Susan Greenhalgh
EVN Conference March 2016
DOD does not endorse
online voting.
“DOD endorses online
voting for the military.”
DoD “does not advocate for
the electronic transmission
of any voted ballot,
whether it be by fax, email
or via the Internet.” –
Pentagon spokesman Lt.
Commander Nathan
Christensen.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politicsgovernment/election/article24783181.html
“DOD endorses online
voting for the military.”
The DoD’s Federal
Voting Assistance
Program (FVAP) wrote in
a 2013 report to
Congress postal mail
return of a voted ballot
“remains the most
responsible method of
ballot return…”
https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/
FVAP/Reports/evsw_report.pdf
“Use of military Common
Access Cards (CAC) can
resolve security and
voter authentication
issues of online ballot
return.”
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation
/2015/08/06/russia-reportedly-hackspentagon-email-system/31228625/
“Ballots sent by email are
not as vulnerable to
attackers as a ‘full
Internet voting system.”’
NIST report 7551 “A
Threat Analysis of
UOCAVA Voting
Systems”
“Email are significantly
easier to intercept and
modify in transit than
other forms of
communication.”
http://www.nist.gov/itl/
vote/uocava.cfm
“Estonia has developed a
secure and trusted
Internet voting system.”
Team of international
researchers assessed the
security and found
exploitable
vulnerabilities that could
permit state attacker to
manipulate the election
undetected.
https://estoniaevoting.or
g/
.
“Estonia has developed a
secure and trusted
Internet voting system.”
https://etee.facebook.com/ausadvalimised
“Encryption can secure
an online voting system.”
The Norwegian online
voting system suffered a
major encryption error
and tens of thousands of
ballots sent in the clear
before it was discovered
and corrected. Norway
abandoned online
voting.
http://www.bbc.com/news
/technology-28055678
“Encryption can secure
an online voting system.”
In the NSW online election
last year, researchers
found they could defeat
the encryption by
intercepting a third party
script that was introduced
into every voter’s
browser. They could then
intercept and change every
vote before sending
it. Over 66,000 votes were
cast before the
vulnerability was patched.
https://freedom-totinker.com/blog/teaguehalderman/
ivote-vulnerability/
“Online voting systems
have been tested for
security.”
Internet voting systems in
the US are not subject to
security testing like other
voting systems. However,
the city of Toronto
conducted an independent
security analysis of three IV
systems and found that no
system provided adequate
protection against the risks
inherent in internet voting.
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Canada2014-01543-security-report.pdf
“Online voting systems
meet accessibility
standards.”
Toronto also evaluated
the accessibility of three
major online voting
system vendors and
found none satisfied the
WCAG 2.0.
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Canada2014-01543-accessibility-report.pdf
“Online voting will lower
cost and increase voter
turnout.”
The British Columbian
legislature
commissioned a report
on Internet voting that
found that evidence
shows that the
presumed benefit of
lower cost and increased
participation were not
realized.
https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/CA-BC-2014recommendations-final-report.pdf
“[X] is supporting (or
opposing) Internet
voting because online
voting will benefit voters
on the [left][right].”
The Heritage Foundation
and Brennan Center,
organizations perceived
to be on opposite ends
of the political spectrum,
both released reports
opposing online voting.
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/electionintegrity-pro-voter-agenda#Introduction
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/07/t
he-dangers-of-internet-voting
The security challenges
of online voting can be
solved with blockchain
(bitcoin) technology.”
Researchers have
published a paper
debunking the theory
that blockchain will
secure online elections.