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April 2004
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IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy no. 15, June 2004
The Politics of Collapse:
Development, the WTO and the Current Round of Trade
Negotiations
Rorden Wilkinson∗
Department of Government, University of Manchester, UK
[email protected]
In September 2003 representatives of the WTO’s 146 member states1 met in Cancún to
discuss progress in the so-called development Round – officially the Doha
Development Agenda (DDA) after the preceding meeting which launched the
negotiations. The task at hand was difficult: to relieve the deadlock plaguing the trade
agenda and in so doing to agree to concessions designed to address the development
concerns of the Global South, while placating the North’s desire to begin negotiations
on multilateral agreements on investment, government procurement, trade facilitation
and competition policy (the so-called Singapore issues). The fault line was agriculture,
a notoriously awkward area. All of the usual players were in town: legions of trade
officials from the industrial North; significantly fewer representatives from the more
numerous countries of the South; protestors; NGOs; press; organising committee
officials; on-lookers; and a heavy security presence comprising armed police, co-opted
personnel and, most formidably, three Mexican warships.
Yet, in spite of comfortable surroundings, relatively good pre-Conference preparation
(in Geneva), the security provisions of the Mexican government, the careful
management of NGOs within and away from the main conference centre,2 and the
efforts of the Conference Chair (Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez) and
his ‘facilitators’,3 the meeting collapsed in a hail of acrimony and was overshadowed
by the suicide of a Korean farmer – Lee Hyung Hae. In the muck slinging that
followed, US Trade Representative Robert Zoellick blamed the agitations, politics of
protest, and ‘won’t do’ stances of ‘larger developing states’ (principally India and
Brazil) for the meeting’s collapse;4 EU Trade Negotiator Pascal Lamy once again
∗
I am grateful for the financial assistance of the British Academy and for the institutional support of the
Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS), University of Manchester, the Watson
Institute, Brown University, and Wellesley College. The paper draws upon and develops arguments first
set out in ‘Crisis in Cancún’, Global Governance, 10: 2 (March 2004) and (co-authored with Amrita
Narlikar) ‘Collapse at the WTO: A Cancún post-mortem’, Third World Quarterly, 25: 3 (April 2004). I
am grateful to Craig Murphy and Amrita Narlikar for their comments on aspects of this paper. Versions
of this paper were presented at the International Studies Association Convention, Montreal 17-20 March
2004, and the Conference on Global Social Responsibility, Wellesley College, 31 April-1 May 2004.
3
labelled the WTO a medieval organisation and warned against expectations of a quick
resumption of the EU seat at the negotiating table;5 and sections of the NGO
community celebrated the meeting’s significance in the wider battle to resist first
world agendas and sink the WTO to the tune of ‘Can’t buy my love’. Were it not for
the Conference’s ratification of the accession protocols for Cambodia and Nepal and
the agreement of a six paragraph ministerial declaration attesting to ‘considerable’
progress having been made during the meeting, little of consolation would have been
salvaged from Cancun.6
In the settling of dust since September, matters seem little better. Hopes that the DDA
would be energised by the convening of another ministerial conference relatively soon
after Cancún were dashed when it emerged in late February 2004 that the Hong Kong
authorities had been unable to agree a date for a meeting, and given the lead time
necessary for preparations (an estimated 9 months) the meeting would not take place
this year; the most talked about developing country coalition forged in the run up to
and during the meeting (the G22) remains intact (albeit with some attrition to a G20)
and resolutely steadfast;7 persistent calls from the WTO Director-General, UN officials
(including Kofi Annan), and trade ministers across the developed and developing
world for serious negotiating to recommence have gone unanswered; US frustration at
the intransigence that crystallised in Cancún has been alleviated slightly by progress
made in securing bilateral trade deals;8 even Lamy’s efforts to skate over North-South,
EU-US tensions in the wake of the meeting have proven unconvincing.9 Indeed, the
only common ground that seems to have emerged is that the DDA will not reach a
conclusion before the Round’s scheduled 1 January 2005 completion.
Yet, amid all the hot air, grandstanding, commentary, protesting, proposals for ways
forward, suggestions for institutional reform, and calls for disbanding the WTO that
followed the meeting, a deeper and potentially more troublesome problem has been
passed over. The problem arises from the answer to one simple question: what if the
differences over agriculture and the so-called Singapore issues are resolved, an
agreement is reached, and the negotiations are eventually concluded? This question
warrants serious consideration given that the history of international trade negotiations
is littered with examples that suggest that Cancún is not unique. Rather, it is merely an
expected, albeit frustrating, punctuation of the negotiations. Indeed, and contrary to
triumphalist declarations otherwise, it is likely that the Round will be concluded.
This paper explores the likely consequences of a conclusion to the DDA. In doing so,
it takes issue with two popular assertions: (i) that the collapse of the Cancún meeting
represents a victory for developing states; and (ii) that the meeting’s collapse bodes ill
for the completion of the DDA. The paper argues that because of the way in which the
DDA was set (and in spite of the modifications likely to result from a post-Cancún
rehabilitation process), the Round’s conclusion will bring about, at best, a continuation
of existing inequalities of opportunity in the WTO’s legal framework and, at worst,
their amplification. These inequalities of opportunity relate to the relative benefit that
member states are able to derive from a utilisation of concessions made in areas of
national economic significance. Moreover, developing countries – the principle losers
of such an outcome – will be locked into this framework by a ‘second single
undertaking’ which will offer them little room for rectification.10 The paper begins by
establishing the case for a likely conclusion to the DDA. It then sets the potential
completion of the DDA within the wider institutional evolution of international trade
4
regulation as a means of better understanding the consequences of concluding a further
Round of negotiations. Finally, the paper offers some concluding comments on the
consequences of a completed DDA as currently constructed.
Why the Round will be concluded
Before we can explore the potential consequences of a conclusion of the DDA it is first
necessary to make the case for its likely completion. Almost as the Cancun meeting
collapsed commentators were suggesting that the breakdown of a second WTO
ministerial meeting in a few short years signalled the beginning of the end for the
WTO (Seattle being the first). Yet accounts such as these fail to appreciate not only the
qualitative difference between each meeting’s collapse, but also the nature of trade
politics. Moreover, by overlooking the likelihood of a completion to the DDA these
accounts fail to appreciate the consequences of such a conclusion. To better understand
why the collapse of the Cancún meeting does not forewarn the failure of the
development Round we need first to explore briefly the breakdown of the Seattle
meeting.
The collapse of the Seattle ministerial meeting in late November, early December 1999
marked the culmination of developing country frustrations with pressure from the US
and EU to take the trade agenda forward at a time when outstanding issues remained
(and, it should be noted, still remain) over the implementation of the results of the
previous trade Round (the Uruguay Round – 1986-1994).11 Preceded by poor
preparations in Geneva, a politically awkward election of a second (and, as it turned
out, third) WTO Director-General, and the continued fall out from the Asian (and
spreading) financial crisis, and set against the backdrop of an election year in the US,
growing civil concern about the social and environmental consequences of trade
liberalisation and surrounded by the first mass demonstrations to accompany a WTO
meeting, it was unsurprising that the Seattle meeting ended in disarray.
The failure of the Seattle conference was much more significant than the collapse of
the Cancún meeting. In Seattle the stakes were higher – to launch a new trade Round;
whereas in Cancún, the meeting was designed merely to review progress within an ongoing Round as well as to provide a point of focus for energising the negotiations. The
point here is that the collapse in Seattle failed to launch a process, while Cancún
merely punctuated an existing process. In this way, Seattle was a critical moment
wherein the beginning of a new phase in the development of institutional trade
regulation had the potential to emerge; whereas, Cancún is a point within an already
emergent phase wherein change has the capacity to take place. It is by recognising the
qualitative difference in the relationship of each meeting to the DDA that we can begin
to understand why the Round is more likely to reach conclusion than not.
Given that the WTO’s members are already locked into a negotiation process,
precedent for the conclusion (or not) of the DDA needs to be drawn from previous
meetings held during, rather than those launching, Rounds. Here, insight can be found
by looking no further than the preceding Uruguay Round. Both the Montreal (1988)
and Brussels (1990) meetings of what-was-then the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) negotiations ended in failure (where again agriculture and a desire to
push the trade agenda forward figured largely);12 and both were followed by
5
commentaries attesting that the demise of the GATT was nigh.13 But rather than
representing fundamental impasses in the negotiations, Montreal and Brussels
signalled an emerging feature of trade negotiations: the politics of collapse. It is this
feature that has come to be an intrinsic part of way in which international trade
regulation under the GATT/WTO has come to evolve.
It is also important to note that the Cancún and Seattle ministerial collapses differ in
another important regard. Whereas the collapse of the Seattle was followed by a
concerted effort to generate support among developing states for the launch of a new
Round, much of which involved fixing development as the centre piece of the
negotiations, such efforts are likely to be absent from the post-Cancún process. First,
developing states are already locked into negotiations through their agreement to the
DDA; second, and in spite of differences in the interpretation of the DDA, the postCancún commentary from the major players suggests an on-going and increasingly
entrenched frustration with the actions of developing states, a stated desire to ‘reform’
WTO procedures to ensure such events are not a feature of future meetings, and a
hardening of resolve among the major players to reach a conclusion.14
Further evidence that the Cancún meeting was merely an instance of the politics of
collapse being repeated in the development of the WTO’s system of regulation can be
found in the details of the meeting itself. In the immediate aftermath of the Cancún
meeting, Conference Chair Derbez came in for considerable criticism for his decision
to call the meeting to a close only part way through the final day. Previous conferences
have shown that it is not unusual for vigorous negotiating to begin only in the very late
stages, and for meetings to be extended as a result. In support of this, it appears that
key member states had begun to move away from what appeared to be entrenched
positions. The EU, whose position seemed to be set in stone, signalled it was prepared
to consider ‘unbundling’ the Singapore issues. This would have left negotiations on the
more contentious issues – investment and competition policy – to a later date in return
for movement in other areas (largely agriculture).15 Moreover, murmurs from the US
team suggested further concessions were also possible, but that to trigger these
required a willingness to negotiate to be forthcoming from developing states. The
absence of any movement on the latter’s part made what followed almost inevitable.
But Derbez’s decision to call the conference to a close was probably not, as some have
suggested, the result of his inexperience of chairing such meetings. At least one
commentator has argued that Derbez’s decision was, in large measure, part of a
negotiating strategy operationalised at the behest of USTR Zoellick to get ‘other
players to return [to the negotiations] with more chips’.16 In pursuing this line of
argument, Jagdish Bhagwati suggests that Zoellick’s frustration with developing
countries during the meeting was fuelled by their refusal to respond to pre-Conference
signals and movements made by the US (such as the agreement to a waiver to the
TRIPs agreement for generic drugs17 and signals that the US would wind down export
subsidies). Zoellick’s resolve was hardened when, in the final moments of the meeting,
a walk out was staged by representatives from least-developed, African and Caribbean
countries and it became inevitable that the meeting would be abandoned thereby
generating pressure to reconvene afresh (and with more chips) at a latter date.18
In the longer term, it is likely that the collapse of the meeting will not be regarded
jubilantly by many developing states. While the breakdown of the meeting in Cancún
6
has succeeded in underlining developing country concerns, a more permanent rupture
in the negotiations would not bode so well. Although developing countries were able
to stand firm in Cancún by forming large coalitions, no such comfort exists outside of
the WTO. The current U.S. administration has stated that in the face of a lack of
progress in the WTO, it will continue to pursue its trade goals bilaterally.19 In bilateral
negotiations, developing states will find it harder to resist pressures to agree to open up
markets and to lobby for reductions in U.S. subsidy regimes. Moreover, an increase in
bilateral activity (especially if carefully targeted) will inevitably undermine the
coherence of developing countries coalitions. Recognition of the vulnerable position in
which developing countries find themselves is likely to spur them back to the
negotiating table.
Finally, one rather basic, but important observation needs to be made. Bargaining is at
the root of the international trade regime. Trade negotiations are based on reciprocal
exchange. In such situations, the outcomes are only agreed once a perceived balancing
of concessions offered and received has been achieved—that is, once a bargain has
been struck.20 It is inevitable, then, particularly given the number of players involved,
the complexity and breadth of the issues at hand, and the political pressure to appear to
be bringing a good deal back home, that negotiations will periodically breakdown.
Indeed, these pressures taken in conjunction with the time and investment already
exerted in WTO processes and the perceived benefits from a conclusion to the Round,
suggest a deal will inevitably be struck.
The potential consequences of the DDA’s conclusion: locking in inequalities of
opportunity
Having established that it is likely that negotiations will be restarted and the Round
will be completed at some future point, we can now move on to consider the
consequences of any such conclusion. It is important to note at the outset that the legal
provisions that shape the liberalisation process have evolved through time in
accordance with the result of a series of political bargains. This means that each new
bargain is laid on top of an existing bargain (albeit that some superseding of provisions
and modification at the margins occurs). It is also important to note that because of the
historical circumstances in which it was fashioned the WTO’s system of regulation is
built upon a series of legal agreements that better suit the economic needs of the
industrial states, than their developing counterparts. More than that, it is a system of
regulation that favours the economic preferences and legal customs of its founding
members (‘Contracting Parties’ as they were known under the GATT). It is instructive
to note, then, that as each new layer of regulation is added, whether in terms of rules
and disciplines in new areas or tariff reductions and other concessions, asymmetries in
WTO rules are perpetuated and, depending on the nature of any bargain struck,
amplified. In this way, the WTO’s legal framework resembles a poorly-layered cake.
This asymmetry cannot, however, be fully appreciated by examining the content of
bargains struck at set moments in time (such as exploring the content of the DDA in
isolation); it can only be comprehended when set within the context of a wider
understanding of the evolution of multilateral trade regulation under the GATT/WTO.
To illustrate this, a little historical recap is necessary.
7
The current system of international trade regulation over which the WTO presides
builds upon the disciplines first developed under the GATT. Though itself originally
intended to be a provisional agreement paving the way for a more extensive system of
regulation administered by the International Trade Organization (ITO), the GATT put
into place a system of international trade law based upon two principles. These
principles – most favoured nation (MFN) and reciprocity – had, in various guises, been
at the root of most international commercial agreements since the mid-nineteenth
century, and had been utilized to great effect by the principal commercial powers. The
GATT also set out to regulate a relatively small segment of commercial activity – trade
in goods. More than that, the GATT’s role within a system of economic management
designed to facilitate post-war reconstruction at a time when few developing states had
achieved formal political independence ensured that the agreement was largely
concerned with liberalising trade in those goods deemed central to that task.
The narrowness of the GATT’s commercial remit was further constrained early on into
its tenure. By the early to mid-1950s, the growing competitiveness of newlyindependent and other developing states in agriculture, and textiles and clothing saw
the GATT’s original Contracting Parties seek to exclude these areas from the
liberalization process. In the first instance this involved extracting a series of voluntary
quotas limiting imports from Japan, Hong Kong, Pakistan and India. However, as such
measures ran contrary to GATT rules, codification of these restrictions was sought.
Codification came during the Dillon Round (1960-1) with the negotiation of the ShortTerm Agreement on Cotton Textiles. The Short-Term Agreement, in turn, evolved into
the 1962 Long-Term Agreement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles, and subsequently
the 1974 MultiFibre Agreement (MFA – of which there were four incarnations).21 At
their root, these Agreements enabled industrial states to offset a decline in
competitiveness in the production of textiles and clothing vis à vis their developing
counterparts by putting into place a system of regulation predicated on Contracting
Parties negotiating bilateral quantitative restrictions or by unilaterally imposing import
constraints.22
Comparable to the way in which the MFA and its predecessors removed textiles and
clothing from the purview of GATT rules, while at the same time institutionalising a
culture of discrimination, was the withdrawal of agriculture as a legitimate target for
liberalisation. On the insistence of first the US and then the European Economic
Community (EEC), agriculture became exempt from GATT rules on domestic support
systems.23 This exemption was consolidated further by the failure of discussions
during the Kennedy (1964-7) and Tokyo (1973-9) Rounds designed to bring
agriculture back into the fray.
The consequences of these early developments had, and continue to have, important
ramifications for the trade regime. First, international trade regulation was established
around a set of economic and legal principles – MFN and reciprocity – familiar to its
founding members, and in which they had considerable experience of utilizing.
Second, the arena of commercial regulation was kept artificially small. Agricultural
and textile and clothing producers in the industrial states were protected from the
growing competitiveness of developing and new independent producers. Producers in
industrial states were, nevertheless, able to benefit from negotiated reductions in
barriers to trade in manufactured, semi-manufactured, low and high technology goods.
The result was to build into the GATT’s evolutionary trajectory ‘first mover
8
advantages’ which forestalled competitive decline while at the same time facilitated
expansion in new areas of industrial production.24
Efforts to redress these imbalances were few and far between, and lacking in
substance. Part IV of the GATT, introduced in 1966, was lacklustre; and the special
and differential provisions that were introduced thereafter were too little to be of
significant economic benefit. But there were other problems. The relative lack of
export earnings, coupled with fierce competition in emerging sectors, un- and underdeveloped national and local infrastructures, inadequate resources, and absences of
expertise and technical knowledge among other factors prohibited developing states
from diversifying their economies. Instead, they remained largely dependent on the
production of raw materials, agriculture, and textiles and clothing, and benefited only
from the limited preferential treatment offered by the GATT and other international
agreements.
By the time the GATT entered its 8th and final round of negotiations – the Uruguay
Round – it had become clear that the General Agreement could no longer maintain its
then current form. Pressures, on the one hand, to extend further the remit of
international trade regulation and, on the other hand, to reverse the exclusion of
agriculture and textiles and clothing as well as extend special and differential treatment
resulted in the creation of a much larger legal framework and the establishment of an
organisation – the WTO – charged with its administration. The inclusion of
agreements on agriculture, and textiles and clothing came as part of a bargain that also
included the introduction of rules on services (under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services – GATS), on trade-related investment measures (under the Agreement on
Trade Related Investment Measures – TRIMs), and on trade-related intellectual
property rights (under the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights –
TRIPs). Unsurprisingly, each of the new agreements conformed to the now standard
GATT model wherein MFN and reciprocity form the core principles; and, the
substance of agreements on services, intellectual property and investment measures
reflected a negotiated outcome of the legal rules, norms and customs in place in the
leading industrial states. More importantly, the bargain reached that concluded the
Uruguay Round was to take the form of a single undertaking thereby binding all
members to its content.
Uruguay was not, however, a panacea. While the inclusion of agriculture, and textiles
and clothing rectified existing imbalances, the introduction of new rules in services,
intellectual property and investment measures extended the trade agenda further. Not
only were the industrial states better suited to taking advantage of these new rules;
their ability to utilize the market opportunities presented therein enabled them to
develop a competitive advantage over future market entrants. The creation of the WTO
had brought with it a new set of first mover advantages.
By the time the WTO met to convene its Third Ministerial Meeting in Seattle
significant tensions had begun to emerge. Industrial members, particularly the U.S. and
the EU, had dug in their heals to forestall any unravelling of their elaborate agricultural
subsidy systems and prevent the opening of markets in this area; significant problems
had emerged with the implementation of Uruguay Round commitments; and pressure
was growing from the U.S. and EU for a further extension in the remit of WTO rules
(to include the four Singapore issues) and to launch a new Round, dubbed the
9
‘Millennium Round’. Moreover, much consternation had emerged over persistent calls
by the U.S. and EU to explore the possibility of a linkage between trade and labour
standards within the WTO, as well as to expand the participation of civil society
organizations.25 Cast within the run up to a U.S. presidential election, and the
disruptions caused by mass demonstrations, the meeting collapsed.
The tensions that had emerged in Seattle prompted a change of tack in the way in
which supporters of a new trade round marketed their aim. The negotiations were to be
‘development-centred’ and to be portrayed as a ‘Work Programme’ thereby avoiding
associated with the previously touted ‘Millennium Round’.26 Even so, in the run up to
the Doha meeting (9-14 November 2001) it was unclear whether the ministerial
conference would give its support to a new set of negotiations. However, the events of
11 September 2001, just 2 months before the meeting, cast the proceedings in a
different light. Few states wished to be seen to be offering opposition in such a tender
political climate. The result was the launch of the DDA.
From the point of view of the developing states, agreeing to the DDA was a
fundamental error. It firmly married a commitment to revisit the Uruguay Round
agreements (coupled with promises to explore the relationship between trade, debt and
finance, the plight of small economies, the transfer of technology, technical cooperation and capacity building, and a commitment to review and strengthen special
and differential provisions) to the commencement of negotiations in investment,
government procurement, trade facilitation and competition policy (and possibly a fifth
e-commerce).27 Moreover, the DDA put in place a specific time frame (negotiations
would commence on the Singapore issues, subject to minor clarification, after the midterm review of negotiations in Cancún) and the results are to form the basis of a second
single undertaking. As a result, the way in which the DDA was crafted ensures that any
movement forward on those issues of concern to the South will automatically trigger
pressure for a movement forward on those important to the North. It is inevitable then
that once the concerns of developing states have been seen to be recognised and
concessions promised, negotiations will commence in new areas. Without a subsequent
movement to the Singapore issues (and movement on all four may be staggered as a
result of Cancún) there will be no formal agreement to, or any subsequent
operationalisation of, any provisions that may benefit developing states. Given the
situation developing states find themselves in, coupled with the broad-based
acceptance of trade liberalisation as an engine for growth among their number, it is
highly unlikely that they will wish not to agree in the medium term to a deal that
includes the Singapore issues.
Conclusion
The consequences of adding a further layer onto the WTO’s existing legal framework
should the DDA be concluded are significant. On the other hand, many developing
states will consolidate their production of agricultural produce, textiles and clothing,
and some low technology goods at a rate of profitability directly related to the rate at
which agricultural subsidies and tariff barriers are wound down in the U.S., EU, and
Japan among others. Little industrial diversification will occur among the poorest or
smallest economies as the costs of moving away from established industries and
investing in new sectors will be prohibitive. This is irrespective of any massive
10
increase in technical and other assistance. It does not, after all, make good business
sense to enable competitors to develop comparative advantages in sectors in which you
are competitive. The leading industrial states will nevertheless be able to benefit from
any WTO movement into new areas. Not only are these new areas already of key
importance to many industrial states, and insignificant to many of their developing
counterparts, the consequence of their utilization will be to put in place yet more first
mover advantages. The result will be a reinforcement of the comparative advantages of
industrial states in a wide, indeed wider, variety of economic areas.
One final point should be made. The greater the number of sectors in which an
economy has, at a minimum, developed a presence, or at most, established something
of a comparative advantage, the better able that economy is to weather periods of
economic downturn. While the onset of recession may hurt industrial states, the pain
will be exponentially greater in their developing counterparts, with the most vulnerable
populations suffering worst. The real problem, should a political settlement be agreed
post-Cancún, is that the vulnerability of developing states is likely to be exacerbated.
The only way forward to address both this potential danger, and to remove some of the
long term inertia plaguing the WTO, is to put in place a moratorium on negotiations in
these new areas at least until after the conclusion of the current Round, and
concentrate instead on addressing the development dimension of the DDA. The
problem for the U.S., EU and remainder of the industrial world, of course, is that to do
so would be politically damaging. Moreover, in the context of the way the WTO
negotiating machinery works, it would be highly unlikely. But for the most vulnerable,
maintaining the present course brings with it far greater risks.
Notes
1
Protocols for the accession of Cambodia and Nepal we agreed in Cancún taking the total number of
WTO members to 148.
2
See Rorden Wilkinson, ‘ACUNS in Cancún’, ACUNS Informational Memorandum, No. 57 (Autumn
2003), pp. 6-8.
3
The five facilitators – the so-called ‘Friends of the Chair’ – were: George Yeo Yong-Bong (agriculture
– Singapore); Henry Tang Ying-yen (non-agricultural market access – Hong Kong); Mukhisa Kituyi
(development – Kenya); Pierre Pettigrew (Singapore issues – Canada); and Clement Rohee
(miscellaneous issues – Guyana).
4
Robert Zoellick, ‘America will not wait for the won’t do countries’, Financial Times, 22 September
2003.
5
Pascal Lamy, final press conference to the Cancún Ministerial Meeting, 14 September 2003; Jagdish
Bhagwati, ‘Don’t Cry for Cancún’, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2004, 83: 1.
6
WTO, ‘Final Ministerial Statement of the Cancún Ministerial Conference’, adopted 14 September
2003 WT/MIN(03)/20 (23 September 2003).
7
See G20 Ministerial Communiqué from the 11-12 December 2003 Brasilia meeting available at:
http://commerce.nic.in/wtodec2003.htm#h2; On the G22 and other coalitions in action during the
Cancún meeting see Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie, ‘Bargain together in Cancún: developing
countries and their evolving coalitions’. Available at:
http://www.flacso.org.ar/areasyproyectos/areas/ri/esiei/tussie/docs/G20.pdf
8
For example, signing free trade agreements with Chile and Singapore, concluding the US-Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and a free trade agreement with Australia, and pursuing a
Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) and Enterprise for ASEAN initiative as well as laying the
foundations for negotiations with Panama, Colombia, Morocco and Bahrain among others. See the
statement by Robert B. Zoellick, US Trade Representative, before the Committee on Ways and Means,
US House of Representatives, 11 March 2004, pp. 3, 7-9.
9
Pascal Lamy, ‘Trade Crisis’, speech to the European Institute, Washington, 4 November 2003.
11
10
A single undertaking refers to the requirement that all member states accept and are bound by (albeit
with lengthier implementation schedules and other minor modifications for developing countries) the
results of the negotiations. The single undertaking was an innovation of the Uruguay Round which
sought to move away from the ‘à la carte’ system in operation under the GATT.
11
See Rorden Wilkinson, ‘The WTO in Crisis: exploring the dimensions of institutional inertia’,
Journal of World Trade, 35: 3 (June 2001).
12
John H. Jackson, The Jurisprudence of GATT and the WTO: insights on treaty law and economic
relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 375.
13
J. Michael Finger, ‘That old GATT magic no more casts its spell (how the Uruguay Round failed)’,
Journal of World Trade, 25: 1 (February 1991), pp. 39-53.
14
Instructive in this regard is the continued importance attached by the current US administration to
pursue its trade objectives multilaterally as well as regionally bilaterally See Zoellick’s statement to the
Committee on Ways and Means, March 2004.
15
Lamy confirmed what had been rumoured to have been a change in the EU’s position in his final press
conference to the meeting. See Pascal Lamy, ‘Final Press Conference closing the WTO 5th Ministerial
Conference’ 14 September 2003, available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla190_en.htm
16
Bhagwati, ‘Don’t Cry for Cancún’.
17
This relates to the 30 August 2003 decision to allow countries producing generic copies of patented
pharmaceutical products under compulsory licences to export the product to ‘eligible’ importing
countries (that is, least-developed members and any other members that have previously notified the
Council of the TRIPs) that are experiencing a natural emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use previously held up by US resistance. See WTO
Document, ‘Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and
Public Health’, WT/L/540 (1 September 2003).
18
Zoellick, ‘America will not wait for the won’t do countries’.
19
See Zoellick, ‘America will not wait for the won’t do countries’; also Bhagwati, ‘Don’t Cry for
Cancún’.
20
See Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organisation, (London: Routledge,
2000), pp. 47-9, 100-114.
21
Bernard Hoekman and Michel Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World Trading System: From
GATT to WTO, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 207.
22
See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic
Relations, (London: MIT Press, 1998), second edition, p. 207-9.
23
Tim Josling, ‘The GATT: Its Historical Role and Importance to Agricultural Policy and Trade’, in
Hans J. Michelmann et al (eds.), The Political Economy of Agricultural Trade and Policy, (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1990), p. 157.
24
Robert O. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, (London: Routledge,
2002), p. 253.
25
Wilkinson, ‘The WTO in Crisis’, pp. 414-417.
26
WTO, ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’, adopted 14 November 2001 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (20
November 2001).
27
See WTO, Doha Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001.
12