Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire
Review Boise National Forest, U.S. Forest
Service
National Oversight Review
National Incident Management Organization
6/1/2014
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Table of Contents
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Purpose ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2
Objectives of the Review ............................................................................................................................. 5
Fire Environment ........................................................................................................................................ 5
Fire Chronology Summary (Complete Chronology is on page 18) ............................................................. 7
Discussion by review objective and observations .................................................................................... 9
Lessons Learned and Recommendations ................................................................................................ 14
Attachments................................................................................................................................................ 17
Ridge Fire Chronology ................................................................................................................................. 18
Typical Fuels and Topography in the vicinity of the Ridge Fire................................................................... 21
Ridge Fire History Map................................................................................................................................ 22
Ridge Fire Progression Map ........................................................................................................................ 23
Objective of this Review
The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document
risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect
effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management
for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive
analysis of incident documentation.
This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and
facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an
opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the
effectiveness of implementation in the field.
The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning
environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
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Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Review Objectives:
Purpose
Objectively look at
actions taken by the
Incident Management
Team and the local
Agency Administrator to
meet the direction
provided by the Forest
Service Chief
In December 2013, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation
Management (F&AM) identified ten fires to be reviewed subsequent to
last fire season for incidents within FS Regions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6. The
National Incident Management Organization (NIMO) was tasked with
conducting the reviews. The letter stated that “Fires were selected
based on complexity and national significance. The designated fires
represent a cross section of our risk management and investment
performance, which includes financial, size, and oversight complexity.”
Further, the letter directed that “The reviews will be conducted using
the 2013 Risk Decision Framework.”
Assess the consideration
and effectiveness of
applying risk
management concepts to
incident cost through the
associated decisions and
expenditures as an
outcome
Identify Best Business
Practices Used on Fires
This Past Season
Identify How Social and
Political Issues Factored
Into Our Decision Making
Identify Which Current
Procedures Can Be
Enhanced or Expanded
Identify Improvements
That Can Be Made In
Sharing and Clarifying
Expectations
Review Team
Members:
Bill Hahnenberg,
Incident Commander,
NIMO
Fritz Cluff, Forest Fire
Management Officer,
Salmon-Challis National
Forest
Brent Spencer, Logistics
Section Chief, NIMO
Nick Giannettino,
Planning Section Chief,
NIMO
The NIMO Executive Committee assigned the Portland NIMO Team to
review the Ridge Fire which took place in Region 4 on the Boise
National Forest. The review team consisted of: Bill Hahnenberg
(Incident Commander-NIMO); Nick Giannettino (Planning Section
Chief-NIMO); Brent Spencer (Logistics Section Chief-NIMO) and Fritz
Cluff (Fire Management Officer-Salmon-Challis National Forest). The
review team gathered incident data from several sources including the
Ridge Fire documentation package located at the Boise National Forest
Forest Supervisor’s Office, ftp site (209s), and the WFDSS.
Interviews were conducted with personnel closely involved with
making key decisions on development of incident objectives, strategy,
and missions. They included the Agency Administrators (Forest
Supervisor, District Ranger and acting District Ranger), Initial Attack
Incident Commander, Type 2 Incident Commander and Operation
Section Chiefs, Type 3 Incident Commanders, Forest Public Affairs
Officer, Forest Ecologist, Boise Interagency Dispatch Center Manager,
and the Boise Fire Staff Officer.
Background
The 2013 Programmatic/Cost Fire Review(s) are grounded in the
objectives of the 2013 Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season.
The reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate the clarity of
communication of Leader’s Intent and the effectiveness of
implementation in the field. The results of the reviews provide
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information critical to the well-established learning environment and continued
improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.
The Chief’s Letter of Intent stated vision for success continues to be defined as safely
achieving reasonable objectives with the least firefighter exposure necessary, while
enhancing stakeholder support for our management. Building on lessons learned in 2012,
utilizing all aspects of risk management continues to provide the best framework to
successfully achieve this vision. Sound decision making relies on identifying reasonable
objectives for protection of critical values at risk, while considering the amount and quality
of firefighter exposure and probability of success. The format/protocol is broken down
into three sections: Pre-Season (engaging the fire before it starts); During Incident
(managing incident uncertainty and inherent risk) and After Incident (learning and
improving).
Pre-Season preparedness is critical to success when a fire starts. In addition to pre-season
preparedness we need to build decision maker and key stakeholder capacity to manage the
uncertainties and inherent risks associated with fires.
The During Incident phase tests our pre-season work and our ability to apply risk
management principles. As acknowledged by the National Cohesive Strategy for Wildland
Fire Management: “Safe aggressive initial attack is often the best suppression strategy to
keep unwanted wildfires small and costs down.”
This strategy will be applied to initial attack where the pre-identified values to be
protected are at the greatest risk. Decisions will be based on firefighter/aviator/public
safety, values at risk (VAR), and the probability of success. Sound financial management
and costs are an output of the best risk informed decisions. To be successful in this Phase,
we (Incident Management Teams and Units) should follow the objectives listed below in
the Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk:
Seven Standards for Managing Incident Risk
1. Complete an Incident Risk Assessment.
 What is at risk, probabilities of harm, and possible mitigations?
2. Complete a Risk Analysis.
 Consider alternatives (objectives, strategies and tactics) against desired
outcomes, responder exposure, probability of success and values to be
protected.
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3. Complete Two-way Risk Communication.
 Engage community leaders, local government officials, partners and other key
stakeholders associated with the incident to share the risk picture and request
input.
4. Conduct Risk Sharing Dialogue (“Red Book”, Chapter 05.11, framework 10
questions).
 Engage senior line officers Agency Administrators (AAs) and political appointee
(as appropriate) in dialogue aimed at understanding, acceptance, and support
for the alternatives and likely decision(s).
5. Make the Risk Informed Decision.
 Develop a time frame to revisit the decision.
6. Document the Risk.
 Document the assessment, analysis, communication(s) sharing, and decision in
the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS).
7. Continue Monitoring and Adjusting.
 Monitor and adjust as necessary or as conditions change. Monitor incident;
revise the risk process as conditions change and reengage stakeholders and
senior officials as appropriate. Significant changes will likely require updates to
the WFDSS (published decision and risk support work).
In areas identified pre-season as having low threats to values to be protected, and
engagement strategy designed to meet restoration objectives may be considered. Line
Officers using fire for multiple objectives must follow the Seven Standards for Managing
Incident Risk to the highest level of performance and accountability. To be clear, Standards
1, 2, 3 and 4 need to be completed pre-season; all standards apply during the incident. The
effective interaction between AAs and Incident Commanders (ICs) is essential to safe
efficient and effective management of incidents, utilizing: the Right Plan; in the Right
Place; at the Right Time; with the Right Assets (personnel and equipment); and for the
Right Duration. Careful attention to these five “Rights” will limit unnecessary exposure to
firefighters and expenditure.
The Third Phase, After Incident indicates as a learning organization we should strive to
improve how we do business and seek to learn from each incident.
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U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Objectives of the Review
1. Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team (IMT) and the
local AA to meet the direction provided by the Forest Service Chief.
2. Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to
incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome.
3. Identify best business practices used on fires this past season.
4. Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making.
5. Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.
6. Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.
Fire Environment
The climate and weather preceding the start of the Ridge Fire was warm and dry, but
not severely so for this point in the fire season. Snowpack for the area was near the
median during the winter but had decreased to below the median by May 2013.
Looking at a three-month period during the first half of 2013, precipitation amount
for the area was somewhat below normal.
The near and mid-term outlooks showed an increased probability of above average
temperatures for the Region of the Ridge Fire, with equal chances of average precipitation
and moderate drought conditions.
The Energy Release Component (ERC) indicated that conditions were trending toward the
90th percentile towards the end of July. Wildfire potential was predicted to be above
normal for the month of August at least, and was forecast to return to normal for the
months of September and October.
The fuels of the fire area consisted of mixed density stands of sub-alpine fir and lodgepole
pine, interspersed with open meadows and steep rocky ridges. The subalpine fir and
lodgepole pine stands had experienced a considerable insect infestation which added a
significant standing dead component to the fuels canopy. Similar fuel types were burned over
on the north, east and south sides of the fire. Another factor affecting fire behavior was the
moisture condition of the fuel with actual reported conditions as follows for:
1) July 16, 2013; 1000 hour fuels – 13%, 10 hour fuels – 6%,
2) July 24, 2013; 1000 hour fuels – 9 to 13%.
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U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Multiple fires had burned in the Ridge Fire vicinity over the previous 25 years. Most
noted should be the Castro Fire (2011), Eight Mile (2009), Red Mountain Fire (2006),
and the Lowman Fire (1989). The fuels in these previous fire areas were lighter than
surrounding unburned stands and were comprised primarily of native grasses, shrubs
and moderate amounts of dead and down woody materials. Although fire could move
through these historic fires, these areas had somewhat less fuel loading.
Topography for the fire area is dominated by a major ridge that runs roughly
southwest to northeast along with numerous other smaller ridges and canyons.
Elevations within the fire range from 6,200 to 8,700 feet.
Results of analysis from July 25, 2013 indicated that the Ridge Fire was burning at a
relatively early point in the local fire season. The probability of a season ending event from
the July 25, 2013 analysis is shown below:
Probability of event
occurring %
Date
Days to Event from
July 25
50
August 25
31
75
September 10
47
90
September 19
58
99
October 19
69
In summary, fire conditions can best be expressed by the July 24, 2013 ERCs which were at
the 80-88th percentile.
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Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Fire Chronology Summary (Complete Chronology is on page 18)
Date
7/17
7/19
Command
T3 Collin Good
Type 3 Good to
Type 2 Wilde
Cost
(rounded to
nearest M$)
30
616
7/24
Type 2
2,800
8/1
Type 2
6,000
8/2
8/3 –
9/19
Type 2
Type 4 Good, Briggs,
Dufferena
Acres
Actions
Started July 16, lightning, 0%
containment, unable to establish
anchor point, steep inaccessible
ground, heavy fuels, no
evacuations, ordered IMT2,
418
Values at Risk – natural
resources, lookout
0% containment, no evacuations
in effect transition from IMT3 to
IMT2 (Wilde), same Values at
1,500
Risk
16% containment, 60% of
perimeter containment of the
4,810
entire perimeter will be
considered a success
46% containment, all resources
removed from fireline due to
5,270
severe weather threat
6,200
5,270
6,800
5,315
48% containment, objectives
met, transfer of command to
local unit at 2000
Contained, Controlled and Out
Final ICS 209 – 9/19/13
Critical Values at Risk
The Ridge Fire was in an area of the Boise National Forest (NF) with few values
immediately at risk. This was recognized during initial attack and consequently a decision
was made to limit exposure to firefighters. The closest developed infrastructure was eight
air miles from the fire. Given that the fire was in an extensive area of dead subalpine fir
with no safety zones, and there was no good place to take action on the fire. The limited
values at risk (VAR) and existing fuels conditions led to a strategy to utilize natural
barriers. These barriers were primarily created from areas with prior fire activity, and had
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lighter fuel. These considerations supported a decision to limit firefighter exposure and to
not engage with a high level of commitment of resources.
When considering the need for action the District was concerned with protection of the
following VAR in the vicinity of the fire:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Bull trout habitat and watershed condition;
A rare stand of blister rust resistant white bark pine;
Recreation trails;
Outfitter and guide camps; and
An area analyzed for possible commercial timber sale.
VAR further removed from the fire area had an influence on long-term planning for
management of the fire. These VAR were considered as the fire evolved including:
1. Developed recreation facilities at the Bull Trout Campground and at the Bureau
of Outdoor Recreation Deadwood Reservoir;
2. Public travel on State Highway 21;
3. Smoke affects with the primary concern being to the community of Stanley and
potential to the tourism-based economy and to individual health;
4. Smoke affects to the community of Lowman, with concerns similar to the
community of Stanley;
5. Wilderness class 1 air shed;
6. Warm Springs Airport; and
7. General forest dispersed recreation.
Early in the fire there was a decision to withdraw firefighters as the fire escaped initial
attack. This provided an opportunity to ensure a common understanding of the long-term
fire management strategy that served to limit exposure to firefighters where there were
few VAR.
The Forest recognized that there were additional potentially significant off-site VAR that
could have been affected and was prepared to address these concerns should it have been
necessary. One of these primary VAR was the off-site affect to the community of Stanley.
Experience has shown that communicating this concern to IMTs to ensure adequate
communication flow is important.
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Discussion by review objective and observations
The following are key observations and corresponding lessons learned grouped by the
review objectives.
1. Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team and the local
Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided by the Forest Service Chief.
The Forest was effectively guided by the 2013 Chief’s Letter of Intent. During the preseason the Forest made a concerted effort to inform and involve cooperating agencies and
interested parties. This level of interaction positioned them well for management of the
fire.
During the incident, consideration of the Chief’s direction was most apparent in the
Forest’s consideration of the “Five Rights” in identifying and implementing a fire
management strategy. The implementation of the fire strategy was evidence of
consideration and application of the Agency’s direction.
2. Assess the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts
to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an
outcome.
The Ridge Fire strategy was very cost effective relative to expected expenses associated
with a more traditional, aggressive fire management strategy. Most cost savings resulted
from the fire being managed with limited personnel and an appropriately sized support
organization. The aviation costs were fairly high; however this was based on a conscious
decision to use aviation to ensure remote site extraction capability and to provide a high
level of firefighter support in a remote and difficult environment. Tactical decisions to
share aircraft and to downsize staffing early were additional effective measures to limit
expenditures.
3. Identify best business practices used on fires this past season.
The Boise NF is proactive in communicating prior to fire season with a large variety of
stakeholders such as county commissioners, sheriff and emergency managers. Meetings
are sponsored by the Forest and include an annual session and monthly updates. The
Forest also broadly provides briefing papers to stakeholders. This effort clearly pays
dividends in gaining support for fire management such as Ridge when a less aggressive
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U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
strategy than typically employed.
Internal pre-season work pays dividends as well. Each year the Lowman District Ranger
(DR) and staff look at what the season holds and where potential for managing fire with
alternative strategies may be possible. When evaluating ignitions there is a look at historic
weather and previous fire behavior and the location relative to past fires. Given this high
level of preparation and ignition specific evaluation the District felt confident they could
manage the fire effectively over a longer period if needed, with a primary goal of reducing
fire fighter exposure.
Communication to identify VAR, building on earlier community based work put the District
in a position to manage the fire with a broad understanding and support. With the
suppression strategy chosen for the fire, it was important to have developed a high level of
external support. Communication is critical with communities well removed from the fire
area which can be seriously affected by smoke. This was done well with the community of
Stanley. In addition, the District has a good working relationship and communicated
closely with a permitted outfitter guide whose operations potentially could have been be
affected by the fire. This also helped gain support.
A very effective practice limiting risk to firefighters was the recognition at the onset of the
fire that there were many factors limiting effective initial attack. This along with
awareness that there were few VAR enabled the development of a safe and effective
strategy for long-term management of the fire.
Safety considerations were also taken into account when personnel were committed to this
remote location with identification of aviation extraction options. The Forest found the
Chief’s Letter of Intent for 2013 to be a good tool to guide conversation, specifically the
“Five Rights” which provided an effective set of guiding principles.
A long-term plan for management of the fire allowed for actions to be employed
commensurate with VAR. This coupled with understanding and awareness of the possible
fire movement and affects due to fire history, supported the development of safe and
effective strategy. The fire was a full suppression fire from the onset. There was some
confusion in describing the limited actions being taken as “full suppression.” This took
effort to relay this to Type 1 crews and many others internally and externally as well. The
District employed the concept of identifying the “Five Rights” to increase clarity of the
management strategy. One effective measure taken to help ensure success was to preidentify management action points if needed to ensure public safety.
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U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
The Forest worked closely with the IMT to gain their understanding of the objectives for
management of the fire. This was initiated when prior to the formal in-brief the Forest
Supervisor met with key IMT members to provide clear leader’s intent. The Forest and
District expected a long-term incident to be managed in a non-aggressive manner. This
enabled the IMT to respond appropriately; for example they used no retardant. In addition
to the Forest clearly sharing priorities with the IMT, the IMT effectively shared resources
with neighboring fires.
Transition to the Type 2 team and back to the Type 3 team was done in such a way that the
long-term objectives for the fire were clear and transfer of command occurred smoothly.
An important early decision to not take action on the east side of the fire resulted in
effective cost containment. Intensive firefighting on the east side of the fire would have
resulted in significantly greater fire costs. Understanding potential fire spread and
recognizing that fire scars would provide for diminished fire behavior made the strategy
feasible.
The fire management strategy evolved as a trade-off with a heavier commitment of aviation
resources resulting in higher costs. This was a conscious decision and was considered to
be both a safe and cost effective trade-off.
Cost considerations were also important when personnel needs were carefully evaluated
during a thorough discussion concerning the size of the incoming IMT. Also, downsizing of
incident personnel was accomplished as soon as possible.
The Intermountain Region made a decision that DRs will manage unplanned ignitions at
their level when qualified. This provides for effective decision making ensuring a high level
of interaction close to the ground.
The Boise NF has a hospital liaison program. This program ensures that an individual
qualified to provide administrative support to those needing hospital services is present.
This program provides a high level of support and is viewed to be very helpful and
effective.
4. Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making.
The social and political factors that were applicable to the decision making on the Ridge
Fire began long before the 2013 fire season. The Boise NF and local communities have had
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U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
a great deal of recent experience with large wildfires – Castro Fire (2011), Eight Mile
(2009), Red Mountain Fire (2006), and the Lowman Fire (1989) surrounded the vicinity of
the Ridge Fire and provided a buffer (or potential containment barriers) to help the Forest
manage the Ridge Fire as they did. Unlike conditions occurring during some of the
previous mentioned fires, locally 2013 was a relatively moist year from mid-season
onward, which contributed to the successful implementation of the selected strategy on the
Ridge Fire. Unlike many units in the national forest system, the Boise NF has a relatively
new Land and Resource Management Plan which describes three categories where fire can
be used on the landscape. Investment in forest plan revision and associated public
engagement, in combination with continuous pre-season work with local communities, led
to successful outcomes for the Ridge Fire and helped the Forest better explain the decision
making trade-offs with an informed, experienced and educated public.

Pre-Season Preparation
The Forest conducted a number of pre-season meetings with a variety of
organizations and individuals ranging from County Commissioners, Fire
Chiefs, Emergency Preparedness Committee members and Sheriff; State
Agency members including Department of Lands, Department of
Environmental Quality (DEQ) and Smoke Management, and Fish and Game;
Federal agency partners including the Bureau of Reclamation and
neighboring NFs; forest user groups including Outfitter and Guide
Associations and other recreation user groups; homeowners associations
and key community contacts, along with community meetings. Personal
contacts were also an important component of the pre-season and during
incident communications. These relationships helped keep stakeholders
involved and informed.

Communication With Responders
The Forest was deliberate in working with responders to assure that key
social and political issues were clear and understood. The Forest Supervisor
had the Incident Commander and Command and General Staff attend a prebriefing to discuss expectations with team leadership prior to the in-brief for
the entire management team. This was done to help clearly convey the VAR,
including the importance of the social and political values associated with the
Ridge Fire, emphasizing the importance of public meetings in the
communities of Lowman and Stanley.
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
Key Social Considerations
The key social considerations for the Ridge Fire included the economic
effects from smoke on the communities of Lowman and Stanley, including the
airport and Highway 21 corridor from Boise to Stanley, ID. This is even more
important locally than in other places since there is such a limited season for
tourism in this area. When the tourist season is adversely affected, it has
pronounced effects on annual revenue generation in the local area which
cannot be offset through other means. This includes not only the traditional
recreation oriented forest users such as outfitter and guide clients, campers,
bicyclists, river users and other important segments of the local economy,
but visitors to the communities themselves.
Although there was
considerable effort to convey the importance of smoke in the area to the IMT,
the effect of smoke on an area generally beyond the geographic standard for
smoke effects – the community of Stanley – required additional attention in
this special situation. In a positive outcome related to smoke effects, the
Forest was successful in working with the Governor’s office, Idaho DEQ, and
the Idaho Department of Tourism in directing visitors to smoke-free parts of
the State.

Other Considerations
The DR John Kidd assigned to the unit was on a fire assignment so there
was an acting DR. The acting DR noted that even though DR Kidd was on
assignment, he maintained contact with two to three key members of the
local community. This was important to have a known individual with
established relationships, this should be emphasized in the future to help
maintain continuity and connections with local individuals.
5. Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded.
There was consistent support from the AAs in oversight of the incident. It was done in
a manner that appropriately added value. The IMT felt that the AAs did a good job in
supporting the IMTs and were appropriately engaged and helpful. Although
individuals changed, the message didn’t change.
The Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) process helped to frame the size and
extent of the VAR. The WFDSS process was also viewed as a valuable tool for developing
alternatives, decision rationale, developing MAPS, and selecting a course of action based
on VAR and firefighter exposure.
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It is important to remember that WFDSS must be kept current with the complexity of fast
moving fires. The organization was built up mindfully; the exclusive use helicopter was
released first, there was no contract equipment, the IMT monitored the caterer, they set
up camp for the long-term and once conditions changed they adjusted resources including
IMT members downward. They had a land use agreement with the airport that was cost
effective and met the needs of the IMT.
6. Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.
It is the expectation of the Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry, and the Director of
F&AM that we emphasize the importance of communicating our intent to all of our
partners, including AAs and ICs. They expect each region and forest to become actively
engaged with their stakeholders and work with them to participate in risk-informed
decision making meetings to prepare with them for the upcoming fire season.
The roles and responsibilities for community involvement between the AA and the IMT
were clearly identified in the Delegation of Authority. The daily practice of the AA/Agency
Representative (AREP) attending with the IC at briefings and public meetings helped
ensure that expectations and leader’s intent were clear and shared throughout the incident.
Firefighter, aviation, and public safety were stressed as the primary objective. Leader’s
Intent was emphasized often on the Ridge Fire.
The District and Forest continue to implement pre-season planning to ensure that all
cooperators understand their roles and responsibilities not only for evacuations, but for all
fire management activities.
In summary-there were no findings that the Forest needs to improve in sharing and
clarifying expectations.
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
1. Pre-season work pays dividends when there is an opportunity to manage a fire
while utilizing natural barriers and supports a determination to not manage all
fires aggressively. In the case of the Ridge Fire this pre-season work was
accomplished with partners and cooperators and the communities adjacent to the
Forest. The potential payoff from this work is often not foreseen. Particularly for
busy fire units like the Boise NF this work is important and takes a concerted effort
on the part of fire personnel and line officers. The importance of cultivating
existing relationships and establishing new relationships cannot be
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overemphasized. Pre-season efforts help fortify communications pathways which
are essential during fire season. The Boise NF responded well to the direction in
the Chief’s Letter of Intent in accomplishing this work. It is recommended this
work continue during the pre-season and that it be encouraged as a standard for
other units.
2. Working with communities, cooperators, partners and forest users in establishing
and discussing values at risk enabled the successful implementation of longer term
management strategies. The understanding and the application of risk
management principles - including the recognized trade-offs required in decision
making, and the ability to share these with cooperators, partners and communities
- is enhanced by preparation. In addition, cost containment is compatible with, and
an inherent part of good risk management. The interaction of effective risk
management and cost containment should be imparted as there is opportunity
internally as well as externally.
3. Similar to the findings in number one above, early external during incident
communication is critical. This is particularly true if the fire is likely to be a longterm event. This was accomplished effectively for the Ridge Fire and should set the
standard for similar fires.
4. The Forest includes an annual review of fire history to evaluate suitable areas for
managing fire for opportunistic restoration in concert with a continuous evaluation
of these areas as seasonal conditions change.
5. The Forest Line Officers were engaged at a high level throughout the fire. This
helped portray clear and consistent leader’s intent. This level of involvement pays
dividends and is important to ensuring a positive outcome for the Forest and
should continue in future fire seasons. The Forest provided clear leader’s intent
utilizing a variety of methods, including an in-brief with the Command and General
staff prior to briefing the entire IMT; providing additional direction in the
Delegation of Authority and WFDSS; having a continued presence and dialogue
with the IMT; and by having the local District Ranger maintain key community
contacts while away from their duty station during the incident. Boise NF Line
Officers could share this experience with others.
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6. The Forest very effectively sized up the fire as an opportunity to practice
suppression with a less aggressive response while concurrently deriving a very
positive benefit by reducing firefighter exposure. Recognizing the fire history in
the area of the fire allowed this effective size up to take place along with the
recognition that values at risk were well removed from the fire area. Utilizing the
Chief’s Letter of Intent to substantiate the fire management strategy, specifically
the “Five Rights,” is an effective way to portray site specific conditions which
garners understanding and support.
7. The Forest made a conscious decision to utilize aircraft at a fairly high level to
ensure support to firefighters in a remote location. It was known that this would
increase the fire cost to a degree, however this was warranted given the fire
location and situation and the increased risk and exposure offered by other
alternatives. This conscious thought process is encouraged for similar fires.
8. The off-site smoke effects to the community of Stanley were understood and
addressed throughout the fire. This gained understanding and support for the
management of the fire. Continuing to consider these effects is important and
should continue, especially in instances where off-site effects are beyond the
standard distances that IMTs are accustomed to dealing with.
9. The Boise NF has an effective medical/hospital liaison program. Firefighters
needing medical care are taken care of in terms of administrative processes given
the established program where those with administrative skills work meet the
needs of the firefighter. These Forest liaisons work with the medical provider to
ensure payments are made and that there are no barriers to an individual receiving
medical care. This is an excellent program which should be encouraged for other
units.
10. Many of the described lessons learned show how the Boise NF is successfully able
to assure that exposure is commensurate with the values at risk in a way that
allows them to safely achieve reasonable objectives with the least firefighter
exposure necessary, while concurrently enhancing stakeholder support. This
should continue on the Boise NF and also serve as a model for other units.
16 | P a g e
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Attachments




Ridge Fire Chronology; see page 18.
Typical Fuels Photo; see page 21.
Ridge Fire History Map; see page 22.
Ridge Fire Progression Map; see page 23.
17 | P a g e
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Ridge Fire Chronology
Date
7/17
Command
T3 Collin Good
Cost
(rounded to
nearest M$)
30
Acres
418
7/18
T3 Good
70
823
7/19
Type 3 Good to Type
2 Wilde
616
1,500
7/20
7/21
7/22
Type 2
Type 2
Type 2
1,000
2,470
1,500
3,060
1,900
3,704
18 | P a g e
Actions
Started July 16, lightning, 0%
containment, unable to establish
anchor point, Steep inaccessible
ground, heavy fuels, no evacuations,
ordered IMT2, Values at Risk –
natural resources, lookout
0% containment, active fire
behavior, established safety and
medevac zones/escape routes, no
evacuations, in-briefed IMT2
same Values at Risk
Lookout
0%resources,
containment,
no evacuations in
effect, transition from IMT3 to IMT2
(Wilde), same Values at Risk
5% containment, extreme fire
behavior in heavy fuels, limited
escape routes, safety zones,
steep terrain and snags limit
accessibility for ground forces.
same Values at Risk, smoke
affecting communities, Class 1
Airshed
7% containment, good progress
on establishing anchor point,
first day no critical resources
needed, other issues same as
above
10% containment, fire moved
significantly to the N and W into
Cat Lakes Basin, aerial resources
diverted to new start involving
structures at Redfish Lake
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
7/23
7/24
Type 2
Type 2
2,400
2,800
4,615
4,810
7/25
Type 2
3,300
5,143
7/26
Type 2
3,800
5,157
7/27
Type 2
4,400
5,246
7/28
Type 2
7/29
Type 2
4,900
5,246
5,300
5,263
7/30
Type 2
5,500
5,263
7/31
Type 2
5,800
5,270
19 | P a g e
14% containment, fire well
established in Red Mt. and Cat
Lakes Basin, constructed safety
zones/escape routes for newly
deployed ground forces
16% containment, 60% of
perimeter containment of the
entire perimeter will be
considered a success
20% containment, active fire
behavior at 0630, continue long
range containment strategy and
risk management actions
30% containment, crews
secured handline to the S and E,
and proceeded into Red Mt. and
Cat Lakes with aerial support
35% containment, limited growth
predicted only to the east, values at
risk limited to Bull trout and white
bark pine habitat
35% containment, same as
above. Safety issues continue
to limit staffing, as they have
from the start of the fire
35% containment, same
as above. Good
performance from T1
crews have helped
contain the fire on the
critical flanks
40% containment, T1
crews continue work on
uncontained North and
Northwest flanks
42% containment, significant
demob
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
8/1
6,000
8/2
5,270
48% containment, Objectives met,
Transfer of command to local unit
at 2000
5,315
Contained, Controlled and Out
Final ICS 209 – 9/19/13
Type 2
6,200
8/3 –
9/19
5,270
46% containment, all resources
removed from fireline due to
severe weather threat
Type 2
Type 4 Good, Briggs,
Dufferena
6,800
20 | P a g e
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Typical Fuels and Topography in the vicinity of the Ridge Fire
21 | P a g e
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Ridge Fire History Map
22 | P a g e
Ridge Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review
Boise National Forest
U.S. Forest Service, June 2014
Ridge Fire Progression Map
23 | P a g e