Essays
Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
Prospect Theory And Decision Under Risk:
A Case Study Of Sadat's Decision In War And Peace
Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry*
Introduction:
Prospect theory is defined as a theory of decision under risk, it has
emerged as an alternative to expected utility theory. It is ironic that just
as rational choice has become the most influential paradigm in
international relations and political science over the eighteenth and
nineteenth decades, expected utility theory has come under increasing
attack by experimental and empirical systemic violations of the
expected utility principle in individual choice behavior.
This challenge to the expected utility theory has reinforced the
development of prospect theory by Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky in 1979.The last theory integrates the descriptive patterns of
the choice behaviour into an alternative theory of risky choice and
several international relations scholars have begun to apply the
concepts of it to foreign policy decision making.
Prospect theory is best known for its hypothesis that individuals
are risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to
losses and for its emphasis on the importance of the actor's framing of
decisions around a reference point.
Despite the similarities between prospect theory and expected
utility theory regarding loss-aversion and the reflection effect
hypotheses, there are important differences between them especially
regerding the framing effect hypothesis which means that the choice is
affected by the way in which the actor frames the decision problem.
*
Department of Political Science, Faculty of commerce & Business
Administration, Helwan University, Egypt
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The framing effect hypotheis challenges the invariance and
dominance assumptions as two of four substantive assumptions of the
expected utility theory.
The substantive assumptions of the expected utility can be ordered
by their normative appeal from the cancellation condition which has
been challenged by many theorists, to invariance, which has been
accepted by all and which means that different representations of the
same choice problem should yield the same preference that is, the
preference between options should be independent of their
descriptions(1).
Because invariance and dominance are normatively essential and
descriptively invalid, a theory of rational choice can not provide an
adequate description of choice problem, conversely prospect theory's
assumptions regrading framing effect have descriptive paradigm, that
is prospect theory does not require that individual differences have no
impact importance or importance. Rather prospect theory reintroduces
the importance of the situation into the analysis of decision making, so
the theory has no normative dimension.
At this point much of Tversky and Kahneman’s work is designed
to show that descriptive and normative theories cannot be combined
into a single adequate model of choice, In short theories that are
empirically accurate in description fail to meet even the most basic
normative prescriptions, thus Tversky and Kahneman ultimately argue
that normative theories need to be abandoned altogether in analysing
Judgment and decision making because they fail to offer an adequate
understanding of actual decision behavior(2).
The descriptive model of prospect theory leads us to the main
research problem of this study: Can descriptive theories - especially
prospect theory as contradicted to normative theories of decision
making - explain mistakes of leaders or can explain why decision
makers may deviate from rationality?
In other words if prospect theory as descriptive theory of decision
making suggests that framing of the problem by actor affect
preferences or choices, is this possible to suggest that domain of
decision problem (gains or losses) as perceived rationality by actors can
explain deviations from nationality by leaders in their military and
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political choices or variations other than this perceived domain or
mental framing cause these deviations and mistakes by leaders.
The main assumption in this study is that if actors perceive
themselves to be in the domain of losses, they tend to engage in riskier
forms of behavior so the actors will choose the preference with more
losses to restore the status quo or to avoid certain losses.
If we qualify this theoretical argument and evaluate predictions
based on prospect theory not in absolute term, but relative to a rational
choice model based on a straight forward expected value calculus, we
should say not that an actor pursued a risky policy because he was in
the domain of losses, but that because of risk-seeking with respect to
losses he adopted amore risky alternative than predicted by a standard
expected value calculation.
Robert jervis was careful of this, he said that a “certain option
would not seem as attractive as standard utility maximization theory
implies” or that the risky option might be taken "even if the standard
probability – utility calculus calls for restraint"(3)
This hypothesis will be tested by examining the decisions of
president Sadat in war and peace, in particular Cease-Fire resolution in
the October 22nd, 1973 the decision to enter into negotiations for the
First disengagement in October 1973 and the Second disengagement in
November 1974, and Finally the Sadat's decision to visit Jersalem.
The Key question in this regard is whether these decisions subject
to rational behavior or rational choice? Or are they subject to the
framing of the political leader to the political and military situation
what is meant here is the mental framing. As how could Sadat frame
the situation in each of these three resolutions and the previous and
sbsequent decisions regarding the accounts for gains and losses? And
how this is reflected on the risk propensities? Are we on the impact of
another factor on risk propensities other than mental framing for gains
and losses which is called motivated illusions?
The importance of this issue returns to the need to consider
several critical military and political decisions from a perspective other
than the perspective of rational choice which assumes utility
maximization. As many analysts argue that if we look to the decisions of
Sadat in war and peace, we will find the deviation of the political leader
from rationality so much because he did not go to maximize the utility
in maintaing the circle of Arab Egypt which was at a great degree of
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solidarity before and after the October war and then as he did not go to
maximize the utility with regard to the Soviet supply of arms to Egypt.
On the contrary he lost the Arab circle as he lost this Super power as a
party that balanced the gifts and grants which were provided by the
United States to Israel. Hence we have to reread the decisions of Sadat
from another prepsective which is the framing of the political leader to
the situation or to the decision problem.
As the perspective of mental framing of the situation subjects to
the analysis of prospect theory we must study;
First: the development of this theory from the emperical and
experimental challenges to expected utility theory.
Second: The implications of prospect theory.
Third: Implications of prospect theory for international relations.
Fourth: Framing of Sadat to different decisions in war and peace
and the effect of this framing on his risk-propensity.
Fifth: The conclusions of applying prospect theory or mental
framing prospective.
First: Empirical and experimental challenges to expected
utility theory and development of prospect theory:
The expected – utility principle posits that actors try to maximize
their expected utility by weighting the utility of each possible outcome
of a given course of action by the probability of its occurance, summing
over all possible outcomes for each strategy, and selecting that strategy
with the highest expected utility.
Expected-utility theory assumes also that an actor's utility for a
particular good is a function of net asset levels of that good and that
preferences over out- comes do not depend upon current assets.
This means that the expected – utility depends on two issues:
First: The net asset levels of the good second: The probabilities given to
different preferences.
The experimental evidence suggests that there are a number of
respects in which people do not behave according the assumptions and
predictions of expected utility theory:At the first dimension:- there is substantial evidence that people
are more sensitive to changes in assets than to net asset levels, to gains
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and losses from a reference point rather than to levels of wealth and
welfare, this called reference dependence(4).
Reference dependence is particularly important because people
treat gains and losses differently, they overvalue losses relative to
comparable gains. As Jimmy Conners exclaimed "I hate to lose than I
like to win"(5)
Reference dependence phenomenon leads to phenomenon of "loss
aversion", one implication of loss aversion is that people tend to value
what they have more than comparable things they don’t have, and that
the disutility of relinquishing a good is greater than the utility of
acquiring it. This over- valuation of current possession is called the
"endowment effect"(6).
Further evidence in support of the hypotheses of loss aversion and
the endowment effect can be found in the observed tendency toward
status quo choices. Because people treat the costs of moving away from
the status quo as losses and the benefits of moving away from the status
quo as gains, and then overweight the former relative to the latter,
people stay at the status quo more frequently than expected utility
theory would predict (7).
The asymmetry between losses and gains is manifested not only in
loss aversion, the endowment effect, and status quo bias but also in risk
-orientation. People tend to be risk-averse with respect to gains and
risk-acceptant with respect to losses. This means that individual value
functions are usually concave in the domain of gains and convex in the
domain of losses, with a "reflection effect" around the reference point.
The reflection effect is defined by Tversky and Kahneman as that the
reversion of the signs of the outcomes or of prospects around 0 reverses
the preference order so risk aversion in positive domain (gains) should
be converted to risk seeking in the negative domain (losses)(8).
All these phenomena (Reference dependence, loss avesion,
endowment effect, reflection effect) mean that the role of the reference
point in defining the distinct domains of gains and losses is crucial and
that the identification or framing of this reference point can have a
critical effect on choice, this phenomenon is the "framing effect". A
change in frame can result in a change in preferences - preference
reversal - even if the values and probabilities associated with out comes
remain the same.
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The main question here as Jak levy asserted is how the problem or
the reference point can be framed?
We can imagine that in a static situation that involves a well
defined status quo, actors usually frame choice problems around the
status quo. Thus Tversky and Kahneman argue that "the reference
state usually corresponds to decision maker's current position"(9).
This is not always the case as the situations are dynamic and the
status quo is changeable. So dynamic situations are likely to induce
variations in the way people select reference points what means that
selection of reference point in different situations or by different people
is often subjective. This problem in international relations is that it is
often impossible to tell the difference between the objective and the
subjective framing of reference point.
The preceding problems and phenomena are related to violations
of expected-utility theory calculations of net asset levels of the good,
there are other violations of the theory calculations of the probabilities
given to different outcomes.
So at the second dimension experimental studies show that
individual choice behavior demonstrates a non-linear response to
probabilities, in contrast to the linear combination of utilities and
probabilities in expected-utility theory. First of all, studies have shown
that individuals overweight outcomes that are certain relative to
outcomes that are merely probable. Kahneman and Tversky called this
phenomenon the "certainty effect"(10).
The examples introduced by Tversky and Kahneman demonstrate
that the "certainty effect" has some thing to do with "risk orientation".
In the positive domain, the "certainty effect" contributes to a risk
averse preference for a sure gain over a larger gain that is merely
probable. In the negative domain the same effect leads to a risk seeking
preference for a loss that is merely probable over a smaller loss that is
certain. So the same psychological principle – the over weighting of
certainty – favors risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk seeking
in the domain of losses(11).
The other thing related to the evidence of the non-linear response
to probabilities is that the extremely likely outcome (but not certain) is
treated as if it is certain this is called the "Pseudo certainty effect" what
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Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
means that an outcome that is actually uncertain is weighted as if it
were certain(12).
Also the non – linear response to probabilities is manifested in
other phenomenon that people tend to overweight small probabilities
and to under- weight moderate and high probabilities, consequently,
changes in probabilities near 0 or 1 have a greater impact on
preferences than comparable changes in the middle of the probability
range(13).
All the preceding forms of behavior are contrary to the
expectation rule (that the utilities of risky outcomes are weighted
linearly by their probabilities). It is also important here to mention that
the effects of the overweighting of small probabilities may be reinforced
by the availability heuristic, in which dramatic events which come
readily to mind are perceived to be more likely than they actually are
(14).
This issue is critical for the military and political leaders at wars
or crises as it is possible to overweight the small probabilities of special
events for example president Sadat overweight the probability that the
third army may turn on the power because it is surrounded by Isreal.
Jack Levy differentiated between over-estimation or exaggeration
of probabilities and the overweighting of low probabilities, overestimation refers to the subjective assessment of probabilities and may
be influenced by the vividness of an event category or by other cognitive
or motivational biases. Overweighting is a property of the weighting
function, which operates on subjective probabilities assessments
independently of the processes by which they are generated, so what is
important here is the mental calculus of gains and losses by the
actor(15).
The question is the actor or decision maker affected by
psychological variations or mental framing when he over-estimate or
overweight an event??
Second:- The implications of the prospect theory:
Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory to integrate
the observed patterns of systemic violations of the expected – utility
theory into an alternative theory of risky choice.
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The prospect theory distinguishes two phases in the choice
process:- (16)
1) The editing phase:- The actor identifies the reference point, the
available options, the possible outcomes, the value and probability of
each of these outcomes.
2) The evaluation phase:- the edited prospects are evaluated and
the preferred prospect is selected.
It is really important to mention that editing and evaluation in
prospect theory involve several mental operations more specifically
prospect theory is based on psycho-mental operations or what Rose Mc
Dermott called psychophysical models. Traditionally, psychophysics
investigates the precise relationship, usually mathematically expressed,
between the physical and psychological worlds. The goal is to determine
the point at which a change in physical stimulus is psychologically
perceived as a sensory change by the subject. Most research in the
sensory domain, has determined that physical stimulus must increase
geometrically for psychological experience to in crease arithmetically
(17).
Tversky and Kahneman applied psychophysical principles to
investigate Judgment and decision making. Just as people are not aware
of the processing the brain engages in to translate vision into sight, they
are not aware of the kinds of computations the brain makes in editing
and evaluating choice. People make decisions according to how their
brains process and understand information and not solely on the basis
of the inherent utility that a certain option possesses for a decision
maker(18).
The first phase (editing phase) involves several mental operations
which simplify the choice problem by transforming the representation
of outcomes and probabilities and these operations are:- (19).
A) Coding:- which involves the identification of a reference point
and the framing of outcomes as deviations (gains or losses) from that
reference point, and this can affect orientation to risk.
B)Combination:- this operation means that prospect can some
times be simplified by combining the probabilities associated with
identical out comes. For example the prospect (200, 0.25 , 200, 0.25) will
be reduced to (200, 0.50) and evaluated in this form.
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C) Segregation: Some prospects contain a riskless component that
is segregated from the risky component in the editing phase for example
the prospect (300, 0.80 , 200, 0.20) is decomposed into a sure gain of 200
and the risky prospect (100, 0.80).
D) Cancellation:- the discarding of components that are shared by
the offered prospects, this operation leads to preference reversals and
violations of invariance.
In complex choice situations, it is difficult to predict how choice
problems are edited because the process is influenced by the norms,
habits and expectancies of the decision maker as well as the features
inherent in a choice problem for these reasons Kahneman and Tversky
focus on the evaluation of prospects rather than the editing of choices,
but editing plays a much greater role in choice situations in
international relations and requires more theoretical and empirical
attention.
The second phase: (the evaluation phase) Once the actor edits the
available options, he then evaluates the edited prospects and selects the
one with the highest value, as determined by the product of a value of
an outcome and decision weight. The weighted value of a prospect V is
given by.
V= ∑w (pi) * v (xi) (20)
Where p is the perceived probability of outcome x, W(p) is the
probability weighting function, and v(x) is the value function
The value function has three main characteristics, which reflect the
behavioral patterns summarized above, these characteristics are (21):(1) it is defined on deviations from a reference point, rather than
on net asset position (thus if the reference point shifts, the value
function shifts accordingly).
This means that the out comes are expressed in prospect theory as
positive or negative deviations (gains or losses) from a neutral reference
outcome, which is assigned a value of zero, the proposed function
expresses the property that the effect of a marginal change in value
decreases with the distance from the reference point in either direction.
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(2) The value function is generally concave for gains and convex
for losses, reflecting risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk
seeking in the domain of losses.
(3) A significant property of the value function called loss
aversion, is that the response to losses is more extreme than the
response to gains. Thus the value function is steeper for losses than for
gains and the marginal utility of gains decreases faster than the
marginal disutility of losses. A typical S-shaped value function is
presented in figure 1.
Value
Losses
Gains
Fig 1 A hypothetical value function
Source:Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky : Prospect theory : An analysis of decision under risk, Op.
cit., P. 279.
As for the probability – Weighting function it measures the impact
of the probability of an event on the desirability of a prospect, however,
it is not a linear function of probability, and decision weights are not
themselves probabilities. Decision weights could be influenced by
factors other than probability, including ambiguity, or uncertainty
about the level of risk.
The probability – weighting function has several characteristics
(22):First:- the weighting function is not well behaved near its end
points (0, 1), this reflects the unpredictability of behavior under
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conditions of extremely small or extremely large probabilities.
Kahneman and Tversky acknowledge this unpredictability and argue
that "because people are limited in their ability to comprehend and
evaluate extreme probabilities, highly unlikely events are either ignored
or overweighed, and the difference between high probability and
certainty is either neglected or exaggerated”(23).
Second:- the fact that the weighting function is not well behaved
near its end points leads to a second important characteristic of this
function that is there is a sharp increase in it in these regions. Thus
changes in probabilities near 0 or 1 have large effects on the evaluation
of prospects.
It is important to note that attitudes toward risk are not
determined by the S-Shaped value function alone. Rather risk –
propensities are determined Jointly by the value function and
probability weighting function. In the domain of gains where perceived
probabilities are in the middle range It will be under weighted. So the
under weighting of probabilities works together with the concavity of
the value function to undervalue the gamble relative to the certain
outcome and thus to encourage risk aversion. In the domain of losses
and also where the perceived probabilities are underweighted, the
underweight of probabilities reduces the weights given to risky negative
prospects, makes them less unattractive and thus encourages risk –
seeking (24).
Conversely where probabilities are small it will be overweighted.
Here the over weighting of probabilities works to increase the value of
positive gambles and to increase the negative value of negative gambles
and thus to encourage risk seeking in the domain of gains and riskaversion in the domain of losses, tendencies which are contrary to the
effects of value function(25).
Third:Implications of prospect theory for international
relations:
Analysts asserted that prospect theory has enormous potential for
explaining a wide range of international behaviour. So they have begun
to apply its implications of loss aversion, endowment effect, risk
orientation and framing effect to theoretical questions in international
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politics such as the stability of the status quo, deterrence, bargaining
and preventive war.
Based on the application of the hypotheses of prospect theory to
international relations, we can find many implications of it for
international politics and foreign policy for example:- (1) The issue of
the status quo bias, (2) Loss aversion and its effect on the stability of
international relations
(3) The implications of prospect theory for military conflicts and
the duration of these combats .
(4) The issue of preference reversals due to the dynamic property
of the political game
(5) The issue of the weights which given to the probabilities of the
options by actors or decision makers and their effect on the choice
system.
1) The issue of the status quo Bias:One implication of prospect theory is that people have a tendency
to remain at the status quo. The status quo is probably the most
common reference point for states as well as for individuals in their
framing of a decision problem. The status quo also is the endowment
point which the decision makers use in their calculations of gains and
losses .
If we apply the properties of the value function as the endowment
effect and the loss aversion we can imply that the disadvantages of
leaving the status – quo are over-weighted relative to the corresponding
advantages. This means that states seem to make greater efforts to
preserve the status quo against a threatened loss than to improve their
position by a comparable amount.
Although the salience of the status quo may be important in itself,
it also contributes to the tendency to define the status quo as the
reference point around which to frame gains and losses, so that the
salience of the status quo might effect outcomes through its impact on
framing and loss aversion, as we will see in the next point (26).
2) Loss aversion and its effect on the stability of international
relations:Levy offers another international implication of prospect theory,
that after suffering losses in territory, reputation or domestic support,
leaders will take excessive risks to recover them (27).
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Through his application of loss aversion hypothesis to
international relations Levy asserts that loss aversion helps to explain
why states are more concerned to prevent a decline in their reputation,
or credibility than to increase it by a comparable amount question.
The question here is that are the hypotheses of status quo bias and
loss aversion lead to stability or instability in international relations?
Prospect theory concerns with two contradictory tendencies:-(28)
1) First:- the tendency towards risk aversion in the domain of
gains, and the dampening effect this has on aggressive behavior to
improve one's position, presumably contributes to stability in
international politics.
2)Second: loss-aversion or risk – acceptant propensities in the
domain of losses, might have the opposite effect and contribute to
instability under certain conditions. A state which perceives itself to be
in a deteriorating situation might be willing to take excessively risky
actions in order to maintain the status quo against further
deterioration.
This would be particularly likely if the state perceived that the
further deterioration in its position were certain, or if its position had
already deteriorated and the state wanted to recover those losses (29).
This means that prospect theory implies that the magnitudes of
the losses involved need not be that large in order to induce risk –
seeking behaviour, particularly important is that the losses are
perceived to be certain.
The preceding idea reflects the centrality of the weights given by
actors to the probabilities of the different options or outcomes, if the
actor overweights or underweights this options and how this effect the
preferences or the choice system.
(3) The implications of prospect theory for military conflicts
and the duration of these combats:Many researchers and analysts try to apply prospect theory in the
field of military conflict. For example Thomas Bauer and Ralph Rotte
use duration analysis for a data set of twentieth century battles to test
two of the main implications of prospect theory. Framing effect and
endowment effect and how to apply them to military conflict.
Bauer and Rotte reach to two important conclusions from this
empirical test:- (30)
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First:- When the actor frame the decision as to be in the domain of
losses, then the experience of losses contributes positively to the
resolution to continue fighting , up to a point where casualties clearly
outweigh any direct utility drawn from ordinary expected – utility
theory.
This conclusion relates directly to one central implication of
prospect theory which is risk-acceptant in the domain of losses.
Second:- The empirical results also indicate that the relative
position compared to the opponent's is clearly less important for the
decision whether to stop a battle or not than the change of one's own
position compared to the beginning of the fight and this conclusion also
relates to an important implication of prospect theory that is the
endowment effect and the role of the reference point in determining the
domain (gains or losses)
If a country expects a deterioration of its international standing it
can be expected to take risky and even aggressive actions in order to
prevent that deterioration. So the effect of loss aversion and risk –
seeking in actual international conflicts asserts that prospect theory
predicts that wars, just like fuitle policies, should take longer to stop
than ordinary cost-benefit calculation would imply.(31).
As soon as losses have occurred and original strategic plans have
failed, decision makers do not adjust their expectations and their
reference point to the new situation but keep on the status quo in order
to recover these losses. The result is a prolongation of wars which is
irrational since wasteful from an economic prespective. Afghanistan,
Vietnam and especially the great war are striking example for this
consequence. (32).
Prospect theory predicts that leaders, due to their loss-aversion
should be prepared to accept an extremely high rate of casualties before
becoming increasingly prepared to stop an offensive. One has therefore
to take account of potential non-linearity in the influence of casualties
on the willingness to keep on fighting, as the rate of casualties which
can be accepted by leaders will be different from one case to another.
(33).
The preceding ideas mean that prospect theory implies that the
political and military leaders will begin the political compromise of any
military conflict if they have made psychological peace with their losses.
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4)The issue of preference reversals due to the dynamic
property of the political game:Because of the asymmetry of gains and losses and the role of the
reference point in defining these distinct domains, the identification or
framing of the reference point can have a critical effect on choice. A
change in frame can result in a change in preferences (preference
reversal) even if the values and probabilities associated with out comes
remain the same. As prospect theory implies that the reference point
will not be static but it can change from one phase to another in the
same problem so the actor will perceive him self to be in the domain of
gains at the beginning of the problem then in another phase he will
perceive him self to be in the domain of losses and vise-versa.
This leads to change of preferences of the actor or change in risk –
propensity due to change of framing of the problem and to the dynamic
property of the political game and that prospect theory call preference
reversal.
Several authors have applied prospect theory to historical cases to
explain leaders’ sudden policy switches. For example Mc Dermott
applied prospect theory to explain president Carter's reverse over
admitting the Shah of Iran to the United States. She argues that at the
beginning of the problem about admitting Shah of Iran to the United
State and it was in February 1979 Carter had high approval ratings
and had achieved, or was expecting, several foreign policy successes,
over arms control, Panama, China, and a Middle East peace treaty.
The hypothesis is that Carter's mental reference point had yet to
adjust to these jumps so that the possible outcomes of his decision on
the shah all lay on the positive side of that point or in the domain of
gains, then prospect theory would predict the risk – averse choice which
was a refusal of the Shah and that was the one Carter made (34).
However by October 1979 Carter's fortunes had sunk – as argued by
Mc Dermott – He had become vulnerable to Republican attacks and
was being challenged by Edward Kennedy within his pary. His
reference point had to adjust down wards and he saw the various
outcomes of a decision on the Shah as losses. Then prospect theory
would predict the riskier course of admitting the Shah, which is what
Carter did. (35)
Prospect theory implies that preference reversal means that we
can predict puzzling change of minds by real leaders.
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(5) The issue of the weights which given to the probabilities of
the out comes and their effect on the choice system.
As mentioned before the probability weighting function measures
the impact of the probability of an event on the desirability of a
prospect, and it was mentioned also that weights are not themselves
probabilities as decision weights could be influenced by several factors
other than probability, Including ambignity, or uncertainty about the
level of risk. What means that decision weight don't respond linearly to
the probabilities of several decisions. Saw the decision maker will
overweight the probabilities of several decisions and under – weight the
probabilities of others.
As mentioned before also the attitudes toward risk are not
determined by the value function alone. Rather these attitudes are
determined jointly by value function and probability weighting
function. This implication of prospect theory has been explained by
jack s-levy- as mentioned before- and also by other authors such as P.E.
Tetlock and J.M. Goldgeieer.
Tetlock and Goldgeieer argued that prospect theory posits that
under certain conditions, decision makers should be willing to take
riskier courses of action than would be justified based on calculations of
their expected final asset position and these conditions are as follows
(36):First:- They have not made psychological peace with their losses.
Second:- They underweight subjective probabilities of failure by
treating small probabilities as equivalent to zero.
Third:- They overweight subjective probabilities of success by
treating large probabilities as equivalent to one.
By contrast, decision makers should be especially reluctant to take
courses of action as risky as those stipulated by expected-value calculus
when they renormalized perceptions of what is theirs in response to
recent gains, when they over weight small probabilities of failure by
dwelling on them, and when they under weight large probabilities of
success by ruminating over how things could go wrong. (37).
Prospect theory implies that the perceived domain (gains or losses)
of the decision maker jointly with the weights given to the probabilities
determine risk- propensities and preferences.
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Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
Fourth: Framing of Sadat to different decisions in war
and peace and the effect of this framing on his riskpropensity.
Whereas there are further complications in applying prospect
theory to international relations in general and to decisions of foreign
policy in specific including that it is difficult to assess probabilities of
various decisions and it is difficult to assess values of alternatives based
on its deviation from certain reference point, a studywhich has
developed a theoretical framework allows to apply this theory to
decisions of foreign policy with no need to recognize such obscure
assessment of values and probabilities of different alternatives of
decision maker(38). Such framework- as herein aforementioned- refers
to that the domain of gains and losses as perceived by decision maker
affects the orientation towards risk; as researcher's or analyst's study
of the domain (gains or losses) as perceived by decision maker allows
clarifying relation between such perceived domain by decision maker
and his or her orientation towards risk.
Such study has referred to that it is essential for the researcher or
the analyst of a decision or series of certain decisions, of foreign policy
in the course of the study and analysis of the perceived domain by the
decision maker, to take into consideration particular matters including;
first: whether the domain perceived by the decision maker objective or
subjective? Although the prospect theory states that framing of the
domain is always associated with considerations of decision maker or
the actor; whether he is in the domain of gains or losses which means
that the perceived domain of a certain decision is in most cases
subjective, the researcher has to reach a particular assessment with
regard to whether such subjective domain (i.e., perceived subjectively
by the decision maker) is in harmony with objective domain (i.e., the
domain as in fact or as recognized by many individuals surrounding the
decision maker.).
Second: there is another significant problem in identifying or
analyzing the domain by the analyst or researcher; identifying criterion
or variable on which a decision maker depends to frame the domain
whereas it is known that different individuals or decision makers may
apply various criteria or variables for identifying an action domain.
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For instance; certain presidents overvalue internal variables in
making certain decision concerning foreign policy or international
relations or in identifying an action domain in certain subject, so
positive international variables may be insignificant to a president who
overvalues internal variables which means that different actors
consider different variables whether such variables are international,
regional or internal ones in identifying whether they are working in
domain of gains or in domain of losses. The researcher tries to identify
such issue based on studying decision maker's announcements and
actions. In order to fulfill the theoretical framework drawn by the
study, the perceived domain is not the sole independent variable
affected decision maker's orientation towards risk however there is
another independent variable has to be taken into consideration in the
course of analysis of certain decision-as aforementioned herein-;
weights of different alternatives given by the decision maker as the
researcher has to assess such weights and probabilities thereof.
Consequently, it should be specified that if the decision maker
overweights subjective probabilities of success or overweights
subjective probabilities of failure and how such matter affects
orientation towards risk.
For the definition of dependent variable, according to such
theoretical framework; orientation towards risk, definition of such
orientation and how the alternative is more risky than others may be
easy in financial and economic matters but for decisions related to
foreign policies, definition of alternatives that are more or less risky is
not easy because a political decision maker does not present probability
assessments to options as preferred by decision analysts.
Therefore, several criteria for more or less risky alternatives have
been drawn, including hierarchal comparisons. For instance, when a
decision maker tries to compare policy (A) with policy (B) as policy (A)
will result in the best outcomes if succeeded and the worst outcomes if
failed however policy (B) will not present a good result if succeeded as
(A), but in case of failure the result will not too bad as in case of failure
of (A). So, policy (B) is less risky than policy (A) because there is less
difference in the result as the best side in (B) is less than the best side in
(A) however the worst side in (B) is less than the worst side in (A).
Thus, the risk of an alternative will be relatively assessed in relation to
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Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
the other alternative available at that time on the basis of the difference
in result. Consequently, it will be easy to identify the decision maker's
orentation towards risk.
In applying such theoretical framework, derived from prospect
theory, concerned with perceived domain and weights given by the
decision maker to different alternatives as they are considered
independent variables affect decision maker's orientation towards risk
as it is considered a dependent variable to a number of Sadat's
decisions in war and peace, we specifically refer to the President Sadat's
decision to cease-fire during October War on 22nd October 1973,
decision of making negotiations with Israel at (101 Km) which resulting
in the first Agreement of Disengagement in January 1974, the second
Agreement of Disengagement in September 1975 and finally his
decision to visit Jerusalem in November 1977, we analyze the perceived
domain by the decision maker, the weights given by the actor to
probabilities of failure and success and orientation towards risk.
1- Perceived domain by the President Sadat:
At first, we refer to the perceived domain concerning the three
decisions as a whole then we refer to the perceived domain by the
President Sadat in relation to each decision separately.
In the frame of our analysis to the perceived domain, we are
concerned with an essential case -as aforementioned herein- which is
whether the domain subjectively perceived by the decision maker is in
harmony with objective domain or not and what are the differences?
The President Sadat have always been perceiving that he is in
domain of losses whether at the level of his relations with international
powers, at the level of his relations with Arab regional powers or at the
internal level.
At the international level, as his point of view, Egypt is not
supported by international powers; on the other hand Israel is highly
supported by the United States, hence Sadat's announcements and
actions towards the Ex-Soviet Union referred to that Sadat realized that
the Soviet Union did not present the support required to pass stage of
war. Such issue is proved when Sadat showed hostility to the Soviet
Union as he expelled Soviet experts then relations have been extremely
aggravated when the President Sadat dismissed the Soviet Union from
negotiations of conflict settlement starting from negotiation of (101 K),
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afterwards, the President Sadat cancelled facilities that the Soviet
Union obtained at the Mediterranean Sea Coast. Moreover, the
President Sadat nullified Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in
March 1976. As a result, Egypt lost the sole source of getting weapons
in order to be balanced with Israel (39).
As the above mentioned is Sadat's subjective assessment in
relation to the domain of (gains and losses) at the international level,
especially at the level of relations with the Soviet Union, the objective
assessment may greatly differ from this subjective assessment
according to evaluation of political and military analysts and decision
makers. For instance, the Lieutenant General, Sa'ad El-Din El-Shazly,
the Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces at that time commented on
what he has been informed by Ali Sadek, the Minister of War at that
time, About Sadat's decision of expelling the Soviet experts and
dispensing of Soviet units saying ((you realize how this decision is
serious, it would greatly affect our fighting capabilities. The Soviet
effectively contributes at air defense. They have two air brigades and
ground-to-air missiles squads)) (40).
The Lieutenant General, Sadek, the Minister of War at that time
commented saying: ((I have always called upon exerting pressure on the
Soviet Union to get what we need… but I did not absolutely imagine
reaching this extent)) (41).
Furthermore, memoirs of the writer, Muhammed Hassanein
Hekal concerning October War emphasized the same meaning as the
factual or objective assessment of international domain stated that
Egypt was in domain of gains as Egypt got weapons from the Ex- Soviet
Union. Hekal has emphasized in his memoirs that assessment of
October War period from 6th October till 26th October referred to that
there were several positive points (gains) and negative points (losses).
One of the positive points was such multitude of weapons in such a way
so as not be provided before to any Arab county by the Soviet Union.
Getting weapons from the Soviet Union- at his point of view- is
considered to be a miracle after the decision of expelling the Soviet
experts in July 1972 as it was expected that the Soviet Union would stop
providing Egypt with weapons, however, the Soviet Union realized that
it may lose its universal position, therefore, the Soviet Union opened
weapon warehouses in full (42).
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Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
What have been said about Sadat's assessment of domain at the
international level would be said also about his assessment of domain at
the regional level. It was obvious from the President's decisions and
actions that he considered this regional field; the Arab regional field
specifically as a negative one. It was clear from Sadat's actions during
October War that there was no coordination between the southern
front line in Egypt and northern front line in Syria. The coordination
was restricted to planning in order to commence the battle, its day and
time. The separation between two front lines was not restricted to
military field but the political field also as Egypt's communication with
Washington was extremely in an individual way so as to Syria was
astonished with Cairo's Peace Draft Scheme presented by Sadat after
10 days as of the battle commencement while the Egyptian Forces were
in climax of victory, exactly on 16th of October in Sadat's speech before
People's Council (43).
Furthermore, the President Sadat has accepted the decision of
cease-fire on 22nd of October 1973 without consultation with Syria and
without notifying Syria of implementation time of such decision. As the
writer Muhammed Hassanein Hekal said; the decision of cease- fire is a
serious matter resulting in very significant results and the war political
leadership of the two front lines has no right to act solely (44).
Thus, from Sadat's decisions, Sadat considered the Arab regional
domain as a negative domain as he did not see any significance to make
coordination with such domain at the subjective level, however, at the
objective level, many people talked about their assessment to the Arab
regional domain as a positive domain in its essence. The Lieutenant
General, Sa'ad El-Din El-Shazly emphasized in his memoirs (Chapter
29) that the Arab Cooperation was not between the two front lines only
but it was obvious among the Arab countries as the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Iraq, Sudan and Kuwait
provided military support to the Egyptian and Syrian front lines (45).
The Lieutenant General, El-Shazly emphasized that if there were
nine Arab countries provided the military support to the two front line
countries, there were other seven Arab countries; United Arab of
Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Katar, Lebanon, and Yemen did not
contribute in the battle with military forces which does not mean that
they refrain from support however it means that they did not have what
they can provide in the battle, "the Arab cooperation during October
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War was in the best image ever emerged among Arabs since
establishment of state of Israel"(46); the lieutenant General, El-Shazly
added with emphasis.
Nevertheless, Sadat was pessimistic in his view to the internal
domain as he believed that the economic situation in Egypt reached to
under zero stage when October War was broken up which means that
the domain internally perceived by Sadat was negative in its essence.
Sadat believed that the economic situation has been declined to
desperation stage. Moreover, Sadat has linked between getting out
from such bad economic situation and obtaining peace (47).
This refers that Sadat gave significance to the negative side in any
domain of the three domains as refers to his concern of internal position
and of his power not to be deteriorated.
2- Weights given by decision maker to failure and success
probabilities and orientation towards risk
We recognize such weights through review each of the three
decisions separately and surrounding conditions. For the decision of
cease- fire on 22nd of October 1973, Sadat made such decision under a
negative domain; under a set of damages affected the Egyptian Armed
Forces since Defreswar Gap and penetration of Suez Canal western
bank by the enemy in comparison of gains obtained by these Forces
before Defreswar Gap. Consequently, according to prospect theory, it
was expected that the commander should continue war in order to
recover losses, on the contrary, Sadat accepted cease-fire. This may be
due- including other factors as will be mentioned- to that Sadat
overweight the failure probabilities; hence, he refused to continue war,
or he refused risk as he considered that continuity of war should lead to
deterioration of Egypt's international, regional and internal position.
It is worth mentioning that there was a series of decisions marked
by risk-acceptance, which resulting in acceptance of cease-fire on 22nd
October 1973 in spite of loss affecting Egyptian Military Forces (48).
First decision of these decisions is that of attack development
towards straits. Such decision represents a kind of risk-acceptance
under gains achieved in the first days of war. As a result, Israel
penetrated the Canal western bank due to incitation of two Egyptian
brigades (21) and (4) in order to make an attack and withdraw them
22
Essays
Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
from the Canal western bank whereas their existence in the Canal
western bank was considered as an essential matter to prevent
penetration of defense line. The second decision which was one of the
decisions resulting in making the decision of cease-fire is that of refusal
of forces withdrawing from east to west after the Gap to confront the
enemy from the west. This decision was considered as a great risk
although Sadat believed that forces withdrawal was a risk. The
military commanders agreed unanimously on the necessity of
withdrawal of squad (21) and the armored brigade (25) from east to
west in order to attack the enemy Gap from west, however, political
commander severely refused such matter continuing to make risky
decisions through his decision to attack the enemy Gap by confronting
it from the east without cover from the air forces.
Many damages were resulted from the series of three risky
decisions which were represented in deepening the Gap. Sadat made
the decision of cease-fire because he overweight the failure probabilities
of Gap confrontation.
Although the decision of cease-fire on 22nd October 1973, from
Sadat's point of view, was less risky than continuing war, such decision
resulting in serious damages as Israelis dared to go forward to the
Canal western side after the Cease-Fire decision on the pretext of
violating the decision by the third army. Consequently, Israel went
forward 35 km in the south at one day which was 23 rd of October 1973
(49).
Thus, the third army and Suez city were besieged by Israel only
after making the decision of cease-fire on 22nd October 1973. The third
army was fully besieged by Israel on 27th October 1973. Such domain
was the domain or the context in which Sadat made the decision of
negotiating Israel at 101 Km at Suez Road. This domain was a negative
one in its essence and Sadat overweight the failure probabilities as a
result of his fear that the third army would be besieged. Such siege may
lead to coup d'ètat by the blocked army to the power as Sadat was
obsessed by the idea of besieged armys may be the focal point of coup
d'ètat to the power (50).
Hence, decision of making negotiations with Israel at (101) Km at
Suez Road looked like a kind of surrender by the Egyptian leadership
as negotiations of (101) Km resulting in the first Agreement of
Disengagement in January 1974 and the second Agreement of
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Al Nahda, Vol. 13 No.3, July 2012
Disengagement in September 1975. Egypt was obliged in such
agreements to withdraw second and third army forces from the Canal
eastern side. This surrender came out of Israel and America's
utilization of the third army as a pressure factor on Egypt in addition to
Sadat's fear- as aforementioned herein- of the army's siege and
consequences thereof.
In addition to the military damages that Egypt suffered from,
Egypt suffered at the international and regional domains; the third
army was not a pressure factor by Israel only, but by the United States
of America also as Egypt surrendered to America to dismiss the Soviet
power. At the regional level, Egypt asked the Arab countries, upon the
American pressure, for lifting embargo imposed by these countries
upon Israel and concerning fuel supply to America (51).
This was the context or the domain in which Sadat made the
decision of visiting Jerusalem in November 1977. Such domain
represented loss at the internal regional and international sides.
Although an international conference in Geneva would has been
convened in which the two great powers and Arab parties participating
in October War in addition to Israel would have been assembled, Sadat
made the decision of peace solely as a result- as herein above
aforementioned- of overweighting failure probabilities as Sadat
believed that the Arab field would bring damages to him continuously
as well as the internal field, especially, the economic side was in decline,
hence, in his point of view, he has to take a risk in order to encounter
such damages internally, regionally and internationally.
Fifth:Results of applying prospect theory or the
perspective of mental framing according to the
theory and prospective view:
We see through analysis of Sadat's decisions in war and peace that
Sadat, political leader or decision maker believed that he permanently
in domain of losses. Consequently, he made unattractive decisions
continuously. This means-as first impression- that the hypothesis is
greatly correct as it states that when decision makers make certain
decisions concerning certain problems as they relate to the negative
domain, decision makers make unattractive or risky decisions in order
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Essays
Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
to restore the current status quo or the situation which the decision
maker experienced before damages are suffered.
However, the worth analysis point in the present study is that were
Sadat's decisions risky decisions in his point of view? From the
subjective side, Sadat made the decision of cease-fire on 22nd October
1973, decision of making negotiations with Israel at (101 Km) at Suez
Road as well as decision of visiting Israel in November 1977 as decisions
away from risk because risk- in his point of view- was represented in
continuing war as an alternative of first and second decisions or to
continue on no peace-no war condition as an alternative of third
decision.
Consequently, the subjective assessment of decision risk would
refer to that although Sadat believed he was in the domain of losses, he
made decisions away from risk, which contradicts with hypothesis of
prospect theory which is considered as a theory of making decisions in
risky conditions because when the decision maker realizes that he is in
the domain of losses, he will make risky decisions. The above mentioned
contradiction may due in its essence to what prospect theory
hypothesized; when a leader or a decision maker overweights the
failure probabilities of certain policies or decisions, this may lead him to
be risk-averse when he is in the domain of losses. Sadat always
overweighted failure probabilities of continuing confrontation with
Israel. For instance, Sadat overweighted failure probabilities of Gap
confrontation through moving some forces from the Canal eastern side
to its western side also he overweighted Arab failure to make peace
with Israel, hence, he made the decision of peace solely, ect,.
This means- as aforementioned at the introduction of the studythat prospect theory gives significance to each condition or each
situation separately; it does not suppose standard sample if the leader
does not follow, he will be described as adventurer but it justifies a
leader's or a decision maker's subjective view in its effect to orientation
towards risk, hence, prospect theory justifies some irrational or
incorrect actions of political and military leaders on the basis of their
view to the domain in which the decision problem is and their view of
weights of success or failure probabilities.
Whoever, many decisions are not made according to mental
framing of a decision maker and the effect of such framing to options or
decisions. They are made under effect of other factors other than such
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Al Nahda, Vol. 13 No.3, July 2012
mental framing. Although prospect theory concerns with each situation
separately and a leader's view in his framework, it hypothesizes that
such mental framing is in harmony with the objective view in a way or
another whether in the way by which the domain specifies the decision
problem, in addition to assessment of weights of different probabilities
of failure or success and finally in specifying if the decision represents a
risk or not.
For specifying the domain whether it represents a positive or
negative one- as aforementioned- we find that Sadat's subjective view
was different greatly from objective view as well as weights of
probabilities that estimated by Sadat were different from objective
assessment of such weights by many military and political leaders as
Sadat believed that it was impossible to confront the enemy Gap from
the Canal western side, on the contrary, many military leaders believed
that was the best option to confront the enemy Gap as an alternative to
confront the enemy from the Canal eastern side.
Moreover, Sadat's assessment or view to alternatives or decisions
concerning the orientation towards risk was different from the
objective view. As aforementioned Sadat believed that decisions or
alternatives that he chose were less risky than continuing war or being
in no peace- no war condition; the decision of cease-fire, accepting
negotiations at (101) Km, or his visit to Jerusalem however from the
objective side such decisions were extremely risky decisions taking into
consideration their consequent damages. The decision of cease-fire led
to that Israel went forward to the Canal western side and the Egyptian
third army squad and Suez City were besieged. The decision of
accepting negotiation at (101) Km led to a condition looked like
surrender to Israeli and American commands. The decision of
Jerusalem visit led to complete loss of Arab countries and Soviet Union
as a great power on the same level with the United States of America.
The most evident indication and evidence that Sadat's view was
greatly different from the objective view was his orientation to settle
peace since the commencement of war till its end regardless of the
domain and his assessment to such domain, as Sadat declared on 16 th of
October Peace Draft Scheme with Israel on his speech before the
People's Council although war was in domain of gains. Then, he
declared again his acceptance to cease-fire on 22nd October although
26
Essays
Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
domain of gains turned to be domain of losses. Sadat continued to
choose such preferences of peace with his visit to Jerusalem and Camp
David discussions later. Such matter comes in contradiction with one of
the basic concepts of prospect theory which is the preferences reversal
due to change of the domain perceived by the decision maker.
This leads us to say that many decisions were not made according
to mental framing as considered by a decision maker but made on the
basis of certain illusions or what is called by sociologists motivated
illusions which means that prospect theory as a descriptive theory may
justify mistakes of decision makers on the basis of their different
framing of the problem.
So decision makers must has a normative criteria to avoid the
losses resulted from the subjective view of certain decisions. The
expected utility theory asserted the utilitarian property of these criteria,
we must assert the ethical property of these.
Decision makers should have subjective view derived from values
not motives. If Sadat moved to the west, especially the United States in
his options, values forced a decision maker to achieve interests of his
country away from such motives. He should be motivated by values of
Arab solidarity and maintenance of Arab circle in the frame of Middle
East region and most critical and interlaced issues thereof.
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References
(1) Tversky, Amos And Kahneman, Danial, Rational Choice And The
Framing Of Disisions The Joucrnal Of Business, Vol. 59, No.4, Oct. 1988,
pp 252-257.
(2) Mc Dermott, Rose, Risk Taking In International Politics: Prospect Theory In
American Foreign Policy, Amazon, Universtity of Michigan Press 2001, pp.
18-19.
(3) Levy, Jack S., Prospect Theory And International Relations: Theoretical
Applications And Analytical Problems, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No.2,
Jun 1992, p. 298.
(4) Levy, Jack S., Prospect Theory, Rational Choice And International
Relations, International Studies Quartaly, Vol. 41, No.1, Mar., 1997, pp.
88-89..
(5) Levy, Jack S., An Introduction To Prospect Theory, Political Psychology,
Vol.13, No.2, Jun 1992, p.175..
(6) Levy, Jack S., Prospect Theory, Rational Choice And International
Relations, Op. Cit, p. 89.
(7) Ibid, p.90.
(8) Kahneman Daniel, And Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of
Decision Under Risk, Econometrica, March No., p. 268 .
(9) Levy, Jack S., Prospect Theory Rational Choice, And International
Relations, Op. Cit., p.91.
(10) Kahneman, Daniel And Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis Of
Decision Under Risk, Op. Cit., p. 265.
Kahneman And Tversky Introduced Many Examples To Explain The
Certainty Effect As The Problem To Choose Between Two Preferences.
Preference A: To Win 2500 With Probability .33,
2400 With Probability .66,
0 With Probability .01
Preference B: To Win 2400 With Certainty.
The Data Show That 82 Percent Of The Subjects Choose Preference B In This
Problem Due To The Certainty Effect.
(11) Ibid., pp. 268-269.
(12) Tversky, Amos And Kahneman, Daniel, Rational Choice And The
Framing Of Decisions, Op. Cit., pp. 265-270.
(13) Levy, Jack S., An Introduction To Prospect Theory, Op. Cit., pp. 178-179
.
(14) Ibid., pp. 178-179.
(15) Ibid., p. 178-179.
28
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Dr. Marwa Hamed El-Badry
(16) Ibid., pp. 179-180.
(17) Mc Dermott, Rose, Risk – Taking In International Politics, Op. Cit., p. 18.
(18) Ibid., p. 18.
(19) - Mc Dermott, Rose, Risk – Taking In International Politics, Op. Cit., pp.
34-24
-
Kahneman, Daniel And Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
Of Decision Under Risk, Op. Cit., pp. 274-277.
(20) Levy, Jack S., An Introduction Prospect Theory, Op. Cit., p. 181.
(21) - Kahneman, Daniel And Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
Of Decision Under Risk, Op. Cit., pp. 277-280
-
Levy, Jack S., An Introduction To Prospect Theory, Op Cit., p181.
-
Tversky, Amos And Kahneman, Daniel, Rational Choice And The
Framing Of Decisions, Op. Cit., pp. 258-259.
(22)- Kahneman, Daniel And Tversky, Amos, Prospect Theory: An Analysis
Of decision Under Risk, Op. Cit., pp.280-284.
-
Levy, Jack S., An Introduction To Prospect Theory, Op. Cit., pp. 181184.
(23) Levy, Jack S., An Introduction To Prospect Theory, Op. Cit., p. 182.
(24) Ibid., p. 183.
(25) Ibid., p.184.
(26) Levy, Jack S.., Prospect Theory And International Relations: Theoretical
Applications And Analytical Problems, Op. Cit., p.285.
(27) O’Neill, Barry, Risk Aversion In International Relations Theory, Center
For International Security And Cooperation, Stinford University, March
2001, P.12.
(28) Levy, Jack S., Prospect Theory And International Relations: Theoretical
Applications And Analytical Problems, Op. Cit., p.286.
(29) There Are Numerous Examples In Which States Appear To Adopt RiskSeeking Or Loss Aversion Behavior In Order To Prevent The Deterioration
Of Their International Positions Or Of The Status Quo These Examples Are:A) Loss Aversion Or Risk-Acceptant Might Lead States In A Arisis Situations
To Take Preemptive Action And Accept The Risks Inherent In War If
They Were Nearly Certain That The Adversary Was A Bout To Initiate A
First Strike, Even Though A Standard Probability – Utility Calculus
Might Call For Restraint.
B) Loss Aversion And Risk-Seeking Also Help To Explain Why States
Frequently Find Themselves Continuing To Follow Failing Policies For
Longer Than A Standard Cost-Benefit Calculus Might Predict, In The
Hope That They Might Recover Their Costs.
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Al Nahda, Vol. 13 No.3, July 2012
C) Political Leaders Also May Accept Riks Through Their Engagement In
Forceful Action Against External Enemies In Order To Secure Their
Deteriorating Domestic Positions Againt Domestic Enemies, The Action
To Divert The Domestic Conflict To External Conflict Is Called
Diversionary Action In Foreign Policy Literatures.
Look Here:- Ibid., pp.286-287
(30) Bauer, Thomas And Rotte, Ralph, Prospect Theory Goes To War: LossAversion And The Duration Of Military Combat, SELAPO, University Of
Munich, October 1997, pp. 1-2 .
(31) Ibid., p. 5.
(32) Ibid., p.5.
(33) Ibid., p. 7.
(34) O’Neill, Barry, Op. Cit., pp.24-25.
(35) Ibid., p. 25.
(36) Geier, J. M. Gold And Tetloch’, P.E., Psychology And International
Relations Theory, Ar Journals. Annual Reviews.Org, 2001, p. 70.
(37) Ibid., pp.70-71.
(38) Mc Dermott, Rose, Risk Taking In International Politics, Op. Cit., pp.3744.
(39) Zahran, Gamal Ali, Forein Policy For Egypt, 1970 -1971, Cairo, Madboli
Libarary, pp 312-313.
(40) El Shazli, Saad Eldin, The Memories Of October War, San Fransisco,
American Centre For Middle East Researshes, 2003, pp. 167, 168.
(41) Ibid., p. 168.
(42) Hekil, Mohamed Hasinen, October 73: Army And Policy, ElAhram
Centre For Translation., 1993, p. 580.
(43) Ibid., p.581.
(44) Ibid., p.583.
(45) About this military support from Arab countries look: Saad Eldin
Elshazly, The memories of October war, Op. cit., P.230.
(46) Ibid., p.230, El Sahzly Assorted There Were Negative Points And Positive
Points In The Arab Cooperation During October War, And About The
Positive Points Look At pp. 230-233.
(47) Zahran, Gamal, Op. Cit., pp. 163-166.
(48) About The Series Of Decisions That Resulted In The Acceptance Of The
Cease-Fire Look At: Elshazly, Saad Eldin, Op.Cit., pp.272-285.
(49) Ibid., pp. 295-296.
(50) Heikl, Mohamed Hasinen, Op. Cit., p. 596.
(51) Elshazly, Saad Eldin, Op. Cit., pp.306-311.
30