentioned by Sa’adeh included Zeno the Stoic,
521
107
Sa’adeh was also acquainted with the writings of Qassim Amin, who encouraged
women to discard the veil in Egypt and called for the restitution of equality between
the sexes and the liberation of women through education. In addition, it is quite
logical to presume that Sa’adeh had witnessed the wave of approval and rejection of
Nazira Zeineddine’s books, the publication of which coincided with his return from
Brazil to Syria and his immediate start in his position as a language (German) tutor
at the American University of Beirut. His alerting articles on the Turkish ambitions in
Syria, particularly in Alexandretta (the Sanjak of Iskandaroun), reveal that he was
well acquainted with the Turkey of Atatürk and the writings of Turkish nationalists like
Zia Gӧkalp and the leading nationalist woman Halidé Edib. Undoubtedly, Sa’adeh
was presumably aware of the new era that was beginning for Turkish women
following the establishment of the new republic in 1923 and the implementation of
many secular reforms including the abandonment of the veil.
Against the cultural current prevailing at that time, one would not wonder to see
Sa’adeh building on this wave of secularization and modernization. However, unlike
all his reformative predecessors, Sa’adeh was not a mere theorist and advocate of
women’s emancipation, but a man of action who tried to implement his views into a
precise plan. His plan, as highlighted in the previous chapter, was to change the
existing order by a new system delivered by a national party of devoted, dedicated
and self-sacrificing members, men and women, united around a common cause.
This party targets the whole society and aims to create a secular and democratic
state void of oppression and discrimination of any kind. As men and women are
victims of the existing order and all suffer from the same socio-economic, legal and
political conditions and endure discrimination, oppression and injustice, Sa’adeh
wanted to generate through his national doctrine a national renaissance that aims to
improve the lives of all Syrians and lead to the welfare and modernization of their
society.
After establishing his party and recruiting dedicated members, men and women,
from all religious backgrounds, “Sa’adeh asked his Muslim party members to urge
their sisters to take off the headdress and veil.”527 He also encouraged women to
engage in politics and to participate in international conferences. Sofia A. Sa’adeh
comments:
Sa’adeh’s party was the first party to accept and encourage the enrolment of
women in politics. This brought a violent reaction from the Lebanese
conservative society. Newspapers condemned the party for accepting women
among its ranks, predicting this would lead to decadence, debauchery and sexual
laxity. In return, Sa’adeh encouraged educated women to participate in
international conferences. The first Lebanese woman to finish her PhD in the field
of Physics in the USA was Salwa Nassar, a party member who at one point
headed the American Beirut College for Women. Sa’adeh knew that he was
Bar Salibi, St John Chrysostom, Ephraim, al-Ma’ari, Deek-el-Jin of Emessa, al-Kawakibi and others. See Antun
Sa'adeh, Al-Muhadarat al-'Ashr (The Ten Lectures), Beirut: SSNP, 1976, p. 105.
526
Ibid.
527
Sa’adeh, Sofia A. “Sa’adeh and National Democracy”, op. cit., p. 530.
108
undertaking a thorough change in the mores not only members who enrolled in
the party, but also society at large.528
Sa’adeh’s espousing of the women’s cause is evident in his views as well as in his
actions. To extract pieces of such evidence and extend our knowledge of Sa’adeh’s
opinion vis-à-vis women, one has to review; a) his thoughts of love and marriage, b)
his novellas and works of literature; in which he defends women and portrays them
as wonderful creatures, while dealing with the relationship between love, morality
and courage, and c) his involvement in the affair of the prolific and famous writer,
May Ziyadeh, who was unfairly placed in a mental hospital.
Sa’adeh’s conception of love:
Sa’adeh’s conception of love can be extracted from his comprehensive literary work:
The Intellectual Struggle in Syrian Literature (As-sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri) and
specifically from his two novellas: A Love Tragedy (Faji’at Hubb) and The Feast of Our
Lady of Saydnaya (Eid Sayyidat Saydnaya), which are contained in one volume titled:
Qissatan. It can also be extracted from the memoirs of his beloved wife: Juliette al-Mir
Sa’adeh and his published love letters to Edvick Jureidini, which he wrote between
October 2, 1937 and April 4, 1938.529
Sa’adeh’s views of love demonstrate his respect and admiration to women and
reveal his new outlook to life. The woman in his thoughts is not depicted as a
material object or a commodity that can be purchased or sold. Neither is she seen
as a mere figure inflamed with desires and used for sexual pleasure. Rather, she is
treated as a real human being with thoughts and feelings and as a real partner in a
loving relationship based on respect, trust and sharing.
Love is spiritual-materialistic
Sa´adeh expressed his opinion that “friendship is the consolation of life, but love is
the drive towards the “High Ideal”.530 His new conception of love is derived from his
new outlook on life and must be viewed, like other concepts such as freedom, right,
strength, duty and discipline, in the light of his new philosophy of al-Madrahiyyah on
which he based his vision of society. It is no longer seen as “a mere passion and a
temporary surge that soon fades away”531, but as a cause of beauty of the whole life
and the participation of the souls in [creating] this beauty. In his novella, Faji’at Hubb,
he criticizes people who view love in terms of the lust of the body, not the emotions
of the heart. To him, a sublime love is a spiritual love which binds two hearts
eternally for the sake of a lofty purpose.
An interesting aspect of Sa´adeh analysis of the subject of love is his refusal to view
love in terms of sexual desires alone. He rejects bodily lusts to be an ultimate end of
love for they are the source of hurt, hatred and minor despicable and sordid enmity,
528
Ibid.
Sa’adeh wrote 18 letters To Edvick over a seven months period from October 2, 1937 to April 4, 1938. Each
letter contained not only his views about love, marriage and happiness, but also a snap shot of his political
activities and concerns for the national cause during that period. See Rasa’el Hubb (Love Letters from Antoun
Sa’adeh to Edvick Jureidini 1937 – 1938), Beirut: Motion, Publishing & Marketing, 1997.
530
Sa´adeh, Antun, As-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., p. 67.
531
Ibid., p. 171.
529
109
which sees nothing in the world, except its smallness, sordidness and
despicability.532
Sa’adeh, moreover, does not see love in terms of “cheeks, breasts and good looking
figure”.533 He rejects material love which is portrayed by “feverish looks, quivering
lips and inflamed kisses”.534 To him, love is a mix of thought and feeling and the
sharing of souls in appreciating life and its beauty and in trying to realize its high
demands and ideals. It is not to be seen as a mere spiritual relationship, but rather
as spiritual-materialistic; “if it gets lips closer to lips, it would pour a soul into
another”, Sa’adeh says.535 He adds: “Love is a unification of souls. Sexual
intercourse is a means for the embracing of souls, which are determined to stand
together or fall together in the struggle against corruption and vices and for the sake
of realizing the high ideal and standing up for the absolute right, justice, beauty and
love...”536 Love, he maintains, “is the union of two souls each telling the other we are
united until we achieve our ideal or die striving for it”.537 It is, accordingly, a lofty,
dignified and serious relationship void of deception and disloyalty and based on
responsibility and sincerity.
Sa’adeh’s perception of sublime love reveals that he has a high regard to women.
He rejects any treatment of women as mere bodies with attractive physical
attributes. Women, according to him, must be treated as human beings with souls
and sentiments. When a man and a woman love each other, their souls and bodies
integrate into a relationship based on devotion, sharing and trust for the sake of
realizing their happiness and lofty ideals. This theme was evident in his novella Eid
Sayyidat Saydnaya, a condensed story of a love-relationship that developed
between one man, Ibrahim, and a young woman, Najla. In this story, Sa´adeh offers
a lesson on the question of love. After confessing their love to each other, Ibrahim
promised Najla, while standing in the church near the picture of Virgin Mary, to
marry her. He fulfilled his promise and married her one year later and the two lived
very happily together. In reality, Sa’adeh demonstrated a high level of respect and
support to women, believing that respect is an important principle in a partnership. In
his letter to Edvick Jureidini, dated December 3, 1937, he expressed his love and
utmost respect to her and his appreciation of her opinion. He also encouraged her to
be strong and confident. Trying to restore her confidence, he said: “Do not be afraid,
but have confidence in yourself and always be strong, as a person can only prevail
through strength and self-confidence.”538
In Sa’adeh’s opinion, love is not a game or a business deal or even a negotiating
matter that aims to win happiness. Rather, it is a fundamental thing, a reality that
drives a human being to do everything possible for its sake.539 In a letter to Edvick
dated December 10, 1937, Sa’adeh wrote: “Isn’t honourable and noble for a person
to travel for the sake of love and to do anything for love, except neglecting his
532
Ibid., p. 57.
Ibid., p. 65.
534
Ibid.
535
Ibid.
536
Ibid.
537
Ibid.
538
Rasa’el Hubb (Love Letters from Antoun Sa’adeh to Edvick Jureidini 1937 – 1938), op. Cit., P. 77
539
Ibid., p. 84.
533
110
fundamental national duty?”540 He adds: “When man finds love, he finds the essence
of life and the strength by which he would overcome all difficulties and triumph over
all enemies.”541 In the same letter, Sa’adeh pointed out that any understanding
between two individuals is of no value without love. He emphasized that love, not
marriage, is the fundamental bond and the cornerstone for any relationship.542
Sa’adeh concludes his ninth letter to Edvick by confessing that he was in love with
her not for the sake of his happiness and comfort, but because he loved her. He also
maintained that he did not choose her because he thought she was a good
housewife, capable of taking care of his needs and comfort; nor did he want her
because he was lured by her wealth, and by the promise of living comfortably. He
wanted her, as he asserted, simply because he truly loved her.543
Sa’adeh was deeply immersed in the national struggle. He could not comprehend
love without connecting it to Syria, the focus of his life. Thus, lovers, in his opinion,
must unite in souls and struggle for Syria and its advancement. To him, love must
transcend individual desires and be directed towards the freedom of Syria. In his
eleventh letter to Edvick, he refers to love as a hidden force that transcends
individual desires and encourages the individual to struggle for higher goals and
ideals. He wrote: “We must hold on to this hidden force in order to realize our higher
ideals. For love that prevents a person from seeking higher ideal is selfish and
indolent. True love is the one that elevates [a person] towards higher ideal and
enables [him] to endure.”544 In his seventeenth letter to Edvick, He states:
The only thing I can now confirm is that I love you. But my love to you is
not for myself nor is it the centre of my life. Syria is the centre around
which my life and my love revolve. All of us should be devoted to Syria
because the time has come, and if elapsed, without us doing anything for
our freedom, then we will plunge into long and harsh slavery. We have to
become a free nation for the Syrian love to be a love of free people, not a
love of salves. A free person will not be able to enjoy his love if he or she is
living in slavery.545
Sa’adeh’s recurrent theme of love based on devotion, self-sacrifice and happiness is
well illustrated in Faji’at Hubb, which focuses on the love relationship between the hero of
the story, Salim546, and a girl from a good family, Da´ad. The two characters love each
other and think identically of the sublime goal that unite their two hearts, but find
themselves at odds with society’s concern for material needs as opposed to emotional
needs. Their love is hampered by people around them (Da´ad’s mother and her friends,
Mr. and Mrs. G) who see the success of a marriage is based on its material support.
Those people “measure emotions and matters of modern life with the standards of
old traditions.”547 Mr. G., who volunteered to dissuade Salim from marrying Daˊad,
kept repeating words of love, fondness and captivation proving that “he does not
540
Ibid., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 85.
542
Ibid., p. 81.
543
Ibid., p. 85.
544
Ibid., p. 95.
545
Ibid., p. 139.
546
Sa’adeh named the hero of the story, Salim, after his younger brother who was a musician and died in 1928.
547
Sa´adeh, Antun, As-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., p. 163.
541
111
understand anything about the meaning of spiritual love which binds two hearts
because of something more elevated than anything that he and the likes of him can
possibly imagine. He views love in terms of the lust of the body, not the emotions of
the spirit. He only understands love with his instinctive mind and not with his moral
conscience.”548
Daˊad’s mother, influenced by her friends, was not keen on the idea that her
daughter marrying a musician with an uncertain future. She put the condition on
Salim that if he wanted her daughter, he would have to give up his music career and
find himself a job with a stable income. Daˊad was sent to another city to keep her
away from her lover and was forced to send Salim a letter asking him not to write or
seek to see her. Salim, prevented from seeing Daˊad and forced to end his
relationship with her, began to experience all sorts of sufferings, misery and
loneliness. He fell into severe depression and began to refuse eating. He became
seriously ill and, before Daˊad’s letter of repentance arrives, passed away. In her
letter, Da´ad wrote:
I am writing to you now from the city, to which they sent me to keep me away from
you, in order to ask you to forgive me for the immense insult my last letter carried. I
have learnt about the pain that you have been going through although my family and
all the people around me have been doing their utmost to keep me from finding out
about your news and what is happening to you. If you only knew the pain I went
through because of the letter I was forced to send you and how much I am suffering
now because of what you are going through.
I learnt that you had visited Mr. G. and I was certain that you only did so for my sake
and for the sake of the sublime goal that joined our two hearts and united them in
pursuit of an objective that, by far, transcends their understanding and beliefs. But,
have courage, for they will not be able to stand between our eyes and the light.
Darkness can never stand in the way of light. They want us to be mere bodies –
physical entities which only seek materialistic needs. But, as far we are concerned,
we feel that we have souls and we sense what our souls aspire to. If that thing which
we feel fades away, what happiness would be left for us? They do not realize that
the pain of the soul is far worse than the pain of the body. They therefore seek the
comfort of my body but do not care for the comfort of my soul.
My dear Salim, forgive me for the pain I caused you. Be certain that I never meant
any of it. I only meant to intercept what happened and to endure the pain alone
since I know how much you need peace of mind in your hard work. So be brave!
Soon I will be near you but, for now, accept my love and greetings.549
“Our” Romantic Life
Sa’adeh respected women and wanted them to be real partners with men, capable
of expressing their feelings and emotions and enjoying their rights to choose and to
love. Sa’adeh attacked our inherited traditions and the prevalent narrow-minded
outlook among the majority of people that forbid honest love in society. To him,
women are not mere subjects of bodily love, but are human beings who have the
right to love and be loved. In his literary work: The Intellectual Struggle in Syrian
Literature, Sa´adeh referred to the romantic life in ‘our’ environment and particularly
548
Ibid. See also Sa’adeh, Antun. Qissatan (Two Novellas): Eid Sayyidat Saydnaya & Faji’at Hubb, Trans. Adel
Beshara, Mooroolbark (Vic): iPhoenix Publishing, 2011, p. 136.
549
Sa´adeh, Antun, As-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., pp. 172 – 173.
112
to the concept of love, which constituted a popular theme treated by poets. “Our
romantic life”, he argued, “still incapable to elevate the psyche to the level of high
intentions, which stimulate intrepidity, courage, dignity and purifying the self from
flaws”.550 He blamed “our” inherited traditions that forbid spiritual relationship and
honest love arising from natural and psychic choice and allow only bodily love. It
was sufficient for an aspirant [of marriage] to be told that his chosen girl had
beautiful features and that her chest, waist and eyes were described in such a way
that would arouse his passion, or otherwise, it would be sufficient to see her in one
or two visits to ensure that her physical beauty would suit his sexual desires. As for
the girl herself, little attention would be paid to her wishes and wants. 551 Hence, it
was on this basis that familial ties [marriage] in our society have been formed and it
still remains the rule on which most of us depend.552 Sa´adeh may be right in putting
the blame on the inherited traditions that forbid honest love in society. These
traditions reflect the prevalent rigid, narrow-minded and backward outlook among
the majority of people that restricts love in “our” society. This outlook is the product
of a long period of decadence that prevailed in all aspects of life and during which
Syria had been subjected to the rule of colonization and its policies. Literature
reflected this general decline and was no different from any other manifestations of
life. However, Sa´adeh concluded, from this type of rigid romantic life our poets and
writers inspired their narrative and poetic spirit, which they revealed in their novels
and erotic poetry.553 No wonder this spirit did not appear to be profound and rich
with psychological features and mental imaginations capable of expressing its
magnificence and splendour.554
Contact with Western literature had its advantages, according to Sa´adeh. It helped
to cultivate the taste of Syrian poets and novelists. Those poets and writers who had
no contact with Western literature focused in their works on the image of physical
love, which seeks gratification in bodily contact. They drew savage images of love
which lacked the “clarity and purity of the profound spirit” .555 Those few who knew
Western literature well and experienced life with increasingly modern minds and
intellects, managed to portray the image of spiritual love. In their poems and prose
works they searched for the spirit of the woman, for the wishes of her heart and for
the hopes and aspirations which tie her sentiments of love to those of the man. 556
Sa’adeh hoped to see his nation free from old customs and traditions so its poets,
novelists and musicians can portray the image of spiritual love and express emotions
that transcend sexual desires. He states:
A nation whose psyche is still at a primary stage or has been confined within selfdeveloped old customs and traditions also has primary music. Being so, this music
expresses only the emotions which are common to both man and animal, such as
sexual desires which exclusively represent most of this nation’s sentiments. On the
contrary, a nation whose mental attitude has been set free and developed has a kind
of music which expresses emotions that transcend sexual desires and fantasies
550
Ibid., p. 209.
Ibid.
552
Ibid.
553
Ibid.
554
Ibid.
555
Ibid.
556
Ibid., pp. 209 – 210.
551
113
which rise above low bestial aims. Their purpose in life is no longer confined to ‘the
reunion with the beloved’ (Wisal al-Habib), but has become a ‘Higher Purpose’ to
which love itself raises their souls and which love strengthens their resolve to
achieve it. Out of this process there will emerge sublime emotions and great ideas
and fantasies that are inconceivable to those whose one and only concern is the
reunion with the beloved.557
Syrian women are pretty
Sa’adeh never disguised his admiration to his countrywomen. In one of his letters to
Edvick, dated February 5, 1938, he tried to assure her of his love. He wrote: “No my
darling, meeting beautiful women of my country does not clear out my heart of your
love. I know how gorgeous they are even before I have met you… But the matter to
me is your life and my life and how we join them together.”558
In his novella Eid Sayyidat Saydnaya Sa’adeh proudly speaks of his countrywomen as
pretty and he describes their costumes which reflect good taste and fine
appearance. The events of this novella, it is important to note, take place in
Saydnaya, a small Aramaic town near Damascus. Its famous and magnificent
monastery, built on a hill overlooking all sides of the town and known as Dayr Sayyidat
Saydnaya, has been recognized as the second popular pilgrimage center in the
Middle East after Jerusalem. It attracts thousands of pilgrims from all over
geographic Syria who visit this site, particularly during its annual feast, which
commemorates the life of Our Lady of Saydnaya. In his story, however, the author
recollects the celebrations during the feast of 1930 and recounts the different popular
festivities occurring for three days, such as the circles of dancing (Dabbke) of men
and women, the tradition of sword fighting and other forms of folklore and partying. In
his description of the lively and colourful style of clothing worn by country girls,
Sa’adeh comments that it is a style that has the splendor of a national costume and
that enables those girls to compete in their wonderful appearance with other country
girls of the world. He states:
The attire of the women of the local villages, costumes tailored for the
feast, thrill visitors attending the feast for the first time. The co village
women of Syria have their own costumes (radiant, colorful, splendidlooking gowns) that speak of good taste and fine appearance. They are
entitled to show these off before countrywomen worldwide. Overall, the
costumes and attire of the village women are pretty and reflect the
glamour of the Syrian national costumes.559
Sa’adeh against the oppression of women
As mentioned earlier, Sa’adeh was against the oppression of women and their illtreatment in society. A noble-hearted man, it can be inferred from Sa’adeh’s
writings, must not tolerate any abuse, coercion or intimidation of women. In such a
situation, he must take risk and try to rescue the troubled woman. To Sa’adeh, the
557
Ibid., pp. 143 – 144.
Rasa’el Hubb (Love Letters from Antoun Sa’adeh to Edvick Jureidini 1937 – 1938), op. Cit., P. 132.
559
Sa’adeh, Antun. Qissatan (Two Novellas): Eid Sayyidat Saydnaya & Faji’at Hubb, Trans. Adel Beshara,
Mooroolbark (Vic): iPhoenix Publishing, 2011, p. 47.
558
114
starting point of getting rid of the problem of mal-treatment of women is education.
Thus, in his writings, he tried to educate his people and instill in them virtues of
nobleness, heroism and preparedness to defend a troubled woman. In his novella
Eid Sayyidat Saydnaya, Sa’adeh portrayed the main character, Ibrahim, in his image
and presented him as a courageous, moral and noble-hearted person, trying to
encourage virtue ethics as expressed in this character’s behaviour and actions. It
must be noted, however, that in his novellas Sa’adeh gave his protagonists his own
personal characteristics and made them adopt many of his ideals and views on life
and society. At any case, through Ibrahim, he wanted to offer his readers an
example of the good man with dignity and self-esteem; a man distinguished by his
courage, intrepidity and preparedness to take risks in order to defend a woman
abused, intimidated or threatened. Ibrahim acted in such a moral way when he saw
Najla annoyed by Jirjis, a relative of a friend of hers who was pestering her to marry
him. He jeopardized his life to rescue her by accepting Jirjis’ challenge to a duel.
Although Ibrahim slightly wounded his opponent, he missed the opportunity of
finishing him off. He was himself badly injured. The challenge took place again
during the next year annual feast. This time Ibrahim defeated Jirjis and prevented
him from kidnapping Najla and forcing her to marry him.
A golden opportunity was presented to Sa’adeh to prove that he was against the
oppression of women and their ill-treatment by a society dominated by patriarchy
and tradition. This opportunity came when the famous writer, May Ziyadeh, was
unfairly placed in a mental hospital. Sa’adeh decided to visit her and offer her his
support. Sa’adeh’s visit to May and his intervention in her affair will be the subject
matter of the next chapter.
115
VIII
Sa’adeh’s involvement in the affair of May Ziyadeh
Few articles were written by Sa’adeh which detailed his involvement in the affair of
May Ziadeh. These articles, which are published in Al-‘Athar al-Kamilah (Complete
Works), provide the source of our information to describe his intervention and the
actions that he took to help release May. Before providing any details about his
involvement in her affair, it is worth introducing this famous female writer.
Marie Elias Ziyadeh (1886-1941), who became known as “Miss May”, was of
Lebanese-Palestinian origin. She was born in Nazareth on 11 February 1886 to Elias
Ziyadeh, who had moved to Palestine from his native Lebanese village of Shatoul,
and Nozha Mu’ammer, a well-educated Palestinian woman. At the turn of the
century, the Ziyadeh family migrated to Egypt and settled in Cairo, where Elias
became the owner of a successful newspaper, Al-Mahrusa, in which May started
publishing her poetry in both French and Arabic under the pen name Isis Copia. In
1911, she translated several poems from her first French collection “Fleurs de Reve”
into Arabic and published them in Jurji Zaydan's renowned Al-Hilal newspaper. The
same year, May published - under the pseudonym Aidah, her second poetry
collection, “Aidah's Diary,” - also in French. When she began writing in Arabic, she
settled on the pen name “May,” which was proposed by her mother and composed of
the first and last letters of her original Christian name. It was under this more
acceptable name to Arabic readers, preceded by the appellation “Miss,” that she was
to achieve fame.
In 1917, May graduated from the newly opened Egyptian University, where she had
studied history, philosophy and modern sciences. The fact that she learnt French
before Arabic during her early education in Lebanon560 did not prevent her from
becoming one of the most distinguished Arabic writers of the early 20th century. In
Egypt, May studied the Qur’an under a number of Azharite shaykhs and was guided
through the labyrinthine structures of Arabic language and calligraphy by famed
Egyptian liberal theorist Lutfi Al-Sayyid (1872-1936).
Poetry was the first literary genre she explored. Her book Dhulumat wa Ashi’a
(Darkness and Rays), published by Al-Hilal in 1933, revealed her skill in poetic
composition. Still studying, she continued to publish her prose poetry (shi’r manthur)
as well as other literary pieces in Arabic newspapers and magazines like Al-Hilal, AlAhram, Al-Siyasa and the Lebanese magazine Al-Zuhour. Her famous poetic prose
work Ayna Watani? (Where is My Homeland?) reflected her feeling of being an
outsider in a society traditionally dominated by men.
560
May received her elementary education in al-Yusufiyyat Nuns’ school and later in Ain Tura before
she moved to Beirut, where she completed her secondary studies.
116
Professor Yunan Labib Rizk, elaborating on May's relationship with Al-Ahram - which
quickly invited her to join its editorial staff, publishing her writings extensively and
allocating considerable space on its front page to her frequent lectures, states:
Clearly Al-Ahram felt she was a great asset. It featured her articles
prominently, published the poems of the ‘the brilliant poetess’ amid
great fanfare, honoured her by choosing her to preside over an
event called ‘the Journalistic Feast’ and hailed her using such
tributes as: ‘If the Lebanese had difficulties in coming to Egypt to
participate in the homage to the Prince of Poets [Ahmed Shawqi], at
least we, since we are in Egypt, should pay homage to the “Princess
of Writers,” whose country we have long envied for its claim to
her’.561
May turned out to be a prolific writer, contributing to the modernization of
Arabic language and thought in nearly every field. Having mastered at least five
languages, she skillfully translated novels from English, German and French into
Arabic. She also experimented with the genre of short stories and consistently
championed women’s rights in her books and lectures. Being herself an activist for
the emancipation of women, she wrote sensitive biographical studies of three
pioneer female writers and poets: A’isha al-Taymouriyya, Malak Hifni Nassif and
Warda al-Yaziji.
In Cairo, May ran the most famous literary salon in the Arab world during the 1920s
and '30s. Open to men and women of varied backgrounds and modelled on the
French example, the salon attracted the greatest writers, poets and intellectuals of
the region. Among those who attended the frequent gatherings were Khalil Mutran,
Abbas Mahmud Al-‘Aqqad, the Azharite Shaykh Mustafa ‘Abd al-Raziq, Shibli
Shumayyil, Ya’qub Sarruf, Antoine Al-Jumayyil, owner of Al-Zuhour, Taha Hussein,
Nile poet Hafez Ibrahim and the “Prince of Arab Poets,” Ahmad Shawqi. 562
With her passing, May left behind more than 15 books of poetry, literature and
translations. Various collections of her previously unknown works have appeared
during the last few years. These include prose poems, speeches, short stories,
theatrical plays as well as collections of essays and articles on travel, literature, art,
criticism, linguistics and social reform.
Much has been written about May, especially by admirers who frequented her salon.
Some of them developed a romantic passion for her, the most famous being the
Egyptian writer-philosopher Abbas Mahmud Al-‘Aqqad. But few systematic studies of
May Ziyadeh and her thought appeared before 1982. Her various works, reflecting
her eclectic interests, remained for the most part scattered and sometimes out of
print. Two collections serving to rectify this unfortunate trend were the bibliographical
561
Rizk, Yunan Labib. “A Diwan of Contemporary Life (427)”, in Al-Ahram Weekly Online, in Issue no.
571, 31 Jan - 6 Feb 2002, http://www.ahram.org.eg/WEEKLY/2002/571/chrncls.htm.
562 Al-‘Aqqad mentions the names of more than thirty personalities who were regular guests in May’s
weekly Tuesday salon gatherings. See Abas Mahmud al-Aqqad, Rijal ‘Araftuhum. Cairo 1963, p. 162.
See also Ziegler, Antje, “May Ziadeh Rediscovered”, http://leb.net/isis/z/ziegler.html, (originally
published May 1997).
117
references of the Lebanese scholar Rose Ghurayyib563 and a selection of unedited
articles compiled by Faruq Saad,564 lawyer and lecturer at the Institute of Fine Arts at
the Lebanese University. In 1982, Salma al-Haffar al-Kuzbari, a Syrian writer,
published the first complete edition of May’s works, which included previously
unpublished documents, letters, speeches, lectures, essays and manuscripts. 565 A
few years later, al-Kuzbari and other academics including Antoine Muhsin alQawwal,566 Joseph Zaydan, Ahmad Husayn al-Tamawi and others, collected and
published the various unknown works of May Ziyadeh, fashioning a picture vastly
different relative to the earlier academic assessment of this leading Arab writer. 567
May Ziyadeh died in Cairo on 19 October 1941. She was buried in the Maronite
Cemetery of Misr Al-Qadima.
Sa’adeh On May
As soon as Antun Sa’adeh heard of May’s death, “felt all his thoughts focus on this
writer.” He immediately wrote a lengthy article entitled The Last Days of May,568 in
which he articulated his opinion of May Ziyadeh and elaborated on the
circumstances which led him to visit her in hospital some months before her passing.
Sa’adeh labeled May a “great scholar” and a “blessing from Providence for a
defeated nation and, resultantly, a misplaced blessing.”569 According to him, precious
few male scholars could match her for her eloquence, wit and integrity. As he
elaborates:
I say with conviction that among the male scholars of Egypt and Syria with
whom I have made contact and whose works I have read, I have found but
precious few who can stake a claim to be like her [May Ziyadeh] in terms of
education, sentiment and talent.570
The circumstances that led Sa’adeh to visit May Ziyadeh in hospital were related to
her supposed insanity. Around 1935, May fell into deep depression. This has been
partly attributed to the death, in the early thirties, of her parents as well as that of her
distant lover Jubran Khalil Jubran, with whom she had been in correspondence for
over two decades - though the two never actually met.571 Vulnerable, May Ziyadeh
found herself the target of the patriarchal social conventions she often railed against
and, being a single woman without her family's backing, lacking the qualifications for
continuing her salon-related activities. Following her slide into depression, her
563
See Ziegler, Antje, “May Ziadeh Rediscovered”, http://leb.net/isis/z/ziegler.html.
Saad, Faruq. Baqat Min Hada’iq May. Beirut 1973 (2nd edition, Beirut 1980), part II (anthology).
565 Al-Kuzbari, Salma al-Haffar (ed.), May Ziyadeh: Al-Mu’allafat al-Kamila (The Complete Works), 2
vols., Beirut 1982.
566 Al-Qawwal, Antoine Muhsin. Nusus Kharij al-Majmu’a (Texts Outside the Collection), Beirut, 1993.
567 See Ziegler, Antje. “May Ziadeh Rediscovered,” op. cit.
568 Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., pp. 181- 196.
569
Ibid., p. 181.
570
Ibid.
571 Her extended correspondence with this foremost representative of Arabic mahjar literature gave
rise to speculation about the nature of their relationship and speculation that a love affair had
blossomed.
564
118
relatives seized on the opportunity afforded by her effective incapacitation to
confiscate her possessions - particularly her estate, claiming that she had lost her
mind and was no longer able to manage her properties. They had her declared
legally incompetent and committed her to a hospital for mental disease in Beirut.
While in hospital, a handful of remaining friends, one of them the famous mahjar
(emigrant) writer Amin al-Rayhani, tried to get her released.572 Meanwhile, Sa’adeh,
who learnt about May Ziyadeh’s unhappy situation from his friend Anis Nassif of
Shuwayr, was equally moved. In the above-mentioned article The Last Days of May,
he describes the actions that he and his party took to help release May and rescue
her from her relative - the conniving “Dr. Ziyadeh,” who had cleverly utilized his
position as a man of medicine to declare her insane and have her confined to a
single hospital room in complete isolation.
Sa’adeh Visits May at the Hospital
Sa’adeh, accompanied by his friend Anis Nassif, visited May at the hospital. The visit
was as very short and interrupted by Anis’ mother and sister, who
unexpectedly dropped by to see her. As soon as May saw Mrs. Nassif and her
daughter, she could no longer control her emotions and began to cry.573 Despite its
short duration, the visit proved to Sa’adeh that May needed immediate outside
intervention and was in a truly desperate situation. When Sa’adeh assured her of his
willingness and determination to help her, she replied in a hopeless tone: “I do not
believe that changing my situation is possible…,” to which Sa’adeh rejoined: “Mine
are not words of momentary encouragement. I do not want words to come before my
actions.”574
Sa’adeh left the hospital determined to save May. When he discovered that Amin alRayhani was preparing a letter to the Egyptian Consul in Beirut to get him to
intervene on the grounds that May was an Egyptian citizen by law, he made known
his opposition to such a move. The principle of sovereignty was seemingly his
concern. He did not think that it would be wise to consult the Egyptian
Consulate regarding May’s case with the justification that May was residing in
Lebanon and her case should be a Lebanese matter. He told Anis: “I will take care
of this matter myself and would like you to reassure May that she will gain her
freedom.”575 Sa’adeh’s behaviour during this period indicates a preoccupation with,
and a fervent desire to rescue May. The question arises, “Why would he trouble
himself with the plight of a writer who is not related in any way to the Syrian Social
Nationalist Party?” May Ziyadeh was not a friend of Antun Sa’adeh, neither was she
a professed believer in the ideology of Syrian nationalism. This author is uncertain as
to whether May was even familiar with Sa’adeh’s ideology, though she may have
been acquainted with its general outlines, knowledgeable as she was when it came
to current political concerns. May had written about certain ideologies that had been
572
See his defence of May Ziyadeh written in 1938 (in Arabic) explaining her difficulties during the
tragic days of 1938. Qissati Ma' May, (My Story with May), 1980 [posth.], The Arab Institute for
Research and Publication, Beirut, Lebanon. Reprinted 1983, 1986 and 1989, Beirut.
573 Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit. p. 187.
574
Ibid.
575
Ibid., p. 188.
119
in vogue before the establishment of the SSNP. In a series of articles576 published
shortly after the Russian Revolution, May raised the issue of socialism in relation to
other political ideologies of the day. Nevertheless, Sa’adeh was totally committed to
helping this writer. The following reasons may help explain his dedication:
1- Sa’adeh did not believe that May was insane, as maintained by her relatives. He
was of the opinion that she suffered from no mental or psychological problems, but
rather was the victim of a conspiracy woven by her relative, Dr. Ziyadeh. How could
he ignore her situation knowing that she was alone and defenceless, and subjected
to maltreatment and oppression? This was probably the first motive that led Sa’adeh
to intervene in May’s case. Fighting oppression in society and defending its weak
members were principles consistently advocated by Sa’adeh. They were moral
benchmarks emphasized in many of his writings and comprising the essence of his
teachings. This can be gleaned in particular from his short story Eid Sayyidat
Saydnaya (The Feast of the Saydnaya Madonna), in which the main character,
Ibrahim, volunteers to defend his beloved Najla when he sees her in trouble.
2- This defenceless and demoralized person in need of help was no ordinary mortal,
but an outstanding writer - particularly in Sa’adeh’s eyes. Before meeting her,
Sa’adeh had formed a positive impression of May after reading some of her works.
Indeed, Sa’adeh’s admiration of May Ziyadeh dated back to 1922, when he worked
with his father in editing the latter's daily newspaper Al-Jaridah in Brazil. At that time,
Sa’adeh wrote a series of literary articles analyzing one of May’s works: Al-Musawat
(Equality).577 His positive impressions regarding her character were confirmed by
their short conversation during his brief visit. He came away imbued with a feeling of
enormous respect for her, claiming that May was a scholar endowed with the sort of
intellectual ability and sound knowledge that he could not find in any of the major
scholars and literati of the day - including Amin al-Rayhani and Mikhail Nu'aymah,
whom he knew and whose works he had been reading for a long time. 578 Hence,
helping May Ziyadeh could be seen as a moral obligation and even a national duty. If
other friends and admirers of May, including Amin al-Rayhani, offered her help,
would it be proper for Antun Sa’adeh to remain aloof? Refraining from intervening on
her behalf would hardly help his image and his party’s reputation in the eyes of
intellectuals and reformers. But image-driven concerns were but one aspect of the
affair, for, in speaking of intellectuals and reformists, May's troubles, given the
similarities between the two rebellious and highly unconventional Syrians could have
struck a personal chord insofar as Sa’adeh was concerned. Considering the strongwilled, even obstinate May something of a kindred spirit, he could not but have
reacted with a sense of personal shock and indignation at her sudden downfall. As
reported by friend and associate Jubran Jurayj, who spent time with him during this
576
These articles were later collected in a book. See al-Kuzbari (ed.), May Ziyadeh: Al-Mu’allafat alKamila, vol. 1, 533-642.
577 This series of articles was published in Al-Jaridah starting in issue 95 of 7th December 1922 and
ending in issue 101 of 14th December 1922. This series is re-printed in one article titled “Nazarat fi alMusawat (Views on Equality) in Antun Sa’adeh, Al-‘Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works) vol. 1
Marhalat ma Qabl al-Ta’sis (1921-1932) (The Stage Prior to the Formation of the SSNP), compiled by
the Cultural Department of the SSNP, Beirut, 1975, pp. 36-47.
578 Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit. p. 188.
120
period, a very agitated Sa’adeh would reflect: “How can such things happen? May
Ziyadeh was accused of being insane, but she is not.”579
3- Sa’adeh’s intervention in May’s case can also be seen as a political
confrontation between the SSNP and its opponents: The Jesuits and certain proFrench Maronite clergymen. When Sa’adeh, after having heard of May's plight, paid
a visit to his friend “Amir” Amin Arslan, and told him of his intention to visit her at the
hospital, Arslan advised Sa’adeh not to intervene in the matter, as he might be
disappointed by the consequences, which could prove harmful to the SSNP. Arslan,
Sa’adeh noted, “was a noble man and a recognized politician during the Turkish era.
He was one of the members of the Central Administrative Council (CAC) 580 who
were arrested and exiled by the French in 1920.” He told Sa’adeh that Dr. Ziyadeh
was an influential man and that he had close relations with the higher ranks of the
Maronite and Jesuit clergy as well as the French Mandate authorities. Moreover, his
uncle was once a candidate for the position of President of Lebanon. Indeed, Dr.
Ziyadeh would not engage in such an action if he were not certain about his
networks and backing. But Sa’adeh insisted on visiting May, asserting that even if he
were to have foreknowledge of any adverse repercussions this might trigger, he still
would not hesitate to rescue her. Accordingly, it can be argued that this was an
opportunity for Sa’adeh to re-engage his opponents - who had attacked him and his
party in the past, on a matter of principle.581
Sa’adeh Advocating the Cause of May
As soon as Sa’adeh reached his office following his visit to the hospital, he wrote an
article which he immediately sent to the editor of the party’s paper, Al-Nahda, with
instructions to display it prominently on the front page of the coming issue. It
appeared on 19 January, 1938, under the title “The Cause of the Famous Writer May
Before the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the [French] High Delegation; An Exceptionally
Serious Affair.”582 The article aroused public interest in May’s case in Lebanon, news
of which soon spread to other parts of geographical Syria.
In publishing this article, Sa’adeh aimed to achieve four objectives:
1.
To inform the public of the seriousness of May Ziyadeh’s cause and uncover its
concealed aspects.
579
Jurayj, Jubran, Min al-Ju’bah (From the Case History), vol. IV, Beirut: SSNP, 1993, P. 41.
The CAC of the Mutasarrifiyyah was created in 1861 as an indirectly elected body to represent the
various sects and ethnic groups that inhabited Mount Lebanon and to act as a quasi-legislative body
helping the Mutasarrif in running the affairs of the Mutasarrifiyyah. Its power was stipulated in the
internationally recognized and supported Règlement Organique and encompassed a variety of areas
such as taxes, land tenure, local government and public works. See Abdo I. Baaklini, Legislative and
Political Development: Lebanon, 1842-1972, Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976,
pp. 49-57.
581 See my work: The Syrian Social Nationalist Party and the Question of Lebanon. Melbourne, 2002,
pp. 53-60. See also Salim Muja’is, Antun Sa’adeh wa al-’Iklirius al-Maruni, (Antun Sa’adeh and the
Maronite Clergy), USA: [n.], 1993.
582 This article was reprinted in Sa’adeh, Antun, al-’Athar al-Kamilah (Complete Works) vol. 4 (1938),
compiled by the Cultural Department of the SSNP, Beirut, 1980, pp. 21-23.
580
121
2.
To put the whole affair on the right legal route, under the jurisdiction of the central
office of the Public Prosecutor of the Lebanese Republic and, by doing so,
preventing the Egyptian Consul from interfering in this affair, the events of which
were taking place in Syrian, not Egyptian, territory.
3. To draw the attention of the French Commission, as Syria’s representative in
international law, to the interference of the Egyptian Consul in the affair of May
Ziyadeh, who was residing in Lebanon.
4. To hold the Lebanese Public Prosecutor’s Office and the [French] High Delegation
responsible for the cruelty visited upon May Ziyadeh.
Sa’adeh asserted that all these objectives were realized following the publication of
his article, which created a sense of public concern and prompted condemnation of
May’s persecutors. Many people phoned the offices of Al-Nahda to inquire about May
and the details of the affair. This overwhelming sense of concern about May Ziyadeh
was even more apparent within SSNP circles throughout the country. SSNP
members and students in various branches convened meetings to discuss the issue.
Sa’adeh also revealed that a suggestion to organize a large demonstration was
forwarded to the party’s central administration by some SSNP women who had
convened a meeting in the home of Harriyah Arslan, wife of Amin Arslan. The
women expressed their willingness to march at the front of the demonstration to
indicate their support for May Ziyadeh. Sa’adeh received similar suggestions from
other branches of the party, but was not keen on demonstrations before
consultations with official circles as well as May’s relatives had been exhausted.
The SSNP’s Initiatives on the Legal Front
Sa’adeh took further action. Accompanied by his friend Anis Nassif, he called on the
Chief Central Examining Magistrate, Hassan Qabalan,583 in order to brief him on the
seriousness of May’s situation. Qabalan thought it would be better to put the matter
before the Appellate Public Prosecutor, Alfred Thabet. Sa’adeh did not waste any
time. He immediately approached Thabet, who in turn advised Sa’adeh that he could
intervene only after a formal application was lodged with the court. Sa’adeh left the
Office of the Prosecutor feeling that the Lebanese judiciary was - for reasons entirely
political, reluctant to get involved in May’s case. Turning to his friend Anis Nassif,
Sa’adeh said: “If none of May’s relatives is willing to lodge an application with the
Office of the Public Prosecutor, I will be obliged to do so myself.”584
Sa’adeh asked Nassif to meet the Central Public Prosecutor, Wajih al-Kuri, the next
day. At the same time, he continued his efforts to contact the higher authorities in the
State. He was thinking specifically of the French Commission which, according to the
Mandate laws governing Lebanon, should act to prevent the interference of the
Egyptian Consul.
583
Sa’adeh revealed that this Magistrate had been legally involved in the affair of the SSNP during
the arrests of 1936. He had interrogated Sa’adeh and other members for about four months during
which a good friendship, based on mutual respect, had developed. Sa’adeh admired him for his
knowledge, integrity and good judgment.
584 Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., p. 190.
122
Sa’adeh himself was given an appointment, at his request, to meet with the head of
the political section of the Commission, Mr. Kiffer, with whom he had had a few
contacts in the past. At the meeting, Sa’adeh explained May’s case and complained
about the interference of the Egyptian Consul in it. He emphasized that May’s case
was a matter of deep concern to him and expressed his hope that the Commission
would deal with it swiftly and impartially so as to guarantee the personal freedom and
civil rights of this prominent writer. Kiffer made Sa'adeh a verbal promise that he
would do his best to help.
Meanwhile, the Central Public Prosecutor, Wajih al-Kuri, promised to personally
intervene in May’s case after meeting with Anis Nassif. Al-Kuri visited May at the
hospital the following day and even he was stunned - the hardened prosecutor was
moved by her abject living conditions and solitary confinement. He immediately went
to see Dr. Ziyadeh to discuss her case. Dr Ziyadeh confronted him with medical
reports purportedly confirming May’s madness and functional incompetence. Dr.
Ziyadeh, as Nassif pointed out to Sa’adeh, was a cunning man not easily
outmanoeuvred.
But Sa’adeh could wait no longer. He asked Anis to prepare May’s house for her
imminent release, preparing to use force if necessary to achieve this. Anis
requested he be given at least another day to see the Public Prosecutor, who upon
meeting with him again promised his help and appeared very sincere. Sa’adeh
acquiesced, but even as he did so, instructed a group of SSNP members,
among whom was activist and writer Abdullah Qubursi, to mobilize for a possible
rescue operation.
The SSNP Protects May
The campaign against May’s freedom by her enemies was not over. A few days
following her release – performed legally and officially, Sa’adeh was contacted his
friend Anis Nassif and told that May was not safe in her house. He said that some
persons claiming to be relatives of May had attempted to enter her house, but that
her personal assistant prevented them from doing so. When Sa’adeh heard this
story, he immediately called the SSNP General Executive of Beirut together as well
as the officer in charge of the volunteers' group and instructed them to make the
necessary arrangements to protect May Ziyadeh from intruders. The officials
immediately assigned a small SSNP militia to the house.
May accepted an invitation to deliver a public lecture at the American University of
Beirut. Sa’adeh alleged that May’s enemies tried to put off this lecture or at the very
least contribute to its failure. They attempted, shortly before it was scheduled to
begin, to forcibly enter May’s house, but were prevented from doing so by SSNP
security guards. On 29 March 1938, May was driven to the AUB to give her lecture
escorted by SSNP bodyguards. May had had extensive experience in lecturing. In
the past, she had delivered a series of lectures on a broad range of subjects. This
time she chose “The Mission of the Writer to Arab Life” as a title for her lecture.
123
Antun Sa’adeh attended the lecture himself and was impressed by May’s talk. “May,”
Sa’adeh commented, “is not a befuddled scholar who speaks confusedly.” 585
At the end of the lecture, Sa’adeh, in the midst of some jubilant SSNP members,
walked towards the Waiting Room of the West Hall of the AUB where May was
surrounded by some friends and lecturers586 and congratulated her on giving an
excellent lecture.
Only after May had spoken publicly and proved her mental competence did Sa’adeh
come to the conclusion that his party’s mission had been accomplished. Accordingly,
he sent instructions to terminate the mission of the security guards assigned to May's
house.
Al-Nahda Unveils the Truth
The campaign against May by her relatives and opponents continued in Egypt
despite her attainment of freedom in Lebanon. Their campaign reached its peak
when they formed a council for her guardianship and issued a statement stipulating
that May should be kept in complete isolation owing to her mental state. The
Egyptian Consul in Beirut conveyed this statement to the Lebanese Government. But
Abdullah Qubursi, in a series of fiery articles published in Al-Nahda, was able to annul
the statement with a strong and convincing legal reply. Consequently, the campaign
against May dissipated and the famous writer returned to Egypt a free person.587
Sa’adeh Visits May Again
Just before May left for Egypt, Sa’adeh paid her a visit accompanied by Dr. Charles
Malek and party member Fakhri Ma’louf. During this visit, May spoke about how she
was declared insane by her relatives and about her awful experience and suffering
during her stay at the mental institution. Sa’adeh noted that instead of being left
alone to relax and enjoy some tranquillity after what she had been exposed to, she
was surrounded by rowdy people. They turned up at May’s house every evening to
chat, play cards, and amuse themselves. Sa’adeh did not approve of their actions
and argued that May should be left alone to recuperate. May, remarked Sa’adeh,
needed no more than two considerate people, who know that silence sometimes is
more precious than gold, to be by her side.588
That was the last time Sa’adeh saw May Ziyadeh. The duties and responsibilities of
his position as the leader of the SSNP occupied every minute of his time and
prevented him from seeing her again. However, Sa’adeh recalled that two months
after his last visit to May, he left Lebanon for Europe and then South America after
stopping for a few days in Cyprus.
585
Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., p. 194.
Among them were Atta Ayoubi’s wife and Dr. Charles Malek, Lecturer in Philosophy at the AUB.
587 Sa’adeh, Antun, Al-Sira’ al-Fikri fil-Adab as-Suri, op. cit., p. 193.
588 Ibid., pp. 194-195.
586
124
Towards the end of 1940, Sa’adeh read in a Syrian newspaper a letter written by
May two years earlier and sent to her friend Layla Nafa’a. In this letter May wrote: “In
the past period I was slow in writing to you due to my pre-occupation with some
serious and difficult problems. Would anyone claim that life is possible without
personal freedom? My personal freedom was attacked and stripped away by my
relatives, who, enticed by money and estates, accused me, following the death of my
parents, of being insane and spread various rumours about me far and wide.” 589
The Ghoul Kills May Ziyadeh
At the beginning of 1941, a newspaper extract on May Ziyadeh was brought to
Sa’adeh. It was originally published in the Sout al-Ahrar paper in Beirut on 18 October
1940. It said that May had appointed a lawyer in Beirut to claim her inheritance. The
lawyer experienced difficulty in getting the Mukhtar [Justice of the Peace] of Shatoul,
Father Yusuf Ziyadeh, to certify the legal application for submission to the court, as
required by the law. The Mukhtar refused to certify the application because he was a
cousin of May’s and thus one of the principal beneficiaries of the inheritance. He and
the remainder of the heirs had already taken possession of May’s father’s share.
Sa’adeh felt that another battle for May was underway. It reminded him of the
notorious Ghoul of Arab folklore, the ferocious beast often mentioned by his father,
Dr. Khalil Sa’adeh, in his articles and lectures. This Ghoul, Sa’adeh proclaimed, had
killed May Ziyadeh.
The last days of May, Sa'adeh proclaimed, were the worst ever experienced by a
Syrian writer. But there probably was not another scholar in the entire world who
could have endured the pain and oppression endured for so long by May. In the end,
she succumbed to the terrifying and destructive Ghoul – the Ghoul that had stalked
her for so long - the Ghoul the Syrian Social Nationalist Movement has prepared a
sharpened sword to slay.
589
Ibid., p. 195.
125
IX
Women activism in the SSNP
Nationalism became a predominant political trend in the Middle East at the beginning
of the twentieth century. World War I, in particular, was a turning point in
transforming simmering nationalist sentiment into full-fledged nationalist movements.
This War resulted in settlements decided by the victorious Allies, which reinforced
European domination in the former territories of the dismembered Ottoman Empire,
but directly contributed to the development of anti-colonial movements in the newly
established political entities (Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, proper Syria and Lebanon)
that were relegated to European Mandatory rule to be readied for independence
soon.
Anti-colonial movements in many parts of the world enlisted the support of women in
various ways to win independence and would not have been successful without their
help. Virginia W. Leonard noted: “Men in patriotic parties mobilized female activists
to fight colonial powers and promised them equality.” 590 In the Middle East, some
women were mobilized in new work and public roles and their demands were
subordinated to nationalist demands. From their part, “women perceived nationalism
as an opportunity” and as a means to “justify stepping out of their narrowly
prescribed role in the name of patriotism and self-sacrifice for the nation and,
ultimately as a way to ‘earn’ emancipation.”591 They became passionate nationalists
and joined with men in the various nationalist movements for independence from
European colonialism that dominated the Middle East in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. These nationalist movements “depended on the mobilization of
women as demonstrators, organizers, speech-makers, and even fighters.”592 Those
women who participated in nationalist struggles not only gained experience, visibility,
and respect, but also “got a new sense of their roles as public persons and ventured
further than before in activities outside family, kin, and household.”593
In the truncated remains of the former Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalists waged a
war of liberation against European-imposed restrictions, resulting in the
establishment of an independent Turkish republic under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in
1923. In this war, some women were engaged in coordinating activities with the
male-led groups. Others formed separate organizations and engaged in their own
segregated activities. A few individual women, such as Nakiye Elgün and Halide
Edib, were significantly involved within the mainstream nationalist movement.594
Halide Edip (Adivar), a writer and early supporter of the Young Turk Revolution,
590
Leonard, Virginia W. “Women in Anticolonial Movements”, in Stromquist, Nelly P. (ed.) Women in the Third
World: An Encyclopedia of Contemporary Issues, op. cit., p. 448.
591
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 108.
592
Nashat, Guity & Tucker, Judith E. Women in the Middle East and North Africa – Restoring Women to History,
op. Cit., p. 110.
593
Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East – Past and Present, op. cit., p. 78.
594
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 110.
126
“played an active role in the Turkish War of independence through her writing on
Turkish consciousness and social reform, and, eventually, through extensive public
speaking.”595 In the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905 – 1911), women
participated in street demonstrations and the political mobilization of other women.
They delivered messages and co-ordinated some political activities. Women also
“founded numerous “patriotic” organizations, beginning with the Patriotic Women’s
League in 1906.”596 When the gains of the revolution were under attack, they
disguised themselves and fought alongside men. In 1921, Colonel Reza Khan seized
power by a military coup, with help from local British military commanders, and
embarked on building a modern nation-state and setting up the Pahlavi dynasty
(1925 – 79). Reza Khan, who in 1925 crowned himself shah of the new Pahlavi
dynasty, tried to mobilize women in the project of modernization and national
strength. “He asked women to contribute to building Iran, both via informed
motherhood and in appropriate jobs, like teaching.”597 Feminists and most
nationalists supported his regime until near the end, but many opposed his brutality.
In Egypt, upper-class women associated with the Wafdist Party, the leading
nationalist organization, organized in 1919 street demonstrations protesting on-going
British occupation and the arrest of nationalist leaders. The same ladies again held a
protest meeting in Cairo on 12 January, 1920 and formed the Wafdist Women’s
Central Committee, a group dedicated to fostering the nationalist cause and
mobilizing women’s participation in the national struggle. 598 Women of all
backgrounds also participated with men in strikes and numerous street
demonstrations, and “harsh repression created numerous female martyrs to the
nationalist cause.”599 As reported in the memoirs of Huda Sha’arawi, “in one
unpleasant incident, a woman who held a national flag from her carriage window was
badly beaten by British soldiers, who unsuccessfully tried to wrench the flag from her
while some observing foreigners made fun of them.”600 However, the Wafdist
revolution forced Britain to make nominal concessions to Egyptian national
sovereignty.
In Palestine, women saw nationalism as a matter of survival. They, along with men,
participated actively in the demonstrations, strikes and military operations that have
characterized the different phases of the national movement. In response to the
shocking disturbances that took place in Palestine in August, 1929, which resulted in
destructive consequences and losses in life and property, Palestinian women from
the various cities, towns and villages held, On October, 1929, the first Arab Women’s
Congress of Palestine, chaired by Madame Kazem Pasha Husseini and issued
memorable resolutions. They considered “the Balfour declaration to be detrimental to
the rights and position of the Arabs of Palestine and an unprecedented act in
history.”
595
Nashat, Guity & Tucker, Judith E. Women in the Middle East and North Africa – Restoring Women to History,
op. Cit., p. 90.
596
Ellen L. Fleischmann. “The Other “Awakening”: The Emergence of Women’s Movements in the Modern
Middle East, 1900 – 1940, op. cit., p. 110.
597
Keddie, Nikki R. Women in the Middle East – Past and Present, op. cit., pp. 85 - 86.
598
Huda Sha’arawi was chosen, in absentia, as president of the Committee.
599
Nashat, Guity & Tucker, Judith E. Women in the Middle East and North Africa – Restoring Women to History,
op. Cit., p. 91.
600
Lanfranchi, Sania Sharawi. Casting off the Veil – the Life of Huda Shaarawi, Egypt’s First feminist, op. cit., p.
64.
127
inon-going violent confrontation with Zionism whose express aim was to occupy the
“promised” land and beyond, reducing the majority indigenous population to a
second-class minority.
In Lebanon, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party was founded secretly by Antun
Sa’adeh in 1932. As a national movement, the SSNP was not any different from
many anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. One of its main
objectives was to free Syria from the colonial powers (the British and the French)
and win independence. Thus, the participation of women in the national struggle was
sought by the leader and considered as much important as that of men.
Since its inception, the SSNP attracted a great number of women who joined its
ranks with their husbands, fathers and brothers. These women found themselves
within the party on an equal footing with other male members, working towards
collective goals. They discovered strength and experienced “self-discovery” by
discussing intellectual, social and political concerns and by exercising their
entitlements to express their opinions, to make recommendations, to vote, to wield
authority and to participate in public debate and the national struggle in general. This
new role of SSNP female recruits and their enhanced participation in the affairs of
their society was not a progress imported from the West. Rather, it was the outcome
of enormous efforts exerted by a man who seemed very determined to elevate his
nation by a means of an organization driven by an authentic national doctrine that
appealed to many Syrian men and women and expressed their hopes and
aspirations.
Afifa Georges Haddad was the first woman to join the SSNP. She was followed by
‘Afifa Shamas from Amiuon and Adiba Shamiyyah. Milya Abu Jawdah joined the
SSNP few months after it was established. As the party was still a secret
organization, Milya recalled that in order to avoid the attention of the French
authorities and the agents, “we used to convene our meetings in secret isolated
places, in private gardens and in unoccupied houses.
In his memoirs, ˊAbdallah Qubrsi wrote about the role and contribution of women in
the founding and early struggle of the SSNP. He asserted that the female
participation in the party, during the establishment stage and after, was obvious.
Wherever the party existed in every quarter and every village, there were many
female unknown soldiers who lent their support and encouragement, their inspiration
and their standing against oppression and injustice.601 Qubarsi mentioned names like
Afifa Haddad, Clauda Thabet, Najla Ma’atouk Haddad, Amilee, Margo and Leila
Halabi, Wadded and Jamelle Nassif, Hourryah Irslan, Angelle Abd al-Massih, Adelle
Ma’arouf Sa’ab, Adiba Shamiyyah, Adelle Kallab and Na’am Fakhouri. Who were
some of these ladies?
Afifa Georges Haddad was the sister of Fu’ad Haddad who was among the five
people to whom Sa’adeh initially articulated his vision and plan and with them
eventually established his party. Fu’ad managed the family’s restaurant in Bliss
Street (Ras Beirut) opposite the American University of Beirut (AUB). At his
restaurant, he was introduced to Sa’adeh by his friend Aziz Saloum. He was told that
Sa’adeh was an émigré, originally born in Shuwayr, who came from Brazil to teach
601
Qubarsi, ‘Abdullah. “The Role of the Woman in the Founding of the Party”, in Ghassan Iz al-Din. The Role of
the Woman in the Social National Renaissance – A Dialogue with Memory, Beirut: Alfurat, 2008, pp. 23 - 29.
128
languages at the university. Impressed by his outward appearance, behaviour and
intellectual talk, Fu’ad admired the teacher and respected him. At the request of
Sa’adeh to help him finding a room to rent, Fu’ad introduced Sa’adeh to his mother
who accepted to rent him out a room in their house in Jeanne d’Arc’s street for its
proximity to the university. Sa’adeh shared the room with Fu’ad and the two became
close to each other.
Afifa was an educated young girl capable of comprehending what sort of activities
and meetings taking place in her house. It was logical to say that she would discover
the clandestine activities and the secret party in which her brother was involved. With
her and her family’s help, Sa’adeh managed to recruit many university students into
the underground party. Afifa’s role, before she took the oath, was to guard the
house, if a meeting was taking place, and warn the participants from unexpected
visitors. When she officially became a member in the party, Sa’adeh assigned to her
the task of taking minutes at the meetings. Eventually she was assigned to execute
delicate missions and to deliver important messages. Her effective role in the
founding phase of the party was described by ˊAbdallah Qubrsi:
It is sufficient in that secret period that a young woman dares to take
our terrifying oath and prepares herself to execute precise missions
perfectly; to pass on messages, instructions and secret codes; and
to go through thousands of eyes and ears and come out productive,
safe and without being detected.602
Clauda Thabet was a good-looking lady, well-educated and fluent in both Arabic
and English. She belonged to a rich family from Ein Zhalta in the Shuf and was the
sister of Na’ameh Thabet: A prominent intellectual who once occupied the position of
the Chairman of the party’s Higher Council. Following the death of her mother,
Clauda turned her mansion house into a meeting place for the SSNP.
In Tripoli, two ladies joined the party during the early period, according to Jubran
Jurayj. These were Fatima Qudssi and Leila Fakhouri, the sister of Anees Fakhouri
who had already joined the party. They were followed by Najla Ma’atouk, Nowfa
Hardan and Imilie al-Halabi.603 Jurayj recalls that Fatima Qudssi and Leila Fakhouri
cooperated together to attract Najla Ma’atouk, a lady reputed for her education and
social status. Their success in convincing Najla to join the party was considered a
valuable achievement. Najla was later granted the status of Amin owing to her
important role and contribution. Other ladies who joined the party in its early phase
were: Athma Salam, Amira Timani, Salwa Bedran, Hourryah Shamnak and her sister
Samiha and Salwa Bustani. Badra Salloum, Hanna Saba Malki, Genfiette Sa’adeh
and Balkis al-Ayyoubi were from al-Koura. Sa’ada Mounzir and Athma Abou samra
were from Broumana. Katrine from Alexandretta (Iskandaroun) and Salma Jibreen
from Safita.
Qubarsi mentioned also Salma al-Sayeigh, who was a famous liberated writer in
Lebanon and Egypt. Salma was known for her passionate and strong advocacy of
602
603
Ibid., p. 25.
Jurayj, Jubran. Min al-Ju’bah (From the Case History) Vol. I, Beirut, 1985, pp. 284 – 285.
129
women’s rights and freedom. She joined the SSNP, in its early days, with her
daughter and son-in-law, Salah Labaki, who was a poet, writer and recognized
lawyer and the son of the first Chairman of the Lebanese Parliament, Na῾aum
Labaki. In her house, which was a meeting place for Artists and scholars, Sa’adeh
met Yusuf Huwayyik (1883-1962), a famous painter and sculptor, who was a close
friend in Paris with Gibran Khalil Gibran; both had the same passion for painting and
sculpture and being from the same part of the world (Syria) and the same age.604
Qubarsi recalled that in 1935 he was assigned, being the Party’s Dean of
Information, to admit three citizens into the party: One male and two females. After
completing the formal procedure of the oath-taking for the male citizen, Qubarsi
turned to the two prospective female members, and began the procedure by asking
them the initial questions. Then, he revealed: “I became somehow hesitant and
unsure whether they should take the same oath and carry the same level of
responsibility as that of the male member? Qubarsi put the rest of the procedure on
hold and rushed to the residence place of Sa’adeh [al-Zaim] and put the question in
front of the leader. Sa’adeh replied:
The oath was written for the party and for every applicant be it a
woman or a man. The equality between the two sexes is absolute.
We do not differentiate between the male and the female in terms of
their rights and duties.605
Sa’adeh believed that national struggle is not restricted to men. It should be carried
out by both men and women. Any action, he said, “would not be recognized as a
national endeavour unless it is carried out with the participation of women and with
their active role in it”.606 Thus Sa’adeh in all his speeches and writings addressed all
Syrians without any discrimination and sought to mobilize men and women and win
their full participation in the national struggle. In his above-mentioned speech at the
social function that was organized by female Syrian Social Nationalists in 1938,
Sa’adeh first congratulated the women who joined his movement and began to take
part in the new national life, providing an example for others to follow. He then
revealed that his national movement was in real need for the participation of women:
“As much as the man is required to endeavour for our nation, we want the woman to
be an active member in society”.607 He added: “Women think in their hearts and their
sensational thinking is very essential for any renaissance and without it we would not
be able to realize our aim”.608
Legislative and executive positions within the SSNP can be assigned to any male or
female member as long as they are qualified. The party’s history provides many
examples of women being in administrative and leadership positions. Ghassan A’az
al-Din describes the proceedings of a social function organized by the ladies on
Sunday 22 of May 1949 and attended by Sa’adeh and his wife, Juliette al-Mir
Sa’adeh. Fayzah Maˊalouf commenced the function by a welcoming speech. Fayzah
was not just an MC for the function. She was in fact the first female Executive
604
Qubarsi, ‘Abdullah. “The Role of the Woman in the Founding of the Party”, op. Cit., p. 28.
Ibid., p. 23.
606
Sa’adeh, Antun. Collected Works. Vol 4 (1938), 1st edition, Beirut: SSNP Cultural Department, 1980, p. 54.
607
Ibid.
608
Ibid.
605
130
General in the SSNP in-charge of the Ladies Mounafaziah609 in Beirut. Her position is
a concrete example that the SSNP provides the opportunity for women to play
effective leadership roles and prove that they can change their submissive roles and
their exploitation by society.610
Jamelle Nassif and her mother were crucial agents in the founding of the ladies
branch of the SSNP. Both were active promoting and spreading the work among
other ladies in society. In his memoirs, Jubran Jurayj indicated that Jamelle Nassif
was the first female in Lebanon and perhaps in the whole Arab world who was
summoned by the French authorities for interrogation that lasted few hours with the
accusation of participating in political action. This distinguished event in the modern
history of the region occurred following the discovery of the SSNP and the arrest of
Sa’adeh and some of his comrades.611
Milya Abu Jaoudah recalls that she joined the SSNP in 1933.
609
A Mounafaziah is an administrative region headed by an executive general assisted by a secretary, a
director of finance, a director of propaganda and a director of military training. The function of the executive
general is to put into effect the laws and administrative plans of the party, the decrees of the Leader and the
authorized commissioners, and to make necessary decisions for the defence of the party in the region, to
spread its influence and to strengthen its effectiveness. He or she directs the work of the directors in the
performance of their assigned duties.
610
Ghassan Iz al-Din. The Role of the Woman in the Social National Renaissance, op. Cit., pp. 51-52.
611
Quoted in ibid., p. 34.
131
)‫ (جبران جريج‬340 ‫قصة الزواج المدني ص‬
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