Justice and Trade: An Argument for (More) Holism
Andrew Walton
Abstract: It is widely believed that global trade and the global economic order more
generally are unjustly structured. However, it is much less clear how exactly we
should understand the idea of ‘trade justice’. It is sometimes argued that trade should
be analysed as a distinct sphere of justice, with principles particular to its purpose and
nature. It is also sometimes suggested that principles should be applied to the
institutions of trade – a global economic order or a state’s trade policy – directly,
asking whether these principles are upheld by these institutions, rather than whether
they are upheld by a combination of institutions considered together. This paper
argues against both of these positions. It contends that the moral concerns relevant to
the structure of the global economy are derived from more general principles, not
particular to trade, and that we should focus on the extent to which trade institutions
work not directly, but with other institutions to uphold these demands. ‘Trade justice’
should not, the paper argues, be conceived in an isolated and detached fashion, but,
rather, by considering the appropriate relationship between overarching demands of
justice and a set of institutions of which trade is a part.
I
What would constitute a just global economic order? What would constitute a just economic
foreign policy for states? Should there be free trade? How and when, if at all, should barriers to
trade, trade sanctions, and trade access conditionality clauses be employed? What principles
should guide our answers to these questions? What is an appropriate framework for considering
the idea of justice in the context of global trade and the global economy? How do our ideas of
justice in this sphere relate to the pursuit of the broader demands of justice, both within and
without the nation-state?
Although many of these questions do not present lines of investigation that are unique or
new to contemporary affairs, they are certainly amongst the most important questions of the era
of globalisation and they are presently attracting much attention in literature. There have been a
series of texts concerned to explore the conceptual notion of ‘trade justice’, investigating what
moral principles might be thought applicable to this domain. 1 There have also been a host of
proposals regarding how to shape global trade in order better to protect or promote demands of
justice. For example, many argue in favour of allowing developing countries to raise tariff
barriers in order to protect fledgling industries in their borders, thereby to enhance development,
basic needs fulfilment, or the position of the less-advantaged. 2 Another prominent case is the
Foremost examples include: M. Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade I: Obligations from Trading and the Pauper-Labor
Argument’, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 6 (2007): 355-377; M. Risse & M. Kurjanska, ‘Fairness in Trade II:
Export Subsidies and the Fair Trade Movement’, Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 7 (2008): 29-56; A. James, ‘A
Theory of Fairness in Trade’, unpublished manuscript (2008), available at http://iisdb.stanford.edu/evnts/5506/A_Theory_of_Fairness_in_Trade.pdf; A. James, Fairness in Practice: A Social Contract
for a Global Economy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).
2
This argument, known as the infant industry argument, has a long history, but recent defences of it include: D.
Moellendorf, ‘The World Trade Organisation and Egalitarian Justice’, Metaphilosophy 36 (2005): 145-162, at p.
153; J. Stiglitz, Making Globalization Work (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 25-102; and G. Brock, Global
Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 230-231.
1
1
argument for making access to trade conditional upon respect for human rights or core labour
standards.3
As this literature has developed, it has become clear that addressing questions such as
those posed above requires exploring a series of theoretical issues. Consider the first of my
questions: ‘what would constitute a just global economic order?’ To answer this question seems
to require addressing, at least, three matters. At a certain stage of analysis, we need to explore
how different possible economic orders and policies fare according to some criteria. We need to
investigate, for example, whether free trade or a coordinated regime of tariffs better fulfils certain
relevant moral demands. But to conduct any such investigation it would be necessary to have a
framework for evaluation. It would be necessary to have explored, beforehand, against what
criteria trade regimes should be assessed. This task involves, at least, two other areas of inquiry.
It requires exploring which demands are relevant and it requires exploring how these demands
should be translated into a framework for assessing the global economy in particular. For
example, to argue that free trade should be endorsed because it helps increase wealth, it would be
necessary also to have an argument showing that increasing wealth is, in some sense, a relevant
end and an argument showing that this end should be used to guide our evaluation of trade
regimes.
These latter two areas of inquiry – the questions of which demands are relevant to
assessing the global economy and how they should be used to construct a framework for
assessment – both speak to deeper philosophical issues than it may initially seem. The first –
which demands are relevant to assessing the global economy – speaks to what I shall call the
sphere debate.4 The sphere debate asks a question about the dominion of moral principles. It
asks: do different moral principles apply in (some) different domains and practices? Is it the
case, for example, that there are different moral principles involved in the distribution of health
care, education, and housing (say, respectively, need, equality, and sufficiency) or should we
conceptualise the distribution of these goods in an integrated fashion under one common
principle (such as equality of resources)? In the case of trade it has become recent parlance to
explore similar issues in the terms: does global trade have its own internal principles – principles
particular to the practice of trade – or are the principles relevant to it external – broader moral
principles that ‘cut-across’ this domain?5 Common examples of these views would be,
respectively, the idea that the gains of trade should be distributed fairly amongst its participants
and the idea that trade should facilitate development.6 As these examples suggest, internal and
external principles are not mutually exclusive. It is possible that both exist. But to answer the
first line of inquiry – which moral principles are relevant to global trade – we do need to consider
whether external principles are pertinent and whether they exist alone or alongside principles that
pertain to the sphere of trade sui generis.
Important recent statement on this issue include: C. Barry & S. Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards:
A Proposal for Linkage’, Cornell International Law Journal 39 (2006): 545-639; James, Fairness in Practice, pp.
305-334. It is worth noting also that the same idea figures prominently in a number of popular social initiatives at
present, such as the Fair Trade movement, on which see A. Walton, ‘What is Fair Trade?, Third World Quarterly 31
(2010): 431-447.
4
This terminology is adopted in reference to M. Walzer Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality
(New York: Basic Books, 1983), where the broad philosophical idea that follows is developed.
5
This way of terming the distinction follows James, Fairness in Practice, pp. 144-146.
6
As will be detailed below, the former view is defended in James, Fairness in Practice, pp. 131-248, while the latter
view is defended in D. Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007),
pp. 251-253.
2
3
The second question – how these ends are to be related to assessing the global economy –
speaks to what I shall call the institutions debate. The issue here concerns how moral principles
are linked with the practical institutions of trade – the structure of the global economy or a
country’s trade policy, for example. Essentially, there are two possibilities. 7 On the one hand, it
is possible to offer a disaggregated answer: principles of justice should be realised directly by the
institutions of trade. On this view, the global economy or one’s trade policy should be shaped to
uphold or promote them. On the other hand, it is possible to adopt an aggregated approach,
arguing that principles of justice should be applied to a broader set of institutions taken together.
On this view, the institutions of trade should be shaped to combine with other institutions to
realise principles of justice, rather than considering whether they uphold or promote these
principles directly. For example, rather than asking whether one’s trade policy upholds them, this
approach asks whether the combination of one’s trade, aid, migration, and foreign policies work
together to uphold them. The two approaches come apart most obviously in a case where, say,
the goal of ensuring all individuals’ basic needs are fulfilled could be better served directly by a
policy of regulated (rather than free) trade, but better served overall by a combination of free
trade and free movement. The disaggregated approach will opt for the regulated trade regime (at
least pro tanto), whereas the aggregated approach will opt for the free trade and free movement
combination.
Often these two debates are not addressed concurrently. However, there seems to be a
trend in recent literature towards both the internal principles and the disaggregated institutions
approaches to trade justice. On the sphere debate, for example, Aaron James has prominently
argued that the predominant principles relevant to global trade are internal principles, which
require ‘no reference to moral principles independent of those justified specifically for the trade
relation’.8 Mathias Risse, likewise, writes that ‘international trade…generates its own principles
of justice’.9 Meanwhile, on the institutions debate, Helena de Bres asserts that ‘we ought to
exclusively direct our principles of justice at particular sub-spheres of global politics: targeting
the parts separately, not the whole’.10 In this vein, Frank Garcia’s analysis proceeds by utilising
an international difference principle ‘applied to trade’, assessing whether various international
trade agreements, such as preferential market access, establish a form of inequality that serves the
interests of the worst-off. 11
My main aim in this paper is to challenge both of these moves. Against the idea of
internal principles, I argue that it does not seem plausible to isolate the moral concerns connected
with trade from many other global moral concerns, such as development, human rights, and
climate change, and that, as such, it does not seem tenable to conceive the idea of ‘trade justice’
as a distinct moral sphere. Against the idea of disaggregated institutions, I argue that such an
approach seems both unfruitful and misaligned with much (beneficial) contemporary practice. I
do not defend the wholly opposite thesis – a fully external-aggregated approach, which would set
forth overarching principles of global justice and consider the institutions of trade only from the
perspective of how these institutions fit together with others to uphold these principles. But I do
The following distinction is set forth in H. de Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’, Social Theory and Practice 39
(2013): 422-448.
8
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 13.
9
M. Risse, On Global Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 272.
10
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at p. 422.
11
F. Garcia, ‘Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions’, Journal of International Economic Law 10 (2007):
at pp. 467-469.
3
7
aim to show that our approach to conceptualising ‘trade justice’ should be more external and
more aggregated – in a sense, more holistic – than seems common in present literature.
Because this paper must move slowly through a number of stages, it is useful to detail
carefully how it will proceed, so readers may see where certain issues will be addressed. In
Sections II and III, I begin by setting forth some comments that provide a framework for the
paper, explaining some definitions and certain points about my methodology. In Sections IV-VII
I outline an approach to trade justice that operates without the idea of internal principles and is
applied in an aggregated fashion, offering some brief remarks in its defence. In Section VIII, I
turn to developing the case further by considering alternative views. In Sections IX, X, and XI I
consider different ideas on trade justice offered in literature. In Sections XII and XIII I consider
some theoretical comments on how demands of justice might be thought to be raised internally
within the domain of global trade. In Section XIV I explore questions regarding how my
arguments address certain aspects of ‘non-ideal theory’. In Section XV I turn the paper towards
two practical examples that I consider in Sections XVI and XVII, before concluding in Section
XVIII.
II
It is useful to begin by stipulating a clear definition of the subject matter. I shall define ‘trade’ as
an uncoerced exchange between two parties for mutual advantage. 12 However, my main focus
here will be on the ideas of a ‘trade regime’ or the ‘global economy’. I shall use these terms
interchangeably to describe a sustained system of trades. They are intended to encapsulate the
idea of an on-going series of economic exchanges between two or more parties facilitated and
regulated by a set of rules and norms, including the possibility that these parties develop their
economic activities to cohere with the dynamics of the arrangement.13 This definition perhaps
directs us to thinking about the relevant ‘parties’ as states and because states have a pivotal role
in constructing and shaping the global economy, they shall often by the focus of my attention in
discussion. Obviously, however, trade regimes involve and affect others also – individuals and
companies, for example – and I shall discuss these actors where it is relevant to do so.
III
It is also useful to provide an overview of the kind of issues that the topic of ‘trade justice’
addresses. In particular, it is useful to consider a smorgasbord of the complaints that are often
made under that label about a global economy as defined above. Such a list can help us by
providing one reference point for forming a reflective equilibrium. Presumably, some, but not all
of the common complaints will be defensible. By outlining a list of such complaints before
considering the theoretical framework, we can work, in Rawls’ words, ‘in both directions’,
exploring what abstract schema can make most sense of our strongest practical convictions and
which practical convictions should be disregarded when we have found a plausible general
theory.14
This definition follows D. Miller, ‘Fair Trade: what does it mean and why does it matter?’, CSSJ Working Paper
Series, SJ013, available at http://social-justice.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/SJ013_Miller_Fairtrade.pdf: at pp. 7-8.
13
This definition is intended to track the definition of the subject matter given in James, Fairness in Practice, p. 19.
14
J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition) (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp.
15-19.
12
4
Complaints about the global economy typically focus on one of three areas. 15 Ex ante
complaints focus on the position of parties prior to ‘entering’ economic relations. Examples
include:
1. The argument of developing countries that they do not face fair opportunities to develop
their economic base through appropriately coordinated tariff regimes;
2. The worry that less-advantaged individuals face circumstances of desperation and are,
thus, susceptible to domination and exploitation;
3. The claim of wealthy country producers that low working standards elsewhere mean that
not everyone enters the market on fair terms.
A second form of objection can be called modus operandi complaints. These worries concern the
morality of the procedures and transactions within the economic system, such as:
4. The objection to any form of economic transaction that involves morally abhorrent
practices, such as slavery or sexual servitude;
5. The worry that poor producers must work in unsafe and unsatisfactory conditions.
The last area of common focus can be called ex post complaints. These complaints concern the
outcomes of involvement in economics systems, such as:
6. The objection that some party does not receive fair pay or benefit for her work or
participation;
7. The worry that some party does not have sufficient means to fulfil some form of need or
desire.
Although these specific complaints do not constitute an exhaustive list of objections to the
existing global economy, I do hope that the categorisation scheme covers, at least, most of the
common forms of objection. With this classification scheme detailed, we can now explore what
approach to the question of ‘trade justice’ can make coherent sense of our worries.
IV
In order to consider how the different approaches I outlined in the introduction operate, it is
useful to begin with a digression to a more familiar example. A good case for conceptualising
the ideas is the question of justice in health care provision.
Often health care has been treated as something of a ‘special case’. It has often been
assumed or argued that, perhaps alongside general considerations of justice, there are sui generis
standards of health care justice. The ‘rule of rescue’ (to save life whenever possible, usually
regardless of cost), for example, can be thought to derive from the very purpose of providing
health care to a population. Similarly, it is sometimes thought that inequalities within the domain
of health care, such as differences in health between social groups, are morally interesting in their
own right, independent, that is, of their connection or relation to other concerns, such as equal
15
The following list draws heavily on James, Fairness in Practice, pp. 7-8. However, the complaints listed are, I
hope, fairly familiar.
5
opportunities. 16 In these approaches, health care is treated as an ‘insulated’ sphere, with
principles and parameters particular to it. 17 Such treatment manifests the idea of internal
principles. It is also not uncommon to assess the practical institutions of health care (government
policy on health, hospitals, and so forth) in an insulated fashion, arguing that these institutions
should uphold moral principles directly. It can be argued that they should be guided by the rule
of rescue, for example, because health care provision should realise ‘principles of health care
justice’.18 It would also not be unfamiliar to hear the thought that health care institutions should
be arranged to rectify the inequalities in health that exist between different social groups. Such
treatment manifests the ideas of a disaggregated institutions approach.
An alternative means of approaching health care justice would be as follows.19 We
consider what justice requires at a general level, adopting, for example, the principle of equality
of resources. We, then, explore how to arrange our various institutions to realise these demands.
Perhaps establishing a universal health care system, combined with other institutional structures,
will best realise equality of resources, by helping compensate some individuals who would
otherwise have less resources than others. With this framework established, we are positioned to
judge the justice of health care systems in different countries. If they do not have a universal
health care system of the kind described, we can conclude that their health care systems are
unjust, ceteris paribus. But notice that the structure of the analysis contrasts with that above in
two respects. First, it operates without any notion of internal principles. In this case, the
approach used only an external principle. Second, the approach used to consider the particular
design of the health care system determined that we should have universal health care provision
on the grounds that the demands of justice were best realised by the system as a whole if such a
policy was followed. If analysis had shown that the demands of justice could be upheld to an
equal extent with a private health care system (combined with other institutions), we should deem
a country with a private health care system (existing alongside these other institutions) neither
more nor less just than a country with universal health care provision. If analysis had shown that
the demands of justice were better upheld by this alternative system, this alternative would be
what justice demands. In this case, countries with universal health care systems would be
deemed less just.20 For, the analysis operated with the position that institutions should be deemed
just to the extent that they, together, uphold the demands of justice. This treatment manifests an
aggregated institutions approach.
As I have presented them, it might seem that the sides of the debate move together, that if
one adopts an internal principles account, one is likely to adopt a disaggregated institutions
approach. There is perhaps some de facto truth to this thought. But there is no necessary link
between the positions in the two debates. It is quite possible to adopt an internal-aggregated
approach, as, for example, would be the case in the argument that realising equality in health is
This belief seems present, for example, in C. Murray et al., ‘Health Inequalities and Social Group Differences:
What should we measure?’, Bulletin of the World Health Organization 77 (1999): 537-543; E. Gakidou et al,
‘Defining and Measuring Health Inequality: An approach based on the distribution of health expectancy’, Bulletin of
the World Health Organization 78 (2000): 42-54.
17
This position is defended, most prominently, by M. Walzer Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and
Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 64-94.
18
Again, Walzer, Spheres of Justice, pp. 64-94 seems to provide an example of this line of argument.
19
The method described reflects the broad approach adopted by R. Dworkin, ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health
Care’, McGill Law Journal 38 (1993): 883-898.
20
In a sense, Dworkin defends such a position in his abstract idealisation of how to address health care justice in
Dworkin, ‘Justice in the Distribution of Health Care’.
6
16
usefully or best pursued by limiting inequality in wealth. 21 It is also quite possible to adopt an
external-disaggregated approach. We could, for example, posit a general requirement that each
individual in a society should be positioned to exercise autonomy and explore, in isolation, which
of a private or public health care system best aids the realisation of this goal.
Thus, there appear to be four available permutations – internal-disaggregated; internalaggregated; external-disaggregated; external-aggregated – and arbitrating between these options
seems to require an argument on each debate.
V
The first step in arguing against the internal principles and disaggregated institutions approaches
involves explicating how to construct an alternative. As noted above, I will not seek to defend
the wholly external-aggregated model that would fill this space, but it is useful to see its structure
and merits as a means of challenging these other approaches. Although there are various
differences between the two cases, we can use the example offered in the previous section as a
framework to guide the construction of such a model for trade justice.
Let us begin by describing an account of global justice that does not seem to offer any
reference to internal principles. 22 I shall call the account sufficiency of resources (SR). SR
requires that all individuals and states hold enough resources to have a minimally reasonable
existence and a basic set of opportunities. For individuals, this requirement will typically mean
that they are owed the protection of certain rights, such as to bodily integrity and to freedom of
conscience, speech, movement, and contract, and a set of resources that make these liberties
effective, such as some level of wealth and education. States, similarly, would be owed some set
of rights, such as those of sovereignty and collective self-determination, and, again, certain
resources to make them effective, such as a certain financial base. This position offers an
external principles account.
To use these demands to determine what is required of the practical institution of global
trade, we consider how these demands can best be upheld by a comprehensive set of institutions
and determine the appropriate structure for the global economy derivatively. Perhaps it will be
the case that they will be best upheld by restricting the permitted transactions extensively and
adopting a carefully directed set of tariffs on trade. Perhaps they will be best upheld by allowing
trades to flow freely whilst taxing and redistributing overall wealth periodically. Perhaps the
former policy looks more effective alone, whereas the latter is more effective overall when
combined with suitable supplementary policies, such as education policies designed to ensure that
individual actors can lay effective claim to their rights or that states have sufficient legal
delegations to prosecute one another for violations of agreed rules. If we simply adopt whichever
combination best realises the principles detailed above, without considering how each institution
upholds them directly, we adopt an aggregated institutions approach.
21
Something akin to this approach seems present in R. Wilkinson & K. Pickett, The Spirit Level: Why Equality is
Better for Everyone (London: Penguin Books, 2010).
22
Readers will notice some obvious similarity of the following comments to the view offered in J. Rawls, The Law
of Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999). Some aspects of the description might
appear to extend the Rawlsian position. For an argument that Rawls should be interpreted along these lines, see A.
Walton, ‘Global Democracy in a Society of Peoples’, Critical Review of International Social and Political
Philosophy, available on EarlyView. However, nothing is intended to depend on the relation to Rawls’ position. The
outline is intended to offer simply a minimalist conception of global justice which I think will be acceptable to most
readers without reference to internal principles.
7
VI
The benefit of constructing this model is that it allows us to see what seems plausible about
addressing trade justice in a fashion that leans more towards the external-aggregated approach.
Perhaps the most important point to note about its external dimension is that it seems to
offer a widely acceptable moral underpinning which offers a reasonable gauge of the commonly
identified problems with the global economy. The outline of SR may not offer an account of
global justice that suits everyone. Indeed, I shall say more about plausible developments of it in
due course. But there are few who would dispute that global justice requires at least something
like what SR recommends.23 Meanwhile, the account seems to provide grounding for many of
the complaints listed in Section III. Complaint 1 – that developing countries they do not face fair
opportunities to develop their economic base – coheres succinctly with the idea that all states
should have the resources and chance to make effective use of their rights of sovereignty and
collective self-determination. Complaint 2 was the worry that some individuals are situated in
vulnerable positions and may be subject to domination and exploitation. Although nothing in the
above conception speaks directly to the terminology of this point, the aims of protecting certain
basic rights and giving all individuals a certain resource base seem likely to incorporate and
address the worry. Respect for basic rights and provision of a resource base also seems to make
sense of Complaints 4 and 5 – the worries regarding abhorrent practices and unsatisfactory
working conditions. Similarly, the resource base makes sense of Complaint 7 – the objection to
individuals or states being without goods to meet basic needs or desires. How some of these
complaints should be addressed is partly a matter to be determined at the institutional level. But
it should be clear that the external approach is not obviously lacking the resources to speak to
them.
There are also some complaints that the external approach does not address. For example,
it would not seem to ground Complaint 6 – that some party does not receive fair pay or benefit
for her work or participation. But it is important to note the exact sense in which it does not
address this complaint. As the commentary on Complaint 7 shows, it is not that the approach is
indifferent to the resources actors hold ex post. The difference is that the external approach
subsumes consideration of the resources actors receive from their participation in trade in a wider
analysis of how their overall resource holdings are tailored to some broader principle (to wit,
whether their bundle is ‘sufficient’ for certain ends). In this approach, what it does omit is a
more specific concern for individuals having a particular amount or proportion of some resource
in virtue of their connection with some particular activity. That omission may prove an important
objection to the external approach. We shall consider whether any arguments can substantiate
that conclusion in the discussion of internal principles. But its simple omission is not reason to
reject the approach. It is also possible to conclude that some of our intuitive complaints should
be rejected if we have found an otherwise reasonable reflective equilibrium between many of the
others and a general theory.
Thus, what we should draw from the discussion, I think, is that the external approach
seems to have the merits of squaring widely accepted ideas about moral principles with a range of
23
For instance, even global justice sceptics accept that there are moral duties to ensure that all individuals have a set
of basic rights guaranteed (see, for example, T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy & Public Affairs
33 (2005): at pp. 126-127) and, as noted above, those who have been considered minimalists about global justice
accept duties to other states of the kinds suggested (see, for example, Rawls, The Law of Peoples).
8
widely believed convictions about problems with the global economy. In doing so, it should
dispel what might seem an obvious worry, showing that the notion of ‘trade justice’ would be far
from empty if it is approached in this fashion. We might, then, think, at least, that there is some
prima facie plausibility to this approach and that the burden of proof lies with those who wish to
defend an alternative means of approaching trade justice.
VII
I think there is also reason to be cautiously positive about the aggregated institutions approach. It
seems likely that the possibilities in terms of institution aggregation exist across a spectrum. It
does not seem compelling to think that which institutions and our directions for them should be
entirely a matter of instrumental calculation. For example, there might be certain epistemic
constraints on which institutions can reasonably be thought to fall within the purview of
standards of justice. If, for example, applying standards to certain areas of individual choice
would make it difficult to determine whether actors had complied with their duties, we might
think that the importance of public assurance negates the idea of applying standards to such
spaces.24 But the basic essence of the aggregated institutions approach is to suggest that moral
principles should be targeted at some set of institutions considered together. In the case at hand,
its important suggestion is simply that we should not consider whether the institutions of trade
alone upholds our moral principles, but whether these institutions cohere with some certain other
institutions to do so. Obvious examples would be whether our trade regime coheres with regimes
on aid, migration, and diplomatic relations.
The major benefit of this approach seems to be that it allows us to garner the benefits of
overlaps and divisions of labour. Consider the following possibility. Imagine that we have an
aim to ensure that all individuals worldwide have a protected right to freedom of conscience.
One option available to us is to restrict trade with countries that do not grant citizens this right.
Let us imagine that this policy would do more to advance protection of freedom of conscience
than trading freely with such states ceteris paribus. But now imagine that by trading freely, we
amass considerably more wealth and that we use this extra wealth to organise a series of global
summits on the protection of freedom of conscience. Let us imagine that this policy combination
would do more to advance protection of freedom of conscience than restricting trade. As noted
above, the different approaches to the institutions debate will select different policies here. The
disaggregated approach will opt for the policy of restricting trade, because, considering the
options for the institutions of trade in isolation, this trade structure does more to advance the
relevant end. The aggregated approach will opt for the policy combination of free trade and
global summits on the grounds that this approach best advances the relevant end tout court, even
though the directions for the institutions of trade appear less conducive in isolation. Now, there
may be various intricacies of these policy options that need to be considered, such as how the
benefits and burdens are distributed across different groups. But holding such variables constant,
it is obvious why the aggregated approach seems valuable. To wit, it better aids the efficient
realisation of the demands of justice. By harnessing what can be usefully contributed to the cause
by different institutions, we can better advance the relevant moral principles than would
otherwise be the case.
On this point see A. Williams, ‘Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 27 (1998):
225-247.
24
9
In one of his most-quoted lines, Rawls writes that ‘the primary subject of justice is the
basic structure of society’.25 He defines the basic structure as comprising various institutions,
including, for example, the constitution, rules concerning property, and the economic structure.
But in arguing that these institutions are the focus of justice, Rawls does not suggest that
principles of justice should regulate each of them directly. Rather, the ‘basic structure is
understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system’.26 His
interest is the overall system and the extent to which this system, as a whole, realises justice. In
adopting this position, Rawls appears to support the aggregated institutions approach. Whilst,
again, the points above do not complete the argument for this approach (alternative positions and
objections must be considered), they do seem to establish some prima facie reason in its favour
and the burden of proof appears to be with those who argue against it.
VIII
The preceding sections have aimed mainly at explicating a broadly external-aggregated approach
and outlining what seems plausible about the essential foundations of its two components. They
do not offer a complete account of ‘trade justice’.27 Nor have they sought or said enough to
defend either of the components in their fullest form. 28 But they should suffice to outline the
dimensions of these components and identify their merits. Thus, it is useful at this juncture to
take the account further by engaging it with a number of positions that have appeared recently in
literature which might seem to be in contest with it. In approaching this task, I will take my lead
from the positions offered by other authors. However, I will try to tackle these views in a
systematic order, first considering some accounts of trade justice and whether they offer intuitive
reasons to adopt internal or disaggregated approaches, second considering whether there is a
deeper philosophical justification, and finally considering whether approaching the issue from the
angle of non-ideal theory has any implications in this regard.
IX
I begin by considering an account of fairness in trade offered by Mathias Risse, together, in part,
with Malgorzate Kurjanska.29 Kurjanska and Risse defend what they call the ‘Weak Westphalia
View’. This view states that a country’s trade policy is just only if it meets four conditions: 1)
Production processes must not harm other countries; 2) Trade must not result in negative rights
25
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), p. 6.
J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (Expanded Edition) (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 258.
27
I offer a more developed statement in A. Walton, ‘On the Currency of Global Justice’, forthcoming.
28
To be sure that it is clear, it is also worth mentioning that I have not attempted to mobilise my arguments to
address practices other than trade. There are other areas where they seem plausible also. A similar case is made on
the subject of climate justice in S. Caney, ‘Just Emissions’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012): 255-300. But
there are where the external-aggregated approach seems unlikely to be defensible, such as family relations. Thus,
without space to consider the wider and more general application of the ideas, my arguments should be understood as
applied to the case of trade only.
29
Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade I’; Risse & Kurjanska, ‘Fairness in Trade II’. I should note here that Risse’s view is
developed somewhat in Risse, On Global Justice, pp. 261-277. I consider a new aspect of his view in Sections X
and XI. But the essence of the view outlined in the aforementioned papers remains apparent in Risse’s more recent
text (see, for example, Risse, On Global Justice, pp. 272-275) and, anyway, it is a view clearly worth considering.
10
26
being violated; 3) Pricing policies (such as subsidies) should not harm workers in other countries;
and 4) Trade policies must be consistent with general duties to the poor.30
Risse identifies cases in which these conditions are violated. Consider, for example:
‘a situation in which A is…involved in trade with B, an activity from which both sides
benefit, whilst representatives of B can reasonably be expected to know that parts of the
population in A are oppressed and the gains from trade occur at this subset’s expense’.31
‘These conditions’, Risse writes, ‘render trade partly constitutive of the oppression and thus are
sufficient to give the oppressed a complaint in fairness against a trading partner’.32 Since the
arrangement violates, presumably, condition 2, it constitutes a case of ‘unfairness in trade’.
It is possible to interpret these ideas as speaking to either of the two debates noted above.
In recent work, when Risse argues that trade is objectionable if, inter alia, it is true for some of
the people involved that ‘their involvement…has emerged through human rights violations’, he
characterises this demands as one of trade’s ‘own principles of justice’.33 Thus, it would not be
unreasonable to presume that the position offered addresses the sphere debate. But if this line is
what Risse means to defend, the arguments he offers are insufficient. The problem is
demonstrated by noting that the same worries attach to any interaction. We can imagine, instead,
that A is involved in diplomatic relations with B for the sake of securing peace in a certain
region, but that this cooperation and the ensuing benefits are possible only because citizens in A
are oppressed. This scenario has the same features of Risse’s case and seems to raise the same
problems, but it does not involve any reference to trade. Indeed, we can assume that A and B do
not trade without altering the conclusion. The worries raised in this case – the violation of
negative rights and the complicity in their violation – are not specific to the trade relation. They
seem best characterised as external modus operandi concerns which have application in the case
of trade. As Miller puts it, Risse’s ‘criterion applies whenever there is interaction between people
from which one party benefits but oppression on the other side that helps create the benefit’; in
short, the ‘problem…is not internal to the practice of trade’.34
Perhaps, then, the arguments should be considered as claims on the institutions debate,
suggesting that trade policy should not violate human right be complicit in oppression. In this
guise, Risse’s arguments and conclusions seem plausible. If we hold modus operandi standards
for our interactions with others, it would seem that certain forms of trading relations are liable to
violate those standards. For example, if we think that an individual should not be forced to
undertake an activity against her will, a trade regime in which forced labour exists will be, ipso
facto, unjust. The same point would seem to hold for oppression.
However, we must be careful how we understand the relevance of this point to the
institutions debate. One available thought is that it is possible to know that there is ‘something
wrong’ by considering only the institutions of trade. As the examples above suggest, we could
identify a moral objection to, say, a country’s trade policy of dealing in slaves by considering the
policy in an isolated fashion. In this respect, there is a way in which the disaggregated approach
can inform our understanding about what is just or unjust in trade policies. But it would not
Risse & Kurjanska, ‘Fairness in Trade II’: at p. 42.
Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade I’: at p. 362.
32
Risse, ‘Fairness in Trade I’: at p. 362.
33
Risse, On Global Justice, p. 272.
34
Miller, ‘Fair Trade: what does it mean and why does it matter?’: at p. 13.
30
31
11
follow that we should approach thinking about designing our institutions in a disaggregated
fashion. A good example is the case of child labour. I take is that we usually think child labour
is (pro tanto) morally objectionable and that a trade policy that includes utilising child labour is,
ipso facto, unjust. However, it remains a separate question how we should design institutions
that aim to respond to this problem. One option would be to boycott the use of child labour, thus
using the institutions of trade to decrease its use or cease our involvement with it. If, considering
the options for the institutions of trade in isolation, such a policy would employ less child labour
than a policy sanctioning it, the disaggregated institutions approach would move in this direction.
However, in the case of child labour, much evidence suggests that child labour is best combatted
by improving the level of wealth held by families of those children who are involved – primarily
because such children work as their families need the money.35 If such evidence were
compelling, an aggregated approach would opt, rather, for a policy combination, continuing to
accept child labour, but aiming to reduce it through suitable aid policies. Such a combination, ex
hypothesi, would be more effective in reducing both the overall incidence of child labour and, by
default, our involvement with it. That is to say, nothing in the fact that we can identify a moral
problem with a particular trade policy in isolation shows that it must be resolved by altering the
trade policy rather than some through some other institutional mechanism. And, indeed,
precisely the same general rationale for operating through an aggregative approach seems to
suggest that it is a suitable avenue for tackling such problems.
X
A second case to consider is a position offered by Aaron James. James’ view does not exclude
the idea of external principles. 36 However, he does argue that ‘they are not the only and perhaps
not the most central issues of fairness in trade’.37 Rather, ‘the basic subject of fairness in trade is
an international social practice of market reliance, a practice whereby countries mutually rely on
common markets (in goods, services, or capital)’. 38 This practice, he writes, generates its own
internal demands, the specification of which ‘requires no reference to moral principles
independent of those justified specifically for the trade relation’. 39 In this respect, James offers a
clear internal principles account.
In particular, James argues that global trade raises three principles of justice. First, there
is a requirement of collective due care, which demands that trade practices leave no individual
worse-off than under conditions of autarky. Second, there is a principle of international relative
gains, which demands that the benefits of trade are divided equally amongst participating parties,
or that disproportionate benefits flow to the worse-off. Third, there is a principle of domestic
relative gains, which demands that the benefits a particular state accrues from trade are divided
equally amongst its population, unless an unequal distribution would benefit the worse-off. 40
There are certain subtleties to the foundations of James’ view that I have set aside until
Section XII. Before addressing these issues, I wish to outline an initial objection to James’
principles. Consider, specifically, James’ second principle – that the gains of trade are to be
D.K. Brown, ‘International Trade and Core Labour Standards: A Survey of the Recent Literature’, OECD Labour
Market and Social Policy Occasional Papers, No. 43 (OECD Publishing, 2000): at pp. 29-30.
36
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 13.
37
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 13.
38
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 1.
39
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 13.
40
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at pp. 2-3.
12
35
distributed equally between participating states, or such that disproportionate benefits flow to the
worse-off. This principle, in James’ view, is supposed to function, as he puts it, with ‘no
reference’ to other, independent, moral principles. If it were plausible, it would appear that we
have found at least one internal principle. Should we be able to validate the claim that there is
some reason parties should share the benefits of trading in a particular fashion independent of
external factors, we would appear to have a conception of justice internal to the sphere of trade.
My sense, though, is that it will be difficult to validate this claim. Imagine a trade
between A and B. Neither makes any loses, but all the surplus value accrues to A. Should we
redistribute wealth from A to B in this instance? It is difficult, I think, to answer this question in
isolation.41 Imagine, for example, that although A profits greatly from this trade, A is a lessdeveloped country, with less resources to fulfil the human rights of its population, and uses a far
lower proportion of the total sustainable amount of carbon emissions than B. In this case, that the
trade leaves A wealthier, but not B seems a rather weak justification for redistribution. More
abstractly, consider that A and B’s levels of advantage comprise a set of factors, including (but
not limited to) their internal resources (such as natural and human capital), the amount of wealth
they receive from aid, and their share of emissions rights. This can be expressed in the following
equation, in which X is the overall level of advantage, N1, N2, N3 are the listed factors, and NN
signified the possibility of other factors that might be considered:
X = N1 + N2 + N3 +…+ NN
A central point of the above example is that the gains of trade will figure in the overall level of
advantage, but that they will not be the total of it. So, we can say that the financial results of
trade (FRT) will figure in the above equation as follows:
X = N1 + N2 + N3 +…+ NN + FRT
The broad thought the example is meant to show, which this equation captures, is that it is
difficult to conceptualise the idea of justice in trade internally, because trade is intertwined with
other factors that comprise the overall level of advantage. The intuition that there is no reason to
ensure equal gains for A and B, for example, would be explained as follows. In the trade
relation, A’s FRT rises whilst B’s FRT remains constant. But since B fares better in terms of the
other factors that comprise advantage, the effect of this trade does not alter their relative X in any
interesting fashion. It remains the case that B(X) > A(X). Since the overall circumstances
remain in B’s favour, there seems little cause to redistribute.
James’ principles do consider relative standing. The international relative gains principle
includes a clause stating that if benefits are distributed unequally, the larger share should flow to
the worse-off. It might be thought that this line can incorporate the lessons of this example. But
such a response would miss the crucial point. The thought is not that internal principles are not
sensitive to other concerns or cannot be modified to be so. The point is that there seems nothing
interesting about the benefits of trade independent of these other concerns. What seems of
interest, fundamentally, is X. The other aspects of advantage and how they change through
41
Although I have found no perfectly suitable place to reference them, I should note that the following discussion is
deeply indebted to D. Hausman, ‘What’s wrong with health Inequalities?’, Journal of Political Philosophy 15
(2007): 46-66 and Caney, ‘Just Emissions’: 262-276.
13
various activities appears interesting only to the extent that they bear, together, on this issue. The
concern, it would seem, is not internal.
Aside from the intuitive example, it is worth noting that this approach is also how the
issue would be considered by many standard theories of justice. Take, for example, the
sufficiency of resources position outlined above. SR stipulated a set of moral demands many of
which require certain levels of goods, such as that individuals and states should have a resource
based to make use of their freedoms. But on such a view, what comprised the relevant bundle of
resources – whether it contained wealth from trade, internal resources, or aid – would be of little
interest. Perhaps some particular goods would be necessary features of any such bundle. For
example, at least in the current world, rights to a certain level of carbon emissions would need to
figure in any such bundle, simply because almost all activities require at least some emissions.
We often think similarly about voting rights – that they should be distributed equally regardless
of other goods. In this respect, there are some goods for which sphere specific distributive
principles do seem to exist. But many goods would be quite narrowly interchangeable.
Particularly, different sources of wealth, such as that accrued from trade or aid, would be
straightforwardly substitutable and the viewpoint on justice would not be concerned with the
source. Importantly, moreover, this conclusion would not be altered by believing that the
demands of global justice were more substantive. Views focused on moderacy or equality of
resources, capabilities, welfare, or opportunities for welfare would all reach the same result.
XI
To embed the comments of the previous section, it is worth considering two other intuitive cases.
The first concerns whether my examples do not help our understanding because there are
too many factors involved to focus specifically on the importance of the trade relation. If we hold
other factors constant, perhaps it would emerge more clearly that internal concerns do exist.42
Imagine, for example, that the level of advantage of A and B meets some relevant principle –
sufficiency or equality, say – before they trade. In this case, surely it does seem fair that the
surplus value is distributed equally.
My sense, though, is that such cases actually make the analysis more difficult. Consider,
first, a conception of global justice along the lines of equality of resources – say, that each state
should hold an equally valuable bundle of goods. If that is the case prior to the trade between A
and B mentioned above and the trade, then, introduces an inequality between them, equality of
resources will also recommend an equal division of the surplus. It will recommend it for
different reasons – to restore equality in X, not because the gains of trade should be distributed
equally per se. But it reaches the same conclusion. Thus, such cases prove difficult for isolating
which issue actually concerns us. If anything, I am inclined to think that tinkering with these
cases might reinforce the argument against internal principles. We can imagine the disruption to
equality between A and B arises as a matter of sheer happenstance. Perhaps some money simply
falls from the sky into A’s garden. In this case, fairness seems to require that the new windfall is
divided equally. This conclusion would seem to suggest that it is our general concern for relative
advantage, not anything particular about trade, which drives our intuitions in such examples. The
analysis might change somewhat if we focus on the principle of SR. Here, if both parties are
above the sufficiency threshold, unequal divisions of additional gains will be deemed morally
42
This way of approaching the issue is intended to mirror the manner in which the question is posed in James,
Fairness in Practice, p. 8.
14
uninteresting. That conclusion might seem objectionable. But it would be no more reason to
accept the idea of an internal principle of trade than to reject SR in favour of global equality of
resources. Indeed, given that we might also react to an unequal division of an arbitrary windfall
above the sufficiency line also, I suspect, again, the case lends support to the latter thought, rather
than the former.
A second case to consider concerns whether the holistic approach obscures a concept that
we typically deem to have meaning: exploitation. The worry would be as follows. Exploitation
is usually thought to be defined along the lines of ‘disproportionate appropriation of value’. This
idea is commonly employed in the context of trade relations of some kind. For example, the
employer, knowing that the potential employee needs work to avoid starvation, can use her
position to bargain for terms that would not be possible in different circumstances. She can
demand that the employee works for very long hours at very low pay and he has little choice
other than to accept. Although they both benefit from this transaction, it seems to remain
objectionable because it is disproportionately beneficial to the employer. Such cases, it may be
argued, seem to imply there is something to the notion of a deal that is internally fair and the
approach outlined above, given its focus on overall positions, struggles to make sense of this
issue. Risse details a worry along these lines, suggesting that it seems an appropriate internal
principle of trade that it is objection if certain people’s ‘contributions to the production of goods
or the provision of services for export do not make them better off…to an extent warranted by the
value of these contributions’.43 The worry may be further reinforced by noting that one of the
common objections detailed in Section III focused on such a point; namely, Complaint 6 – the
objection that some party does not receive fair pay or benefit for her work or participation. This
objection is often raised to the major profits reaped by large companies while their workers in
developing countries have barely enough to survive.
The difficulty with such a case, though, is, again, that there are various ways to consider
the issues involved. Notice that, in fact, alongside Complaint 6, there are also three other
complaints that may be relevant: Complaint 2 – the worry that less-advantaged individuals face
circumstances of desperation and are, thus, susceptible to having power exerted over them;
Complaint 5 – the worry that poor producers must work in unsafe and unsatisfactory conditions;
and Complaint 7 – the worry that some party does not have sufficient means to fulfil some form
of need or desire. As noted above, a view that does not incorporate internal principles can
explain all of these complaints. Thus, the question to be asked about internal principles of the
kind asserted by Complaint 6 is best analysed by attempting to remove such factors from the
analysis. We should consider a case in which an actor does not face desperate circumstances
either before or after the trade and or unacceptable working conditions. But once we set aside
such issues, it is less clear that Complaint 6 is altogether plausible. Few, for example, object to
Michael Bloomberg accepting a salary of $1 annually for his job as major of New York.44 We
may, as in cases above, think that relative levels of advantage matter beyond worries such as
desperate circumstances, but, as noted in such cases, there does not seem any reason to restrict
this concern to only one aspect of advantage. In other words, the case suggests, again, that
conceptualising a distributive principle for trade independent of external factors is problematic.
43
Risse, On Global Justice, p. 13.
Interestingly, Risse, On Global Justice, p. 273, notes this example and argues that it justifies including the clause
that disproportionate benefit is unobjectionable if it is voluntarily accepted. But it is difficult to see why Risse would
halt at this clause. If voluntariness cancels the differential benefits principle, it would seem that our overriding
concern is voluntariness. If the latter is addressed, the differential benefits concern is moot.
15
44
XII
If the arguments of the preceding sections are correct, it would appear that a number of common,
intuitive cases for thinking in terms of internal principles do not succeed. Yet, it is possible that
these positions can be defended by appeal to a deeper philosophical argument concerning the
foundation of moral principles. A prominent example to consider is Aaron James ‘constructive
interpretivist’ practice for moral theorising. 45 He claims that devising a theory of fairness for any
institution or set of practices involves ‘an independent characterization of the nature of the social
structure at issue, in light of its basic aims and organizational form, and a specified set of relevant
interests and claims’.46 In other words, principles of justice are practice-dependent. The first
important consequence of such a position is that the application of principles of justice is
pertinent only if a practice already exists. James calls this the ‘Existence Condition’.47 The
second important consequence is that the content of justice depends on the particular institutions
and practices to which they will be applied. Judgements about principles for some institution,
James writes, ‘must be made against a background conception of what kind of activity or social
practice is in question, a conception that itself generates initial presumptions about what factors
are relevant’.48 The foundational point for a theory of justice, in other words, is to ‘identify an
existing social practice, including its point, or the goods it is meant to realize’.49
James argues that it is this approach that is useful for thinking about the context of global
trade. He writes: ‘Existing trade has three important features: (i) it is undertaken for common
purposes, (ii) it involves the coordination of action, and (iii) it provides a distinct subject of
assessment’.50 It is, therefore, appropriate to derive principles of justice specific to the practice of
international trade, specific to its common purposes. If this view is correct, there would be a
foundational sense in which the arguments I offered above would fail. Even if the focus on
external concerns of justice remained of (greatest) import in theorising about the global economy,
this view would show that there are also moral concerns specific to the sphere of trade.
In a certain sense, I do not wish to challenge James on his account of moral theorising,
but, in similar vein to my arguments above, I do wish to suggest that he casts his method too
narrowly in the case of trade. The worry is that it is difficult to see how we can isolate the point
and purpose of international trade from a set of other institutions and their purposes. James
argues that the aim of trade is to augment national wealth, thus setting its function and currency.51
But many have argued that its primary function should be seen in terms of engendering peace.52
Even if the latter argument is false in its assertion of the primary aim of trade, it remains true that
peace is one of the common bi-products of good trade relations. The European Union is some
testament to this point. And if this point is accurate, trade policy becomes inseparable from
45
The details below offer a summary of this method and its application to the topic of interest here. For a more
detailed discussion see A. James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practices: Rawls and the Status Quo, Philosophy
and Public Affairs 33 (2005): 281-316.
46
Risse, On Global Justice, p. 272.
47
James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practices’: at p. 295.
48
James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practices’: at p. 289.
49
James, ‘Constructing Justice for Existing Practices’: at p. 282.
50
A. James, ‘Distributive Justice without Sovereign Rule: The Case of Trade’, Social Theory and Practice 31
(2005): 533-559, at p. 539.
51
James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 11.
52
The argument is most classically associated with the work of Richard Cobden, but is common in the liberal
tradition of international relations.
16
foreign policy. A similar difficulty arises in the opposite direction too. We might think that the
aim of an on-going international diplomatic arrangement, such as the United Nations, is designed
to ensure peace and safety for the world’s citizens. But it could be argued that the aim is to
ensure peace for the sake of national income, since a successful peace agreement would reduce
the need for military expenditure. At any rate, this outcome can fairly be considered a possible
bi-product and it is clear that neither national income nor trade policy can be ignored when
considering international diplomacy.
Perhaps these points have most obvious application to the institutions debate, but my
sense is that they speak to the sphere debate also. Even on James’ view, for a practice to be
considered to raise demands of justice, it must be possible to identify ‘what kind of activity or
social practice is in question’ and ‘its point, or the goods it is meant to realize’. But what the
example above suggests is that the aims and currency of institutions are rarely clear when they
are considered in isolation. They overlap with other institutions with other facets both in how
they are designed and what they are designed to achieve. Even the point and purpose of such
institutions cannot be discerned in an internal fashion.
XIII
Although the previous section sought to dismiss one version of a deeper philosophical defence of
internal principles, there is another way in which an argument about the foundations of morality
might challenge my view. In both my defence of the alternative approaches to trade justice and
my commentary on other views, I have largely assumed that there are existing external demands
of global justice and many of my arguments rely on this assumption being valid. Without it, my
arguments that our ideas about ‘trade justice’ and the various benefits and burdens of trade are
coherently captured by considering these demands would be a non-starter. Now, I think it is
indisputable that there are some external demands of global justice, such as a requirement to
protect human rights. Even those most critical of the idea of global justice and those who defend
internal positions on trade justice accept that much.53 But it could be argued that the wider
concerns I have used in my arguments, such as concern for relative wealth, are pertinent at the
global level, if they are pertinent at all, only in virtue of trade relations. If this claim were true,
perhaps the distinction I attempted to draw – between external principles of global justice and
principles internal to the global economy – would collapse. The principles of justice I outlined
would, in some sense, be principles arising within the sphere of trade.
I have defended the view that a more comprehensive set of demands of global justice are
pertinent to our world elsewhere. 54 Here, given that my main focus is to challenge those who
argue for internal principles, I will offer a more limited reply. To wit, even if it is the existence
of global trade that raises demands of justice, there is no reason to consider the emergent
principles ‘internal’ principles. The former concern speaks, essentially, to a question about the
initiation or ‘trigger’ of demands of justice, whilst the idea of internal principles speaks to the
nature of those demands. There is no necessary connection between these two issues. From the
fact that the existence of medicine set a foundation for the Hippocratic Oath, it does not follow
that its principles should be understood as ‘maxims of medicine’, specific only to medicine’s
point and purpose. It may remain applicable within that domain, but it can quite easily be
On the former, see, for example, T. Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 33
(2005): 113-147, at p. 130, and on the latter, see James, ‘A Theory of Fairness in Trade’: at p. 13.
54
A. Walton, ‘Justice, Authority, and the World Order’, Journal of Global Ethics 5 (2009): 215-230.
53
17
understood as a principle that generates general demands to be applied through whichever
institutional system best upholds these demands. To make an inference from a principle’s origin
to its content and nature is a form of genetic fallacy, if not a category mistake.
XIV
In a sense, the objection considered in the previous section began to focus attention on questions
about the ‘real world’. It proceeded by arguing for internal principles on the grounds that what
moral principles are of relevance to trade depends on the type of structures that exist. In this
respect, it begins to touch upon the question of ‘non-ideal theory’, understood here to be the idea
of theorising about justice within certain constraints provided by the ‘real world’. It is useful to
take such concerns further to focus upon whether such an approaching to theorising may
challenge my conclusions in another way. In literature, the view which offers the most direct
critique of my position in this regard is an argument offered by Helena de Bres. 55 The position de
Bres advocates stands in stark contrast to mine. She writes, explicitly, that ‘we ought to
exclusively direct our principles of justice at particular sub-spheres of global politics: targeting
the parts separately, not the whole’.56
De Bres identifies what she calls GBS theorists (Global Basic Structure theorists) who
believe that ‘the proper target for [concerns of justice] is the global order in its entirety’.57 She
argues against this view on the grounds that principles of justice applied to the idea of a global
basic structure cannot be action-guiding. De Bres suggests that for an argument on principles of
justice to be reasonably plausible, it must be the case that ‘normal human agents are capable of
both discerning what they require in particular sites, and of then directing their actions in
accordance with those requirement’.58 Applying principles of justice to a global basic structure,
she argues, violates this demand on two accounts. First, because the existing global architecture
is so large, so patchwork, and so complex, there would be epistemic difficulties in normal human
agents deriving what justice required of each sphere from an account of justice that targeting the
whole system.59 Second, she argues that the only way in which this problem could be overcome
would be to have a global structure that mirrored the unified, supreme, comprehensive
arrangement we have within nation-states – that is, a world state – which is neither feasible nor
desirable.60 De Bres favours, rather, a ‘disaggregated approach’ to global justice, because
isolating the dynamics of individual spheres of global justice is feasible and can be applied
without creating a global leviathan. In short, she argues that since ‘the workings of global
politics are piecemeal’, both realistically and normatively, ‘our theories of global justice should
be too’.61
Although it is not perfectly clear from her text, I think what de Bres means to defend, in
terms of the terminology offered here, is a case for a disaggregated institutions approach. If this
understanding is correct, my response to her position emerges in two stages. The first is to raise a
question on de Bres’ action-guiding criterion. Broadly, I agree that theories of justice must be
capable of guiding action in some sense. However, it seems to me that the crucial question is
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’.
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at p. 1.
57
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at p. 7.
58
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’, at p. 11.
59
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at pp. 18-24.
60
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at pp. 14-18.
61
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: at p. 8.
55
56
18
whether theories of justice are capable of issuing demands that normal human agents can
understand and follow, not whether the foundational commitments of the theories hold this
property. Consider, for example, the principle of equality. I take it that this principle is a
principle of justice. However, in its bald form, it is clearly not action-guiding. It becomes
action-guiding when it is developed and applied in more precise statements of what it requires of
an array of institutions. I take it that de Bres does not mean to object to this line of reasoning
about justice. Indeed, she seems to accept that her own position would require the same kind of
process at the point of determining how we should delineate different domains of justice and how
we should conceptualise the boundaries and overlaps between them.62 But if so, it seems to
follow that the crucial criterion for theories and principles of justice is that they must be capable
of being distilled into forms that can direct action of normal human agents, not that they hold this
property in their broad form.
The second element of my response is to suggest that de Bres’ characterisation of the
alternative positions on theorising about global justice is slightly misleading. It seems to me that
the options for the application of global justice lie rather on a spectrum. At one end, there is the
option of a world state. At the other end, there is a world of self-sufficient nation-states.
Between these options lies the idea of disaggregated spheres of global justice with their own
schemas of principle. But it would seem possible that also within this middle-ground there could
exist the option of disaggregated sites of justice which derive their relevant role from a
theoretically developed account of what a whole system should achieve.
It would, of course, be difficult to determine how each institution in such a system should
operate. But it does not seem implausible that such an account can be determined. It certainly
does not seem any more problematic than attempting to delineate and conceptualise a schema of
different domains of global justice at a foundational level, especially when one considers the
points made about institutional overlap in Section VII. If so, the aggregated approach avoids the
objection from the world state that de Bres raises, at least as much as the disaggregated approach.
With the account determined and relevant roles for each institutional domain derived from it, it
should also circumvent de Bres’ worry that attempting to explore global justice within the ‘global
basic structure’ would be too complex to be action-guiding. It may remain the case that the
overarching theory and its foundations would not be directly action-guiding. But, as noted in my
first point, this issue cannot be what de Bres means to reject.
XV
The preceding analysis has been rather abstract. Although I related my initial arguments to
common complaints about the global economy, much of what has been said in defence of the
view focused on ideas about the structure of moral reasons. Perhaps it has not addressed all the
possible objections to the approach, but hopefully it has considered the main alternative
statements in literature on these abstract issues. Accordingly, it seems useful to end the paper by
relating the discussion to a more practical level with consideration of two cases of application.
XVI
To begin, I will canvass a case in which the broad approach I have advocated in this paper is
applied in a fashion that affirms its merits.
62
De Bres, ‘Disaggregating Global Justice’: pp. 26-27.
19
The case concerns the writing of Thomas Pogge on the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). 63 In brief, TRIPS sets forth the rules allowing
economic actors to ‘patent’ their ideas, granting the actor property in the intellectual content of
their inventions and prohibiting (without payment or penalty) other actors from using these ideas.
These rules have been defended with reference to the economic benefits that actors receive from
them, which, it is argued, provide incentives to innovate and develop new technologies. They
have also been subject to many criticisms, though. The most prominent is the claim that such
regulations allow companies to raise the cost of the goods, which prevents essential medicines
reaching the world’s poorest people.
In much of the debate surrounding TRIPS, it has been common to target the agreement
itself, asking whether the rules it establishes are just or unjust. In contrast, Pogge highlights that
altering the TRIPS agreement is not the only way we can approach the problem. We can also
consider the surrounding infrastructure. He proposes that, rather than altering TRIPS, one option
would be to establish a Health Impact Fund (HIF), which would establish a pool of money paid to
actors who produce medicines which have the greatest impact on reducing the global disease
burden. There are clear incentives for companies to develop and market goods under this system
because they will receive major rewards for successful innovations. But the new system has the
benefit of ensuring that these inventions benefit the world’s poor.
The approach Pogge adopts mirrors the suggestions I have made about global trade.
Although focusing on a common complaint about the global economy, which mirrors Section
III’s Complaint 7 – the worry that some party does not have sufficient means to fulfil some form
of need or desire – Pogge seems, rightly, to consider it a general concern of justice. In this
respect, his view adopts an external account in thinking about principles relevant to trade. Then,
in considering how to uphold the demand he does not, as many have done, consider only how the
trade regime can be shaped accordingly. He canvasses how trade can combine with other
institutions. In this respect, he adopts the aggregated approach.
Whether these arguments establish a defence of the HIF depends on a number of factual
issues which there is not space to consider here. Yet, whatever may be the correct understanding
of the facts, it seems clear that Pogge’s strategy presents an attractive alternative strategy to
debates focused solely on the TRIPS agreement. Perhaps the factual analysis would show that
TRIPS accompanied by the HIF is preferable to altering TRIPS. Even if we imagine that his
factual analysis of TRIPS is faulty in certain ways, it may remain the case that his proposals
provide a more effective system than many arguments for TRIPS modifications. Indeed, even if
we were to conclude that altering TRIPS was the best way to proceed, we would, at least, be
doing so because we knew that that was, overall, the most effective strategy. In the worst case
scenario, we have a more robust reason for action. In the best case, it appears that we have a
means of unlocking an otherwise intractable dilemma. Regardless of the specific conclusion, it
does seem that the approach offers a plausible and meritorious approach to this issue.
XVII
The second case to consider is one in which the alternative approaches are applied and seem
problematic. The case in question is the idea of linking labour standards with trade agreements.
T. Pogge, ‘The Health Impact Fund and Its Justification by Appeal to Human Rights’, Journal of Social
Philosophy 40 (2009): 542-569.
63
20
A recent statement on the issue is Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy’s writings on ‘linkage’.64
Barry and Reddy begin by affirming the following:
‘Proposition O: A very important factor in determining whether an institutional
arrangement for the governance of the global economy should be viewed as superior to
another is whether it improves the level of advantage of less advantaged persons in the
world to a greater extent.’65
The particular aspects of advantage with which they are concerned is left a little ambiguous, but
they commit to ‘presuming that…advantage is generally enhanced by higher employment, higher
real wages and improved working conditions’, including certain ‘basic labour standards’, such as
the right to collective bargaining and non-discrimination.66 Based on these principles, they
assert:
‘Proposition L: It is desirable to bring about an institutional arrangement in which rights
to trade are made conditional upon the promotion of labour standards.’67
Although it is somewhat implicit in their text, the approach adopted by Barry and Reddy
certainly seems to utilise both the internal principles and disaggregated institutions approaches.
Regarding the former, they write:
‘Failure to abide by labour regulations protecting basic labour standards breaks
fundamental rules governing membership in a cooperative economic union.’68
This claim does not explicitly assert that labour standards are internal standards of global trade,
but it is certainly suggestive of this idea. Meanwhile, Proposition O’s ranking of trade regimes in
terms of which most benefits the worst-off seems to align with the disaggregated approach.
Anyhow, others who defend the same conclusion often openly adopt these approaches. James,
for example, writes:
‘the trading system is the natural place to address the labor exploitation issue, since
concerns of labor exploitation are at least partly internal to the socioeconomic
relationship.’ 69
Barry and Reddy’s argument is extremely thorough in its analysis and it remains one of
the strongest defences of linkage. However, as has been emphasised elsewhere, 70 they operate
with two slight ambiguities that are problematic in precisely the way holistic approach suggests.
First, they equivocate between whether they mean to address the conditions of the worst-off per
se or specifically the worst-off, or badly-off, workers. Their proposal seems most likely to assist
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’.
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’: at p. 548.
66
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’: at p. 548.
67
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’: at p. 549.
68
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’: at p. 553, emphasis added.
69
James, Fairness in Practice, p. 320.
70
D. Markovits, ‘Three Thoughts Concerning “Just Linkage”’, Yale Law School Faculty Scholarship Series (2006),
Paper 421.
21
64
65
the latter and if they are understood in this way, there is a sense in which the concern may seem
internal to trade. But ‘Proposition O’ appears more directed towards the former and seems
clearly more plausible than if it is altered to focus on workers specifically. This point suggests
that Section III’s Complaint 5 – the worry that poor producers must work in unsafe and
unsatisfactory conditions – is better cast in terms of external principles. Second, Barry and
Reddy focus their attentions primarily on different ways that these standards can be upheld within
global trade.71 They do not, at least at any length, consider a host of alternatives that could be
tried, ranging from (in the extreme) direct force to (the more mundane) appropriately directed
development aid. This approach also seems problematic, since there are a host of reasons –
ranging from difficulties in international economic law to straightforward effectiveness – to
believe that tying these rights to trade agreements is rather problematic. At least from what is
presently known, this approach is likely to be far less worthwhile than encouraging their
protection through other mechanisms, such as aid-led promotion.72 Again, the case demonstrates
the clear merits of the aggregated approach.
XVIII
How should the global economy be structured? As noted in the introduction to this paper, this
question is amongst the most pressing of our era. I have not provided answers to it here, but,
rather, attempted to provide a framework for considering the issue. To provide a complete theory
of ‘trade justice’ would require two investigations in addition. The first would to delve into what
external demands of global justice exist. The second would involve relating these ideas to a
conception of the global political order as a whole and determining how we should shape the
global economy from this picture. The first of these tasks I left aside for reasons of space. As
noted above, I consider the issue elsewhere. The second, too, is left aside for reasons of space,
but also because, if my arguments here are correct, this task is perhaps not suitable for a political
philosophy journal. From my analysis, it would seem to follow that, although political
philosophy has an important role framing the questions we must ask about ‘trade justice’,
detailing relevant principles and identifying the logical space in which these questions must be
explored, specifying what justice demands of a trade regime – and, indeed, any other institution –
is a task that requires considerable empirical input. In the case of trade, this input is likely to
include analysis from economics, political science, law, and perhaps others. In this respect, the
paper affirms recent arguments made by Herzog suggesting that conceptualising the demands of
justice requires considerable exchange between disciplines, each contributing an important
component of the overall analysis.73 It also affirms the point consistently made by Rawls that,
while philosophy may be able to frame what justice requires, much more applied social sciences
are needed to know what it demands in practice. 74 In these respects, the arguments here defend
the claim that considering the relationship between justice and trade very much requires us to
move in the direction of a more holistic analysis.
Barry & Reddy, ‘International Trade and Labour Standards’: pp. 587-604.
On this subject see L. Herzog & A. Walton, ‘Qualified Market Access and Inter-Disciplinarity’, Ethics and Global
Politics (forthcoming).
73
L. Herzog, ‘Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory and the Problem of Knowledge’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 29
(2012): 271-288.
74
See, for example, Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Revised Edition), p. 175.
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71
72