CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY, NORTHRIDGE
PAVING THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR TO LA PANAMERICANA?
THE POST-ELECTORAL HOPES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA VIVA
KENNEDY CLUBS, 1960-1963.
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
For the Master of Arts degree in History
By
Jorge Nicolas Leal
May 2011
··------- - - - - - - - - -
The thesis of Jorge Nicolas Leal is approved:
Dr. Thomas Devine
Date
Dr. Susan Fitzpatrick-Behrens
Date
Dr. Josh Sides, Chair
Date
California State University, Northridge
ii
Acknowledgments
My CSUN journey, which began many years ago, now comes to an end in 2011
with this thesis. CSUN is such a big part of my life, so much so, that I would not be the
same person if I had not been educated in this great institution. In here, I first learned
how to write solid stories, articles and then how to research and write history. I plan to
continue writing the history of Mexicans and Latinos in the U.S. during my academic
training in the Ph.D program at UC San Diego and throughout my life.
There are several outstanding historians at CSUN who taught me, trained me and
supported me, even when life circumstances threaten take me away from academia. I am
forever grateful to Professor Merry Ovnick who first got me interested in the urban
history of Los Angeles. She also readily agreed to become my advisor for the PreDoctoral Fellowship. Professor Josh Sides helped me tremendously throughout my time
as a history student at CSUN. Professor Sides chaired my thesis committee and provided
invaluable insights, suggestions and edits to this project. Most importantly, Professor
Sides never gave up on me, encouraged me to continue thinking and researching about
the past and present of Los Angeles. Moreover, he became a pillar of support and
guidance during the Ph.D application process. Professor Thomas Devine needs a special
mention as he first suggested a book on this topic when I assisted him in one of his
classes. Professor Devine's concise observations and edits made this a much more
readable document and I can only hope, I became a better writer in the process. Professor
Susan Fitzpatrick-Behrens offered very important and valuable comments regarding the
religious factor of the thesis and of course, the much needed Latin American perspective.
By sharing kernels of her vast knowledge of Latin America, Professor FitzpatrickBehrens encouraged me to continue learning more about Latin America. Professors
Devine, Fitzpatrick-Behrens and Sides; as the members of my thesis committee, I want to
thank you from the bottom of my heart for your help, support and guidance.
I also want to recognize Professors Richard Horowitz, Rachel Howes, Erik
Goldner and Charles Macune, who have made the history department such a strong,
challenging, yet nurturing program. I was fortunate to have Dr. Mary Pardo as my first
professor at CSUN back in the fall of 1994. She taught me a great deal about life and the
American university system in my very first semester in here. I will forever be grateful
for her life-long advice and everlasting support. iGracias Profesora!
Citlali Sosa-Riddell deserves the most effusive footnote for her help, patience,
and advice not only in this project but also throughout my personal, professional and
academic endeavors. Thank you for being a true friend! I would also like to acknowledge
Familia Sosa-Riddell for their unwavering help. Adaljiza and Bill were they first people
who believed in me, encouraged and supported me to back to school and work towards a
Ph.D. Gracias de Coraz6n.
Gracias a mis padres Olivia y Nicolas por su apoyo, paciencia, respeto y
ensefianzas vitalicias. Hubo afios dificiles, pero tambien afios de recompensas. jLos amo
papas! A mis dos hermanas Elsa Alejandrina y Olivia Elizabeth, quienes me aguantaron
de todo y espero que ahora, a los afios, les he sabido pagar por su paciencia. jLas quiero!
Finalmente y principalmente agradezco a mi compafiera, Blanca Estela Lopez
Conde, por compartir tu vida conmigo y por hacerme entender lo que significa ser pareja.
Te agradezco el apoyarme, comprenderme y respetarme. Gracias por todos tus valiosos
consejos. Tu inagotable creatividad me inspira todos los dias. jTe quiero bombonia!
iii
Table of Contents
Signature Page
11
Acknowledgments
111
Abstract
v
Introduction
1
Chapter 1:
The political conditions of Mexican Americans prior to 1960
4
Chapter 2:
The Creation of the Viva Kennedy Clubs
9
Chapter 3:
Dispatches from the L.A. Barrio La Opinion's
14
Reporting of the 1960 Campaign
Chapter 4:
The 1960 Election in Southern California
33
Chapter 5:
The Transnational Aspirations of the Viva Kennedy Clubs
41
Chapter 6:
The Unsuccessful Quest for Nominations
47
Conclusion
58
Bibliography
61
iv
ABSTRACT
PAVING THE ROAD TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR TO LA PANAMERICANA?
THE POST-ELECTORAL HOPES OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA VIVA
KENNEDY CLUBS, 1960-1963.
By
Jorge Nicolas Leal
Master of Arts in History
John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign served as the catalysis for the
formation of the first truly national Latino political organization, the Viva Kennedy Clubs.
The members and leaders of this group became enchanted by Kennedy's youth. Most
significantly, these mostly middle-class Mexican Americans fervently assisted Kennedy's
campaign as an act of understated solidarity for a Catholic Irish-American candidate who
shared both their same religion and whose ethnic origin, -just as theirs- was distinctive
from the Anglo-Saxon dominant culture.
Hence, for a few fleeting and buoyant months, the Viva Kennedy Clubs brought
together numerous political and civic groups, many of which were already active throughout
the Southwest but had previously espoused divergent agendas. A coalition was built around
one single one goal: to assist a fellow Catholic and hyphenated American win the presidency.
By believing that vague election promises truly represented future executive orders, the club
leaders convinced themselves and the club members that Kennedy's victory would bring
about the following results: the immediate appointment of Latinos in prominent government
positions, the naming of Latinos as U.S. ambassadors in Latin American countries and most
significantly: the implementation of swiftly sweeping solutions to the problems faced by
Latinos in the agricultural fields and barrios of the U.S.
v
However, Kennedy's ambiguous electoral pledges were not fulfilled as expected by
the leaders of the Viva Kennedy Clubs. This project analyzes the opinions, interviews and
editorials written about these emerging Mexican American leaders in the Spanish-Language
Newspaper La Opinion, to account for their disappointment. Moreover it attempts to trace the
development of the political ideas espoused by the Viva Kennedy leaders during the
campaign and place them in a transnational context as these Mexican Americans aspired to
be named as American emissaries in Latin America since they perceived the southern
hemisphere as vulnerable to the Soviet Union's influence.
vi
Introduction
John F. Kennedy's 1960 presidential campaign served as the catalyst for the
f01mation of the first national Mexican American electoral organization; the Viva
Kennedy Clubs. Kennedy's youth energized the leaders and members of the club who
fervently assisted his campaign throughout the summer and fall of 1960. Since many of
these Mexican Americans shared the Irish American candidate's religion, most of the
Club's members viewed their political activism on behalf of Kennedy's campaign as an
act of Catholic solidarity with a candidate whose ethnic origin also differed from the
prevailing White Anglo-Saxon Protestant dominant culture. Kennedy reciprocated by
acknowledging Latinos in campaign speeches and appealing to the group as part of his
electoral strategy. Kennedy's overtures to Latino voters marked the first time a prominent
presidential candidate recognized this ethnic group as a national voting bloc.
For a few fleeting and buoyant months, the Viva Kennedy Clubs brought together
political and civic groups active throughout the American Southwest that had previously
espoused divergent agendas to pursue one goal: assisting a fellow Catholic and
hyphenated American win the presidency. Believing that vague election promises
represented future executive orders, the club leaders convinced themselves that a
Kennedy victory would translate into the appointment of Latinos to high government
positions and the naming of prominent community members to ambassadorships in Latin
American countries. Most significantly, they believed a Kennedy administration would
quickly bring sweeping changes and address the problems Latinos faced in the
agricultural fields and barrios of the U.S.
1
However, once elected, Kennedy did not fulfill his campaign promises in the form
the leaders of the Viva Kennedy Clubs had expected. As a result, they felt exploited and
believed that this setback revealed their political inexperience and naiVete in navigating
the treacherous waters of American electoral politics. Indeed, they were unable to secure
major political rewards from a candidate they considered a "friend." In the aftermath of
the election, some Viva Kennedy pmiicipants became active members of the Democratic
party machine believing that demonstrating party loyalty was the most effective method
to achieve the political gains they sought for their ethnic group. Others became
disenchanted with the partisan political maneuvering and eventually took the route of
community-based political activism, attempting to effect changes in their local areas such
as unionizing workers. Still other prominent Viva Kennedy Club members withdrew
from all political involvement but remained prominent and influential members of their
barrios.
This project builds on the historical literature that recounts the Mexican American
experience in the twentieth century and expands the scope of Ignacio M. Gm·cia's study
Viva Kennedy Mexican Americans in search of Camelot to present a more extensive
chronicle of the voices and actions of the Viva Kennedy leaders in Southern California
during and after the 1960 presidential election. Drawing on articles and opinion pieces
published in contemporary periodicals, this study presents the story of the Los Angeles
Viva Kennedy Clubs told by the members themselves.
This study's central source is La Opinion, the L.A. Spanish-language newspaper,
that for over eight decades has chronicled the Latino experience in Southern California
and whose reporting provides crucial insights into Latino ethnic identity formation and
2
political action in Los Angeles. Moreover, the editorial pages of La Opinion present us
with a variety of political essays written by influential Latin American thinkers, which
were then read by Los Angeles readers, including perhaps the Viva Kennedy leaders and
members. That Mexican American leaders engaged with the ideas articulated in these
essays -which considered the role of the U.S. in Latin America- suggests their interest
in securing diplomatic posts as American Foreign Service Officers.
Thus these emerging Mexican Americans leaders perceived that their actions
within the American political process could have had transnational implications. They
felt that their potential diplomatic work in the Western Hemisphere as "Americans of
Latin American descent" could hinder the spread of communism in the region, an effort
that would help them boost the role of Mexican Americans in different areas of American
society and also would bring recognition to the Mexican Americans in Latin America.
While the diplomatic nominations did not materialize in the 1960s, the quest itself
highlights the constant flow of ideas and political observations between Mexican
Americans and Latin Americans. This transnational dialogue evident in the contemporary
Spanish-Language press presents a different narrative of the known historical account of
the political and philosophical thought developed in the Mexican American barrios of the
U.S. Additionally, it provides a glimpse of the different attempts by Mexican Americans
to be both an integral part of American society while continuing to sustain their bonds
with Latin America, an endeavor intended to assert their cultural identity and assist the
economic progress of Latin America.
3
Chapter 1
The political conditions of Mexican Americans prior to 1960
Prior to the 1960 election, the majority of Mexican American voters in California
identified with the Democratic Party. This affiliation was rooted in the Great Depression
and New Deal eras, and the specific policies of the Hoover and Roosevelt
administrations.
By the 1920s, increased immigration resulting from the Mexican
Revolution had created a "Mexican Problem" in the Southwestern U.S., only made more
severe by the economic crisis of the Depression. Policies such as the Repatriation
Program under President Hoover, which deported thousands of Mexican immigrants and
U.S. citizens, turned Mexican Americans away from the Republican Party.
In contrast, Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, from which many Mexican
Americans directly benefited, drew many into the Democratic Party based on the notion
that it was the party best-suited and willing to address the needs of the growing Mexican
American population. 1 However, early political activism among Mexican Americans
flourished at the grassroots rather than in the electoral realm. In response to the
conditions in the barrio and the discriminatory treatment of Mexican Americans in the
interwar years, community organizations emerged across the Southwest reflecting two
ideological strands in civil rights activism: a middle-class based assimilationist view that
stressed Americanization and citizenship embodied in the League of United Latin
American Citizens (LULAC), and a working-class based separatist view that emphasized
1
On the repatriation of the 1930s, see Francisco E. Balderrama and Raymond Rodriguez, Decade of
Betrayal: Mexican Repatriation in the 1930s (Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1995).
For an in-depth study of the Chicano community in Los Angeles in the 1930s, see George J. Sanchez,
Becoming Mexican American: Ethnicity. Culture. and Identity in Chicano Los Angeles (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993).
4
racial and class solidarity among Mexican Americans and Mexican immigrants, a stance
adopted by the Congress of Spanish-Speaking Peoples. 2
These ideological divisions persisted after World War II with the emergence of
the American GI Forum, an assimilationist-oriented organization whose mission was to
fight for the rights of Mexican American war veterans. On the other side of the political
spectrum, fringe groups such as the left-wing Asociaci6n Nacional Mexico-Americana
(ANMA) and the Civil Rights Congress, which focused on the racial inequalities the
Mexican American community experienced. Prior to 1960, these organizations struggled
to remain active in spite of the communist hunt unleashed by Senator Joseph McCarthy. 3
Despite the ideological range of barrio political advocates, the prevailing tenor of
Mexican American political activism during and after World War II was a "politics of
supplication" practiced by groups like LULAC and the GI Forum. According to the
historian Lorena Oropeza, the "politics of supplication" showcased a narrow conception
of citizenship, ethnic group patriotism, and loyalty and generally avoided criticism of
U.S. institutions. 4 The attempts at exercising political power in the postwar era reflected
this politics of supplication. Mexican American candidates tried to portray themselves as
2
On the ideological divisions among Mexican Americans in the interwar period, see David G.
Gutierrez, Walls and Mirrors: Mexican Americans, Mexican Immigrants, and the Politics ofEthnicity
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). On LULAC, see Benjamin Marquez, LULAC: The
Evolution of a Mexican American Political Organization (Austin: University of Texas. Press, 1993).
3
On the GI Forum, see Henry Ramos, The American GI Forum: In Pursuit of the Dream, 1948-1983
(Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press, 1998); on ANMA, see Mario Garcia, Mexican Americans: Leadership,
Ideology, and Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); on the Civil Rights Congress, see Gerald
Horne, Communist Front?: The Civil Rights Congress, 1946-1956 (Rutherford: Associated University
Presses, 1988).
4
Lorena Oropeza, jRaza Si! jGuerra No!: Chicano Protest and Patriotism During the VietNam War Era
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 12-13.
5
loyal and patriotic to indifferent Anglo Saxon voting majorities. Hence, political power at
the local level proved elusive for Mexican Americans throughout 1950s.
Mexican American political representation in the American era was non-existent
until 1949, when Edward R. Roybal was elected to the Los Angeles City Council and
became the first person of Mexican descent to serve in that body since 1881. Roybal's
election was achieved through the efforts of the Community Service Organization,
founded in 1947, that conducted voter registration drives in Mexican American
neighborhoods. 5 Roybal's other successful strategy involved the formation of coalitions
with other ethnic groups, since the community lacked sufficient electoral power to act on
its own at the time. In Roybal's 9th Council District, 16,000 out of 87,000 registered
voters were Mexican American, yet Roybal was able to beat the incumbent by a margin
of nearly two to one (20,472 to 11,956) in the 1949 City Council election. 6
Nonetheless, Roybal's victory did not yield more political victories for Mexican
American candidates in the 1950s. In fact, Roybal twice failed trying to get elected to
higher office. In 1954 he ran for Lieutenant Governor of California and in 1958 he sought
a seat on the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors. Though Roybal won the Democratic
primary for Lieutenant Governor, he lost the election, as he did not have the support of
the party. Moreover, according to Mexican American historian Rodolfo Acuiia, the
5
Rodolfo Acufia, Anything But Mexican: Chicanos in Contemporary Los Angeles (New York: Verso,
1996), 44-45, 51. Juan G6mez-Quifiones, Chicano Politics: Reality and Promise, 1940-1990 (Albuquerque:
University of New Mexico Press, 1990), 53-54. Gutierrez, Walls, and Mirrors, 168-172. Gutierrez notes
that unlike the strictly middle-class organization LULAC, the CSO was the first group to welcome
immigrants and citizens, middle-class and working-class membership, and in so doing made great advances
in immigrant politics throughout the 1950s.
6
For a detailed study of coalitions between Mexican, Jewish, and African Americans in Los Angeles in this
period, see Shana Bernstein, "Building Bridges at Home in a Time of Global Conflict: Interracial
Cooperation and the Fight For Civil Rights in Los Angeles, 1933-1954," Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford
University, 2003.
6
Chandler family (owners of the Los Angeles Times) opposed Roybal's candidacy as it
perceived Roybal's interests to be in conflict with its own. In 1958, Roybal was initially
declared the winner of the Supervisorial election over Ernest Debs, but after three
recounts, during which ballots from East Los Angeles were at one point mysteriously lost
and then recovered, Roybal was declared the loser by a slim margin. 7
In addition to Roybal's unsuccessful bids for state and county office, in 1958
Henry "Hank" Lopez ran for California Secretary of State. Lopez was the only minority
candidate running on the Democratic ticket for state office, but he did not have the
backing of the Democratic state party because Governor Edmund "Pat" Brown and Jesse
Unruh, the Speaker of the Assembly, believed that a Mexican American could not gain
the necessary support to win. Lopez was the only Democrat on the ticket to lose that year,
convincing many Mexican American Democrats that the Democratic Party did not fully
support the community's political efforts. Thus Roybal remained the lone Mexican
American elected official in Los Angeles until the 1960s. 8
This continued marginalization coupled with the dramatic growth of the
community during the 1950s-the Mexican-origin population in Los Angeles reached
600,000 by 1960, having tripled statewide since 1940-led to the fmmation in 1959 of
the Mexican American Political Association (MAPA), a formally non-partisan
organization created with the specific goal of organizing Mexican Americans into an
ethnic voting bloc and electing Mexican American representatives. MAPA's official
nonpartisan stance reflected growing discontent with the apparent resistance within the
7
8
111
Rodolfo Acufia, Occupied America, 5 ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004), 280.
G6mez-Quifiones, Chicano Politics, 67.
7
Democratic party, locally and statewide, to the election of Mexican American
.
representatives.
9
9
Acuna, 274.
8
Chapter2
The Creation of the Viva Kennedy Clubs
The Democratic party's apathy towards Mexican American candidates at the state
level also meant that Mexican Americans and citizens of Latin American descent were
mostly disregarded as a voting bloc during national campaigns. 10 Previous to 1960 the
only effort to develop an organization that gathered Mexican Americans in support of a
presidential candidate had been "Amigos de Wallace" a Califomia group active in 1948
during Henry Wallace's failed bid as the Progressive Party candidate. The Democratic
Party either took Mexican American voters for granted or perceived them as simply
another part of the Democratic coalition. 11
Therefore it is hardly surprising that the Democratic party did not initiate the first
partisan effort to appeal to Mexican American voters in the 1960 presidential election.
Rather, a group of Republican Mexican Americans in California took the first steps. The
group, "Latin American Veterans and Volunteers for Eisenhower-Nixon," had worked on
behalf of the former allied supreme commander during his successful 1952 and 1956
presidential campaigns. 12 This group maintained its organizational structure and
volunteered to work on the Richard M. Nixon 1960 campaign. In spite of this, the
Republican candidate from Califomia discouraged the effort, as he was uncomfortable
10
Ignacio M. Garcia, Viva Kennedy: Mexican Americans in Search of Camelot (College Station, TX:
Texas A&M University Press, 2000). 34.
11
According to the historian Enrique M. Buelna, "The Mexican Question: Mexican Americans in the
Communist Party 1940-1957" (Article Published by the Center for Research on Latinos in a Global
Society. University of California, Irvine, 1999), 3.
12
Byran 0. Jackson, Michael B. Preston, Bruce E.Cain, Sandra Bass, Racial and Ethnic Politics in
California (Berkeley: IGS Press, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California at Berkeley,
1991), 185-319.
9
about having an "ethnic" angle to his campaign. 13
Instead, an entry-level staffer in John F. Kennedy's office set in motion a similar
organization whose mission was to assist his boss get the Mexican American vote in as
many states as possible. The son of an Irish American father and a Mexican American
mother, Carlos McCormick was attending the University of Arizona when he met and
married Mercy Estrada, the daughter of Ralph Estrada, a prominent attorney and member
of several Mexican American organizations in Arizona. Estrada soon incorporated
McCormick into the political work ofhis friends in Washington. 14
Once in the nation's capital, the Mexican-Irish American endeared himself to the
Kennedys when in 1959 he volunteered to translate Kennedy's Spanish press clippings
for free. McCmmick's closeness with the American G.I. Forum, a Mexican American
veterans advocacy group, soon led him to enlist Kennedy in the organization. 15 Though
essentially a symbolic gesture, McCormick's initiative brought together Kennedy and
Mexican Americans for the first time.
Kennedy hired McCormick as part of his staff in the spnng of 1960.
Subsequently, McCormick briefed Kennedy and his advisors on the Mexican American
groups active in the Southwest. He also attempted to persuade the presidential candidate
that in a close election, a relatively small number of voters could tip the balance in his
favor, hence the Mexican American vote would be crucial in 1960. McCormick's pitch
impressed Kennedy to the point that he assigned him the task of organizing a Mexican
13
Garcia, 35.
14
Kenneth Burt, The Search for a Civic Voice: California Latino Politics (Claremont, CA: Regina Books,
2007), 186.
15
Garcia, 57.
10
American outreach organization. McCormick began setting up the group that would
become the Viva Kennedy Clubs prior to the Democratic National Convention held in
Los Angeles in July 1960. 16
McCormick first approached the American G.l. Forum, which had an advocacy
presence in Washington D.C. but was especially strong in Texas. Given that McCormick
envisioned a national organization, he also sought and obtained the support of Alianza
Hispana-Americana, the group his father-in-law led in Arizona. By the time the
Democratic convention opened, McCormick had enlisted LULAC in Texas and MAPA
and the CSO in California.
McCormick then recruited to the partisan effort the few prominent Latino elected
officials in the Southwest; Dennis Chavez, U.S. Senator from New Mexico; Henry P.
Gonzalez, state senator in Texas; and Councilmember Roybal in Los Angeles.
McCormick designated these popular Mexican American politicians as national co-chairs
of the nascent Viva Kennedy Clubs. 17
Chavez, Gonzalez, and Roybal, avowed liberals and enthusiastic regional leaders,
were effective at organizing and influencing supporters in their communities, but
preferred to limit their efforts to the regional level, thus staving off a possible battle for
leadership of the nascent clubs at the national level. 18 During the convention in Los
Angeles, McCormick arranged a meeting between Robert Kennedy and the newly
appointed co-chairs. As the campaign manager and on behalf of his brother, Kennedy
welcomed the group's support. Though it was agreed that the Viva Kennedy Clubs would
16
Burt, 187.
17
Garcia, 43.
18
Garcia, 44.
11
work with the Kennedy campaign, no specific strategies were discussed and the leaders
delegated the development of the national organization to McCormick. Roybal later
admitted that the Mexican American leaders made no formal request for political
compensation in exchange for their efforts to help the Kennedy campaign. Nonetheless,
the three leaders did share with Robert Kennedy their concerns about not obtaining
federal government jobs and expressed their desire to desegregate the school systems in
their communities. 19
After Kennedy captured the nomination and the final sprint of the campaign
began, the Mexican American leaders returned to their communities to foster the efforts
to elect Kennedy. The aforementioned organizations became feeders to the Viva Kennedy
Clubs, and their offices transformed into Viva Kennedy Clubs headquarters during the
campaign. 20 In his pitch to secure the Mexican Americans' support for Kennedy,
McCormick referred to the similarities between the candidate's background and Mexican
customs such as being Catholic and belonging to large patriarchal families. McCormick
informed voters that Kennedy was, "an attractive war hero, which was macho, wealthy
and had big family and an attractive wife." Throughout the campaign, the club's literature
reminded Mexican Americans that Jackie Kennedy spoke Spanish, but Kennedy's
religion became the main "off the cuff' selling point of the Viva Kennedy Clubs.
McCormick continually told Mexican American audiences, "He's a Catholic like us,
who's running for president and sees our problems and is concerned."21
McCormick then returned to Washington, rented an office on K Street and began
19
Garcia, 44.
20
Garcia, 53. Burt, 188.
21
Burt, 187.
12
delineating the activities and goals of the group. The Kennedy campaign provided him
with an assistant, Arthur Valdez, from the office of Congressman Joseph N. Montoya of
New Mexico. 22 Though he operated from a cramped office and had only one other person
working alongside him, McCormick gave himself the ostentatious title of "executive
director of the Viva Kennedy Clubs" and embarked on constructing a truly national
organization. In the Fall of 1960 he set out to accomplish the following goals: register
Mexican Americans to vote; deliver a pro-Kennedy message all over the Southwest; raise
the profile of the Mexican Americans as a voting bloc; make the case to the media about
the crucial role the group would play in the November election; and, fmally and most
importantly, tum out the Mexican American vote on November 8, 1960. In pursuing
these goals in Los Angeles, McCormick received crucial support from the venerable
Spanish-language newspaper, La Opinion.
22
Burt, 187.
13
Chapter 3
Dispatches from the L.A. barrio: La Opinion's reporting ofthe 1960 Campaign
Founded in 1926 by Mexican expatriate Ignacio Lozano, La Opinion became the
source of information for Mexicans immigrants who yearned to be informed about the
current events occurr-ing in Mexico and Latin America. By 1960, La Opinion had become
the tribune for Spanish-Speaking Angelenos in which to communicate with their
community about their civic involvement in American society. Though English was
undoubtedly the first language for the majority of the Mexican American leaders in the
1960s, the city's English-Language newspapers often neglected to repmi Mexican
American civic and political involvement. Thus, these leaders confronted the paradox of
advocating the value of assimilating into the mainstream society in Spanish - a foreign
language. they aspired to become active pmticipants in the American civic process, they
still had to rely on a remnant of the old countty; a publication that still focused on
updating immigrants on news from Mexico.
The ascent of the Mexican American generation born in the interwar yem·s
initiated a process of identity construction in both English and Spanish discussions. In the
pages of La Opinion terms like "Mexican American," "Spanish Speaking," "Of Latin
American
Descent,"
"Hispanic
American,"
and
"Latin-blooded"
were
used
interchangeably, perhaps part of an effort to identifY the most agreeable term. More
importantly, La Opinion offered itself as the vehicle through which Mexican American
groups could publicize their political activities and discuss their ideas, plans, and
aspirations. La Opinion's reporting during the 1960 election offers a detailed glimpse of
the events that occurred in the banios of Los Angeles during the campaign.
14
The newspaper published its first article on the Viva Kennedy Clubs prior to the
Democratic convention. The text detailed the aforementioned meeting between a group of
Mexican American leaders and Robert Kennedy. La Opinion called this gathering a
"special" conference to signal the importance of the reunion held at the Biltmore Hotel in
Downtown Los Angeles. Among the topics discussed were the prospects of scheduling
the candidate for a dinner with the Mexican American leaders once he arrived in Los
Angeles. For the first time Robert Kennedy laid out what became the Kennedy
campaign's offer to the group:
The U.S. government has not given its due consideration to the
appointment of people with the natural comprehension in Latin American
relations, specifically our government has overlooked the Mexican
Americans and their leadership in the Southwest and this has continued to
the present. The foreign policy of the United States in relation to Latin
America would be greatly served and it would be enhance greatly with the
support of American personnel of Latin American origin in the foreign
corps. 23
A day before the opening of the convention, La Opinion interviewed McCormick
and identified him as a "prominent Kennedy campaign official." McCormick reiterated
the promise that if Kennedy was elected president, more Mexican-Americans would be
appointed to diplomatic missions in Latin America since they "know the language and
are familiar with the cultures."24
During the convention, MAPA opened a temporary office close to the event; this
office included a "suite" where the members could follow the proceedings on television
and "taste some hors d'oeuvres and cocktails while they are being introduced to the
23
"Entrevista un grupo a R. Kennedy," La Opinion, July 3, 1960. All stories cited hereafter are from La
Opinion and translated by the author.
24
"Carlos McCormick promete misiones diplomaticas para Mexico-Americanos," July 10, 1960.
15
national leaders of the Democratic Party." Though the MAPA members were given the
opportunity to spend some time with the convention participants, the soiree was not a free
affair and the members were required to contribute five dollars to be collected by Henry
P. Lopez, one of the MAPA leaders. 25
McCormick arranged a meeting between the California members of the nascent
Viva Kennedy Clubs and John F. Kennedy. Hank Lopez, the MAPA leader, who was also
a former Democratic candidate for Secretary of State, wrote an account of the meeting for
La Opinion. Lopez related that the group offered a report to Kennedy regarding the
Mexican Americans' participation in his campaign. Lopez stated that one of the promises
the leaders made was to register 250,000 Mexican American voters in California. Lopez
also claimed "neutral observers consider that the Mexican Americans and Latin
Americans could give the margin of victory to any candidate in the state." He noted that
the leaders reminded Kennedy that in 1948 Harry Truman won California by a margin of
less than 18,000 votes and that Mexican Americans vote "85 or 95 percent in favor of the
Democratic Party." According to Lopez, the report provided to Kennedy suggested that
"there was a vast reserve of Mexican American voters that are yet to be mobilized" thus
the Viva Kennedy Clubs would assist Kennedy in that task and insure that they voted for
him. Significantly, Lopez mentioned that the registration techniques that the clubs would
use included assistance from the churches of different denominations and emphasized
that the "Catholic church has always been of assistance in the voter registration drives."26
25
"Abre oficinas La MAPA," July 10, 1960.
26
Henry P. Lopez, "Campana entre votantes de extracci6n Mexicana," July 17, 1960.
16
Though the Mexican Americans from Texas favored the vice-presidential
candidacy of Lyndon B. Johnson, the California contingent leaned heavily toward Adlai
Stevenson. Accordingly, their first reaction to Johnson's nomination was disappointment.
In the section "Panoramas Angelinos," an anonymous political and society gossip
column, La Opinion remarked, "As expected the child-faced Jack Kennedy triumphed
and everybody was delighted by his victory. But there's not complete happiness and
'Jackie' spoiled the party for more than a few when he announced Johnson as his pick. .. "
The column continued on to reflect on the issue: "now if we take into consideration
convention politics, there was no other option for Jack ... we are told that Jack was forced
to accept Johnson, unless he risked losing the election in the Southern States as well as
the 'so-called' border states." Moreover, "Argos," the nom de plume for an anonymous
writer at La Opinion, remarked on the reactions to the convention and claimed that
Mexican American delegates were "very well received, and they obtained all kinds of
considerations from the candidates and the only complaint would be that there were not
enough Mexican Americans attending the events.'m
In response to the speeches given at the Democratic convention, La Opinion
published an editorial titled "Los derechos del pueblo de habla hispana" [The Rights of
the Spanish Speaking people]. The piece comments on Kennedy's convention
pronouncement in favor of Civil Rights legislation. It is a rather timid statement that
applauds Kennedy's platform and calls to readers' attention that the document includes
"some form" of civil rights "legislation" for the "Spanish Speaking People."28
27
"Panoramas Angelinos," July 17, 1960.
28
Editorial, "Los derechos del pueblo de habla hispana," July 17, 1960.
17
The next entry pertaining to the local Viva Kennedy Clubs appeared on July 31
and focused on the voter registration efforts of the Community Service Organization
(CSO). Adopting the slogan "Unanse a Ia cruzada" [Unite to the crusade], the CSO
announced the start its Voter Registration Drive on August 1. According to CSO
president Herman Gallegos, the groups intended to register a quarter of a million voters
between August and October. Gallegos also noted that "During the CSO's thirteen years
of existence, the group has awakened the civic conscience of Hispanics and due to their
voters registration efforts more than half a million voters of 'Latin American descent'
have participated in the last three statewide elections."29 The next day, La Opinion
published an article announcing that Carlos McCormick, "an expert in the Spanish
language," had been formally named as the executive director of the "Viva Kennedy
Clubs." McCormick is quoted as saying that the clubs would allow "five million Spanishspeaking Americans to actively participate in the upcoming presidential election." 30
On August 6, the newspaper published an editorial titled "Las obligaciones del
ciudadano" [The obligations of the citizen] in which it urged readers who were American
citizens to register to vote, noting that doing so was their obligation and duty not only to
this nation but also "a way to be involved in international affairs." The editorial also
encouraged readers to fulfill their other responsibilities as citizens. These included
attending political rallies, working on behalf of the candidates of their choice, making a
constant effort to convince their neighbors to register to vote, and encouraging other
29
"Una cruzada de registro de los votantes porIa CSO." July 31, 1960.
30
"Carlos McCormick dirige los Clubs 'Viva Kennedy,"' August 1, 1960.
18
members of the community to vote on Election Day. La Opinion also reminded its
readers of their "civic duties" in another editorial piece published on August 27. 31
By the end of August, the activities of the "Viva Kennedy Clubs" were in full
swing. More than 250 people attended the official opening of the area headquarters in
Los Angeles. Roybal spoke fervently about "the movement" that the clubs had created. 32
On August 28, 1960, La Opinion's "Argos" reported that the clubs were spreading like
"fungus" all around Los Angeles, and were giving "our own people the opportunity to
support the youthful Democratic Senator." On the same page, there is a photo of CSO
organizers conducting a registration drive in East Los Angeles.
In response to the increased political activity in the L.A. barrios in September
1960, La Opinion opted to add another writer to the political beat, "with the purpose of
fomenting the civic-social service." Octavia R. Costa became the new "liaison" between
the organizations that worked on "behalf of our racial upbringing" and the readership of
La Opinion. The paper explained that Costa would interview and profile individuals and
organizations that "can contribute guidance, also to encourage them to position our racial
group in the place that its numbers require, its continuous improvement in the cultural
sector and the everyday involvement in the civic life of the United States." Costa began
reporting on the conditions of the "Latin American" community in Los Angeles, and
enhanced La Opinion's coverage of the 1960 presidential election. He also served as the
31
"Las obligaciones del ciudadano," August 6, 1960.
32
Though most of the research on the Viva Kennedy Clubs has focused on the organizing of the Mexican
American electorate, other Latin Americans also were active in the campaign and even founded their own
clubs. Such was the case with the Puerto Rican community in West Los Angeles. La Opinion published an
announcement of the club's founding. Its leader, Doctor Raymundo W. Rodriguez, also declared that to
finance its activities, the nascent club was organizing a fundraising dance to be held on August 27 featuring
the sextet "Los Jibaritos," a popular Puerto Rican band, as the music act. See "Un club 'Viva Kennedy' fue
fundado aquf," August 24, 1960.
19
sole daily newspaper chronicler of the L.A. Latino community until Ruben Salazar
developed his regular column at the Los Angeles Times in 1962. 33
As part of its election coverage La Opinion profiled on its front page the
continuous attacks on Kennedy's religion. This issue triggered La Opinion to publish an
editorial dedicated to Kennedy's religion, which discussed how Kennedy "had
continuously" stated and demonstrated his loyalty to the United States above his religion.
The editorial also alluded to the "dirty campaign that is being violently fought against
Kennedy from the South of the country. It also defended Kennedy, lamenting that, "it is a
real shame that Mr. Kennedy continues to be accused and doubted. He has repeatedly
sworn loyalty to the constitution and for him this document has priority over any
religious consideration, that would attempt to breach the separation of church and
state."34
The recurring attacks on Kennedy's Catholicism could be understood as a
message to the mostly Catholic Mexican American community: if you were a Catholic,
you were seen as suspect. Cesar Chavez, at the time a CSO organizer, later commented,
"Every time that he (Kennedy) got put down for being a Catholic this made points with
the Mexicans who are all Catholics, [they] looked at him as sort of a minority kind of
person. " 35
Emphasizing the potential closeness of a Kennedy administration to Latin
America, La Opinion reported on his September 12 speech at Plaza San Jacinto in El
Paso, Texas, located a short distance from the Mexico-U.S. border. In the speech,
33
"Labor de acercamiento," September 11, 1960.
34
"Es atacada su lealtad, dice Kennedy," September 10, 1960.
35
Cesar Chavez interview (1970), John F. Kennedy Library.
20
Kennedy said that his administration "would again lend a friendship hand to the Latin
American nations." Kennedy also commented that for him, "El Paso" not only meant "El
Paso del Norte," but also "El Paso al Este, al Sur y tambien al Oeste." [Not only the
passage to the north, but also the passage to the east, south, and, to the west], thus
declaring that Texas had a vital importance not only to his campaign, as exhibited by his
picking Johnson as his running mate, but also to his prospective administration's effort to
. 36
reach out to other countnes.
For Mexican Independence Day, La Opinion published a missive supposedly sent
by Kennedy via Senator Chavez and Congressman Joseph Montoya, the co-chairs of the
Viva Kennedy Clubs. The message, addressed to the "Mexicans and Mexican
Americans," saluted the community for another anniversary of Mexico's Independence. It
highlighted the U.S. and Mexico's "common aspiration to be free and uphold liberty as a
supreme principle against the challenges presented before these two nations."
37
Though it was customary for politicians to send this type of message to the
Spanish language newspapers during national festivities, Nixon did not make any direct
pronouncement. Instead, his California campaign hosted an event on September 15 at the
Ramsaur Stadium in the city of Compton. The event was billed as a free "Mexican
Artistic Festival" at which New York governor Nelson Rockefeller was scheduled to
speak. The ad for the event announced Rockefeller as a "great friend of the Spanish
Speaking people around the world" and that, as a homage to Mexican Independence Day,
36
"Ofrece Kennedy Amistad a Ia America Latina," September 13, 1960.
37
"Saluda de Kennedy en el dia de Ia Independencia," September 16, 1960.
21
Rockefeller would recite an "impmiant speech in Spanish in support of vice president
Richard Nixon's presidential candidacy."
"Solidaridad Latina-Americana Pro-Nixon," a group led by Jorge I. Motalvo,
sponsored the event. The group was formed to support the GOP presidential candidate
using the same model as the Viva Kennedy Clubs. Motalvo told members that "Latin
Americans have a lot to gain if their votes take Nixon to the presidency, because as a
Californian, Nixon has very close bonds to elements of Hispano-American origin and he
will fight for them." According to La Opinion, Rockefeller met with the members of the
group during this September visit to California and answered their questions in Spanish,
assuring them that if Nixon was elected he would consider appointing citizens of
"Hispanic American" descent to serve as U.S. representatives in Spanish speaking
countries, something Kennedy had also promised.
38
During the September festivities "Argos" took the opportunity to comment on the
civic duties of La Opinion's readership. First, he reported the Mexican Consul was
"proud of the Mexicans" living in Los Angeles and that their "exceptional conduct"
honored Mexico especially when they became part of the civic society. "Argos" also
reported New Mexico Senator Dennis Chavez's visit to campaign for Kennedy on behalf
of the Viva Kennedy Clubs. Chavez is described as a 72 year-old man with a "very agile
mind with a mastery of the Cervantes' language," which developed into a common motif
in the articles published in La Opinion: the Mexican American leader's ability to speak
Spanish. "Argos" briefly detailed the proceedings of the event at the Biltmore Hotel
where Roybal was confirmed as national co-chair of the club. A message from Robert
38
Information featured on a Rockefeller Ad published September 14, 1960 and in the column "Notas
Polfticas" printed on September 11, 1960 and September 25, 1960.
22
Kennedy stated that Roybal's appointment was in recognition of, "his leadership and
influence not only in California but throughout the nation." 39
At the end of September, Congressman Joseph Montoya of New Mexico, another
national leader of the Viva Kennedy clubs campaigned in California. Montoya declared
that "the great Mexican American population in California would be a decisive force in
the next elections and it is possible that the voters of this origin would have give the state
either to the Democrats or Republicans." Montoya then went on to state what became a
prominent campaign theme: "The citizens of Mexican origin prefer Kennedy and the
Democratic Party because we are mostly working people that want to identify with the
party that has traditionally defended the rights of the workers." 40
Leopoldo G. Sanchez utilized the proselytizing work of the Viva Kennedy Clubs
in Los Angeles to benefit his candidacy for municipal judge. Though Sanchez sought a
lower ranking post, the prospect of his victory was heralded as an achievement since
Mexican Americans only held a handful of elective offices in California. Rather than
pursuing a new post, however, Sanchez was running to replace judge Carlos Teran, a
Mexican American who had moved to a state post. Costa published an extensive
interview with the candidate on September 18 that detailed the activities of the Sanchez
campaign and how it overlapped with the work of the Viva Kennedy Clubs. For instance,
Sanchez and the club shared the same space at the "American GI Forum" office in East
Los Angeles, and in September both organizations were working diligently to register
Mexican Americans to vote. Additionally, Sanchez organized a dinner on behalf of his
39
"Panoramas Angelinos," October 9, 1960.
40
"Montoya hace aqui labor por Kennedy," September 23, 1960.
23
campaign that Viva Kennedy members attended. Roybal officiated as the master of
ceremonies, and the Sanchez campaign raised five thousand dollars. 41
The debates between Kennedy and Nixon turned into pivotal moments in the
campaign, and supposedly at the urging of Carlos McCormick, Kennedy included in his
remarks references to the plight of the people of Latin American descent. 42 In his opening
statement of the first-ever televised presidential debate on September 26, 1960, Kennedy
declared:
I'm not satisfied until every American enjoys his full constitutional rights.
If a Negro baby is born - and this is tme also of Puerto Ricans and
Mexicans in some of our cities - he has about one-half as much chance to
get through high school as a white baby. He has one-third as much chance
to get through college as a white student. He has about a third as much
chance to be a professional man, about half as much chance to own a
house. He has about uh - four times as much chance that he'll be out of
work in his life as the white baby. I think we can do better. I don't want the
talents of any American to go to waste. 43
The reference to Puerto Ricans and Mexicans for the first time shone the spotlight on the
struggles of "Americans of Latin American descent" and transformed them into a
national issue to be discussed, addressed, and resolved. Moreover, Kennedy's statement
energized the leadership and rank and file of the Viva Kennedy clubs as evidenced in
Roybal's interview with Costa published in La Opinion on October 15. "I have an
absolute faith in us obtaining the victory," Roybal declared, "and I have to confess that it
41
Octavia R. Costa, "Expone sus propositos el Lie. Leopolda Sanchez a La Opinion," September 18, 1960.
The amount collected was published in the section "Instantaneas,".October 18, 1960.
42
Carlos McCormick interview conducted in 1984 quoted in Burk, 189.
43
The American Presidency Project [online], http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29400,
accessed on November 8, 2008.
24
wasn't so in the first days. (But) after the debates, Kennedy's stature has grown with the
electorate and they have realized that Kennedy is the candidate needed by the country."44
Roybal aTgued that the Democratic candidate was the best suited for the presidency
for two reasons: "The declaration in defense of the civil rights included in the presidential
plank" and "Kennedy's Catholic position." According to Roybal, Kennedy's civil rights'
stance would not take away many southern votes, however the Catholic question had
become "a more serious threat." Roybal explained that "while the candidate has
explained his faith endlessly and stressed his loyalty to the nation above anything else,
there are even Democrats that fear Kennedy just because he's a Catholic." Nonetheless
the councilmember expressed optimism. "Times have changed in the U.S. This is 1960
not 1928"- a reference to the failed presidential bid of the Catholic Democrat Al Smith.
"This time," he continued, "the working class of the nation will start to see Kennedy as
the new Roosevelt as he's capable of achieving great social changes needed that will
compare to the unforgettable President [Roosevelt]"45
Roybal's interview also included a veiled criticism of the CSO. Though he
praised the CSO for registering a considerable number of voters in a short time, Roybal
stated, "The CSO has to understand that it is not enough to stay working at a civic level.
There has to be a greater political involvement so the organization is useful to the
community and the nation. Otherwise, it presents an ambiguous, unconvincing and
hesitant attitude." Roybal also referred to the CSO' s nonpartisan stance. "Right now the
organization is not making a public show of support for Kennedy but their leadership is
44
Costa, "Los mexicoamericanos dan'm en California, dice Roybal el triunfo a Mr. Kennedy," October 15,
1960.
45
Ibid.
25
for Kennedy, we at the Viva Kennedy Clubs want them to be public on their support, we
need to win this election. It would be calamitous if Nixon goes on to become president,
he's not a fi·iend of the Mexicans, regardless of what he's saying right now." Roybal
finished the interview by declaring his absolute confidence that "the Mexican Americans
will decide Kennedy's victory in California, New Mexico, Arizona and probably
Texas."46
The rift between the Viva Kennedy Clubs' leadership and the CSO then moved
from the pages of La Opinion to the pages of Time magazine, a national publication. The
magazine published a story profiling the role of Robert F. Kennedy in his brother's
campaign and discussed the campaigns' efforts to register new voters. The articled then
stated that "140,000 new Spanish-speaking Democrats have been registered in California
through the Viva Kennedy Clubs." 47 Though Robert Kennedy purportedly provided this
information, and the figures were somewhat accurate, the article credited the clubs with
the voter outreach efforts, not the CSO. Gallegos sent an irate response in which he took
issue with the claim and stated that the group, which set the "all-time registration record,"
was the Community Service Organization, not the Viva Kennedy Clubs. Gallegos then
asserted that the "CSO is neither a Viva Kennedy, a Viva Nixon, nor a Viva any other
politician outfit. .. CSO is strictly nonpartisan, and it saves its 'vivas' strictly for human
dignity, for the rights of oppressed minorities, for their speedy incorporation into all
phases of the lifestream of the overall community."
48
This last phrase was one of the
most pointed statements made by a California Mexican-American leader during the entire
46
Ibid.
47
"Little Brother is Watching," Time, October 10, 1960.
48
Herman Gallegos, "Vivas," November 7, 1960, Letter section.
26
campaign. In demanding integration and "rights," it broke with the campaign's prevailing
mood, which was characterized by public optimism and respectful, perhaps suppliant
messages from Latino leaders.
Nonetheless the split between MAP A and the Viva Kennedy Clubs and the CSO
was apparent; such disagreements would continue into the future. While Roybal and
MAPA advocated for political involvement within party and governmental structures, the
CSO preferred to organize at a non-partisan, non-political community level.
As the campaign intensified and in accordance with Roybal's demands that the
CSO and other groups take a stance on the election, La Opinion announced its
endorsement of Kennedy on the front page of its October 23 Sunday edition:
The United States and the free world face some of the most dangerous
periods in history ... the communist' flag is already waving in the
Caribbean ... This is not the time for being neutral or inhibited ... therefore
the citizen has to make a conscious decision this upcoming election
day ... we at La Opinion have already taken this decision, as a independent
newspaper but always concerned to the nation's interest we have
concluded that the candidate that can best face the challenges inside the
country and abroad is the senator John F. Kennedy.
The editorial continued, "due to our racial affinities and the countries that we come
from we can't overlook the great urgencies that are faced by the Latin American
countries, these nations that have been forgotten by the U.S. in the last years ... Kennedy
offers a resurgence of the friendship and good neighborhood spirit that will be beneficial
not only to these countries but also the U.S."49
As November
gth
approached, the reporting on the election in the newspaper
began to focus decisively on the Kennedy campaign. On the same day as its endorsement,
La Opinion reported that Mexican American actor Anthony Quinn had been named chair
49
"John F. Kennedy, el hombre necesario," October 23, 1960.
27
of the Viva Kennedy Clubs Committee of the Arts and, according to McCormick, Quinn
had already started working on behalf of the organization. Also, the "ladies committee,"
headed by Lucile Roybal, and "Mrs. Nat King Cole and Mrs. Steve Allen," was
organizing a formal dinner on October 27 to raise funds for the clubs. The music was to
be provided by the Mariachi Atotonilco and its singer, Martita Galindo. 5°
Just a week before election day, Kennedy embarked on a two-day swing through
California. During this visit Kennedy once more emphasized the importance of the
Mexican American electorate in a speech delivered in the garment district before a
thousand Mexican American women who worked in this industry. Kennedy then had
lunch at the traditional Casa Avila on Olvera Street. For his main speech in this L.A.
visit, the candidate chose the East Los Angeles Junior College Stadium. The Los Angeles
Times estimated that throughout his visit to Los Angeles, Kennedy drew about 200,000
people. 51 His choice of venues certainly suggested that Mexican American leaders'
arguments about the significance of their community's vote had made some headway
with Kennedy's campaign.
In an editorial commenting on Kennedy's visit, La Opinion noted the favorable
conditions Kennedy was encountering during the fmal swing of the campaign. He was
ahead in the polls and commanding more enthusiastic crowds at his rallies than was
Nixon. Nonetheless, the editorial raised "several underground factors" that could derail
Kennedy's triumph. First, the polls cited a large number of voters that declined to share
their preference with the pollsters, but more significantly La Opinion focused on the
50
"Notas politicas," October 23, 1960.
51
"Kennedy ataca a Nixon yes aclamado en la Angel6polis por las multitudes," La Opinion, November 2,
1960. See also "200,000 Welcome Kennedy in Downtown L.A. Motorcade," Los Angeles Times.
November 2, 1960.
28
"religious question," a factor that preoccupied the Latino community during the 1960
election:
While the matter has been put on the backburner of the campaign and
while both candidates have tried to quell this matter, it remains alive,
without anybody certainly knowing which candidate will be benefited
from this matter. While in some regions (specially in the South), there is
an active and somewhat underground campaign against Mr. Kennedy
based on religious prejudices, there are some that believe this campaign is
acting as a boomerang that has favored Kennedy in other regions, arising
empathy for him by people that consider Kennedy victim of unjust
propaganda.
The opinion piece proceeded to offer La Opinion's comment on the matter:
For our part, we have the belief that will be hopefully corroborated on
November 8, that this nation has overcome for the most part, a very
heartbreaking period in which the faith of the candidate was the factor that
[would] determine his victory or defeat. We believe that the great majority
of voters are capacitated to make their preferences in the merits of the
person, in his capacity as a public servant, in his political ideas without
taking into account the church that he attends to get in contact with the
Creator. If our opinion is justified, the results of the election, next Tuesday
will have no other result than the triumph of the Democratic candidate,
John F. Kennedy.
Though understated, it is clear that the piece attempted to compare Kennedy's Catholic
dilemma, one which the editorial hints also reflected the Mexican Americans'
predicament: the lack of social mobility in U.S. society because of their perceived
"otherness." Nonetheless La Opinion's tone was hopeful and even confident that the
"nation has overcome ... a very heartbreaking period," and expressed hope that a
Kennedy's victory would represent another step forward for the nation, implying a step
forward for Mexican Americans as well.
In the days before to the election, La Opinion returned to its readership's foreign
policy concerns, expressly U.S.-Latin American relations. La Opinion printed a story
heralding Kennedy's creation of the "Citizens Committee for a New Frontier Policy in
29
the Americas" on the eve of the election. The committee's function would be to "support
the policy objectives of Senator Kennedy in Latin America." The group included Adlai
Stevenson, William Benton, and Puerto Rican academic Jaime Benitez. The article
lauded the initiative by stating, "this committee will foment a healthy environment
between the U.S. and Latin America." 52
Two days before the election, La Opinion extended its election coverage. On its
front page, the newspaper ran wire stories that covered the final swings of both
campaigns and in its local section the main story read, "The CSO appeals to all L.A.
voters to vote." The article quoted a "young CSO leader" named Cesar Chavez, one of
the national directors of the CSO. On behalf ofthe organization, Chavez stated, "the CSO
asks that the Mexican citizens that recently became U.S. Citizens to go vote next
Tuesday, that not one stays at home forgoing his or her right to vote. Voting is not only a
privilege but an obligation as an American citizen." Chavez also emphasized that voting
"was a more relevant right for people of Mexican origin as we have been in the fringes of
the public life of this homeland, that actually is our homeland." Chavez then delivered the
suppliant part of his message. "Many problems have already been resolved, there are
some others to be met and our problems will only be solved if we get interested in the
public life of this nation, promoting the election of the best citizens."
Chavez reminded the readers of La Opinion that the CSO was not a political
group and did not, "endorse a candidate or a political party. The only action that [the
CSO] demands from its members and citizens in general. . .is that they go out and vote." 53
52
"Kennedy forma consejo para Hispanoamerica," November 5, 1960.
53
"Apelaci6n a los votantes de la CSO de Los Angeles," November 6, 1960.
30
Though Chavez's statement to La Opinion reiterated Gallegos' assertion first published
in Time that the CSO was not a partisan organization, Gallegos' non-political stance put
the CSO at odds with the other organizations involved in the campaign. Moreover the
CSO's unwillingness to commit to political organizing would later alienate Chavez and
Dolores Huerta, another CSO organizer.
Another Argos column entitled "Ground Zero" appeared in the same edition. The piece
described the buoyant mood in Los Angeles prior to the election. "Argos" cited opinion
polls published in English-language newspapers, and while he cautioned that most
newspapers "leaned Republican," nonetheless, these outlets were forecasting a Kennedy
victory, some of them by a large margin. Even though "Argos" expressed skepticism
about the polls and "dared to declare that in affinity with our newspaper's stance, we are
hoping for a Kennedy triumph, the candidate that has become a crowd magnet and that
some ingenious brain has branded a 'mix between FDR and Elvis,' we are hoping that the
senator from Massachusetts prevails and this sentiment is shared by the majority of the
Mexican American voters that are praying for the victory of the Democratic candidate."54
In addition, the number of political advertisements in the pages of La Opinion
increased during the fmal days of the campaign. Though the presidential campaigns paid
for many of the ads, members of the Mexican American elite also published their own
public notices that urged their community to vote. Francisco Bravo, a Stanford-educated
medical doctor paid for an ad printed on November 6 that encouraged "everybody to vote
this Tuesday November 8 for the Democratic platform, the party of the working people."
Bravo's political ad endorsed Kennedy and Leopolda Sanchez. His ad's slogan, "Sino
54
"Panoramas Angelinos- Hora Cero," November 6, 1960.
31
votamos nos botan" [Ifwe don't vote, they bounce us], amounted to an urgent call for
action that contained a Spanish double-entendre that threatened possible deportation if
the members of the community "don't vote."
55
55
Political ad paid by Dr. F. Bravo, November 6, 1960.
32
Chapter 4
The 1960 Election in Southern California
After months of frenzied activity, the members of the Viva Kennedy Clubs in
Southern California waited impatiently for November 8, 1960- Election Day. They held
high hopes that their chosen candidate, John F. Kennedy, their "Catholic friend" as the
Mexican American membership of Viva Kennedy knew him, would prevail in the
electoral contest. The Viva Kennedy participants believed that a Kennedy presidency
would significantly improve the economic and social conditions of the barrios, the
neighborhoods that most Mexican Americans across the nation inhabited. Furthermore,
both the rank and file and the Viva Kennedy leadership remained convinced that once
Kennedy became president, he would almost immediately place the few established
Mexican American political leaders in prominent posts within the Kennedy
administration.
The election day edition of La Opinion offered readers a series of articles that
attempted to provide balanced coverage of the unfolding electoral contest. Indeed, La
Opinion published a lengthy press release sent by a group called "Mexican Americans
Pro Nixon." A note prefaced the text stating that although La Opinion had already
endorsed Kennedy in the race - which also explained the publication of several proKennedy editorials in the days previous to the election - the news pages of La Opinion
would remain objective and impartial. 56 The piece's author, Doctor Reynaldo J. Carreon,
outlined the group's motives for supporting Nixon's candidacy. They derived from two
tenets: the valuable knowledge of Latin America by the Mexican Americans in
56
"John F. Kennedy, El hombre necesario," October 23, 1960. Pg 5.
33
understanding the Cold War tension in the region and the fact that Nixon was a fellow
Californian. 57
Can·ion proceeded to consider the importance of the upcoming election to the
"American People" - a term that for Carillo also included Mexican Americans - who, he
claimed, were pondering their electoral decisions based solely on their being part of the
American society, disregarding the repercussions that the outcome of the election would
have in the hemisphere:
This is a decisive moment for the "American People"; consequently it is a
decisive moment for us the "Mexican Americans" as we are part of the
"We, the People." We want to make clear that we don't assume a political
position as "Mexican Americans" but as Americans. We are not thinking
about the consequences that this election could carry in Mexico or Latin
America, nor in the effects that it could have in our condition as "Mexican
Americans" but we take a stance based exclusively on the well being of
America.
In addition, Carrion's article included a message written by Nixon and sent to one of Pro
Nixon's members:
As a Southern California native and having grown up to the east of
Whittier where plenty of Mexican Americans reside, I have a high esteem
of the important role that this excellent people have played in the
development of our state and our nation. Moreover I believe that this
splendid group of people could decide the results of the upcoming
election. I hope to have the opportunity to greet my many Mexican
American friends in my upcoming visit to California to once again express
my gratitude for the vital and important contribution that they have
provided to the progress and development not only of California but for
the nation as well.
Nixon's words emphasized his familiarity with Mexican Americans, but in
contrast to Kennedy's campmgn message, Nixon did not address specific issues of
importance to the ethnic group, nor did he make any promises in exchange for their votes.
57
Reynaldo J. Carreon, "Aboga por Nixon un grupo local de mexicoamericanos," November 8, 1960, 1.
34
The Pro Nixon faction cited an interview of Nixon conducted by an unidentified "local
magazine" to imply that the GOP candidate had promised to appoint Mexican American
ambassadors or emissaries to represent the nation in Latin America. In the interview
Nixon is quoted stating that "it is time for solidarity with the whole hemisphere to
become a vital force, the bonds among the free nations have to grow closer," therefore
"the Mexican Americans from California could provide an important bridge between the
people of the U.S. and Mexico as we are fortunate to have them among us and to take
advantage of their culture. " 58
According to Carreon, "Mexican Americans Pro Nixon" made the decision to
support the sitting vice-president based on their "rights and privileges as Americans not
as Latin Americans." However, at a later point in his essay, the Pro-Nixon leader did
highlight the Latin American lineage of the group: "our origin ... places us in
advantageous position to weigh the repercussion that the results of this election will have
in Latin America." Carreon brought up Nixon's contentious visit to Peru and Venezuela
in 1958 and proclaimed that contrary to media accounts, Nixon was in fact warmly
received and that the riots his visit provoked were led by "small groups full of
communists agitators." According to Carreon, "if these groups showed their hatred it
was their insecurity that this man caused in them. The man that sooner or later would be a
champion of the free world." "Nixon's election," he concluded, "will bring happiness to
the free nations of Latin America and will drown in desperation those Communist
lackeys." 59
58
Carreon, "Aboga par Nixon un grupo local de mexicoamericanos," La Opinion, November 8, 1960, 1.
59
Ibid.
35
The additional news articles printed in La Opinion on Election Day and the days
following were mostly wire reports detailing election results. Though correctly
proclaiming Kennedy the winner, these articles erroneously claimed that Kennedy had
carried California. La Opinion did not run any editorials regarding the election during this
period.
It did, however, publish an attention-grabbing article by its Tijuana
correspondent. On Thursday November 9, Aurelio Garcia filed a piece detailing Nixon's
impromptu visit to Tijuana on election day. A photo of Nixon eating at "Heidelberg
Restaurant" on Avenida Revoluci6n, a major thoroughfare in the border city,
accompanied the article. Garcia managed to interview Nixon who was having lunch with
the mayor ofTijuana. 60
Nixon informed the writer that he had voted earlier in the day in Whittier and had
decided, "to take a trip to get away from all that campaign and election noise." Therefore
Nixon, along with an aide and two secret service agents, traveled to Tijuana for lunch. "I
had not been in Tijuana for about twenty years, and it has changed a lot, it has been a
pleasure to visit it today." Nixon added that while it was too soon to know the results of
the election, "either way the voting goes, my interest to assist Tijuana and the Mexican
people in general will remain the same." Xicotencatl Leyva, the mayor of Tijuana, hosted
the lunch for Nixon. Leyva commented that it was an honor to have lunch with "such
honored guest, probably the next president of the United States." 61
The wish the Mexican mayor expressed did ultimately materialize, but not in
November of 1960. Nixon returned to Whittier and went to bed still unaware of the
60
Aurelio Garcia II, "Visita Nixon Tijuana en el dia de la elecci6n," La Opinion, November 9, 1960, 1, 3.
61
Ibid, 3.
36
outcome of the election. He woke up to the news that he had lost the election by .1
percent of the popular vote, one of the narrowest margins in history. As a consolation,
Nixon did manage to defeat Kennedy by 35,623 votes in his home state of California. 62
Nixon's victory in California surprised the Kennedy camp and would diminish the
potential leverage the Viva Kennedy Clubs had with the incoming Kennedy
administration.
As the results began to be gathered and both the Kennedy and Nixon campaigns
dealt with the contentious electoral disputes throughout the nation, the Viva Kennedy
leaders were euphoric. McCormick declared that Kennedy had received 85 percent of the
Mexican American vote at the national level. Henry Lopez claimed that 90 percent of the
approximately 425,000 registered voters of"Spanish Speaking descent" in California had
voted for the Irish American candidate. 63 In addition, the Kennedy campaign sent out a
congratulatory press release addressed to both Lopez and Roybal, which was reprinted in
La Opinion. 64
The first editorial piece m La Opinion to comment on the election results
appeared on November 11. It began by stating, "The U.S. has elected for the first time in
its history a Catholic president. However, the important fact here is not that Kennedy is a
Catholic, but that the people of the United States have overcome the era of intolerance."
62
The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29400, accessed
November 5, 2008.
63
The numbers the Viva Kennedy leadership cited were unofficial estimates, as no state broke down the
number of voters by ethnicity. For general estimates on California's voting reported at the time, see "As
Votes Kept Coming In-Here's What Really Happened," US. News & World Report (November 28, 1960),
69, 70. For a detailed discussion about the voting trends of minority groups see Mark R. Levy, MichaelS.
Kramer, The Ethnic Factor; How America's Minorities Decide Elections (New York: Simon and Schuster.
1972), 77, 256-257.
64
"Mensaje de Kennedy a Lopez." La Opinion. November 11, 1960. Pg. 3.
37
The editors then forecast the challenges that awaited the new administration: "The
problems that Kennedy will face are enormous, inside and outside of the country. The
Cold War continues at its highest level. The nation will need to expand its productive
capacity and only a strong leader like Kennedy will be able to guide this nation, but he
will need the faith and support of the people. We are confident that both qualities will not
be lacking during his presidency." 65
In the same edition "Argos" also commented on the Kennedy election. "Last
Tuesday was a lesson for Mexican Americans," he claimed, "as they learned that they
have much more power than what they imagined and that power was manifested in the
result of the election." 66 Argos went on to state, "the campaign was a collective madness
in the community, with effervescent activity by the 'Viva Kennedy Clubs' and its leaders
Henry Lopez and Eduardo [sic] Roybal whose work we can surely say made the
difference between triumph and defeat. " 67
The mood was still effervescent on November 12 when La Opinion published
another piece regarding Kennedy's victory. The editorial titled "The Vote ofthe Mexican
American" first commends the newspaper's decision to endorse Kennedy and then
congratulates Roybal and Lopez and the Viva Kennedy members for the electoral
triumph. The editorial even overestimates the importance of Viva Kennedy as it warned
that while the majority of the Mexican American vote went for Kennedy, this ought not
to be an automatic outcome in the upcoming elections. La Opinion also cautioned against
65
Carreon, "Aboga por Nixon un grupo local de mexicoamericanos," La Opinion, November 8, 1960, 1.
66
This item was published when Kennedy was still considered the winner in California; it would take some
weeks until Nixon's victory in the state was certified.
67
"Panoramas Angelinos-La semana pasada," La Opinion, Segunda Edicion, November 11, 1960, 1.
38
the "dangers that a monolithic voting bloc could present as this could consolidate power
in a small group of leaders and dilute the personal responsibility." 68
The November 12 editorial also cited several examples of precincts in both Texas
and California where the Mexican American voters had overwhelmingly voted for
Kennedy over Nixon. At this time La Opinion still held the erroneous notion that
Kennedy had won California, therefore is it not surprising to discover the triumphalist
tone in this piece. "This event," the editors declared, "demonstrates the great importance
acquired by the voters of Mexican origin, which indicates the surge of a civic spirit of our
own, so in the future our great mass of citizens receives the consideration and respect of
this nation. " 69
Furthermore, the Viva Kennedy leaders must also have been delighted to read the
November 12 edition of Los Angeles Times. In its pages, the city's newspaper of record
acknowledged the role of the Viva Kennedy Clubs in the campaign and even
acknowledged that the group's involvement had been crucial to Kennedy's victory.
According to McCormick who is quoted in the piece, "almost 1 million persons of
Mexican, Puerto Rican and other Latin extraction were contacted by the Viva Kennedy
Clubs." McCormick also states that California had been the largest Viva Kennedy state
organization "where 150,000 -mostly in Southern California- were enlisted," by
Roybal and Lopez. According to McCormick, "some precincts in East Los Angeles had a
68
"El voto del mexicoamericano," La Opinion, November 12, 1960, 5.
69
Ibid.
39
100% turnout of registered voters and no precinct where a Viva Kennedy Club was
operating had less than 90% turnout, all heavily Democratic."70
70
Don Shannon, "Kennedy, Debates Were Key," Los Angeles Times. November 2, 1960, Bl.
40
Chapter 5
The Transnational Aspirations of the Viva Kennedy Clubs
In the euphoric days after the electoral victory, Robert F. Kennedy decided to
recognize publicly the Viva Kennedy contributions on behalf of the Kennedy campaign.
In an interview with a Mexico City reporter, he declared that it was the "votes of
Mexican Americans and other Latin Americans in the United States that elected" his
brother. He added that the Kennedy administration would pay closer attention to the
countries in Latin America. 71
Hence, the Kennedy camp had once again explicitly acknowledged the work the
Viva Kennedy Clubs had done. Moreover, it appeared that the incoming Kennedy
administration would usher in a new era in diplomacy in which Mexican Americans
would be called on to represent the United States. This pledge energized those Mexican
Americans who were anxious to play a greater role in American society and foreign
policy. According to the historian Ignacio M. Garcia, one of the reasons behind the
formation of the Viva Kennedy Clubs had been that these Mexican American leaders
were looking for opportunities to serve their nation through both federal and
ambassadorial appointments. Since many of these men were World War II veterans, the
Viva Kennedy members perceived themselves as active participants in the Cold War
conflict; they saw themselves as the American bridge to Latin America and the ones who
could save the Latin American nations from communism. 72
71
72
Garcia, 106.
Garcia, 7-8.
41
The bridge metaphor could also be applied to the intellectual proficiency of the
emerging Mexican American leaders. These prominent Angelenos of Mexican descent
did in fact ascribe to both the American and the Latin American cultural and intellectual
traditions. Therefore, the results of the 1960 presidential election also provided a moment
to ponder the possible ramifications of Kennedy's victory as they were perceived by
noted Latin American thinkers. In the buoyant post-election interlude, La Opinion ran an
eloquent essay by the renowned Ecuadorian intellectual Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco. 73
Pareja's essays published in La Opinion presented Spanish-speaking Los Angeles with a
series of historical analyses of the complex relationship between the U.S. and Latin
America. Pareja's writings were admittedly influenced by the ideas of Mexican political
philosopher Jose Vasconcelos, particularly his Raza C6smica [Cosmic Race] treatise. 74
Therefore Pareja's essays likely struck a chord with Mexican readers familiar with
Vasconcelos' proposition of creating a modem mestizo culture in Latin America. 75
In his post-election piece Pareja first highlighted several instances during which
the U.S. had exerted its power in the region through military and political interventions as
a way to fulfill its "manifest destiny." But in a conciliatory tone, Pareja then asked the
readers not to dwell on the past since "history is made for tomorrow, not for yesterday. It
is our duty to do so in our time." 76 The South American essayist proceeded to describe
73
For detailed biographical information on Pareja Diezcanseco's life and work see Carlos A. Sole, Maria
Isabel Abreu, Latin American Writers (New York: Scribner, 1989).
74
Jose Vasconcelos, Jaen Didier Tisdel, The Cosmic Race: A Bilingual Edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1997).
75
For an extended synthesis of Vasconcelos' writings and philosophical musings see John H. Haddox,
Vasconcelos of Mexico. Philosopher and Prophet (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967).
76
Alfredo Pareja Diezcanseco, "El Kennedy de America Latina," La Opinion, November 19, 1960, 5.
42
the jubilant mood in Latin America that had resulted from Kennedy's election. Pareja
also compared Kennedy to former president Franklin D. Roosevelt, as they were both
Democrats. Pareja argued that Kennedy "was required" to continue Roosevelt's "good
neighbor" policy in Latin America.
Furthermore, Pareja described Kennedy's impact in the world as being threefold.
"Since the moment of his election there are three Kennedys: one for the United states,
another one for the 'free world' and a third Kennedy for Latin America." Pareja
concluded his essay by expressing his optimism about the upcoming administration and
urged Kennedy to "realize that the America Mestiza is not an enemy but instead, a
somewhat resentful but valuable friend as this friend does not hide his feelings." 77
Pareja's essay provided the readers of La Opinion with a well-informed Latin
American perspective regarding Kennedy's election. Pareja also outlined a probable
scenario that would unfold domestically and internationally in the upcoming months: the
emergence of several "Kennedys." Hence, much to the misfortune of the Mexican
American leaders, the Kennedy that would be deeply invested in the affairs of Latin
America was categorically not the same Kennedy that resided in Washington - the
Kennedy that these Mexican American leaders thought would be in charge of distributing
the political rewards given in exchange for the contributions they had made to his
campmgn.
But just as there were several Kennedys for different political realities, the
Mexican American men leading the Viva Kennedy Clubs also had to contend with
articulating different representations of themselves. On the one hand, these Mexican
77
"El Kennedy de America Latina," La Opinion, November 19, 1960, 5.
43
American men adhered to the notions of assimilation into American society. Nonetheless,
they still needed to negotiate their public portrayals as aspiring American emissaries
whose main attribute was their embrace of Latin America cultural traditions. Hence they
not only needed to craft a leadership role from which they could promote the assimilation
of Mexican Americans into the American society, but also simultaneously emphasize
their Latin American heritage.
Undoubtedly those who heard these two simultaneous messages were puzzled at
times. For instance, in a post-election interview with Viva Kennedy leader Henry Lopez,
the La Opinion reporter made a point of emphasizing Lopez's proud ownership of a
"precious" book that contained the complete works of the Nicaraguan poet, Ruben Dario.
Mention of Lopez's ownership of this prized volume highlighted for readers his
familiarity with and connection to one of Latin American's most prominent literary
works.
After showing Lopez's pride in displaying his own Latin American cultural
identity, the reporter proceeded to ask Lopez whether the Viva Kennedy efforts implied
the acceptance and validation of an ethnic separation, which would potentially work
against the assimilation efforts that many Mexican American leaders were advocating.
Lopez emphatically responded that efforts like the Viva Kennedy Clubs actually fostered
the
a~similation
of Mexican Americans. "I am a supporter of the perfect national
assimilation, where there will not be Mexicans, there won't be blacks, there will not be
any minority groups. But while minorities exist as they do exist socially these days, I
believe that [the Viva Kennedy Club] has been the most efficient political group action.
44
And that it would one day also serve the goal of paving the way for total assimilation [of
Mexicans into the American Society]." 78
Furthermore, Lopez also expressed the hope present during the pre-inauguration
days in the Mexican American community of Los Angeles regarding the upcoming
Kennedy presidency. "We have to thank [Kennedy] for being the first presidential
candidate who has recognized the political importance of the Mexican Americans and for
giving an absolute importance to our [ethnic] group. In view of this attitude [shown by
Kennedy], I am sure that his administration will provide positions of relevance to our
own. [These Mexican Americans] who will work very hard to prove their quality and
capacity. This election marks a precedent that no one will be able to deny in the :future."79
Lopez's avowed confidence was the result of Kennedy's electoral victory and the
sudden national recognition the Kennedys had given the Viva Kennedy Clubs. Moreover,
the Viva Kennedy members perceived that this was the historical moment in which the
achievements of their professional lives and their work in their communities would
fmally facilitate their becoming essential members of the American political
establishment. They believed that their college degrees, successful careers, patriotism,
and intelligence were the only prerequisites needed to obtain the posts they coveted in the
. .
. 80
Kennedy admrmstratwn.
These presumptions, however, also demonstrated their political inexperience and
naivete. Their lack of political gamesmanship and inability to comprehend the complex
78
Costa R. Octavia, "Ambiciosos proyectos del licenciado Enrique Lopez," La Opinion, December 8,
1960,4.
79
Ibid., Pg 4.
80
Garcia, 122.
45
negotiations and complicated political calculations that preceded the distribution of
influential positions left them at a distinct disadvantage. The Viva Kennedy leaders were
not aware of the inner workings of official Washington. They believed that directing
public announcements to their "friend" Kennedy was an adequate way of presenting their
requests to the president-elect.
The Mexican American leaders were perhaps encouraged by the earlier efforts of African
Americans during the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration. At the request of first
lady Eleanor Roosevelt, the administration created the Federal Council ofNegro Affairs,
a group which comprised the few African Americans working within the federal
government who were asked to serve as informal advisors to President Roosevelt
regarding African American issues. The group came to be known as "The Black Cabinet"
and was instrumental in two respects: first, through the group's intercession more
professional African American men and women were appointed to higher level positions
within the federal government; secondly, "The Black Cabinet" represented the first time
that the input of African American professionals was considered. Indeed, their
contributions ultimately did influence some federal policies during the New Deal. 81
81
For a detailed discussion of"The Black Cabinet," see Nancy J. Weiss, Farewell to the Party ofLincoln:
Black Politics in the Age ofFDR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 136-156.
46
Chapter 6
The Unsuccessful Quest for Nominations
In the aftermath of Kennedy's triumph, the Viva Kennedy leadership decided not
to immediately pursue federal appointments in the incoming administration that could
have had direct influence in their communities. Rather, the Southern California leaders
opted to become part of the global American efforts in the Cold War. The day after
Kennedy was sworn as president, Francisco Bravo, a prominent Viva Kennedy member,
began his own public lobbying via an open letter to President Kennedy on behalf of a
Viva Kennedy founder, Roybal. Bravo was a well-known doctor in East Los Angeles
who had placed several advertisements urging the readers of La Opinion to vote in the
1960 elections. His letter, which was reprinted in La Opinion, addressed Kennedy
directly and announced that Los Angeles Viva Kennedy members "had received word
that you are considering our councilman Edward R. Roybal for the post as Assistant
Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs." 82 Bravo did not identify his sources,
thus implying to the readers that he might be privy to the political dealings occurring in
Washington, which is doubtful. Bravo went on to add, "Allow me to wholeheartedly
recommend that you nominate Mister Roybal to this important post. He is of Latin
extraction, very mature and formal. Above all, he is highly prepared." Additionally,
Bravo forecast a positive response to the hypothetical appointment of a Mexican America
as an ambassador to a Latin American country. "The nomination will be received by joy
and gratitude and our country would be accepted as a friend. We need this type of gesture
82
"Recomiendan a! regidor Roybal para alto puesto," La Opinion. January 21, 1961. 4.
47
in this time of insecurity that now prevails in Cuba and other countries." Bravo concluded
his message reiterating that, "Councilman Roybal would be a magnificent ambassador of
good will and friendship. " 83
The Los Angeles Viva Kennedy members perceived Roybal as a likely candidate
for the much-coveted opportunity to serve as a U.S. diplomat in Latin America; Roybal
was a World War II veteran, and as the chair of MAPA and co-chair of Viva Kennedy, he
was arguably the Mexican American with the highest visibility in southern California.
Soon it was said that McCormick in Washington had placed Henry Lopez's name on the
supposed short-list to be considered for another diplomatic post in Latin America. The
mere possibility that Roybal and Lopez were being considered for a position as a midlevel State Department official stoked the ambitions of other Mexican American
contenders from California and the Southwest who also vied for these nominations.
However, a result of the electoral loss in California, Kennedy also felt compelled to
rebuild his western base by reaching out to the state's Democratic power brokers Governor Pat Brown and Assemblyman Jesse Unruh. Thus, Kennedy consulted Brown
and Unruh about the possible appointments of the aforementioned Californian
politicians. 84
Brown and Unruh quickly shot down Lopez's potential nomination. Their actions
mirrored their decision not to support Lopez's candidacy as Secretary of State in the 1958
83
Ibid., 4.
84
Burt, 195-196.
48
elections. According to his allies, Unruh was a "reward and punishment guy." 85
Therefore the Speaker of the California State Assembly made sure to impair Lopez's
political rise primarily because Lopez was a well-known member of the California
Democratic Council, a liberal group within the California Democratic Party that Unruh
saw as a rival force that was impeding his quest to expand his power within the party.
86
Though Lopez's nomination never got off the ground, Roybal's name continued
to be floated around Los Angeles and in some Washington circles. Nonetheless, before
long Roybal had to contend with the surfacing of Carlos Teran, another Mexican
American prospect who Governor Brown had proposed.
Soon, the Kennedy
administration began to consider Teran for a positon. Teran served as a medic and
translator during World War II and earned his law degree from the University of
Southern California. In 1957, Republican governor Goodwin Knight appointed Teran, a
Democrat, to the East Los Angeles Municipal Court. Two years later, governor Brown
promoted Teran to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
As a leader in the Mexican American community, Teran had about the same
stature as Roybal. At the time Teran was being considered for Assistant Secretary of
State, he was serving as president of the Council of Mexican-American Affairs, a nongovernmental advocacy group. Teran was also a member of the G.I. Forum. He had not
played a significant part in the Viva Kennedy effort, however. As a matter of fact, Teran
was not well regarded by the Viva Kennedy cohort as he had sided with Judge Howard
85
In interviews with Burt, Assemblyman Tom Rees and Carlos McCormick detailed Unruh's efforts to
"torpedo" Lopez's nomination. McCormick also recalled that in order to derail his possible nomination,
Unruh at some point claimed Lopez had almost been disbarred. Burt, 196.
86
On divisions within the California Democratic Party during the 1960 Democratic National Convention
see Edmond Costantini, "Intraparty Attitude Conflict: Democratic Party Leadership in California,"Political
Research Quarterly 16 (1963), 956-972.
49
H. Walshok in the November 1960 election to fill his vacancy at the East Los Angeles
Municipal Court. In this election, the Viva Kennedy Club endorsed Judge Leopolda
Sanchez, a founding member of MAPA, who ended up prevailing over Walshok. 87
In the midst of the jostling for positions, New Mexico Senator Dennis Chavez
became the lone voice to advocate for federal appointments of Mexican Americans as
opposed to diplomatic posts. On January 21, 1961, a day after Kennedy was inaugurated
president, Chavez took the podium and spoke about this issue on the floor of congress.
Chavez requested that Mexican Americans or "people of Hispano-American descent" be
appointed to federal post in Texas. Chavez strongly emphasized in his speech that, "Jack
Kennedy would not gotten elected president if the [electoral] majorities in New Mexico
and Texas would have not voted for him." 88
The burgeoning Mexican American leadership greatly respected Chavez as he
was one of the few Mexican Americans in congress. As a result, he had been named
national chair of the Viva Kennedy Clubs. Nevertheless, others did not support Chavez's
appeals. Instead, the different regional Viva Kennedy chapters in the southwest began to
lobby for their own contenders. For instance, Viva Kennedy chapters in New Mexico and
Texas proposed other potential candidates for the post of Assistant Secretary of State. The
Texas chapter of the Viva Kennedy Clubs saw Hector P. Garcia, founder of the G.I.
Forum in Texas and a national Viva Kennedy co-chair, as a power-broker. 89 Garcia also
87
Burt. 192.
88
"Hace la petici6n el senador Dennis Chavez," La Opinion. January 21,1961. 3.
89
For more on Garcia's lifelong efforts to bring social justice and equality to Mexican Americans in the
southwest, see Ignacio M. Garcfa, Hector P. Garcia: In Relentless Pursuit of Justice, The Hispanic civil
rights series (Houston, TX: Arte Publico Press, 2002)
50
wrote to president Kennedy to "respectfully" recommend Vicente Ximenes, an
economics professor and a G.l. Forum leader from New Mexico. 90 Also in Texas, the
Viva Kennedy leadership chose to support Raymond L. Telles who had the distinction of
being the first Mexican American to be elected as the mayor of sizeable American city,
El Paso. 91
Given the crowded field of candidates from the Southwest, La Opinion's
editorials understandably championed the nominations of Roybal and Teran, the Southern
California contenders perceived to be vying for the post of Assistant Secretary of State.
Even though the Roybal-MAPA camp had fired the opening salvo, Teran's possible
consideration for the post also garnered considerable attention. During budding days of
the Kennedy administration, the Los Angeles newspaper published a profile of the judge
and commented that "President Kennedy, according to sources, demonstrated great
interest in this Mexican American jurist during his visit to this city last year. Also [Teran]
has received the most decisive backing from Governor Brown. " 92 La Opinion also
published other local politicians' public expressions of support for Teran. 93 In his weekly
column, Argos weighed in on the speculation that Teran was being considered for the
90
Garcia, Viva Kennedy, 109.
91
At the time Telles was elected mayor of El Paso, the city had a population of 212,930. This fact meant
that the border city was considered one of American's fifty largest urban settings. Data obtained at U.S.
Census Bureau [online] http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/twps0027 .html
Accessed November 28,2009.
92
"Posible designaci6n de Teran como embajador," La Opinion, February 2, 1961, 1.
93
Los Angeles County Supervisor Frank G. Bonelli made public the telegram he sent to President Kennedy
in which he expressed "his support in favor of the nomination of judge Carlos Telles as U.S. ambassador to
Mexico or some other Latin American country." See "Mas apoyo al Juez Carlos M. Teran," La Opinion,
February 10, 1961, 4.
51
diplomatic post. "The news has caused a stir," he noted, "specially since Roybal had been
rumored to be considered for that post as well. " 94
The remark signaled the divergence occurring within the different California
political groups. MAP A, Lopez, and Roybal were at onset of a battle against Brown and
Unruh with Teran serving as a proxy. The message regarding the looming hostilities soon
reached Washington. "Los Angeles is up in arms" the Southern California Viva Kennedy
membership told McCormick. 95 As a result, the Kennedy administration decided not to
pursue Teran's nomination. Instead the President asked the newly minted Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk, and Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles to make the decision.
These two men opted to appoint a candidate of Latin American origins with previous
diplomatic experience, Arturo Morales-Carri6n, a Cuban-born Puerto Rican official. 96
Accordingly, the Kennedy administration must have believed that it was beginning to
fulfill the campaign promises made to the Viva Kennedy Clubs, since it was appointing
officials of Latin American extraction to responsible positions.
But the nomination of Morales-Carri6n did not sit well with the Viva Kennedy
membership as he was neither Mexican American, nor did come from the Southwest.
Most significantly, Morales-Carri6n was not involved with the Viva Kennedy during the
presidential campaign. To the Viva Kennedy leadership, the post of Assistant Secretary
of State for Western Hemisphere Mfairs was one of the rewards they expected to receive
for their work on behalf of the Kennedy campaign. As a result, these men felt slighted,
94
"Panoramas Angelinos -La semana pasada," La Opinion, Second Edition, February 12, 1961, 1.
95
Burt, 197.
96
Burt, 195.
52
and from Texas to California, they began to express their disappointment at being passed
over and ignored for the post they had coveted for one of their own members. 97
However, since the Mexican American leaders did not have a direct line of
communication with Kennedy, their criticisms of the new administration were confmed
to regional southwest newspapers, far away from the eyes of the president and his aides
who were certainly not reading or considering the headlines of La Opinion. In
Washington, the Viva Kennedy leaders could only count on their sole liaison,
McCormick, who was yet to be nominated for a specific post himself. Indeed, during the
first months of the Kennedy presidency, he served only as at-large administration staffer.
Still, McCormick received the brunt of the complaints as he was seen as both the primary
contact and mediator between the Mexican American community and President Kennedy.
McCormick, however, lacked any significant influence in the appointment process, a fact
that frustrated people like Garcia from Texas. Garcia demanded that McCormick "do
more," to which McCormick replied that he was, "doing all within my power to secure
top positions for our people." Frustrated, McCormick then told Garcia to let him know if
he had a better method for securing these appointments, as he would greatly appreciate
his assistance on this matter. 98
The disappointment over the lack of significant appointments going to Mexican
Americans seeped into the pages of La Opinion. In the regular column "Panoramas
Angelinos" the following reflection appeared: "It seems at least until now, that the
Mexican Americans who were so praised for their efforts in the Democratic campaign in
97
Garcia, 109-112.
98
Ibid., 108.
53
California, are being left behind in the nominations being made [by the Kennedy
administration]. And even though there have been several rumors that have spread wildly,
these have been nothing but rumors and we remain just like we were before, 'just
dreaming.' Perhaps next time!..." 99
The Kennedy administration did continue to look for other Mexican Americans
to nominate to positions within the State Department in order to satisfY the Viva Kennedy
leadership and, more importantly, to continue to court the favor of the Mexican American
electorate in the Southwest. In April 1961, Telles, the mayor of El Paso received the
ambassadorship to Costa Rica. Telles was a rising star in the Mexican American political
scene in Texas, however he had participated only intermittently in the Viva Kennedy
effort. Although Telles' appointment was publicly hailed as "the first time a Mexican
American holds such a high level diplomatic post," 100 Roybal expressed his
dissatisfaction with the appointment at several points during the first months of the
Kennedy administration, complaining that Kennedy's selections did not include any of
the national Viva Kennedy leadership or men from the California chapters who were
constantly being recommended to the President. 101
Roybal's dissatisfaction with the new administration's nomination choices
surely increased after the announcement of two other appointments to mid-level federal
posts - even though they ostensibly acknowledged Kennedy's debt to the emerging
Mexican American voting bloc in the Golden State. In March 1961, McCormick became
99
"Panoramas Angelinos -La semana pasada," La Opinion. Second Edition, February 26, 1961, 1.
100
"Torno posesi6n Telles como embajador de E.U. en Costa Rica," La Opinion, April21, 1961.2.
101
Roybal quoted in "Kennedy Patronage, Latin American Policies under Fire," Congressional Quarterly
(January 23, 1961); and "Viva Kennedy Leaders in Revolt," Valley Morning Star, June 28, 1961, both
quoted in Garcia, 196.
54
the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State for Inter-American Mfairs.
McCormick reported to Morales-Carri6n, but also continued to serve as the unofficial
advisor to Kennedy regarding Mexican American issues. 102 The Viva Kennedy leaders in
California did not attribute much significance to McCormick's selection, as he was
already part of Kennedy's extended circle. Furthermore, though McCormick hailed from
California, he was not considered part of the California group. Rather, his political
loyalties belonged to Arizona's Mexican American political clan headed by attorney
Ralph Estrada, his father-in-law. 103
The next appointee, Hector G. Godinez, became the second Mexican American
from California Kennedy nominated during the first hundred days of his presidency.
Godinez had been the national president of The League of United Latin American
Citizens (LULAC). He was also a World War II veteran who served as a tank commander
for General George C. Patton. 104 Though LULAC's agenda seldom focused on foreign
affairs, during the campaign Godinez and LULAC had endorsed the Viva Kennedy
platform and called on Kennedy to appoint Mexican Americans in "positions of good
will" throughout Latin America. 105 This gesture, along with LULAC-sponsored campaign
rallies in favor of Kennedy during the presidential election probably put Godinez on
Kennedy's radar and helped insure his nomination as postmaster in the city of Santa Ana
in Orange County.
102
"Frontiersmen: Do they All Want to Be President?" Newsweek, March 19, 1962, 34-35.
103
Burt. 197.
104
Ibid.
105
Craig Allan Kaplowitz, LULAC. Mexican Americans, and National Policy, Fronteras series, no. 4.
(College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2005), 72.
55
Godinez's appointment to a relatively rnmor municipality in southern
California did not gamer much praised from the Mexican American leaders in Los
Angeles. The Los Angeles Times merely published a brief notice of the announcement
and La Opinion did not even reference the news in the days following the
pronouncement. 106 Roybal and MAP A must have not been pleased with Godinez'
nomination as LULAC was not a part of MAPA's coalition that had built the Viva
Kennedy structure in California. Most poignantly, the new position did not grant Godinez
any additional respect even in his own community. In Santa Ana the rumor was that
Godinez "went from a letter carrier one day to being the postmaster the next because he
helped to bring the Hispanic vote for John Kennedy." 107
By the time Kennedy administration reached its one hundred day mark, it had
only appointed a handful of officials of Latin American descent. This of course came as
a bitter disappointment to the Viva Kennedy membership that thought Kennedy would
immediately assign scores of Mexican Americans to positions of power and influence in
his administration. Adding insult to injury, none of the national Viva Kennedy leaders
had been selected in this process.
California Politicians like Roybal
and Lopez, perhaps
stung by the
disillusionment of not seeing their envisioned goals materialize, quickly set out to
continue their political work at the local and regional level. They began to orchestrate
meetings with people who had participated in the Viva Kennedy Clubs in order to
establish an organization with broader political goals. A conference with this purpose was
106
"Week in Review," Los Angeles Times. April9, 1961, 2.
107
Joseph Breckenridge interview conducted on September 4, 2002, quoted in Burt, 197.
56
held on March 4, 1961 in Phoenix, Arizona. 108 The result of the conference was the
establishment of Political Association of Spanish-speaking Organizations (PASO) which
attempted to become a national umbrella group that would unite all of the different
Mexican American advocacy organizations active at the time. However PASO's
influence proved to be limited in California as Roybal and MAP A continued to assert
their predominance over other organizations, a fact that prevented PASO from
transforming into a wider coalition.
108
"Notas Politicas-Conferencia en Phoenix, Ariz," La Opinion, Segunda Edici6n, March 26, 1961,1.
57
Conclusion
During the first weeks of the new Kennedy administration, those active in
Southern California Mexican American political circles confronted two lamentable
developments. First, the unity the 1960 presidential election had created, a unity that had
brought together various political groups into the Viva Kennedy Clubs, quickly
dissipated. By April 1961, MAPA and LULAC were at odds over Kennedy's
appointments. The President - perhaps without even intending to do so - favored
LULAC over MAPA in the selection of Godinez as postmaster, thus ignoring MAPA's
contribution to Kennedy's presidential campaign in California.
Seoncd, the few selections of Mexican Americans for posts in the Kennedy
Administration clearly demonstrated that the image of Kennedy as a friend of the
Mexicans Americans was a campaign myth that the Viva Kennedy leadership had creatd
and Carlos McCormick had augmented. Nonetheless, the idea that Kennedy was attentive
and open to granting the demands of these men took hold in their political maneuvers.
The fact that their pleas were inconsequential during the nomination process further
highlighted their political naivete. Though the Viva Kennedy members believed then·
organization had been instrumental in Kennedy's victory, after the election, Kennedy's
circle focused on mending fences with the major Democratic powerbrokers in California.
Hence Kennedy delegated the decisions regarding the appointments of Californians to
Governor Brown and Speaker of the California State Assembly Unruh. Brown and Unruh
were unwilling to recommend Mexican American politicians like Roybal and Lopez
58
because they had established the Viva Kennedy effort outside of the Democratic Party
machine.
The decision of the Viva Kennedy leadership to prioritize the pursuit of
diplomatic nominations over federal appointments in the Southwest became a watershed
moment in terms of the Mexican American political narrative. There were pressing social
equality issues confronting Mexican American communities from Texas to California.
Why then advocate for the appointment of ambassadorial positions in Latin America?
How could Mexican American representing the interests of the United States abroad
address the plight of the Mexican Americans living the American barrios and rural
towns?
To answer this query, one must first remember that many of these Mexican
American leaders were World War II veterans. They established a prominent role for
themselves within their communities by serving the U.S. in a military conflict abroad.
After their service, they were able to garner benefits through the G.I. bill, enroll in major
universities and earn prestigious degrees. In time, many embraced the notion that serving
as American officials abroad was a logical next step beyond military service.
Such
assignments, they believed, would allow them to augment their public roles and perhaps
obtain desired recognition from the broader American society.
Most significantly, these men believed that although these posts were given to
individuals, each appointment would represent and reflect positively on the Mexican
American community. Therefore their diplomatic service would serve a dual purpose:
first it would grant them recognition as American citizens of "Latin American descent" in
the hemisphere. They would then be exemplary American citizens, making important
59
contributions to containing the communist threat in Latin America.
Second, these
Mexican Americans perceived themselves as perhaps not only American ambassadors,
but Mexican American emissaries. They proposed to be part of both the U.S. and Latin
America's political process, thus complicating their stated commitments to assimilation.
Moreover, they hoped that through their diplomatic service they could perhaps
contribute, if only indirectly, to improving the social and economic conditions of the
Mexican American minority. However, when the diplomatic posts Mexican Americans
coveted were not offered to them, they shifted the focus of their political struggle back to
their barrios.
60
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http://www.stanfordalumni.org/ere/reunions/chicano alumni hall.html
63
available
available
available
available