Introduction
Schools and universities should be a safe atmosphere where students come to learn and
strive for better futures. Our society has strong beliefs about the sanctity of childhood and the
duty of society to protect children from harm. However, a safe school environment is not always
the case. Several highly publicized school shootings involving multiple homicides have raised
concerns for school safety. The graphic images, massive media coverage, and shocking nature
of the shootings have created an environment of heightened awareness among parents, teachers,
and students. This proves that the current school procedures and emergency management
strategies may be insufficient in ensuring the safety and well-being of students, faculty, and staff.
“Youth violence is widespread in the United States. It is the second leading cause of
death for young people between the ages of ten and twenty-four: 5,570 young people aged ten to
twenty-four were murdered- an average of sixteen each day in 2003” (CDC, 2007, p. 1). The
school setting is not intended for anxiousness, stress, or fear for one‟s life. Emergency managers
must strive to minimize vulnerability of schools, encourage sanctity, and support protection of
our children. “Among homicide victims aged ten to twenty-four years old, 81 percent were
killed with a firearm” (Lebrun, 2009, p. 11). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) found
that 272 incidents of violence affected institutions of higher education in the United States
between 1900 and 2008 (Drysdale, Modzeleski, & Simons, 2010). Every community must
evaluate how proactive their school officials are at preventing and planning for violent attacks
within their own school walls.
School violence is a subset of youth violence which is a broader public health problem.
Youth violence pertains to harmful behaviors that may start early and continue into young
adulthood, which includes a variety of behaviors such as bullying, slapping, punching, and
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weapon use. Victims of school violence can suffer serious injury, significant social and
emotional damage, or even death (CDC, 2010). School crisis consists of three common factors
which includes disruption of the normal school routine, some level of emotional and
psychological upset, and a need for plans, procedures or protocols beyond what the school had
previously had in place (Lebrun, 2009).
In addition, school shootings date back to at least 1974 when an 18 year old honor
student shot at janitors and firefighters who responded after he had set off his school‟s fire alarm
(Fraser, 2009). Now, some of the more recent highly publicized school shootings include
Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University, and Northern Illinois University. In the
Virginia Tech shootings, Seung Hui Cho, a 23 year old Virginia Tech student, killed two
students in a dorm, and then killed twenty-five more students and five faculty members at Norris
Hall. Fifteen other victims were wounded and this shooting is considered to be the deadliest
campus shooting in U.S. history (Bollinger, Nicoletti, & Spencer-Thomas, 2010). Due to these
devastating homicides, policies and activities must be activated to reduce the school‟s
vulnerability to damage from future disasters.
Purpose
The purpose of this research is to evaluate the effectiveness of the existing emergency
management strategies set in place in for school shootings in the United States. Another
objective is to highlight research that demonstrates more effective and reasonable methods to
prevent school violence and keep schools safe. The study will be limited to case studies that
occurred in the United States involving schools, colleges, and universities; however the project
will focus on the Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University, and Northern Illinois
University shootings.
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Furthermore, the project will allow for a more in-depth study the four phases of
emergency management involving school shootings in the high school, college, and university
settings. The project will accomplish a better understanding on mitigation, preparedness,
response and recovery pertaining to shootings in the school setting. Also, the significance of the
project is so that students are no longer fearful of attending schools and the fear-based mentality
that stems from excessive media attention will diminish. As a result, the final project will benefit
students, faculty, and staff by creating a safer learning environment through the application of
the phases of emergency management. Through experience, training, and a better understanding
of the factors that lead to school shootings; students, faculty, and staff will potentially have the
ability to assess a potentially deadly situation and respond accordingly.
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Literature Review
Introduction of the Four Phases of Emergency Management
“Emergency Management is the managerial function charged with creating the
framework within which communities reduce vulnerability to hazards and cope with disasters.”
The study of Emergency Management seeks to promote safer, less vulnerable communities with
the capacity to cope with hazards and disasters. Furthermore, the mission is to protect
communities by coordinating and integrating all activities necessary to build, sustain, and
improve the capability to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to, and recover from threatened
or actual natural disasters, acts of terrorism, or other man-made disasters (Lawrence, 2007).
Emergency Management can also be defined as the discipline dealing with risk and risk
avoidance. The four phases of Emergency Management are a continuous process that manages
hazards in an effort to avoid the impact of disasters or emergency situations. Mitigation is a
phase of Emergency Management and it includes activities that reduce or completely eliminate
disaster effects. Preparedness is another phase and it involves planning how to respond. Also,
response is a phase that occurs during and after a disaster or emergency situation in order to save
lives and prevent further damage. Recovery is a phase that continues until all systems are
normal or as close to normal as possible. The cycle of these phases can start at any phase and the
phases may overlap one another (Haddow & Bullock, 2006). This paper applies the four phases
of Emergency Management to the risk analysis of school shootings.
Mitigation
The first step in preventing school violence is to understand the extent and nature of the
problem. Mitigation is a phase of Emergency Management and some of the current approaches
include zero-tolerance policies, gun-control legislation, security measures, threat assessment, and
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mental health services. In the case of school shootings, this phase should focus on interventions
to strengthen security, warnings and emergency drills for students and facility to respond, and
effective communication to alert the faculty and students at risk.
Risk Factors
Mitigation efforts should ultimately reduce risk factors and also promote protective
factors at multiple levels of influence including individual, relationship, community and societal
levels. “Young people using violence do not suddenly pick up a gun or knife one day and kill.
Rather, it is a series of actions and life events that propels a young person to kill” (Lebrun, 2009,
p. 12). There are many factors that may influence an individual to turn to violence. Studies of
school shooters, by the FBI and the Secret Service reveal a combination of factors in their
psychological adjustment and peer relationships that could make it possible to prevent most
school shootings without the use of elaborate security and expensive programs (Lebrun, 2009).
Many potential shooters are diagnosed with disorders including conduct disorder,
oppositional defiant disorder, psychopathology and personality disorders, and many have mental
health issues. Therefore, these students have experienced and continue to experience violence
that is not pathological behavior but a logical adaptation to living in a violent environment.
Also, many youths live with parents or other adults that are violent with each other. If the
parents are out of control, then the child loses the stability of the family structure and often
times, children are dragged into adult conflicts (Lebrun, 2009).
Access to Guns
“The fact that guns are not the cause of youth violence does not mean that guns do not
play a critical role in escalating aggressive behavior into more violent outcomes” (Cornell, 2006,
p. 3). Psychological research shows how access to guns can influence the decision-making
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process and attitudes of youth. Some school shooters obtained their weapons from locked gun
cabinets in their own homes. Youths who carry weapons to school may buy them from retail
outlets that sell weapons legally or in cases where the law forbids juveniles from owning
weapons; they obtain them from acquaintances or relatives (Gerler, 2004). The Federal GunFree School Zone Act of 1994 requires school officials that wish to receive federal funds to expel
any student who brings, possesses, or uses a firearm on a public school campus for a minimum
of one year (Stephens, 1995). The primary goal of efforts to reduce gun violence among
adolescents should focus on the removal of illegal firearms from the adolescent population at
large.
It is a simple fact that school shootings are impossible without guns that are affordable,
available, easy to load and fire, and capable of firing many rounds within a few seconds.
However, studies show that introducing more gun legislation may not be the most effective
mechanism to achieve this goal. However, there are a number of potentially effective strategies.
For instance, targeted deterrence efforts that combine the efforts of school and court officials,
law enforcement officers, and juvenile probation officers to share information and monitor
students who have criminal records or fail to complete after care programs. Also, criminal
justice officials can use tracing and ballistic imaging to uncover and punish individuals who
provided weapons to juveniles. They can also strengthen criminal penalties for those who
transfer handguns to juveniles. Local law enforcement officials, school administrators, and
school resource officers (SRO) should work together in order to trace the source of illegal
weapons brought to school. School officials should demand information about weapons sources
from students, perhaps using the idea of a lesser punishment for the offender if they reveal the
source of the weapon. Lastly, enforcement efforts should also concentrate on the activities that
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surround the exchange of weapons in order to interrupt the methods of weapons transfer (Gerler,
2004).
Security
“More students are carrying weapons to school – 18.5 percent reported carrying a weapon
(gun, knife, or club); 5.4 percent carried a gun on one or more days” (Lebrun, 2009, p. 13). One
of the most disturbing things about school shootings is the fact that heavily armed students have
the ability to enter into schools with undetected guns, ammunitions, and explosives. As a result,
schools have high priorities of deterring school violence by increasing security and limiting
access. Some prevention and intervention approaches that have emerged from case studies and
discourse among experts are the security of the facility, changes in the vulnerability of facilities
to intrusion, and increasing the capacity to respond at the moment of a threatening situation
(Fraser & Wike, 2009).
As part of prevention against school shootings, schools have participated in new or
improved security strategies. Many schools have controlled security by limiting access and
egress of students. For instance, most schools have security systems for visitors in which they
must sign-in, sign-out and wear a visitor sticker. Another method of security is to require that
staff and students wear badges or picture IDs to deter unauthorized school presence or access and
allow for the school to have a controlled environment that is monitored by school staff. Also,
many schools conduct routine or random searches and inspection of school bags and lockers.
Metal detectors have been installed at school entrances and exits as another method to increase
security. Digital cameras that can pan across an area to be monitored by multiple observers have
also been installed in schools, such as in the hallways and near entrances and exits. The cameras
will also allow for documentation of any potential threats or acts of violence. “Today, schools
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across the country are combining basic security measures, such as searching lockers (53%),
placing school staff in the hallways (90%), locking entrances and/or exit doors during the school
day (54%), and requiring visitors to sign in, with more sophisticated measures” (Cornell, 2010,
p. 28).
School Resource Officers
School resource officers (SROs) are another addition to school security. They create a
visible sense of security to students, faculty, staff and parents (Fraser, 2009). The SRO is a
consultant on law enforcement and security matters. Also, they respond to emergencies or crisis
situations in which there is an imminent risk of violence. Schools are encouraged to make use of
their school resource officers for prevention purposes. Moreover, they have a positive impact on
the school climate through establishing high visibility in the school, maintaining the positive
relations with students, and taking an interest in school activities and events as another member
of the school staff. SROs are able to adopt a problem-solving approach to crime prevention by
identifying potentially unstable situations or brewing conflicts between students before they
actually occur. Lastly, if a school does not have an SRO, then the school division should make
arrangements for a liaison from the local police department (Gerler, 2004).
Zero-Tolerance Policy
Highly publicized school shootings in the 1990s generated fear and concern among
school officials. The anxiety of educators was further inflamed by waves of false bomb threats
and hit lists that troubled many schools. As a result, school authorities became so highly
sensitive to any seemingly dangerous to any seemingly dangerous student behavior that many
turned to radical measures. Fear of school shootings have driven school authorities to adopt
harsh zero tolerance policies. Zero tolerance became a widespread practice in which students are
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automatically expelled for any violations of school safety rules. Schools can apply a zero
tolerance policy that seeks to impose punishments such as suspensions or expulsions for minor
offenses in hopes of preventing more serious offenses in the future. In 1994, the Gun-Free
Schools Act required that schools expel students for one calendar year if they are found to be in
possession of a firearm at school. Even though the law permitted local school districts to modify
the expulsion on a case-by-case basis, the provision was frequently overlooked in favor of less
flexible policies that mandated automatic expulsion for all infractions. Lastly, many schools
expanded zero tolerance well beyond the arena of firearms or lethal weapons (Gerler, 2004).
Profiling
One response to the pressure for action is an effort to identify the shooter by developing a
“profile” of the typical school shooter. Although, this may sound like a reasonable preventative
measure, in practice, trying to draw up a catalogue or checklist of warning signs to detect a
potential shooter can be short-sighted or even dangerous. These checklists are publicized by the
media and can end up unfairly labeling many nonviolent students as potentially dangerous or
even lethal. Checklists and warning signs that have been used to construct a profile of the
violent student contain many general risk factors common to large numbers of youths (Gerler,
2004).
Threat Assessment
The FBI has developed a Threat Assessment Protocol which has been developed to a ssess
the potential likeliness that the threat made by a student will be carried out. The Four-Prong
Assessment Model as way to help schools and communities deal with the possibility of a crisis
situation. This model consists of the personality of the student, family dynamics, school
dynamics and the student‟s role in those dynamics, and social dynamics. Using the four-prong
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model, information on who is making the threat, what the threat is, and what is known about the
individual needs to be gathered. The purpose is to help educators, law enforcement officials,
mental health practitioners, and all those who work with youths begin the discussion of whether
the person making the threat has the intention, ability, and the means to act on the threat. It is
essential that the individuals make the proper determination when they are assessing a potential
risk (Lebrun, 2009).
Altering the School Environment
Another mitigation strategy would be to change the school environment and react in a
more positive environment. By altering the physical environment of the school, it can reduce
vulnerability by incorporating a more controlled setting. As part of hazard mitigation, schools
can minimize violence by reducing class size and reducing enrollment at large schools. Schools
should also implement a school door numbering system to improve public safety response
(Crawford, 1999). Another problem is that many classrooms only have one exit and no
windows. This creates problems even with other emergencies such as fires, bomb threats, or gas
leaks that require immediate evacuation from the building. Connecting classrooms and
removing the need to enter hallways when it is dangerous to do so could help avoid the situation
of an active shooter. In addition, adding escape ladders or ropes so that upper floors may be
evacuated by means other than the stairwell could also be helpful.
The school system should educate faculty, staff, and students about training and exercises
in order to prevent school shootings. An imperative prevention strategy is to train and educate
all relevant individuals on avenger behaviors. Faculty and staff should also be trained on how to
contact a Behavioral Intervention Team (BIT). The purpose of the team is to promote the health
and safety of students. Behavioral Intervention Team addresses student behaviors that are
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disruptive which includes mental health and safety issues. Their mission is to provide a
structured positive method for addressing student behaviors that impact the school community,
manage each case individually, and then initiate appropriate intervention without resorting to
disciplinary measures (Stevens, 1995). Faculty and staff should also be educated on privacy
laws and what behaviors are considered reportable.
Bullying
Bullying is a vital issue because it has serious and lasting consequences for victims, and
students who take part in bullying are at risk for continued aggressive and antisocial behavior.
Schools must do a better job of defining bullying, teaching students what bullying is, and
encourage students to seek help when they are being bullied. Over the years, bullying prevention
has gained substantial momentum toward becoming a national concern, as reflected in the
growth of bullying prevention programs and increase in the number of states involved in bully
prevention efforts. One approach toward reducing bullying would be to infuse bullying
prevention efforts with strategies and methods that have been proven to be effective in
aggressive youths, such as conflict resolution and problem-solving. Also, counseling for
bullying can make use of the cognitive-behavioral methods that are found to be effective in
teaching students anger control, empathy, and the ability to get along with others (Cornell, 2006).
One of the main motives of students who carry out violent acts involves revenge against
those that have bullied or teased them. Therefore a major achievement would be for schools to
do a better job of defining and preventing bullying. Anti-bullying programs benefit vulnerable
students by lessening their experience of humiliation and alienation from their classmates.
Nearly every case of a school shooting involves bullying, and the obvious chain of causation,
from bullying to humiliation to rage to revenge is shown as a characteristic of school rampage
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shooters (Fast, 2008). Therefore, it is imperative that administrators and teachers learn from case
studies and past mistakes by impeding bullying in order to prevent future complications and
tragedies.
Preparedness
Another phase is preparedness and some of these strategies include emergency plans,
education, practice drills, warnings and communication, and training. After numerous tragedies
have occurred at schools in the past years, emergency planning has now become a priority in
school districts. By now, every school in the country should have some form of an emergency
response plan in place.
Planning Team
Each school should establish a safe school planning team that involves a variety of key
individuals within the community. Critical team members should include the superintendent of
schools, chief of police, presiding juvenile judge, chief probation officer, health and welfare
providers, mayor, city manager, representatives from mental health, and emergency response
teams. The planning team should also conduct a school safety assessment. An initial component
of the process is to determine the condition of the school in regard to a variety of safety issues,
including violence, weapons in school, gangs, substance abuse, harassment, and bullying.
Another step of assessing the school is examining the security practices (Stephens, 1995).
Emergency Plans
Intervention refers to the school‟s response to a school shooting, terrorist attack,
ecological disaster, or other crisis. The keystone to intervention is the response plan or
emergency plan. An emergency plan is a document created and implemented by
interdisciplinary crisis response team selected from the school and community. The
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responsibility of the designated local emergency manager is to develop and maintain the
community emergency plans. As the emergency management profession is evolving, more
communities have emergency managers responsible for guiding response and recovery
operations (Bullock & Haddow, 2006). An emergency plan specifies how teachers, school
administrators, students, parents, police officers, firefighters, emergency workers, and others will
respond collaboratively to a variety of crises that could take place in or around school. The plan
coordinates the actions of seasoned responders and provides those with less experience with
specific, effective tasks so that they are less likely to panic, become paralyzed with fear, or
respond in a way that jeopardizes others (Fast, 2008). Emergency planners are required to
anticipate various high-risk scenarios and how to prepare for them. Lastly, they must be aware
that what happens will rarely be just the scenario planned for which is the case for this incident.
Planning should be a continuous process. Schools should implement a safety plan by
completing a written plan and revising the plan as needed. Emergency planning is driven by two
goals which include hazard assessment and risk reduction. Hazard assessment involves
documenting known threats and finding new threats. Risk reduction analysis is the specification
of the actions that are necessary to minimize the known or projected levels of danger. Hazard
assessment measures, monitors, and evaluates risks while risk reduction balances the
consequences of risk with the state of technology and the resources available. An effective
planning process for an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) includes seven milestones. These
milestones include assembling the planning team, examining hazard vulnerability, establishing
task assignments, conducting resource analysis, defining roles and responsibilities under the
plan, ensuring the management structure is adequate, and revising or preparing the written plan.
Prior preparation and planning prevents poor performance (Lindell & Perry, 2007).
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All school personnel must be trained to understand the safety plan and the role they play
during a crisis. The protocols involved in the plan must be practiced so they can be executed
smoothly during times of confusion. Since no one is expected to remember the protocols or
search through a safety plan with students‟ lives are in jeopardy, it is recommended that teachers
and staff have a brief manual, pamphlet, or flipchart to remind them of their responsibilities.
Some schools have developed emergency kits containing updated floor plans, class rosters,
lockdown protocols, a list of staff members serving on the crisis response team, and of all staff
members certified in first aid. The emergency kit may also contain a cell phone and a portable
radio (Fast, 2008).
Training, Drills, and Exercises
Once a plan is developed and the personnel trained to follow the plan, the next step is
exercising the plan. Exercises and drills provide an opportunity to evaluate the efficiency and
effectiveness of the plan. Also, exercises test the systems, facilities, and personnel involved in
implementing the plan. Exercises should be conducted at all levels of the government and in the
private sector. Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) defines an exercise as “a
controlled, scenario-driven, simulated experience designed to demonstrate and evaluate an
organization‟s capability to execute one or more assigned or implicit operational tasks or
procedures as outlined in its contingency plan” (Haddow & Bullock, 2006, p. 171).
There are four types of exercises identified by FEMA which includes full-scale, partialscale, functional, and tabletop. A full-scale exercise is usually conducted in conditions as close
to an actual event as possible. Also, the exercise is used to evaluate the operational capabilities
of emergency management systems over an extended period and usually most of the
organizations plan will be tested. The purpose of this type of exercise is to stress the
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organization‟s ability to accomplish their mission under realistic conditions. A partial-scale is an
exercise with limited goals, with a portion of the organization participating, and the scope is
generally less than that of a full-scale exercise. Furthermore, it is conducted to evaluate a limited
number of objectives or to evaluate the organization‟s capability to execute newly developed
procedures. Functional exercises allow the evaluation of various procedures that are similar to
one another. This type of exercise is limited to activities within a specific functional category of
the organization and the activities are scenario-driven. Table-top exercises use a hazard-specific
scenario, supporting documentation, and injected messages simulating field-derived information,
where the participants discuss anticipated actions while in a controlled environment. The
exercise usually involves senior staff, elected or appointed officials in an informal setting and the
products derived from this type of exercise may include emerging policy, plan revisions, and
conceptualization of new procedures (Haddow and Bullock, 2006).
Schools should also practice drills with local emergency responders. Drills help to
improve skills and portray any short-comings of the process that need to be addressed. Also, the
increased experience of the responders, the quicker and more efficient the response. Emergency
responders need to be included because they are vital in handling the situation, providing
medical assistance, and moving of the victims. Mass evacuations to locations off-campus should
also be practiced. Moving large masses of people in a confined space quickly is difficult. An
off-campus location needs to be coordinated with community resources for those who have
evacuated from the incident. Students who have escaped the building need to avoid gathering in
front of the building or congregating when evacuated. A location needs to be identified for
parents who arrive at the scene in search of their son or daughter (Response Options, 2007).
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Furthermore, emergency drills need to be conducted with as much realism as possible.
Normal, daily duties should be conducted immediately prior to the drill to allow for manpower
needs evaluation by departments and response time assessments. In addition, the whole school
must be involved in the drill and some action must be taken by every person in the school.
Training not only helps ensure improved response from personnel, but it also gives first
responders the chance to contribute input to the school‟s emergency plan. Also, it allows
participants to uncover areas of concern, realize resource needs, point out strengths, and better
coordinate inter-agency efforts (Response Options, 2007). In conclusion, preparedness planning
and training that was shared among responder organizations contributed to good working
relationships, trust, and the rapid triage, treatment, and transport of the victims.
Lockdown
Lockdown is the only defensive strategy and policy used by most schools in response to
an active shooter event despite persistent failure when challenged. Many schools use this
procedure as an attempt to prevent access of an active shooter to the students. At first the
procedure begins with an announcement of some sort in order to signal the entire school to enter
into lockdown mode. In addition, the protocol consists of all staff and students securing
themselves in a room, turning off the lights, covering the windows, making sure that the door is
locked, retreating to a corner of the room away from the door, and then awaiting the “all-clear”
signal from the police (Response Options, 2007).
The concept of lockdown originated in prisons, since when there is a riot in a prison there
is an attempt to secure the prisoners not involved in the mayhem by locking them into their cells
for their own safety. Unfortunately, the system used in prison does not have the same
effectiveness as keeping students out of harm‟s way of an active shooter. However, lockdown is
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still continued to be used in the school system because there are some advantages. First of all, it
is easy to train staff and students to shut and lock a door and it is also an easy procedure to put
into motion because it only requires that one word be heard. Furthermore, it allows the police to
easily identify the bad guy if he is the only person in the school who is mobile (Response
Options, 2007).
A.L.I.C.E. Training
“A.L.I.C.E.” is an Active Shooter and Violent Intruder program and the acronym stands
for Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, and Evacuate. The program is a comprehensive
approach, which advocates integrated strategies incorporating environmental design, technology
and communication, law enforcement and action. Also, the training program is designed to give
a person, or even a group of people, who may be involved in a potentially life threatening
situation a chance to change the outcome of the situation. In an active shooter situation, action
must be taken by those in immediate danger because essentially they are the real first responders.
It gives the victims some mental and physical tools that could play a vital role in their survival.
The program is beneficial to people of any size, age, and experience since it is designed so that
anyone can utilize the strategies. Lastly, the A.L.I.C.E. program should be presented to students,
faculty and staff throughout the campus community (Response Options, 2007).
Warnings and Communication
Many school shooters leak information prior to an attack, therefore increasing
communication within the school and school community which may provide authorities with
sufficient early warnings. If authorities have timely warnings of a crisis, then communication to
the schools warning of the potential hazard can save lives. In the event of an attack, rapid
communication can assist in instructing students to take cover or if time permits to evacuate
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safely to a secure campus location (Fraser & Wike, 2009). The system response for school
shootings should involve immediate notification of all individuals on campus or at school and
first responders such as law enforcement and emergency response teams. Communication
systems should involve high-tech notification systems such as intercoms, loud speaker systems, a
specific alarm only used for active shooters, text messaging warnings, email warnings, phone
warnings, and any other technology that can be used to notify all individuals in the school or on
campus (Bollinger, Nicoletti, & Spencer-Thomas, 2010). Lastly, schools must also secure
immediate external support from police, hospital, or emergency medical services through a
telephone or intercom.
Staff and students require real-time information in order to act in their best safety interest.
Classrooms must be equipped to contact 9-1-1 directly. Unfortunately, many districts do not
allow teachers to contact 9-1-1 without going through the main office or contacting the principal
first. Schools should have a quick and foolproof communication system that is available to all
teachers in their classroom. The communication system could be an intercom, a telephone, or a
cell phone in an “emergency kit”. College campuses are environments that create a whole
different set of problems since the responsibility of being well-informed rests more on the
students rather than the teachers (Fast, 2008).
In recent years, universities have been implementing emergency alert systems that allow
them to text message student cell phones if a shooting or other crisis is taking place. However,
the problem is that not every student signs up for the alert system. A recent survey showed that
at Virginia Tech, four out of ten students had failed to sign up for the service. Campus safety
experts attribute student‟s disinterest to feelings of invincibility, reluctance to give out personal
information, and an aversion to paying text-messaging fees. Mass text message alert systems are
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extremely useful because it utilizes a line of communication that is already normative and it can
be used as a powerful tool in disseminating important lifesaving information. Effective
communication will ultimately assist in identifying the location of an attacker or potential threat
in order to disrupt a developing event (Fast, 2008).
Response
Response is the third phase of emergency management and in school shootings this phase
may consist of coordination of resources and first response of police, emergency medical
services (EMS), and SWAT teams. The response phase consists of immediate actions to restore
security and safety.
Police and SWAT Teams
Police must arrive on scene, traverse the campus, enter the building, and find the location
of the event. In order to determine how to respond during a crisis, responders must ensure that
the reports of a crisis are in fact accurate. The first action is to respond to the scene and then
secure the scene and maintain order. After the incident, police will investigate the crime scene
and interview witnesses. A SWAT team is a special group of police trained to deal with
unusually dangerous or violent situations. They are deployed in situations when hostages are
being held, or heavily armed persons need to be captured such as an event of an active shooter.
Special Weapons and Tactics Team or SWAT provide a ready response to situations that are
beyond the capabilities of normally equipped and trained department personnel. Team duties
include hostage rescue, riot control, perimeter security, rescuing citizens endangered by gunfire,
and resolving high-risk situations with a minimum loss of life, injury, or property damage.
When entering the incident of a school shooting, SWAT team members will storm the school
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carefully searching each classroom for wounded individuals or possible accomplices (Gerler,
2004).
Emergency Medical Services
Unfortunately, school-associated violent deaths are only part of the problem and there are
a number of students that require medical care for nonfatal, violence-related injuries. These
potential injuries include relatively minor injuries such as cuts, bruises, or broken bones. Other
severe injuries include gunshot wounds and head trauma that are more serious and have the
potential to lead to permanent disability (CDC, 2010). In the event that a student, teacher, or
staff member is wounded and needs medical attention, it will be denied until the building is
cleared for the threat. This process can take hours to complete. Unfortunately, according to their
protocol, emergency medical services are unable to treat patients until the scene is clear
(Response Options, 2007).
Paramedics must first triage the casualties and then transfer the victims to the hospital.
Medium-energy or high-energy weapons such as firearms cause damage not only to the tissue
directly in the path of the missile, but also to the tissue on each side of the missile‟s path. The
variables of profile, tumble, and fragmentation will influence the extent and direction of the
injury. Most shootings are done at close range with handguns, which makes the probability of
serious injury high. Paramedics must evaluate wound sites to provide valuable information to
direct management of the patient and to relay to the receiving facility. Temporary control of the
hemorrhage should be provided and patients should be transported immediately (Response
Options, 2007).
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Hospitals
Hospitals must also be prepared to respond to mass-casualty incidents. School shootings
could result in a large mass of victims suffering from severe injuries that are life-threatening.
When medical staff begins treating gunshot-wound victims, the ballistics of the guns that were
used is not usually known, so the extent of internal injury is difficult to assess at the onset. The
location of the entry wound is only the starting point. Even though it may appear as though the
injury is minor, the bullet may have taken a direction that affected major organs, veins, or
arteries. Hospital staffs must be aware that vital signs with young victims can change quite
rapidly since they can be stable and maintain that condition for a long time and then suddenly
drop to critical levels. A team of radiologists can come down to emergency rooms and conduct
real time positron emission tomography (PET) scans in order to aid in determining who requires
surgery and in what priority order (Stambaugh, 2008).
School Administrators, Faculty, and Staff
The burden falls on the school districts to provide their staff with the knowledge and
options in the critical incident area. Those individuals in the critical incident area are located in
the danger-zone of the shooting and are at high-risk for potential danger. If there is no law
enforcement present in the time of danger, then the faculty and staff must have some method
available to at least contain the situation until the police are able to arrive and eliminate the
threat. School personnel are neither mentally nor physically equipped with the skills and
knowledge to protect themselves and students in the situation of being confronted with a
dangerous situation. Emergency managers must provide adults and students with the knowledge
and techniques that can be utilized for everyone‟s protection. Teachers are afraid to teach
students how to respond to active shooters since they are backed by legal counsel. If the students
22
get hurt the teachers are liable. They feel it is better to herd students into a corner, offering no
resistance so that if they are shot and killed, as they followed the standard policy and could not
be found liable for the situation (Response Options, 2007).
During the response phase, the individual who learns of the threat or sees the individual
with the weapon will follow the established protocols for informing administrators or authorities.
Then, the administrator will contact local agencies by calling 9-1-1 and will inform remaining
school faculty of lockdown procedure or evacuation protocols. Staff members should move all
students out of the immediate area and if possible lock students into classrooms or areas away
from the window or from the scene. Administrators should provide emergency responders with
detailed maps or charts of the school area. School officials are to follow the orders of the police
and SWAT teams. Staff should not give out details to the media as the situation is occurring
because it may create panic or even fuel the ego of the shooter (Lebrun, 2009). The initial tasks
of the administrators should focus on accounting for all staff and students. Then, staff should
join mental health workers in comforting the parents and students. Once all the students are
accounted for, the staff should assist the students in getting home (Gerler, 2004).
Recovery
Lastly, the recovery phase involves mental health services, intervention strategies,
psychological first aid, and rebuilding the community to recover from the tragedies. After the
crisis, the school should be reopened as soon as possible in order to provide comforting routines,
an opportunity for students to confront their fears of returning to the scene of the violence, and to
provide a familiar setting so students can process what has occurred. Exposure to tragic events
such as a school shooting can lead to a wide array of negative health outcomes including
depression, anxiety, and many other psychological problems. Those students who are too fearful
23
to enter the building should be provided with tutoring outside the school until graduation or a
time when they are ready to reenter the school (Fast, 2008).
Debriefing
Debriefings are a common procedure for law enforcement, fire and medical agencies.
Debriefings simply give employees a chance to discuss their reactions to a traumatic event after
responding to the incident. Trained counselors typically lead debriefing sessions for the groups
or individuals involved. Psychologists frequently work with first responders in groups so they
can share reactions or ask each other questions about what happened. Also, the people involved
in the group debriefing are generally the individuals who worked together during the crisis. The
practice of debriefing first responders started after the Vietnam War. Since, the war was so
controversial, returning soldiers seldom discussed their combat experiences which as a result
many soldiers developed post-traumatic stress disorder. Therefore, in order to avoid these
problems, first responders are encouraged to undergo debriefing if they have participated in a
traumatic event of an unusual nature (Unauthored, 2006).
Postvention
Postvention refers to services that are provided after a crisis to help students, the school,
and the community deal with their grief and eventually return to a pre-crisis level of functioning.
The services are provided to a school or community following the death of one or more
individuals. The goals of the process include supporting those grieving the loss, assisting the
school in returning to its normal routines, identifying and supporting those most at risk for severe
reactions to the death (Lebrun, 2009). Since every disaster has its own set of conditions, it is
important that each school has a postvention coordinator who will lead the process of recovery.
The coordinator will contact the victim‟s family, provide condolences, support the family in
24
making funeral arrangements, and discuss how the family wants the school to be involved in the
funeral. In addition, the coordinator will organize counselors for students and staff.
Mental Health Services
A student‟s response to a crisis such as a school shooting will depend on the age, prior
experience of trauma, the stability of the home life, among other factors. A younger child may
exhibit sadness, fear, anger, or shame. Also, they may show symptoms such as insomnia, loss of
appetite, stomachaches, headaches, or externalizing symptoms such as fighting or destroying
property. Older students may become involved in substance abuse, sexual acting out, or
delinquency. On the other hand, teachers and staff are often too busy attending to the needs of
their students that they neglect their own needs. This could lead to difficulty fulfilling
professional obligations, accelerate “burn-out”, and create and aggravate a variety of emotional
and cognitive problems. Therefore, teachers, therapists, and rescue workers may need to be
reminded to participate in debriefings and other kinds of grief work (Fast, 2008).
Crisis team support
The crisis team should compile a list of at-risk students to be individually screened. Atrisk students include students with mental health concerns, students presently receiving help for
drug or alcohol abuse, or individual classmates. Students and staff who were closest to the
shooting or who knew the victims or the shooter well were considered to have the highest
priority. High-risk students and staff should be monitored and met with frequently by mental
health workers. Trained teachers or counselors may be required to conduct ongoing grief
presentations and sessions for individuals. The students should be monitored consistently and
there should be follow-ups and check-ins over the months following the tragedy (Gerler, 2004).
25
Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
Each individual will respond to the trauma differently and some of the responses include
feelings of fear, grief, and depression. Some physical responses include nausea, changes in
eating and sleeping habits, and withdrawal from activities. Most people will feel relief from
these symptoms within three months of the shooting, however if the symptoms persist, the
individual may be suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Post-traumatic stress
disorder is defined as an intense emotional and physical response that occurs from thoughts and
reminders of the event that could last for many weeks or months after the traumatic events.
Victims of PTSD suffer from symptoms that fall into three types which consist of reliving,
avoidance, and increased arousal. The symptoms of reliving may include flashbacks,
nightmares, and extreme emotional or physical reactions to reminders of the tragic event.
Avoidance symptoms involve staying away from activities, places, thoughts, or feelings related
to trauma or even feeling detached from others. In the last type, symptoms of increased arousal
include being overly alert or easily startled, difficult sleeping, irritability, outbursts of anger, and
lack of concentration. Lastly, other symptoms involving PTSD include panic attacks,
depression, suicidal thoughts, drug abuse, feelings of being isolated, and not being able to
complete daily tasks (Lebrun, 2009).
Memorials
Memorials have been created after school shooting incidents in order to help the grieving
express their emotions and have a place to go where they can feel a sense of community,
comfort, and connectedness with others who are experiencing the same thing. Informal
memorials are likely to spring up immediately after the shooting death of students or faculty.
Plans to handle flowers, cards, stuffed toys, must be made in advance. The school may minimize
26
spontaneous memorials by providing alternate commemorative opportunities for students
engaging students early on in response efforts or making an announcement about the families‟
wishes. However, commemorative activities and memorialization efforts should not be a focus
of the crisis response in the immediate aftermath of a death. For instance, if done too soon, there
may be a perception that the school is trying to close the chapter on grieving. Therefore, less
formal but thoughtful commemorative activities developed over time with active student
involvement tend to be much more meaningful and therapeutic to students and staff (Lebrun,
2009).
The most effective approach to preventing violence and protecting students during
postvention is a combination of addressing physical safety, educating practices, and programs
that support the social, emotional, and behavioral needs of students. (Lebrun, 2009). Schools
may close down for a few days to a week after the crisis so that the community can attend
funerals and memorial services. This also gives the school time to clean up and repair the
destruction. Funerals and memorial services are often open to the entire community and the
services are attended by thousands. The services are important so that people have the
opportunity to say their final goodbyes in a public ceremony, express their love for the deceased,
and pledge to remember him or her. (Fast, 2008).
27
Methods
School shootings are a major public concern in the United States and have created a fearbased mentality regarding the safety of our schools. Although, media attention involved in
school shootings has created an atmosphere of fear, schools can become better prepared through
the lessons learned from these strategies. The project will look into the problems that plague
schools and seek to answer the questions that regard the safety of our schools. Throughout the
project, each of the four phases of emergency management will be applied to the event of a
school shooting. The current approaches for each phase will be examined and evaluated based
on the effectiveness of each approach. Results will focus on which strategy is most effective in
preventing, preparing for, and responding to school shootings. Lastly, case studies from
Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Northern Illinois shootings will be included to evaluate the
school‟s approach and to focus on the lessons learned from these tragedies.
The various strategies for each phase of emergency management were researched and
summarized in the literature review. For each phase, different strategies used by schools or
universities are described regardless of their effectiveness. Through use of case studies and
expert research, the most effective emergency management strategies for each phase were found.
An essential aspect of the research was the final reports of each case study. Literature
research was undertaken on various topics through the internet and other written sources.
Throughout the project, many useful references were submitted by experts on the various topics.
The findings in the literature review are similar to the project because each of the sources refers
to the emergency management strategies to school shootings. Many of the sources also make
contain recommendations for improvements in preparing and responding to crises.
28
The research will involve evaluating public high schools and schools of higher education
(colleges and universities) in the United States, on the school‟s effectiveness of mitigation,
preparedness, response and recovery methods set in place for school shootings. The geographic
boundaries will be within U.S. borders because the boundaries will allow for a large
representative population and more accurate research findings.
First, research will be obtained primarily through previous studies found in secondary
sources such as the internet, books, articles, and papers written by experts in the study of
Emergency Management and school shootings. The data found will be evaluated and popular
strategies for each phase will be described in the literature review. After finalizing the data,
statistics from secondary sources regarding the number of shootings and the prevalence of school
violence will be included to reinforce the purpose of the research. The data will be used to
determine the most effective strategy for the phases of mitigation, preparedness, and response.
After determining with the approach was successful or not, the research will backed by lessons
learned from the case studies of Columbine High School, Virginia Tech University, and
Northern Illinois University.
The necessary data to test the hypotheses involves the emergency management strategies
that schools and universities use in the situation of a school shooting. The research findings can
be applied to schools, colleges, and universities all throughout the United States. The findings
can also be applied to emergency plans and can assist schools in the most effective prevention
and preparedness approaches. The research is applied research because the findings do have an
apparent application to a practical problem and the findings of the proposal imply that something
can be done. Furthermore, the significance of this research is so that students are no longer
fearful of attending schools and the fear-based mentality that stems from excessive media
29
attention will diminish with accurate research findings. It is desirable that schools will be safer
places to attend and school violence will dramatically decrease with the use of the
recommendations based off of the research data.
30
Results
Mitigation
Threat Assessment
In the case of highly infrequent events such as school shootings, profiles are likely to
generate huge rates of false-positive identifications. A major weakness of student profiling is
that it assumes that there is a single type of violent student and that these violent youths share a
common set of characteristics or traits. Another ineffective strategy for mitigation is the zerotolerance policy. The central problem with zero-tolerance policies is that all threats of violence
are treated as equally dangerous and deserving of the same of the same consequences. Ohio state
law requires every school district to have a zero-tolerance policy that makes no exceptions;
however these kinds of policies provide no latitude for school authorities to consider the
seriousness of the threat or degree of risk posed by the student‟s behavior. “Zero Tolerance has
become a philosophy that has permeated our schools; it employs a brutally strict disciplinary
model that embraces harsh punishment over education” (Gerler, 2004, p. 123). These types of
policies and practices fail to give school officials the means for making practical distinctions and
informed judgments concerning the risk posed by different student behaviors. However, threat
assessment meets this need (Gerler, 2004). Therefore, instead of using profiling or a zerotolerance policy as a mitigation strategy, threat assessment is a much more reliable approach for
school shootings.
Threat assessment is an approach to violence prevention that was originally developed by
the U.S. Secret Service based on studies of people who attacked or threatened to attack public
officials. Then, it was soon recognized as a way to analyze potentially violent situations that had
general law enforcement applications. As a result of the serious of high-profile school shootings
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that occurred in the 1990s, threat assessment was advocated to be applied to schools. In 2002, a
joint report of the U.S. Secret Service and Department of Education recommended that schools
train threat assessment teams to respond to student threats of violence. Threat assessment is
conducted when a person threatens to commit a violent act, or engages in behavior that appears
to threaten an act of violence. It is a process of evaluating the threat and the circumstances
surrounding the threat in order to uncover if there are any facts or evidence that indicate that the
threat is likely to be carried out (Gerler, 2004).
“Reliably predicting any kind of violence is extremely difficult. Predicting that an
individual who has never acted out violently in the past will do so in the future is still more
difficult. Seeking to predict acts that occur as rarely as school shootings is almost impossible”
(Fast, 2008, p. 237). Even though it is difficult to predict who would-be a school shooter, or
when a shooting might take place, it is possible to avert a school shooting using an approach
known as “threat assessment protocol.” Four months after the Columbine incident, the National
Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, a division of the FBI, held a five-day convention on
preventing school shootings. One hundred and sixty law enforcement agents, school
administrators, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals converged in Leesberg, Virginia for
the conference. From their analysis of 18 FBI case studies of school shootings; the group
identified threat assessment as the key tool in avoiding a school shooting (Fast, 2008).
Overall, the group‟s consensus was that without exception, students tell you what they
are going to do beforehand. The FBI refers to such communication as “leakages,” and the
messages can be verbal, or take the form of drawings, journal writings, videos, or school essays.
A leakage may occur in the form of a cry for help, an expression of inner conflict, a boast or
even when the shooter tries to solicit the help of friends or classmates in obtaining weapons or
32
perpetrating violence. However, dependence on leakages creates another problem since
adolescents must also be able to recognize leakages for what they are and share them with the
school authorities and law enforcement agents. Luckily, since Columbine, many potentially
serious school rampage shootings have been prevented by students who heard of plans and
warned students. For example, in 2001, school shootings were averted at New Bedford High
School in New Bedford, Massachusetts; at Southside High School in Elmira, New York; at
Royal Valley High School in Hoyt, Kansas; and at Monument High School in Twentynine
Palms, California (Fast, 2008).
Like other mass killers, school shooters often tell others of their plans to kill. However,
those shooters that give forewarnings of actions are not often taken seriously. In order to create a
safe environment for students, teachers and counselors must pay closer attention to students who
exhibit early warning signs. These warning signs may include becoming more hostile in dealing
with family and friends, self-injurious behaviors and a sense of rage (Holmes, 2001).
School shootings are rarely impulsive since most shooters plan their assaults and provide
clues or warning signs that they are contemplating an attack. Shooters usually leave a trail of
evidence that they are preparing to commit murder or murder and suicide. Typically, the
shooters plan the event in their mind, take action to acquire the necessary weapons, practice, and
then carry out the crime (Stambaugh, 2008). For instance, the perpetrators at Columbine gave
many warning signs such as a story written in English class that described a shooting spree by an
assassin in a black trench coat, as they planned the attack for over a year (Fraser & Wike, 2009).
Also, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the killers of the Columbine High School massacre told
fellow students that “something” was going to happen on Hitler‟s birthday (Holmes, 2001, p.
120). Once a threat has been made, schools should focus on a threat assessment for the
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particular situation. “Threat assessment is intended to help schools avoid the pitfalls of both
overreacting and under-reacting to student misbehavior, which can have important implications
for school discipline practice and the prevention of violence” (Cornell, 2010, p. 34).
Once a student threatens a school, the first step is to evaluate the threat and then decide
whether the threat is clearly transient or substantive. Community mental health systems are
responsible to work closely with school systems in order to develop protocols for assessing the
mental health needs of students showing evidence of suicidal ideation, depression and anger
(Fraser & Wike, 2009). Once the threat is considered to be serious, the next step would be to
conduct a safety evaluation which would include taking immediate precautions, protecting
potential victims, consulting law enforcement, and beginning a mental health evaluation. The
following step would be to implement a safety plan which involves, completing a written plan,
revising that plan as need, and also maintaining contact with the threatening student. After a
threat is evaluated, an example of a prevention effort would be the development of an
intervention plan that is designed to resolve the conflict or problem that caused the threat to
occur in the first place.
Many young shooters give forewarnings of actions however these warnings are often not
taken seriously by those privy to these comments (Holmes, 2001). Kip Kinkel told another
student that he had a plan to plant a bomb under the bleachers at his school and then block the
doorway so that the other students could not escape. He also described how he planned to go
into the cafeteria and shoot students with his .22 rifle since he had more rounds for that weapon
than he had for his 9 mm pistol. Although, his threats should seem alarming and should be taken
seriously, the student paid little attention to Kip‟s comments, only thinking that he was trying to
sound important (Holmes, 2001). Therefore, there is an obvious need for research encouraging
34
students to come forward after a classmate has expressed a threat or engaged in threatening
behavior.
Codes of silence refer to the unspoken agreement among students that they should not
share information about other students with teachers, administrators, or parents. Schools are
more likely to report concerns of fellow peers if the school provides an anonymous method of
voicing concerns. Also, students are more likely to speak up about potential threats if the
student‟s concern produces visible action and then disclosures are treated discreetly (Fraser &
Wike, 2009). A school environment characterized by mutual respect between students and
adults and efforts to break the code of silence is a mitigation strategy. Students must be
comfortable with seeking help from adults to resolve problems or report a threat of violence. As
a result, it is imperative to down codes of silence in schools in order to open up communication
between students, teachers, and parents about information regarding possible threats to safety.
The National Threat Assessment Center, a branch of the Secret Service also studied the
same problem. They did an examination of 37 school shootings from 1974 to 2000, led the
group to a similar conclusion that school shootings could best be avoided by attending to the
leakages. In the study, they identified four factors in threat assessment. The first factor is the
threat‟s level of detail since the more detail involved the more likely it is real. For instance, for
details such as the identity of the victim, the motivation, the means by which it will be carried
out, and the time and place are detailed and specific threats that should be taken seriously with
great concern. Next, the second factor is plausibility because even though a threat may be
detailed it still may be considered implausible. Another factor is whether the student is making
the threat is under unusual stress, such as the divorce of their parents, a failing grade on a course
that leads to the loss of a scholarship, a break-up with a girlfriend or boyfriend, a public
35
humiliation, or an arrest that might result in a felony. Some students will respond to these
experiences in varying degrees. A fourth factor is the character of the student making the threats.
One should identify whether the threat is coming from a student who rarely causes trouble or if it
is from a student that is known for violent behavior, has a history of encounters with the law, or
may have carried out threats of violence in the past (Fast, 2008).
Furthermore, threat assessment in schools is predicated based on six principles. First,
threatened or targeted violence is not a spontaneous, unpredictable event, but the result of a
deliberate and detectable process. For instance, students who commit serious acts of violence do
not suddenly “snap” and begin shooting at random; their behavior is preceded by days or weeks
of thought and planning. In many cases, they even share their intentions with others. Therefore,
targeted school violence can be prevented if enough information is known about the student‟s
preparatory behavior. Second, a threat assessment must not only consider the student who makes
the threat but the other factors surrounding the threat including the situation, the setting, and the
target as well. The threat assessment team will attempt to construct a complete picture of the
threat in context. Third, the school authorities investigating the threat must adopt a critical mindset that strives to accumulate reliable evidence and verify all claimed facts about the situation.
They must be willing to accept or reject hypotheses based on a careful analysis of all available
information. Hopefully, this approach will guard against the potential for school authorities to
jump to conclusions that a student is dangerous based on rumors or unverified allegations
(Gerler, 2004).
Subsequently, the fourth principle is that conclusions must be based on objective facts
and behaviors, instead of inferred traits or characteristics of the student making the threat. The
fifth principle is that all information should be gathered from multiple sources within and outside
36
the school system. This principle requires schools to look beyond their own boundaries and use
all available resources rather than function as a closed and isolated system. An integrated
systems approach to investigation seeks cooperation among groups and organizations that
comprise the community. Lastly, the final principle is that threat assessment is ultimately
concerned with whether the student poses a threat, not whether the student has made a threat.
“Threat assessment does not conclude when a student is found to have made a threat; rather,
threat assessment aims to determine how serious the threat is and then what should be done about
it” (Gerler, 2004, p. 119).
School psychologist, counselors, specialists, teachers, and administrators are all on the
front lines in order to assess and collect information about what is happing at the moment a
student makes a threat. The FBI Four-Prong Assessment model consists of the personality of the
student, family dynamics, school dynamics and the student‟s role in those dynamics, and social
dynamics. On the day that a threat is made, a preliminary assessment needs to be done.
Information on who is making the threat, what the threat is, and what is known about the
individual needs to be gathered using the four-prong model. Information needs to be gathered,
analyzed for seriousness, identified as being high, medium or low, and then proper action needs
to be taken by school authorities (Lebrun, 2009)
Schools are advised to designate a threat assessment coordinator who is responsible to
lead the school‟s response to student threats of violence. Also, the threat assessment coordinator
would chair a multidisciplinary team consisting of law enforcement and mental health
professionals. The team would conduct an assessment to determine the seriousness of the threat
and identify an appropriate course of action. They would attempt to identify characteristics that
might increase the level of violence risk and identify strengths or protective factors that would
37
decrease the risk of violence as well. In more serious cases, the team would then integrate all
information in order to plan an appropriate intervention and reduce the risk of violence. The
members of the threat assessment team should make risk reduction their ultimate goal (Gerler,
2004).
Gerler (2004) presented many recommendations for establishing threat assessment teams
based on experience, training and consulting with student threat assessment teams. One
recommendation is that the threat assessment team should be led by the school principal or
assistant principal. Since, principals have authority over student discipline it would be
problematic for someone other than the principal to be in a position of authority in making
decisions about a student who made a serious threat of violence. An additional recommendation
is that the team should include the school resource officer (SRO) or another law enforcement
representative. Another recommendation is to have the school psychologist or a school-based
mental health professional available to conduct mental health evaluations of the students who
make very serious threats.
In conclusion, threat assessment should extend beyond evaluation of the threat to the
development of a threat response. “Threat assessment is not an approach to student discipline,
but a means of preventing future acts of violence” (Gerler, 2004, p. 119). Also, threat
management involves the implementation of strategies and interventions aimed at reducing the
risk of violence. Furthermore, threat assessment is a means of investigation that leads directly to
targeted interventions and attempts to deal with specific conflicts before they result in violence
(Gerler, 2004). As a result, threat assessment presents a clear alternative to widespread practices
such as zero tolerance and student profiling.
38
Preparedness
A.L.I.C.E. Training
Although lockdown is easy to train staff and students to enact, it is not a very safe standalone defense. There are many disadvantages to the lockdown drill. For instance, the goal of
lockdown is basically to try and make a school appear empty, as if everyone has disappeared;
however an active shooter knows exactly where everyone is located. In fact, the lockdown drill
has actually done a lot of the active shooter‟s job since it has kept all his potential targets in the
building. Many classrooms have handles that open from the inside whether the door is locked or
not and many classroom doors have windows. Therefore, the intruder can easily break the glass
in the door, reach through and open the door. The lockdown has then failed and the plan gives
no more options (Response Options, 2007).
Lockdown even goes against the most natural human instinct in response to danger which
is fight and flight. Another major problem is the fact that this type of response has a lack of
communication and the staff and students in the danger zone are in desperate need of
information. In this type of defense, the information only flows from the incident area out to
administration and the police. There is no back-flow of information to the danger zone, which
prevents good decisions being made by those in immediate danger. Being huddled in a corner of
a room, in the dark, hearing shots and screams, having no clue of what is happing is not the most
effective situation to be in. Lockdown as a stand-alone defense to the active shooter must be
declared as insufficient; especially since the system has failed many times against just one or two
determined attackers (Response Options, 2007).
A.L.I.C.E. is a far superior plan in combating directed violence. The program is designed
to inform parents and others who wish to provide students information on increasing the chances
39
of surviving a tragic and horrific event. Unfortunately, many institutions of education only offer
limited information on survival options such as telling children to hide in a corner should they
come under attack. However, the problem is that hiding a group of students in a corner creates
an easy target for an active shooter. Fortunately, the training can provide information that will
convey that options do exist beyond the one-size-fits-all strategy. Even though, securing in place
is an acceptable strategy, it is not always the appropriate response in all situations. Currently,
there is the Introduction to the A.L.I.C.E. program available in an on-line format. The e-course is
created to teach concepts and demonstrate strategies. Overall, the training will create an
awareness of easily adaptable skills that anyone can utilize to survive (Response Options, 2007).
All individuals in school or on campus should be trained on how to react in the situation
of a shooter. For example, in incidents such as Virginia Tech and Columbine, playing dead has
been a proven survival technique if the shooter is in the room and shots have been fired. The last
option for a situation of an active shooter is to actively resist, which means to attack the
perpetrator with whatever means are available such throwing books or cell phones at the shooter
and then taking the shooter down (Bollinger et al., 2010). Education is a huge key to prevention.
Fear is a major reason why schools are preferred targets. Due to the young ages, lack of
life experiences, and the traditionally soft demeanor of students, the active shooter does not
expect much resistance. The active shooter expects to simply intimidate the students into easy
targets. For this reason, minimizing the impact of fear begins with information and training.
The ability to quickly make decisions while under stress and fear separates the survivors from
statistics. Therefore, individuals must be mentally prepared in order to decide if one will survive
a violent encounter (Response Options, 2007).
40
During the Columbine incident, Harris and Klebold walked around the library for over
seven minutes, shooting 22 students, killing ten. While the shootings occurred, there were two
breaks; one due to the fact that they both ran out of ammunition and they had to reload and the
other when the two decided to take shot at the police located in the parking lot from the library
windows. These windows could have been used as an early escape, however when a student
asked a teacher if they should just leave, the teacher told everyone to just remain hidden under
the tables. During the duration of the library event, no student emerged from under a table or
attempted anything just as they had been told or trained to do. The students did nothing and
served as easy targets for the aggressive shooters (Response Options, 2007).
Although Virginia Tech did not have a Lockdown policy, as the shootings started many
students reverted back to what they had been told to do in high school. The students went into a
corner or crawled under desks. Virginia Tech serves as a perfect example of how to and how not
to respond to an active shooter. For instance, in the classrooms in which students remained as
passive and static targets, there was great tragedy and 22 people were killed. However, in three
classrooms where some degree of action was taken, the survival rates were much higher with a
total of seven people killed in these classrooms. Therefore, if violence is being directed toward
an individual and that individual chooses to do nothing, that individual will lose (Response
Options, 2007).
Lack of firearm training in the typical active shooter presents a weakness that can be
exploited. In most cases, the active shooter does not possess any tactical skills that would
reflect their ability to successfully attack large numbers of people. These tactical skills include
seeing the target, aiming the weapon, and squeezing the trigger. For instance, proper aiming of a
weapon requires alignment of the front and rear sights at the target and the ability to aim and the
41
point of impact is directly related to the ability of the shooter to align the sights at the target.
Fortunately, the movement of the target and distance from the shooter can interfere which is a
helpful factor to deter potential victims (Response Options, 2007). By interfering with the
necessary skills required to use the weapon, it greatly increases the chances of survival and also
diminishes the chances of getting injured. This type of training tactic is much more productive
than only turning to the tactic of shelter-in-place.
Videos of the Columbine shooting show students hiding under tables, and screaming
while shooters just picked them off one by one. Similarly, in the Virginia Tech shooting students
in a connecting building were huddled on the floor rather than fleeing from potential danger.
These types of passive tactics make students easy targets (Hilty, 2010). “Historically, students
and teachers who have taken action in these events have fared vastly better than those who
remained passive and presented the shooter with a static target” (Response Options, 2007, p. 37).
The gunman is there to take lives in the first place, so those who are proactive and counteract the
attacker have a better chance of survival. It is frustrating that the education community is
seemingly unwilling to accept that their procedures are woefully ineffective. Unfortunately, poor
safety methods can lead to dead children in our school environments (Response Options, 2007).
Fear will momentarily immobilize those in danger and students need to quickly recognize,
assess, and respond to the threat.
As discussed A.L.I.C.E. training is Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, and Evacuate.
The idea is that once people are alerted about the shooter, they have the option to escape,
barricade themselves or ultimately fight back if necessary. This type of approach gives people
other options for survival. The first priority is to escape the situation, but if that is not possible
then people should barricade the door. Students can barricade the door by locking the door, or
42
using desk, chairs, bookshelves, or anything large to block the shooter from entering the room.
If the shooter does get inside, then students can run around screaming and throwing things to
distract the shooter in order to make themselves more difficult targets. They can throw
textbooks, cell phones, computer monitors, or anything within reach at the shooter to throw off
his aim and perception. Other students can restrain the shooter as a large group. A large group
could combat a shooter by clinging onto his legs or arms, and knocking him to the ground.
Lastly, cell phones should be used to relay information to police, and to get information about
safe exits to escape the shooter (Hilty, 2010).
In conclusion, A.L.I.C.E. training gives people who are at risk options and a better
chance of survival. Instead of training students to do nothing, staff and students should be
enabled with action plans that encourage them to do something proactive for their survival rather
than awaiting the police who will probably not arrive in time. These actions can consist of easily
taught strategies that enable escape or create interference with the ability to shoot accurately.
The primary goals of the A.L.I.C.E. plan involves utilizing technology and information in ways
that allow students and staff to make informed decisions, removing as many people from the
danger zone as possible in order to minimize targets of opportunity, and providing realistic
training so that those who are stuck in the crisis zone have options available to enhance their
chances of surviving (Response Options, 2007).
Response
An effective response plan must reflect a connection and coordination with community
response planning, so that the school response integrates smoothly with state and local efforts.
In the event of an emergency crisis such as a school shooting, local fire, police, and emergency
medical personnel respond to the event in a systematic and well-planned course of action. In
43
order to determine how to respond during a crisis, responders must ensure that the reports of a
crisis are in fact accurate. The first action is to respond to the scene and then secure the scene
and maintain order. In addition, the first responders will rescue and treat those injured, contain
and suppress fire or hazardous conditions, and retrieve the dead (Bullock & Haddow, 2006).
However, the community emergency plans should also identify roles and responsibilities for all
responding agencies and personnel for a wide range of disaster scenarios. All agencies must also
coordinate together, communicate and function as one unit working toward the same goal.
The shortcoming is that with any first responders, there is a time lapse between the
beginning of a situation and the arrival of police or emergency medical services. Actions by
local first responders are driven by the procedures and protocols developed by the responding
agency. In the event that there is a shooter in a school, most police department‟s protocol is to
wait until two or more police officers are on scene before entering the building. Time is ticking
while students are instructed to wait for the responders to save them. The revised training for
police responding to schools advocates immediate entry and the fastest possible ending to a
critical incident at a school, which is basically an assassination mission (Response Options,
2007). Therefore, Rapid response (RAID- Rapid and Immediate Deployment) is more effective
than tactical response (SWAT Teams) in active shooter events.
Law enforcement procedures during the time of Columbine consisted of first responders
securing the perimeter and gathering intelligence. First responders work to negotiate with the
intruders while awaiting arrival of the SWAT team who would make entry into the scene and
secure the situation as a last resort. Unfortunately, these procedures do not work when an
intruder is inside killing students. After the Columbine shootings, there was much criticism
toward the Jefferson County Sheriff‟s Department for their slow reaction. As a result, law
44
enforcement is now trained to deploy immediately in a diamond formation in order to seek out
and resolve the problem (Response, 2007).
Furthermore, Columbine High School did not have a safety plan in place which
contributed to the chaotic nature of the response. Consequently, there was no school-wide policy
about who to call, or what to do during a crisis (Fast, 2008). Over 1,000 law enforcement
officers and emergency medical personnel from Arapahoe County, Lakewood, Arvada, and other
neighboring communities had converged on the high school. Some responding agencies had to
park over a mile away from the school due to the congestion. Also, in six local hospitals,
emergency codes were announced over the speaker systems, medical workers readied their
operating rooms, checked blood supplies, and prepared for incoming ambulances (Fast, 2008).
The full-on attack began during the 11:30 a.m. lunch hour when one of the gunmen
heaved a pipe bomb onto the school roof and then started spraying students with gunshots. Due
to the volatile situation and the fact that deputies were unsure of how many snipers were
shooting, police then retreated to set up a safe perimeter outside the school. It wasn‟t until 11:52
a.m. when the SWAT team was authorized to make an immediate entry into the school by the
command post (Fast, 2008). By 12:30 p.m., SWAT teams moved cautiously from one classroom
to the next, searching every desk and backpack, collecting and defusing pipe bombs, and
liberating students in hiding. When students left the building, they were directed to a holding
area where they were frisked, questioned, and offered medical care. Then from the triage center
across the street they were taken by ambulance to one of the local hospitals, or bused to Leawood
Elementary School to be reunited with their parents. At 4:00 p.m. deputies found Harris and
Klebold‟s bodies and at 4:30 p.m. they declared the incident over. Throughout the day and the
45
next, crime scene analysts picked through the rubble, collecting spent shells, analyzing blood
traces, and gingerly defusing unexploded devices (Fast, 2008).
During the Virginia Tech shootings, the incident first started around 7:15 a.m. when Cho
abruptly entered the dormitory of Emily Hilscher. The police were investigating a double
homicide at West Ambler Johnston Hall when the shooting broke out at Norris Hall. At the
moment, there probably has never before been more active police presence on campus. The two
buildings were separated by about 700-800 yards and according to the reports the shootings at
Norris Hall lasted approximately nine minutes with about 170 rounds fired (Perkins, 2008).
The second incident at Norris Hall began shortly after the responders returned to service
after the first incident. Police responded within three minutes after receiving the 9-1-1 call.
Officers immediately proceeded to implement their training for dealing with an active shooter.
Their policy is to go to the gunfire as fast as possible, however not in a careless headlong rush
but in a speedy but careful advance. Police officers tried the three entrances, but found them all
chained. They moved to a fourth entrance which was the maintenance shop door and shot open
the conventional key lock. Then, they had to clear each classroom as they passed it to avoid the
shooter or shooters from being fired upon from the rear. Other police officers surrounded the
building in case the shooter emerged firing or trying to escape. Once the shooting stopped the
police switched modes into a rescue team. Since, the events unfolded so quickly, a formal
incident commander and emergency operations center was not set up until after the shooting
(Kaine, 2008).
Medics initially began triaging patients brought to the stairwell while police were
bringing them out of the building. Patients were brought to what is known as a treatment area
which is the location for the collection and treatment of patients prior to transport (Walsh, 2005).
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Twenty minutes after arrival on scene, VTPD announced that the shooter was down and that
EMS crews could enter the building. Critical patients were transported to local hospitals, and
noncritical patients were moved to a secondary triage area. Twenty-seven ambulances and more
than 120 EMS personnel were utilized, and assisted with coverage through established mutual
aid agreements (Kaine, 2008). Hospital response consisted of twenty-seven patients that were
treated at area hospitals. Most of the hospitals initiated internal ICS and mobilized internal
resources in anticipation of patients.
During the Northern Illinois shooting, the incident began at 3:03 p.m, when the
perpetrator kicked open a side door at the back of the stage of Cole Hall and started firing.
Within a couple minutes DeKalb Fire and Rescue set up operations at a Staging Area that had
been predestinated at the mass casualty incident drill at NIU. At 3:15 p.m. Cole Hall and campus
was declared secure from further threats and EMS units began responding from staging. At 3:26
p.m. the first patients began transport to the hospital.
The response phase of the Northern Illinois Shootings was effective for many reasons.
First of all, NIU police officers are rather unique because officers are now becoming certified as
Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). Training significantly enhances the services that these
officers can provide during emergencies and it was an important factor during the immediate
response to the incident (Stambaugh, 2008). Also, the City of DeKalb Fire Department, the NIU
Department of Public Safety, the hospital, and other mutual-aid responders were prepared.
Agencies had practiced emergency drills and coordinated their planning. Each agency was
familiar with the Incident Command System (ICS) and had formally incorporated the system into
their plans. Fire, EMS, university police, and university events management partners worked
47
together frequently in planned and unplanned events, so the command and control procedures of
these agencies were well practiced.
First and foremost, during the response phase of a school shooter there will be an
immediate need to communicate and collaborate with local emergency responders. Therefore,
planning with local police and emergency medical personnel to establish a clear understanding of
the NIMS/ICS roles of each group during a crisis should be emphasized. NIMS represents a
fundamental shift in the philosophy of incident management to an all-hazards cooperative,
multiagency approach to incident management (Walsh, 2005). It was developed after looking at
lessons learned from major incident responses, especially from the events of September 11,
2001. Organizations that lack the components of NIMS are unable to make key decisions
quickly and accurately enough during a catastrophe (Dorn, 2007). “Nationwide focus has been
directed to find solutions to better aid and responders of all emergency and disaster situations
with their duties and tasks” (Messler, 2007, p. 1). When an incident escalates beyond the
campus‟ capabilities, NIMS defines the incident command structure. It also determines what
agency of the federal government fills the relevant position in the command structure and its
scope of responsibility in a national incident.
In addition, Incident Command System (ICS) is a familiar component of NIMS for most
of the public safety community. It is a system based on an expandable, flexible structure that
uses common terminology, positions, and incident facilities for domestic incident management.
As a part of ICS, Incident Action Plans (IAPs) are oral or written plans that contain general
objectives reflecting the overall strategy for managing an incident (Walsh, 2005). Mass Casualty
Incident (MCI) Plan is defined as a written plan utilized by all participating agencies that help
control and coordinate emergency personnel, equipment and other resources from the scene of a
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MCI to the conclusion of the incident (Perkins, 2008). In order for ICS to be effective, it
depends on a common framework as well as common characteristics and definitions. The
common characteristics enable the ICS to function in a consistent manner across geographic
areas, disciplines and incident sizes. ICS structure consists of an EMS Commander, a Triage
Officer, a Treatment Officer and a Staging Officer. The EMS Commander has many
responsibilities in an incident, such as developing the incident medical plan and developing
procedures for handling major medical emergencies involving incident personnel (Walsh, 2005).
First responders are not the only ones responsible for rapid response during the incident.
Faculty and staff should take a more proactive role during the response phase. Rather than,
herding students into a corner, offering no resistance and following the standard policy, they
should give students more options for survival. Also, warnings and communication from the
school to students must also be sent out in a timely manner. In the case of Virginia Tech, the
Education department issued its final report in December 2010, finding that the university failed
to issue a timely warning to the campus after Cho shot and killed two students in a dormitory
early morning on the day of the incident in 2007. The university sent out an e-mail to the
campus over two hours later and by that time Cho was already chaining shut the doors to a
classroom building where he killed 30 more students and faculty, and then himself. Also, the email was criticized as being too vague because it referred only to a “shooting incident” but did
not mention that anyone had died. Later, the university sent a second more explicit warning,
however by that time Cho was near the end of his shooting spree. The education department
stated, “Had an appropriate timely warning been sent earlier to the campus community, more
individuals could have acted on the information and made decisions about their own safety”
49
(Potter, 2011, p. 1). This lesson learned from Virginia Tech exemplifies the significance of
effective warnings and timely communication.
In the case study of the Northern Illinois shooting, the university quickly responded with
effective communication to its students. NIU‟s President immediately authorized activation of
the Emergency Communications Plan. At 3:20 p.m. NIU posted an alert on its Web site and sent
a blast email telling the campus there was a report of a gunman and gave directions for safety.
The crisis team decided to cancel classes until further notice, acted to make counseling available,
scheduled a news conference for 5:30 p.m. and established student/parent hotlines (Stambaugh,
2008).
Lastly, through evaluating case studies, there have been many recommendations
regarding the response phase of school shootings. One recommendation is a unified command
post should be established and operated based on the NIMS Incident Command System model.
Also, an emergency operations center must be activated early during a mass casualty incident. It
is recommended that regional disaster drill should be held on an annual basis. These drills
should include hospitals, the Regional Hospital Coordinating Center, all appropriate public
safety and state agencies, and the medical examiner‟s office and should be followed by a formal
post-incident evaluation. Triage tags, patient care reports, or standardized ICS forms must be
completed accurately and remained after a multi-casualty incident. Another recommendation is
that no circumstances should the deceased be transported under emergency conditions because it
only increases the likelihood of hurting others. In addition, campus police everywhere should
train with local police departments on response to active shooters and other emergencies. It has
been recommended that dispatchers should be cautious when giving advice or instructions by
phone to people in a shooting without knowing the situation. For example, telling someone to
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stay still when they have the option to flee or flee when they should stay still can result in
unnecessary deaths. Therefore, when in doubt, the dispatcher should be reassuring. Police
should escort survivors out of buildings, when manpower and circumstances permit. Lastly,
schools should check the hardware on exterior doors to ensure that they are not subject to being
chained shut since that could result in affect the immediate response (Perkins, 2008).
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Case Studies
Schools and universities throughout the country can benefit from evaluating the case
studies of previous school related shootings. The lessons learned from past tragedies can
ultimately lead to a better understanding of how the four phases of emergency management are
applied in real situations. In addition, the findings from case studies can be applied to
emergency plans and can assist schools in the most effective prevention and preparedness
approaches. Schools can learn from the mistakes of others to improve their own preparedness
and response strategies. As a result of the incidents of school shootings, it will heighten
awareness of the potential problems and therefore push schools to make changes and strive for
improvement. Altogether, through the evaluation and application of case studies, schools can
become safer places to attend. Even though, limited research specifically addresses school crisis
response efforts, many lessons have been learned from those who have been involved with the
response and intervention efforts in the aftermath of a school shooting.
Columbine High School
On April 20, 1999, in the town of Littleton, Colorado, two high school seniors, Dylan
Klebold and Eric Harris, enacted a full-on massacre in the middle of the school day at
Columbine High School. Columbine High School is one of three in the unincorporated southeast
portion of Jefferson County and 1,945 students attend the high school. In less than fifteen
minutes of the first lunch period, the two student gunmen killed 13 and wounded 21 before
turning the guns on themselves. Investigators recovered the two student‟s plans for attacking the
school after the tragedy had taken place and these plans outlined a mission to kill as many
students and faculty as possible. They planned to set off destructive bombs inside the school and
then shoot survivors as they tried to escape. Bombs inside their cars were also part of the plan in
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order to kill law enforcement, fire or medical personnel responding to the scene (Unauthored,
2006). The boys planned to kill hundreds of their peers using guns, knives, and a multitude of
bombs. In the end, the massacre concluded with the senseless killings of 14 students and one
teacher, including the lives of the two murderers.
Harris showed up to the school at 6:15 a.m. for his bowling class wearing a flannel shirt
and blue jeans. Five hours later, Harris returned to school with his friend Klebold wearing a
black trench coat and mask, armed with an arsenal of bombs and guns. The attack was
scheduled around the moment when the boys imagined the cafeteria would be most crowded
which was determined to be 11:17 a.m. Around 11:15 a.m., students recalled Harris carrying a
duffel bag into the cafeteria and these bags were filled with explosives. Harris returned to his car
that was crammed with 20-pound propane tanks, 20 gallons of gasoline, an assortment of pipe
bombs and set the detonator for 11:47 a.m. as at that time the parking lot would be crowded with
unsuspecting police and rescue workers. Klebold‟s car was parked in another parking lot and
was also filled with explosives to detonate at the same time as Harris‟s. The two gunmen waited
for the 11:17 a.m. explosion in cafeteria, however nothing happened and they realized that the
first phase of the attack had failed. According to an FBI computer simulation, if the explosives
in the duffel bags had exploded at 11:17 a.m. as Harris and Klebold had intended, the explosion
would have compromised the structural integrity of the school, bringing down the roof, killing
more than a thousand and making it the worst school disaster in history. Fortunately, the bombs
never detonated because of the unpredictable nature of fireworks powder and a very simple
electronic failure (Fast, 2008).
After the explosives failed, they decided to launch a commando-style assault on the
school. Then, the full-on attack began during the 11:30 a.m. lunch hour when one of the gunmen
53
heaved a pipe bomb onto the school roof and then started spraying students with gunshots. As
two students fell dead, the murderers hustled into the school hallways (Bonilla, 2000). Lt. Terry
Manwaring, SWAT commander for the Jefferson County Sherrif‟s Office was the first member
of the Jefferson County command staff to arrive on scene. At approximately 11:36 a.m.,
Manwaring parked his patrol car in the middle of the intersection of Pierce and Leawood Streets
a short distance to the north of the school, which established the original position of the incident
command center (Unauthored, 2006). Columbine High School did not have a safety plan in
place which contributed to the chaotic nature of the response. Consequently, there was no
school-wide policy about who to call or what to do during a crisis (Fast, 2008).
Neil Gardner, the sheriff‟s deputy stationed at the school exchanged gunfire with one of
the shooters but did not hit him. Twenty minutes later, a SWAT team of officers from Denver,
Arapahoe County and Littleton entered the building. Unfortunately, Deputy Paul Smoker and Lt.
Terry Manwaring also fired at a gunman and missed. Due to the volatile situation and the fact
that deputies were unsure of how many snipers were shooting, police then retreated to set up a
safe perimeter outside the school. Dozens of students fled the scene and dozens remained
trapped in the building. Pipe bombs exploded filling hallways with smoke and fire alarms blared
as the broken fire-sprinkler system gushed out water and flooded the cafeteria. Even more
bombs blasted within the schools, spraying the students with shrapnel and collapsing ceiling tiles
(Bonilla, 2000).
Students cowered under desks in fear. Dave Sanders, a teacher and girls‟ basketball
coach was bleeding profusely after being shot directing panicking students away from the chaos.
The teacher died hours later even though he was assisted with makeshift tourniquets. Witnesses
of the tragic event stated that the two gunmen specifically targeted prep athletes. According to a
54
witness, one girl was asked if she believed in God, she responded yes and they shot her. Outside
the school, ambulance crews raced to take away the injured victims and the gunmen fired at the
paramedics on the south end of the school. Down the hall from the chaos, 60 students crammed
into an office and for two hours, they huddled and prayed that the gunmen wouldn‟t find them as
they listened to multiple gunshots. The students barricaded themselves in the office, flipped off
the lights and ducked down. President Clinton states, “We all must do more to recognize and
look for early warning signals that deeply troubled young people send, often before they explode
into violence, surely more of them can be saved and more innocent victims and tragedies can be
avoided” on national television during the tragedy (Bonilla, 2000, p. 44).
Harris and Klebold entered the school library and then walked toward the west windows
to shoot out the windows toward law enforcement and fleeing students. Then, the gunmen
turned their attention to the students inside the library and killed four and injured four before
moving back toward the library entrance. Using the phone at the front counter of the library, Ms.
Nielson called 9-1-1 and she reported the incident in a shrill, shaking voice with a background of
gunfire and thunderous explosions. She then interrupted her own phone call to shout at the
students who were standing around and gaping, “Everyone get under the table, get under the
table!” (Fast, 2008, p. 215). Dave Sanders a teacher, herded students out of the cafeteria and
toward the Pierce Street exits. After most of the students were out of harm‟s way, Sanders
started for the library to evacuate the students there. However, Sanders and a student found
themselves face-to-face with the shooters and Sanders was shot twice from behind in the neck
and head which severed his carotid artery. With blood pouring from his mouth, some 30
students who had made refuge in the closet that he managed to reach tried to stop the bleeding.
55
As shown in Figure 1, another teacher held up a sign that stated “1 bleeding to death,” and this
gesture quickly became part of the “iconography of Columbine” (Fast, 2008, p. 216).
By then, over 1,000 law enforcement officers and emergency medical personnel from
Arapahoe County, Lakewood, Arvada, and other neighboring communities had converged on the
high school. Some responding agencies had to park over a mile away from the school due to the
congestion. Also, in six local hospitals, emergency codes were announced over the speaker
systems, medical workers readied their operating rooms, checked blood supplies, and prepared
for incoming ambulances. Mrs. Nielsen dropped the phone to take cover under a desk and over
the next few minutes, police officers could hear the shooters move around the room, taunting and
executing students while sparing others according to their whim. They could also hear the
screams, crying, pleading, and the explosions of gunfire so loud that it made their ears ring. One
of the victims, Patrick Ireland was unable to escape due to his critical injuries. Even though, he
was drifting in and out of consciousness, he eventually made his way to a broken window and
leaned out. As shown in Figure 2, two SWAT team members caught sight of him, drove their
armored truck under the window, climbed onto the roof, and caught him as he lunged through the
glass (Fast, 2008).
It was 11:42 a.m. and in the previous seven minutes, ten people are killed and 12 more
were wounded. There were a total of 56 people in the library and 34 of them escaped injury.
Some students survived by pretending to be dead. A student named Craig Scott, laid in the
expanding pool of another student‟s blood, pretended to be dead and was overlooked in the
carnage. Another student named Austin played dead, resting his head against another‟s
backpack. After leaving the library, the shooters moved down a hallway that ran by the science
wing peering through windows of locked classrooms, making eye contact with students and
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Figure 1: A sign that a teacher held up stated “1 bleeding to death,” and this gesture quickly became part of
the iconography of Columbine (Shepard, 1999).
Figure 2: One of the victims, Patrick Ireland eventually made his way to a broken window and leaned out. Two
SWAT team members caught sight of him, drove their armored truck under the window, climbed onto the roof,
and caught him as he lunged through the glass (Shepard, 1999).
57
teachers, and then moving on. They could have easily shot through the locks, but at this point in
time their movements were directionless. They threw pipe bomb over the railing from the
hallway and into the cafeteria causing loud explosions. Then, they went down into the cafeteria
to survey the damage (Figure 3). One gunman said, “Today the world‟s going to come to an end.
Today‟s the day we die” (Fast, 2008, p. 222). Klebold threw a propane bomb which causes a
fire in the cafeteria that activates 5 sprinklers in the area. At 11:52 a.m. the SWAT team was
authorized to make an immediate entry in to the school by the command post. Sometime
between 12:02 and 12:08 a.m. Eric and Dylan lit a Molotov cocktail and then committed suicide
(Fast, 2008).
By 12:30 p.m. SWAT teams moved cautiously from one classroom to the next, searching
every desk and backpack, collecting and defusing pipe bombs, and liberating students in hiding.
When students left the building, they were directed to a holding area where they were frisked,
questioned, and offered medical care. From the triage center across the street they were taken by
ambulance to one of the local hospitals, or bused to Leawood Elementary School to be reunited
with their parents (Figure 4). At 4:00 p.m. deputies found Harris and Klebold‟s bodies and at
4:30 p.m. they declared the incident over (Figure 5). Throughout the day and the next, crime
scene analysts picked through the rubble, collecting spent shells, analyzing blood traces, and
gingerly defusing unexploded devices (Fast, 2008).
Rachel Scott‟s Honda and John Tomlin‟s pickup truck, two of the students who were
killed, became spontaneous shrines located in Clement Park lot for grieving classmates (Figure
6). Students found comfort in decorating the vehicles with flowers, notes, poems, and blue and
white balloons. Clement Park remained the area for the mourning and a wall was erected where
people from around the nation and world came to pay their respects and leave stuffed animals,
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Figure 3: Image from the security tapes of the shooters, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold in the cafeteria
surveying the damage (Shepard, 1999).
Figure 4: Paramedics treating one of the victims of the shooting (Shepard, 1999).
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Figure 5: The crime scene of the two shooters after they committed suicide in the library of the high school (Shepard, 1999).
Figure 6: This is a picture of Rachel Scott‟s Honda. Students found comfort in decorating the
vehicles with flowers, notes, poems, and blue and white balloons (Shepard, 1999).
60
crosses, angels, candles, bouquets, photographs, ribbons, and the omnipresent blue and white
balloons. Greg Zanis, a woodworker from Chicago traveled to Littleton, and erected 15 crosses,
six feet high, in a row across the length of the ridge; thirteen for the victims and two for the
killers. On Sunday, April 25, a memorial service was organized by Governor Bill Owens.
Approximately sixty-five thousand people gathered in the Bowles Crossing Theater parking lot
to mourn the deceased and pray for the wounded. Vice President Gore, General Colin Powell,
Reverend Franklin Graham, and a local pastor conducted the memorial service. Governor
Owens read a necrology, and then released a white dove into the air for each name (Fast, 2008).
On the day of the tragedy, police psychologist Lottie Flater and her associates debriefed
individual officers, SWAT team members and school resource officers. Police psychologist
worked with the first responders on site and a victim advocate also came to the Sheriff‟s
Communications Center to debrief Dispatchers. In the case of the Columbine shootings, the
agency offered debriefings to all employees and not just those who responded to the incident.
On June 1 and 2, 1999, the Sheriff‟s office held several debriefings for the employees who
wanted to participate. A four person group from The Counseling Team in San Bernardino,
California flew out to lead the session. Over the course of two days, employees gathered at
Columbine High School, walked through the building and heard an overview of the response
efforts and results of the investigation. Following the overview session, employees split into
groups to discuss their reactions to the incident and the continuing media coverage (Unauthored,
2006).
Investigators needed at least two days inside the school to collect crime evidence. All the
bodies were finally removed by 5:30 p.m. on Wednesday since the task was delayed because the
killers spread live bombs around the bodies. Robots are often used to handle bombs; however
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the machines were unable to be used in the library crime scene due to the number of bodies. In
the library, ten victims and both shooters died. Police found more than 30 pipe bombs around
the school, inside booby-trapped cars and in the suspects‟ two suburban homes. Some of these
bombs were palm-sized carbon-dioxide cartridges wrapped with nails and BBs to maximize
killing power, while others were equipped with timers and made from propane barbecue tanks.
Police found four guns including a 9mm semiautomatic carbine, two sawed-off shotguns and a
handgun (Bonilla, 2000).
On Friday, April 30, two thousand emotionally battered students made their way over to
Chatfield High School to finish out the last month of school. As students returned to their school
they cried, hugged, and contemplated the tragic rampage as newspapers and television reporters
surrounded them. Columbine‟s facilities were too badly damaged to serve the students and many
of the students were too traumatized to re-enter the building. The shooter‟s close friends, Brooks
Brown, Nate Dykeman, Zack Heckler, and about a dozen other students were asked not to return
to school in exchange for passing grades in all subjects and a diploma for simply staying home
(Fast, 2008).
At Chapel Hill Memorial Gardens in Littleton, Colorado, a memorial crosses were made
for each student that died in the tragedy (Figure 7). In addition, Littleton civic leaders led a
campaign to create a permanent memorial site on the southeastern side of Clement Park. As part
of the memorial, there is an inner Ring of Remembrance and an outer Ring of Healing. In the
core of the memorial lies an intimate grove a trees growing out of an oval of intricate landscape
and stone paving. The stone is etched with words that are individual narrative remembrances of
the deceased victims crafted from interviews of the victim‟s families and friends (Figure 8). An
intricate ribbon design fills the center space and hugs the Ring of Remembrance. The tails of the
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Figure 7: A memorial of crosses at Chapel Hill Memorial Gardens with the name and picture of
each student who died during the incident (Shepard, 1999).
Figure 8: The memorial at Clement Park (Shepard, 1999).
63
ribbon are inscribed with the phrase “Never Forgotten” frame a connection to the outer Ring of
Healing to become a symbolic link between the community and the deceased. In addition, the
cost of the memorial was estimated at three million dollars, however with the downturn of the
economy, and the tragedies of September 11 th and Hurricane Katrina, the budget was trimmed to
1.5 million. Fortunately, President Clinton raised several hundred thousand dollars for the fund
through personal appearances. On April 24, 2007, the Columbine Memorial Fund announced
that they had successfully reached its goal and construction of the memorial began. Bringing a
degree of closure to the horrific tragedy, the memorial was dedicated on September 21, 2007
(Fast, 2008).
Summary
As for the mitigation phase of Columbine, there were many indicators that Harris and
Klebold were planning a violent attack. They showed many signals and risk factors prior to the
incident. For instance, Klebold kept a journal in which he wrote about being an outcast, being
depressed, and hating his life. Also, both Harris and Klebold were brutally teased in school and
they both dealt with the bullying by internalizing the disdain of those who bullied them. Also,
the boys had access to guns by convincing others to purchase the weapons for them. A friend
named Robyn Anderson, who was already 18, purchased weapons at a gun show by only
showing the sellers her I.D. They bought guns from three private sellers and for each sale they
paid cash with no questions asked and no background check. Prior to the attack, the boys even
documented their plans in videos. In the videos, they document their sadness and anger about
the way they were treated during childhood, their skill at deceiving people, and a variety of
narcissistic beliefs (Fast, 2008). Another warning sign was a story written in English class that
described a shooting spree by an assassin in a black trench coat, as they planned the attack for
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over a year (Fraser & Wike, 2009). Harris and Klebold even told fellow students that
“something” was going to happen on Hitler‟s birthday (Holmes, 2001, p. 120). In order to
reduce codes of silence, teachers should encourage students to come forward after a classmate
has expressed a threat or engaged in threatening behavior. A threat assessment done
immediately following the threat could have minimized risk and possibly could have prevented
the incident.
For preparedness, Columbine did not have an emergency plan in place which contributed
to the chaotic nature of the response. There was no school-wide policy about who to call or what
to do during a crisis. Without an emergency plan in place, the teachers, administrators, students,
parents and first responders did not have the experience and resources to respond collaboratively
with one another. The lack of planning had an effect on the how those at risk reacted during the
incident and the response phase. An emergency plan would have provided those with less
experience with specific, effective tasks so they would be less likely to panic, become paralyzed
with fear, or respond in a way that jeopardizes others (Fast, 2008).
During the response phase, over 1,000 law enforcement officers and emergency medical
personnel from Arapahoe County, Lakewood, Arvada, and other neighboring communities had
converged on the high school. Even though there were plenty of first responders present, there is
a time lapse between the beginning of the situation and the entry of responders. Time is ticking
while students are instructed to wait for responders to save them. Teachers told students to
follow the lockdown procedures and told them to hide under tables or crowd into a corner. For
instance, Ms. Nielson interrupted her own 9-1-1 phone call to shout at the students who were
standing around and gaping, “Everyone get under the table, get under the table!” (Fast, 2008, p.
215). While, 60 students crammed into an office and for two hours, they huddled and prayed
65
that the gunmen wouldn‟t find them as they listened to multiple gunshots (Bonilla, 2000).
A.L.I.C.E. training would be beneficial to these students and staff because it would provide them
information on increasing the chances of surviving and give them options other than remaining
in place.
As a part of the recovery phase, the first responders were encouraged to go to debriefing
sessions following the incident. Also, the community memorialized the victims in a variety of
ways. For example, Rachel Scott‟s Honda and John Tomlin‟s pickup truck, two of the students
who were killed, became spontaneous shrines located in Clement Park lot for grieving
classmates. Students found comfort in decorating the vehicles with flowers, notes, poems, and
blue and white balloons. At Chapel Hill Memorial Gardens in Littleton, Colorado, a memorial
crosses were made for each student that died in the tragedy. In addition, a permanent memorial
site was created on the southeastern side of Clement Park (Fast, 2008).
66
Virginia Tech University
On the morning of April 16, 2007, a gunman went on a rampage at the Virginia Tech
campus. Throughout the incident, an outraged student named Seung-Hui Cho murdered 32
people and wounded 17 people before shooting himself (Johnson, 2007). This tragedy has
brought about a concern for security within schools and colleges and the incident comprised of
the worst school shooting in American history. Training of emergency responders in National
Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Management had a major influence on the
strategy used for this emergency situation. This incident reinforces the need for all CEOs,
department heads, key managers and crisis team members to receive formal training in the
National Incident Management System (NIMS). The organizations that lack the components of
NIMS are unable to make key decisions quickly and accurately enough during a catastrophe
(Dorn, 2007).
Virginia Tech now serves as the mechanism that emphasizes security issues on
educational and healthcare campuses. One of the issues is the urgent need for standardized
disaster and emergency planning. The incident at Virginia Tech even shows the need for
preparedness, incident command and control implementation outside the normal governmental
realm. “Nationwide focus has been directed to find solutions to better aid and responders of all
emergency and disaster situations with their duties and tasks” (Messler, 2007, p. 1). For this
incident, Incident Command System is defined by Western Virginia EMS Council. Their Mass
Casualty Incident (MCI) Plan is defined as a written plan utilized by all participating agencies
that help control and coordinate emergency personnel, equipment and other resources from the
scene of a MCI to the conclusion of the incident (Perkins, 2008).
67
Michael Dorn (2007) states that, “April‟s massacre also demonstrates the need for every
campus to have a distinct plan in place for each of the four phases of emergency management.
In ensuing litigation, Virginia Tech will likely need to demonstrate that it used best practices to
address all four phases of its legal and moral obligation to protect the campus community” (p. 1).
The phases ultimately help to keep the campus safe and allows for a distinct plan in emergency
situations.
As part of the response phase, the primary agencies involved in the incident were
Virginia Tech Rescue Squad (VTRS) and Blacksburg Volunteer Rescue Squad (BVRS). These
agencies were for responsible for incident command, triage, treatment and transportation of the
patients. The Virginia Tech Rescue Squad (VTRS) was the lead EMS agency in the incident.
They are located on the Virginia Tech campus and are the oldest collegiate rescue squad of its
kind nationwide. The squad is a volunteer, student-run organization with 38 members (Kaine,
2008). There were also other regional agencies that responded to the incident and functioned
under the Incident Command System.
Furthermore, the incident first started around 7:15 a.m. when Cho abruptly entered the
dormitory of Emily Hilscher. Noise from the room was so loud and in such a disturbing manner
that the resident advisor, Ryan Clark, who lived next door, checked to see what was happening.
Cho shot both Clark and Hilscher at close range. Although, Cho was known to previously stalk
female students, police found no motive for the slaying of Hilscher. Clark was presumed to be
killed because of his interference with the shooter and his identification. Even though, Cho did
not have access to the building he could have easily slipped in while someone entered or left the
building. The sounds of the shots or bodies falling were misinterpreted by nearby students as
someone possibly falling out of a lofted bed. A student in a nearby room, called the Virginia
68
Tech Police Department (VTPD) and a police officer and an emergency medical service (EMS)
team were dispatched to the scene (Kaine, 2008).
Upon arrival, the responders found a tragic scene at West Ambler Johnston Hall (WAJ)
which was the scene of the first two murders. The first victim was a 22 year old male with a
gunshot wound to the head. He went into cardiac arrest and the patient was pronounced dead on
arrival at Montgomery Regional Hospital (MRH). The other victim was an 18 year old female
and she also suffered from a gunshot wound to the head. She arrived at Montgomery Regional
Hospital (MRH) and later was transferred to Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital (CRMH)
since it was a Level I trauma center. But, during transport to the second hospital, the patient
went into cardiac arrest, and was pronounced dead on arrival. The report concludes that the
triage, treatment and transport of the two patients were appropriate, especially since both victims'
injuries were incompatible with survival (Perkins, 2008).
When Chief Wendell Flinchum of the VTPD learned about the incident at 7:40 a.m., he
called for additional resources from the Blacksburg Police Department (BPD). A detective for
the investigation and an evidence technician also headed to the scene of the two murders.
Immediately after the arrival of the police, they began to interview students in the rooms near
Hilscher‟s room. The police essentially locked down the building with officers located on the
inside and outside. They found no evidence other than shell casings, footprints, and the victims
found in the room (Kaine, 2008).
Police first suspected Hilscher‟s boyfriend, since she was last seen with him after he had
dropped her off. The police sent out a BOLO (be on the lookout) alert for his pickup truck, but
since it was nowhere to be found, it was implied that he had left the campus. But, after two
people were shot dead, police needed to consider the possibility of a murderer on campus, even
69
though a domestic disturbance was a likely possibility. The police did not tell the Policy Group
that there was a chance that the gunman was loose on campus and they did not advise the
university to cancel classes or close the university (Kaine, 2008).
Even though, there is a misconception that there was a two hour gap between the two
incidents, there was actually continuous action and deliberations among responders. The VTPD
and BPD also mobilized their emergency response teams after the first shooting. Generally, the
VTPD and BPD officers responded and carried out their investigative duties in a professional
manner. However, the police conveyed the wrong impression to the university Policy Group
with the suspicion that the suspect was no longer on campus (Kaine, 2008). Between shooting
sprees, Cho mailed photos, a letter and video clips of himself in an angry rage to NBC (Figure
9). In the video he states, “You had 100 billion changes and ways to avoid today. But you
decided to spill my blood. You forced me into a corner and gave me only one option. The
decision was yours. Now you have blood on your hands that will never wash off” (Potter, 2011,
p.1). Therefore, one recommendation would be that in the preliminary stages of investigation,
the police should avoid focusing on a single theory.
The response to Norris Hall began shortly after the responders returned to service after
the first incident. Cho proceeded to Norris Hall wearing a backpack with his killing tools. He
carried two handguns with almost 400 rounds of ammunition, a knife, heavy chains, and a
hammer. VTRS crews overheard police radio traffic advising an active shooting at Norris Hall.
At that time, a VTRS officer assumed EMS Command and established an incident command
post at the VTRS station. VTRS also contacted the Montgomery County EMS Coordinator to
place units outside the campus on standby. Montgomery emergency responders were on standby
at a staging area, which is a location where resources assigned to an incident are not yet deployed
70
Figure 9: This image is of the shooter, Cho Seung-hui from a video he sent to NBC between shooting sprees
(Potter, 2011).
71
but are held ready. Also, the Montgomery County Communication Center paged out a request
for any available units to respond to Norris Hall (Kaine, 2008).
In Norris Hall, Cho chained shut a pair of doors at each of the three main entrances used
by students. His plan to chain the doors had a dual effect of delaying anyone from interrupting
his plan as well as keeping the victims from escaping. The first class of students he attacked had
little chance to call for help or to even take cover. Cho walked into room 206, shot and killed the
instructor, and continued shooting, without saying a word. Then, Cho entered room 207 and shot
the professor and several other students. In classroom 211, the professor called 9-1-1 as the
students tried to barricade the door with the instructors table. Regardless, Cho pushed his way
in, shot the professor and walked down the aisle shooting students. He returned to the other
rooms but was unsuccessful since the doors had been barricaded by students. Unfortunately, he
returned to room 211 and continued to shoot students; ultimately killing 11 students and the
instructor, and wounded six others in this room. Eventually, he tried to enter room 204 as
professor Liviu Librescu braced his body against the door as students fled through the windows.
Librescu was fatally shot through the door holding it as several students escaped. The massacre
continued for nine minutes after the first 9-1-1 call was received and in total occurred for 10-12
minutes. Within that short period of time, Cho murdered 25 students, five faculty, and another
17 people were shot and critically injured (Kaine, 2008).
Police responded within three minutes after receiving the 9-1-1 call (Figure 10). Officers
immediately proceeded to implement their training for dealing with an active shooter. The
officers tried the three entrances, but found them all chained. They moved to a fourth entrance
which was the maintenance shop door and shot open the conventional key lock. Then, officers
had to clear each classroom as they passed it to avoid the shooter or shooters from being fired
72
Figure 10: Police and SWAT teams responding to the shootings (Kim, 2007).
73
upon from the rear. They found casualties in the hallway and a scene of mass slaughter in the
classrooms. Other police officers surrounded the building in case the shooter emerged firing or
trying to escape. Once the shooting stopped the police switched modes into a rescue team.
Since, events unfolded so quickly, a formal incident commander and emergency operations
center was not set up until after the shooting (Kaine, 2008).
Medics initially began triaging patients brought to the stairwell while police were
bringing them out of the building (Figure 11 and 12). The walking wounded victims were led to
police SUVs for further assessment and treatment in a safer location. These patients were
brought to what is known as a treatment area which is the location for the collection and
treatment of patients prior to transport. The treatment area is typically organized according to
patient status (Walsh, 2005). Twenty minutes after arrival on scene, VTPD announced that the
shooter was down and that EMS crews could enter the building. The EMS Command assigned a
Triage Officer, and triage of patients continued both inside and outside Norris Hall. Critical
patients were transported to local hospitals, and noncritical patients were moved to a secondary
triage area. Twenty-seven ambulances and more than 120 EMS personnel were utilized, and
assisted with coverage through established mutual aid agreements (Kaine, 2008).
Incident Command System (ICS) structure that was used throughout the incident was
based on NIMS guidelines. This structure consisted of an EMS Commander, a Triage Officer, a
Treatment Officer and a Staging Officer. The EMS Commander has many responsibilities in an
incident, such as developing the incident medical plan and developing procedures for handling
major medical emergencies involving incident personnel (Walsh, 2005). Throughout the
incident, the ICS structure used did not strictly follow the normal NIMS guidelines, however it
did include the necessary organization.
74
Figure 11: Responders carrying victims out Norris Hall to be treated by paramedics (Kim, 2007).
Figure 12: Responders carrying out one of the students injured during the shooting spree (Kim, 2007).
75
Hospital response consisted of twenty-seven patients that were treated at area hospitals.
Most of the hospitals initiated internal ICS and mobilized internal resources in anticipation of
patients. Patient injuries ranged from gunshot wounds to asthma attacks, fractures and even
burns. However, a lack of communication between the scene and area hospitals presented a
challenge because hospitals did not know how many patients they would be receiving. Of the
patients transported to the hospitals, only the two initial victims from the West Ambler Johnston
died in or prior to arrival at the hospital (Perkins, 2008).
Although the incident was quite tragic, there were many positive lessons learned from the
event. For example, EMS responses to both scenes occurred in a timely manner. Also, patients
were correctly triaged and transported to appropriate facilities. The incident was managed in a
safe manner and there were no reported injuries among responders. In addition, local hospitals
were prepared for patient surges and managed the patients well. Altogether, EMS agencies
demonstrated an exceptional working relationship. Lastly, the overall EMS response was
excellent, and the lives of many were saved that day (Perkins, 2008).
Along with the positive lessons learned, there were also many areas for improvement. For
instance, there was a delay between VTRS's monitoring of the incident and its actual dispatch to
Norris Hall. Also, the use of multiple radio frequencies led to issues regarding vehicle staging
and clearance into Norris Hall. Another problem was triage tags were used on some, but not all
patients. In addition, police ordered transport of deceased patients under emergency conditions.
The lack of a unified command post caused frustrations. Ultimately, communication issues and
barriers led to confusion during the incident and lack of control (Perkins, 2008).
Even communication between emergency responders and the public was a major concern.
E-mails were sent out to students and staff in order to warn them about the first shooting at West
76
Ambler Johnston Hall however there were many problems associated with the e-mail. “The first
e-mail warning to students and employees did not go out to students, faculty and staff until 9:26
a.m., more than two hours after the shooting at the dormitory, according to the time stamps on
copies obtained by NBC News. By then, the classroom shooting was under way. The message
warned students to be cautious but did not warn them not to go to class” (Johnson, 2007, p. 1).
Before the first e-mail was even sent out to the students, the gunman had struck a second time. If
classes had been canceled earlier then maybe some more deaths could have been prevented.
Unfortunately, the police did not have the capability to use the university alerting system
to send a warning to the students, staff, and faculty. University administrators failed to notify the
campus of the dangerous situation in a timely manner (Kaine, 2008). The first message sent by
the university could have been sent at least an hour earlier and should have been more specific
and included more detail. Also, the e-mail should have included information to the Virginia
Tech community saying that two homicides of students had occurred and the shooter was
unknown and still at large. The administration should have advised students and staff to
safeguard themselves by staying in residences or other safe locations until further notice. This
incident also shows the importance of university‟s having an emergency operations plan for
canceling classes or closing down the campus.
Communication during emergency situations is incredibly important. For example, in
tornadoes and chemical accidents, the inability to provide prompt emergency notification could
result in the deaths of hundreds of people. The ability to communicate effectively and rapidly is
a very crucial element to the successful resolution of any type of crisis. A major problem was
that the e-mail sent out only warned students to be cautious; it did not cancel classes. Based on
the information, administrators and police initially believed that the first shooting was an isolated
77
incident. They felt that they did not need to close the campus since they believed that the
gunman had fled the campus. Therefore with the circumstances of Virginia Tech, a
recommendation would be that all key facts should be included in an alerting message and
disseminated as quickly as possible. In addition, universities should have multiple
communication systems and they should not always rely on newer technology as a method of
distributing information (Dorn, 2007).
Local and regional first responders participated in critical incident stress management
activities including defusing and debriefings immediately after the incident. Also, the Division
of Student Affairs organized a group of family liaisons and these individuals were assigned to
two or more families for the purpose of providing direct support to victim survivors. They
tracked down and provided information to families of those killed and to victim survivors,
assisted with details of recovering personal belongings and contacting funeral homes, and acted
as information link between families and the university. Furthermore, the university community
came together in many ways including small prayer groups, formal ceremonies, and candlelight
vigils. Cassel Coliseum was the site of the convocation that occurred on Tuesday, April 17.
President George Bush, Governor Tim Kaine, University President Charles Steger, Professor
Nikki Giovanni spoke to a worldwide television audience and 35,000 people in attendance.
Later that night, one by one, thousands of candles were lit in a quiet testimony of the shared
mourning that veiled every corner of the campus during the student-organized candlelight vigil
(Figure 13). In addition, stones were placed in a semicircle before the reviewing stand to honor
the victims of the previous day‟s shooting (Figure 14). Mourners left message boards full of
condolences, flowers, stuffed animals and other remembrances to honor the professors and
students who died (Perkins, 2008).
78
Figure 13: Virginia Tech students holding up candles during a vigil at the campus on April 17, 2007 (Kim, 2007).
Figure 14: A mourner at the memorial for the victims of the Virginia Tech Shootings (Kim, 2007).
79
In conclusion, the actions on April 16 were heroic and demonstrated courage through
emergency responders. President Bush said in a brief televised statement, “Schools should be
places of sanctuary and safety and learning. When that sanctuary is violated, the impact is felt in
every American classroom and every American community. Today, our nation grieves with
those who have lost loved ones at Virginia Tech” (Johnson, 2007, p. 1). The events that took
place at Virginia Tech shocked the nation and hopefully it will never happen again. However,
the incident proved the importance that when a disaster or emergency strikes a campus the
responsible personnel should know how the incident command system works.
Summary
For the mitigation phase of the Virginia Tech shootings, many red flags and warning
signs were missed. VTPD knew that Cho had been cautioned against stalking, that he had
threatened suicide, he was issued a temporary detention order, and that he had spent a night at St.
Albans as a result of the detention order. The Care Team at Virginia Tech was established to
identify and work with students who have problems; however they did not know the details of all
these occurrences. Residence Life knew of multiple reports and concerns expressed over Cho‟s
behavior in the dorms. Also, the academic component of the university spoke up loudly about
Cho stating that he was a sullen, foreboding male who refused to talk, frightened classmates and
faculty with gruesome writings, and refused faculty recommendations to get counseling.
However, Judicial Affairs and the Cook Counseling Center decided that Cho‟s writings were not
actionable threats and the Care Team‟s review resulted in their being satisfied that private
tutoring would resolve the problem. No one sought to check up on Cho‟s progress the following
semester. The team did not have someone who was experienced in threat assessment and did not
check collateral information that would help determine if Cho truly posed a risk or not.
80
Therefore, incidents of dangerous or threatening behavior must be documented and reported
immediately to a college‟s threat assessment group and must be acted upon in a prompt and
effective manner in order to protect the safety of the campus community (Massengili, 2007).
In Norris Hall, from the inside, Cho chained shut a pair of doors at each of the three main
entrances used by students. His plan to chain the doors had a dual effect of delaying anyone
from interrupting his plan as well as keeping the victims from escaping. As a result, the response
time of the police to enter the building was delayed. The officers tried the three entrances, but
found them all chained. Attempts to shoot off the padlocks or padlocks failed, so they moved
rapidly to a fourth entrance which was the maintenance shop door and shot open the
conventional lock (Kaine, 2008). Therefore, schools should check the hardware on exterior
doors to ensure that they are not subject to being chained shut in order to mitigate against
delayed response time.
As for the preparedness phase, training of emergency responders in National Incident
Management System (NIMS) and Incident Management had a major influence on the strategy
used for this emergency situation. The university‟s Emergency Response Plan dealt with
preparedness and response to a variety of emergencies, but nothing specific to shootings. Also,
the VT Emergency Response Plan does not deal with prevention of events, such as establishing a
threat assessment team to assess the risk of specific problems and individuals. Their plan was
deficient in several respects because it did not include provisions for a shooting scenario and did
not place police high enough in the emergency decision-making hierarchy. Furthermore, their
plan did not include a threat assessment team and the plan was out of date. Also, the training of
staff and students for emergency situations at Virginia Tech did not include shooting incidents.
The VTPD and BPD were well-trained and also had conducted practical exercises together.
81
Both had undergone active shooter training in order to prepare for the possibility of a multiple
victim shooter (Massengili, 2007).
During the response phase, police responded within three minutes after receiving the 9-11 call to the shootings at Norris Hall. Officers immediately proceeded to implement their
training for dealing with an active shooter. Their policy was to go to the gunfire as fast as
possible, however not in a careless headlong rush but in a speedy but careful advance. They had
to clear each classroom as they passed it to avoid the shooter or shooters from being fired upon
from the rear. Other police officers surrounded the building in case the shooter emerged firing or
trying to escape. Once the shooting stopped the police switched modes into a rescue team.
Since, events unfolded so quickly, a formal incident commander and emergency operations
center was not set up until after the shooting (Kaine, 2008). Medics initially began triaging
patients brought to the stairwell while police were bringing them out of the building. Patients
were brought to what is known as a treatment area which is the location for the collection and
treatment of patients prior to transport (Walsh, 2005).
Although Virginia Tech did not have a Lockdown policy, as the shootings started many
students reverted back to what they had been told to do in high school. The students went into a
corner or crawled under desks. Virginia Tech serves as a perfect example of how to and how not
to respond to an active shooter. For instance, in the classrooms in which students remained as
passive and static targets, there was great tragedy and 22 people were killed. However, in three
classrooms where some degree of action was taken, the survival rates were much higher with a
total of seven people killed in these classrooms. Therefore, if violence is being directed toward
an individual and that individual chooses to do nothing, that individual will lose (Response
Options, 2007).
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As part of the recovery phase, local and regional first responders participated in critical
incident stress management activities including defusing and debriefings immediately after the
incident. In addition, the university community came together in many ways including small
prayer groups, formal ceremonies, and candlelight vigils. Cassel Coliseum was the site of the
convocation that occurred on Tuesday, April 17 in which President George Bush, Governor Tim
Kaine, University President Charles Steger, Professor Nikki Giovanni spoke to a worldwide
television audience and 35,000 people in attendance. Later that night, thousands of candles were
lit in a quiet testimony of the shared mourning that veiled every corner of the campus during the
student-organized candlelight vigil. Also, stones were placed in a semicircle before the
reviewing stand to honor the victims of the previous day‟s shooting and mourners left message
boards full of condolences, flowers, stuffed animals and other remembrances to honor the
professors and students who died (Perkins, 2008).
83
Northern Illinois University
On February 14, 2008, less than one year after the Virginia Tech shootings, the campus
community of Northern Illinois (NIU) located in DeKalb, Illinois faced a similar horror. The
University is situated 65 miles due west of Chicago and has a total enrollment of approximately
25,000 students. It all began when a former NIU graduate student walked onto a stage of a large
lecture hall and began firing at students and the instructor. The shooter was a 28-year old male,
named Stephen Kazmierczak who had a history of mental illness. During the incident, he shot
and killed five students and wounded 18, some critically. By the end of the incident, his suicide
accounts for a total of six deaths. Cole Hall is the building where the shooting occurred and it is
centrally located on the interior of campus and is directly across from a concentration of
dormitories (Stambaugh, 2008).
In addition, the murderer suffered from a variety of mental illnesses. He was diagnosed
as bipolar and suffered from symptoms of anxiousness, depression and insomnia. Before he
graduated from high school, he had been hospitalized six times for suicide attempts or threats.
Also, at school he was teased for being “crazy and suicidal” and he even told a girlfriend that he
wanted to hurt some people. His parents sought medical help for their son many times and also
asked the high school administrators to conduct an evaluation of him. However, the parents only
received a book on how to deal with disabled students. Years later, after the Virginia Tech
shootings occurred, he studied everything he could about the Virginia Tech assailant, including
where that person bought his guns. He was also intrigued with the fact that Cho chained the
doors shut at Norris Hall in preparation for the ensuing massacre (Stambaugh, 2008).
The incident began at 3:03 p.m, when the perpetrator kicked open a side door at the back
of the stage of Cole Hall and unemotionally fired a shotgun at the graduate assistant teaching and
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then at students sitting in the front rows of the large classroom. At first, a few stunned students
thought it was a prank. However, they immediately realized that it truly was a deadly assault
and rushed to the aisles to get out of the auditorium. Students were frantic to get out, running
around on top of others, screaming and pushing through rows of desks and seats to reach the
aisles. Kazmierczak reloaded and shot three more times and then switched to handguns to fire
48 more shots. He then left the stage and walked up and down both main aisles, firing at
students as they fled or remained frozen in their seats. He operated as the Virginia Tech attacker
had, calmly, unemotionally he walked up the aisles and shot again and again. After firing nearly
60 rounds, the shooter returned to the stage, turned the weapon on himself and died from a
gunshot wound to the head. Many of the wounded victims made it outside and dispersed to
different locations, mostly the Holmes Student Center and the Neptune residence hall complex.
However, the more seriously wounded were too injured to leave. Lastly, the horrific attack ended
so quickly that when rapidly responding officers arrived on scene, the perpetrator was already
dead (Stambaugh, 2008).
Students running out of Cole Hall passed a DeKalb on duty fire shift commander in his
vehicle and shouted that there had just been a shooting, so the officer immediately radioed his
information to the 9-1-1 center at 3:07 p.m. Within a couple minutes DeKalb Fire and Rescue
set up operations at a Staging Area that had been predetermined at the mass casualty incident
drill at NIU (Figure 15). As police entered Cole Hall, they discovered the dead shooter on stage
along with deceased and seriously injured students, and about a half dozen students who
remained in their seats in shock (Figure 16). Although the shooter was dead, the police officers
faced two immediate tasks which included ruling out the possibility of other shooters so that the
emergency medical responders could be cleared to come on site, and assisting in triaging the
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Figure 15: A parking lot near Cole Hall became a staging area for emergency personnel who responded to a shooting at the
DeKalb campus (Sumberg, 2011).
Read more: http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1713717,00.html#ixzz1J3FCI2Pk
Figure 16: Tactical police forces rush to the scene of the shooting (Sumberg, 2011).
Read more:
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1713717,00.html#ix
zz1J3Fbufxb
86
wounded. Officers removed students who were not physically wounded from the room and then
went to each victim, checking pulses and breathing. With their emergency medical training, NIU
police officers attended to the wounded, assessed their injuries and provided immediate aid while
other officers established first, second, and third perimeters around the scene. At 3:15 p.m. Cole
Hall and campus was declared secure from further threats and EMS units began responding from
staging (Figure 17). NIU‟s Department of Public Safety served as the lead agency until the
shooter was identified and determined to be the only assailant. The Command shifted to the
DeKalb Fire and Rescue Department until all victims had been transport approximately three
hours after the incident began. After all victims were transported, the focus shift to investigation
and Incident Command returned to NIU‟s Department of Public Safety (Stambaugh, 2008).
NIU‟s President immediately authorized activation of the Emergency Communications
Plan. At 3:20 p.m. NIU posted an alert on its Web site and sent a blast email telling the campus
there was a report of a gunman and gave directions for safety. At 3:26 p.m. the first patients
were transported to the hospital (Figure 18). The crisis team decided to cancel classes until
further notice, acted to make counseling available, scheduled a news conference for 5:30 p.m.
and established student/parent hotlines. Throughout the course of the evening, NIU Public
Affairs staff continued to feed new information to key stakeholders, wrote and disseminated
public updates, handled media calls, and gathered, created, and distributed photos, maps, and
diagrams. The staff also monitored news coverage, kept track of social media and blogs, and
constantly updated the NIU Web site (Stambaugh, 2008).
In addition, the injured victims were taken to Kishwaukee Community Hospital which
was the only hospital nearby. Once notified of the shooting, the hospital quickly formed a team
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Figure 17: Rescue workers evacuate and treat a victim (Sumberg, 2011).
Figure 18: Rescuers treat and transport the injured victims (Sumberg, 2011).
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of doctors, surgeons, nurses and other technical staff to handle the incoming patients. However,
when the patients started arriving, the hospital had difficulty with patient identification. Since
the scene was secured so quickly and all the victims were moved out fast, no triage tags were
used, the student‟s belongings were scattered, and information that would typically identify them
was in their backpacks back at Cole Hall. Seventeen individuals were transported to
Kishwaukee Community Hospital and from there eight victims were taken to other hospitals in
the region. Three of the injured victims were critically injured and had to be resuscitated,
however all three victims were saved. According to an after-action report, emergency medical
and hospital services that were carried out reveals that the right decisions and actions were taken
during triage and treatment, lives were saved, and no one was hurt in the process of providing
emergency medical services to the victims (Stambaugh, 2008).
Fire and rescue services at NIU are provided by the City of DeKalb Fire Department and
the campus is part of their response area. The department‟s normal response time from call to on
scene is three to five minutes. NIU police force has 60 officers that patrol the campus on a 24hour basis, and the residence halls are established as Community Safety Centers with access
control. In addition, NIC police officers are rather unique because all officers are now becoming
certified as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs). Training significantly enhances the
services that these officers can provide during emergencies and it was an important factor during
the immediate response to the incident (Stambaugh, 2008).
The City of DeKalb Fire Department, the NIU Department of Public Safety, the hospital,
and other mutual-aid responders were prepared for disasters. Agencies had practiced emergency
drills and coordinated their planning. Each agency was familiar with the Incident Command
System (ICS) and had formally incorporated the system into their plans. Fire, EMS, university
89
police, and university events management partners worked together frequently in planned and
unplanned events, so the command and control procedures of these agencies were well practiced.
Also, the agencies studied the official report on the Virginia Tech shootings and had integrated
the lessons learned listed in that report into the university‟s and City of DeKalb‟s emergency
response plans. “The information concerning the tragedy at Virginia Tech campus has
significantly contributed to improved campus emergency preparedness at schools across the
country, including at NIU” (Stambaugh, 2008, p. 5). Lastly, the value of the report, their
training, and their joint planning was apparent in the excellent response to Cole Hall by the
agencies.
The Incident Management Team (IMT) developed an Incident Action Plan (IAP) which
included mass casualty, emergency communication components, and other documents related to
emergency preparedness. Also, the team organized and conducted drills to test procedures and
then made adjustments to their plans to reflect the results. Furthermore, the multi-casualty
incident (MCI) plan was reevaluated in wake of the April 2007 shootings at Virginia Tech.
Campus and local emergency response agencies practiced the university‟s MCI plan on October
10, 2007. The NIU Department of Public Safety and the DeKalb Fire Department led a mock
mass casualty exercise in order to practice staging and managing resources. During the drill, the
regional MABAS radio system was tested and mutual-aid ambulances, the County Health
Department, Kishwaukee Hospital, and air transport support were involved (Stambaugh, 2008).
Most students contacted their families to let them know they were safe and others were
urged to do so by public communication from NIU at 4:30 p.m. Many of the family members of
the students who were killed and wounded began arriving shortly after the incident and went
directly to the hospital. The hospital‟s communications system was inundated with calls and the
90
attending physicians were contending with multiple communication issues. Also, the hospital set
aside their conference room for arriving family members so they were separate from the media.
State police, sheriff‟s office, and the coroner arrived between 8:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. to work
with families on matters concerning the identification of the wounded or deceased. Three
victims at Cole Hall died at the scene along with the shooter when he committed suicide. Two
other students died of lethal wounds at the hospital; one at Kishwaukee and the other who was
transported to St. Anthony‟s Hospital (Stambaugh, 2008).
On the evening of February 14, the Fire Chief relieved the shift that was on duty, relieved
them of their responsibilities, and brought in a critical incident stress management team which
conducted a diffusing session with the firefighters. Then, on the following Tuesday night,
February 19, a formal debriefing was held for all responders including firefighters, paramedics,
police officers, dispatchers, mutual aid companies and any others who were involved in the
response at NIU. On February 28, there was a comprehensive medical debriefing session held at
the Kishwaukee Community Hospital Training Center to discuss how the response worked, why
it was so successful, and what ideas should be carried forward to improve future operations
(Stambaugh, 2008).
Small memorials to the murdered and injured students began appearing on NIU‟s campus
within hours of the incident. Flowers, cards, teddy bears, and messages of remembrance were
some of the ways that mourners made tribute to the victims (Figure 19). Also, mourners lit
candles at midnight and huddled together for support. On February 19, parents of the slain
students were escorted by the NIU police chief to view the memorials on campus. In addition,
the university planned a memorial service to honor the victims of the shooting. One week after
the crisis at 3:06 p.m., NIU and the surrounding community observed five minutes of silence
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Figure 19: Trinkets, candles and flowers cover the memorial site for the victims of the shooting
(Sumberg, 2011).
92
while the bells at Holmes Student Center and various churches in the area chimed for five
minutes, one minute for each student that died. Then, on February 24, ten days after the incident,
12,000 people assembled in then NIU Convocation Center to honor the victims, hear words of
encouragement, and find emotional support. State and Federal officials spoke about the
community‟s strength and ability to move beyond the sadness of the day. Nearly 300 counselors
volunteered to assist at NIU and they were positioned in classrooms, residence halls, department
offices to assist help students and faculty cope with the transition and sense of loss once classes
resumed. The university hoped that the presence of the counselors would contribute to healing
and a sense of unity within the campus community. Also, the scheduled chiming of the bells, the
memorial service, and the counseling support on campus contributed to sharing of grief, the
honoring of the deceased and injured victims, and the initiation of healing (Stambaugh, 2008).
Lastly, on February 14, 2009, a year after the shootings, the plan for a permanent
memorial to the victims of the February 14, 2008 shootings was unveiled. NIU will build garden
called “Memorial Garden” near Cole Hall to serve as a permanent memorial. The garden will
have a curved peaceful walkway and five illuminated sections of cardinal red granite (Figure 20).
Each of the five sections of granite will make up the “Reflection Wall” and each will be
engraved with the name of one of the five students who lost their lives. “Memorial Garden will
honor the memories of the five students we lost that day, while at the same time embracing the
resolute Huskie spirit characterized by „Forward, Together Forward‟” (Parisis, 2009, p.1)The
memorial will have a significant emotional impact and for generations to come it will serve as a
reminder of how precious life is.
93
Figure 20: Plan for “Memorial Garden” near Cole Hall (Parisis, 2009).
94
Summary
For the mitigation phase of the Northern Illinois shooting, Kazmierczak also showed
multiple warning signs prior to the incident. He was diagnosed as bipolar and suffered from
symptoms of anxiousness, depression and insomnia. Before he graduated from high school, he
had been hospitalized six times for suicide attempts or threats. At school he was teased for being
“crazy and suicidal”. His parents sought medical help for their son many times however, only
received a book on how to deal with disabled students (Stambaugh, 2008).
As part of the preparedness phase, agencies had practiced emergency drills and
coordinated their planning. The Incident Management Team (IMT) developed an Incident
Action Plan (IAP) which included mass casualty, emergency communication components, and
other documents related to emergency preparedness. Also, the team organized and conducted
drills to test procedures and then made adjustments to their plans to reflect the results. The NIU
Department of Public Safety and the DeKalb Fire Department led a mock mass casualty exercise
in order to practice staging and managing resources. During the drill, the regional MABAS radio
system was tested and mutual-aid ambulances, the County Health Department, Kishwaukee
Hospital, and air transport support were involved. Each agency was familiar with the Incident
Command System (ICS) and had formally incorporated the system into their plans. The agencies
studied the official report on the Virginia Tech shootings and had integrated the lessons learned
listed in that report into the university‟s and City of DeKalb‟s emergency response plans. “The
information concerning the tragedy at Virginia Tech campus has significantly contributed to
improved campus emergency preparedness at schools across the country, including at NIU”
(Stambaugh, 2008).
95
During the response phase, within a couple minutes DeKalb Fire and Rescue set up
operations at a Staging Area that had been predetermined at the mass casualty incident drill at
NIU. Although the shooter was found dead, the police officers faced two immediate tasks which
included ruling out the possibility of other shooters so that the emergency medical responders
could be cleared to come on site, and assisting in triaging the wounded. NIU police officers are
rather unique because officers are now becoming certified as Emergency Medical Technicians
(EMTs). Training significantly enhances the services that these officers can provide during
emergencies and it was an important factor during the immediate response to the incident. With
their emergency medical training, NIU police officers attended to the wounded, assessed their
injuries and provided immediate aid while other officers established first, second, and third
perimeters around the scene. At 3:15 p.m. Cole Hall and campus was declared secure from
further threats and EMS units began responding from staging. After all victims were transported,
the focus shift to investigation and Incident Command returned to NIU‟s Department of Public
Safety (Stambaugh, 2008).
For the recovery phase, on February 19, a formal debriefing was held for all responders
who were involved in the response at NIU. On February 28, there was a comprehensive medical
debriefing session held at the Kishwaukee Community Hospital Training Center to discuss how
the response worked, why it was so successful, and what ideas should be carried forward to
improve future operations. Small memorials to the murdered and injured students began
appearing on NIU‟s campus within hours of the incident. Mourners lit candles at midnight and
huddled together for support. On February 24, ten days after the incident, 12,000 people
assembled in then NIU Convocation Center to honor the victims, hear words of encouragement,
and find emotional support (Stambaugh, 2008). Lastly, on February 14, 2009, a year after the
96
shootings, the plan for a permanent memorial to the victims of the February 14, 2008 shootings
was unveiled. NIU will build garden called “Memorial Garden” near Cole Hall and it will have a
curved peaceful walkway with five illuminated sections of cardinal red granite (Parisi, 2009).
97
Conclusion
Schools can no longer afford to use the excuse “I never thought it would happen here.”
Armed youth in schools pose a real threat to the safety of students, faculty, and staff. Each and
every school and university must be prepared for violence and crisis. Schools must incorporate
mitigation and prevention strategies in order to create a less vulnerable environment and
minimize violence. Each situation of a school shooting presents emergency managers with new
lessons learned and new interventions. The intention is not to scare people into thinking that
there is a violent situation lurking around every corner; it is to promote change.
No two disasters are exactly alike and any type of disaster reveals something new about
preparedness and response which adds to the collective knowledge about what needs to be
considered, what works, and what may not work. Even though a mass murder at a university is
still a rare event, it draws significant national and international attention in the lessons that can
be drawn from the tragedy (Stambaugh, 2008). Shootings occur with frequency, but not
regularity and with almost every shooting there is another similar shooting, a copycat crime that
has the potential to lead to another death or act of senseless violence (Holmes, 2001).
In summary, the first step toward mitigation focuses on interventions to strengthen
security and protect students, faculty, and staff. Mitigation strategies include evaluating risk
factors, access to guns, security efforts, school resource officers, altering the school
environments, and minimizing bullying. However, threat assessment is the most effective and it
is a promising approach to violence prevention. As shown in the case study of Colu mbine, there
were many indicators that Harris and Klebold were planning a violent attack. Prior to the attack,
the boys documented their plans in videos (Fast, 2008). Another warning sign was a story
written in English class that described a shooting spree by an assassin in a black trench coat, as
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they planned the attack for over a year (Fraser & Wike, 2009). Harris and Klebold even told
fellow students that “something” was going to happen on Hitler‟s birthday (Holmes, 2001, p.
120). As shown in the Virginia Tech case studies, the academic component of the university
spoke up loudly about Cho stating that he was a sullen, foreboding male who refused to talk,
frightened classmates and faculty with gruesome writings, and refused faculty recommendations
to get counseling. However, Judicial Affairs and the Cook Counseling Center decided that Cho‟s
writings were not actionable threats and the Care Team‟s review resulted in their being satisfied
that private tutoring would resolve the problem. Therefore, incidents of dangerous or threatening
behavior must be documented and reported immediately to a college‟s threat assessment group
and must be acted upon in a prompt and effective manner in order to protect the safety of the
campus community (Massengili, 2007).
In order to reduce codes of silence, teachers should encourage students to come forward
after a classmate has expressed a threat or engaged in threatening behavior. A threat assessment
done immediately following the threat could have minimized risk and possibly could have
prevented the incident. Threat assessment represents an alternative to profiling and zerotolerance. This strategy focuses on determining whether the individual actually poses a threat or
is engaged in threatening behavior for some other reason. In order to save lives and reduce
damages from future school shootings, everyone must strive for the improvement of mitigation
strategies specific for school homicides and potential violence (Gerler, 2004).
For preparedness, strategies include establishing a planning team, writing emergency
plans, training, drills, exercises, and warning and communication. Training is a major
component of preparedness. As shown in the case study of Northern Illinois University, the
Incident Management Team (IMT) developed an Incident Action Plan (IAP) which included
99
mass casualty, emergency communication components, and other documents related to
emergency preparedness. Also, the team organized and conducted drills to test procedures and
then made adjustments to their plans to reflect the results. For years, lockdown has been the
training approach for schools. As shown in the Virginia Tech shootings, the classrooms in which
students remained as passive and static targets, there was great tragedy and 22 people were
killed. However, in three classrooms where some degree of action was taken, the survival rates
were much higher with a total of seven people killed in these classrooms. Therefore, if violence
is being directed toward an individual and that individual chooses to do nothing, that individual
will lose (Response Options, p. 68, 2007). A.L.I.C.E. training gives people who are at risk
options and a better chance of survival. Therefore, schools and universities should provide
training based on new approaches such as A.L.I.C.E. rather than the less effective approach of
the lockdown drill.
For the response phase, the responders include police, SWAT teams, emergency medical
services, hospitals, school administrators, faculty, and staff. All of these agencies must respond
to the event in a systematic and well-planned course of action. The revised training for police
responding to schools advocates immediate entry and the fastest possible ending to a critical
incident at a school. As shown in the case study of Virginia Tech, officers immediately
proceeded to implement their training for dealing with an active shooter. Their policy is to go to
the gunfire as fast as possible, however not in a careless headlong rush but in a speedy but
careful advance (Kaine, 2008). Rapid and immediate deployment of police officers is more
effective than waiting on tactical response (SWAT Teams) in active shooter events. Faculty and
staff should take a more proactive role during the response phase. Rather than, herding students
into a corner, offering no resistance and following the standard policy, they should give students
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more options for survival. Furthermore, during the response phase of a school shooting there
will be an immediate need to communicate and collaborate with local emergency responders, so
planning with local police and emergency medical personnel to establish a clear understanding of
the NIMS/ICS roles of each group during a crisis should be emphasized.
Finally, the recovery phase involves providing services after a crisis to help students, the
school, and the community deal with their grief and eventually return to a pre-crisis level of
functioning. As part of recovery, debriefings are a common procedure for law enforcement, fire
and medical agencies in the aftermath of a school shooting. Debriefings simply give employees
a chance to discuss their reactions to a traumatic event after responding to the incident.
Furthermore, memorials have been created after school shooting incidents in order to help the
grieving express their emotions and have a place to go where they can feel a sense of
community, comfort, and connectedness with others who are experiencing the same thing.
Informal memorials are likely to spring up immediately after the shooting death of students or
faculty. As shown in the case studies of Columbine, Rachel Scott‟s Honda and John Tomlin‟s
pickup truck, two of the students who were killed, became spontaneous shrines located in
Clement Park lot for grieving classmates (Fast, 2008). Schools and universities are also creating
permanent memorial sites to commemorate the victims who died. As shown in the aftermath of
the Northern Illinois shootings, a plan for a permanent memorial to the victims was unveiled on
February 14, 2009. NIU will build garden called “Memorial Garden” near Cole Hall and it will
have a curved peaceful walkway with five illuminated sections of cardinal red granite (Parisi,
2009).
When violent tragedies occur on campuses, the world reacts differently from the way it
treats similar events that occur off-campus. Therefore, to maintain the sense of feeling safe in a
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school or campus environment, the community, school system, and emergency managers should
create polices and support activities to reduce vulnerability to shootings and other acts of
violence in school environment. As a result, educators, emergency managers, and mental health
professionals need to take a more proactive role in understanding, dealing with, and preventing
school violence. In conclusion, through the phases of emergency management, the community
as a whole can set forth recommendations and learn from previous case studies in order to
change the outcomes of school shootings in the future.
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