CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS OF EVALUATION
A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
Community/Clinical Psychology
by
Francine Bravo Crowley
May 1985
The Thesis of Francine Bravo Crowley is approved:
Karla Butler Chair
C-alifornia State University, Northridge
ii
DEDICATION
For Dieter:
Whose faith and confidence provided me with the strength to
accomplish my goal.
iii
Q
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
My sincere thanks and appreciation to Robert Dear for his
guidance and help on this research.
Special thanks to Karla Butler and Ben Mehlman for their time,
encouragement and support.
Special thanks to Jim Fleming for his assistance with the
computer analyses.
iv
'
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ii
Approval
Dedication
iii
Acknowledgements
iv
Table of Contents
v
Abstract
....................................................
vi
Introduction
1
Past Research
3
Current Research
5
Standards of Evaluation
10
Present Study
11
Method ••••••••
12
Subjects ................ .
12
Materials
13
Procedure
13
Performance Attribution
14
Independent Measure
15
Dependent Measure
16
16
Results
Table 1. 0
17
Table 2.0
18
Discussion
18
References
22
Appendices
27
Self-consciousness Scale
28
Attribution Assessment Scale
30
Results of evaluation of assumptions
31
v
ABSTRACT
SELF-AWARENESS AND STANDARDS OF EVALUATION
by
Francine Bravo Crowley
Master of Arts in Psychology
Subjects attempted to solve a series of puzzles in a study which
ostensibly measured performance under conditions of distraction.
The
stimuli used to induce self-awareness were actually manipulations of
self-awareness.
Subjects seated in front of a small mirror and exposed
to a tape recording of their own voices constituted the high self-aware
conditions.
Those subjects seated in front of a nonreflecting surface
and exposed to a tape recording of another participant's voice comprised
the low self-aware conditions.
was manipulated.
In addition, performance attribution
Half of the subjects were led to believe that success
on the task was due to ''ability", and half of the subjects were told
success was due to ''luck".
Several of the puzzles were in fact insoluble;
therefore successful completion was possible only by cheating on the
task.
All subjects were given the opportunity to cheat without fear of
being detected. It was predicted that cheating would be more frequent
in the ability conditions than in the luck conditions, and that this
effect would be more evident in the high self-aware than the low
vi
self-aware groups.
Further, a self-consciousness scale was administered
which yields two related, but distinct measures of self-consciousness-public and private (Fenigstein et al, 1975).
In the low self-aware
conditions, the focus of the subjects' attention was not manipulated;
therefore it was possible to examine whether there was a relationship
between dispositional public self-consciousness and the incidence of
cheating--independent of the self-awareness manipulations.
were in line with the predictions.
The results
Responses of high self-aware subjects
indicated that self-awareness inhibited cheating behavior under the
luck conditions, but augmented it under the ability conditions.
Discussion centers on the theoretical implications of these findings.
vii
INTRODUCTION
The theory of "objective self-awareness" was formulated on the
basis of a distinction drawn between two forms of conscious attention
(Duval and Wicklund, 1972).
When an individual's attention is focused
outward on the environment, he or she is said to be in a state of
"subjective self-awareness" (SSA).
Conversely, when the individual's
attention is turned inward toward the self, he or she is in the state
of "objective self-awareness" (OSA).
In 1934, Mead pointed out that the uniqueness of the self lies
in its ability to become an object unto itself, whereas no other
organism shares this potential.
Mead stated that the self is the
''subject" of consciousness when the individual's attention is focused on
objects in the environment. However when the individual gets outside
him/her self, by taking the point of view of the other, he/she becomes
an "object" unto themselves (Mead, 1934).
The distinction made between these two forms of conscious
attention is necessary in order to further understand phenomena in terms
of the self-evaluative behaviors which are said to result when an
individual is confronted with self-focusing stimuli.
One of the primary
assumptions of objective self-awareness theory is that the focus of
one's attention cannot be both objective and subjective at the same
moment.
That is, these two states can be described as mutually
exclusive (Duval and Wicklund, 1972).
Mason holds a similar point of
view, " ••• when one channels concentration of awareness in one direction
or area of experience, there is generally only a vague awareness
pf pther areas of experience ••• "
(Mason, 1961, p.27).
1
2
In a similar manner, Polanyi stated, " ••• our attention can hold only
one focus at a time ••• " (Polanyi, 1958, p. 57).
Thus, it appears that
the focus of an individual's attention shifts back and forth between
varying aspects of the self and the environment.
It is important to
note that the dichotomy made between the self and environmental focus
is an imperfect one.
When attention is self-directed it can take as its
focus either internal perceptual events or observable overt behaviors. One
can probably envision many alternative reactions to self-awareness; for
example, an individual exposed to self-focusing stimuli may experience
an awareness of information gleaned from prior focus on his or her
environment (Carver, 1979).
A main assumption of objective self-awareness theory holds that
when a person is confronted with the self-aware state, he or she will
not react to him or her self in an impartial manner.
Rather, when the
person encounters another individual who he believes is aware of his
presence, the person will come to evaluate himself along dimensions
cued by the circumstances of the situation.
For example, in an
achievement setting, the salient self-evaluat1on standard would
involve a comparison of one's own performance to an ideal performance
standard.
Should this evaluation result in feelings of inadequacy for
the individual, then he or she will suffer from some degree of selfcriticism.
The comparative relationship between one's present
behavior and an ideal standard, has important regulatory consequences
on behavior.
There have been a multitude of experiments which have demonstrated
that self-focused attention is effective in bringing about a phenomenon
known as the "discrepancy reduction" process (Carver, 1975; Scheier,
Buss and Buss, 1978; Gibbons, 1978; Carver.and Scheier, 1981).
This
process is aimed at increasing the consistency between self-descriptions
and behavior, by causing the individual to behave more in accordance
with internal standards, morals, or whatever norm or standard of
behavior is salient.
Exactly which dimensions become critical, will be
determined by prior experiences or by the subjective importance assigned
to given traits or ideals.
In general, it can be said that there are
certain "ideal" traits or characteristics that almost anyone would desire,
such as beauty, creativity, intelligence, etc ••
In short, the theory
holds that self-focused attention promotes a tendency to compare one's
own behavior against a salient reference point, which in turn, results
in increased efforts to conform to that reference point.
Past Research
A major assumption of Duval and Wicklund's original theory (1972)
involved the presumption that a system of psychological "standards of
correctness" is possessed by every individual.
These researchers
defined a standard as:
"A mental representation of correct behavior, attitudes, and
traits (i.e., etiquette, suitable dinner conversation, or
protocol at a funeral).
It follows that the opportunity to
engage in self-evaluative behavior is also possible, given the
individual is in the objectively self-aware state" (Duval and
Wicklund, 1972, p. 4).
Another postulate of objective self-awareness theory assumes that
when a person is in the OSA state, this self-focused state will
invariably lead to a critical self-evaluation process.
Duval and Wicklund
argued that the OSA state was necessarily aversive because it involved
3
4
a comparison of self to ideal standards--standards that are seldom
atualized in reality.
Although Wicklund later modified his position to
account for those individuals who were able to meet or exceed their
aspirations, he believed that any positive affect associated with it
would be short-lived, as one's prior standards are quickly altered to
reflect the current behavioral accomplishments (Wicklund, 1975).
In
summary, the theory predicts that when an individual is confronted with
the self-aware state, he/she will make efforts to avoid those conditions
leading to further self-awareness.
If this is not possible, the
individual will make efforts to reduce any perceived "real-ideal"
discrepancy (this is accomplished almost invariably by altering his/her
behavior or attitudes, so as to be more in line with the norm).
In the objective self-awareness literature, these efforts have
been referred to as "discrepancy reduction" attempts (see e.g., Carver,
1975; Gibbons, 1978).
One issue that was overlooked by objective self-
awareness theory concerns the fact that a critical factor in bringing
about these avoidance attempts, is the person's beliefs about the
alterability of the perceived discrepancy.
Researchers have found
withdrawal from the self-focused state to occur only when the person
believes the discrepancy to be otherwise unalterable (Steenbarger and
Aderman, 1979; Carver et al, 1979).
Thus, only when the individual's
behavior cannot be modified so as to be more in accordance with internal
standards, will the self-focused state be perceived as aversive, and
subsequently avoided.
On many occasions researchers have discovered
that when an individual has prior doubts or suspicions about his/her
ability to alter the discrepancy, the discrepancy reduction process may
be prevented (Carver, 1979; Carver, Blaney, and Scheier, 1979a; 1979b;
(Carver and Scheier, 1982).
Current Research
Duval and Wicklund's theory has been criticized by many researchers
for failing to take into account the possibility that the individual
who is able to perform in accordance with internal standards will "seek
out" self-focusing stimuli (e.g., McDonald, 1980; Greenberg and
Musham, 1981).
The theory concentrates exclusively on the avoidance
factor without giving consideration to the possibility that the individual
who is able to exceed his/her aspirations will experience the positive
affect and subsequent "seeking out" behaviors that have been found to
be associated with it.
What these researchers were instrumental in
pointing out, was that the OSA state may lead to a negative selfevaluation (and accompanying negative affect), whenever the individual
becomes aware of a self-contradiction (e.g., between behavior and
attitudes), or when a discrepancy exists between real and ideal states.
Self-evaluation is not characteristic of SSA because a comparison between
self and standards of correctness does not occur.
Moreover, the theory
assumes that the subjectively self-aware individual, whose focus of
attention is on the environment, is more likely to experience a sense of
"mastery" over the environment because it is only in the objectively
self-aware state that the individual could conceive of him/her self as
falling short.of some ideal or standard.
Rotter made a similar
distinction in his control categories of "internal" and "external" locus
of control.
He discovered that when an individual engages in an activity
that is followed by a reward, if that individual does not feel he/she
was the sole cause of the occurrence of the reward, then he/she is said
to believe in "external'' control and such concepts as luck, fate, or
5
6
chance factors.
In contrast, the individual who believes in "internal
control" will attribute the reward to his/her own instrumental actions
and not to destiny or chance (Rotter, 1966).
As previously stated, it is necessary to assume the individual is
capable of experiencing both states of awareness.
be made of any theory involving the self.
This assumption must
The primary factors
determining which state the individual will assume, are governed by the
circumstances of the situation.
However it is possible. to manipulate
the individual's state of awareness.
For example, several researchers
have reported successfully inducing self-awareness through the use of
mirrors (Duval and Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975; Davis and Brock,
1975; Carver and Scheier, 1978).
Other reliable methods of inducing
self-awareness which have been reported in the literature include:
hearing a tape recording of one's voice; seeing oneself on camera,film
or video; instructions to self-reflect; or, being the center of attention
as is the case with an audience (Carver and Scheier, 1978; Buss, 1980;
Fenigstein and Levine, 1984).
Until recently the various methods of inducing self-awareness
have been used more or less interchangeably.
However, current research
is demonstrating that mirrors and audiences (two commonly used
manipulators of self-awareness) have different behavioral effects.
Buss
and other researchers have found the effects of mirrors to differ in a
very important way from audiences.
Specifically, mirrors focus attention
on the private aspects of the self, while audiences focus attention on
the observable/public aspects of the- self (Buss, 1980; Framing, Walker,
and Lopyan, 1982; Gibbons and Wright, 1983).
7
As Buss pointed out, his own "self-consciousness" theory differs
from "self-awareness" theory primarily in the different predictions
each would make if manipulations of self-awareness were varied.
In
discussing Duval and Wicklund's theory (which for the sake of brevity,
Buss referred to as, "Wicklund's self-awareness" theory), Buss stated:
"He does not distinguish between private and public manipulations;
he mentions only self-awareness manipulations.
Therefore, he
would predict the same results regardless of how self-awareness
was induced" (Buss, 1980, p. 98).
Many other extensions and revisions have been made to the original
theory proposed by Duval and Wicklund (1972).
One recent trend in the
literature concerns a change in the terminology.
The rather cumbrous
terms "objective self-awareness" and "subjective self-awareness" have
been replaced with the terms "high" and ''low" self-awareness, respectively,
to indicate the presence or absence of the self-aware state.
Recently Duval and Wicklund's theory has been referred to as
"self-awareness" theory in order to differentiate it from the more
current "self-consciousness" theory (Buss, 1980).
Self-consciousness
theory was a direct outgrowth of the vast research generated by Duval
and Wicklund's work.
What the self-consciousness research has added to
the literature is an examination of the relationship between both the
"state" and "trait" aspects of the concept.
The habitual tendency to
focus attention inward toward the self or outward toward the environment
is known as the trait of "self-consciousness''.
Alternatively, the state
of "self-awareness" refers to a transient condition of "self-reflexive"
consciousness.
It is in this self-reflexive state that the individual
becomes the object of his or her own attention (Fenigstein, Scheier
8
and Buss, 1978; Buss, 1980).
Individual differences in dispositional self-consciousness were
thought to have important implications for the previously reviewed
phenomena.
Therefore, Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) constructed
a scale designed to measure the personality characteristic of "selfconsciousness".
They discovered two related, yet distinct components
which they identified as "public" and "private" self-consciousness.
Both construct validity and discriminant validity have been established
for the subscales (Carver and Glass, 1976; Carver and Scheier, 1978;
Turner et al, 1978).
The private self-consciousness scale is comprised
of statements such as, "I reflect about myself a lot," or "I'm generally
attentive to my inner feelings," and was designed to measure the
tendency to be aware of the covert and personal aspects of the self.
The individual who is privately self-conscious is more cognizant of
his/her own feelings, moods and beliefs.
This individual is self-
reflective and tends to fantasize about him or her self.
The public domain, which was of primary interest in the present
study, includes all observable personal attributes and behaviors.
The
public self-consciousness scale is comprised of items such as, "I'm
concerned with what other people think of me," or "I usually worry about
making a good impression."
The publicly self-aware individual attends
to the same aspects of him/her self that any observer might examine or
scrutinize.
These individuals are concerned withhow their personal
appearances and behaviors are being perceived by others, as demonstrated
by a recent study by Tobey and Tunnell (1981).
Further, they have been
found to be more compliant than privately self-aware individuals, and to
9
adjust their attitudes and behaviors to be more in line with what they
anticipate the perceived expectancies of others to be (Scheier, 1980).
These findings are related to those of Cheek and Briggs (1982), who
found that publicly self-conscious individuals rated their "social
identities" as being more important to them than did individuals high in
private self-consciousness.
In the face of conflict, it is predicted
that dispositional public self-consciousness will lead the person to
try and establish a more favorable public image.
In the present study, subjects assigned to the low self-aware
conditions were not subjected to the self-awareness manipulations.
Thus, it was possible to examine whether differences in dispositional
self-consciousness were related to the incidence of cheating independent
of the self-awareness manipulations.
It was believed this examination
might prove useful as individual differences in private (but not public)
self-consciousness have led to behavioral effects duplicating those of
experimentally induced self-awareness in many different situations
(Brockner, 1979; Scheier and Carver, 1980; Carver and Scheier, 1981;
Framing, Walker and Lopyan, 1982). This line of thinking can be traced
to an earlier study carried out by Fenigstein et al, (1975). These
researchers reported: "We assume dispositional self-consciousness has
essentially the same impact on behavior as situational self-awareness."
In the
p~esent
investigation, it was predicted that in the low
self-aware conditions, the incidence of cheating would be positively
correlated with public self-consciousness.
This is because, as Buss
(1980) pointed out:
"If you are playing a role, public self-consciousness should
cause you to conform more to the role requirements.
If standards
of morality or performance are relevant, you should struggle
harder to meet such standards not only because you fear punishment,
but also because you do not want to be seen as deficient in
ability or morality" (Buss, 1980, p. 37).
Standards of Evaluation
Duval and Wicklund's theory was insufficient when it came to
specifying the source of evaluative standards, which the individual is
said to employ for purposes of self-evaluation.
Duval and Wicklund
suggested that the standards could be of several types, with internal
standards (e.g., a self-ideal) and external standards (e.g., a perception
of normative behavior) being common examples.
The majority of the
research reveals that standards usually pertain to morality and prosocial
behaviors (e.g., Carver, 1974; Diener and Wallbom, 1976; Wegner and
Schaefer, 1978).
Self-awareness theory supports the view that the
self-aware individual is more apt to engage in normative behavior than
is the non-self-aware individual.
It would not be surprising therefore,
for self-evaluation to involve an assessment of the self in comparison
to standards of morality.
Another broad source of evaluative standards can be defined as
those associated with competency.
Self-evaluation frequently results
in comparisons between one's own level of competency and societal
standards of, for example, intelligence and beauty. It is not difficult
to foresee circumstances in which the maintenance of a self-definition
of competency would be at direct odds with a self-definition of morality.
Thus, the present study sought to determine the conditions under which
one standard is more likely to influence behavior over another standard.
The work of Vallacher and Solodky (1979) was the first to examine the
10
{l
respective contributions of competency and morality based standards
under conditions of self-awareness.
They predicted a priori that in a
situation of conflicting standards, the prepotent standard would be the
one with the clearest implications for self-evaluation.
Present Study
The present study sought to replicate the findings of Vallacher
and Solodky's 1979 study, in which conflicting standards were induced
by making competency (success on a puzzle-solving task) impossible
without accompanying immoral behavior (cheating on the task).
That is,
moral behavior (in this case the inhibition of cheating) precluded the
demonstration of competency.
It is predicted that the individual will behave in accordance with
the standard that has the clearest implications for self-evaluation.
One factor which should have an influence upon the individual's decision
to cheat or not to cheat would be the attribution made for success or
failure (Weiner, 1974).
If performance outcome is due to luck or chance
factors, success would not bring about a positive evaluation with regard
to the competency standard; nor would lack of success necessarily
promote a negative self-evaluation.
However when performance outcome
is attributed to luck related factors, the morality standard is still
capable of inducing a positive self-image or evaluation.
Thus, when
performance outcomes are attributed to external factors, the morality
standard should become prepotent over the competency standard in the
evaluation process.
On the other hand, if ability is considered to be
responsible for one's performance outcome, the competency standard
should assume prepotency over the morality standard.
Assuming that
competency standards assume salience in this manner, it follows that
11
cheating would be the only means by which a favorable self-evaluation
could be secured.
In summary, the competency-based standard assumes
prepotence over the morality-based standard when performance outcome is
attributed to ability as opposed to luck or chance factors.
In the present investigation, the conflict between morality and
competency was directly manipulated.
Conditions of high and low self-
awareness were also manipulated and crossed factorially with performance
attribution.
With regard to the performance attribution, half of the
subjects were told success was due to luck, while the other subjects
were led to believe success was due to ability.
Since several of the
puzzles were insoluble, success was possible only by cheating on the
task.
Subjects were given the opportunity to digress from the rules
without fear of being detected.
It was predicted that this digression/
cheating would occur more often when performance outcome was attributed
to ability as opposed to luck, and that this effect would be more
apparent in the high self-aware than the low self-aware conditions.
Further, for the subjects in the low self-aware conditions, the
direction of their awareness was not subject to manipulation; therefore
it was possible to determine if there was a relationship between
public self-consciousness and the incidence of cheating--independent
of the self-awareness manipulations.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects in the experiment consisted of 64 undergraduate students
from California State University, Northridge, who participated in the
study in exchange for credits in their introductory psychology courses
and received no other compensation for their time.
12
There were 16
13
subjects per experimental condition, and subjects wer randomly assigned
to one of four conditions.
Materials
The stimuli used to induce self-awareness were (1) a small 12 x 18
inch mirror, and (2) a tape recording of the subject's own voice.
Those subjects in the low self-aware conditions were seated in front of
a poster with the same dimensions as those of the mirror, and listened
to a tape recording of another participant's voice.
All recordings were made using 60 second continuous tape loops.
Subjects in the high self-aware groups were instructed to record a
message which provided the following information about themselves:
first name, his/her hair and eye color, year in school, and major area
of study.
The remainder of the tape was filled in by having the
subjects recite the alphabet until signalled by the experimenter; at
which time the subject was to say, "Stop, your time is up, move on to
the next puzzle."
This tape then served as time marker to indicate
the time limit for each puzzle, as well as to serve as a distractor
during the experiment.
Procedure
Before beginning the actual experiment, subjects were reminded
that the purpose of the study was to examine performance under conditions
of distraction.
The performance aspect of the task involved working
on a series of geometric puzzles, which were similar to the ones used
by Srull and Karabenick (1975).
Subjects were told that the sources of
distraction would be the mirror (or poster), and a tape recording of
their own (or another participant's voice), which would play while they
attempted to solve the puzzles.
There were two example puzzles and ten
14
test puzzles.
Both of the example puzzles_were solvable, but only six
of the ten test puzzles could be solved.
Subjects were given explicit
instructions to follow in solving the puzzles.
They were told to
reproduce the lines of the puzzle drawing without lifting the pencil from
the paper, and without retracing any line.
Subjects were encouraged to
attempt as many solutions as the one minute time limit permitted.
If
the subject was able to solve the puzzle, he or she was to put an "X"
in the appropriately marked box indicating whether or not the puzzle
had been solved.
If the puzzle could not be solved, the subject was to
so indicate and move on to the next puzzle.
It was made clear to all
subjects that they were to work no longer than 60 seconds on each puzzle;
further, they were not to go on to the next puzzle until the tape told
them it was time to do so, nor were they to go back to an earlier puzzle
if they had extra time after any given puzzle.
After being given a
brief overview of the study, subjects filled out the self-consciousness
scale (Fenigstein et al, 1975).
Performance Attribution
Following administration of the self-consciousness scale, subjects
were given task instructions.
The experimenter provided a series of
verbal information that was intended to foster one of the following
beliefs:
(1) performance outcome would be due to luck or chance factors,
or (2) performance outcome would be due to ability-related factors.
Subjects in the ability conditions were told the puzzle-solving task
involved a number of basic skills:
visual motor coordination, quick
reaction time and abstract reasoning ability.
In addition, these subjects
were told that success on the task was indicative of one's level of
intellectual functioning.
For subjects in the luck conditions, the
15
experimenter pointed out that success was due to luck or chance factors,
and in no way reflected their degree of intellectual functioning.
Immediately following this manipulation, the experimenter worked
the two example puzzles for the subject.
In reproducing one of the
puzzles, the experimenter purposely retraced one of the lines and asked,
"Is there anything wrong with either of these?"
If the subject did not
point out the experimenter's mistake, it was reemphasized that there
was no retracing allowed.
The experimenter then proceeded to work the
puzzle correctly and said, "You see these two puzzles look exactly the
same, but only this one was solved correctly--without violating the
retracing rule."
In reality, the experimenter was attempting to convey
the nondetectibility of cheating on the task.
The experimenter then
provided the subject with the operating instructions for the tape loop,
and exited from the room for a ten minute period.
Independent Measures
Independent measures consisted of
(1) performance attribution
manipulation with two levels--ability and luck, and (2) self-awareness
manipulations, both mirror and self-recorded messages.
subject
Before the
began working on the test puzzles, he or she was reminded that
the purpose of the study was to examine performance under conditions of
distraction.
In the high self-aware conditions, subjects sat directly
in front of the mirror and listened to a tape recording recording of
their own voices while they attempted to solve the puzzles.
conditions, the recordings served multiple functions:
In these
heightener of
self-awareness, distractor during the testing, and time marker to
indicate the time limit for the task.
For subjects in the low self-
aware conditions, a poster was positioned directly in front of them,
and they were exposed to a tape recording of another participant's
voice while they worked on the puzzle-solving task.
Dependent Measure
The dependent measure was recorded as the number of times the
subject cheated (with a maximum of four times possible).
Only six
of the ten test puzzles were soluble, therefore an indication of "X",
as solved, on an insolvable puzzle, provided an unobtrusive measure
of cheating.
RESULTS
The use of quadratic regression imposed on a 2 x 2 factorial
design was employed for purposes of data analysis.
All analyses were
performed using SPSS canned computer programs (Nie et al, 1975).
The
dependent variable was examined under each combination of the independent
variables.
Public self-consciousness scores were transformed (squared>
in order to detect the possibility of a curvilinear relationship existing
between the transformed score and the frequency of cheating.
A square root transformation was performed on the dependent
variable in an attempt to make the assumption of homogeneity of variance
more plausible.
After the transformation, results of evaluations of
assumptions of linearity, homogeneity of variance, and homogeneity of
regression were all satisfactory (see Appendix for proofs).
It was predicted that the frequency of cheating would be a
function of performance attribution, and that this effect would be more
evident in the high self-aware than the low self-aware conditions.
results were in line with the predictions.
The
The responses of subjects
who were in the high self-aware conditions indicated that self-awareness
16
17
inhibited cheating behavior under the luck .conditions, but augmented
the cheating behavior under the ability conditions (see Table 1.0).
TABLE 1.0
*Frequency of Cheaters and Noncheaters as a Function of
Attribution Manipulation and Self-awareness
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H!
i~ ~~ lHlHlH~ H; HlH~ H~ H~ H~ ~n HmlHlHlH~ Hlii ~ HlH~ HlH; il iHlil; H~ H1li 1HW; Hn~ ~ ll jg ~ H~ Hl§~HE HlHlHi~ 1Hi ill Hi HlH~H ~ H1H~E lH; ln H~Hi HlHW~ ~1 1H~ HlHlil ~ H1H~ H~ l
*indicates the number of subjects who cheated on
at least one puzzle
The analysis of variance for the 2 x 2 quadratic regression
revealed significant main effects for:
(1) performance attribution,
F (1, 58)= 30.025, p<: .0001, and (2) self-awareness condition, F
( 1, 58)= 9. 250, p
< .004.
In addition, there -was a significant
attribution by self-awareness condition interaction, F (1, 58)= 13.372,
p
~
.001.
An examination of the public self-consciousness scores
failed to substantiate the predicted correlation between subjects high
in public self-consciousness (in the low self-aware conditions only),
and the frequency of cheating.
Displayed in Table 2.0 are the unstandardized regression coefficients
(B) and intercept, the standardized regression coefficients (BETAs),
2
and the squared semipartial correlations (sr. ).
l
The sr. 2 values were
l
calculated using an equation taken from Tabachnick and Fidell (1983):
sr.l
2
=
F.l
df
res
The squared semipartial correlation for the ith independent variable, is
calculated from the F. ratios printed in the SPSS output, in the area
l
designated, "VARIABLES IN THE EQUATION", the residual degrees of freedom
2
(df
) listed in the analysis of variance table, and R , which is labeled
res
"R SQUARE" in the output. Also displayed are the Multiple R, R2 , and
adjusted R2 values; R for regression was significant, F (5, 58)
p(
.0001.
TABLE 2.0
Standard Multiple Regression of Attribution, Self-awareness
and Public Self-consciousness on the Frequency of Cheating
VARIABLES
B
BETA
sr. 2
l
ATTRIBUTION
-.353
-.518
.2762
INTERCEPT
SELF-AWARENESS
CONDITION
-.199
-.292
.0820
R SQUARE
ATTRIBUTION X SELFAWARENESS CONDITION
-.245
-.l59
PUBLIC SCORE
.038
.242
-.001
-.241
(PUBLIC SCORE) 2
*
p
= 10.95,
= .4140
= .4856
ADJUSTED R
SQUARE
= .4412
MULTIPLE R
= *.6968
.1186
< . 0001
In summary, a total of 49% of the variability of task performance
could be predicted given knowledge of performance attribution and selfawareness condition.
DISCUSSION
The present investigation was successful in replicating the
findings of Vallacher and Solodky (1979).
Further evidence was obtained
for the finding that situationally induced self-awareness causes the
individual to be more aware of the implications of his or her behavior
18
19
for self-appraisal and evaluation; this in turn, leads to increased
behavioral conformity to salient standards.
Given the multitude of
sources from ·which behavioral standards can arise, it is not difficult
to envision the potential for conflict between internal and external
standards.
The results of the present study have demonstrated that in
a situation of conflicting standards, the standard which will assume
prepotency is the standard with the greatest implications for selfevaluation.
Thus, when the competency standard was rendered salient (in the
present study) by attributing success to ability, subjects cheated in
order to demonstrate their competency.
Alternatively, when the
performance standard was not related to competency (i.e., in the luck
conditions), the frequency of cheating behavior was significantly
diminished.
Theoretically, this is due to the fact that the morality
standard had assumed prepotency in the situation.
In such a situation,
the inhibition of cheating could still afford the individual a favorable
self-evaluation with regard to the morality standard.
The results of the present study appear to be in opposition to
the findings of Diener and Wallbom (1976), who found that heightened
self-awareness led to decreased levels of cheating behavior in subjects.
It is however, critical to note that these experimenters utilized a
"large two-way mirror covering much of one wall'', and a self-recorded
message of the subject's voice to manipulate self-awareness.
Buss (1980)
has argued that large three-way clothing mirrors induce a state of
public self-awareness because they focus attention on the overt/public
aspects of the self.
Further, it has been discovered that self-recorded
passages also induce a state of public self-awareness (Buss, 1980;
20
Framing, Walker, and Lopyan, 1982).
Given that the subjects in the
Diener and Wallbom study were made publicly self-ware, it is not
surprising that they found a decreased amount of cheating because
cheating is clearly an antinormative behavior.
The absence of any relationship between subjects (in the low selfaware conditions) high in public self-consciousness, and the incidence
of cheating may be partially due to the fact that the experimental
design utilized herein was not publicly-oriented.
That is to say, in
the absence of a salient observer (present in the room during the testing
procedure), subjects may never have become concerned about the type of
impression his or her performance would make.
It was not possible,
however, to have a live observer present in the room during the testing
procedure, as this would likely reduce the incidence of the cheating
behavior (since it would make the subjects publicly
self~aware).
The findings presented here have important implications for
efforts to predict behavior from attitudinal measures.
It is clear
that assessment of individual attitudes is not sufficient to predict
behavior, as it is equally important to assess the individual's
perception of the salient social standard
(given the situation is
ambiguous), or expected behavior.
In conclusion, it may not be necessary to call forth varying
mechanisms to account for the divergent effects of self-awareness on
performance outcomes.
Rather, these divergent effects may be due to
the salience of differing self-evaluative standards ( e.g., in the
present study, morality and competency).
The competency-morality
distinction is only one of many possible distinctions that can be made
21
with regard to self-evaluative standards.
It remains for future
research to delineate the possible sources of evaluative standards, and
to specify t~e circumstances that elicit their particular relevance.
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Scheier, M.F., and Carver, C.S. (1981).
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APPENDICES
27
28
Fenistein-Scheier-Buss·Scale
Please rate these items on a one to five point scale, where a
score of one indicates the item is extremely uncharacteristic of
you, and a five means that the item is extremely characteristic of
you.
Extremely
Extremely
Uncharacteristic
Characteristic
~1----~2---=3--~4~~5-
1.
I'm always trying to figure myself
out.
2.
I'm concerned about my style of
doing things.
3.
Generally, I'm not very aware of
myself.
4.
It takes me time to overcome my
shyness in new situations.
5.
I reflect about myself a lot.
6.
I'm concerned about the way I
present myself.
7.
I'm often the subject of my
own fantasies.
8.
I have trouble working when
someone is watching me.
9.
I never scrutinize myself.
10. I get embarrassed very easily.
11. I'm self-conscious about the
way I look.
12. I don't find it hard to talk
to strangers.
13. I'm generally attentive to my
inner feelings.
14. I usually wprry about making
a good impression.
15. I'm constantly examining my
motives.
29
Extremely
Uncharacteristic
Extremely
Characteristic
-1-----2--~3--~4--~5-
16. I feel anxious when I speak in
front of a group.
17. One of the last things I do before
I leave my house is look in the mirror
18. I sometimes have the feeling that
I'm off somewhere watching myself.
19. I'm concerned about what other people
think of me.
20. I'm alert to changes in my mood.
21. I'm usually aware of my appearance.
22. I'm aware of the way my mind works
when I work through a problem.
23. Large groups make me nervous.
30
TEST EVALUATION SCALE
Please rate the following statements using a scale of one to four;
where a one indicates complete agreement, and a four indicates
strong disagreement with the statement.
---1
I AGREE:
1. Using a "hit and miss" approach
was the only method of solving
the puzzles.
2. Math majors probably have
less difficulty solving the
puzzles.
3. I could have done better if I
had more experience with this
type of puzzle.
4. Every individual has an equal
chance of completing these
puzzles.
5. My basic geometry skills really
came in handy on this task.
6. I believe there is a system
to solving these puzzles.
7. Successful completion of the
puzzles was contingent on a
number of chance factors.
B. I could have done better if
I had had more time.
9. One minute was ample time to
finish; luck is either with
you or against you.
10. Choosing which point to begin
drawing the line was a lot like
guessimg the flip of a coin.
2
3
4
HIGHLY/ SOMEWHAT/ SLIGHTLY/ NOT AT ALL
31
Q
CORRELATION MATRIX
nH:!!: H::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::n: n::::::::::::::::::: m::::::::::::::::::: ::::::::::::::::: n:::::::::
VARIABLES
ATTRIBUTION
SELF-AWARENESS
CONDITION
PUBLIC
SCORE
(PUBLIC)
SQRT
(DV)
ATTRIBUTION
-.5178
SELF -A\~ARENESS
CONDITION
-.2883
ATTRIBUTION X SELFAWARENESS CONDITION
-.2255
-.2026
-.3655
PUBLIC SCORE
.0537
-.1325
1.0000
0.0000
.0945
(PUBLIC SCORE) 2
.0590
-.1484
0.0000
1.0000
.0890
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES:
(1) Performance Attribution:
(2) Self-awareness Condition:
-.4812 to -.2244
-.3297 to -.0679
(3) Attribution x Self-awareness interaction:
-.3790 to -.1108
RESULTS OF BARTLETT'S TEST FOR HOMOGENEITY OF
s2 :
After the square root transformation of the DV:
~ = V 1ns 2 - ~ V.J 1ns.J 2
w
w
60(-.7427)-(-48.738) =
-44.562 + 48.738
= 4.18
Before the square root transformation of the DV:
-?-= vw 1nsw2 - I: v.J 1ns.J 2
CRITICAL VALUES:
60(.2129)-(3.245)
.95
= 7.82, P< .05
12.777- 3.245 = 9.53
.98 ~ = 9.84, P< .01
x;
•
32
s
HIGH SELF-AWARE/ ABILITY CONDITION
Q
u
A
R
E
R
0
0
T
0
F
D
~
I
c
H
•1/
E
A
-
/
-·
/
T
I
N
G
.5
x3 (PUBLIC)
35
PUBLIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCORE
s
Q
HIGH SELF-AWARE/ LUCK CONDITION
u
A
R
E
R
0
0
T
2.0
0
F
.
D
~
c
1\
I \
H
E
A
I
I
T
I
N
G
·- - - - -.- -
I
I
_J
\
\
\
\
\
·--·--·--·--·--·--·--·----·
X (PUBLIC)
3 I
I
I
15
20
25
PUBLIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCORE
30
35
33
s
Q
u
A
R
E
R
0
0
LOW SELF-AWARE/ ABILITY CONDITION
2.0
T
0
F
D
v
/T
I
c
I
H
E
A
T
I
N
.
/
1.5
il
•/
I
..__.
I
r
j\
I'
I
1.0
11
/ I
I
I
\
\
I
G
\
\
.5
\
\
0.0
1/
15
25
20
PUBLIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCORE
s
Q
u
LOW SELF-AWARE/ LUCK CONDITION
A
R
E
R
0
0
T
0
2.0
F
D
v
I
1.5
c
H
E
A
T
I
N
I
~r
I I
/
1.0
I
,- -·- -1
j
r- - ,__ - - - - ' - - - - •.
\
G
\
.5
I
' I
\I
x3 (PUBLIC)
I
15
20
25
PUBLIC SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS SCORE
30
35