CAI,IFORiHA .STATE UlTIV:SR.SITY, NORTHPIDG:S
CHOICE-SHIFT HYPOTIIES:ES:
\\
A THREE 1.'JAY TEST
A thesis submitted in partial satisfaction of tte
requirements for the decree of Master of Arts in
Psychology
by
Pamela Ann Reuben
/
January, 1979
California State University, Northridge
January, 1979
ii
1~pprove1
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of Contents.
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List of Tables •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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List of Firures ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• o•••••••• vii
Abstract •••••
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Introduction.......................................
General Experimental Strategy.
Independent Variables.
Expected
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The Pre-test.
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.Sub.jects.....................................
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Apparatus •• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
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Procedures.
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Results •••••••••• ....... ..... . ... . ....... ...
The Hain Experiment. .... ........................
Subjects •••••••••••• .................. .......
:Sxperimentol Desi,cn. ...... . .... .... . -........
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rrest Booklets.
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Procedures ••••
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Procedures for the risky-arr;uments-only
condition And the
condition.
cautious-ar~urnents-only
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2!+
..-proceoures
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arruments conrlition anrl the cautiousfeerlback-nn-arruments condition •.•••••••••
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Procedures for the arcuments-and-feedback
conditions •••••••••••
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Procerlures for the no-arcuments-no-feedback
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Results •••••••.•.•..• . .............................
Dependent Measure. ..............................
condition.
Risk Jtems ••••••••. ~.
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Cautious Items •••••••
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Risk-Caution Items Together •••••••••••••••••••••
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Discussion ••
References.
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Appenrl.iJ{_ .l1 •••• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• " ••••
Mean
Ratin~s
of Arguments Selected in the
Pretest •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
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Test Booklet ContaininF; Risk Arcuments#
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List of Cautious Arguments •••••••••••••
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Cautious Arcuments used for Risk Item
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Cautious Arguments used for Risk Item 2
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(Hr. H')
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Cautious Arguments used for Cautious
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C8utious
Ar~uments
used for CAutious
Ite]1 2 (~.r'~r. I<) ..............
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r_rabl_e 1 :
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.E~~{})er:L~en.tnl_ Desj_{~n......................
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2: Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for
Risk Items...............................
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Table 3: Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores
on Risk Items at three levels of Feedback
and at three levels of Arruments.........
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Table 4: Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for
Cautious Items...........................
Table
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5: Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores
on Cautious Items at three levels of Feedback and at three levels of Areuments....
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Table 6: Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for
Averaged Data............................
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Table 7: Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores
on Averafed Items at three levels of
Feedback and at three levels of Arguments.....................................
vi
L~O
Firure 1 : Mean Choice-Shift Scores for Risk Items
plotted
~s
a function of
Ar~uments
with
scores pooled over Feedback ••••••••••••••
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Firure 2: Mean Choice-Shift Scores for Cautious
Items plotted as a function of Arfuments
with scores pooled over Feedback •••••••••
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Fi,c>:ure 3: l 11ean Cl:oice-Shift Scores for Cautious
Items plotted as
a
function of Feedback
with scores pooled over Arcuments ••••••••
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Ficure 4: Mean Choice-Shift Scores for the Averared
Items
platte~
as a function of Arguments
with scores pooled over Feedback •••••••••
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Fizure 5: Mean Choice-Shift Scores for the Averaged
Items plotted as a function of Feedback
with scores pooled over Arr::uments........
vii
L~3
CHOICE-SHIFT HYPOTHESES:
A TEREB WAY TEST
bv
.;
Pamela Ann Reuben
Master of Arts in Psychology
Jonuory, 1979
This experiment tested the predictive VBlue of
the following three explanBtions of choice-shift phenomen2: (1) the cultural-value hypothesis, (2) the relevantarGuments hypothesis, and (3) the two-process hypothesis.
The cultural-value hypothesis Bsserts that knowledge of
the decisions made by other croup members is the
sufficent condition effecting the extremity of decision
mak1np; found in groups (choice-shifts). The relevantar[uments hypothesis Bsserts that the sufficent condition
is exposure to new, relevant arguments. The two-process
hypothesis states that both of the above conditions
must be present to effect choice-shifts. Results
supported the two-process hypothesis.
vii1
INTRODUCTION
The very old joke that the camel is the result of a
committee trying to make a
do~
is hardly a tribute to the
benefits of group endeavors. However, it does inrlicate that
in groups people sometimes appear to endorse strange decisions---decisions decidely different from those that
would be made by individuals working along. The phenomenon
is now refered to as choice-shifts.
The initial study of the choice-shift phenomenon
was made in 1961 by J. Stoner, then working on his Master's
thesis at MIT. Stoner was interested in individual differences in risk-taking behavior. To assess these differences
he presented his subjects with situations where they were
to advjse a hypothetical person to
chaos~
between two
courses of action, X or Y. Subjects were first given a
list expressing several probabilities of success that
could be associated with the hypothetical person's selection of behavior X. The probabilities on the list ranged
from 1/10 to 10/10 chances of success.
Once given the list, subjects were then asked to
select the lowest probability of success that they would
accept and still advise the hypothetical person to choose
.
b e h DYJ..Or
X. This is the riskiest choice a subject could
make.
On the other hand, a choice of 10/10 meant that
1
2
only if the chance of behavior X being followed by success
was absolutely
certain, would the subject advise the
hypothetical person to choose behavior X. This was the most
conservative choice that could be made.
After making their initial decisions, the subjects
were divided into 13 groups and asked to discuss the situation they had decided upon and then to arrive at a
unanimous decision for each. Stoner found that for 12 out
of 13 groups, the group decision was riskier than the
individual decision. In 1962, Wallach, one of Stoner's
advisors, successfully replicated the findings.
From 1961 to 1971, over 250 experiments on choiceshifts were published. During this time, a few researchers
questioned whether reported results could be attributed
to the type of task given to subjects. Many of the studies
had used Stoner's original task. Interestingly, the task
had come to be called Wallach and Kogan's Choice-Dilemma
Questionnaire. The task required subjects to role play.
They were not directly affected by the advice they chose
to Give the hypothetical person. The consequences of their
decisions were unknowable and had on1y vague re1evance
for them. If these were the necessary and sufficent conditions for producing the shift toward risk, there was
little reason to explore the alternative theories that
were being proposed.
Several experiments investigated whether a shift
3
would occur when the consequences of decisions were known
and relevant to subjects (Bern, Wallach, and Kosan, 1955;
0
•
'.if
.
.
u3JOnc,
:·,o l.osln,
. o l .Osln
an.d S'nerman, l _gr.~~·u;
Kor-an and
"'
11/
ZaleskA, 1969.; Harquis and Reitz, 1969; Pruitt and Teaser,
1969)~
These experiments found (1) shifts toward risk,
(2) shifts toward caution and (3) no shifts.
St].ll, whilE:: the findin.ss were not consistently
toward risk, the majority of studies found group decisions
to be significantly more extreme than individual decisions.
Also questioned was whether the findings generalized
to a population other than colleee students. Perhaps
students had risk preferences decidedly hic:her than the
rest of the population and the shift toward risk was unique
to them,. However, subsequent experiments· found risky shifts
for middle-level executives, (Marquis, 1962), and for
groups of psycholocists, psychiatrists and social workers
(Siegel and Zajonc, 1967).
The effect is also not unique to the task (Bern,
Wallach and Kogan, 1965; Pruitt and Teager, 1967). Furthermore, it has been demonstrated across cultures (Bateson,
1966; Kogan and Doise, 1969; Rim, 1963; Lamm and Kogan,
1970).
Given that the effect was neither task nor subject
specific, it was now meaningful to explore alternative
explanations of the choice-shift phenomenon. One alternative explanation was the diffusion-of-responsibility
hypothesis proposerl
The
hypothe~is
-!n
_J..
10<:?
/ -- .._ 'o'l
held
•.1
th~t
:J,e'Tl
~~~
·~
~s
'
::r:::·ll."'c"'
' l ,_:;
-
-
_..
...1
members of
~roups,
people
feel th2t their responsibility for ma\in( decisions is
shared by the rest of the ;roup. This lessening of personal
responsibility was considered to be the source of the
zroup I s
•
1 •
r1s~1er
d ec1s1on
-. ·
1- •
ma~1ng.
Irovrever, shifts in the
conservative direction have also been found (Rabow, 1 or-.r:~ .•'
./ '-
Stoner, 1968; Johnson and Andrews, 1971). A lessening of
personal responsibility could not easily account for these
shifts.
Other findincs failed to support the diffusion
hy~o-
thesis. ?or example, one implication of the hypothesis was
that increased cohesiveness of a group would lead to incresed diffusion, which should lead to an increased magnitude·
of the shift; that is, cohesiveness sh2uld lead to riskier
decisions by group members. However, increasing cohesiveness actually lead to a decreased effect in the magnitude
of the shift (Dian, Miller and Magnan, 1971).
In addition to the finding above, an earlier study
had found a choice-shift for people who had no discussions
but merely observed others' discussions
TT
(
~
r~.op
an and Wellach,
1967). Even simply informing people of others' preferences
produced a shift (Prni tt and Tear7er, 1967).
The diffusion hypothesis is still ocassionally cited
by researchers because regardless of the evidence against
it, there has not yet been a definitive demonstration as to
5
whether the effect occurs when one does not feel himself
to be a member of the croup. It can be arpued that watchinf
a group sparks the feeling of membership producing the
diffusion effect and causing the choice-shift found by
Kogan and Wallach in 1967. Likewise, sitting in a group
simply exchanging information about other's choices may be
sufficent to elicit the feelinr of group membership. Still,
most researchers today are unconvinced that diffusion of
responsibility is the mechanism underlying choice-shifts.
Another early explanation of choice-shifts was that
people who are high-risk takers exert more influence in
discussions. This hypothesis also fails to explain shifts
in the conservative direction. Still, two early studies
found significant positive correlations between subjects'
initial riskiness and their amount of rated influence
(Wallach, 1962; Marquis, 1962). However, ratings of influenc~ we~e
marie after post-discussion decisions. Since
in both studies the shift was toward risk, high..;.risk
people may have been perceived as influential only in retrospect and were not, in fact, influential during the
discussion. T·wo other studies found that when shifts
toward caution were obtained, high-risk takers were seen as
less influential
(Nordh~y,
1962; Rabow et al., 1966). This
finding coupled with the discussion of the findings of
Wallach (1962) and Marquis (1962) suggest that group
members' perception of persuasiveness of high-risk takers
6
may be due to what happens in
s:~roup
discussion.
It was also found that when using amount of time
spent talkinc as an indice of influence,
hi~h-risk
people
did not talk any more often than low-or moderate-risk
takers (Hyers 2nd Hurdoch, 1972). And in 1968, Kogan and
Burt, usinG homogeneous hich-risk groups, found no relationship between risk preference and three measures of
influence; yet they did find a shift toward risk.
Therefore, like diffusion-of-responsibility, this
hypothesis also seems inadequate as an explanatory mechanism of choice-shifts.
In 1971, th? Journal of Persona)_i ty ·and Social
PsycholO{Tl: devoted an entire issue to choice-shift the
phenomenon. The issue published eighteen recent experiments. Also published was an introductory review of the
hypotheses at tempting to expla.in the choice-shift and a
summary article on the results and conclusions to be
drawn from the new studies. As the summary article notes,
the preponderance of evidence favored three explanatory
mechanisms: (1) the cultural-value hypothesis, (2) the
relevant-arguments hypothesis and (3) the two-process
hypothesis which encompasses both the cultural-value and
the relevant-arE,uments concepts.
The cultural-value hypothesis and the relevantarguments hypothesis both assert that the type of tasks
used in the research lead to decisions based upon cultural
7
values. Several studies lend support to the notion that
values underlie the shift. In studies where shifts toward
risk have been observed, subjects said that hirh-risk
choices were the choices that they most adnired (Levincer
and Schneider, 1969; Pilkonis and Zanna, 1969). Vlhere
cautious shifts were observed, subjects said they considered low-risk choices to be the most admirable (Madaras
and Bern, 1968). A cross-cultural
the above two findings
(Carls~n
stu~y
in Uganda replicated
and Davis, 1971). For items
showing a shift toward risk, subjects said they felt it
most desirable to be viewed as among the risky people.
Ylhile for items showing cautious shifts, subjects said
it was most desirable to be seen as among the cautious
people (Ferguson and Vidmar, 1971).
Thus, it is evident that the cultural-value and
relevant arguments hypotheses share a basic assumption,
namely
t~at
values underlie choice-shifts. It is further
evident that the shared assumption is a supported one.
However, there is a crucial difference between the hypotheses regarding the sufficent condition generating the
shift.
The cultural-value hypothesis holds that a socialcomparison process is the critical function producing
choice-shifts. Groups make more extreme decisions because
during discussion, each person finds out the decisions
made by the other group members on their pre-discussion
8
measures. Each person then estimates the averace value of
the croup's initial selection of odds on their pre-discussion measure. For them, this value then typifies the
cultural norm.
Thus, in their second decision people attempt to
move either to the group average or to a point slightly
above it. Some support for the social-comparison postulate
has been found. In an experiment where subjects were only
allowed to exchange information about the choices they
had made on their initial decisions, a choice-shift was
observed (Pruitt and Teager, 1967).
On the other hand, the relevant-arguments hypothesis
holds that it is not knowledge of the choices other group
members made that produces the shift. Rather, it is the
number and the direction of new arguments to v1hich the
subjects are exposed. According to this hypothesis, a
subject's initial decision indicates the position for
which he has the maximum number of persuasive arguments.
Then during discussion the typical subject is exposed to
a preponderance of new arguments favoring the direction
to which he will shift on his second decision. It has
been shown that when shifts toward risk were observed, a
significant proportion of the arguments favored risk; and
when shifts toward caution
wer~
observed, a significant
proportion of the arguments favored caution (Silverthorne,
1971). Moreover, when subjects were allowed only to reveal
9
their arpuments and not their decisions, a choice-shift
was observed (St. Jean, 1970)
Thus, there is a dilemma. In Pruitt and Teacer's
study, a shift was observed when the only information
presented to subjects was the choices the rest of the
group had made.
I~
St. Jean's study, a shift was observed
when the only information presented was relevant arguments.
How may these findings be reconciled?
In 1971, Pruitt offered 'three possible explanations.
First, there is the social-comparison explanation. This
argument holds that in St. Jean's study, subjects used
the arguments to accurately infer the choices each group
member had made. Thus, the shift was actually due to
knowledge of others' choices.
The second explanation favors relevant-arguments
theory. This explanation holds that the consecutive
balloting procedure used by Pruitt and Teager, stimulated
subjects to think up new, relevant arguments. These new
arguments were what produced the shift.
The third explanation is also the third hypothesis
proposed and supported as explanative of choice-shift
phenomena. This explanation is the two-process hypothesis.
It holds that the full magnitude of the shift results from
both knowing others' choices and the impact of relevant
arguments. Since both factors are producinf: the shift, this
is the reason both experiments found shifts.
10
l'ro experiment has attempted to simultaneously test
all three hypotheses mentioned above. IIowever, in recent
years, two experiments have attempted to simultaneously
test the relevant-ar,f"uments hypothesis and the culturalvalue hypothesis.
In 1973, Burnstein and Vinokur attempted to test
both notions. They had three conditions:(l) Ambiguous-For:
Subjects all argued for the position they had chosen in
their initial decisions. However, each group member was
unable to tell if the others were or were not in favor of
the position they were advocating. (2) Ambiguous-Acoinst:
All subjects argued against their original positions. But
again, whether they were arguing for or against their
original positions could not be discerned by other group
members. (3) Unambiguous-Against: All subjects argued
against their original positions and all group members
were aware of this.
According to relevant-arguments theory, both the
Ambir,uous-For and the Ambiguous-Against groups should show
shifts if arguments are the criti6al process producing the
shift. If social comparison processes are operating both
conditions should show no shift.
However, the authors note that in the AmbiguousAp,ainst condition, subjects are being asked to defend a
position for which they have few persuasive arguments. For
this reason they say the relevant-arrruments hypothesis
11
must predict no shift for this condition. Since no shift
is also predicted by the social-comparison postulate, this
condition is not a critical test of the two hypotheses.
Nonetheless, when no shift vms found, the experimenters
hailed it as support for relevant-arguments. They also
note that the lack of shift can be explained by the twoprocess hypothesis. They further note that it could be a
counterattitudinal effect.
No shift was found for the
Unambi~uous-Against
con-
dition. The experimenters said that this finding failed to
support the social-comparison explanation. However, the
question can be raised as to whether this condition truly
can be called unambiguous. This condition called for
subjects to recognize a given argument n/10 chances of
success, i.e. 6/10. Then the subjects had to use this
knowledge to infer and remember that the position really
advocated WG.s 1+/10. This procedure had to be done for each
group member. It doesn't seem farfetched to think that
procedures obstructed group members' computation of the
group average, a computation which is central to the
social-comparison notion. Thus the lack of shift found
here might be due to procedural flaws. Like the Ambic:uousAgainst condition, it does not seem to be a sufficent test
of the two hypotheses.
The Ambiguous-For condition did show choice-shifts
and thus does lend some support to the relevant-arguments
12
theory.
~owever,
a more thorough and less confounded
design must be done before one is truly convinced of the
explanatory power of the hypothesis.
Another test of the two
hypothe~es
was carrierl out
by Murningham and Castore in 1975. They concluded that
their results supported the relevant-2rguments hypothesis.
However, as with the previous study, serious questions can
be raised as to whether procedures provided a sufficent
test.
One condition of the
Murnin~ham
and Castore study had
subjects make their initial decisions on two items that in
the past had been reliably associated with shifts toward
risk. After making their decisions, subjects were presented
with three arguments the experimenters had prepared. All
three arguments favored caution. Subjects were told that
the arguments were those usually made by the average person.
Hurningham and Castore reasoned that if social comparison
processes were involved, the cautious arguments
~hould
produce no shift since the items themselves were eliciting
a value for risky decisions. When they obtained a shift
toward caution for this condition, the experimenters
claimed this result supported the relevant-arguments hypothesis.
However, it· can still be ar;"ued that this shift was
due to social-comparison processes. Subjects were lead to
believe that the arguments they received were indicative of
13
the
aver~~e
response. They did not know how the other
members of their rroup had decided. Thus they well mirht
have drawn the conclusion that they had incorrectly interpreted the cultural norm upon which the decision was based.
Further, they mic·ht have thoucht the croup's average was
really cautious. And as the cultural-value hypothesis predicts, they shifted toward caution in their attmpts to
adhere to the cultural norms as typified by what they believed the group average to be.
This then is the current state of the literature
pertaining to the major explanations of choice-shifts.
Several explanations were oricinally proposed. They have
been narrowed down to three, the cultural-value hypothesis,
the relevant-arguments hypothesis and
th~
two-process hypo-
thesis.
This study is a three way test of the above hypotheses. The experiment was undertaken for the following
reasons: (l)to provide an unconfounded test of the explanations, (2) to discover the sufficent condition(s)
un~er­
lyin:; choice-shifts, and (3) to provide 8ddi tional knmvledce to the body of work done on choice-shifts.
Gener,al E:7]2erime nta 1 Stra te,c·:y
The general stratecy of the experiment was to pit the
asserted determinants of the choice-shift phenomenon
against one another. In such a situation, each hypothesis
predicts different outcomes.
14
A discussion of the specific predictions is enhanced
by first reviewinG the independent variables used in the
experiment.
Independent variables. There are three experimental
variables. The first variable is the type of Feedback
subjects are given, where Feedback supposedly represents
the group's average choice made during their initial
decisions for a given stimulus item. This variable has
three levels. The feedback given subjects either represents
cautious decision making, or risky decision making, or it
is withheld entirely. Feedback is a between subjects factor.
The second variable is the type of Arguments subjects
receive for the stimulus items. This variable has three
levels, arguments advocating a risky decision, arguments
advocatinc a cautious decision, or no arguments at all.
This variable too is a between subjects factor.
As mentioned in the introductory review, stimulus
items themselves are often associated with a particular
direction in which a choice-shift occurs. If a given item
elicits a value for risk but Arguments or Feedback are
cautious, a shift of reduced maenitude might occur as a
result of these two factors pulling in the opposite direction. To handle this problem, a third variable, type of
stimulus Item, was included in the experimental design.
Two items reliably associated with risky choice-shifts and
two items reliably associated with cautious choice-shifts
15
were presented. All subjects saw all stimulus items.
Further, if items exerted ;:;n effect unaffected by t:.e
presence of other
vari~bles,
the
desi~n
allowed for the
observation of an itens main effect.
Expected Results
Given the delineation of the independent variables,
it is now possible to more clearly show the specific
experimental results that are expected.
The relevant-arguments hypothesis holds that arguments alone produce choice-shifts. Therefore, if this
hypothesis is correct, an analysis of variance performed
on the data should show only a main effect for Arguments.
No main effect of Items or Feedback is expected since the
hypothesis holds that these factors do not contribute to
the shift. Further, the hypothesis gives no reason to
believe that the arguments variable operates differentially
at different levels of the other manipulated variables.
Therefore no interactions are expected.
Similarly, the cultural-value hypothesis holds that
knowledge of the group's average decision on the initial
me~sure
is the sole determinant of choice-shifts. Therefore
if this hypothesis is correct, an analysis of variance
should show a main effect for the Feedback variable only.
Again, since the hypothesis gives no reason to believe
Feedback will operate differentially at the levels of the
other variables, no
interactio~s
are expected.
The two-process hypothesis states that choiceshifts Bre a function of both .t;lrP'Uments and feedback.
Therefore the results expected were two main effects, one
for Feedback
an~
one for Arguments. It should be noted
that regardless of whether the two factors contribute
equally to the magnitude of the choice-shift, the design
of the experiment is such that only main effects should
obtain. Aleo, again no interactions are expected.
!'{STHOD
To insure that all areurnents used in the actual
experiment were equally convincing, the following pre-test
was carried out •
.Sub_j£cts
Twenty-four female students at California .State
University at Northridge were randomly assiEned to one of
two groups • .Single-sex rroupinis were used to eliminate
responses based on sexual motives as might be obtained in
rn1xed-sex proupinrs.
Prior to the pre-test, twenty-four booklets were
prepared. Each booklet contained four items, one to a page,
SE'lected from 'Ha1lcch & Koran's Choice-Di lemr,1a Questionnaire (1962). These items were the same ones used in the
actual experiment.
As mentioned earlier, each item presents subjects
with a choice between two behaviors, X or Y. Below each
item, arguments were printed advocating a choice of be~avior
X. For 12 of the booklets, choice X was advocated,
by all arguments, only if the chance of the behavior
succeedinr was high. For example, one item concerned
itself with an engaged couple who had many arguments.
They faced the choice to not get married (behavior Y) or
17
18
to ret married (behavior X). The cautious artuments for
this item cdn be found in
Appendix~.
For the remaining 12 booklets, behavior X was
advocated even if the chance of success was small.
The order in which items were placed on a page was
counterbalanced. That is, for each of the two groups (12
subjects to a group) 4 subjects saw the same item, say
item A, first, then B, then C, and then D. Four subjects
saw B first, then
c,
tten D and then A,, etc.
Arguments were presented via a sincle randomly
selected order; i.e. for three arpuments, a random numbers
table was consulted and once a given order established,
all booklets followed the same order.
A second piece of apparatus used
w~s
an ll-x-19 inch
poster- board. Printed upon it, was the following:
= NOT
2
AT ALL CONVINCING
= SLI GHTI,Y
CONVINCIT\TG
= CO!'-TVINCING
4 = VERY CONVINCING
5 = EXTRENELY CONVINCING
3
Procedures
Each group of 12 subjects was brought to
room. Subjects were seated and told:
This experiment is
p~ople
conce~ned
with how
make decisions. I am going to
hand you a booklet. On each page of
~
large
19
the booklet, a situation is described
wherein a person is faced with a decision.
I'd like you to read the situation
described carefully. You will then note
that below each item is a list of arcuments advocating a particular decision.
I'd like you to read each argument and
rate how convincing you think that
arcument is.
At this point, the poster board was held up and.the ratinc
scale was explained merely by reading the boarde Subjects
were told that next to the arrument they were to place the
number corresponding to how convincing they thoupht the
argument was. The board was held up before subjects the
entire time they were making their judgements. After the
ratin~
scale was explained, subjects were told,
Please rate each argument separately.
It is important
th~t
you do not compare
arguments, simply judge each on its own
merits.
Booklets were then handed out and subjects were told to
bet;in.
Results
The mean
ra~ing
for each argument was calculated. For
each of the four Items, two arguments advocating risk and
two arguments advocating caution were selected such that all
20
arruments were of equal convincinG
stren~th.
That is,
"tn tests perfor;r:erl on the rlifferences nmonr selected
ar[;'Uments showed all differences to be statistically in-
Appendix A contains the mean ratings for all
selected arruments as well as the actual arguments used.
The pre-test completed, it was then possible to
test the predictive value of the three hypotheses in a
manner that held the convincincness of arguments constant •
.Subjects
108 female students takinr" either Psychology 150 or
Psycholor:;y 250 at California State University at Northridge
served as subjects. Single-sex groupings were used to
eliminate responses based on sexual motives, as might be
obtained in mixed-sex grouping. Further, females had
originally rated the convincingness of the arguments to be
used. Therefore, females were aeain used for the main
experiment in case convincingness differed as a function of
sex.
Subjects were taken in groups of four. Each fourperson group was randomly assigned to one of the nine
combinations of the three levels of Feedback and the three
levels of Arguments. There were three four-member croups
(12 subjects) in each experimental
condition~
21
The experimental desirn was a three-factor, mixed
design. The first independent variable, a between-subjects
factor, was Feedback with three levels, risky, cautious,
or none. The second independent variable, also a between• 1
subjects factor, was Arguments with three levels, rlSKY,
cautious, or none. The third independent variable was a
within-subjects variable, Items, with two levels, risky
and cautious. The design is dE'picted in Table 1 with three
groups at each combination of Feedback and Arguments.
Test Booklets
Prior to the experiment, 108 booklets were prepared.
Each booklet
co~tained
two copies of the same four items
used in the pre-test. Two copies of each item were required
because, as mentioned earlier, choice-shift scores require
subjects to make two decisions for each item.
Each presented item, along with its corresponding
probabilities were presented one to a page. Thus, the
presentation of four items required eight pages per booklet.
Of the four items presented, past research had shown
two to be reliably associated with choice-shifts toward
risk and two to be reliably associated with choice-shifts
toward caution (Burnstein and Vinokur, 1973).
The order of item presentation
wa~
counterbalanced.
While all booklets contained two copies of all items,
the remaining content of a given booklet differed as a
22
Experi~ent8l
Desirn
r
r----
-----
Feedback
"~rr·m:1e n ts
I
I
-
Groups
Caut
4,5,6
--
,_
-
-
~
I
-
.
.
~
~
-----~
I.
--+-----!
1
J
I
I
1
Groups r
tI
16,17,13t-------~--------- -----~
Groups
-+--_:___·
l
--
j
13, 14,, 5~-------~---------
None
Cau t
Groups
r------
I
22,23,24~-------
I Gro~ns
.
1I
Til
·-1-Jo_n_.e_J
_ _..,_1
~
~
.i
Caut
~Tone
~
---------~-----~
Groups
, o, 11 , 12 ------- ---------
isk
R
I
('
--t-------
---------,----~
----4----j----=t----------~~'
i I
Croups
7 ~),
Q 9
____~None L. ,
I
Caution.J.I
c~ut~on~1
1----'----t-'/·-·---•"-1-1-----c,;.-+
Groups
1
'2 ,3
~~----
l~isk
I-
f1isk
Risk.~2
Rislr.:/:~1
-----~
-----~--- c----~
,---------
--~I
I
I
=I'
-----+.
25,26, 271-------j---------r--~~
_J
function of the experimental condition subjects were presented with.
For each item in the conditions where subjects were
to be given risk
arcu~ents,
two arguments advocating a
risky decision were placed between the two pages requiring
their first and second decisions. Thus, .subjects made their
first decision, turned the page and read the two selected
arguments, then again turned the page and, after re-reading
the stimulus item, made their second decision. Arguments
were different for
eac~
item but all advocated
~
risky
decision.
In the conditions where subjects were to be given
cautious arguments, the booklets were ordered in the same
way except all arguments advocated a cautious decision.
All arguments in all booklets were selected on the
basis of the pre-test.
For the
:·~o-Argumen ts
conditions, no arguments ·were
presented. Subjects merely made their first decision, turned the pare and, after re-reading the item, made their
second decision.
Procedures
Each four-member group of subjects was brought into
an experimental room containing four chairs and a small
table. On one sid& of the room was another chair which the
experimenter used to sit upon. Two chairs were on each side
of the table, placed back to back. After subjects entered
the room and were seated, the experimenter rave them the
test booklets and read them the instructions. These instructions are printed in Appendix A. Once instructions were
read, procedures differed as a function of the experimental
condition subjects were in.
Procedures for the risk.y-ar;;:uments-onl:y concH tion
and the cautious-arpuments only condition. Subjects were
told to read the first item in the booklet and make their
decisions for that item. They were also told to look up at
the experimenter once they had done this and not to turn
the par:e.
Once all subjects had made their decisions, they were
told to turn the page and read the two presented areuments.
Ar~uments
presented were either both risky or both cautious
and subjects were further told that these arguments had
been put forth by people who in previous experiments had
to make a decision for that item. Subjects were also told
that the arguments were merely samples and did riot necessarily represent what the average person thought. After
readine the arcuments, subjects were to look back up at
the experimenter and not to turn the page.
Once subjects had read the arguments, they were told.
that the same item was going to be on the next page. They
were asked to
re-~ead
the item and make a second decision
and that the decision could be the same decision they had
made before or a new one; it was up to them.
25
After
makin~
their
secon~
decisions, subjects were
asked to turn the paPe and read a new item and make a
decision for it.
The above procedures were repeated for each of the
four stimulus items.
Procedures for the risky-feedback-no-arruments
condition and the cautious-feedback-no.arpuments condition.
After subjects had made their decision for the first item,
the experimenter pretended to go around and look at each of
their decisions. Further, the experimenLer pretended to
enter each decision into a small hand calculator and to
then calculate a Proup averape. Subjects were then informed
of their e:roup average. If they were in the Risky-FeedbackNo-Arguments condition, they were told that the group's
avera~e
choice of probabilities was 2/10. If they were in
the Cautious-Feedback-No-Arguments condition, they were
told the group's average was 8/10.
Having received this Feedback, subjects were asked to
turn the page, re-read the item and make a second decision.
Again, they were told the second decision could be the same
or different, it was up to them.
After making the second decision, they were told to
go on to a new item. These procedures were the same for
each of the four stimulus items.
26
Procedures for the arruments-anrl-feedback conditions.
There Are four ;\r'"u:-ne n ts-and -Feedback conc-Ji tions: ( l)
~hsh:.y
Feedback with Risk Arzuments, (2) Cautious Feedback with
Cautious
Ar~;uments,
(3) Risky Feedback with Cautious
Arguments, and (4) Cautious Feedback with Risk Areuments.
For all of these experimental conditions, subjects
read the first item and made their initial decision. They
were then presented with one of the above four combinations of Feedback and Arguments.
After hearing the Feedback and reading the Arguments,
they were asked to turn the pafe, re-read the item and
make their second decision. They then went on to a new
item. This procedure was repeated for all four stimulus
items.
Procedures for the no-arruments-no-feedback condition.
In this experimentDl condition subjects made their
initial decision and were then simply asked to turn the
page, re-read the item and make a second decision. As with
all other experimental conditions, subjects were told thBt
their second decision could be the sBme or different; it
was up to them. This procedure was repeated for all four
stimulus items.
EESULTS
Deuenrlent
~easure
Choice-shift scores, the dependent variable in this
experiment, are difference measures. Four choice-shift
scores were computed for each subject, one per item. Each
score value was obtained by subtractinG the subject's
selection of probabilities on the first decision from the
probabilities selected on the second decision.
Negative score values indicate movement in the
direction of risk while positive score values indicate
movement in the direction of caution. A score VAlue of
zero indicates no chance from the first to the second
decision.
Risk Items
In order to observe whether like items behaved in
like manner, two separate analyses of variance were
performed, one on the risk items data and one on the
cautious items data.
Table 2 presents the cell means obtained for the
risk items. The analysis of variance performed on this
data is presented in Table 3 and, as it shows, only a main
effect for Arcuments was
obtained.(~=6.327,
df=2/99,
p~.Ol)
The strength of association measure, eta squared, revealed
that only
6~3%
of the sample variance in choice-shift
scores was accounted for by the type of Argument presented.
27
28
TABLE 2
Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for Risk Items
--
-
Risk Items
Item
Item
1
Feedback
Arr"uments
---·
....,.,.,.,.__;_~---·---
2
-.
-.16
Risk
---
Risk
------------ ·-
--~--
·-
Caution
··--
-
-··-.
·-'
-~33
-.66
-.42
----~--
·-. 16
. ...
-.50
------~--~--
None
-.33
-.16
-.25
Risk
.66
-.16
.25
.66
.83
Caution
1• 0
Caution
---- ---
--
None
.83
.16
.50
Risk
-.50
-.16
-.33
1 .o
.50
.75
0
• 16
•
i
None
Caution
w:w
wac~~-
None
oR
v
.29
mAT)LR
.Lr. . ___ 'i..J
3
Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores on Risk Itens
at three levels of Feedback and at three levels of Arcurnent
Source of Variance
3etween-Subjects
df
NS
F
107
Arguments (A)
2
13.46
Feedback
2
5.02
2.37
4
2.18
1.03
99
2.11
A
X
(F)
F
Error: be tvie en subjects
6.37**
Wi thin-Sub.jects
108
(I)
1
4.17
3.28
1.36
Items
A
X
I
2
1. 72
F
X
I
2
.50
A
X
F X I
4
.89
99
1.27
Error:within-subjects
Total
**
p~.01
215
t-1
,,
30
The Argument main effect is plotted in
Fi~ure
1. It
shows thst when arruments advocated risk, choice-shift
scores evidenced movement in the direction of risk. Further
when arfurnents advocated a cautious decision, choice-shift
scores evidenced movement in the direction of caution.
When no ar,r:uments were presented, scores tended to hover
close to zero.
However, Newman-Keuls comparisons of the Argument
means revealed only one significant difference. The choiceshift scores of those receiving arguments advocating risk
were significantly more risky than scores obtained from
those receiving arguments advocatinf caution. The absolute
difference between these conditions was .863, df=3/99,
p(.Ol, while the Nevrman Keuls critical value was .576.
No significant difference was found between the
scores of those receiving risk arguments and the scores
of those receiving no arguments, the absolute difference
here beine only
.493~
Further, no significant difference
was found between the scores of those receiving cautious
arguments and the scores of those_receiving no arguments,
the absolute difference between
th~se
conditions being
only .370.
While there was no sie_;nificant main effect for the
Feedback variable at the .05 level, the obtained F was
significant at the .10 level, indicating a trend for
scores to move in the direction of the presented Feedback.
.9
.
Q
'..._)
.?
.6
.5
,/
/
.4
.. 3
U1
<1.>
.2
H
0
0
U2
•1
0
-. 1
-.2
-.3
-.4
-.5
-.6
-.7
=.8
-.9
Risk
None
Caution
Type of Argument
Firure l. Hean Choice-Shift Scores for Risk Items
ulotted as a function of Arpuments
over Feedback.
Scores are pooled
32
The cell means for the cautious items is presented
in Table 4. The results of an analysis of variance performed on this data is presented in Table 5. As it shows,
two main effects were found: (l) an Arr_:uments main effect
(F=~.656,
df=2/99,
p~.Ol),
and (2) a Feedback main effect
(F=3.324, df=2/99, p<.Ol).
Strength of
a~sociation
measure, eta squared, re-
vealed that ag3in Arguments accounted for approximately
6%
of the sample variance, while Feedback accounted for
only 1.3% of the variance.
Figure 2 illustrates the obtained Arguments effect.
It shows that once again the decisions made by subjects
moved in the same direction as that advocated by the
presented arguments. That is, when arguments advocated a
risky decision, choice-shift scores evidenced movement
toward risk; while when arguments advocated a cautious
decision, choice-shift scores evidenced movement toward
caution. Again, when no arguments were presented, choiceshift scores tended to hover close to zero.
Newman-Keuls comparisons of the 1'l.rr,ument means for
the Cautious items data revealed only one significant
difference. The scores of those receiving arguments
advocating risk were significantly more risky than the
scores of those receiving arguments advocating caution. The
absolute difference between these conditions was .889,
Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for Cautious Items
·-
Cautious Iter11s
Item
Item
Risk
n·
1
.!:'elSe\:
-1.0
-.6()
-.83
Caution
0
0
0
None
-1.33
.......,..._
I
Caution
II
I
I
l
2
1
FeedbAck
Ar.£.llmen ts
D.
l
~,lSi:\:.
.42
I
-
+.16
-tI
-
LJ.1
~• 12
.08
Caution
• 50
None
.33
.50
.lt2
Risk
-.33
-.50
-.42
1. 20
.85
J
I
Caution
None
I
I!
-!-----fj_
-.50
lllon_e_ ] .
I
'--·
50
I
.33
-.16
I
I
-.08
• 17
34
Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores on Cautious
Items at three levels of Feedback and
~t
three levels of
Arr;uments
Source of Variance
df
ES
F
Between-Subjects
}~ r
gum en t s (A)
2
14.59
6.56**
(F)
2
7.29
3.32**
4
• 99
99
2.19
Feedback
A
107
X
F'
Error:between subjects
<1
Within-Subjects
108
(I)
1
5.35
3.07
.4 X I
2
2.23
1.28
F
I
2
1 • 15
41
A X F X I
4
4.17
2.39
99
1.74
Items
X
Error:within subjects
Total
**
P<· 01
215
35
.
ol
_,
c:
0
.8
.7l
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
•1
0
-. 1
I
-.2
-.3
-.4
-.5
-. 61
-.7
-Q8
-. 9 I
Risk
None
Caution
Type of Argument
FiRure 2. Mean Choice-Shift Scores for Cautious Items
-------~~
over Feedback.
df=3/99, p<.Ol, while the critical value was .586.
As with the risky items, the scores of those
risk arcuments were not
si~nificantly
receivin~
different from the
scores of those receiving no arguments; the absolute
difference here beinr .320, thus smaller than the necessary
.586. Nor were the scores of those receivinc cautious
arguments significantly different from the scores of those
receiving no arguments. The absolute difference between
these conditions was .568.
Figure 3 illustrates the Feedback main effect found
for the Cautious Items data. Inspection shows that choiceshift scores moved in the same direction as that of the
presented Feedback. That is, when subjects were told that,
on their first decision measure, the grdup average was
extremely risky, they tended to make riskier decisions on
their second measure. Similarly, when subjects were told
that their group average was extremely cautious, their
scores moved in the cautious direction on the second
measure. Acain, in the abscense of Feedback, choice-shift
scores tended to hover near zero.
Newman-Keuls comparisons were performed on the
Feedback means. This procedure revealed only one significant difference. Those who received the Feedback that their
group average was extremely risky had significantly more
risky scores than those who received the Feedback that
their
e~oup
average was very cautious. The absolute diff-
37
•
Q
'J
.7
.6
.5
{/}
<1.1
H
0
0
U2
.41
.3,
.zj
•1
0
-.1
-.2
-.3
-.6
-.7
-.s I
-. 9__
, -+---------+-Risk
None
Caution
Type of Feedback
Fir;ure ,2. Hean Choice-Shift Scores for Cautious Items
plotted as_A function of Feedback with scores pooled
over Arp.:uments.
erence between these
con~itions
W8s .625, df=3/99,
p~.05
while ;:F'ain the critical value w;:;.s • 5B6.
Since no Item main effects were observed in the
analyses of either the risk or the cautious Items, it was
concluded that like Items behaved consistently. Thus, for
a more reliable and a
sin~le
observation of both levels of
Items (risk/caution), the mean choice-shift score for each
subject over the two like Items was computed. This procedure cave each subject a single risk Item score and a
single cautious Item score. Table 6 presents the cell means
for this avera?ed data.
The results of an analysis of variance performed
on the averaced data is presented in Table 7. It shows two·
main effects, an Arguments main effect (F=10.9262, df=Z/99,
pO::.Ol) and e Feedback main effect
(F=L~.77,
df=2/99, P' .01)
Strength of association measure, eta squared, revealed that the Arguments effect accounted for
4%
of the
sample variance while the Feedback effect accounted for
1% of the variance.
Figure 4 presents a plot of the obtained Arguments
effect and, once again, it shows that scores consistently
evidenced movement in the same direction as that advocated
by the presented
~rpuments.
Further, in the absence of
arguments, scores were closer to zero.
Newman-Keuls comparisons of the Arcuments means
39
~rABLE
6
Cell Means of Choice-Shift Scores for Averased Data
I
Arguments
lt(?ms
Risk
Feedback
Risk
-.33
Risk
-.42
Caution
---
-.58
0
-.21
-.46
-
I
I
-.25
-
.
.,_.,
3~
1 .25
Risk
Caution
-.83
'
None
I
Caution
II
.83
Caution
• 13
.83
.a.
1 ./
R3
ov
I
• 46
-.33
-.42
-.37
Caution
.75
-.08
.33
None
.08
I
Risk
Il
I
I
~42
None
I
.. 50
.I
:1
• 17
. 12
40
Analysis of Variance of Choice-Shift Scores on
Averape~
Items at three levels of Feedback anrl at three levels of
Arruments
-------------------------·-------------------Source of Variance
Between-Subjects
df
H.S
F
107
Arr:;uments (A)
2
13.?9
1o. 93**
Feedback
2
6.03
4.77**
4
.27
99
1. 26
A
X
(F)
F
Error:between subjects
Within-Subjects
103
(I)
1
1.19
Items
.(1
1 • :.:.0
A X
I
2
.23
~
F
X
I
2
• 13
~1
A
X
F
4
1.32
99
.85
X
I
Error:within subjects
Total
**p(. 01
215
1
1. 56
.7
.6
.5
.4
.3
.2
•1
0
-., I
-.2
-.3'
-.4
-.51
I
-.o
r
-.7
-.8
-. 9..:.---41,..._.
Risk
None
Ceution
Type of Argument
Figure 4. Mean Choice-Shift Scores for
Avera~e~
Items
J212.tted as a function of Ar;::uments ·with scores pooled
over Feedback.
1·2
for this averarPd data revealed two sirnificant differences.
The scores of those receivinr arrurnents advocatinG risk were
sisnificantly more risky than the scores of those receivinr
arguments advocatinf caution. The absolute difference between these conditions was .875, df=3/99, p .01, while the
critical value was .445. In addition, the scores of those
receiving arcuments advocating caution were significantly
more cautious than the scores of those
receivin~
no arcu-
ments. Again, while the critical value was .445, the absolute difference between these conditions was .543, df=3/99
p<. 05.
No si.r:onificant difference was found betvreen the risky
arguments condition and the no arguments condition, the absolute difference here beinc only .409.
Figure 5 illustrntes the Feedback main effect found
for the avera[ed data. Inspection shows that choice-shi t
0
scores once again evidenced movement in the same direction
as the presented Feedback. And, as with the cautious items,
in the abscence of Feedback, scores hovered near zero.
Newman-Keuls comparisons revealed only one sifnificant difference. Those receivinc risky Feedback had sicnificantly higher risk scores than those receiving cautious
Feedback. The critical value was .445 while the absolute
difference between these conditions was .576, df=3/99,
p<.05.
.
0_/
.
n
c:
0
~_)
.7
•
,,r- I
u
.5
.4
.3
.2
•1
ol
-. 1
I
-.21
I
-:.3
/
-. L+
-.5,
-.6
-.7
-.8
.
- c...
Risk
None
Caution
Type of Feedback
Fipure 5. Mean Choice-Shift Scores for
Avera~ed
Items
plotted as a function of Feedback with scores pooled over
DISCUs:~noN
This study tested three explanations 6f choice-shifts:
(l)The
relevant-Ar~ur.1ents
hypothesis, (2) the cultural-
value hypothesis and, (3) the two-process hypothesis.
The
relevent-c:rr:~uments
explenetion holds that the
sole determinant of choice-shifts is the type of arsument
that subjects are presented with. On the other hand, the
cultural-value hypothesis states that the sole determinant
of the shift is subjects' knowledge of the averace value
selected by their group on the initial decision measure.
The
two-p~ocess
explanetion claims that the full magni-
tude of the shift is effected by the presence of both of
the above mentioned factorso
For the relevant-ar[uments explanation to be supported
by this study, results were expected to show choice-shifts
for the Arguments variable only. Further, the 0irection
of the shifts (toward risk or toward caution) were expected to be in the same direction as that advocated by the
arguments presented. Where arguments advocated a risky
decision, choice-shifts in the direction of risk were
expected. Where ar,r;uments advocated caution, choice-shifts
in the dj_rection of caution were expected. In the absence
of arcuments, no choice-shifts were expected.
For the cultural-value explanation to be supported by
this study, results were expected to show choice-shifts
44
for the FeedbAck variable only. Further, the direction of
the shifts were expected to be in the s2me direction as
that of the Feedback that subjects were civen. If subjects
were told that their croun's averare on the initial de-
cision measure vras risky, then choi:ce-shifts in the direction of rif::>k were expected. In the absence of Feedback., no
choice-shifts were expected.
For the two-process hypothesis to be supported, both
the results predicted by the relevant-arguments explanation and the results predicted by the cultural-value
explanation
we~e
expected to occur.
Of the three hypothesis tested, the most support was
found for the two-process explanation. The Arguments
main effect observed in all of the analyses of variance
performed stronrly
sug~ests
that the type of arcument
subjects are riven is a determinant of the extremity of
decision making found in groups. As predicted, observed
scores were in the direction advocated by
argum~nts.
Further, the finding of a Feedback main effect for
the analyses of the data for both the cautious items and
the averaged items suggests that knowledge of the initial
choices of the members of the group is also a determinant
of choice-shifts. Again, as predicted, observed scores
were in the same direction as that of the Feedback supplied to subjects.
While it does appear that both arguments and knowledge
46
of others' initial rlecisions are determinants of choiceshifts; it also appears that the effects of the two
determinants are not of equal
stren~th.
Differential
strencth is indicated by the findinc that for the cautious
items data, the Arguments variable accounted for roughly
double the sample variance that the Feedback variable did.
Further,
~or
the averaeed items data, the Arsuments vari-
able accounted for almost four times the cample variance
that the Feedback variable did.
It may be, however, that the appearance of this differential strength is a deceptive one. The Feedback that
subjects were 7iven was not their real group averape.
Since the hypothesized effects of the Feedback variable
are that groups shift on the basis of cultural norms
which they view their group averaFe as typifying, it may
be that
~alse
Feedback caused them to have doubts as to
how well their group average conformed to the cultural
norm. They may have viewed their group as atypical and,
as a result, were less influenced by the Feedback variable, thus producing the decreased effect found for
Feedback.
The above notion is strenr,thened by the fact that,
almost invariably, subjects in the Feedback conditions
of this experiment expressed shock that the group averace
presented was so extreme. Further, durin[
de-briefin~
sessions, when subjects were told that the Feedback
47
supplied them was false, many said they suspected that
had been the case.
If, as
sug~ested
by Levinger and Schneider (1969) and
Pilkonis and Zana (1969), the cultural norms advocating
risky decision making are more salient to subjects than
norms advocating caution, the above effect may explain
why, for the risk items data, the Feedback variable was
significant at the .10 level rather than the .05 level.
In other words, for the risk items, it may have been
easier for the subjects to think, on the basis of false
Feedback, that their proup was atypical than it was for
them on the cautious items. Thus, the weakened effect
of the Feedback variable was even further weakened for
the risk items.
Certain results need to be further examined. For the
analyses performed on both the risk items and the cautious
items data, both the Risky Arguments condition and the
Cautious Arguments condition consistently failed to be
significantly different from the No Argumen ~~s condition.
These findings were so despite the fact that in both
analyses, the Risky Arguments condition differed from the
Cautious Arguments condition to a .01 degree of significance. For the averaged items data, only the Risky Arguments condition failed to be siGnificantly different from
the No Arguments condition.
A similar occurence was found f·-:>r the Feedback varieble.
Feedback main effects occurred for both the Cautious Items
data and the Averaped Items data. However, for both perforoed analyses, the Risky Feedback condition and the
Cautious Feedback condition failed to differ significantly
from the No Feedback condition.
Now for experimenters to place stronf confidence in the
two-process hypothesis, the hypothesis should cenerate an
explanation for the above findings. And,
~ndeed,
this can
be done.
The two-process hypothesis holds that both Arguments
and knowledge of others choices on their initial decision
measure are determinants of the full nagnitude of choiceshifts. Thus, it may
b~
that a comparison of a condition
where only one factor (Arguments or Feedback) is operating
to a condition where neither factor is operating, is a
difference too small to be detected in this experiment.
This explanation is made more appealing by the following considerations. The comparison procedure used in this
study was the Newman-Keuls technique, a moderately conservative procedure (Linton and
G~llo,
1975). Now many
of the aforementioned comparisons failed to reach significance by a very small amount. Therefore, it is likely
that had a less conservative test been chosen, significant
differences would have been obtained.
However, prior to the experiment, it was planned to do
at least three analysis of variance, each of which might
have
requirerl between three
Thus, the experimenter
w~s
six specific comparisons.
~nd
relunct2nt to use a less con-
serv8tive test.
Given the results of this study, it seems cocent to
suggest that both arguments and knowledge of others choice
are determinants of choice-shifts. But are they the sole
determinants? Apparently not, for in total they accounted,
for both the Risk Items and Cautious Items data, only
around
8%
of the sample variance. For the Averaged Items
data, ttey accounted for only
5%
of the variance. Thus it
may be that there are other, perhaps even more crucial
factors, th&t contribute to choice-shift phenomena.
One possible contributor to the phenomena might be the
Items variable itself. For both the Risk· Items and the
Cautious Items, the effect was sisnificant at the .10
level, giving reason to wonder whether Items contribute
to the observed magnitude of the shift. Johnson and
Andrews (1971) have stated that this is so. They claim
that Items contain some initial
polari~y,
sort of setting
the direction which arguments and initial decision measures will take.
Future research should attempt to examine whether Item
type contributes to the magnitude of choice-shifts. While
it is true that this study failed to observe an Items
effect significant to the standard
.05 level, it must be
remembered that only four items were observed. And four
50
items is hardly a
ran~e
upon which to base any stronc
statements about the role, or lack of it, played by Items
in
choice-shif~
phenomena. Beyond this, common-sense
grounds argue for the experimenters to at least entertain
a suspicion that the content of the items croups are deciding upon may effect the extremity of their decision
making.
Another area for future experiments concerns the
methodological obstacles already mentioned in this experiment's manipulation of the Feedback variable. Future
experiments should attempt to examine whether false
Feedback reduces the variable's strenrth as a r1eterminant.
The observation of the Arcuments variable was also
restricted due to methodology. This is because the convincinG power of the arguments used was average to low.
If convincingness is increased, it may be that the Arguments effect is also increased. Further, in any given
experimental condition, only two arguments were used. If
the number of areuments presented is increased, it may
also lead to increased strength of the Arguments variable.
Thus, another area for future research would be manipulation of these two components of the Arguments variable.
The resulting magnitudes of the shifts produced could be
observed.
This study also has implications for explaining the
findings of past research on choice-shift phenomena. If
51
indeed both variables are determinants, t\e first
implication is that the
Teager
(19~7)
findin~s
explain why Pruitt and
found a choice-shift for conditions of
Feedback only, while St. Jean (1970) found choice-shifts
for Arguments only.
t,,
t'ner, l-'. ~ ln
.
f_ac t
"'"ur
1
i·eeu..Jb acK
-r-1
•
lS
or,.. l _ess
f'-"'
e~J.ec
t on
choice-shift macnitudes than Arguments, a reason may be
offered as to why MurEinham and Castore (1975) and
Burnstein and Vinokur ( 1973) failed to find support for
the Feedback variable. The findine might not only be due
to poor experimental design but to a choice of insufficently
stron~
levels in their selection of the Feedback
variable itself.
In conclusion then, the two-process hypothesis of
choice-shift phenomena is supported by the results of
this study. Further, there are COlent reasons to suspect
i terns themselves as contributory to t:::..e magnitude of
choice-shift phenomena. The results of this
licht on conflicts and findings of past
~tudy
researc~.
shed
Also,
the results provide nev1 directions which future experiments on choice-shifts may undertake.
3ateson, R. Familiarization, rroup discussion, and risktaking. Journal of Experimental Social Psycholo:z, 1966,
~'
11 9-129.
Bem,
D.J., ':'!allach, H.A. and Kogan, N. Group decision
makinG under risk of aversive consequences. Journal of
Personality_£:_nd Soci8l PsycholoPy, 1965, ]_,4_53-460.
Burnstein E. and Vinokur, A. Testins two classes of
theories about induced shifts in individual choice.
Journal of Ex32erimental Social Ps,Ycholor'-y, 1973, ,2,
123-137.
Dian, K.L., Miller, N. and Magnan, M.A. Cohesiveness and
social responsibility as determinants of group risktaking. Journal of Personality and Social Psycholory,
1971'
2, 400-406.
Johnson, D.L. and Andrews, I.R. Group polarization of
• d
J..
.]u.gemen~.-s
b
• "' .
1-J
07,)_' __:±,
2 1 l _01
...D syc.onoml£2Clence,
__, - l__ 02
__,.
Kogan, N. and Daise, W. Effects of anticipated delegate
status on level of risk-takine in small decision-makinf
groups. Acta Psycholopica, 1969, 29, 223-243.
Koran, N. and Zaleska, M. Level of risk selected by
individuals and groups when deciding for self and others.
Proceedings, 77th Annual Convention, APA, 1969,
424.
52
lf, 423-
53
Lnmm, E. and
Ko~an,
Ps:vcholo::y, 1970,
£.,
~.
Risk takin[ in the context of
351-363.
Levin£er, G. and Schneider, D.J. Test of the culturalvalue hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social
Ps vc11olo~''
-k·l
..
-
:_· •. . , . ,
lo<a
11' 165-170.
-7'-··"./'
Linton, M. and Gallo, P.H. The nractical statistician
----------------------------·
Monterey, California: Wadsworth
Publishin~
Company, 1975.
Madaras, G.R. and Bern, ,D.J. Risk and conservatisim in
group decision making. Journal of Experimental Social
Marquis, D.G. and Reitz, H.J. Effect of uncertainty on
risk takinr; in individual Rnd r:roup decisions. 3ehaviQ£
Marquis, D. G. Individual responsibility and group
decisions involving risk. Industrial Manarement Review,
1 962 '
3' 8-23.
Murningham, J.K. and Castore, C.H. An experimental test
of three choice-shift hypothesis. Hemory and CoRnitiont.
1975, 2_, 171-174.
Myers, D.G. and Nurdoch, P.J. Is risky shift due to
disproportionate .influence of extreme r;roup members?
British Journal of Social and Clinical Psycholory, 1972,
~'
109-114.
54
Nordh¢y, ?. Group interaction in decision makinc under
risk. School of Industrial Manar·ement, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, 1961.
Pilkonis, P.A. and Zanna, M.P. The choice shift
phenomenon in groups: replication and extension. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1968.
P?wi~t,
D.G. and Teager, A. I. Components of croup
risk-takinp:. Journal of ExE_erimental Social Ps:vcholof;y_,
1967, ~' 189-205.
Pruitt, D.G. and Tearer, A.I. A reexamination of the
familierization hypothesis in croup risk takinr. Journ,gl
9f ExnerirJentel Social
Psycholo~~y,
1969, .§., 346-350.
Habow, J., Fowler, F.J., Bradford, D.L., Hofeller, M.A.
and Shibuya, Y. The role of social norms and leadership
Rim, Y. Interpersonal values and risk taking. Paper
presented at the First International Congress of
Psychiatry, London, February, 1963.
Sie,r:el,
s.
and Zajonc, R.B. Group risk-taking in pro-
fessional decisions. Sociometry, 1967, 30, 339-350.
St. Jean, R. Reformulation of the value hypothesis in
group risk taking. Proceedincs of the 78th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, 1970,
55
Stoner, J.A.F. 7·(jsky And cautious shifts in ;·rolm
decisions: the
in~"luence
of wi 'ely >eld velues. JournAl
of :SxJ2.erinentel Sociel Psycholo:·:y, 1968, !±, l+!f-2-4.59.
Wallach, M.A., Kogan, N. and 3em, D. Group influence on
individual risk takinr. Journal of Abnorr1al and Social
J:s;y:chol£.cz, 1 962, 6 5, 75-86.
Wallach, M.A., Kocan X. and Bern, D. Diffusion of responsibility and level of risk taking in groups. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psycholo.,a·y, 1964, 68, 263-274.
Wallach, M.A., Ko7an, N. and Burt, R.B. Are risk takers
more persusasive than conservatives in croup discussion?
Journol of Ex•)t--:,rimental Sociol Psycholop;;y:, 1968, !±' 76-
Zajonc, R.B., Wolosin, R.J., Wolosin, M.A. end Sherman,
S.J. Individuel and croup
risk-takin~
in a two choice
situation. Journal of Experimental .Social PsycholQL:u
Q
'
1 96_,(_;,
.:±'
f<o
',..!./~ 1 O'
o.
APPErWIX A
H:SAN RATINGS OF ARGtfJ\IENTS SELECTED IN
5(
'-'
T~JE
PRl<;TEST
57
ARGUl-fCNTS
·-~-·- ------·~----·
Risk
Risk
Ar:;ument
IT3?···1,S
Arr:~ument
'
2
1
Cautious
Arrument
Cautious
.Ar,cument
1
2
~
I
Ii
2.83
1
I
l
.
I
,_,....
iI
j 3.0
2.66
·---···
-~·.,._
Lt-
r---~·~·-~·
--.---.--
2.92
--------·-
_...,.,._,.~_,..~,··~··.
·----~·~.,~-~-
2.90
2.70
~--~
2.2E5
2.67
2.26
3
-
I
I
3 v::
-
2
l
~
Ii
2.25
2.75
2.25
,.
I 2.92
·+----·--.. . . . . . . . . .__
2.87
2 ·'-+2
58
APPE~TDIX
TEST
BOOKV<~T
A
CONTAINING RISK ARGlfMENTS
59
Instructions:
On the following paces, you will find a series of
situations that are likely to occur in everyday life. The
central person in each situation is faced with a choice
between two alternative courses of action, which
we
misht
call X and Y. Alternative X is more desirable and attractive than alternative Y, but the probability of attainine
or achievinf X is less than that of attainins or achieving
Y.
For each situetion on the followinr: paces, you will
be
asked to indicate the minimum odds of success you
would demand before recommending that the more desireable
or attractive alternative, X, be chosen.
Mr.
~
is currently a colleJe senior who is very
eaper to pursue craduate study in chemistry leading to the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree. 3e has been accepted by both
University X and University Y. University X has a worldwide reputation for excellence in chemistry. While a
depree from University X would signify outstandinG train-
inf in this field, the standards are so very riporous
that only a fraction of the degree candidates actually
receive the degree. University·Y, on the other hand, has
much less of a reputation in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor of Philosophy
thouch the degree has much less
presti~e
De~ree,
than the corre-
spondine dePree from University X.
Ima~ine
that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded
a degree at University X, the one with the greater
pres~
tig:e.
PleFJse check the LOWEST probability that you would
consi<ier acceptable to make it worthwhile for Hr. F to
enroll in University X rather than University Y.
The chances
---degree
from
are 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
University X.
chances
---The
degree from
are 7 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
University X.
___ 'rhe chances are 5 in 10 that Hr. F would receive a
61
rle~ree
from University X.
Dre 3 in 10 thc-o.t 1::r.
der-ree fro?n University x.
T~JP
ch;:;~nces
chances
- -The
degree from
H'
w;u1d receive a
are 1 in 10 that I·Ir. F would receive a
University x.
62
Mr. F should chose University X even if the chances of
his
rettin~
his doctorate is 1 in 10 because if he doesn't
make it, he can always re-apply to University Y.
Mr. F should chose University X even if the chance of
his getting his doctorate is 3 in 10 because he'll get
lot better education there and that is what counts.
a
11r. F is cutrently a
to pursue
~raduate
colle~e
study in
senior who is very eaper
c~emistry
leadinr to the
Doctor of Philosophy Degree. He has been accepted by both
University X and University Y. University X has a worldwi,1e reputation for excellence in chemistry. While a
degree from University X would sicnify outstandinp trainin~
in this field, the standards are so very ricorous
that only a fraction of the derree candidates actually
receive the decree. University Y, on the other hand, has
much less of a reputation in chemistry, but almost everyone admitted is awarded the Doctor of Philosophy
De~ree,
though the decree has much less prestige than the correspending desree from University X.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. F. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds that Mr. F would be awarded
a decree at University X, the one with the ,creater pres-
Please check the ID 1llEST probability that you would
consider acceptable to m,'3ke it worthwhile for Hr. F to
enroll in University X rather than University Y.
chances are 9 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
deGree from University X.
---The
chances
---The
degree from
--- The
are 7 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
University X.
chances are 5 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
64
derree from University X.
chances are 3 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
deGree from University X.
-----The
chances are 1 in 10 that Mr. F would receive a
degree from University X.
-----The
(c:;
·/
Mr. E is the president of a li 7 ht Metals corporation
in the United States. The corporation is quite prosperous,
end has stroncly consirlererl the possibilities of
bus~~ ness
expansion by buildinc an additional plant in a new location. The choice is bet·ween builrling another plant in tLe
u.s.,
where there would be a moderate return on the initial
investment, or builrling a plant in a foreign country. Lower labor costs and easy access to raw materials in that
country would mean a much
hi~her
return on the initial
investment. On the other hand, there is a history of
political instability and revolution in the foreiPn country under consideration. In fact, the leader of a small
minority party is committed to nationalizing, that is,
takinp over, all foreign investments.
Imagine that you are advisinp Mr. E. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds of continued political
stability in the foreign country under consideration.
Please check the LO'NEST probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. E's corporation to build a
plant in that country.
_____ The chances are 1 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
The ch;mces
---will
remain
Are 3 in 10 that the foreicn country
politically stable.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
The chances
---will
remain
are 7 in 10 that the foreirn country
politically stable.
chances are 9 in 10 that the foreirn country
will remain politically stable.
---The
67
Mr. E should build the plant in the foreirn country even
if the chence that the country will remnin politically
stable is 3 in 10 because the corporation is already
prosperous and so it can afford to take a big chance for
big revm rcJ s •
Mr. E should build the plant in the foreign country even
if the chance that the country will remain politically
stable is 1 in 10 because
w~en
the
U.s.
corporations in-
vest money abroad, it makes foreign countries more willing
to co-operate with
u.s.
goals and ideals.
Mr.
~
is the president of a
li~ht
oetals corporation
in the United States. The corporation is quite prosperous,
anrl hss stron:ly considereo the possibilities of business
expansion by building an additional plant in a new location. The choice is between buildinc another plant in the
U.S., where there would be a moderate return on
t~e
initial
investment, or buildinc a plant in a foreign country. Lower labor costs and easy access to raw materials in that
country would mean a much higher return on the initial
investment. On the other hand, there is a history of
political instability and revolution in the foreign country under consideration. In fact, the leader of a small
minority party is committed to nationalizing, that is,
taking over, all foreign investments.
!marine that you are advising Mr. E. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds of continued political
stability in the foreign country under consideration.
Please check the LOWEST probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. E 1 s corporation to build a
plant in that country.
~'-'-
The chances are 1 in 10 that the foreicn country
Will remain politically stable.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the foreir:::: country
will remain politically stable.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the foreign country
will remain politically stable.
69
---The
chances are 7 in 10 that the
forei~n
country
will renain politicCJlly st::J.:)le.
---The
chances are 9 in 10 that the foreicn country
will remain politically stable.
70
Mr. M is
conte~platin~ ~arria?e
to Miss T,
8
rirl
whom he has known for little more then a year. Recently,
however, a number of arruments have occurred between them,
su~~estin:
sharp differences of opinion in the way each
views certain matters. Indeed, they decided to seek professional advice from a marria[e conselor as to whether it
would be wise for them to marry. On the basis of these
meetincs with a marriage counselor, they realize that a
happy marriage, while possible, would not be assured.
Imapine that you are advisins Mr. M and Miss T. Listed below are several probabilities or odds that their marriace
would prove to be
8
happy and successful one.
Please check the LOWE.ST probability that you would
consider acceptable for Mr. M and Miss T to get married.
chances are 9 in 10
---The
happy and successful.
that the marriage would be
chances are 7 in 10
---The
happy and successful.
that
t~e
marriage would be
___ The chances are 5 in 10 that the marriare would be
happy and successful.
chances are 3 in 10
---The
happy and successful.
tha~
the marriage would be
___ The chances are 1 in 10 that the marria£te would be
happy and successful.
71
They should Ret married even if the chances are 3 in 10
that the
marria~e
will be successful because they rio love
each other and should try to have what time torether they
can.
They should
~et
married even if the chances are 1 in 10
that the marriage will be successful because if they care
enough to see a marriage counselor, they probably care
enou~h
to put in the effort required to work things out.
72
Mr.
~
is
conte~platinr
marria7e to Kiss T, a
~irl
whom he has known for little more than a year. Recently,
however, a number of
ar~uments
have occurred between them,
sucresting sharp differences of opinion in the way each
views certain matters. Indeed, they decided to seek professional
advic~
from a marriape counselor as to whether it
would be wise for them to marry. On the basis of these
meetings with a marriage counselor, they realize that a
happy marriage, while possible, would not be assured.
Imagine that you are advising Mr. M and Miss T. Listed below are several probabilities or odds that their marriace
would prove to be a happy and successful one.
Please check the LOWEST probability t'iat you would
consider acceptable for Mr. M and Miss T to get married.
J:he chances are 9 in 10 that the marria!:se would be
happy and successful.
1
___
chances are 7 in 10 that the marriage would be
happy and successful.
--=The
chances are 5 in 10
---The
happy and successful.
that the marriage would be
___ The chances are 3 in 10 that the marriage would be
happy and successful.
chances are 1 in 10
---The
happy and successful.
that the marriage would be
73
electrical enrineer, who is married and has
one chilrl, has been workinr for a larce electronics corporation since rrraduating from college five years aco. He is
assured of a lifetime job with a modest, though adequate,
salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. On
the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will
increa.se rmch before he retires. Wl1.ile attendinc a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded
company which has a hiFhly uncertain future. The new job
would pay more to start with and would offer the possibility of a share in the ownership if the company survived the
competition of the larrer firms.
Ixar:;ine that you are advising Hr. A. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds of the new company's provins
financially sound.
Please checle::. the LOWEST probability thc;t you vrould
consider Bcceptable to make it worthvrhile for Hr. A to
take the new job.
_ _The chances are 1 in 10 that .the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances are 3 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
The chances are 5 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
chances
---The
financially
are 7 in 10 that the company will prove
sound.
---The
cnances are 9 in 10 that the conpany will prove
financially sound.
75
Mr. A should take the new job even if the chance of its
future success is
for
R
bic,~er
in 10 because it offers him t>.e hope
career success than the old job ever will.
Mr. A should take the new job even if the chance of its
future success is 3 in 10 because if it doesn't work out,
he could probably get his old job back.
7G
Mr. A, an electrical encineer, who is married and has
one
child, has been
ation since
workin~
~raduatins
for a larre electronics corpor-
from college five years acao. He is
assured of a lifetime job with a modest, thouph adequate,
salary, and liberal pension benefits upon retirement. On
the other hand, it is very unlikely that his salary will
increese much before he retires. Vlhile attendinr: a convention, Mr. A is offered a job with a small, newly founded
company which has a highly uncertain future. The new job
would pay more to start with and would offer the possibility of a share in the ownership if the company survived the
competition of the larger firms.
Ima,r:ine that you are advising 1·1r. A. Listed below are
several probabilities or odds of the new company's provinc
financially sound.
Please check the LOWEST 5robability that you would
consider .3cceptable to make it vrorthvfhile for Nr. A to
take the new job.
___The chances are 1 in 10 that the comp8ny will prove
financially sound.
chances
---The
financially
are 3 in 10 that thP company will prove
sound.
chances
---The
financially
are 5 in 10 that the company will prove
sound.
___ The chances ere 7 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
77
---The
chances 8re 9 in 10 that the company will prove
financially sound.
'7• i,_;Q
. 1~PPEKDIX A
liST 0? CAUTIOUS ARGU?vfENT.S
79
CRutious f1r ·unents userl for RLsk Iter:; 1
(
-;'.;' "V'>
•.• .L
.!._:::.
,\
)
Mr. A should take the new job only if there is
8
9 in 10 chance it will be successful because in our era of
hi~h
unemploynent, a lifetime job is too valuable a thin[
to give up lichtly.
Mr. A should take the new job only if there is a 7
in 10 chance it will be successful because if he really
works hard at the old job, he'll probably do a lot better
than he has done so
fa~.
Cautious ArPuments used for Risk Item 2 (Mr. F)
Mr. F should chose University X only if there is
a 9 out of 10 chance of his getting the degree because
what really counts is what a person knows and not where
he got his derree from.
Mr. F should chose University X only if
the~e
is
a 7 out of 10 chance of his getting the degree because
gettinc a doctorate is difficult enourh without beinc so
elitist you'll only settle for the best.
Cautious
Ar~uments
used for Cautious Item 1 (Mr. E)
Mr. E should build the plant in the foreign country
only if there are 9 in 10 chances that the country will
remain politically stable because making sure of a return
80
on an initial investment is rood business practice.
Mr. E should build the plant in the foreign country
only if there are 7 in 10 chances that the country will
remain politically stable because otherwise he might not
only lose money but have his executives face kidnapping
and murder as well.
~tious
Arruments used for Cautious Item 2 (Hr. :r.r)
They should get married only if the chances are 9
in 10 that the marriage will be successful because whom
one wants to share his or her life with is a very
impor~
tent decision.
They should get married only if the chances are 7
in 10 that the marriaFe will be successful because otherwise they will probably get a divorce and suffer a lot
more then.