PSS Contracts for Rail Infrastructure
Sofia Lingegård
Department of Management and Engineering, Linköping University, Linköping
Sweden
Abstract
Increased costs and few incentives for technical development within the rail infrastructure
industry have resulted in an increased interest for new contracting types such as PSS. This
paper examines the current situation, investigates benefits and challenges when using PSS
contracts, and attempts to develop a model for both traditional and PSS contracts. The results
show that advantages, such as incentives for development and potentially lower costs, are
challenged by a conservative buyer in combination with reservations. This is due to
inexperience and insecurity working with this business model, resulting in the actors
questioning the feasibility. The models developed clearly show the different phases of the
contracts and state which actor is responsible for the each phase. This is useful when
comparing different contracts, as well as when determining responsibility and issues related to
the interface between different phases and actors.
Keywords: product service systems, rail infrastructure, innovation, model.
1. Introduction
For a long period of time, productivity development has been weak in the construction
industry, such as road and rail infrastructure, possibly due to the traditional form of
contracting used. These traditional forms for operation and maintenance have caused
increased costs, and thus resulted in an increased interest for new contracting types (Hedström
et al., 2005, Nilsson, 2009). Construction contracts are currently used to a large extent in
Sweden, but this type of contract has shortcomings concerning weak incentives for the
development of procedures (Nilsson et al., 2006). Major obstacles for technical development,
as well as the limited room for innovation, are due to over-detailed specifications of how to do
things (Stenbeck, 2004). This gives the procurer a reason to design the contracts to produce
more incentives for cost efficiency (Nilsson et al., 2006). To improve the cost efficiency of
maintenance by improving the conditions as early as in the development phase, and to
perform maintenance as efficiently as possible considering the entire life cycle of the
products, is also in the strategy of the Swedish Transport Administration (Riksrevisonen,
2010). One way of doing this could be with another type of contracting. Performance
contracting gives better incentives for contractors to develop the product by e.g. finding a
better balance between building and maintaining costs, and the contractor is responsible for
delivering an agreed-upon function which should provide a cheaper solution for both procurer
and contractor (Nilsson et al., 2005). This type of contracting is also known as Product
Service Systems or PSS (Goedkoop et al., 1999). A more extensive review of this type of
contracting can be found in Section 3.
In cooperation with the Swedish Transport Administration (STA), the DORIS (Development
of integrated product service Offerings for Rail Infrastructure Systems) project was launched
to investigate the possibility for PSS contracts within the rail infrastructure in Sweden. This
paper, partly based on parts of the initial literature study (Lingegård, 2010) as well portions of
the subsequent interviews with actors in the industry, has the following objective.
1.1.
Objective
The objective of this paper is to investigate, through a literature review and an interview
study, what has been realized so far for rail infrastructure in the PSS area, and to highlight
potential benefits and challenges when using PSS contracts for rail infrastructure.
Furthermore, a model illustrating traditional contracts and PSS contracts will be developed.
This leads to the following research questions:
RQ1: To what extent are PSS contracts used for rail infrastructure?
RQ2: What phases are included in a model for traditional contracts and PSS contracts,
respectively, when procuring rail infrastructure?
RQ3: What possibilities and challenges are the actors identifying for PSS contracts for rail
infrastructure?
2. Method
An introductory interview with a well-informed employee at the Swedish Transport
Administration was the starting point for this research. The goal was to gain sufficient
knowledge within the area to start searching for literature for this study. A literature review
was selected as the first phase of the research, since it could provide information concerning
the current praxis in the industry in focus as well as to present a picture of the main areas of
interest, and thereby steer the research towards an interesting and useful path.
Literature reviewed includes several different kinds of sources: scientific articles, homepages,
reports, master theses as well as doctoral and licentiate theses. The information was limited to
just a few sources, and most of the information was retrieved from the Swedish National Road
and Transport Research Institute and the Swedish Transport Administration. When possible,
triangulation using different sources was used. No geographical limits were employed when
searching for literature; instead, the search included literature from several continents, even
though some of it is not included in this paper. This is partly due to the conditions for the
contracts, which differed significantly from the ones in Sweden, and therefore are not relevant
in this study, partly due to the difficulty in judging the quality. The next step was to conduct
interviews and thereby dig deeper into the areas of interest. The literature study provides a
foundation, but the relationship between the actors as well as the perspectives on PSS for the
different actors had to be explored using interviews. The respondents were chosen using the
snowball approach, starting with the one contact that initialized the literature search. The
interviews were performed by phone or during meetings and were always recorded.
3. Product Service System: one concept, several names
The focus for this paper is PSS contracts, where the procurer requests a function instead of a
specific execution (Nilsson & Pyddoke, 2007). This type of functional buying/selling is
known by different names, with the most commonly occurring presented in Table 1 with no
intergroup order.
Table 1: Different names for performance-based contracts.
Name
Outcome-based
contracting
Performancecontracting
Performancebased contracts
Definition/description
“…a contracting mechanism that allows the customer to
pay only when the firm has delivered outcomes, rather
than merely activities and tasks.”
“The contract terms are based on that future users are
given access to some specific services, not on the
contractor fulfilling technical specifications: it is the
performance of the asset over the contracting period
that matters.”
“…are about contracting on performance, rather than
tasks or outputs by the service provider.”
Reference
Ng et al., 2009, p.
1 (Ng et al., 2009)
Nilsson et al.,
2006, p. 7 (Nilsson
et al., 2006)
Ng and Yip, 2009,
p. 207 (Ng & Yip,
2009)
Functional sales
Solutions
projects
Performance
contracts
Product Service
System, PSS
Integrated
Product Service
Offerings, IPSO
“The customer purchases a function and the hardware
plus service includes the totality of activities that enable
the customer to benefit from a total functional
provision.”
“…solutions projects usually include the responsibility
for the provider to manage, resource, support and
improve the delivery of the solution through the life of
the product or system in use.”
“Performance Contracts are defining a product and it is
up to the contractor how to achieve this. Therefore,
work selection, design and delivery are all his
responsibility.”
“a marketable set of products and services capable of
jointly fulfilling a user’s need”
“…from a lifecycle perspective, to offer and optimise a
solution with a combination of products and services
that satisfies an identified customer need, and at the
same time increases the suppliers’ competitiveness. “
Alonso-Rasgado
et al., 2004, p. 515
(Alonso-Rasgado
et al. , 2004)
Brady et al., 2005,
p. 364 (Brady et
al. , 2005)
Zietlow, 2005, p. 3
(Zietlow, 2004)
Goedkoop et al.,
1999, p. 18
(Goedkoop et al.,
1999)
Lindahl et al.,
2006, p. 1-2
(Lindahl, 2006)
From this table it can be concluded that even though the names of the concepts differ, they
still include the same content; namely, the focus is on the output, and not on how the output is
achieved. In this paper, the concept will be called Product Service System, or PSS, since this
is the most common name for the concept.
3.1.
PSS characteristics
PSS offerings have a life-cycle perspective, and the combination of products and services can
be combined into an optimized solution for the customer, as well as give the manufacturing
company the possibility to have control over the product throughout its whole life-cycle
(Brady et al., 2005, Lindahl, 2006). PSS provides the supplier with a possibility to increase
the value of the solution for the customer by integrating components in new ways (Brady et
al., 2005), and is thereby a driver for the development of a technical solution (Lindahl, 2006).
This provides incentives for the supplier to realize a more economical and environmental
development when considering the whole life-cycle (Lindahl, 2006). Companies acting in a
mature industry can use the PSS as a growth strategy and compete with their core competence
rather than with physical assets (Mont, 2002). The author also states that PSS requires a closer
and improved relationship with the customer, and the customer no longer has to be the owner
of the product.
4. The current situation for rail infrastructure procurement
The Swedish Transport Administration, formerly the Swedish Rail Administration, is
responsible for 80% of the total rail system in Sweden (Banverket, 2008). Since 2001,
maintenance contracts for the Swedish rail system have been procured in competition
(Banverket Produktion, 2009). Although competitive procurement has resulted in reduction in
costs for maintenance, the costs are still increasing, and in 2008 maintenance and
reinvestment costs made up over 50% of the cost for new investments.
It was concluded in a doctorial thesis (Svensson, 2006) concerning the former Swedish Rail
Administration that there has not been significant pressure on the organization, internally or
externally, to use life-cycle environmental management, and the work has been focused on
environmental issues found locally, and not on life-cycle perspectives. Furthermore, the
author states that the railway industry needs to adopt new perspectives to start working with
environmental management of the products, and to set environmental requirements when
designing new products, i.e. before introducing them in the material supply chain.
Construction contracts are the most common contracts within the infrastructure construction
industry in Sweden (Nilsson & Pyddoke, 2007). The concept is based on the procurer
specifying what, how and how much for the project (Nilsson et al., 2005). The tenders are
made in unit prices, with the choice of tender mainly based on the lowest price (Hedström et
al., 2005). Construction contracts imply that the procurer carries all the risk, and a maximum
roof for the price is set which does not create any incentives for the contractors to make the
processes more efficient; instead, they benefit from reaching the maximum sum (Nilsson et
al., 2005).
Since 2005, performance contracts have been used for maintenance in Sweden
(Riksrevisonen, 2010), meaning that “…the Swedish Rail Administration procures a
functionality of the track that has been set in advance. The contractor subsequently decides
what measures to take with respect to the performed reviews and regulations for
maintenance.” (Banverket, 2009) The length of the contracts is 5 years, with an additional 2year option, and uses bonuses and penalties (Riksrevisonen, 2010).
The phases in the life-cycle of railway infrastructure are the following (Banverket, 2002,
Trafikverket, 2011):
•
Design/Planning: When a need is identified and different solutions are evaluated,
enquiry documentation is generated, including requirements for the specific
procurement as well as requirements on potential tenderers. The process from idea to
finished construction may take several years.
•
Construction: The construction of the rail infrastructure.
•
Operations: Measures taken to make sure the construction works as intended without
changing the technical or functional state of the construction. Examples of operations
measures include cleaning of the facility and removal of leaves and snow.
•
Maintenance: Measures taken during the life-cycle of the construction to maintain
and restore the standard. Preventive maintenance is perform in set intervals or based
on the state of the construction, while corrective maintenance deals with errors that
have occurred in the functionality of the construction.
Another type of maintenance is the reinvestment to restore the original state of the
construction. The construction has to be evaluated as technically expended and/or not
economically feasible to maintain. The difference between maintenance and
reinvestment is different cost levels.
4.1.
Industry examples of PSS for rail infrastructure
This section provides two different examples of PSS projects which are collected from
Sweden and the UK, as shown in Table 2.
4.1.1. Arlandabanan, Sweden
Arlandabanan is a railroad section with double tracks, including a 7 km tunnel and several
underground stations, between the city of Stockholm and Arlanda airport (Arlandabanan
Infrastructure AB, 2010). The winning tender for this Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
contract was a consortium constructed by six companies from several different countries
(Arlandaexpress AB/A-train, 2010). The consortium later formed the company, A-train, to
finance, build and subsequently run the train traffic. In 1999, after three years of construction,
the ownership of the facility was transferred back to Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB, but Atrain got the responsibility to run and maintain the facility during the same time period, as
well as the right to use the tracks for traffic until 2040 (Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB,
2010). In this contract, ticket revenues from the end customers serve as revenues for A-train
(Nilsson & Pyddoke, 2007).
A conditional loan from the government made up one-third of the construction costs, and all
the income risk was carried by the consortium, as well as most of the cost risk in the project
(Arnek et al., 2007). A-train had the right to a penalty from Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB
for major changes in the prerequisites, e.g. if it was not feasible to construct a double track
within the time that was agreed, due to e.g. discovery of archeological findings or incorrect
technical information (Enberg et al., 2004). A-train got the freedom to balance the cost for the
initial investment and the cost for maintenance, and subsequently chose to use another
solution for the tracks than the original idea of the procurer (Nilsson, 2008).
4.1.2. The Northern Line, UK
In 2003, three long-term contracts including maintenance and upgrading of infrastructure for
the London Underground network were signed. These PPP contracts spanned over 30 years,
with opportunities to review the contracts and requirements every 7.5 years (London
Underground, 2010). The contract for the Northern Line included the leasing of the trains and
an area of 50 stations, and full responsibility for the design, manufacturing and cleaning of
trains and related equipment (Harding & Watts, 2000). During the first four years, 80% of the
contracts consisted of capital works and 20% of service elements, while the service made up
100% of the total in the fifth year and beyond.
The contracts are output-specified, and the required performance levels were measured with
the following three factors (London Underground, 2010):
•
Availability, counting delays and disruptions lasting longer than two minutes.
•
Capability of the line.
•
Ambience, measuring the quality of the customers’ travelling environment.
Before the start of the contracts in 2003, the measures were set at a level of around 5% worse
than the historic data of the London Underground. This was decided to be the benchmark for
the first five years, and then subsequently become more challenging with time (London
Underground, 2010). The report also states that bonuses and penalties are used as additional
adjustment for the performance, and liabilities for environment and safety are included.
Table 2: Reviewed contracts for rail infrastructure.
Project
Arlandabanan,
20 km (SWE)
The Northern Line,
50 stations, (UK)
Content
Finance, build, operate
and maintain the tracks.
Operate the train traffic.
Design, manufacture and
service the trains. Operate
the train traffic.
Length
45 years
30 years
Payment
Contractor built the tracks and
is now leasing them. Ticket
revenues.
Leasing contract based on a
guaranteed number of trains
and performance improvement.
5. Modelling the rail infrastructure procurement
The interview study includes seven respondents from different contracting companies and
seven respondents belonging to the STA, whereof three work within the Investment Division,
three within the Operations Division and one within the Material Services. The Investment
Division procures construction contracts while the Operations Division procures operation
and maintenance contracts. The respondents believe that these two divisions currently do not
have much interaction. A model illustrating who holds the responsibility for each phase for
the traditional contracts currently used to procure rail infrastructure in Sweden is shown in
Figure 1. The Investment Division participates in the Design and Construction phase, while
the Operations division is involved in the Operations and Maintenance contracts.
Design,
3 months
Construction,
0,5-3 years
STA
Investment
Contractor X
Operations, 5+2 years
Maintenance, 5+2 years
STA
Operations
Contractor Y
Figure 1: Illustration of traditional contracts for procuring rail infrastructure in Sweden and what part
has the responsibility for each phase.
The contractors formulate tenders based on the enquiry documentation developed by the STA,
as described in Section 4. The procurement of the construction and the subsequent operations
and maintenance are done independently. When an operations and maintenance contract ends
a new procurement process is initiated. The owner of the last contract has an advantage when
bidding on the next contract, since this company is already established in the area and hence
likely can offer a tender with a lower cost.
5.1.
Procuring infrastructure with PSS contracts
A PSS contract for rail infrastructure would include design, construction as well as operations
and maintenance, as shown in Figure 2. The STA would announce an enquire document,
where only what is wanted is specified, and not how it is supposed to be realized. The
planning of the stretch and the environmental evaluations are still performed by the STA, but
the design of the construction and the maintenance are the work of the tenderer. Tenders are
sent in from contractors, with all tenders within the laws and regulations required, and the
STA does not interfere with the design. The STA does however evaluate the design in the
tenders, after the Design phase in Figure 2, and subsequently chooses the best offer. Even
though the Contractor X in Figure 2 is shown as being responsible for the whole contract, this
company would need to bring in sub-contractors to be able to manage the whole life-cycle.
Normally, a combination of more general contractors and railway-specialized contractors are
involved when rail infrastructure is constructed and maintained.
The respondents did not have a common opinion concerning the length of the contract, mostly
due to the operations and maintenance phase of the contract, which was hard for them to
estimate. These contracts span over five to seven years today, and the question remains of
how many years would be suitable for a PSS contract. Another issue raised concerning the
contracts is what types of projects are suitable for them, i.e. new constructions and/or
reinvestments.
Design,
+3 months
Construction,
0,5-3 years
Operations, 10-45 years
Maintenance, 10-45 years
Contractor X
Figure 2: Illustration of PSS contracts for rail infrastructure and the actor that is responsible.
5.2.
PSS Advantages and challenges for rail infrastructure
Among the respondents, the views of advantages and challenges concerning PSS for rail
infrastructure varied. Differences were also found within the STA and among the contractors.
On the other hand, several issues were indicated as advantages and challenges for both
groups, as seen in Table 3.
Table 3: Advantages and challenges described by the interviewed respondents in the rail infrastructure
industry.
Advantages
Challenges
Provide the full picture of the life-cycle.
Organization-related issues such as culture
and competence.
Increased risk for the provider with longterm contracts.
Impact on the market; competition and size
of companies.
Suitable length of the contract concerning
risk management and payback time.
Procuring a function boosts development
and innovation.
More durable solutions with a long-term
perspective.
Result in a lower total cost when balancing
construction costs with operations and
maintenance costs.
Suitable projects; new projects and/or
reinvestments
A life-cycle perspective boosts development
The contractors would have the responsibility for both the construction and the maintenance of
a specific area of rail infrastructure, which was mentioned as an advantage by the respondents,
since it would imply more room for creativity and innovative solutions. Furthermore, according
to most of the contractors knowing that they were going to maintain the area themselves would
make them build more durably, since they have the possibility to balance the construction cost
with the maintenance cost. They argue that more flexible and suitable solutions are likely to
bring down the total cost of the project. This is in line with the literature stating that using a
product-service mix with more durable materials and other designs may prolong the lifetime of
the product and potentially optimize maintenance and operations (White et al., 1999).
Furthermore, with a PSS contract the contractors feel there are incentives for innovation and
clever solutions. New combinations of products and services, as well as more customized
offers, could better respond to the change in conditions and needs (Mont, 2002).
Risk management
According to the respondents, a major hurdle for PSS is the fact that they claim the contractor
will have to carry more risk compared to traditional contracts. This is due to the uncertainty
factor connected to long-term contracts, where the contractor would have to base their pricing
on estimations. This mainly concerns the operations and maintenance phase, but according to
the respondents even uncertainties in the construction phase could be considerable in some
cases. This could potentially increase the price, making this a concern for both provider and
buyer. This matter has been discussed in the literature, with (Oliva & Kallenberg, 2003) saying
that the profitability of a provider depends on the ability to assess risks accurately. On the other
hand, good risk management could be seen as a competitive advantage for the contractors if
they learn how to design to avoid or at least decrease the risk. There is another dimension to the
long-term factor in the PSS literature; namely, the possibility for manufacturing companies to
continuously receive revenue when providing services as well (Brady et al., 2005). In the rail
infrastructure industry, however, contractors already provide the services, but traditionally in
independent operations and maintenance contracts where the risk is lower. This means that the
cost reduction from having the overall picture and making clever solutions will have to exceed
the potential price increase caused by the risks connected to a long-term contract. This is all
dependent on the contractor’s ability to assess risks, and it is possible there is a learning curve
involved that would diminish this issue with time and experience.
Conservative corporate culture
Both the STA and the contractors are concerned about the conservative culture within the
STA, and also the way the organization is structured, where the Investment and Operations
Divisions have separate budgets and sub-optimize their profits. This could cause problems
when evaluating the tenders after the Design phase. This could also be potentially problematic
when evaluating completed contracts, since the two divisions have different perspectives. The
lack of information on lifetime costs of ownership can prevent the customer from
understanding the product-service options (Railway Gazette International, 2006). In this case,
however, the hurdle is probably more due to a traditional way of thinking and a short-time
perspective from the buyer’s side. Furthermore, hesitation concerning the acceptance of this
type of contract within the corporate culture of the STA has been raised from both the STA
itself and from the contractors. This resistance has been described in previous research as
preventing the change needed to develop new product-service mixes (Cooper & Evans, 2000).
Market situation
The respondents are also concerned about the potential effect the PSS contracts could have on
the market. In a mature industry, PSS could be part of a growth strategy (Mont, 2002), but
since the respondents believe that larger international companies would be interested in the
PSS contracts, there might not be room for the national companies to grow. The respondents
also stress that smaller contractors would not be able to bid on large contracts like this, and
also that long-term contracts could potentially freeze the market. If there are any national
companies capable of taking on PSS responsibility, they would be the ones that already are of
decent size, since it has been emphasized that smaller companies would not stand a chance in
the current competition.
5.3.
Applying the model
The two examples reviewed for rail infrastructure, the Arlandabanan project in Figure 3 and
the Northern Line in Figure 4, have both similarities and differences. Both include design,
construction and operations and maintenance as well as operating the train traffic. On the
other hand, the Arlandabanan project involves construction of new infrastructure while the
Northern Line focuses on reinvestment of the infrastructure (Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB,
2010, Harding & Watts, 2000). The Northern Line contract has an output-specified
performance level where availability is emphasized when it comes to payment for the
contractor (London Underground, 2010). It is a totally different case for Arlandabanan, since
that consortium receives its revenues from the end customers (Nilsson, 2008) and not the
procurer. While the Northern Line contract was formulated as a PSS contract, it is not known
how specified the contract for Arlandabanan was, even though there seems to have been
margins for flexibility for the A-train when formulating their solution (Nilsson, 2008). Other
similarities are the long time period for the contracts, 45 years for Arlandabanan
(Arlandabanan Infrastructure AB, 2010) and 30 years for the Northern Line (London
Underground, 2010). This differs significantly from the time periods currently used for
maintenance contracts in Sweden, discussed in previous sections.
Both contracts reviewed in this paper seem to have the life-cycle perspective that is included in
a PSS contract (Lindahl, 2006), as well as the combination of products and services (Lindahl,
2006) that is required. The type of products and services differs for the contracts, even though
they are implemented in the same industry.
The Arlandabanan project
Design
Construction,
3 years
Maintenance, 45 years
Operations, 45 years
Operating the train traffic,
45 years
Contractor X
Figure 3: Illustration model of the Arlandabanan project.
The Northern Line
Design
Maintenance, 30 years
Construction,
+ 5 years
Operations, 30 years
Operating the train traffic,
30 years
Contractor X
Figure 4: Illustration model of the Northern Line project.
6. Concluding discussion and conclusion
Judging from the interviews, it is clear that PSS contracts are believed to improve the
incentives for development and innovation in the industry. This type of contract also has the
potential for optimizing the process and lowering the total cost. One major concern is the
increased risk taken by the contractors, potentially increasing the prices and thereby
overthrowing the potential cost reduction from the optimization. Other issues are the type of
project suitable for PSS contracts, the length of the contracts and the conservative culture
within the STA. These issues, in combination with reservations due to inexperience and
insecurity working with this business model, make the respondents question the feasibility of
PSS contracts.
The models constructed illustrate the contracts used today for procuring rail infrastructure as
well as the composition of PSS contracts. The models clearly show the different phases of the
contracts, and state which actor is responsible for the each phase. This is useful when
comparing different contracts, and also when determining responsibility and issues related to
the interface between different phases and actors. More stakeholders could potentially be added
to the model and thus influence these issues in different phases, such as in the operation of train
traffic, if this function is not included in the contract.
6.1.
Further research
The next step in the DORIS project is to further analyze the material from the interview study
and dig deeper into the reasoning of the respondents. The study will also be extended with a
workshop including top managers from the STA to investigate and clarify the role, motivation
and attitude towards PSS contracts for rail infrastructure. This will be followed by a
quantitative study focusing on the environmental and economic advantages and disadvantages
of PSS contracts for rail infrastructure.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank the Swedish Transport Administration for financing the
research and the respondents for contributing with their time and knowledge.
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