Democratization Strategy in Africa: A Non-linear Approach
Abstract
Western development strategies in Africa commonly link economic and governance
reforms together. Policy recommendations are mostly drawn from the frameworks of marketbased, limited government capitalism and democratic representation. Critiques of the laissezfaire policies from the Washington Consensus strategy are well established and documented.1
However, there is not the same level of critical analysis from academics or practitioners of the
democratic reform agenda traditionally pushed by Western governments. This paper challenges
the linear democratic reform agenda used in Western development strategies, and argues that
establishing democratic foundations in Africa may best be achieved using a non-linear approach
via policies to encourage a strong developmental state.
Introduction
If democratization is perceived as the end goal of any state’s evolution, then development
strategies must take a flexible approach to the conditionalities of aid. Abstractly this seems to
be understood by all democratic countries; that it does not matter what path you take to
become a democracy, as long as the goal is democracy. Countries in the ‘democratic club’ view
each other’s democratic systems as relative equals, and prior government systems do not hold
a country hostage. Within the African development paradigm this understanding seems less
consistent. Over the past 30 years the developmental perspective of democratization in subSaharan Africa (SSA) has been more linear. The pathway starts with electoral, evolves to
constitutional and ends with consolidated (Liviga 2009). I argue that there must be a shift away
1
For a general overview of criticisms see The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global
Governance: Towards a New Global Governance edited by Narcís Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz, or The Shock
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism by Naomi Klein
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from the linear perspective to one based on the idea that a successful democratization pathway
depends on culture, context and the citizens/leaders. The difference in strategy can be summed
up as viewing democratization as a process of development, rather than a process to
development. Given the unique culture and context of many SSA countries I propose that a
strong development state serves as the most promising pathway to democratization. To
elaborate this argument, I will first explore the main terms of the paper which are
democratization, strong development state and trust vis-à-vis the state. I then explain how
these three elements interact in SSA, and what it means for democratization. I then transition
to test of my argument in three case studies from SSA, which have varying experiences of
development state policies and democracy. Lastly, I highlight potential weaknesses to my
argument, and how I sought to limit their influence.
What are we analyzing?
The seminal work by Thandika Mkandawire (2001) on developing states provides the most
encompassing definition of a strong development state. He notes there are four important
factors that must be present. The first, and perhaps most obvious factor is one of ideology. A
development state is committed to the mission of development via economic growth.
Mkandawire explains that the elites must establish an “ideological hegemony… [so that] key
actors in the nation adhere voluntarily.” Second, there must be a strong institutional structure.
A development state must have the capacity to, “implement economic policies sagaciously and
effectively.” Such capacity is determined by four factors—institutional, technical, administrative
and political. Third, the state must have autonomy. The state must be free from the “myopic”
social forces which will attempt to limit changes necessary for effective long-term economic
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policies. A strong state has the administrative capacity and the political ability to implement its
developmental agenda. Finally, a strong development state must have some social anchoring,
“that prevents it from using its autonomy in a predatory manner and enables it to gain
adhesion of key social actors.” A strong development state is often associated with
authoritarianism, so is generally not promoted by Western governments. There are two points
to this, first, this may be a symptom of the linear approach to democratization. For example,
there are a number of governments that were strict authoritarians, yet after developing
became democratic, like South Korea. The second point, is that there is nothing inherent in
either a strong development state or democracy that inhibits their coexistence, for example the
African country of Mauritius has successfully mixed both systems (Matlosa 2007). Since there is
no objective definition of democracy, it is very difficult to operationalize, but some are close to
measuring it.
The Democracy Index states that, “democracy can be seen as a set of practices and
principles that institutionalize and thus ultimately protect freedom” (Economist Intelligence
Unit 2014). The fundamental features include: a government based on majority rule and the
consent of the governed, the existence of free and fair elections, the protection of minorities
and respect for basic human rights. These fundamental features are expressed through
institutions that are based on certain democratic values: equality before the law, due process
and political pluralism. The power of these democratic features and institutions rests in the
general population and requires trust.
Trust is a vital element of both democracy and development, creating an interesting
dynamic. First, social trust can have a positive impact on a country’s economic growth, through
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macroeconomic and microeconomic outcomes (Rainer and Siedler 2009; Knack and Keefer
1997; Alesinaa and La Ferrara 2002; Slemrod and Katuščák 2005). Second, trust in the core
institutions of a political system impacts the dynamics between the general population and the
state. Trust, “matters for whether people become politically active, whether they favor policy
reforms, and whether they are willing to comply with binding decisions of policy makers”
(Rainer and Siedler 2009; Levi and Stoker 2000). U.S. political commentators call this ‘political
capital’, which when strong, enables greater policy discretion by a leader in any form of
government, but especially in democracies. So, trust can have significant impacts on both
development and democracy, but one must also ask, how can government actions influence
trust?
Recent developmental strategies focus on democratic reforms to build trust and legitimacy.
While there is evidence that democratic reforms can lead to institutional trust, the overall social
trust often remains unchanged, which minimizes the overall benefits to the economy (Rainer
and Siedler 2009). There is another problem with initially focusing on democratic reforms
because democratic reforms, especially when attempting to consolidate, are only possible if
voters trust that the political institutions do not abuse their privileged position of power
(Luhiste 2006). Since there must already be a basis of trust, either in the state or with a leader
before democratization, another strategy should be used to build institutional and societal
trust.
According to Lühiste, individual trust in institutions has two main variables: 1) cultural,
which is a measure of whether an individual trusts other people and 2) performance, which
measures how well an individual believes the economic and political systems functions.
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Significantly, individual perceptions of improving economic conditions lead to stronger trust in
political institutions. This is supported by Rainer and Siedler (2008), who found that only if the
population, or a sub-group, experiences personal economic success will social trust increase.
There is further evidence, however, that economic improvements don’t necessarily need to be
focused on the individual to increase institutional trust, as long as overall social economic
conditions are improved by falling inequality or a general rise in income (Luhiste 2006). These
findings support the non-linear approach to democratization, particularly if there is an initial
lack of trust in government institutions. Because democratization is contextual to each region
and culture it is important to analyze how this dynamic of trust applies to SSA.
Trust, the development state and democracy in SSA
Unfortunately, the history of many countries in SSA caused a deep mistrust/pessimism of
state power. Government power was systematically abused to sell its citizens into slavery
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2010), discriminate against its colonial subjects (Ekeh 1975; Mamdani
1996), used as a tool for ethnic rivalries (Mamdani 1996), a symbol of corruption and selfenrichment (Van de Walle 2001), while also largely failing to provide basic services (Noman and
Stiglitz 2012). For example, the indirect rule of colonialism in Africa led to the existence of the
‘two publics’, a primordial and civic (Ekeh 1975). In the primordial public, morality plays a large
role and duty trumps gain. Whereas in the amoral civic public, gain trumps duty and bribery is
therefore tolerated under the false assumption of infinitely available wealth. This is a problem
for democratization and development because amorality erodes societal trust (Omotoso 2014).
Developmental strategies in SSA largely have ignored the need to rebuild trust through the
state, and at times have undermined the supreme authority of the state.
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International service NGOs, and the allocation of aid made restoring confidence in the state
difficult. Low capacity government agencies become overwhelmed by grant monies and
conditions, which reduced the quality of projects and distorted the focus away from the served
population to the central or foreign organizations (Craig and Porter 2002). The proliferation of
NGOs in the 1990s followed the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and
the role-back of the state (Matanga 2010). In this context, NGOs replaced the state as a service
provider. While this helped provide an alternative pathway for foreign aid away from bloated
and often inefficient government agencies, it created long-term effects on governments’ roles
as service providers. This impacted future democratization and development efforts as trust is
usually gained by the competent delivery of a service, which should be directed to the state
(OECD 2009). Also, aid disbursements earmarked for specific projects in an agency distorted
government capacity to serve target populations in the long-term (Batley 2005). Employees hop
from project to project and lose the capacity of a service provider. By undercutting the
centrality of the state in development strategies institutional trust was further distorted,
reducing the effectiveness of linear democratization strategies even more. Without initial trust
in indigenous institutions, effective democratic reform is difficult, so what is the best way to
increase trust in government, considering the situational shortcomings of many SSA states?
The best option is trust built on prosperity and economic growth. The developmental state
is the most logical path for quick development. The single-minded focus on development, if
socially embedded, can lead to effective government institutions and most importantly societal
and institutional trust. The trust gained supports the success of democratic reforms, and places
less pressure on individual leaders as catalysts for successful change. There is potential for a
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strong developmental state and democratization to fit together, especially in SSA, as there is
precedent for democratic development states.
Case studies
I will present three different case studies from SSA. Each will illustrate how the interplay
between state ideology, development and democratization plays out through trust. First, I will
show how Botswana successfully used a development ideology and policy implementation to
develop trust and a foundation of democratic institutions. Second, I will use a quick overview of
Tanzania as a case where a state has partially built up required trust through developmental
ideology, and has made some progress toward democratization. Last, I will focus on Zimbabwe
as a state that failed to implement a development ideology and effective policy
implementation, which led to both development problems and state structural problems
(“failed/weak state”).
Botswana gained independence in 1966, with a lot of barriers to democratic and
developmental success. The country was surrounded by hostile, minority controlled
governments, only the 500-foot boarder with Zambia connected Botswana to independent
African states. The economy was among the poorest in world, physical and institutional
infrastructure was completely underdeveloped, only 100 km of roads existed in the country and
strikingly even the capital was not in Botswana’s boundary, but in Mafeking, South Africa until
1965 (Good and Taylor 2008). Politically, Botswana was, “dominated by hereditary chiefs who
controlled patronage and acted as intermediaries with the British, whilst consolidating their
cattle holdings and enriching themselves at the expense of the rural peasantry” (Good and
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Taylor 2008). Only when the prominent Chief Tshekedi Khama died while forming the new
constitution did the opportunity for a minimalist democracy ever take hold.
At independence, Prime Minister Seretse Khama began the task of consolidation of the
county’s electoral democracy with the goal of, “constructing an interventionist state to
facilitate development, and hence the accumulation of capital” (Good and Taylor 2008). Khama
created democratic bodies (parliament, land boards, town and district councils, village
development committees, etc.) and integrated traditional chiefs as members of the institutions,
but maintained authority over them.
“The [members of the ruling party] were thus able to implement policies with both
legitimacy and a lack of opposition able to overturn decisions: ‘the strength and
cohesion of the ruling party in the National Assembly . . . made it possible for those in
power to implement their market-oriented development strategy rather undiluted’. This
helped facilitate the transition to democracy and its consolidation.” [original emphasis]
(Good and Taylor 2008)
Since independence there is a sustained marriage between bureaucracy and the ruling party,
typical of development states. For example, the former President Festus Mogae held positions
as Planning Officer, Director of Economic Affairs, Alternate Governor for Botswana at the IMF,
Governor of the Bank of Botswana, Permanent Secretary to the President, Secretary to the
Cabinet, Minister of Finance and Development Planning and finally vice-president in 1992,
before taking over the presidential reins in 1998. The diversity of experience for one person in,
“contrast with the rest of Africa is quite stark…[and] very rare” (Good and Taylor 2008).
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Botswana experienced growing income distribution in the 1980’s and in 1989 encouraged
electoral competition to keep legitimacy, which saw opposition parties win 35 percent of the
vote, while the dominant Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) got 65 percent (Good and Taylor
2008). By focusing on economic development, “revenues were utilized for infrastructural
development both physical and human…[and] no significant foreign debt was acquired in the
process” (Good and Taylor 2008). This came at a cost of poor economic diversification and a
small middle class (which is usually based on manufacturing). Democratization is a “complex,
fraught, and long process,” for greater equality. It starts with the establishment of economic
development and a capital class/bourgeoisie (Good and Taylor 2008). While Botswana is not a
perfect democracy by Western standards it consistently outperforms most African countries on
measures of democracy and freedom (Freedom House 2015; Economist Intelligence Unit 2014).
The current democratic situation in Botswana seems less remarkable today (with South
Africa and Namibia’s democracies), and critics point out weaknesses in its government
structure (lack of horizontal political accountability and economic diversification), yet over the
past 50 years it has been able to do what most African countries still struggle with, successfully
mixing democracy, growth and stability. However, within the historical perspective when
Botswana became independent 50 years ago, the country was presented with many more
barriers to democracy than African countries now face. Botswana was able to develop and
sustain a functioning electoral democracy through a top-down development structure of
government which focused on economic growth.
Tanzania is a case study which reflects the influence of a more limited set of developmental
policies that led to enough trust to successfully begin transition to a democracy. The mainland,
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Tanganyika, gained independence in 1961 and formed a union with Zanzibar in 1964 to
establish what is now Tanzania. The government was authoritarian, under Julius Nyerere until
1990’s. Through the 1970’s Nyerere focused on development policies which consolidated
government power and laid a foundation of ideological trust.2 “From 1965 to 1990 the
Tanzanian political system became statist as the government tried [and indeed succeeded] to
mobilize people through centralization and domination of political authority. The leadership did
not use ethnicity, religion or class to bolster its power” (Liviga 2009). There was no significant
fractionalization of the population, actually, and rather ironically, the main barrier to further
democratization is the cohesion in policy ideas. The high level of trust in the government
allowed Tanzania to successfully transition to a more democratic government in 1992, and is
revealed in the continued power of the main political party, CCM, through democratic elections
(Gray and Khan 2010).3 There is more work to be done regarding democratization in Tanzania,
but the ability of the strong development state to build a cohesive socio-political framework
has laid a foundation for the transition from authoritarian to electoral democracy and to a
flawed constitutional democracy (Liviga 2009).
Lastly, the case of Zimbabwe. After independence the state pursued developmental
policies, but never became an effective developmental state. Some argue it was not a
developmental state (Maundeni 2002) while others have classified it as a quasi/weak
development state (Parsons 2002). Either way, the economy was managed through strict
control over agriculture outputs and input support (Chattopadhyay 2000). But poor
2
3
Admittedly, this was not only because of state policy, but because of the popularity of Nyerere
Part of the reason is due to poor financing of opposition parties, but it cannot count for the whole situation
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diversification (and poor development policies in general) led to high debts. Zimbabwe applied
for a SAP which led to restructuring and drew back the few semi-effective development
controls that existed (Chattopadhyay 2000). This unsurprisingly caused a further hollowing out
of revenue streams and an increased collapse of government capacity. As a result, the
weakened government had little control over the economy and did not have the capacity or
trust to ‘right the ship’ during the hyperinflation crisis of the 2000’s (Jacobsena 2010). There is
also another element to the Zimbabwe case that links its weak developmental government to
cultural history. Because Zimbabwe and Botswana share a similar cultural identity this
perspective will offer a good opportunity to further compare the two states.
The historical culture of the Tswana states (Botswana, South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe,
Zambia) deeply combined religious leaders with economic/political issues – essentially the state
and religion were the same (Maundeni 2002). “There was a very close connection between
religion and the economy: religious leaders, of whatever particular cult, were expected to be
able to use their connections with the high-god and senior mhondoro spirits to produce rainfall
and to avert shangwa, disaster” (Beach 1979). The adoption of the modern state onto such a
system, as occurred in Zimbabwe but not Botswana, worked against the state’s central
authority in the creation of wealth. Successes in the economy were attributed to the religion
rather than the state. The adoption of Christianity did not change the underlying features of
this system, it just replaced the indigenous religion with a different belief system (Maundeni
2002). Similarly colonialism did not drastically alter the fundamentals as it kept the system
intact for use in administration of indirect rule (Mamdani 1996).
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As already mentioned in Botswana, the post-colonialism government instituted a top down
approach. They created new government institutions, but placed chiefs into chairmanship
positions to incorporate the traditional with the modern. However, the chiefs’ power was
greatly limited. Displacing the chiefs from central government moved economic and political
drivers to the modern state – establishing the state as the final authority and defining where
trust should lay. In contrast, Zimbabwe’s ZANU organization from the beginning, incorporated
the indigenous culture, recruited Shona priests into important potions, and borrowed religious
symbolism (Maundeni 2002). The increased power of Shona culture limited Zimbabwean
nationalist leaders’ ability to consolidate power and make executive decisions. The fractious
leadership resulted in a fractious organization and power, and most importantly divided trust
away from the central government. This helped defeat white rule in the short-term, but in the
long-term, it could not create a developmentally mobilized political movement (Maundeni
2002).
The dynamics of this had a downward cyclical effect. The weak developmental state was
unable to sustain economic growth, which reduced social trust and further hurt the economy.
To improve trust Zimbabwe could have instituted democratic reforms, like Botswana and
Tanzania did in the late 80’s early 90’s, however, the poor institutional trust in Zimbabwe
limited the potential for reforms. Without public trust/support power the next option is to
capitalize on natural power asymmetries between the state and sub-groups resulting in a
strong shift to autocracy. Without a strong development state in Zimbabwe to build support
and trust through economic growth the government became more autocratic to keep in power.
Limitations & Weaknesses
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With any developmental argument there will be some limitations and critiques. First, I base
my argument on both deductive and inductive explanations. While there is deductive validity,
one could argue that inductively each situation is different and cannot be compared. I tried to
minimize the inherent shortcomings of any case study approach by choosing only regionally
close countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Additionally, the most illustrative cases of Zimbabwe and
Botswana share a similar pre-colonial culture, which endured through colonialism.
Leadership differences is another variable. It has been identified as a very important
variable, especially when ideological consolidation is attempted (Kim 1996). However, for
obvious reasons of human individuality, leadership differences are hard to control. In an
attempt to limit the influences of leaders in the three examples after independence all
experienced long-standing leaders with powerful personalities and prominent cultural ties.
Conclusion
If democracy is the end goal, trust and stability are needed. A strong state must be central
to any strategy backed up by the trust of citizens. Given the history & role of government in
SSA, it is evident that trust was weak. Democracy that is built on a shaky foundation of trust is
prone to failure. Since strong democratic reforms need trust as prerequisite, trust initially must
be built through another pathway. A strong developmental state can build trust through
economic growth and distribution, which helps the transition to a stable, consolidated
democracy. This was the pathway of South Korea, but there is already precedent in Africa for
democratic developmental states with Botswana. Strong democratic foundations can be
achieved through economic growth and social/institutional trust, which will enable a
sustainable transition to a strong democracy.
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