ESRC Research Seminar Series
New Approaches to WMD Proliferation
King’s College London
27 February 2006
Abstracts
1. James Acton (VERTIC) “IAEA verification of military research and development”
2. Caroline Baker (Salford) “The continuing importance of the security determinant in
nuclear weapons proliferation”
3. Carole Boudeau (Brunel) “Determining intentions: Intelligence assessments on Iraq's
nuclear weapon programme”
4. Tiphaine de Champchesnel (CESIM) “Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et
de Maîtrise des Armements”
5. Claire Darbyshire (Salford) “Secrecy and biodefense – uneasy bedfellows; the
implications for the norm of non-proliferation”
6. Samuel Evans (Oxford) "Defining dual-use: The governance of the international
distribution of technologies"
7. Nick Green (Royal Society) “Royal Society's work on the scientific aspects of
international security”
8. Brian Jamison (Southampton) “Scotland, Trident and its replacement: Same old song
and dance?”
9. Ursula Jasper (St Gallen) “Reconciling arms control and international relations
theories”
10. Catherine Jefferson (Sussex) “The chemical and biological weapons taboo:
Psychological perspectives”
11. Masamichi Minehata (Bradford) “Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention: The contribution of Asian countries”
12. Jenny Nielsen (Southampton) “An assessment of proposals to address the lack of
universality of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)”
13. Harsh Pant (King’s) “The Indo-US nuclear deal and its implications for the nonproliferation regime”
14. Matthew Rendall (Nottingham) “Nuclear weapons and intergenerational exploitation”
15. Patricia Shamai (Southampton) “Exploring the concepts behind the definition
‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’”
16. Katie Smallwood (Sussex) “New science & technology - A threat to chemical
disarmament?”
17. David Willcox (Kent) “Human experimentation and the British development of CBW
during the Cold War: An overview of a historical research project”
1. James Acton (VERTIC)
“IAEA verification of military research and development”
A State intent on developing a nuclear device needs to do more than just acquire a sufficient
quantity of fissile material. It must also undertake an extensive research and development
program to weaponize that material. The current nuclear safeguards system is based on the
accountancy and control of declared nuclear materials. In addition, the Agency’s capability to
detect undeclared nuclear materials production has been enhanced in the last few years by
the adoption and implementation of Additional Protocols by a growing number of states.
This VERTIC study assesses the Agency’s options for the detection of clandestine
weaponization activities. The study will review the IAEA’s present authority under its statute
and relevant safeguards agreements. It will thereafter try to ascertain what changes, if any, of
the organization’s mandate and structure are needed to enable the IAEA to consider,
investigate and draw conclusions on the existence of an illicit nuclear weapons program.
2. Caroline Baker (Salford)
“The continuing importance of the security determinant in nuclear
weapons proliferation”
In the literature regarding nuclear weapons proliferation during the Cold War, security is
considered to be one of the most prominent determinants of states’ decisions to acquire and
retain nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War many scholars and policy makers
expected that the importance states placed on nuclear weapons would decrease, with some
actually believing that full and complete disarmament could be achieved. This paper briefly
outlines some of the ways in which reliance on nuclear weapons for security has actually
increased in the post-Cold War world, reflecting a possible resurgence of realist thinking in
regards to nuclear weapons proliferation today and in the future.
3. Carole Boudeau (Brunel)
“Determining intentions: Intelligence assessments on Iraq's nuclear
weapon programme”
This presentation aims to share some preliminary thoughts on the problem of the detection of
intentions to engage in WMD-related activities. It takes the case of pre-war intelligence
assessments on Iraq's WMD as its starting point, especially the debate surrounding the
purpose of the aluminium tubes that the Iraqi regime sought to acquire (i.e. were they
designed for conventional weapons or for nuclear centrifuges?). The proposition is that, in
these intelligence assessments, the regime's intention to acquire nuclear weapons was
evidenced in and through the settlement of the debate on the purpose of these ambiguous
technologies.
4. Tiphaine de Champchesnel (CESIM)
“Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des
Armements”
Overview of the “Centre d'Etudes de Sécurité Internationale et de Maîtrise des Armements”
(Centre for the Study of International Security and Arms Control) in Paris.
5. Claire Darbyshire (Salford)
“Secrecy and biodefense – uneasy bedfellows; the implications for the
norm of non-proliferation”
Following the United States’ rejection of the 2001 draft protocol and the revelations of their
secret biodefense research programs in the same year, fears have been raised over the
implications of this apparent move from openness to secrecy within the United States. These
fears have been compounded by the closeness of these projects to the limits of what is
permissible under the BTWC. The focus of this research will be to examine this move from
openness to secrecy in relation to the implications it may have on the non-proliferation regime
and the norm of non-proliferation.
6. Samuel Evans (Oxford)
"Defining dual-use: The governance of the international distribution of
technologies"
In international trade, technologies are controlled differently depending on whether they are
seen as being militarily significant. If they are not militarily significant, they are freely traded
subject only to WTO regulations. If they are militarily significant, great effort is made on the
part of states to control the spread of the technologies. There is a middle ground, however,
were technologies are seen as having significant military as well as civilian uses. These ‘dualuse’ technologies are an ideal area to see how social processes interact with, define, and are
defined by technologies. This thesis explores the way dual-use technologies gain and lose
their label by an in-depth study of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a multilateral export control
regime. Currently, Sam's research is in a preliminary stage, and his presentation will outline
his research objectives and explain why his focus on the Wassenaar Arrangement - which
specifically does not deal with WMD - is important to this seminar series.
7. Nick Green (Royal Society)
“Royal Society's work on the scientific aspects of international security”
The Royal Society has a long standing interest in the scientific aspects of international
security. The presentation will give an overview of the Society's work to date in this area and
look forward to issues that the Society could address in the future. The Society established a
standing committee of its Council in 1988 dedicated to this area called the Scientific Aspects
of International Security (SAIS). SAIS reassessed its remit in late 2005 and agreed the
following: 'SAIS will consider the scientific and technical aspects of international security such
as arms control, non-proliferation, countering terrorism and reducing the risk of the misuse of
scientific research. Its principal roles are to prioritise issues in this area that the Society can
act on; proactively and reactively undertake studies, prepare advice and report to Council;
maintain contact with scientists nationally and internationally; and provide briefings for
Fellows.'
8. Brian Jamison (Southampton)
Scotland, Trident and its replacement: same old song and dance?
In the shadow of the war in Iraq, a conflict publicised by US and UK governments as the
necessary antidote to Saddam Hussein's secret WMD programmes, the Blair government will
announce its own intentions for the British nuclear deterrent -Trident. Arguably, the situation
for Labour could not be better. In the post 9/11 and 7/7 world the looming threat of terrorism,
complimented by the intentions of 'rogue states' such as Iran or North Korea, will continue to
be highlighted throughout the UK in order to foster enthusiastic support for Trident's
successor.
What this system will entail has yet to be revealed, but, as argued by the Thatcher
government in the early 1980s, Scotland's reward for its continued support might include an
economic upturn, sustained employment and improved security. Politicians will argue that
Scotland's families will be well fed and, more importantly, protected from dangerous radicals
and or governments. Dating back to the earliest days of the Cold War this particular message
proved to be an effective mantra - its track record is impressive. Yet with the USSR now long
defunct will Scotland buy into this form of hype again?
With Rosyth Dockyard in Fife stripped of submarine refitting operations in 1993 and the British
electorate instructed to keep open a watchful eye for terrorist activities, we might ask what the
Scottish Parliament has done to bolster job security at Trident's shore establishments or to
assist the MoD in protecting Coulport and Faslane from the cult of the suicide bomber. It
appears that peace activists have exposed inadvertently the vulnerabilities of shore
establishments and submarines to acts of terrorism, showing that entry into Trident's shore
facilities and various waterways remains all too accessible. In the midst of the Cold War the
billions spent on nuclear deterrence can be justified, but, remembering Rosyth's experience,
will the west of Scotland continue to retain Trident, and the 3,300 civilian jobs it supports, in
an age where the strategic importance of Europe has taken a back seat to the Middle East?
If Iraq, Iran and North Korea are the latest security threats, and the West is fighting a war
against terrorism that could take generations, civilian employees might want to consider
whether the Royal Navy would prefer to operate the national deterrent from the south of
England rather than the west of Scotland.
In the run up to the Trident replacement decision Scotland's complex relationship with the
national deterrent will be, in all likelihood, dumbed down - reduced into neatly packaged
sound bites for easy digestion by the whole of the Scottish electorate. The question is, will
Scots again accept the modest short-term rewards associated with Britain's nuclear deterrent
or has the war against Iraq, and its imaginary WMD programmes, somehow served to
enlighten the public?
9. Ursula Jasper (St Gallen)
“Reconciling arms control and international relations theories”
In recent years, prevailing arms control efforts and policies seem to lack a thorough
embedding into the realm of international relations theories. Instead, they are based on adhoc tactics to counter what we perceive to be a dangerous proliferation of WMD. However,
without examining the underlying causes of arms acquisition, security perceptions, and
national security policies, arms control efforts will remain somewhat arbitrary and haphazard.
Due to this shortcoming, a comprehensive approach towards arms control and disarmament
can hardly receive the attention it deserves. Therefore, there seems to be a need for
academic research into the potential theoretical underpinnings of arms control. The goal of
this study will be to reconcile arms control / disarmament strategies with IR theories and
security studies in the hope of increasing the comprehensibility and applicability of arms
control.
10. Catherine Jefferson (Sussex)
The chemical and biological weapons taboo: Psychological perspectives
It has been suggested that the use of poisoned weapons offends a deep-rooted, historically
prevalent and cross-cultural taboo (Cole, 1997; Cole, 1998; Robinson, 1990; Robinson, 1993;
Price, 1995; Price, 1997; Mandelbaum, 1981, Tucker, 2006). Yet, while there is general
agreement about the importance of this taboo, there has been less agreement about its
nature and origins. Some commentators have suggested that it may have a genetic or
biological basis. Consistent with evolutionary biology (and with other taboos such as incest,
homicide and cannibalism), it is suggested that aversion to poisonous substances has
advantages for survival (Cole, 1998; Mandelbaum, 1981). Psychological research in the field
of disgust and contamination sensitivity provides some illuminating evidence to strengthen
this suggestion and findings from this field will be discussed in this presentation. Some of the
limitations of this explanation will also be examined, and the problems of assessing the
robustness of the taboo against CBW will also be touched upon.
Selected bibliography
Burris, C. T. & Rempel, J. K. (2004), ‘“It’s the End of the World as We Know It”: Threat and
the Spatial–Symbolic Self,’ in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 86, No. 1,
19–42
Cole, L. A. (1997) The Eleventh Plague: The Politics of Biological and Chemical Warfare
(New York: W. H. Freeman Co.)
Cole, L. A. (1998), ‘The Poison Weapons Taboo: Biology, Culture, and Policy,’ in Politics and
the Life Sciences, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 119-135
Curtis, V.A. & Biran, A. (2001), ‘Dirt, disgust and disease: is hygiene in our genes?’ in
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine. 44 (1): 17-31
Haidt, J., Rozin, P., McCauley, C., & Imada, S. (1997), ‘Body, Psyche, and Culture: The
relationship between disgust and morality,’ in Psychology and Developing Societies, Vol. 9,
pp. 107–131.
Mandelbaum, M. (1981) The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after
Hiroshima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), Ch. 2
Matchett, G. & Davey, G. C. (1991), ‘A test of a disease-avoidance model of animal phobias,’
in Behaviour Research & Therapy, Vol. 29, pp. 91-4
Price, R. (1995), ‘A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo,’ International Organisation,
Vol. 49 no. 1, pp. 73-103
Price, R. (1997) The Chemical Weapons Taboo (New York: Cornell University Press)
Robinson, J. P. (1990), ‘Banning Chemical Weapons,’ in Proceedings of the Fortieth
Pugwash Conference in Science and World Affairs: towards a secure world in the twenty-first
century (London: Pugwash)
Robinson, J. P. (1993), ‘Origins of the Chemical Weapons Convention,’ in Morel & Olson
(eds.) Shadows and Substance: CWC (Oxford: Westview Press)
Rozin, P., Nemeroff, C., Horowitz, M., Gordon, B., & Voet, W. (1995), ‘The borders of the self:
Contamination sensitivity and potency of the mouth, other apertures and body parts,’ in
Journal of Research in Personality, Vol. 29, pp. 318–340.
Rozin, P., Haidt, J., & McCauley, C. R. (1993), ‘Disgust,’ in M. Lewis and J. Haviland (Eds.),
Handbook of Emotions, pp. 575-594. (New York: Guilford)
Sims, N. A. (1987), ‘Morality and Biological Warfare,’ in Arms Control, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 5-23
Tucker, J. B. (2006) War of Nerves: Chemical Warfare From World War I to Al-Qaeda
(Pantheon)
Zanders, J. P. (1996) Dynamics of Chemical Armament: Towards a Theory of Proliferation
(Thesis submitted in fulfilment of Ph.D in Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel)
11. Masamichi Minehata (Bradford)
“Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: The
contribution of Asian countries”
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) has been in an urgent crisis since the
fate of the Protocol negotiations in 2001 and the failure to adopt the Final Declaration at the
Fifth Review Conference in 2002. In the run up to its Sixth Review Conference in 2006, the
objective of the dissertation is to explore the possible contribution of the Asian countries
(China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, and Pakistan) whose engagement to the Convention
has not been clear enough with a view to strengthening the Convention.
The prime question is whether there is any space in which the Asian countries can have
impact on the negotiation process of the Convention or not. If the possibility of the contribution
by the Asian countries exists, to what extent could it be feasible?
To answer this question, the dissertation tries to achieve a full review of the evolution of the
Convention through negotiations on the provisions of the Articles of the Convention, the
Protocol negotiation by the Ad Hoc Group (AHG), and discussions on specific topics at the
Inter-Review Conference meetings. In the context of the AHG and Inter-Review Conference
meetings, the particular engagements by the Asian countries are examined in both quantity
and quality perspectives by making use of official documents of the Convention in relevance
since 1972 including working papers, statements, and final documents in each session.
12. Jenny Nielsen (Southampton)
“An assessment of proposals to address the lack of universality of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)”
The lack of universality of the NPT continues to be a deficit for the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, particularly as the three non-NPT signatories possess nuclear weapons. Adopting the
assumption that the NPT should remain the legal and normative core of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the presentation will provide an assessment of various proposals of how
to engage the 3 non-NPT vis-à-vis non-proliferation objectives.
13. Harsh Pant (King’s)
“The Indo-US nuclear deal and Its implications for the non-proliferation
regime”
During the visit of the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, to the US in July 2005, the
world’s oldest and the world’s largest democracies decided to turn a new leaf in their rather
topsy-turvy bilateral relationship. The Bush Administration declared its ambition to achieve full
civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it realizes it goals of promoting nuclear power
and achieving nuclear security. In pursuit of this objective, the Bush Administration would
“seek agreement from the US Congress to adjust US laws and policies, and would “work with
friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation
and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for
safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.” India, on its part, promised “to assume the same
responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages of other leading
countries with advances nuclear technology.” The Indo-US nuclear pact virtually rewrote the
rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India’s credentials as responsible nuclear
state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order. The nuclear agreement creates a
major exception to the US prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that doesn’t accept
international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. This has some major implications for the
nuclear non-proliferation regime which many see as failing to cope with new challenges to the
global nuclear order. Will the new US-India nuclear deal define the new framework for
thinking about the emerging nuclear realities?
14. Matthew Rendall (Nottingham)
“Nuclear weapons and intergenerational exploitation”
Nuclear weapons are a Faustian bargain, but one in which we send our descendants to hell. If
Kenneth Waltz and his followers are right, nukes reduce the risk of war while raising its costs,
and buy you and me, if we live in nuclear states, a better chance of dying in bed. Still,
deterrence is bound to break down sooner or later, leaving future people to pick up the
pieces. Every post-holocaust generation will lose from this devil's bargain.
This article builds a bridge between the nuclear optimism-pessimism debate and the political
theory literature on intergenerational justice. Most critiques of nuclear optimism have sought
to show that war is more likely than the optimists say. Here I grant their claims, and show that
they lead to morally rotten consequences. Nuclear deterrence may be less stable than Waltz
and his disciples let on, in which case it is a mug’s game. But if it does work, then it is
exploitative. As when we guzzle gas or run up debt, we benefit at future generations’
expense.
States that do not already have the bomb should not acquire it. States that are already
nuclear should slash their arsenals, and Britain and France should scrap them. If nuclear
weapons are as effective as their defenders claim, deterrence should work with far smaller
numbers of them. But even if minimum deterrence does raise the risk of war, given a choice
between a greater risk of war and limited damage, and a lower risk of war and unlimited
damage, neo-realists should prefer the former, because it assures survival and reduces
exploitation of future generations.
Liberals and constructivists may argue that a premature attempt at minimum deterrence could
short-circuit long-term pacifying processes such as the spread of democracy. But if Russia
and the United States invoke this as grounds for retaining large arsenals, they are morally
obligated to do much more to promote such progress.
15. Patricia Shamai (Southampton)
“Exploring the concepts behind the definition ‘Weapons of Mass
Destruction’”
Essentially the thesis will analyse critically the conceptual discussions and historical context
within which the definition has emerged. So far, I have identified three distinct factors, which,
acting together have acted as catalysts for change. These are political, technological and
normative factors. The thesis examines the impact of these factors from the historical
beginnings of debate (the Conferences of the Hague) through to the 1948 definition (UN
Commission for Conventional Armaments) and in doing so, I am attempting to unravel how
and why weapons of mass destruction are categorically distinct from other weapons. Finally,
in answering these questions, I then hope to place these findings within the context of modern
debate and to question once more the conceptualisation of WMD.
16. Katie Smallwood (Sussex)
“New science & technology - A threat to chemical disarmament?”
This presentation will introduce aspects of the doctoral research I plan to carry out during the
next three years. The main focus of the research will be an exploration of whether the threat
to chemical arms control has changed - or will change - with new chemical technologies used
in the pharmaceutical industry, particularly in research and development (R&D). It will be
based on an identification and analysis of these new advances; the extent to which they have
been incorporated into R&D; the drivers behind the adoption of new technologies by industry
and their potential for hostile exploitation. The talk will specifically address some of the
theoretical aspects of the work, such as how technological advance may be perceived as a
threat to the chemical weapon regime.
17. David Willcox (Kent)
“Human experimentation and the British development of CBW during
the Cold War. An overview of a historical research project”
The death of Leading Aircraftsman Ronald Maddison on the 6th May 1953 has focused
attention on the use of human volunteers in the development of CBW and protection against
CBW. This paper outlines the current work being undertaken at the University of Kent, funded
by the Wellcome Trust, to examine the work at Porton Down and the role of the volunteers
who participated.