When to Terminatea Charitable Trust?
CLIFF LANDESMAN
Imaginethattheworldas we knowit willlastforever(nosolarexplosion,
no extinctionin the cold darknessof everincreasingentropy,etc.).The
world as we know it includespreventable
humansufferingand stable
investment institutions. You are a utilitarian philanthropist setting up a
trust that will grow in value for a specified period. When the trust matures
the capital and accumulated income will go to an organization working to
prevent famine, poverty and human suffering. You are pessimistic about
human affairs, but optimistic about the long term future of the stock
market. You expect human suffering to grow at a slow constant rate, but
you believe the money in the trust will grow at a slightly faster rate (in real,
inflation-adjusted dollars). There might even be proportionally less and
less human misery in the world and still constant absolute misery growth.
Total human happiness would just have to soar fast enough.
Having imagined those conditions, ask yourself a simple question. What
date would you set for dissolving the trust? For any date that you pick, had
you picked a later date, you could have helped more people with more
money. If you do not pick a date, if you have the trust grow forever, then
of course the trust will never help anyone. As a utilitarian, your guiding
principle is to maximize human welfare (properly defined). But in selecting
a date, you know there is none which satisfies this constraint.
Utilitarians are not the only people who can be teased and stymied with
an over abundance of good alternatives. An immortal Epicurean who
owns an 'EverBetter' bottle of wine faces a similar frustrating choice. [5]
Even mighty Bayesian decision theorists face a challenge when infinities
enter the picture. [7] The charitable trust example simply makes the
dilemma vivid for utilitarians - maximizers with a heart - using a modest
number of empirically false, but not extravagant assumptions.
While the trust example does assume an everlasting population, and is
more conveniently presented if one allows for endlessly growing human
needs, it avoids talk about infinite utilities [1] or (as a possibly more palatable substitute for the concept of infinite utilities) lexically ordered utilities
[9]. As a result, our particular scenario does not invite us to compare
infinite quantities. [2], [10]
The theory of satisficing tempts principled do-gooders and systematic
decision makers to desert their loyal maximizing brethren. [6] It tells the
overly eager do-gooders: Don't try to maximize human welfare, just
promote it well enough. This is inferior advice even in many of the satisficer's favourite examples. It seems irrational to settle for less when you can
ANALYSIS 55.1, January 1995, pp. 12-13. ? Cliff Landesman
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WHENTOTERMINATE
A CHARITABLE
TRUST? 13
to bebetter,allthingsconsidered,
getmore,free.Ifyoujudgeanalternative
have
an
to
choose
the betteralternative
reason
andevery
you
impeccable
reasonto rejectthe inferiormediocrealternative
(leavingasidesituations
in whichstrivingfor the bestcanbe self-defeating
[4] or in conflictwitha
virtuousdisposition[8]).Butwe mightmakea smallconcessionto satisficing andproposethis maxim:Wheneverpossible,do the bestyou can!If
doingthe bestis not possible,do goodenough!Ambitiousaltruistswould
bewelladvisedto maximizehumanwelfarewhenmaximizing
is possible.
should
do
to
human
welfare.
Otherwise,
they
enough promote
The qualifiedmaximis vague,as it is meantto be. Unfortunately,
it
leavesus with a seriousresidualproblemaboutwhen to terminatethe
trust:whendoinggood,whatis enough?1
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[email protected]
References
[1] Edward Gracely, 'Playing Games With Eternity:the Devil's Offer', Analysis 48
(1988)113.
[2] Mark Nelson, 'Utilitarian Eschatology', American Philosophical Quarterly 28
(1991)339-47.
[3] Derek Parfit,Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1984).
[4] Philip Pettit, 'Satisficing Consequentialism', Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volume58 (1984) 165-76.
[5] JohnPollock,'How Do YouMaximizeExpectationValue?',Noais17 (1983) 409-21.
[6] MichaelSlote,Beyond Optimizing(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1989).
[7] Roy Sorensen, 'InfiniteDecision Theory', in Gambling with God, edited by Jeffrey
Jordan (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,1994).
[8] ChristineSwanton, 'Satisficingand Virtue',Journalof Philosophy,90 (1993) 33-48.
[9] Robert Thrall, 'Applications of Multidimensional Utility Theory', Decision
Processes,edited by R.M. Thrall, et al., (New York:John Wiley & Sons, 1954).
[10] Peter Vallentyne, 'Utilitarianism and Infinite Utility', Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 71 (1993) 212-17.
While the philosophically interestingcharitabletrust dilemma is imaginary,a closely
related situation is real. I and a dozen or so nickel and dime philanthropistsbelong
to the 2492 Club. We each contributedless than $25 to open a Giftrustmutual fund
account (#25000044879) with TwentiethCenturyInvestors.With luck, a millennium
after Columbus landed in America, this account will pay out its accumulated value
(expected to exceed the equivalentof 26 million in 1992 dollars) to Oxfam America,
an organizationthat fights hungerin partnershipwith poor people around the world.
Other altruisticgamblerswho wish to join the 2492 Club, hoping to influenceevents
centuriesfrom now, and betting that currentconditions will prevail for another 500
years, should contact the author or Oxfam America. The probability of success is
small, but as Derek Parfit points out ([3], Chapter 3), when the consequences are
great, moral agents should not ignore very small chances.
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