This article was downloaded by: [Indian School of Business]
On: 10 September 2013, At: 20:26
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House,
37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Construction Management and Economics
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcme20
The effect of time on safety incentive programs in the
US construction industry
a
Manish Gangwar & Paul M. Goodrum
a
a
151C Raymond Building, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506‐0281
Published online: 17 Feb 2007.
To cite this article: Manish Gangwar & Paul M. Goodrum (2005) The effect of time on safety incentive programs in the US
construction industry, Construction Management and Economics, 23:8, 851-859, DOI: 10.1080/01446190500184527
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01446190500184527
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained
in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no
representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the
Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and
are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and
should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for
any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of
the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic
reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any
form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://
www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions
Construction Management and Economics (October 2005) 23, 851–859
The effect of time on safety incentive programs in the
US construction industry
MANISH GANGWAR and PAUL M. GOODRUM*
151C Raymond Building, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506-0281, USA
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Received 24 May 2004; accepted 23 March 2005
Recently, safety incentive programs have been under scrutiny by the US Occupational Safety and Health
Administration for their effectiveness to improve construction safety performance. Most of the previous
research on construction safety incentives focused on anecdotal evidence examining the merits and demerits of
safety incentives. Meanwhile, the long-term effect of safety incentive programs on construction safety remains
uncertain. This research examined how key safety performance indicators changed over time in the presence of
safety incentive programs in the US construction industry using primary survey data. The paper’s key finding is
that the effectiveness of safety incentive programs does diminish with time, as suspected by earlier experts and
managers in the US construction industry.
Keywords: Construction, incentive, safety, personnel management, motivation
Introduction
Safety is a concern for everyone, particularly in the US
construction industry, which chronically suffers from
an exceptionally high number of fatalities compared to
other US industries. According to the US Bureau of
Labor Statistics’ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries
(CFOI), the total number of fatalities in the US private
construction sector in 2003 was 1126, which equaled
11.7 worker fatalities for every 100,000 construction
workers. This resulted in construction having the forth
highest rate of fatalities per worker in the US behind
agricultural, mining and transportation industries
(BLS, 2003). The CFOI collects detailed data on all
work deaths related to traumatic occupational injuries
in the US.
Recent research by the authors did identify that
companies that have a safety incentive program do on
average have lower lost-time and restricted accident
rates than companies without safety incentive programs
(Goodrum and Gangwar, 2004). Proponents of safety
incentive programs will argue that the programs serve
as a positive reinforcer that affects worker behavior and
eventually jobsite safety (Krause and McCorqudale,
*Author for correspondence. E-mail: [email protected]
1996). However, what remains uncertain are the longterm effects of safety incentive programs on company
safety performance in construction. A common concern of many organizations is that the benefits of
behavior modification programs, such as incentives,
diminish over time (Guastello, 1993). Although individual organizations have anecdotal evidence to support this theory, it is unknown whether diminishing
effects of safety incentives occur over a significant
population of construction firms.
Kinds of safety incentive programs
Workplace behavior modification programs have been
shown to positively reduce the number of accidents
(Lund and Aaro, 2004), and safety incentive programs
are just one ends to the means of influencing a
population’s safety behavior. An organization’s safety
culture, which includes individuals’ personal motivation for safe behavior, risk justification, and optimism,
has also been deemed important in improving workplace safety (Williamson et al., 1997). In one way or
another, these factors can be influenced by incentive
awards by recognizing errant work habits and motivating individuals to work in a safer manner (Laitinen and
Ruohomaki, 1996). Safety incentive programs can be
Construction Management and Economics
ISSN 0144-6193 print/ISSN 1466-433X online # 2005 Taylor & Francis
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals
DOI: 10.1080/01446190500184527
852
divided broadly into two categories: (1) injury/illnessbased incentive programs and (2) behavior-based
incentive programs (Krause and Hodson, 1998;
Opfer, 1998; Flanders and Lawrence, 1999; Hinze,
2002).
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Injury/illness-based incentive programs
Injury/illness-based incentive programs are based on
the number of injuries and or illnesses as a criterion to
reward workers and crews. Individuals or groups are
rewarded for avoiding or lowering accidents over a
predefined periods. These programs work on the
underlying assumptions that: (1) facilities and equipment are safe and do not cause any accidents; (2)
workers have proper training and knowledge to use
equipment; and (3) accidents are primarily a result of a
worker’s negligence or compromise on safety (Smith,
1997). While there are certainly other measures of
safety performance, such as behavioral measures,
accident frequency is considered the most objective
safety performance measure (Duff et al., 1993). One
problem with injury/illness-based incentive programs is
that they directly equate prizes with a number of
injuries (Krause and Hodson, 1998). In the absence of
injury/illness-based incentive programs, a gross temptation already exists to not report work related injuries
and illnesses, especially less serious ones (McDonald
and Hrymak, 2002). Injury/illness-based incentive
programs tend to compound the temptation for workers not to report an injury, since workers do not want to
lose individual incentives and do not want to be the
reason for the whole group not receiving an award
(Geller, 1996a). Furthermore, other studies have
shown that organizational issues may influence the
investigation and reporting of injuries by safety professionals (Woodcock and Smiley, 1998), which could
also bias the effectiveness of injury/illness-based incentive programs. Another concern is that these programs
can become trivial and hard to discontinue in the long
run, because workers begin to view incentives as an
entitlement; a discontinuation may cause significant
negative impacts (Smith, 1997). Injury/illness-based
incentive programs may also provide false feedback and
may actually act as a demotivator if not administered
fairly from the craft workers’ perspective (Krause and
McCorquodale, 1996; Smith, 1997; Prichard, 2001).
For example, one crew may actually make a substantial
effort to avoid injuries but unfortunately experiences an
accident and does not receive any incentive. Indeed,
research has found that many accidents are a chance
event occurring as a result of a combination of
circumstances outside the control of a supervisor or
crew (McDonald and Hrymak, 2002). Of course,
another aspect to also consider in injury reporting is
Gangwar and Goodrum
that companies with superior safety programs tend to
be more likely to report the actual number of accidents
compared to companies with lesser quality programs in
safety (Goetsch, 2003).
Behavior-based incentive programs
Behavior-based incentive programs observe worker
behavior as a criterion for awarding incentives.
Previous research has identified the means of measuring individual behavior as a proxy for safety performance (Duff et al., 1993; Robertson et al., 1999).
Examples of rewarded behavior include participation in
activities such as safety meetings and training programs, suggestions about how to improve jobsite safety,
the proper use of personal protection equipment and
other behavior that can help avoid accidents. Although
behavior-based programs solve the problem of erroneous feedback addressed in injury/illness-based incentive programs and improve attendance in meetings and
training programs, the question of how to measure their
effectiveness still remains (Geller, 1996b). Some
programs handle this problem by gauging its effectiveness by regular tests and providing two-way feedback.
Moreover, these programs are also helpful in eliminating the problem of underreporting of injuries by
removing a direct link between an award and the
number of accidents reported. Behavior-based observation can also provide data about equipment and
facilities that put workers at risk for injury. A downside
of behavior-based incentive programs is that they are
comparatively difficult to measure and monitor,
because worker behavior is inherently more complex
and difficult to gauge (Geller, 1996a). In addition,
workers’ behavior changes constantly in reaction to
external factors like new equipment, new facilities, new
work groups, and even behavior observation programs
themselves.
Research objectives
Most prior research on safety incentive programs in
construction has been based on qualitative data. Many
claims of improved safety resulting from the use of
incentives are based on anecdotal data or company
specific cases. The overall impact of safety incentive
programs on a large population has rarely been
quantified. A greater unknown is the long-term effects
of safety incentive programs. With this in mind, the
research objectives were to:
(1)
identify whether the effectiveness of safety
incentive programs diminishes over time; and
853
Safety incentive programs
(2)
identify whether the long-term effectiveness of
safety incentive programs varies with different
performance measures.
The scope of the study was limited to construction
contractors in the southeastern United States. The
project examined how safety performance related to the
age of safety incentive programs using primary survey
data.
Methodology
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Data collection
Based on previous findings and the research objectives,
a pilot survey was created and administered to three
general contractors located in Kentucky and Tennessee
of the US. The pilot survey was a draft of the actual
survey used in the study, and it asked the safety
directors of the three participating general contractors a
series of questions regarding their use of safety
incentives and safety performance measures.
Following completion of the pilot survey, the safety
directors were interviewed by phone to solicit their
comments and suggestions regarding the survey document, which were incorporated into the actual survey.
Finally, the empirical data on the use of safety
incentives and company safety performance over a 5year period were collected.
To collect the data, a survey questionnaire was
developed for company safety directors and other safety
professionals in charge of their companies’ safety
programs in the US. In addition to identifying whether
a company did or did not have a safety incentive
program, the survey asked a series of questions about
the safety incentive programs including: how long the
safety incentive program had been in existence, criteria
for awarding safety incentives, and types of incentives
Table 1
awarded. Finally, the survey collected various company
safety performance data including the number of lost
time and other recordable accidents along with the total
number of employee hours worked each year from
1997 to 2001.
Out of a total of 165 surveys received, 20.6% were
collected from the state of Kentucky, 15.2% from
North Carolina, 12.1% from Tennessee, 10.3% from
Ohio, 9.7% from Virginia, 9.1% from each Georgia and
Indiana, 7.3% from Florida and 6.0% from other states
including Alabama, West Virginia, Michigan, Missouri,
and Texas (Table 1). The average number of workers
in 2001 for the sampled companies was 199 workers.
Fifty percent of the companies had fewer than 67
workers in 2001, and 10% of the companies had more
than 368 workers.
Out of 165 sampled companies, 13.9% were engaged
in both building and heavy construction, 41.8% were
involved in only building construction, 29.1%
were involved in only heavy construction, and 15.2%
were doing specialty work in construction. Out of a
total of 165 responses, 98 companies, which were
59.4% of the total, had a safety incentive program
(Table 2).
Sixty-six companies, 67.3% of the companies with a
safety incentive program, awarded tangible items like
cash, gifts, and prizes to their employees. No company
reported to award only intangible items like trophies,
certificates, time-off and parties to their employees.
However, 29 companies, 39.6% of the companies with
a safety incentive program, awarded both tangible and
intangible awards to their employees. Thirty-eight
companies, which were 38.8% of the companies with
a safety incentive program, based their safety incentive
program on injuries only. This is in comparison to 28
companies, which were 28.6% of the companies with a
safety incentive program, based their safety incentive
program on behavior only. Moreover, 23 companies,
Breakdown of sampled companies by state
State
Kentucky
North Carolina
Tennessee
Ohio
Georgia
Virginia
Indiana
Florida
Alabama
Others
Total
Total responses
34
25
20
17
15
16
15
12
7
4
165
Percentage with safety incentive Percentage without safety
program (in state)
incentive program (in state)
44.1
72.0
55.0
58.8
86.7
62.5
66.7
58.3
28.6
50.0
59.4
55.9
28.0
45.0
41.2
13.3
37.5
33.3
41.7
71.4
50.0
40.6
854
Table 2
Gangwar and Goodrum
Breakdown of companies by trade
Building & heavy
Only building
Only heavy
Specialty
Total
Count
Percentage
Count
Percentage
Count
Percentage
Count
Percentage
Count
With SIP
Without SIP
Total
17
17.3%
39
39.8%
27
27.6%
15
15.3%
98
6
9.0%
30
44.8%
21
31.3%
10
14.9%
67
23
13.9%
69
41.8%
48
29.1%
25
15.2%
165
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Note: SIP denotes safety incentive program. The categories of building, heavy, and specialty construction are the three major industry
classifications as identified by the North American Industry Classification System, which is maintained by the US Census Bureau.
23.5% of the companies with a safety incentive
program, based their safety incentive program on both
injuries and behavior. However, nine companies, 9.2%
of the companies with a safety incentive program, did
not respond to this question. Although previous
research by the authors (Goodrum and Gangwar,
2004) did find that construction firms with a safety
incentive program also had lower accident rates than
those did not, the study did not find statistical
differences between companies that awarded tangible
awards in their incentive programs and others that
awarded intangible awards or between companies that
based their safety incentive program on injuries and
others that based their program on behavior. However,
since the study only investigated 98 firms with a safety
incentive program, the relatively small sample population may have attributed to the lack of statistical
significance.
The primary method of analysis used in this effort is
analysis of variance (ANOVA), which determines the
probability that two or more samples are drawn from
the same parent population. The purpose of an
ANOVA is to test for statistically significant differences
between the means of two or more samples by
determining if an independent variable is different
enough not to have occurred by chance. In other
words, if the group means do not differ significantly, it
is inferred that the independent variable(s) did not have
an effect on the dependent variable. The key statistic in
an ANOVA is the F-test level of difference of group
means. A significance level of 0.05 indicates that the
chance of samples being from the same population is
5%. ANOVA analysis was used to identify whether
various safety performance indicators were different for
the categories under consideration or the difference in
values was merely due to chance. A p-value of less than
0.05 is normally a good indicator that differences in
value are not by chance but due to some other reason.
The Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) was
used to perform the ANOVA computations.
Measures of safety performance
In order to quantify the effectiveness of the safety
incentive programs, three different measures of safety
performance commonly used in the US construction
industry were collected in the survey. These measures
were: OSHA recordable cases, lost-time workday cases,
and restricted workday cases.
(1)
(2)
(3)
OSHA recordable cases: cases when workers, due
to an injury and illness sustained at work, have
to visit a doctor for more than first aid
are classified as a recordable case by the US
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
Lost-time workday cases: cases when workers,
due to an injury or illness sustained at work, are
not able to perform work are classified as losttime workday cases.
Restricted workday cases:—cases when workers
are not able to work in their full capacity, due
to an injury or illness sustained at work, and
assigned a lower workload are classified as a
restricted workday case.
Recordable, lost-time, and restricted incident rates
were calculated for each company using equation (1),
which is the standard equation used by the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics to calculate incident rates for all US
industries.
Incidence rate~
Number of cases|200,000
Total employee hours per year
ð1Þ
The figure 200,000 is the base for 100 full-time
employees working 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per
year.
Using equation (1), the 2001 OSHA recordable
incident rate for the sampled companies was 4.71. In
addition, the 2001 lost-time workday incident rate was
2.90, and the 2001 restricted workday incident rate was
1.81. By comparison to data from the Bureau of Labor
855
Safety incentive programs
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Statistics, US Department of Labor (BLS, 2004), the
overall 2001 recordable incident rate for the US
construction industry was 7.9; the 2001 lost-time
workday incident rate was 4.0, and the 2001 restricted
workday incident rate was 3.9.
It is noted that the sampled construction firms did
have lower incident rates than the industry averages.
There are two possible reasons to explain this
difference. First, the distributions of building, heavy,
and specialty contractors differ from industry averages,
and specifically the frequency of specialty contractors,
which on average have higher incident rates, are under
represented in the sample. Second, contractors with
higher than average incident rates may have chosen to
not respond to the survey.
Analysis
OSHA recordable cases
To begin examining the long-term effect of safety
incentive programs on OSHA recordable incident rates,
the mean 2001 OSHA recordable incident rate was
compared among companies that implemented their
safety incentive program (SIP) in a given year or
afterwards to the rest of the companies who had
implemented a safety incentive program previously to
a given year. Since the number of companies that
implemented an SIP in a particular year was less than
required for a sound statistical analysis, all companies
that implemented an SIP in or after a particular year
were grouped together. For example, the mean 2001
recordable incident rate for the companies that
implemented an SIP within 1 year, which were
Table 3
OSHA recordable incident rates
Year
Age of
program
in years
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
Fewer than 1
Fewer than 2
Fewer than 3
Fewer than 4
Fewer than 5
Fewer than 6
Fewer than 7
Fewer than 8
Fewer than 9
Fewer than 10
2001 OSHA recordable
incident rate of
companies with
row’s age
companies that implemented an SIP after 2000, was
2.41. Next, the mean 2001 recordable incident rate for
the companies that implemented an SIP within 2 years,
which were companies that implemented an SIP in
1999 or 2000, was 2.70. The increase in the mean from
2.41 to 2.70 could only be possible if the mean
recordable incident rate of the companies that implemented an SIP in 1999 was higher than the mean
recordable incident rate of the companies that implemented an SIP in 2000. Similarly, the mean 2001
recordable incident rate for the group of companies
that implemented an SIP after a particular year was
calculated and tabulated (Table 3, third column).
There is a gradual increase in the mean 2001 OSHA
recordable incident rate as more companies with older
SIP program are included in the group. This trend,
among this sample of construction firms, supports the
theory that the positive effects of an SIP does diminish
over time (Figure 1). It is important to note that this
and other analyses in this paper examined the
difference in rates only due to the presence of an SIP.
The analyses do not delineate the different types of SIP
that were used in each company, such as the use of
tangible or intangible safety incentives for example,
primarily because the sample size of the research
population does not support this type of more detailed
analyses, although such effort is worthy of future
research.
To further examine the effect of an SIP effectiveness
over time, the mean 2001 OSHA recordable incident
rate was compared among companies that implemented their SIP in a given year or afterward to the rest of
the companies who had either never implemented a
safety incentive program or had implemented a safety
2001 OSHA
recordable incident
rate of rest of the
companies
Mean
N
Mean
N
2.41
2.70
2.97
2.89
3.84
3.75
4.08
4.44
4.66
4.74
10
18
32
36
44
45
48
53
57
67
5.11
5.25
5.52
5.65
5.44
5.50
5.38
5.22
5.09
5.08
124
116
102
98
90
89
86
81
77
67
Difference
df
F-value
Sig.
2.70
2.55
2.55
2.76
1.60
1.75
1.30
0.78
0.43
0.34
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
133
1.89
2.88
4.54
5.82
2.13
2.58
1.46
0.54
0.17
0.11
0.17
0.09
0.04
0.02
0.15
0.11
0.23
0.47
0.68
0.74
Note: Since number of companies that implemented an SIP in a particular year was few, companies that implemented an SIP after a particular
year were also included to calculate mean in the second column; for example, second column mean for 1998 denotes mean for all the companies
that implemented an SIP in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
856
Gangwar and Goodrum
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Figure 1 OSHA recordable incident rates
incentive program previously to the given year. For
example, the mean 2001 OSHA recordable incident
rate for companies that implemented an SIP after 2000
was 2.41, compared to 5.11 for the rest of the
companies. Similarly, the mean 2001 OSHA recordable incident rate for the companies that implemented
an SIP after 1999 was 2.70 compared to 5.25 for the
rest of the companies. The differences in the mean
2001 OSHA recordable incident rate between two
groups of companies that implemented an SIP after a
particular year and rest of the companies were not
statistically significant for 2000 and 1999. In addition,
the differences in the mean 2001 OSHA recordable
incident rate between mentioned groups were also not
significant for 1996 and earlier. However, the differences in mean 2001 OSHA recordable incident rate
were statistically significant for year 1998 and 1997
(Table 3). These results show that companies did not
experience a significantly positive effect of SIP on
OSHA recordable incidence immediately. Rather
Figure 2 Lost-time workday incident rates
among these sample of companies, it took 3–4 years
before an SIP became effective. In addition, the
significant change in the OSHA recordable incidences
was not permanent and diminished with time among
the sampled construction firms.
Lost-time workday cases
Similar to the OSHA recordable incident 2001 rates,
the mean 2001 lost-time workday incident rate
increased as more companies with older SIP program
were included in the group. When companies that
implemented an SIP after 1996 were added to the
group, the mean 2001 lost-time incident rate remained
fairly constant but at higher levels compared to groups
that implemented an SIP afterwards. Once again
among this population of construction firms, the age
of the SIP had a negative effect on its effectiveness.
In the case of lost-time workday incident rates, the
difference between the companies that implemented an
857
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Safety incentive programs
Table 4
Lost-time workday incident rates
Year
Age of
2001 lost-time incident rate
program in
for companies that had
years
implemented SIP after
row’s year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
Fewer
than
than
than
than
than
than
than
than
than
than
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2001 lost-time
incident rate for rest
of the sample
companies
Mean
N
Mean
N
1.16
1.37
0.95
0.99
1.63
1.60
1.68
1.70
1.69
1.64
10
17
31
35
43
44
47
52
56
67
3.03
3.11
3.47
3.55
3.48
3.51
3.53
3.63
3.73
4.10
127
120
106
102
94
93
90
85
81
70
Difference
df
F-value
Sig.
1.87
1.75
2.52
2.56
1.84
1.92
1.86
1.94
2.04
2.46
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
0.690
0.968
3.297
3.716
2.151
2.361
2.290
2.612
2.990
4.535
0.41
0.33
0.07
0.06
0.15
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.09
0.04
Note: Since number of companies that implemented an SIP in a particular year was few, companies that implemented an SIP after a particular
year were also included to calculate mean in the second column; for example, second column mean for 1998 denotes mean for all the companies
that implemented an SIP in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
SIP after a particular year and the rest of the companies
in the sample did not show any statistically significant
difference above the 95% confidence level even after
adding more companies with older SIP in the group.
Once again, the most noticeable change was recorded
for the years 1998 and 1997. The lost-time workday
incident rate for companies implementing an SIP after
1997 was 0.99 compared to 3.55 for the rest of the
companies in the sample with a 94% confidence level.
In addition, the mean 2001 lost-time workday incident
rate for companies implementing an SIP after 1998 was
0.95 compared to 3.47 for the rest of the companies in
the sample with a 93% confidence level (Table 4).
Figure 3 Restricted workday incident rates
Restricted workday cases
In the case of restricted workday cases, there was again
a general increase in the mean 2001 restricted incident
rate as additional companies with older SIP were
included in the group.
In the case of restricted workday incident rates, the
difference between the companies that implemented an
SIP after a particular year and the rest of the companies in
the sample did not show any statistically significant
difference above the 95% confidence level, even after
adding more companies with older SIPs in the group.
However, the difference in the mean 2001 restricted
workday incident rates become noticeably different for
858
Gangwar and Goodrum
Table 5
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
Year
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
Restricted workday incident rates
Age of
2001 restricted workday
program in
incident rate for
years
companies that had
implemented SIP after
row’s year
Fewer than 1
Fewer than 2
Fewer than 3
Fewer than 4
Fewer than 5
Fewer than 6
Fewer than 7
Fewer than 8
Fewer than 9
Fewer than 10
2001 restricted
workday incident rate
for rest of the sample
companies
Mean
N
Mean
N
0.85
0.85
1.02
0.97
0.90
0.88
0.93
0.95
1.20
1.42
9
16
30
34
41
42
45
49
53
63
1.86
1.93
2.03
2.09
2.21
2.24
2.26
2.32
2.21
2.16
119
112
98
94
87
86
83
79
75
65
Difference
df
F-value
Sig.
1.02
1.08
1.01
1.11
1.32
1.36
1.32
1.37
1.01
0.74
127
127
127
127
127
127
127
127
127
127
0.614
1.165
1.663
2.219
3.502
3.814
3.698
4.142
2.278
1.241
0.44
0.28
0.20
0.14
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.04
0.13
0.27
Note: Since number of companies that implemented an SIP in a particular year was few, companies that implemented an SIP after a particular
year were also included to calculate mean in the second column; for example, second column mean for 1998 denotes mean for all the companies
that implemented an SIP in 1998, 1999, and 2000.
1996 to 1993; the most significant change was recorded for
year 1993. The mean 2001 lost-time workday rate for
companies implementing an SIP after 1993 was 0.95
compared to 2.32 for the rest of the companies in the
sample with a 96% confidence level. In addition, the
differences in the mean 2001 restricted workday incidence
rates between the mentioned groups were also not
significant for 1992 and earlier. The finding again confirms
that SIPs take some time before showing effects on safety
performance indicators, and their effect on safety performance indicators diminishes over time (Table 5).
Conclusion
The findings suggest that safety incentive programs do
affect safety performances of companies, but these
effects change over time. The findings suggest that as
safety incentive programs grow older, companies’
accident rates increase over time as well. This confirms
what others have found in separate research efforts
using different methods of investigation (Guastello,
1993; Smith, 1997).
The findings also suggest that incentives can take a
few years before they have an impact on a company’s
OSHA recordable, lost-time workday, and restricted
workday cases. Among the sampled construction firms,
this time period was 3–4 years. However, the positive
impact was not permanent and diminished with time.
These findings adequately satisfy the study’s first
objective in terms of identifying if the effectiveness of
safety incentive programs changes over time. In terms
of the study’s second objective of identifying whether
the long-term effectiveness of safety incentive programs
vary with different performance measures, this study
found no significant difference based on the study’s
three safety performance measures of recordable,
restricted, and lost-time accident rates. It is acknowledged that the paper examined only the dichotomous
occurrence of whether a company did or did not have a
safety incentive program. These results could be
different if the analysis differentiated between different
types of incentive programs and their effectiveness over
time. Although worthy of future research, this type of
detailed analysis was not possible with the sample size
of the given primary data source.
The exact reason for the increase in accident rates
over time even in the presence of a safety incentive
program remains uncertain and was not studied in the
research. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
incentives over time become less viewed as a motivation and more perceived as an entitlement.
Furthermore, this research supports what many safety
professionals have assumed regarding the long-term
effectiveness of safety incentive programs in construction but had yet never been quantified. It is clear from
these analyses that after a safety professional successfully introduces and implements a safety incentive
program within their company the challenge does not
end. The safety incentive program must be continuously reinvented within the company through new
award schemes and measures in order to maintain the
interest and motivation of the workforce to improve
jobsite safety.
Safety incentive programs
Downloaded by [Indian School of Business] at 20:26 10 September 2013
References
BLS (US Bureau of Labor Statistics) (2003) Census of fatal
occupational injuries (CFOI)—current and revised data,
US Department of Labor, available from: http://
www.bls.gov/iif/oshcfoi1.htm#2003 (accessed 1 November
2004).
BLS (US Bureau of Labor Statistics) (2004) Data on injury/
illness rates, US Bureau of Labor Statistics, available
from: http://www.osha.gov/oshstats/work.html (accessed
24 November 2004).
Duff, A.R., Robertson, I.T., Cooper, M.D., Phillips, R. and
United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
(1993) Improving safety on construction sites by changing
personnel behavior, HSE Contract Research Report No.51/
1993.
Flanders, M.E. and Lawrence, T.W., Jr. (1999) Warning!!
Safety incentive programs under OSHA scrutiny.
Professional Safety, December, 29–31.
Geller, E.S. (1996a) The truth about safety incentives.
Professional Safety, October, 34–9.
Geller, E. (1996b) The Psychology of Safety: How to Improve
Behaviors and Attitudes on the Job, Chilton Book Company,
Radnor, PA.
Goetsch, D. (2003) Construction Safety and Health, Prentice
Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ.
Goodrum, P. and Gangwar, M. (2004) The effectiveness of
safety incentive programs in construction. Professional
Safety, July, 24–34.
Guastello, S. (1993) Do we really know how well our
occupational accident programs work? Safety Science, 16,
445–63.
Hinze, J. (2002) Safety incentives: do they reduce injuries?
Practice Periodical on Structural Design and Construction,
7(2), 81–4.
859
Krause, T.R. and Hodson, S.J. (1998) A close look at safety
incentives. Occupational Health & Safety, June, 28–30.
Krause, T.R. and McCorquodale, R.J. (1996) Transitioning
away. Professional Safety, March, 33–36.
Laitinen, H. and Ruohmaki, I. (1996) The effects of feedback
and goal setting on safety performance at two construction
sites. Safety Science, 24(1), 61–73.
Lund, J. and Aaro, L. (2004) Accident prevention: presentation of a model placing emphasis on human, structural, and
cultural factors. Safety Science, 42, 271–324.
McDonald, N. and Hrymak (2002) Safety Behavior in the
Construction Sector, The Occupational Health and Safety
Institute of Ireland (OSHII), Dublin, Ireland.
Opfer, N.D. (1998) Construction safety improvement
through incentive compensation. 1998 AACE International
Transactions, Cincinnati, OH, PROD.01.1-PROD.01.4.
Prichard, R. (2001) Safety incentive programs: a critical
assessment, International Risk Management Institute,
available
from:
http://www.IRMI.com/expert/articles/
prichard005.asp (accessed 27 October 2004).
Robertson, I.T., Duff, A.R., Marsh, T.W., Phillips, R.A.,
Weyman, A.K., Cooper, M.D. and United Kingdom
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) (1999) Improving
safety on construction sites by changing personnel behaviour: phase 2, HSE Contract Research Report No. 229/
1999, London.
Smith, T.A. (1997) What’s wrong with safety incentives?
Professional Safety, May, 44.
Williamson, A., Feyer, A., Cairns, D. and Biancotti, D.
(1997) The development of a measure of safety climate: the
role of safety perceptions and attitudes. Safety Science,
25(1–3), 15–27.
Woodcock, K. and Smiley, A. (1998) Organizational pressures and accident investigation Proceedings of the Human
Factors Association of Canada Annual Conference,
Mississauga, ON.