Sorting and the Split-Ticket
A ppendix
Table A1. Coding Information and Variable Descriptions……………………………….1
Figure A1. Distribution of Sorting Scores……………………………………………………..3
Table A2. Fixed Year Effect Estimates for “Table 1”……………………………………..4
Table A3. Alternative Modeling Specification…………………………………………….…5
Table A4. Out-Party Voting Across House and Presidential Offices...………...……6
Table A5. CCES Tabular Marginal Effect Estimates………………………………..……7
Table A6. Regression Estimates for Effect of “Change” in Sorting over Time…….8
0
Sorting and the Split-Ticket
Table A1. Descriptive and Coding Information for Variables Included in Manuscript
N
Mean
Std. dev
Mi
n
Max
Split-ticket vote
13636
0.1929
0.3946
0
1
Sorting
18633
0.2569
0.2367
0
1
Out-party
incumbent
26318
0.2529
0.4347
0
1
Indifferent
26318
0.3315
0.4707
0
1
Policy-balancing
24263
0.5583
0.1239
0
1
Index of issue
position strength
26318
0.4495
0.2527
0
1
26318
0.5024
0.5
0
1
Variable
Partisan strength
Political
knowledge
Operationalization
1 = for vote for any combination of Dem-Rep for Presidential and House
of Rep., 0 = straight-ticket, Dem-Dem or Rep-Rep, vote
Captures overlap and strength of partisan and ideological selfidentification, ranging from 0 to 1; see Figure A1 for full distribution of
scores and manuscript for full operationalization
Folded partisan identification, where 0 = Independent, 0.33 = leaning
partisan, 0.66 = weak partisan, and 1 = strong partisan
1 = incumbent running for House of Representatives is of opposite party
as R; otherwise coded 0
1 = R responding that they did not like or dislike anything about the
parties; otherwise coded 0
Party balancing = abs(Rideo - Cideo) – abs(Rideo – (GOPideo +
Dideo)/2), where: Rideo = respondent’s self-placement within ideological
space; Dideo = respondent’s placement of Democratic Party within
ideological space; GOPideo = respondent’s placement of Republican Party
within ideological space; Cideo = the value of Dideo or GOPideo that
most closely approximates the respondents ideological self-placement,
Rideo
An index of extremity of responses to policy statement, including:
government health insurance, aid to blacks, government provision of jobs,
defense spending, and abortion. Responses--usually five-part
disagree/agree options--are folded so that neutral opinions are low values
and strong opinions are high values; simple additive index is then created
such that variable ranges from 0 = neutral on all issue positions to 1 =
has strong opinion on all issues
1 = correctly identifying which party controlled House of Rep.; otherwise
=0
1
2
Table A1. Descriptive and Coding Information for Variables Included in Manuscript continued...
Variable
N
Mean
Std. dev
Min
Max
Operationalization
Education
26092
0.5082
0.2891
0
1
White
26318
0.5857
0.4926
0
1
Ranges from 0 = less than 8th grade education to 1 = advanced post-bach
degree
1 = self-identify as white, 0 = otherwise
Black
26318
0.1036
0.3048
0
1
1 = self-identify as black, 0 = otherwise
Old South
26318
0.2854
0.4516
0
1
1 = state included in original Confederacy, 0 = otherwise
Urban
26318
0.2171
0.4123
0
1
1 = lives in urban area, 0 = otherwise
Age
26146
0.361
0.2144
0
1
Individual's age ranges from 0 (17) to 1 (94)
Male
26318
0.4481
0.4973
0
1
1 = self-identify as male, 0 = self-identify as woman
Income
24251
0.4592
0.2863
0
1
Income quintiles, ranging from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest)
Protestant
26318
0.5522
0.4972
0
1
1 = self-identify as Protestant, 0 = otherwise
Notes: Dummy “year” variables not included
3
Sorting and the Split-Ticket
Figure A1. Distribution of Sorting Scores 1972-2012
2,750
2,500
(N) Observations
2,250
2,000
1,750
1,500
1,250
1,000
750
500
250
0
16
14
Percent
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
0.000.050.080.090.120.160.190.200.280.310.530.621.00
Source: 1972-2012 Cumulative ANES Time-Series
4
Table A2. Year Fixed Effects Estimates Corresponding to “Table 1” in Manuscript
Model 1
b
s.e.
Model 2
b
s.e.
1972
1976
1980
1.672**
1.109**
1.291**
0.137
0.112
0.115
1.632**
0.992**
1.188**
0.126
0.113
0.114
1984
1988
1992
1996
1.079**
1.088**
0.972**
0.607**
0.110
0.107
0.111
0.099
1.025**
1.066**
1.000**
0.620**
0.109
0.106
0.108
0.101
2000
2004
2008
0.663**
0.688**
0.571**
0.105
0.102
0.103
0.688**
0.610**
0.450**
0.103
0.103
0.100
Source: 1972-2012 Cumulative ANES Time-Series
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01
5
Table A3. Alternative Modeling Specification with Additional Demographic Variables
Sorting
Partisan strength
Out-party Incumbent
Indifferent
Balance
Issue strength
Political knowledge
Education
White
Black
Old South
Urban
Age
Male
Income
Protestant
Constatnt
Model 1
-2.288**
(0.18)
-----
Model 2
-----
1.192**
(0.12)
0.197
(0.12)
0.369
-1.417**
(0.10)
1.138**
(0.09)
0.166
(0.10)
0.755**
(0.20)
-0.269*
(0.12)
-0.250**
(0.06)
0.159
(0.14)
0.031
(0.09)
-0.648**
(0.17)
0.437**
(0.11)
0.089
(0.08)
0.126
(0.26)
0.004
(0.08)
0.148
(0.16)
-0.07
(0.04)
-2.427**
(0.16)
9,783
(0.17)
-0.438**
(0.08)
-0.214**
(0.06)
-0.011
(0.11)
0.065
(0.10)
-0.483**
(0.17)
0.441**
(0.11)
0.107
(0.07)
0.094
(0.20)
-0.07
(0.07)
0.066
(0.12)
-0.146**
(0.05)
-2.000**
(0.14)
11,983
Source: 1972-2012 Cumulative ANES Time-Series
Notes: Models are replications of Table 1 in manuscript, save with the addition of extra control
variables per reviewers’ request. Substantively, coefficients for main explanatory variables change
very little. *p<0.05, **p<0.01
6
Table A4. House vs. President Out-Party Voting? Examining the Composition of the
Split-Ticket
Out-party defectors within ticketsplitter category
80
70
Percent
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Congressman
President
7
Table A5. Marginal Effects of Partisan Strength and Sorting on Likelihood of Casting Split-Ticket
Across Four Ticket Pairings, 2010 CCES
Partisan strength
Sorting
Governor-
Governor-
Governor-
Governor-
Average
US House
US Senate
State House
State Senator
M.E.
-0.069
-0.057
-0.069
-0.081
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.122
-0.099
-0.125
-0.139
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.069
-0.121
Source: 2010 CCES
Notes: Marginal effect of partisan strength and sorting calculated using respective “Model 1” and
“Model 2” in each matching logistic regression model found in Table 2 in manuscript. These effects
calculated holding other variables at means; standard errors in parentheses.
8
Table A6. Logistic Regression Estimates for Change in Ticket-Splitting from 1992-1996
b
s.e.
Sorting increase
-1.49** 0.63
Sorting decrease
-0.30
0.52
Predicted probability of split-ticket when
Male
-0.86*
0.50
….no increase in sorting = 14.0%
Education
-0.04
0.16
….increase in sorting
Knowledge
0.05
0.26
White
-0.66
1.10
Black
-0.71
1.33
Policy balance
-0.08
0.16
Old South
-0.58
0.78
Constant
-1.34
1.40
X2
11.34
Pseudo R2
0.07
N
476
Source: 1992-1996 ANES Panel Study
Notes: *p<0.05, **p<0.01
9
=
0.04%