NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT CHARTBOOK:
COUNTRY HISTORIES ON DEBT, DEFAULT, AND FINANCIAL CRISES
Carmen M. Reinhart
Working Paper 15815
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15815
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
March 2010
The author is grateful to Vincent Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff for useful comments and suggestions,
National Science Foundation Grant No. 0849224 for financial support and to Maura Francese, Elín
Guðjónsdóttir, Fregert Gustaffson, Sophia Lazaretou, Ashok Mody, Diego Saravia, and Jan-Luiten
Van Zanden for providing invaluable references on individual countries and, in some cases, sharing
their historical data as well. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2010 by Carmen M. Reinhart. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs,
may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to
the source.
This Time is Different Chartbook: Country Histories on Debt, Default, and Financial Crises
Carmen M. Reinhart
NBER Working Paper No. 15815
March 2010
JEL No. F3,H6,N50
ABSTRACT
This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of public debt and economic
crises of various forms. It is a timeline of a country’s creditworthiness and financial turmoil. The analysis,
narrative, and illustrations in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), This Time is Different: Eight Centuries
of Financial Folly, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although
detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency, incidence,
etc. of specific crises episodes by country. The Chartbook compliments the thematic analysis with
individual country histories, and provides the grounds for a systematic analysis of the temporal patterns
of debt cycles, banking and sovereign debt crises, hyperinflation, and, for the post World War II period,
the reliance on IMF programs.
Carmen M. Reinhart
University of Maryland
Department of Economics
4118D Tydings Hall
College Park, MD 20742
and NBER
[email protected]
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Table of Contents
Section
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Preamble
Key to Charts and Methodology Notes
Debt and Crises: Main Themes
Highlights and Future Research
References
List of figures
Figure
1.
2.
3a.
3b.
3c.
4a.
4b.
5a.
5b.
6.
7.
8a.
8b.
9
10a.
10b.
11.
12a.
12b.
13a.
13b.
13c.
14a.
Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking
Crises, 1975-2009
Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default, Devaluation
and Banking Crises, 1865-1895
Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking
Crises, 1970-2008
Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default, and
Banking Crises, 1852-2009
Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1895
Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Banking Crises,
1865-1914
Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1835-2009
Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,Default, Banking Crises,
and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009
Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914
Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1919-2009
Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009
Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1826-2009
Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom,
Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914
China: Central Government (domestic plus external), Default and Banking Crisis,
1865-1924
China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1875-1914
China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external), and Banking
Crises, 1981-2009
Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1902-2009
2
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure
14b
15.
16.
17.
18
19a.
19b.
20.
21a.
21b.
22a.
22b.
23.
24a.
24b.
25.
26a.
26b
27.
28
29.
30a.
30b.
30c.
31.
32a.
32b.
33a.
33b.
34
35a.
35.
Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, 1892-2009
Cote D’Ivoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1880-2009
Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default and Banking
Crises, 1914-2009
Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009
El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external)Debt, Default and Banking
Crises, 1914-2009
El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009
Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1914-2009
Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 18802009
Germany: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1870-1912
Ghana: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1884-2009
Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1884-1939
Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and
Devaluation, 1920-2009
Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and
Devaluation, 1914-2009
Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1908-2009
Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009
Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1835-2009
Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1975-2009
Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises, 19292009
Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1861-2009
Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1885-2009
Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
3
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Chartbook 2010
Figure
36.
37a.
37b.
38a.
38b.
39.
40a.
40b.
41.
42.
43.
44a.
44b.
45.
46.
47a.
47b.
48.
49.
50a.
50b.
51a.
51b.
52a.
52b.
53.
54.
55a.
55b.
56.
Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009
Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910
Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1872-2009
Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009
Myanmar: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1980-2009
Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external) and Banking Crises,
1814-2009
New Zealand: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1860-2009
New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1905
Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004
Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1914-2009
Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1917-2009
Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1905
Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1948-2009
Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises,
1980-2008
Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
and Banking Crises, 1917-1947
Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
and Banking Crises, 1984-2009
Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1851-2009
Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 19702009
Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945
Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation,
and Banking Crises, 1985-2009
Singapore: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,and Banking Crises,
4
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Chartbook 2010
1969-2009
Figure
57a.
57b.
58a.
58b.
58c.
58d.
59.
60a.
60b.
61.
62a.
62b
63.
64a.
64b.
65a.
65b.
66a.
66b.
66c.
66d.
67a.
67b
68.
69.
70.
South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009
South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1895
Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679
Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1850-2009
Spain: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises,
1970-2008
Sri Lanka Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1950-2009
Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1719-2009
Sweden: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts,
“Near-default”, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009
Thailand: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009
Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings, and Banking Crises,
1692-2009
United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1790-2009
United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009
United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
and Banking Crises, 1871-2009
Uruguay: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and Default, and Banking
Crises, 1865-1914
Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, and Banking
Crises, 1921-2009
Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises,
1970-2009
Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1970-2006
5
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
I. Preamble
This Chartbook provides a pictorial history, on a country-by-country basis, of debt and
economic crises of various forms. The analysis, narrative, and illustrations in This Time is
Different, were primarily organized around themes (serial default, inflation, etc.), although
detailed tables in the book chronicled country-specific information on the dating, frequency,
incidence, etc. of specific crises episodes by country. 1 The Chartbook compliments the thematic
analysis—indeed, it fills in as documentation to its underpinnings. What follows systematically
illustrates for 70 countries the individual timeline of public and private debts, banking, sovereign
domestic and external debt crises, and hyperinflation, starting from a country’s independence
(and even prior to that in numerous cases) to the present. The dating of the largest output
declines and a country’s history with International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs since World
War II to deal with an assortment of economic ills contribute to the chronologies.
The individual country histories are often fascinating in their own right, highlighting that
virtually no country has escaped unscathed from economic crises of one form or another. In
effect, in a number of countries, financial crises are more “a way of life” affecting all, if not most
generations. Black swans are not that rare.
The prologue to this Chartbook is minimalist by design and is organized as follows. The
next section offers an essential guide to the country charts and the accompanying tables, clarifies
methodological issues, and delineates the approach followed to document the vast number of
sources referenced in this analysis.
Section III summarizes some of the main (common or recurrent) themes and patterns that
(collectively) the country histories reveal. Some of these are documented in the literature while
others merit considerable further study. These “big picture” themes include: The repeated-game
nature of sovereign debt crises and the fact serial default is commonplace among today’s
1
Reinhart and Rogoff, (2009)
6
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
emerging markets just as it was among advanced economies in an earlier era needs little
commentary, as even a causal perusal of the charts display this historical pattern. The serial
nature of banking crises (particularly among the more developed economies prior to World War
II) is equally compelling. Nearly all of the 21 advanced economies in the sample record an
impressive crisis tally, especially from the 1880s to the 1930s. The episodes where there are
surges in private debt before the crisis and public debts after the crisis are not only numerous but
span across advanced and emerging economies in nearly all regions. And so on…
The last section discusses where there are gaps in the data and overall analysis of the
debt-crisis cycle. As such, it is a roadmap for future research,
II. Key to Charts and Methodology Notes
For working definitions of banking, currency, debt, and inflation crises, see the extensive
discussion in Reinhart and Rogoff (2009a and 2010). As to the crises highlighted in the country
profiles, our focus is on primarily external sovereign default (also its less common counterpart-domestic sovereign default) and banking crises. Many countries have a rich history of recurring
(and often chronic) exchange rate crashes and inflation crises, particularly (but not exclusively) in
post World War II Latin America. We only provide limited information on these recurring follies
in monetary history.2 We do include, highlight and date all hyperinflation episodes, as these have
been associated with the complete or near complete liquidation (through de facto default) of
domestic currency debts.
Key to charts
Besides the events discussed above, in a few charts we highlight “near- default” episodes,
which involve some form of international assistance to avoid a default or a restructuring. Their
dates are also listed in the first column of the accompanying table. Some examples of sub2
In the tables that accompany each country profile, we do provide, as summary statistic on inflation crises,
the share of years with annual inflation above 20 per cent per annum. This inflation performance also gives
a reasonable indication of the incidence of currency crashes,
7
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
sovereign defaults (by states or provinces) are also flagged. In a few charts, historic currency
crashes (such as the collapse of an 80-year old peg) are highlighted as well. More mundane
episodes of inflation and currency crises are not shown. However, the full sample incidence
(share of years) in an inflation crisis, is reported in the table below the chart, so as to provide
information on chronic inflation problems. 3 The major output collapses shown in the tables that
accompany the charts and the numerous IMF progams since 1952 (listed as a memorandum item
at the bottom of the table) are not depicted in the figures, to avoid compromising clarity.
Table 1. Coloring and Shading to Highlight Events in Country Charts
Years in default or restructuring
External debt
Years in default or restructuring
Domestic debt
Near default, as defined in text
First year of banking crises
Hyperinflation
(annual inflation > 500%)
Pale
shading
Dark
shading
Bright
shading
Black
line/bar
Medium
shading
Insets of smaller tables and charts into the figures
Insets are used throughout to provide complementary information to that shown in the
main figure. For example, for many advanced economies, an inset plots for household credit to
GDP from the mid-1990s to the present to highlight trends in private debts ahead of the 20072008 crisis. In other cases, these insets provide information on the maturity composition of the
debt (public or private, as the case may be) on the eve of a banking crisis be it default or
hyperinflation. The distribution of public and private debt before and after a crisis also provide
documentation of the numerous crisis cases where the government assumed important quantities
of private debts.
3
For evidence on the correlation and overlap between currency crashes and inflation crises, see Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010).
8
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Descriptive statistics in the tables to each country
Descriptive statistics are mostly self-explanatory, but two particulars merit explanation.
The first year of banking crises are listed and those shown in italics indicate that the episode in
question was not deemed to be a systemic crisis. Near default episodes are also shown in italics
and not counted in the tally of default. The last column provides information on the largest annual
output declines, usually the top five, but more or less when relevant. Both the year and the
percent decline (in parentheses) are given. For full output collapse episodes, the interested reader
is referred to Barro and Ursua (2009).
The bottom portion of the table gives memorandum items on IMF programs with the
country over the period from 1952 to 2009. The first year of the program is listed as well as the
total number of programs. The relevant sources are discussed below.
Debt ratios
Debt is usually shown as a percent of GDP and in a few cases as a percent of exports. In a
handful of cases we have debt data for the earlier part of the 19th century but no GDP or trade
measure to scale the debt data by. In those few cases, we show changes in debt (often over three
years) to provide an indication of the debt cycle. The nominal GDP data comes from numerous
scholars as well as official statistical sources. For a number of developing countries we have
more data on exports than for GDP (in all cases we have post World War II nominal GDP data).
In these cases the charts show the actual debt/GDP ratio for the period during which GDP data is
available (say post 1920s) and use the debt/exports ratio times the average export to GDP ratio
(for the period during which both series overlap) to back-cast the series.
References and sources
Most charts list the main source as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), which has an extensive data
appendices listing sources series-by-series and country-by-country over different subperiods.
Additional sources listed below each graph usually indicate that we came across these sources
subsequent to the publication. Prominent examples of the recent discoveries include: detailed
9
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
recent historical studies of Italian, Greek, Dutch and Swedish public debts (Maura Francese and
Angelo Page for Italy, Sophia Lazaretou on Greek 19th century domestic debts, Frit Bos for the
Netherlands, and Klas Fregert and Roger Gustafsson for Sweden.) As the sample was extended
to include Bulgaria, Ghana, Iceland, Ireland, and Switzerland, pertinent sources for these are also
listed in the relevant country page. Finally, the sources for the IMF programs are Bird, Hussain
and Joyce (2004), Mody and Saravia (2009), and the IMF’s Annual Reports for several years to
update these studies through 2009.
III. Debt and Crises: Main Themes
This section highlights some of the issues where the collective evidence from the country
histories are particularly illuminating. Throughout, I use country examples or specific crises
episodes to illustrate particular points.
(i) Serial default is a widespread phenomenon across emerging markets and several
advanced economies. Figures 8a and 26 for Brazil and Greece, respectively (among many more
that are similar) call attention to this point by simply shading the years in default throughout the
sample; the summary table also lists the timing and duration of each default spell while the tally
entry (bottom of column 1) reports the default tally for 1800-2009. Countries such as France and
pain have a higher count if pre-1800 default episodes are counted.
(ii) Prior to World War II, serial banking crises in the advanced economies was the
norm; as the larger emerging markets developed a financial sector in the late 1800s—these
economies joined the “serial banking” crisis club. Country histories for Belgium (Figure 6),
Canada (Figure 10a) among others, illustrate this pattern. The world financial centers (the UK,
Figure 65a and the US Figure 66a) take the lead in serial banking crises. One can speculate that
the less-developed economies substitute foreign bankers for nonexistent domestic ones. As such,
when acute sovereign fiscal difficulties arise, these become manifest in serial external default
rather than serial domestic banking crises.
10
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
(iii) In light of serial debt and banking crises (not to mention chronic currency and price
instability), it is not surprising to see a similar serial pattern in the incidence of IMF programs.
Peru and the Philippines set the record with 24 and 23 programs, respectively. However, IMF
programs were not always in the exclusive domain of emerging markets. During the 1950s1970s, the IMF was more like the discount window of a central bank and did not carry the stigma
it of the default or near default cases. Among the advanced economies, the U.K. holds the record
with 11 programs.4
(iv) Private debts typically surge prior to a banking crises. This pattern is evident in
total external debt (a stock), capital inflow bonanzas (a flow), domestic banking sector credit (a
stock), or any combination of these. 5 Public debts may or may not surge ahead of banking
crises. Indeed, especially in financial repression cases the governments efforts to stuff its debts in
“captive “ bank balance sheets Procyclical fiscal policies, where the government amplifies the
boom-bust cycle in total debt (as documented in Kaminsky, Reinhart and Vegh, 2003), all too
often re-enforce the boom in private indebtedness ahead of the banking crisis.
For external debts, see Figures 30b and 62a for Iceland and Thailand, respectively.
Surges in capital inflows do not last forever. When they end, countries often display the Calvotype sudden stop syndrome, even in crises of an earlier century in advanced economies. 6 The
U.S. experience during 1865-1913, shown in Figure 68b, exemplifies this behavior. Domestic
credit climbs sharply prior to the banking crisis an unwinds afterward—the examples form
banking in Colombia (Figure 12b) and Norway (Figure 47b) demonstrate this time profile. By
contrast, the famous (or infamous) lost decade and bank debt overhang in post 1992 crisis Japan
is evident from Figure 34b. The coverage on domestic credit boom in this Chartbook is not
intended to be as comprehensive as public and external debt—the primary focus. However, the
4
Bird et.al. (2004) aptly title their paper on IMF programs “Many Happy Returns?..”
The term “capital flow bonanza” is introduced in Reinhart and Reinhart(2008) and refers to a surge in
capital inflows (over and beyond their historoic norm).
6
Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo_Kung (2006), for example.
5
11
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Chartbook 2010
pattern alluded to here is strongly supported by the evidence from studies that have focused
primarily on the domestic credit cycle. The most comprehensive in terms of country coverage is
Mendoza and Terrones (2008), who find most booms are followed by currency crises, banking
crises or both. The smaller country set for the 1880-2008 period studied in Schularick and Taylor
(2010) presents similar findings.7
(v) Banking crises most often either precede or coincide with sovereign debt crises. To
be clear, we are referring to “domestic” banking crises, the issue of whether banking crises in the
financial centers precede domestic banking crises and or sovereign defaults or restructurings is
examined in some detail in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). The reasons for this temporal sequence
may be the contingent liability story emphasized by Diaz Alejandro (1985) and formalized in
Velasco (1986), in which the government takes on massive debts from the private banks, thus
undermining its solvency.8 Even absent large scale bailouts (and without counting the post-crisis
new government guarantees) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) establish that, largely owing to
collapsing revenues, government debts typically rise by about 86 percent in the three years
following a systemic financial crisis, this sets the stage for rating downgrades and, in the worst
scenario, default.
The list of country examples of this sequencing is too long to enumerate, we would
highlight as illustrative, the Barings 1891 crisis in Argentina (Figure 3b), Austria’s banking crisis
in 1931 and subsequent default in 1932 (Figure 5a) and Indonesia’s 1997-1998 banking crisis and
1999-2000 default (Figure 32a).
(vi) Public debts follow a repeated boom-bust cycle; many (if not most) of the bust
phase involved a debt crisis in emerging markets. Public sector borrowing surges as the crisis
nears. Debts continue to rise after default, as arrears accumulate and GDP contracts markedly.9
7
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Gourinchas et.al. (2001) also document for different samples this
boom-crisis-bust pattern.
8
See Arellano and Kocherlakota (2008) for a framework that is consistent with these dynamics.
9
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) on evidence on output behavior before during and after debt crises.
12
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Chartbook 2010
If there is an exchange rate crash associated with default, as shown in Reinhart (2002), the
valuation effect on external debts also contributes to further increase in debt/GDP ratios.
The boom-bust episodes are very numerous cutting across regions and time. The crisis
episode in Figure 69 for Zambia illustrates the pre-crisis surge in public debt—as well as its
continued climb in the early stage of default.
(vii) As suggested in the Diamond and Dybvig’s famous framework of banking crises, shortterm debts (public and private) escalate on the eve of banking crisis and sovereign defaults. 10
This pattern is also consistent with He and Xiong’s (2010) setting, where creditors' incentives to
shorten debt maturity to protect themselves against runs by other creditors. Most famously,
Mexico ramped up its short-term debt issuance just in advance of its “Tesobonos” crisis in 1994
as in Figure 40b. In the march toward hyperinflation, long-term debts disappear altogether; the
German hyperinflation of 1923-1924 (Figure 22a) demonstrates these dynamics.
(viii) Private debts become public debts-after the crisis. Several examples from the debt
crisis that engulfed Latin America in the early 1980s and lasted a decade are documented in
various insets that document the rising share of private “hidden debts” carrying implicit
government guarantees (Figure 62a for Thailand, among others) (Figure 19a for Ecuador, for
example). 11
10
11
See Chang and Velasco (2000) for an open-economy treatment of Diamond and Dibvig (1983).
For a discussion of hidden public debt see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008).
13
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Chartbook 2010
Figure 1. Algeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and
Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
Banking crisis
(black line)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
Default
(shaded)
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Algeria, 1962-2009
External
default
Dates
1991-1996
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
6
n.a.
1990
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1989, 1991, 1994,1995
0
Share of
years in
external
default
10.4
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
12.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1961(12.1)
1962(21.1)
1966(4.8)
1971(8.5)
1980(5.4)
Total number
4
14
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 2. Angola: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1975-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
700
Banking crisis
(black bar)
600
Domestic defaults
(dark shading)
500
400
1993-1996 Hyperinflation
Year
Inflation
1993
1379.5
1994
949.8
1995
2672.2
1996
4146
300
200
Default (shaded)
100
0
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: No data is available prior to 1985 right after independence from Portugal (1975) and during the
early year of the 27-year civil war (1975-2002).
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Angola, 1975-2009
External
default
dates
1985-2003
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
19
1976
1992-2002
1991
Hyperinflation
dates
1993-1996
Number of episodes:
1
2
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
1
Share of
years in
external
default
54.3
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
60.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1974 (5.0)
1975 (38.4)
1976 (10.2)
1992(5.8)
1993(24.0)
Total
0
15
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3a. Argentina: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Public foreign bond issues and default
1827-1857
the first and longest
default
250
50
40
30
200
Hyperinflations
20
10
0
1824
1834
1844
1854
1864
150
1874
`
External defaults (shaded)
banking crises (black lines)
100
50
0
1867
1877
1887
1897
1907
1917
1927
1937
1947
1957
1967
1977
1987
1997
2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown above. Domestic default episodes are that overlap with
external default are not shaded (see table below for dates)
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Argentina, 1816-2009
External
default
Dates
1827-1857
1890-1893
1951
1956-1965
1982-1993
1989
2001-2005
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
31
4
1
10
12
-9
1890-1893
1982
1989-1990
2001-2005
2007-2009
1885
1890
1914
1931
1934
1980
1985
1989
1995
2001
Hyperinflation
dates
1984-1985
1989-1990
Number of episodes:
7
5
10
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1958-1962, 1967-1968, 1976-1977, 1983-1984, 1987, 1989,
1991-1992, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003(2)
16
Share of
years in
external
default
32.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
24.7
7 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1914(10.4)
1917(8.1)
1931(6.9)
1959)6.5)
1985(7.0)
1989(7.0)
2002(10.9)
Total
20
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3b. Argentina: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1865-1895
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
160
1890 Barings banking
crisis and default
1885 and 1890 crises
Year Private as a
% of total
1884
42.1
1885
96.6
1889
78.2
1890
100.0
140
120
1885, banking crisis and
exit from Gold Standard
100
80
60
40
Banking crises
(black lines)
20
0
1865
1867
1869
1871
1873
1875
1877
1879
1881
1883
1885
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
17
1887
1889
1891
1893
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 3c. Argentina Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default, Hyperinflation
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
70
Hyperinflation
First year of
the banking crisis
(black line);
default (shaded)
60
50
40
30
Curency crash;
bank holiday
and an output
collapse of
over 30%
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
20
10
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method
is used. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
18
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure4a. Australia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt,
Near-default, and Banking Crises, 1852-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
200
Household debt as a percent of GDP
130
110
90
70
50
1995
1999
2003
Banking crises
(black lines);
there is a "neardefault"
in 1932
in New South
Wales.
180
160
140
120
100
80
2007
60
40
20
0
1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: S.J. Butlin (1968), OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: An interesting anecdote on sub-sovereign debt from correspondence with Huw McKay (who also
refered us to Butlin’s work, which dates the earliest banking crises.. During the great depression, the left
wing government of the largest state in Australia, New South Wales, voted to default on its foreign debt,
only to be over-ruled by the Federal Government. Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Australia, 1800-2009
(calculations since independence—1901)
External
default
dates
1932
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1828
1843
1893
1931
1989
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
5
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1961
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
2.8
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1882(5.6)
1892(12.3)
1893(5.5)
1930(9.5)
1931(6.7)
0
Total
1
19
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 4b. Australia: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1895
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
160
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath
Year Private as a
% of total
1886
16.9
1887
34.8
1891
17.9
1892
12.8
Banking crises
(black lines)
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1865
1867
1869
1871
1873
1875
1877
1879
1881
1883
1885
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
20
1887
1889
1891
1893
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 5a. Austria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Banking crisis begins in
1931 (black lines) and default in 1932.
1938 was the last of 7 default episodes (shaded)
100
90
80
70
60
The 1921-1922 hyperinflation
Year
Share of
short-term debt
1919
68.6
1920
87.9
1921
99.1
50
40
30
20
10
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Austria, 1800-2009
(Austria-Hungary pre-1918)
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
Share of
years in
external
default
17.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
13.3
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1919(15.6)
1931(8.0)
1932(10.3)
2009(3.8)
1802-1815
14
1945
1873
1921-1922
1816
1
1924
1868-1870
3
1929
1914-1915
2
1931
1932-1933
2
2008
1938
1
1940-1952
13
Number of episodes:
7
1
5
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
Total
None
0
Notes: There is an issue whether to treat (more or less) consecutive defaults in 1802, 1805, and 1811 as
separate episodes or as a single longer episode, as above.
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
21
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 5b. Austria: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
World War I begins
450
400
350
300
Banking crisis
(black line)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
22
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 6. Belgium: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Banking Crises, 1835-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
140
120
100
80
60
40
First year of banking crises
(black lines)
20
0
1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Belgium, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1838
1842
1848
1870
1914
1925
1931
1934
1939
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
10
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1952
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
23
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5.2
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1932(4.5)
1938(2.3)
2009(3.2)
0
Total
1
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 7. Bolivia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
1931 default
Share of
Year
short-term debt
1928
18.3
1929
46.2
1930
51.2
1000
Domestic default (dark shading)
900
800
700
1984-1985 hyperinflation
600
500
The 1931
default
episode
(shaded) lasted
18 years
400
Banking crises (black lines)
300
200
100
0
1914
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics.
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Bolivia, 1825-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1875-1879
5
1927
1987
1931-1948
18
1982-1985
1994
1980-1984
5
1999
1986-1993
8
1989-1997
9
Number of episodes:
5
2
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1956-1957, 1959, 1961-1967, 1969, 1973, 1980,
1986 (2), 1988(2), 1994, 1998, 2001
Hyperinflation
dates
1984-1985
Share of
years in
external
default
21.6
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
14.6
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1954(9.5)
1956(5.9)
1982(4.4)
1983(4.5)
1
Total
20
24
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 8a. Brazil: External Debt, Default, Hyperinflation and Banking Crises, 1824-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
1988-1994 Hyperinflation
Year
Share of
short-term debt
1987
11.8
1988
44.1
1989
79.2
900
Hyperinflation
800
700
600
Defaults
(shaded)
500
400
300
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
200
100
0
1824 1834 1844 1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1924 1934 1944 1954 1964 1974 1984 1994 2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: For 1824-1945, public external debt; for 1946-2009 external debt is the aggregate of public and
private debts. Only the major banking crises are shown. There are a total of 9 default episodes but only 8
shaded regions, as two episodes occur in consecutive years (see table below). Only systemic banking crises
are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Brazil, 1822-2009
External
default
Dates
1828-1834
1898-1901
1902-1910
1914-1919
1931-1933
1937-1943
1961
1964
1983-1990
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
7
4
9
6
3
7
1
1
8
1986-1987
1990
1890
1897
1900
1914
1923
1926
1929
1963
1985
1990
1994
Hyperinflation
dates
1988-1990
1992-1994
or
single
episode
1988-1994
Number of episodes:
9
2
11
2(1)
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1958, 1961, 1965-1972, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1998, 2001-2002
25
Share of
years in
external
default
26.6
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
26.1
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1893(12.8)
1896(7.2)
1930(6.0)
1981(4.4)
1990(4.2)
Total
16
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 8b. Brazil: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default and Banking Crises, 1875-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
90
The Barings crisis of 1890
Banking crises
(black lines);
default (shaded)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
26
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 9. Bulgaria: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1919-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
350
Three external defaults
(shaded)
300
250
200
150
100
Banking crises
(black lines)
50
1981-1990, only external public debt
data available (dashed line)
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Bulgaria
External
default
Dates
1916-1920
1932
1990-1994
Duration
(in
years)
5
1
5
Domestic
default
dates
n.a.
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1931
1994
n.a.
Number of episodes:
3
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1991-1992, 1994, 1996-1998, 2002, 2004
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
27
0
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
6 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1934(8.5)
1990(9.1)
1991(10.8)
1993(11.6)
1996(8.0)
2009(6.5)
Total number
8
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 10a. Canada: Central Government (domestic plus external), 1867-2009
(debt as a percent of exports and GDP)
700
1935- Alberta defaults
600
First year of banking
crisis (black line)
500
Debt-to-exports (solid)
400
300
200
100
Debt-to-GDP (dotted)
0
1867
1877
1887
1897
1907
1917
1927
1937
1947
1957
1967
1977
1987
1997
2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein. The 1983 banking crisis (also shown) does
not meet the systemic criteria.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Canada, 1867-2009
External
default
Dates
1935 “near”
Duration
(in
years)
10
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1837
1866
1873
1906
1908
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0.7
6 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1876(6.7)
1919(7.6)
1921(10.8)
1931(15.4)
1932and
1933(7.1)
1912
1923
1983
Number of episodes:
0
0
8
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
0
Total
0
28
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 10b. Canada: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
1890
Barings crisis
50
45
40
35
30
The Panic
of 1907
25
Banking crises
(black lines)
20
15
10
5
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
29
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 11. Central African Republic: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
120
Banking crises
(black lines)
100
80
60
1994, a rare 100 percent
devaluation across the
CFA franc zone
40
Second and
ongoing default
(shaded)
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs:
Central African Republic, 1960-2009
External
default
Dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1981
1
n.a.
1976
1983-2009
27
1988
Number of episodes:
2
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1980-1981, 1983-1985, 1987(2), 1989, 1994, 1998
n.a.
0
Share of
years in
external
default
56.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
4.0
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1979(5.6)
1983(6.0)
1996(8.1)
2003(7.1)
Total
10
30
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 12a. Chile: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1826-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
250
9 default/restructuring
episodes (shaded)
200
150
Banking crises
(black lines)
100
50
0
1826
1846
1866
1886
1906
1926
1946
1966
1986
2006
Sources: Diaz et. al (2001), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Chile, 1818-2009
External
default
Dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1826-1842
16
n.a.
1890
1880-1883
4
1899
1931-1947
18
1907
1961
1
1915
1963
1
1926
1965
1
1976
1972
1
1981
1974-1975
2
1983-1990
8
Number of episodes:
9
0
7
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1956, 1958-1959, 1961, 1963-1966, 1968-1969,
1974-1975, 1983, 1985, 1989 (2)
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
27.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
20.3
7 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1919(14.2)
1921(13.3)
1930(16.0)
1931(21.2)
1932(15.5)
1947(10.8)
1975(12.9)
1982(13.6)
0
Total
16
31
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 12b. Chile: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom,
Default and Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
120
Banking crises
(black lines);
default (shaded)
100
The Barings crisis of 1890
80
The Panic
of 1907
60
40
20
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources:.Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
32
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13a. China: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1885-1937
(debt as a percent of exports)
1600
Banking crisis
(black line)
defaults
(shaded)
1400
1200
Domestic
default
(dark shading)
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1885
1895
1905
1915
1925
1935
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
China, 1850-2009
External
default
Dates
1921-1936
1939-1949
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
16
11
1921
1932
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1863
1866
1873
1883
1898
1910
1923
1931
1934
Number of episodes:
1998
2
2
10
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1981, 1986
1
No output data from 1939 to 1951.
Hyperinflation
dates
1946-1948
Share of
years in
external
default
12.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
10.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1934(8.7)
1960(3.4)
1961(17.3)
1
Total
2
33
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13b. China: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1875-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
70
Banking crises
(black lines)
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
34
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 13c. China: Central Government Debt Issuance (domestic plus external)
and Banking Crises, 1981-2009
(three-year sum in issuance as a percent of GDP)
23
Total (Central government)
Year
Debt/GDP
2006
16.5
2008
27.8 est.
2009
35.7 est.
Asian financial
crisis
21
19
17
15
13
First year banking
crisis
(black line)
11
US subprime and
global crisis; fiscal
stimulus plans in
China.
9
7
5
3
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, several issues, National Debt Association of China, Reinhart and
Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein, and authors’ calculations.
Notes: Data on central government debt outstanding (domestic plus external) is no longer published.
Estimates for 2008 and 2009 are based on issuance data for those years.
35
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 14a. Colombia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1902-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
80
The runup to default
Year
Share of
Short-term debt
1929
15.1
1930
20.2
1931
43.9
70
Banking
crises. 1982
and 1998
(black lines)
60
50
40
1932, the last of 7 default
episodes (shaded)
30
20
10
0
1902 1907 1912 1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Sources: Junguito and Rincón (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Colombia, 1819-2009
External
default
Dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1826-1845
20
n.a.
1982
1850-1861
12
1998
1873
1
1880-1896
17
1900-1904
5
1932-1934
3
1935-1944
10
Number of episodes:
7
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1957-1960, 1962-1964, 1966-1973, 1999, 2003,
2005
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
35.6
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
17.8
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1914(3.4)
1934(2.1)
1999(4.2)
0
Total
18
36
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 14b. Colombia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
50
The 1998 banking cisis was
associated with the worst
recession recorded.
45
First year of
the banking
crises
(black lines)
Coverage of
domestic credit
series expanded
40
35
30
25
20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method
is used.
37
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 15. Costa Rica: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
Default and Banking Crises, 1892-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
750
6 of a total of 9 defaults/restructurings are shaded
650
550
450
350
First year of banking
crises (black lines)
250
150
50
1892
1902
1912
1922
1932
1942
1952
1962
1972
1982
1992
2002
Sources: Soley Güell (1926), UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources
cited therein.
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Costa Rica, 1838-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1828-1840
13
n.a.
1987
1874-1885
12
1994
1895-1897
3
1901-1911
11
1932-1952
21
1962
1
1981
1
1983-1990
8
1984-1985
Number of episodes:
9
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1961-1962, 1965-1967, 1976, 1980-1982,1985,
1987, 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 2009
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
34.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5.3
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1923(7.6)
1927(9.2)
1932(8.0)
1934(11.8)
1942(10.4)
1944(9.4)
1982(7.3)
0
Total
16
38
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 16. Cote D’Ivoire: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
250
Almost uninterrupted ongoing
default for 26 years (shaded)
200
150
100
1994, a rare 100 percent
devaluation
across the CFA franc
zone countries
Banking crisis
(black line)
50
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Cote D’Ivoire, 1960-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1983-1998
16
n.a.
1988
2000-2009
10
Number of episodes:
2
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1981, 1984-1986, 1988-1989, 1991, 1994, 1998,
2002, 2009
n.a.
0
Share of
years in
external
default
52.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
6.0
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1965(2.2)
1983(3.9)
1990(6.9)
2000(4.6)
Total
11
39
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 17. Denmark: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Accounting definition of debt
expanded
90
80
70
60
50
Banking crises
(black lines)
40
Household debt as a % of GDP
1995
79.6
2000
90.9
2005
115.9
2008
136.7
30
20
10
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Denmark, 1800-2009
External
default
Dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1813
1813
1857
1877
1885
1902
1907
1921
1931
1987
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
1
10
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
40
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
1.9
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1856(5.6)
1877(2.7)
1921(2.9)
1932(2.6)
2009(5.0)
0
Total number of years
0
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 18. Dominican Republic: Central Government (domestic plus external)
Debt, Default, Devaluation and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
100
1975-2001, default on
domestic debt (dark shading)
First year of banking crises
(black lines).
3 external defaults
(lighter shading)
90
80
70
60
50
In 1985 the 1 peso to 1 US dollar peg
in place since 1905, is abandoned
40
30
20
Banking crises
(black lines)
10
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Dominican Republic, 1844-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1872-1888
17
1975-2001
1996
1892-1893
2
2003
1897
1
1899-1907
9
1931-1934
4
1982-1994
13
2005
1
Number of episodes:
7
1
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1959, 1964, 1983, 1985, 1991, 1993, 2001, 2003,
2005
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
28.3
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
6.6
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1965(12.4)
1985(2.5)
1990(5.5)
0
Total
9
41
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 19a Ecuador: Central Government (domestic plus external)
Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP )
140
120
Shown are five of a total of
ten external defaults
(lighter shading)
100
80
In 2000, in the midst of crisis,
Ecuador officially fully dollarized
in place since 1905, is abandoned
60
40
20
Banking crises
(black lines)
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: For the period 1973-1989 the data is for external public debt for general government, this
underestimates public indebtedness, as it does not include domestic (or internal) debts—at the same time
general government is more inclusive than our central government measure. These two effects are working
in opposite directions.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ecuador, 1830-2009
External
default
Dates
1826-1845
1868-1890
1894-1898
1900-1904
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
20
4
1
5
1999
1981
1998
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
1906-1911
3
1914-1924
9
1929-1954
1982-1995
1999-2000
2008
Number of episodes:
10
1
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007
Dates of programs
1961-1966, 1969-1970, 1983, 1985-1986, 19881989, 1991, 1994, 2000, 2003
Share of
years in
external
default
57.8
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
13.9
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1983(2.1)
1987(6.0)
1999(6.3)
0
Total
18
42
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 19b. Ecuador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
160
Private debts become public
debts--1982 default
Year
Share of
private debt
1972-1981
18.2
1982
21.1
1983-1992
2.2
1999 banking
crisis and default
Ecuador dollarizes
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
Banking crises
(black bars)
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
43
0
1995
2000
2005
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 20. Egypt: Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1862-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
350
300
1876, the first of 2 default
episodes (shaded)
Banking crises
(black lines)
250
200
150
No external public
debts 1940-1960
100
50
0
1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Notes: By 1945, the outstanding balance on Ottoman debts were either fully paid off or forgiven; no
external debts are recorded through 1960.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Egypt 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1876-1880
1984
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
5
1
n.a.
1907
1981
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1990
2
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1962, 1964, 1977-1978, 1987, 1991, 1993, 1996
Sources: Pre-World War II GDP from Yousef (2002).
44
0
Share of
years in
external
default
2.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5.2
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1887(2.2)
1914(3.0)
1920(6.6)
1942(3.6)
1991(3.2)
Total
8
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 21a El Salvador: Central Government (domestic plus external)
Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
70
External default
episodes (light shading)
60
50
Domestic default (dark shading);
first year of banking crisis
(black line)
40
30
20
10
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), and sources cited therein, and UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics.
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: El Salvador, 1838-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1828-1860
33
1981-1996
1989
1898
1
1921-1922
3
1932-1935
11
1938-1946
21
Number of episodes:
5
1
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1958-1963, 1965, 1967, 1969-1970, 1972, 1980,
1982, 1990, 1992-1993, 1995, 1997-1998, 2009
n.a.
0
Share of
years in
external
default
22.7
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.5
7 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1927(12.1)
1931(10.1)
1932(10.2)
1938(7.1)
1949(9.2)
1980(8.6)
1982(6.3)
Total
20
45
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 21b. El Salvador: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Private debts become public
debts--1981 domestic default
Year
Share of
private debt
1971-1980
40.7
1981-1990
5.8
2007
27
60
In 2001, El Salvador
dollarizes
50
40
30
20
As an exception to the rule,
El Salvador defaulted on its
domestic debts (shaded) in
1981 while servicing external debts.
10
Banking crisis
(black bar)
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
46
1995
2000
2005
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 22a. Finland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
120
First year of banking crisis
(black lines)
100
80
60
40
20
0
1914
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Finland, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1900
1921
1931
1939
1991
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
5
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1952, 1967, 1975
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
7.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1862(5.4)
1867(8.0)
1931(2.4)
1991(6.2)
2009(6.4)
0
Total
3
47
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 22b. Finland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
In 1992, the markka
"crashed" during the
Exchange Rate Mechanism
Crisis
100
90
80
70
60
50
1991, the first
year of
the banking crisis
(black line)
40
30
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method
is used.
48
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 23. France: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
300
Year
Debt/GDP
1815
17.2
1848
45.8
1870
53.4
1873
89.6
250
200
150
100
Banking crises
(black lines)
50
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: France, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1812.
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1802
1805
1848
1881
1889
1907
1914
1930
1994
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
0.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5.7
6 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1848(6.1)
1859(6.5)
1870(7.6)
1876(8.2)
1931(6.0)
1932(6.5)
Number of episodes:
0
10
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
Total
1956, 1958, 1969
3
1
Excludes World Wars I and II. There are a couple of additional output declines comparable in magnitude
to those shown in the latter 19th century.
49
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 24a. Germany: Federal and Total Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
The march to hyperinflation
Year
Share of
short-term debt
1916
24.1
1918
31.7
1920
51.7
1922
77.7
1923
99.6
Banking crises
(black lines)
80
70
60
50
Total debt (solid)
40
1923-1924
Hyperinflation
30
20
Depressionwartime
default
(shaded)
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
Federal debts
(dash)
10
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Only systemic banking crises are shown.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Germany, 1800-2009
External
default
Dates
1807
1812
1850
1932-1953
Duration
(in
years)
1
1
1
22
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1948
1857
1880
1891
1901
1925
1931
1977
2007
Hyperinflation
dates
1923-1924
Number of episodes:
4
1
8
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
50
Share of
years in
external
default
12.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
9.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1919(19.5)
1923(16.9)
1931(7.6)
1932(7.5)
1946(52.6)
2009(4.9)
1
Total
0
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 24b. Germany: Public and Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom
and Banking Crises, 1870-1912
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
400
Banking crises
(black lines)
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
51
1900
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 25. Ghana: Total Public (domestic and external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
1971-2003, frequent currency
crashes and high inflation
150
130
1957
Independence
110
90
70
50
First year of
banking crisis
(black line)
Domestic default (dark shading)
external default (light shading)
30
10
1952
1957
1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ghana, 1957-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1966
1
1979
1982
1968
1
1982
1997
1970
1
1974
1
1987
1
Number of episodes:
5
2
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1966-1969, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987(2), 1988,
1995, 1999, 2003
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
9.4
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
45.3
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1955(6.4)
1975(12.5)
1982(6.9)
1983(4.6)
0
Total
14
52
2007
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 26a. Greece: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1848-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
450
Banking crisis
(black line)
defaults
(shaded)
400
350
Household debt as a % of GDP
300
1995
6
2000
12.9
250
2005
35.9
2008
49.7
200
1941-1944
Hyperinflation
150
100
2010, Neardefault
50
0
1848 1858 1868 1878 1888 1898 1908 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1988 1998 2008
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Greece, 1829-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1826-1842
17
1932-1951
1931
1941-1944
1843-1859
17
1991
1860-1878
19
1894-1897
4
1932-1964
33
Number of episodes:
5
1
2
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007
Dates of programs
None
1
Excludes World Wars I and II. Source: Kostelenos et. al. (2007)
53
Share of
years in
external
default
48.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
12.7
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1847(14.0)
1852(14.7)
1856(11.7)
1891(11.5)
1919(17.7)
Total
0
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 26b. Greece: Government Domestic Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1884-1939
(loans to the government as a percent of Central Bank loans)
60
Central Bank loans to the
government as a percent
of total loans
50
40
30
Rising domestic debt in
the eve of external default
20
Banking crisis
(black line)
defaults
(shaded)
10
0
1848
1858
1868
1878
1888
1898
1908
1918
1928
1938
Sources: Lazaretou (2005), Levandis (1944), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
54
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 27. Guatemala: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Devaluation, 1920-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
70
External default
episodes (shaded)
60
The 1-to-1 peg in place since 1900 ends in 1985
50
40
30
Banking crisis (black lines)
20
10
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Guatemala, 1838-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1828-1856
29
n.a.
1991
1876-1888
13
2001
1894
1
2006
1899-1913
14
1933-1936
4
1986
1
1989
1
Number of episodes:
7
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1960-1961, 1966-1970, 1972, 1981, 1983, 1988,
1992, 2002-2003, 2009
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
31.4
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1922(5.6)
1931(6.7)
1932(12.5)
1943(33.3)
1982(3.5)
0
Total
15
55
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 28. Honduras: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Devaluation, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
250
External default
episodes (shaded)
200
150
Honduras has not had a systemic
banking crisis in this period
100
50
The 2-to-1 peg in place since 1919 ends in 1981
0
1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Honduras, 1838-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1828-1867
40
n.a.
1999
1873-1925
53
2001
1981-2009
29
Number of episodes:
3
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1957, 1959-1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 1971-1972,
1979, 1982, 1990, 1992, 1999, 2004, 2008
n.a.
0
Share of
years in
external
default
65.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1924(6.6)
1932(10.4)
1933(6.2)
1942(8.6)
1954(5.7)
Total
19
56
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 29. Hungary: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
200
Wartime 1941 default lasts
nearly 3 decades.
First year of banking crises
(black lines)
180
160
140
120
1945-1946
Hyperinflation
100
80
60
40
20
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Hungary, 1918-2009
External
default
dates
1932-1937
1941-1967
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
7
27
n.a.
1931
1991
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
1945-1946
Number of episodes:
2
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1982, 1984, 1988, 1990-1991, 1993, 1996, 2008
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
57
Share of
years in
external
default
37.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
14.1
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1931(4.8)
1990(6.7)
1991(11.9)
2009(6.7)
1
Total
8
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 30a. Iceland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1908-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
80
70
Banking crisis, currency crash,
and near default, 2007-present
60
50
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
40
30
20
10
0
1908 1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Iceland, 1918-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
2007-2010
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
“near” 3
n.a.
1985
2007
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
25.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1916(11.7)
1918(6.2)
1920(15.2)
1968(5.6)
2009(8.5)
Number of episodes:
0
0
2
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
Total
1960, 2008
2
1
The reported declines for 1916, 1918, and 1920 are on a per capita basis (Historical Statistics of Iceland,
2010).
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
58
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 30b. Iceland: External (public plus private) Debt and Banking Crises, 1922-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
External
Share of
Debt/GDP short-term debt
2005
Banking crisis, currency crash,
"near default", 2007-present
276.4
16.5
2006
428.3
17.5
2007
522.8
37.5
2008
870.1
39.0
2009:Q3
923.8
48.5
150
130
110
90
70
50
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
30
10
-10
1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1947 1952 1957 1962 1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007
Sources: Historical Statistics of Iceland (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
59
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure30c. Iceland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
420
The exchange rate crashed
by about 95% against the
dollar in 2008
370
320
270
220
170
First year of
the banking crisis
(black line); near default (shaded)
120
70
20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
60
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 31. India: Public (domestic plus external) Debt Reschedulings, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1835-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
1400
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
1990-1991
"Near default"
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
Debt restructuring
(shaded)
0
1835 1845 1855 1865 1875 1885 1895 1905 1915 1925 1935 1945 1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: India, 1835-2009
(calculations since independence—1947--reported)
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
1958
1
1969
1
1972-1976
5
1989-1990
Number of episodes:
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
1863
1908
1914
1921
1929
1947
1993
3
0
7
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1957, 1962-1963, 1965, 1981, 1991 (2)
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
11.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.2
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1891(9.2)
1899(7.8)
1918(12.8)
1920(7.9)
1947(17.2)
0
Total
7
61
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 32a. Indonesia: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
3 default/restructuring
episodes (shaded)
100
"Hidden debts" on
the eve of Asian crisis
Years
Share of
private debt
1985-1994
14.2
1995
26.6
1997
34.8
Banking crises
(black bars)
90
80
70
60
50
1966, the
Year of Living
Dangerously
inflation
hits 940 %
40
30
20
10
1949, Independence
0
1911 1916 1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Sources: Creutzberg, P. (1976), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Indonesia, 1800-2009
(calculations since independence—1949--reported)
External
default
dates
1966-1970
1998-2000
2002
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
5
3
1
n.a.
1992
1997
Hyperinflation
dates
1966
Number of episodes:
3
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1961, 1963, 1968-1973, 1997-1998, 2000
Share of
years in
external
default
14.8
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
31.1
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1931(7.1)
1958(4.7)
1963(4.2)
1967(4.4)
1998(13.1)
1
Total
11
62
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 32b. Indonesia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
90
During 1997-1998, the
exchange rate collapsed by
about 235% against the
dollar; inflation spikded to
60 percent
80
70
60
50
First year of
the banking crisis
(black line); default (shaded)
40
The "twin crisis" was
followed by defaults
30
20
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
63
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 33a. Ireland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1929-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Household debt as a percent of GDP
120
100
80
100
60
40
2000
2002
2004
2006
80
2008
60
40
First year of
banking crisis
(black line)
Wartime
20
0
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: National Treasury Management Agency, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Ireland, 1919-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1836
1856
n.a.
2007
Number of episodes:
0
0
4
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
64
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1933(2.5)
1937(3.8)
1958(2.1)
2008(3.0)
2009(7.5)
0
Total
0
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 33b. Ireland Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
200
First year of
the banking
crisis
(black line)
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
65
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 34. Italy: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1861-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
180
First year of banking crisis
(black lines)
Wartime default (shaded)
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1861
1871
1881
1891
1901
1911
1921
1931
1941
1951
1961
1971
1981
1991
2001
Sources: Francese and Pace (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Italy, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1940-1946
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
7
n.a.
1866
1887
1891
1893
1907
1914
1921
1930
1935
1990
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
1944
Number of episodes:
1
0
11
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1974, 1977
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
66
Share of
years in
external
default
3.3
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
10.5
7 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1867(8.3)
1881(6.7)
1892(5.6)
1919(16.7)
1920(8.7)
1930(4.9)
2009(4.8)
0
Total
2
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 35a. Japan: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1885-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
200
Wartime 1942 default
(shaded) lasts a decade.
First year of banking crises
(black lines)
180
160
140
120
100
1945 Hyperinflation
80
1992
banking
crisis ushers
in lost
decade
60
40
20
0
1885
1895
1905
1915
1925
1935
1945
1955
1965
1975
1985
1995
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Japan, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1942-1952
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
11
1946-1948
1872
1882
1901
1907
1917
1923
1927
1992
Hyperinflation
dates
1945
Number of episodes:
1
1
8
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1962,1964
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
67
Share of
years in
external
default
5.2
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
11.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1896(5.5)
1899(7.4)
1920(6.2)
1930(7.3)
2009(5.0)
1
Total
2
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 35b. Japan Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
330
310
Spring and fall
2000
burst of IT bubble
290
270
250
230
210
190
First year of
the banking
crisis
(black line)
170
150
130
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
68
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 36. Kenya: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
140
120
100
80
Banking crises
(black lines)
60
40
Defaults
(shaded)
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Kenya, 1963-2009
External
default
Dates
1994-1998
2000-2001
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
5
2
n.a.
1985
1996
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
2
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985, 1988(2),
1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2003
Share of
years in
external
default
14.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
8.5
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1952(11.1)
1953(2.5)
1961(2.4)
0
Total
15
69
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 37. Korea: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and
Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
"Hidden debts" on
the eve of Asian crisis
Years
Share of
private debt
1985-1994
18
1995
19.9
1997
30.4
60
1998, near-default/bailout
episode (shaded)
Banking crises
(black bars)
50
40
30
Private external debt
as a % of GDP
30
1997-1998 banking
crisis
20
20
10
10
0
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998
0
1975
1970
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Korea, 1945-2009
External
default
dates
1997-1998
Duration
(in years)
2
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1983
1985
1997
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
3
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1965-1975, 1977, 1980-1981, 1983, 1985, 1997
Notes: Near default (italics) not counted in total.
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
70
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
15.4
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1920(12.3)
1922(7.1)
1939(10.4)
1951(7.7)
1998(6.9)
Total
17
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 37b. Korea Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
120
The Asian 1997-1998
banking cisis and "near"
default.
110
100
90
First year of
the banking
crises
(black lines)
80
70
60
50
40
30
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
71
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 38a. Malaysia: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default, and
Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
80
"Hidden debts" on
the eve of Asian crisis
Years
Share of
private debt
1985-1994
15.9
1995
32
1997
32.8
70
Banking crises
(black bars)
60
Public external
debt (solid)
50
40
30
20
10
Private external debt (dash)
0
1970
1974
1978
1982
1986
1990
1994
1998
2002
2006
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Malaysia, 1963-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
n.a.
1985
1997
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
0
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1912(7.2)
1925(12.4)
1938(4.9)
1951(5.5)
1998(7.4)
Total
0
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
72
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 38b. Malaysia Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
First year of
the banking crises
(black lines)
160
140
120
100
80
Domestic credit
aggregate expanded
coverage
60
40
20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
73
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 39. Mauritius: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
1997 banking crisis
Years
Share of
private debt
1982-1991
8
1992-1996
16.3
1997
13.5
1998-2002
6.4
70
60
50
40
30
1997 banking crisis
(black line)
20
10
0
1975
1970
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mauritius, 1968-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
n.a.
1997
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1978-1981, 1983, 1985
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
11.9
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1964(6.9)
1968(6.9)
1980(10.1)
0
Total
6
74
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 40a. Mexico: Public Foreign Bond Issues, Default, and Banking Crises, 1824-1910
(Billions of US dollars, three-year sum)
180
1
The first 6 of 8 default
episodes (shaded)
0 .9
160
0 .8
140
0 .7
120
0 .6
100
0 .5
Banking crises, 1883, 1907,
and 1913 (black lines)
0 .4
80
60
0 .3
40
0 .2
20
0 .1
0
0
1823
1833
1843
1853
1863
1873
1883
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
75
1893
1903
1913
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 40b. Mexico: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1872-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
500
1994-1995 "near-default"
Tesobono crisis
Year
Share of
Short-term debt
1992
43.7
1993
58.6
1994
72.8
Banking crises
(black lines)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
1982, The last of 8 default
episodes (shaded)
100
50
0
1872
1882
1892
1902
1912
1922
1932
1942
1952
1962
1972
1982
1992
2002
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Mexico, 1821-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1828-1830
3
1850
1883
1833-1841
1
1928-1932
1907
1844-1850
7
1982
1913
1854-1864
11
1920
1866-1885
20
1929
1914-1922
9
1981
1928-1942
15
1994
1982-1990
9
Number of episodes:
8
3
7
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1954, 1959, 1961, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1995,
1999
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
76
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
43.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
11.1
6 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1902(7.1)
1930(6.3)
1932(15.0)
1983(4.3)
1995(6.2)
2009(6.7)
0
Total
9
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 41. Morocco: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
140
Morocco's first default was 1903-1904
120
1983 was a default and a
banking crisis
(black line)
100
80
60
40
Defaults
(shaded)
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Morocco, 1956-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1903-1904
2
n.a.
1983
1983
1
1986-1990
5
Number of episodes:
3
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1959, 1965-1969, 1971, 1980-1983, 1985-1986,
1988, 1990, 1992
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
11.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0.0
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1981(2.8)
1992(4.0)
1995(6.6)
0
Total
16
77
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 42. Myanmar: External (public plus private)
Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
250
Single default
episode (shaded)
200
150
100
50
Banking crisis
(black bar)
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs : Myanmar, 1948-2009
External
default
dates
1997-2009
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
13
1984
1987
1996
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
2
4
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1969, 1973-1974, 1977-1978, 1981
Share of
years in
external
default
21.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
37.1
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1954(6.2)
1966(4.2)
1987(4.0)
1988(11.4)
0
Total
6
78
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 43. Netherlands: General Government (domestic plus external)
and Banking Crises, 1812-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Household debt as a percent of GDP
130
110
90
70
50
End of French rule
and wartime default (shaded)
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
300
250
200
150
100
First year of banking
crisis
(black lines)
50
0
1812 1822 1832 1842 1852 1862 1872 1882 1892 1902 1912 1922 1932 1942 1952 1962 1972 1982 1992 2002
Sources: Bos (2007), CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009)
and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Netherlands, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1802-1814
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
13
1802-1814
1819
1897
1914
1921
1939
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
1
6
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1957
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
79
Share of
years in
external
default
6.2
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1830(3.5)
1896(3.8)
1931(6.1)
2009(4.0)
0
Total
1
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 44a. New Zealand Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and Banking Crises,
1860-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
250
Between 1914 and 1929 the share of domestic
debt rose from less than 20% to about 50%
Household Debt as a Percent of GDP
First year of
banking
crises
(black lines)
Wartime
110
90
70
50
1995
1999
2003
200
150
2007
100
The 1892-1893 crisis was
common to Australia and New
Zealand
50
0
1860
1870
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: New Zealand, 1907-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
n.a.
1893
1987
Hyperinflation
dates
Number of episodes:
0
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1967
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1876(11.6)
1908(6.9)
1931(8.5)
1948(9.9)
1951(7.6)
0
Total
1
80
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 44b. New Zealand: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1905
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
140
1891-1893 crisis-Barings aftermath
Year Private as a
% of total
1886
16.9
1887
34.8
1891
17.9
1892
12.8
Banking crisis
(black line)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1865 1867 1869 1871 1873 1875 1877 1879 1881 1883 1885 1887 1889 1891 1893 1895 1897 1899 1901 1903
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
81
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 45. Nicaragua: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt and
Default, Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
4500
Runup to 1932 default
Share of
Year
short-term debt
1925
8.8
1927
60.6
1929
89.6
1931
93.3
First year of
banking crisis
(black line)
1985-1990 Hyperinflation
Year
3500
Inflation
571.4
885.2
13109.5
4775.2
7428.7
3004.1
3000
There is no private domestic
or external debt; the domestic public
debt market disappears
(no data 1950s-1960s)
1000
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
Peak debt-to-exports is
524% in 1932
4000
2500
2000
1500
500
0
1914
1924
1934
1944
1954
1964
1974
1984
1994
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1950, hence, we scale debt by exports.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nicaragua, 1838-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1828-1874
1894-1895
47
2
1985-1990
1987
2000
1911-1912
1915-1917
1932-1937
1979-2009
2
3
6
31
Hyperinflation
dates
1985-1990
Number of episodes:
6
1
2
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1956-1958, 1960, 1963-1964, 1968-1970, 1972, 1979, 1991,
1994, 1998, 2002
82
Share of
years in
external
default
47.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
12.2
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1930(19.2)
1936 (20.4)
1978(7.9)
1979(26.6)
1988(12.4)
Total
15
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 46. Nigeria: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
180
160
Banking crises
(black bars)
Fleeting default
on an oil
warrant
140
120
100
80
60
2004-2005 was the
last of 5 default
episodes.
40
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Nigeria, 1960-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1982-1992
11
n.a.
1992
1986-1988
3
1995
1992
1
2001
1
2004-2005
2
Number of episodes:
5
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1987, 1989, 1991, 2000
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
28.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
24.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1967(15.5)
1978(5.9)
1983(5.1)
1986(8.8)
1987(10.8)
0
Total
4
83
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 47a. Norway: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
70
60
50
40
30
20
First year of banking crises
(black lines)
10
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Norway, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
n.a.
1898
1921
1931
1936
1987
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
5
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5.2
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1831(7.0)
1848(4.7)
1921(9.7)
1931(7.8)
0
Total
0
84
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 47b. Norway: Domestic Private Credit, 1900-2004
(Amount outstanding at year-end as a percent of GDP)
180
160
140
120
100
First year of banking
crises
(black lines)
80
60
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Eitrheim, Ø., K. Gerdrup and J.T. Klovland (2004), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited
therein.
85
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 48. Panama: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1914-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
120
1988-1989-US trade
sanctions; freezing of assets
in US; bank runs and bank
holiday; defaults on demestic
debts (darker shading)
external default episodes
(shaded)
100
80
60
40
There were no
external
debts
20
Banking crisis
(black line)
0
1923
1933
1943
1953
1963
1973
1983
1993
2003
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Notes: No GDP data is available prior to 1945, hence, we scale debt by exports and adjust it by the ratio of
exports to GDP to splice the pre-World War II series.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Panama, 1903-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1932-1946
15
1988-1989
1988
1983-1996
14
1987-1994
Number of episodes:
3
1
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1965, 1968-1975, 1977-1980, 1982-1983, 1985,
1992, 1995, 1997, 2000
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
27.1
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1948(5.9)
1983(4.5)
1988(13.5)
0
Total
20
Notes: The 1987-1994 default is on bonds, while the 1983-1996 episode is on bank loans.
86
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 49. Paraguay: External (public plus private) Debt, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
80
2002 banking crisis; 2003
7th default episode
70
60
50
40
30
20
Banking crises
(black bars)
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Paraguay, 1811-2009
External
default
dates
1874-1885
1892-1895
1920-1924
1932-1944
1968-1969
1986-1992
2003-2004
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
12
4
5
13
2
7
2
n.a.
1890
1997
2002
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
7
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1957-1961, 1964, 1966, 1968-1969, 2003
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
87
Share of
years in
external
default
22.6
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
11.1
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1940(5.3)
1947(13.1)
1983(3.0)
2009(4.5)
0
Total
10
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 50a. Peru: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1917-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
100
1988-1990
hyperinflation
1983, The last of 8 default
episodes (shaded)
90
80
70
60
50
Banking crises (black lines)
40
30
20
10
0
1917
1927
1937
1947
1957
1967
1977
1987
1997
2007
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Peru1821-2009
External
default
dates
1826-1848
1876-1889
1931-1951
1969-1969
1976
1978
1980
1984-1997
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
23
14
21
2
1
1
1
14
1931-1938
1985-1987
1872
1983
1999
Hyperinflation
dates
1988-1990
Number of episodes:
8
2
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1954, 1958-1968, 1970, 1977-1979, 1982, 1984,
1993, 1996, 1999, 2001-2002, 2004
Share of
years in
external
default
40.2
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
13.2
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1930(11.5)
1931(8.1)
1983(9.3)
1988(9.4)
1989(13.4)
1
Total number of years
24
88
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 50b. Peru: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1905
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
1400
1200
1000
800
Banking crises
(black lines);
default (shaded)
600
400
200
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
89
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 51a. Philippines: External Private and Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1948-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
80
1983 is the single default
episode (shaded)
70
60
50
Baking crises
(black lines)
40
30
Domestic plus externa public
debt (solid)
20
Private external
debt (dash)
10
0
1948
1958
1968
1978
1988
1998
2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Philippines, 1946-2009
External
default
dates
1983-1992
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
10
n.a.
1981
1997
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
0
2
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2007
Dates of programs
1962-1968, 1970-1976, 1979-1980, 1983-1984,
1986, 1989, 1991, 1994, 1998
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
90
Share of
years in
external
default
18.8
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
6.3
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1904(13.9)
1923(6.1)
1935(6.8)
1984(7.5)
1985(7.5)
Total
23
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 51b. Philippines Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default
and Banking Crises, 1980-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
1991, the first year
of
the banking crises
(black lines)
20
10
1984
1989
1994
1999
2004
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
91
2009
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 52a. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
and Banking Crises, 1917-1947
(debt as a percent of GDP)
700
1919-1923 Hyperinflation
Total
Share of
debt
short-term
1919
9,988
77.1
1920
70,741
87.5
1921
252,705
94.0
1922
744,836
97.3
1923 111,509,994
100.0
Depression and wartime
defaults (shaded)
600
500
400
300
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
200
100
0
1917
1922
1927
1932
1937
1942
1947
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation and IMF Programs:
Poland, 1918-2009
External
default
dates
1936-1937
1940-1952
1981-1994
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
2
13
14
n.a.
1931
1934
1991
Hyperinflation
dates
1919-1923
1990
Number of episodes:
3
0
3
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1990-1991, 1993-1994
Share of
years in
external
default
31.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
18.5
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1980(-6.0)
1981(10.0)
1990(7.2)
1991(7.0)
1
Total number of years
4
92
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 52b. Poland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation
and Banking Crises, 1984-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
Banking crisis
(black bars)
Hidden debts?
Share of
Year
private debt
1992
0.8
1996
3.7
1998
25
2007
46.8
80
70
60
50
1990
Hyperinflation
40
The last of 3 defaults
(shaded)
30
20
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
93
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 53. Portugal: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1851-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
Household debt as a percent of GDP
1892, the last of 6 default
episodes (shaded)
100
80
60
40
20
1995
1999
2003
80
70
60
2007
50
40
30
1890, 1923, 1931
the first year of
banking crises
(black lines)
20
10
0
1851 1861 1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Sources: OECD, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Portugal, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1828
1837-1841
1850-1856
1892-1901
Duration
(in
years)
1
5
7
10
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1828
1846
1890
1920
1923
1931
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
4
0
6
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1977, 1978, 1983
Share of
years in
external
default
11.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
9.5
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1918(5.1)
1928(9.7)
1935(5.3)
1936(7.6)
1940(6.5)
0
Total number of years
3
94
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 54. Romania: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
180
Hidden debts?
Years
Share of
private debt
1996-2000
23.6
2001-2005
38.2
2007
46.4
160
140
Banking crisis
(black bar)
120
100
1981 is the second of
three defaults
(shaded)
80
60
40
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses and IMF Programs: Romania, 1878-2009
External
default
dates
1933-1958
1981-1983
1986
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
26
4
1
1933-1958
1931
1990
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
3
1
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1975, 1977, 1981, 1991-1992, 1994, 1997, 1999,
2001, 2004, 2009
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
95
Share of
years in
external
default
22.6
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
9.8
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1989(5.8)
1990(5.6)
1991(12.9)
1997(6.1)
2009(7.2)
0
Total number of years
10
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 55a. Russia: Public Foreign Bond Issues and Default, 1815-1945
(as a percent of exports)
1
300
The first 3 of 5
defaults (shaded);
0.9
250
first year of banking
crises black lines
0.8
1918-1924
Hyperinflation
0.7
200
0.6
1917-1918, domestic debts
were also repudiated
150
0.5
0.4
100
0.3
0.2
50
0.1
0
0
1815 1825 1835
1845 1855 1865 1875
1885 1895
1905 1915
1925 1935
1945
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, Hyperinflation, and IMF Programs:
Russia 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1839
1885
1918-1986
1991-1997
1998-2000
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1
1
69
7
3
1917-1918
1947
1957
1998-1999
1862
1875
1896
1995
1998
2008
Hyperinflation
dates
1918-1924
1993
Number of episodes:
5
4
6
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1992, 1995-1996, 1999
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
96
Share of
years in
external
default
38.8
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
13.8
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1992(14.5)
1993(8.7)
1994(12.7)
1998(5.3)
2009(7.9)
2
Total number of years
4
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 55b. Russia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Hyperinflation,
and Banking Crises, 1985-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
100
Banking crises
(black bars). 1998-banking
and renewed default
90
80
70
60
1993
Hyperinflation
50
40
30
20
The last two of 5 defaults
(shaded)
10
0
1985
1987
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
97
2001
2003
2005
2007
2009
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 56. Singapore: Central Government (domestic and external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1969-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
110
The Asian
1997-1998 crisis
(shaded)
100
90
80
70
60
50
First year of
banking crisis
(black line)
40
30
1969
1974
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
2004
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Since the mid-1990s all public debts of the central government are domestic.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Singapore, 1965-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
n.a.
1982
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
2.2
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1964(3.5)
2001(2.4)
2009(2.0)
0
Total number of years
0
98
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 57a. South Africa: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1911-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
120
1985-1987, multilateral trade sanctions
and first two default episodes
(shaded)
100
1989, banking
crisis and
last default
80
60
40
Banking crises (black lines)
20
0
1911
1921
1931
1941
1951
1961
1971
1981
1991
2001
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: South Africa, 1800-2009
(calculations since independence—1910--reported)
External
default
dates
1985-1987
1989
1993
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
3
1
1
n.a.
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1865
1877
1890
1977
Number of episodes:
1989
3
0
4
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1958, 1961, 1976(2), 1982-1983
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
99
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
5.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
1.0
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1983(1.8)
1992(2.1)
2009(1.8)
0
Total number of years
6
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 57b.South Africa: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1895
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
1890 Barings crisis
Year Private as a
% of total
1888
70.2
1889
84.8
1890
80.3
1891
40.0
300
250
200
Banking crises
(black lines)
150
100
50
0
1865
1867
1869
1871
1873
1875
1877
1879
1881
1883
1885
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
100
1887
1889
1891
1893
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58a. Spain: Short-term Loans to the Crown and Defaults, 1601-1679
(Billions of ducats, three-year sum)
35
1
0 .9
30
0 .8
0 .7
3 of a total of 13
defaults (shaded)
25
0 .6
20
0 .5
15
0 .4
0 .3
10
0 .2
5
0 .1
0
0
1600
1610
1620
1630
1640
1650
1660
1670
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Domestic and External Default, Banking Crises, and Hyperinflation: Spain, 1550-1799
External
default
dates
Duration
(in
years)
1557-1560
4
1575-1577
3
1596-1597
2
1607
1
1627
1
1647
1
Number of episodes:
6
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1557-1560
1575-1577
1596-1597
n.a.
n.a.
3
0
0
101
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58b. Spain: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1850-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
1877, the last of 13 defaults
(shaded) since 1557
180
160
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
1920, 1931,1977, and 2008
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Spain, 1800-2009
External
default
Dates
Duration
(in
years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1809
1
1936-1939
1814
1820
1
1829
1831-1834
4
1846
1837-1867
31
1920
1851
1931
1877-1882
7
1977
Number of episodes:
2008
6
0
6
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1959, 1960, 1978
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
23.8
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.8
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1868(10.1)
1874(8.4)
1896(8.0)
1936(22.3)
1937(8.3)
0
Total number of years
3
102
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58c.Spain: Total (public and private) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
9
The last of 13
sovereign
defaults that
began in 1557
(shaded)
8
7
6
5
From 1875 onwards all capital flows are private
4
3
2
1
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
103
1905
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 58d. Spain Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP, 4-quarter moving average)
210
First year of
the banking crises
(black lines)
190
170
150
130
110
90
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
Notes: For periods where no quarterly nominal GDP is available, a moving-average interpolation method is
used.
104
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 59. Sri Lanka: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1950-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
180
160
Two default episodes
(shaded)
140
120
100
80
60
40
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
20
0
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sri Lanka, 1948-2009
External
default
dates
1979
1981-1983
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1
3
1996
1989
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
2
1
1
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1965-1966, 1968-1969, 1971, 1974, 1977, 1979, 1983, 1988,
1991, 2001, 2003(2)
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
105
Share of
years in
external
default
6.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
3.2
4 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1918(-6.5)
1930(4.0)
1935(5.2)
1944(5.5)
Total number of years
14
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 60a. Sweden: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1719-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
1811, Sweden's only default
episode (shaded);
unclear whether it involved
external debts
80
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Three-year inflation reaches 258 %the highest this 300 year-period
1719
1739
1759
1779
1799
1819
0
1839
1859
1879
1899
1919
1939
1959
1979
1999
Sources: Fregert, K och R. Gustafsson, (2008), "Fiscal Statistics for Sweden 1719-2003", Research in
Economic History, volume 25, 137-191, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: Prices are far more volatile during pre-World War II. For this reason, and owing to the fact that
deflation is about as likely as inflation prior to the rise of fiat money, we also examine the evolution of
(smoother) three year changes in the price level.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Sweden, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
1811
Duration
(in
years)
1
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
n.a.
1811
1876
1897
1907
1922
1931
1991
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
0
6
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Share of
years in
external
default
0.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
1.9
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1826(8.9)
1838(5.7)
1861(5.7)
1921(3.7)
2009(4.2)
0
Total number of years
0
106
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 60b. Sweden Banking Survey: Domestic Credit, Default
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
Domestic credit aggregate expanded
coverage, 2002-2009
135
75
125
70
115
105
65
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
60
55
50
First year of
the banking crisis
(black line)
45
40
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
107
2000
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 61. Switzerland: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt
and Banking Crises, 1880-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
First year of
banking crises
(black line)
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1880
1890
1900
1910
1920
1930
1940
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Switzerland, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
n.a.
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
1870
n.a.
1910
1921
1931
Number of episodes:
1933
0
0
5
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
None
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Sources: Pre-WWII real GDP, Bassino and van del Eng, (2006).
108
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1854(11.1)
1860(13.0)
1867(12.1)
1877(9.7)
1975(7.3)
Total number of years
0
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 62a. Thailand: Public (domestic and external) and External (public and private) Debts,
“Near-default”, and Banking Crises, 1913-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
350
1997-1998
"Near
default"
(shaded)
300
250
Public and private
external debts (dash)
200
150
100
50
Banking crises
(black lines)
Public (domestic and external debt)
0
1913 1918 1923 1928 1933 1938 1943 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003 2008
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Thailand, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in
years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1997-1998
“near” 2
n.a.
1983
1996
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
0
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1978, 1981-1982, 1985, 1997
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
109
0
Share of
years in
external
default
0.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
9.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1919(4.2)
1942(9.0)
1945(6.8)
1998(10.5)
2009(2.3)
Total number
5
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 62b. Thailand Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
200
180
First year of
the banking crisis
(black line)
160
140
120
100
80
60
Currency collapse, recession
and "near default"
40
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
110
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 63. Tunisia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
80
Last of 5
defaults
(shaded)
70
60
50
1991was the first year of
a banking crisis
(black line) which lasted
5 years
40
30
20
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Tunisia, 1956-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1867-1870
4
n.a.
1991
1956
1
1958
1
1963
1
1979-1982
4
Number of episodes:
5
0
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1964-1967, 1969-1970, 1986, 1988
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
13.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
0.0
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1955(5.1)
1957(4.1)
1959(4.2)
0
Total number
8
111
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 64a. Turkey: External Public Debt, Default, and Banking Crises 1854-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
1200
8 default/restructuring
episodes (shaded)
1000
2000-2001 banking crisis
and "Near" default
800
600
400
Banking crises
(black lines)
200
0
1854 1864 1874 1884 1894 1904 1914 1923 1933 1943 1953 1963 1973 1983 1993 2003
Sources: Pamuk (1995), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs: Turkey, 1800-2009
(calculations since independence—1923--reported)
External
default
dates
1876-1881
1915-1928
1931-1932
1940-1943
1959
1965
1978-1979
1982
2000-2001
“near”
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
6
14
2
4
1
1
2
1
2
n.a.
1931
1982
1991
2000
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
8
0
4
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1961-1970, 1978-1980, 1983-1984, 1994, 1999, 2002
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
112
Share of
years in
external
default
19.5
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
35.6
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1927(9.1)
1932(6.0)
1994(5.5)
2001(5.7)
2009(5.6)
0
Total number
18
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 64b. Turkey: External Public and Private Debts, Default, Near-default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
70
2000-2001,"Neardefault"
(shaded)
Banking crises
(black bars)
60
50
40
Publlic and
private (solid)
30
1982 was both a default
and banking crisis. The
last of 6 default episodes
20
Private external
debt (dash)
10
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
113
1995
2000
2005
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 65a. United Kingdom: Central Government Debt, Restructurings,
and Banking Crises, 1692-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
In 1932, World War I
debts are restructured.
300
250
First year of
banking crisis
(black lines)
200
150
100
50
Debt restructuring (shaded)
0
1706 1721 1736 1751 1766 1781 1796 1811 1826 1841 1856 1871 1886 1901 1916 1931 1946 1961 1976 1991 2006
Sources: UKpublicspending, (2010), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:
United Kingdom, 1800-2009
External
default
dates
n.a..
Duration
(in
years)
n.a.
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
1822
1834
1888-1889
1932
1810
1815
1825
1837
1847
1857
1866
1878
1890
1974
1984
2007
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
0
4
12
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1956-1958, 1961-1964, 1967, 1969, 1975, 1977
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
Notes: Summary of private forecasts for 2009 in italics.
114
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
2.4
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1919(10.9)
1920(6.0)
1921(8.1)
1931(5.1)
2009(4.9)
0
Total
11
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 65b. United Kingdom Banking Survey: Domestic Credit and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
190
170
150
130
110
90
Coverage of domestic
credit series
expanded
70
50
30
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
115
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66a. United States: Central Government Debt, Default, and Banking Crises, 1790-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
1873-1884, 10 states in
default (shaded)
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
Debt
restructuring
9
states
in
default
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:
United States 1790-2009
External
default
dates
1790
Duration
(in
years)
1
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1790
1841-1842
1873-1884
1933
Share of
years in
external
default
n.a.
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
1.4
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)1
1908(10.8)
1914(7.7)
1930(8.6)
1932(13.1)
1946(10.1)
1814
n.a.
1818
1836
1841
1857
1861
1864
1873
1884
1890
1907
1914
1929
1984
Number of episodes:
2007
1
2
15
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
Total
1963-1964
2
Notes: The default of US states are not counted in the tally as the total number of episodes refers to
sovereign credit events only.
1
Excludes World Wars I and II.
116
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66b. United States: Private Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports)
30
Banking crises
(black lines)
25
20
15
10
5
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
117
1895
1900
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66c. United States: Private Debt Outstanding, 1916-2009
(end-of- period stock of debt as a percent of GDP)
300
1933, suspension of the Gold Clause
default (shaded)
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1916
1926
1936
1946
1956
1966
1976
1986
1996
2006
Notes: Data for 2009 is end-of-June. The Flow of Funds is reported for 1945-2009; prior to that the
Historical Statistics of the United States series is scaled (down) to match the Flow of Funds data.
Sources: Historical Statistics of the United States, Flow of Funds, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve, International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, OECD, World Bank, Global
Development Finance, and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) and sources cited therein.
118
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 66d. United States Banking Survey: Domestic Credit
and Banking Crises, 1970-2008
(credit outstanding at end-of-period as a percent of GDP)
250
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
Spring and fall 2000,
burst of IT bubble
230
210
190
170
150
130
110
Savings and loan decade-long episode
90
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and
sources cited therein.
119
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 67a. Uruguay: Public (domestic plus external) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
and Banking Crises, 1871-2009
(debt as a percent of exports)
"Hidden debts" on the
eve of default-2003
Year
Share of
private debt
1991-2000
3.9
2001
6.9
2002
21.6
600
500
400
300
200
First year of
banking crises
(black lines)
2003, The last of 9
default
episodes (shaded)
100
0
1871 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Notes: For the period 1871-1914 only external debt data is available. Domestic debts (only a few
observations are available) was negligible during this period.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:
Uruguay, 1811-2009
External
default
dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1876-1878
3
1932-1937
1893
n.a.
1891
1
1898
1915-1921
7
1971
1932-1938
7
1981
1965
1
2002
1983-1985
3
1987
1
1990-1991
2
2003
1
Number of episodes:
9
1
5
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1961-1962, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, 1975-1977, 1979-1981,
1983, 1985, 1990, 1992, 1997, 1999-2002
120
Share of
years in
external
default
13.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
18.0
6 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1905(10.1)
1914(16.7)
1920(12.8)
1931(17.3)
1933(12.5)
1982(9.3)
Total
21
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 67b. Uruguay: Total (private and public) Capital Inflows from the United Kingdom and
Default, and Banking Crises, 1865-1914
(capital flows as a percent of exports, three-year sum)
500
450
400
350
300
Banking crises
(black lines)
Default
(shaded)
250
200
150
100
50
0
1865
1870
1875
1880
1885
1890
1895
1900
1905
Sources: Stone (1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
121
1910
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 68. Venezuela: Central Government (domestic plus external) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1921-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
90
2004 is the last of 10 default
episodes (shaded)
80
70
60
Banking crises
(black lines)
50
40
30
By 1930 Venezuela had paid off all its external debts .
20
10
0
1921 1926 1931 1936 1941 1946 1951 1956 1961 1966 1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:
Venezuela, 1829-2009
External
default
Dates
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
Hyperinflation
dates
1826-1840
15
1995-1997
1978
1848-1859
12
1998
1993
1860-1862
3
1865-1881
17
1892
1
1898-1905
8
1983-1988
6
1990
1
1995-1997
3
2004-2005
2
Number of episodes:
10
2
2
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1960, 1989, 1996
n.a.
Share of
years in
external
default
35.9
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
11.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1914(12.6)
1931(19.2)
1942(12.6)
1989(8.6)
2002(8.9)
0
Total number
3
122
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 69. Zambia: External (public plus private) Debt, Default,
and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
450
Defaults
(shaded)
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
Banking crisis
(black line)
50
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, and IMF Programs:
Zambia, 1964-2009
External
default
dates
1983-1994
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
12
n.a.
1995
Hyperinflation
dates
n.a.
Number of episodes:
1
0
1
0
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983-1984, 1986, 1995(2), 1999, 2004,
2008
123
Share of
years in
external
default
24.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
40.0
3 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1966(5.5)
1977(4.9)
1994(13.3)
Total
12
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
Figure 70. Zimbabwe: External (public plus private) Debt, Default, Restructuring,
Hyperinflation, and Banking Crises, 1970-2009
(debt as a percent of GDP)
Highest Monthly Inflation Rates in History
Country
Month with
Highest monthly
Equivalent
Time required
highest rate
inflation rate
daily rate
for prices to double
Hungary
16984.00 1.30 x 1016%
1.95 15.6 hours
Zimbabwe
39753.00
796000000.00
0.98 24.7 hours
Yugoslavia
34335.00
3130000.00
0.65 1.4 days
8675.00
295.00
0.21 3.7 days
Greece
16377.00
113.00
0.17 4.5 days
China
18019.00
42.10
0.13 5.6 days
Germany
140
Ongoing banking
crisis (black line)
since 1995
120
100
80
60
40
Prior default, 1965-1974
Defaults
(shaded); latest is ongoing
20
0
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Sources: Hanke (2008), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and sources cited therein.
Default, Banking Crises, Growth Collapses, IMF Programs and Hyperinflation:
Zimbabwe, 1965-2009
External
default
dates
1965-1974
2000-2009
Duration
(in years)
Domestic
default
dates
Banking
crisis dates
(first year)
10
10
2006
1995
Hyperinflation
dates
2006-2009
Number of episodes:
2
1
1
Memorandum item on IMF programs, 1952-2009
Dates of programs
1981, 1983, 1992 (3), 1998, 1999
1
Share of
years in
external
default
40.0
Share of
years in
inflation
crisis
40.0
5 worst
output
collapses
year(decline)
1977(8.0)
1992(8.4)
2000(7.3)
2003(10.4)
2008(14.1)
Total
7
124
C.M. Reinhart
Chartbook 2010
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