양면게임이론(Two-Level Game)
 기본시각
 양면게임이란?
 윈셋(win-sets)의 중요성
 윈셋의 결정요인
 사례분석
Robert Putnam (1988). "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games". International Organization 42(3), pp. 427–460
[번역본: 로버트 퍼트남, “외교와 국내정치: 양면게임의 논리,” 김태현, 유석
진, 정진영(편),『외교와 정치』(오름, 1995) pp. 33-79] 참조
기본시각
 International negotiations involve bargaining
on at least two levels:
• between or among national governments,
and
• between government leaders (or
negotiators) and other domestic political
actors
 Successful negotiations require:
• agreement between negotiators /
countries on the basis of mutual benefit
• capacity of each government to secure
internal ratification of the agreement
according to its relevant political
processes
양면게임이란?
 Politics of international negotiations can usefully
conceived as a “Two Level” game
• Level I : International Level
• International negotiations with the other party
• Bargaining between negotiators from different
countries, leading to a tentative agreement
• Level II : National Level
• Domestic negotiations with domestic constituents
• Separate discussions within each party’s constituents
about whether to ratify the agreement
양면게임이란?
Level 1 Game
Country “A”
Governmental Leaders
(Negotiators)
|
--------------
Level 2 Game
Country “A”
Political Leaders / sr. negotiator
+++++++++++++++++++++++
Internal political / b’cratic actors
+++++++++++++++++++++++
External political / societal actors
(supportive / conditional / opposed)
Country “B”
Governmental Leaders
(Negotiators)
|
Level 2 Game
Country “B”
Political leader / sr. negotiator
+++++++++++++++++++++
Internal polit. / b’cratic actors
+++++++++++++++++++++
External political / societal actors
(supportive / conditional / opposed)
윈셋(win-sets)의 중요성
 Win-sets
• The set of all possible agreements among negotiators that
would obtain ratification by their respective constituents
• "Ratification" generally refers to any decision-process at
Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I
agreement
 Reason I:
Larger win-sets make agreement more likely
• The larger the win-sets are, the more likely an agreement
will be reached
• Agreement is possible only if the win-sets of each of the
parties overlap
윈셋(win-sets)의 중요성
 Reason 2:
The relative size of the respective Level II win-sets affects
the distribution of the joint gains from international
bargaining
• The larger the perceived win-set of a negotiator, the more
he can be "pushed around" by the other party
• A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage
FIGURE 1. Effects of reducing win-set size
Xm-------------[--------[--------]-------[---------------Ym
Y1
Y2
X1
Y3
Max. possible
Max. possible
gains for X
gains for Y
윈셋의 결정요인
Level II
Preferences
&
Coalitions
Win-sets
Level I
Negotiators’
Strategies
Level II
Institutions
윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 선호와 연합

The lower the cost of “no-agreement” to constituents,
the smaller the win-set
• Some constituents may face low costs from n0agreement, and others high costs
• The former will be more skeptical of Level I
agreements than the latter
• The size of the win-set depends on the relative size of
the “isolationist” forces and the “internationalists”
• Support for international agreements is greater in
smaller, more dependent countries with more open
economies, as compared to more self-sufficient
countries
윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 선호와 연합

Preferences of the constituents determine the size of winsets
• In cases in which the constituents share homogeneous
interests, the win-set tends to become larger
• The more the negotiator can win at Level I the better
his possibility of winning ratification
• In cases in which the interests of the constituents are
more heterogeneous, Level I agreements are imposed
unevenly on them and a non-agreement is more likely

The more politicized the issue, the smaller the win-set
become
• Most professional diplomats emphasize the value of
secrecy to successful negotiations
윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 정치제도

The size of the win- set depends on the Level II political
institutions

Ratification procedures clearly affect the size of the win-set
• a two-thirds vote vs. a simple majority
• Japanese propensity for seeking the broadest possible
domestic consensus before acting constricts its win-set

Domestic political practices can affect the size of the win-set
• Strong discipline within the governing party increases
the win-set by widening the range of agreements for
which the Level I negotiator can expect to receive
backing
윈셋의 결정요인
Level II 정치제도

`state strength´ and ` state autonomy´
• The greater the autonomy of the
central decision- makers from their
Level II constituents the larger the winset and the greater the likelihood of
achieving international agreements
• The stronger the state is in terms of
autonomy from domestic pressure, the
weaker its relevant bargaining position
internationally
윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략

The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the
Level I negotiators

A tactical dilemma:
• The larger his win-set, the more easily he can conclude
an agreement, but also the weaker his bargaining
position vis-a-vis the other negotiator
 Reducing own win-sets
• Hand-tying strategy:
• Making open promises to domestic constituents or
• Making issues as politically sensitive by rallying
support or opposition from one’s constituents
(예) 2008. 6. 한미 쇠고기협상
윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략
 Expanding own win-sets
• Side-payment strategy:
• Providing compensatory payments to losers
suffering from the agreement to encourage its
ratification
• (예) 2000, 2001년 한·중 마늘협상
• Collusion strategy:
• Act in collusion by exchanging concessions to
ensure ratification mutually because each has an
interest in helping the other to get the final deal
ratified
윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략

Maximizing the other side’s win-sets
• Synergistic linkage strategy:
• Linking issues so as to change the utility functions of
the other side’s constituents
• Reverberation strategy:
• Asking the other side’s constituents to lower
expectations or change the image of issues
• Much ambassadorial activity – wooing opinion leaders,
contacting opposition parties, offering foreign aid
(예) 1997년 IMF-한국 구제금융협상
• Cross-governmental lobbing or coalition:
• NGOs’ activities and influence
(예) 대인지뢰금지캠페인(ICBL), 확산탄연대(CMC)
윈셋의 결정요인
Level I 협상자의 전략